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743,005 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
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Schwartz 2013
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Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
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forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
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only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
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Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
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1nc
| null |
3
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
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Navy
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2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,006 |
Borders inevitable – they constitute being -
|
Prozorov 8 [Sergei, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 38-9]
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Prozorov 8 [Sergei, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 38-9]
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the argument that boundaries are onto- logical preconditions rather than merely ontic phenomena points to the impossibility not merely of dispensing with boundaries in practice, but also of transcending them in thought , it is only by a prior reification of the boundary that disavows its spectral parergonal ontology, and endows it with empirical presence that the discourse of denigration of boundaries becomes possible in the first place it does not follow from this that particular orders, bounded in historically specific ways, are in any way necessary. There can be no “natural” boundaries, just as it is impossible to legitimize the location of a boundary with reference to the limits of ethnic or political identity that it bounds, if only because this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that they delimit It is precisely this ontological stance that permits the ontic discernment of the diverse potentialities at the margin, Our critique of immanentist tendencies in politi- cal thought, which is necessarily a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must therefore not be equated with a shallow conser- vatism of the defense of the status quo or a nostalgia for the Westphalian nation-state. Just as Schmitt’s argument about the impossibility of the negation of the political did not entail for him the impossibility of the demise of the nation-state, we must not equate the ontological status of the borderline with the historical immutability of the modern embodiment of the boundary in the nation-state border. New forms of delimiting difference may well be invented, just as new forms of antagonism are certain to appear. boundaries are neither natural givens nor superficial social constructs, but rather markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world, its difference from itself that precludes its closure into self-immanence.
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that boundaries are onto- logical preconditions points to the impossibility of dispensing with boundaries in thought this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that they delimit, Our critique of immanentist tendencies which is a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must not be equated with a shallow conser- vatism of the defense of the status quo boundaries are markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world
|
What then becomes of boundaries in an anti-immanentist turn in polit- ical ontology? Should we simply reaffirm the ontological necessity of boundaries and their irreducible presence even in the immanentist designs for the unity of the world? Indeed, the argument that boundaries are onto- logical preconditions rather than merely ontic phenomena points to the impossibility not merely of dispensing with boundaries in practice, but also of transcending them in thought. As I have argued, it is only by a prior reification of the boundary that disavows its spectral parergonal ontology, and endows it with empirical presence that the discourse of denigration of boundaries becomes possible in the first place. A crucial distinction must be drawn, though, between the ontological function of boundaries and the empirical positivities of bounded entities. While the existence of some or other boundaries must be viewed as an ontological necessity, it does not follow from this that particular orders, bounded in historically specific ways, are in any way necessary. There can be no “natural” boundaries, just as it is impossible to legitimize the location of a boundary with reference to the limits of ethnic or political identity that it bounds, if only because this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that they delimit, i.e., to assert that a boundary is not a ground. It is precisely this ontological stance that permits the ontic discernment of the diverse potentialities at the margin, analyzed in this volume—the reaf- firmation of the parergonal status of the boundary necessarily focuses our attention on concrete practices of (re)constituting marginal entities as pos- itive effects of delimitation. In other words, anti-immanentist discourse must not merely displace the utopian pathos of overcoming boundaries in global, self-immanent unity, but also problematize and disturb the existence of such unities within the pluralistic international order. From this perspective, a critique of the state may well be derived from the critique of globalism rather than function as its opposite. Our critique of immanentist tendencies in politi- cal thought, which is necessarily a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must therefore not be equated with a shallow conser- vatism of the defense of the status quo or a nostalgia for the Westphalian nation-state. Just as Schmitt’s (1976, 2003) argument about the impossibility of the negation of the political did not entail for him the impossibility of the demise of the nation-state, we must not equate the ontological status of the borderline with the historical immutability of the modern embodiment of the boundary in the nation-state border. New forms of delimiting difference may well be invented, just as new forms of antagonism are certain to appear. Thus, boundaries are neither natural givens nor superficial social constructs, but rather markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world, its difference from itself that precludes its closure into self-immanence.
| 3,187 |
<h4>Borders inevitable – they constitute being - </h4><p><strong>Prozorov 8 [Sergei, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 38-9]</p><p></strong>What then becomes of boundaries in an anti-immanentist turn in polit- ical ontology? Should we simply reaffirm the ontological necessity of boundaries and their irreducible presence even in the immanentist designs for the unity of the world? Indeed, <u>the argument <mark>that boundaries are onto- logical preconditions</mark> rather than merely ontic phenomena <mark>points to the impossibility</mark> not merely <mark>of dispensing with boundaries</mark> in practice, but also of transcending them <mark>in thought</u></mark>. As I have argued<u>, it is only by a prior reification of the boundary that disavows its spectral parergonal ontology, and endows it with empirical presence that the discourse of denigration of boundaries becomes possible in the first place</u>. A crucial distinction must be drawn, though, between the ontological function of boundaries and the empirical positivities of bounded entities. While the existence of some or other boundaries must be viewed as an ontological necessity, <u>it does not follow from this that particular orders, bounded in historically specific ways, are in any way necessary. There can be no “natural” boundaries, just as it is impossible to legitimize the location of a boundary with reference to the limits of ethnic or political identity that it bounds, if only because <mark>this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that they delimit</u>,</mark> i.e., to assert that a boundary is not a ground. <u>It is precisely this ontological stance that permits the ontic discernment of the diverse potentialities at the margin,</u> analyzed in this volume—the reaf- firmation of the parergonal status of the boundary necessarily focuses our attention on concrete practices of (re)constituting marginal entities as pos- itive effects of delimitation. In other words, anti-immanentist discourse must not merely displace the utopian pathos of overcoming boundaries in global, self-immanent unity, but also problematize and disturb the existence of such unities within the pluralistic international order. From this perspective, a critique of the state may well be derived from the critique of globalism rather than function as its opposite. <u><mark>Our critique of immanentist tendencies</mark> in politi- cal thought, <mark>which is</mark> necessarily <mark>a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must</mark> therefore <mark>not be equated with a shallow conser- vatism of the defense of the status quo</mark> or a nostalgia for the Westphalian nation-state. Just as Schmitt’s</u> (1976, 2003) <u>argument about the impossibility of the negation of the political did not entail for him the impossibility of the demise of the nation-state, we must not equate the ontological status of the borderline with the historical immutability of the modern embodiment of the boundary in the nation-state border. New forms of delimiting difference may well be invented, just as new forms of antagonism are certain to appear. </u>Thus, <u><mark>boundaries are</mark> neither natural givens nor superficial social constructs, but rather <mark>markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world</mark>, its difference from itself that precludes its closure into self-immanence.</p></u>
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Neg vs Vermont lb
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1nc
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Case
| 313,095 | 3 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
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Hubervermont
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1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
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Kozak
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Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,007 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
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Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
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The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4><strong>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.<strong></mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,008 |
2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework
|
Nye, 86
|
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)
|
Imagine an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? ? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
|
an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons
|
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
| 2,258 |
<h4><strong>2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework </h4><p>Nye, 86<u></strong> (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)</p><p></u>The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 <u>Imagine </u>that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where <u><mark>an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants</mark> lined up against a wall.</u> When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle <u><mark>and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other</mark>.</u> Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. <u><mark>Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity</mark> by refusing to play his dirty game? The point</u> of the story <u>is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But <mark>at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden?</u></mark> Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? <u><mark>What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons</mark> from a terrorists' nuclear device?</u> At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others<u>? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences?</u> Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. <u><strong>Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 105,466 | 37 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,009 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,904 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,010 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,011 |
No impact - liberalism checked the excesses of the state after Westphalia –
|
Dean 4
|
Dean 4 (Mitchell, professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle, “Four Theses on the Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf) TYBG
|
It is not merely the succession or addition of the modern powers over life to the ancient right of death but their very combination within modern states that is of significance. How these powers are combined accounts for whether they are malign or benign. Foucault shows that the genocidal character of National Socialism did not simply arise from its extension of bio-power.16 Nazism was concerned with the total administration of the life, it articulated this with another set of features concerned with “the oneiric exaltation of a superior blood if we are to understand how the most dramatic forces of life and death were unleashed we have to understand how bio-power was articulated with elements of sovereignty and its symbolics it is not simply the development modern bio-power life that makes the Holocaust possible. It is the system of sovereign notions within the new bio-political discourses of eugenics that makes the unthinkable thinkable. The fact that all modern states must articulate elements of sovereignty with bio-politics also allows for a virtuous combination. The virtue of liberal and democratic forms of government is that they deploy two instruments to check the unfettered imperatives of bio-power, one drawn from political economy and the other from sovereignty itself.17 Liberalism seeks to review the imperative to govern too much by pointing to the quasinatural processes of the market Liberalism also invokes the freedom and rights of a new subject—the sovereign individual advanced liberal democracies are able to differentiate their bio-politics from that of modern totalitarian states
|
How powers are combined accounts for whether they are malign or benign it is not simply the development modern bio-power that makes the Holocaust possible. It is the system of sovereign notions The fact modern states must articulate sovereignty with bio-politics allows for a virtuous combination liberal government check bio-power Liberalism invokes the freedom and rights of the sovereign individual advanced liberal democracies are able to differentiate their bio-politics from that of totalitarian states
|
Second Thesis: It is not merely the succession or addition of the modern powers over life to the ancient right of death but their very combination within modern states that is of significance. How these powers are combined accounts for whether they are malign or benign. According to this view, it is not the moment that life became a political object in the eighteenth century that defined the disturbing features of modern states. Rather, the different ways in which bio-politics is combined with sovereign power decide their character. Certain passages from Foucaultʼs lectures and from the History of Sexuality can be interpreted in this way. In a passage from the latter, Foucault shows that the genocidal character of National Socialism did not simply arise from its extension of bio-power.16 Nazism was concerned with the total administration of the life, of the family, of marriage, procreation, education and with the intensification of disciplinary micro-powers. But it articulated this with another set of features concerned with “the oneiric exaltation of a superior blood,” of fatherland, and of the triumph of the race. In other words, if we are to understand how the most dramatic forces of life and death were unleashed in the twentieth century, we have to understand how bio-power was articulated with elements of sovereignty and its symbolics. Pace Bauman, it is not simply the development of instrumental rationality in the form of modern bio-power, or a bureaucratic power applied to life that makes the Holocaust possible. It is the system of linkages, re-codings and re-inscriptions of sovereign notions of fatherland, territory, and blood within the new bio-political discourses of eugenics and racial hygiene that makes the unthinkable thinkable. The fact that all modern states must articulate elements of sovereignty with bio-politics Contretemps 5, December 2004 21 also allows for a virtuous combination. The virtue of liberal and democratic forms of government is that they deploy two instruments to check the unfettered imperatives of bio-power, one drawn from political economy and the other from sovereignty itself.17 Liberalism seeks to review the imperative to govern too much by pointing to the quasinatural processes of the market or of the exchanges of commercial society that are external to government. To govern economically means to govern through economic and other social processes external to government and also to govern in an efficient, cost-effective way. Liberalism also invokes the freedom and rights of a new subject—the sovereign individual. By ʻgoverning through freedomʼ and in relation to freedom, advanced liberal democracies are able to differentiate their bio-politics from that of modern totalitarian states and older police states.
| 2,791 |
<h4>No impact - liberalism checked the excesses of the state after Westphalia – </h4><p><strong>Dean 4</strong> (Mitchell, professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle, “Four Theses on the Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf) TYBG</p><p>Second Thesis: <u>It is not merely the succession or addition of the modern powers over life to the ancient right of death but their very combination within modern states that is of significance. <mark>How</mark> these <mark>powers are combined accounts for whether they are malign or benign</mark>. </u>According to this view, it is not the moment that life became a political object in the eighteenth century that defined the disturbing features of modern states. Rather, the different ways in which bio-politics is combined with sovereign power decide their character. Certain passages from Foucaultʼs lectures and from the History of Sexuality can be interpreted in this way. In a passage from the latter, <u>Foucault shows that the genocidal character of National Socialism did not simply arise from its extension of bio-power.16 Nazism was concerned with the total administration of the life,</u> of the family, of marriage, procreation, education and with the intensification of disciplinary micro-powers. But <u>it articulated this with another set of features concerned with “the oneiric exaltation of a superior blood</u>,” of fatherland, and of the triumph of the race. In other words, <u>if we are to understand how the most dramatic forces of life and death were unleashed</u> in the twentieth century, <u>we have to understand how bio-power was articulated with elements of sovereignty and its symbolics</u>. Pace Bauman, <u><mark>it is not simply the development</u></mark> of instrumental rationality in the form of <u><mark>modern bio-power</u></mark>, or a bureaucratic power applied to <u>life <mark>that makes the Holocaust possible. It is the system of</u></mark> linkages, re-codings and re-inscriptions of <u><mark>sovereign notions</mark> </u>of fatherland, territory, and blood <u>within the new bio-political discourses of eugenics </u>and racial hygiene <u>that makes the unthinkable thinkable. <mark>The fact </mark>that all <mark>modern states must articulate </mark>elements of <mark>sovereignty with bio-politics</mark> </u>Contretemps 5, December 2004 21 <u>also <mark>allows for a virtuous combination</mark>. The virtue of <mark>liberal</mark> and democratic forms of <mark>government</mark> is that they deploy two instruments to <mark>check</mark> the unfettered imperatives of <mark>bio-power</mark>, one drawn from political economy and the other from sovereignty itself.17 Liberalism seeks to review the imperative to govern too much by pointing to the quasinatural processes of the market </u>or of the exchanges of commercial society that are external to government. To govern economically means to govern through economic and other social processes external to government and also to govern in an efficient, cost-effective way. <u><mark>Liberalism</mark> also <mark>invokes the freedom and rights of</mark> a new subject—<mark>the sovereign individual</u></mark>. By ʻgoverning through freedomʼ and in relation to freedom, <u><mark>advanced liberal democracies are able to differentiate their bio-politics from that of</mark> modern <mark>totalitarian states</mark> </u>and older police states.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
Case
| 428,794 | 24 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,012 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
|
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
|
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4><strong>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,013 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4><strong>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u>, if still controversial, <u>proposal</u> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <strong><mark>one revenue stream</strong> would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u>. <u>In</u> the context of drugs like <u>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></mark> all, or even many, <u><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs</strong> </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u>because of differing state tax rates, <strong>the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
cartels
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,014 |
Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight
|
Mataconis 9/27
|
Mataconis 9/27/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)
|
Holder’s resignation places the administration in a quandary If Republicans gain control of the Senate the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly the president would have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority it would pose problems for the administration the confirmation process would be brutal the president would get a new attorney general, but not someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the lame-duck It won’t be easy the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Republicans could try to run out the clock through procedural motions and holds there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year
|
most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the - lame-duck It won’t be easy. we’re talking about maybe four weeks the Senate will be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote , and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done Republicans could try to run out the clock there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination before the end of this year
|
As I noted yesterday, Holder’s resignation at this late date places the administration in something of a quandary. If Republicans gain control of the Senate in November, then the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly. At the very least, the president would likely have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, it would still pose political problems for the administration. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, the confirmation process would likely be brutal. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, the president would likely get a new attorney general, but it would most assuredly not be someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will attempt bring the nomination before the Senate during the upcoming post-election lame-duck session. It won’t be easy. Right now, the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate Republicans could do to stop the nomination, although they could try to to delay it or even run out the clock on the Senate’s session through procedural motions and the use of holds, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.
| 2,670 |
<h4><strong>Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight</h4><p>Mataconis 9/27</strong>/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)</p><p>As I noted yesterday, <u>Holder’s resignation</u> at this late date <u>places the administration in</u> something of <u>a quandary</u>. <u>If Republicans gain control of the Senate</u> in November, then <u>the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly</u>. At the very least, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority</u>, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, <u>it would</u> still <u>pose</u> political <u>problems for the administration</u>. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, <u>the confirmation process would </u>likely <u>be brutal</u>. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>get a new attorney general, but</u> it would most assuredly <u><strong>not</u></strong> be <u><strong>someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. </u></strong>It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that <u><mark>most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will</u></mark> attempt <u><mark>bring the nomination</u></mark> before the Senate <u><mark>during the</u></mark> upcoming post<mark>-</mark>election<mark> <u>lame-duck</u></mark> session. <u><strong><mark>It won’t be easy</u></strong>.</mark> Right now, <u>the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas.</u> In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most <u><mark>we’re talking about maybe four weeks </mark>in which <mark>the Senate will </mark>actually <mark>be in session</u>. <u>That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote </mark>in the Judiciary Committee<mark>, and send the nomination to the floor</u>, <u><strong>but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done</mark>.</u></strong> Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> could do to stop the nomination, although they <u><mark>could try to</u></mark> to delay it or even <u><strong><mark>run out the clock</u></strong></mark> on the Senate’s session <u>through procedural motions and</u> the use of <u>holds</u>, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, <u><mark>there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination </mark>through the Senate <mark>before the end of this year</u><strong></mark>, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,827 | 4 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,015 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,905 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,016 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
|
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
|
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,017 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4><strong>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system<strong>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,018 |
The aff’s call to fix a world gone astray is part of debate’s fixation on the suffering of the Other – this perspective is one of prescriptive colonialism that leads to endless violence
|
Nayar 12
|
Jayan Nayar 12, law prof at the University of Warwick, The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority, December 15, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10978-012-9115-8/fulltext.html
|
People suffer Whilst lip service is paid to ‘voices of suffering’ voices are absented of significance in objectification voices are retained as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention The politics of discoursing suffering is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport to offer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated its structural causation identified its alleviation interrogated suffering itself becomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’ the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other of imperial recognition response and intervention Thus rationalised solutions are offered to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering that is perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning suffering as global injustice becomes a problem of reformulating globalisation as cosmopolitanism In these examples suffering and its alleviation becomes rational work, and the technocratic bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory always with some justification close at hand Suffering as commodity remains the ever-present alibi for legitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. A corrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes the saviour We make a huge assumption that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed With this assumption we attempt to think our way out of betrayals to enable the realisation of Good promises the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on Perhaps to assuage our thoughts, so many questions are followed by so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity As if the failures thus far have been simply due to a lack of ingenuity of the ‘human race’! What if suffering persists not merely as the outcome of a failure of (humane) consciousness to be corrected by suffering-based ethical theorisations of human rights and global justice, but as the result of created, planned and effected imperialist design visions of the good life are defined not by attachments (to the suffering Other) but by a ‘disengaged imagination’ that seeks no utopian mission domination is justified in terms of better acquaintance with universal knowledge and better access to universal modes of acquiring knowledge’ Theorisations of hope that gaze upon suffering and that purport to contemplate, manage and solve suffering help create masks of hegemony for the brutal faces of domination.27
|
lip service is paid to voices of suffering’ voices are absented of significance voices are retained as theory’s launch-pads for intervention The politics of suffering is a politics of the theorist to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down suffering becomes secondary to the theorist the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other of imperial recognition rationalised solutions are offered The theorist becomes the technician to overcome suffering suffering alleviation becomes technocratic measuring of suffering becomes the practical implication of theory Suffering remains the ever-present alibi for interventions amidst disappointments A corrupt imperial, global order of social relations becomes the saviour to assuage our questions are followed by should’-assertions that crowd redesigns for Humanity suffering persists not as the outcome of a failure of (humane) consciousness but as the result of imperial design visions of good life are defined by a ‘disengaged imagination’ Theorisations of hope that gaze upon suffering and that purport to solve suffering masks brutal domination
|
People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data), nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name ‘suffering’. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of theory possesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to ‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition; voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport to offer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory, suffering itself becomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’—the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other—of imperial recognition, response and intervention.20 Thus rationalised solutions are offered to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering that is perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning. Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violation becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering as global injustice becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models’ (Young 2006); or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004) or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking suffering and its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to entrench further the Levinasian injunction to responsibility—for further endeavours of thinking-hope, to serve further the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, as depoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi for legitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. A corrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, with every call for the alleviation of suffering (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption—we, who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition—that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises in which we wish to believe. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question: what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How many more resources? What kind of political institutions? Perhaps to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, so many questions are followed by so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity—that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; should redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations; should enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible; should reform and democratise international institutions. The list, again, goes on, as do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009). Andrew Linklater’s contemplations on the prospects for ‘cosmopolitan obligations’ for ‘distant suffering’ is characteristic of the intellectual idealism of much theorisings of Humanity’s hopeful futures: the gulf between human societies may not be so difficult to bridge. … The obstacles to substantial progress have been well documented, and they will continue to shape the tracks along which globalization travels. But it is not beyond the ingenuity of the human race to rise above increasingly problematical particularistic moralities, and to create global arrangements that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obligations to reduce distant suffering. (Linklater 2007, p. 33) As if the failures thus far have been simply due to a lack of ingenuity of the ‘human race’! What if, instead, the world order of inflicted suffering (and ‘the gulf between human societies’), the order of global impoverishment and insecurities, persists not merely as the outcome of a failure of (humane) consciousness to be corrected by suffering-based ethical theorisations of human rights and global justice, but as the result of created, planned and effected imperialist design as it continuously seeks to reshape world orders for profit? To what extent do the many ethical urgings for global transformations actually encounter the geo-and bio-politics of global coloniality that is defined by the material desires, motivations and actions of globalising elites, for whom, as Bauman (2003, p. 20) tells us, visions of the good life are defined not by attachments (to the suffering Other) but by a ‘disengaged imagination’ that seeks no utopian mission.26 In the face of such actualities, what do we make of the useful suffering of the ethical Self who purports to think for the Other? Inconsequentiality is the least of the criticisms that may be made. Nandy’s observation is pertinent: ‘domination today is rarely justified through oracles, ritual superiority, or claims to birthrights; domination is now more frequently justified in terms of better acquaintance with universal knowledge and better access to universal modes of acquiring knowledge’ (Nandy 2007, p. 227). Theorisations of hope that gaze upon suffering and that purport to contemplate, manage and solve suffering, therefore, as knowing (and modes of knowing) the Other, help create masks of hegemony for the brutal faces of domination.27
| 8,906 |
<h4>The aff’s call to fix a world gone astray is part of debate’s fixation on the suffering of the Other – this perspective is one of prescriptive colonialism that leads to endless violence</h4><p>Jayan <strong>Nayar 12</strong>, law prof at the University of Warwick, The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority, December 15, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10978-012-9115-8/fulltext.html</p><p><u>People suffer</u>.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data), nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name ‘suffering’. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of theory possesses no experiential meaning. <u><strong>Whilst <mark>lip service is paid to</strong></mark> ‘<mark>voices of <strong>suffering’</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>voices</u></mark> as such <u><mark>are absented of</u></mark> experiential truth or ontological-political <u><mark>significance</mark> in</u> any <u>objectification</u> of suffering as condition; <u><strong><mark>voices are retained</u></strong></mark> instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) <u><strong><mark>as theory’s</strong></mark> justificatory <strong><mark>launch-pads for intervention</u></strong></mark>. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 <u><mark>The politics of</mark> discoursing <mark>suffering</u></mark> therefore <u><mark>is a politics of the theorist</mark>, suffering a problem <mark>to be solved by the theorist, where</mark> <strong><mark>prescription is divorced from experience</u></strong></mark>, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. <u><strong>At best, <mark>those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down</mark> of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may</strong> purport to <strong>offer</strong>, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated</u> (or otherwise), <u>its structural causation identified</u> (or otherwise), <u>its alleviation interrogated</u> for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory, <u><strong><mark>suffering</strong></mark> itself <strong><mark>becomes secondary</mark> <mark>to the</mark> politics of the ‘<mark>theorist</strong></mark>/philosopher’</u>—<u><mark>the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other</u></mark>—<u><mark>of imperial recognition</u></mark>, <u>response and intervention</u>.20 <u>Thus <mark>rationalised solutions are offered</mark> to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may</u> indeed <u>be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present</u>, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. <u><mark>The theorist becomes the technician</mark>, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, <mark>to overcome</mark> the problem of <mark>suffering</mark> that is perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning</u>. Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violation becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), <u>suffering as global injustice becomes a problem of reformulating</u> political affinities within the new meta-game of <u>globalisation as</u> methodological <u>cosmopolitanism</u> (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models’ (Young 2006); or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004) or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). <u>In these examples</u> of discoursing suffering, thinking <u><strong><mark>suffering</mark> and its <mark>alleviation</u></strong></mark>, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 <u><strong><mark>becomes</mark> rational work, and the <mark>technocratic</u></strong></mark>, even <u>bureaucratic, <strong><mark>measuring of</strong> suffering</mark> and its (appropriate) <strong>responses <mark>becomes</strong> the practical implication of <strong>theory</u></strong></mark>; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, <u>always with some justification close at hand</u>, only serving to entrench further the Levinasian injunction to responsibility—for further endeavours of thinking-hope, to serve further the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. <u><strong><mark>Suffering</u></strong></mark>, as condition, <u><strong>as commodity</u></strong> to be exploited, as depoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, <u><strong><mark>remains</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>ever-present alibi for</strong></mark> legitimate <strong><mark>interventions amidst</mark> constant</strong> (and inevitable) <strong><mark>disappointments</mark>. <mark>A corrupt</mark>, violent, <mark>imperial, global</mark> <mark>order</mark>(ing) <mark>of social relations becomes</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>the saviour</u></strong></mark>, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, with every call for the alleviation of suffering (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? <u>We make a huge assumption</u>—we, who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition—<u>that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed</u>. <u>With this assumption</u>, <u>we attempt to think our way out of</u> (continuing) <u>betrayals to enable the realisation of</u> promises in which we wish to believe. <u>Good promises</u> they seemingly are: <u>the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on</u>. We ask the question: what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How many more resources? What kind of political institutions? <u>Perhaps <mark>to assuage our</u></mark> faith in the consequentiality of our <u>thoughts, so many <mark>questions are followed by</mark> so many ‘<strong><mark>should’-assertions</u></strong> <u>that <strong>crowd</mark> our repeated <mark>redesigns for Humanity</u></strong></mark>—that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; should redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations; should enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible; should reform and democratise international institutions. The list, again, goes on, as do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009). Andrew Linklater’s contemplations on the prospects for ‘cosmopolitan obligations’ for ‘distant suffering’ is characteristic of the intellectual idealism of much theorisings of Humanity’s hopeful futures: the gulf between human societies may not be so difficult to bridge. … The obstacles to substantial progress have been well documented, and they will continue to shape the tracks along which globalization travels. But it is not beyond the ingenuity of the human race to rise above increasingly problematical particularistic moralities, and to create global arrangements that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obligations to reduce distant suffering. (Linklater 2007, p. 33) <u>As if the failures thus far have been simply due to a lack of ingenuity of the ‘human race’! <strong>What if</u></strong>, instead, the world order of inflicted <u><strong><mark>suffering</u></strong></mark> (and ‘the gulf between human societies’), the order of global impoverishment and insecurities, <u><strong><mark>persists not</strong></mark> merely <strong><mark>as the outcome of</strong></mark> <mark>a <strong>failure</strong> of (humane) consciousness</mark> to be corrected by suffering-based ethical theorisations of human rights and global justice, <strong><mark>but as the result of</strong></mark> created, planned and effected <mark>imperial</mark>ist <strong><mark>design</u></strong></mark> as it continuously seeks to reshape world orders for profit? To what extent do the many ethical urgings for global transformations actually encounter the geo-and bio-politics of global coloniality that is defined by the material desires, motivations and actions of globalising elites, for whom, as Bauman (2003, p. 20) tells us, <u><strong><mark>visions of</mark> the <mark>good life are defined</strong></mark> not by attachments (to the suffering Other) but <strong><mark>by a ‘disengaged imagination’</mark> that seeks no utopian mission</u></strong>.26 In the face of such actualities, what do we make of the useful suffering of the ethical Self who purports to think for the Other? Inconsequentiality is the least of the criticisms that may be made. Nandy’s observation is pertinent: ‘domination today is rarely justified through oracles, ritual superiority, or claims to birthrights; <u>domination is</u> now more frequently <u>justified in terms of better acquaintance with universal knowledge and better access to universal modes of acquiring knowledge’</u> (Nandy 2007, p. 227). <u><strong><mark>Theorisations of hope</strong> that</mark> <mark>gaze</mark> <mark>upon suffering and <strong>that purport to</strong></mark> contemplate, manage and <strong><mark>solve suffering</u></strong></mark>, therefore, as knowing (and modes of knowing) the Other, <u>help <strong>create <mark>masks</mark> of hegemony for the <mark>brutal</mark> faces of <mark>domination</mark>.27</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
Case
| 402,889 | 23 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,019 |
also tons of alt causes they can’t solve
|
Wilkinson, 10-1-13 –
|
Wilkinson, 10-1-13 – Tracy, Columnist with the Los Angeles Times, “Economists dial down projections for Mexico's growth,” LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-economy-pena-nieto-20131001,0,711698.story.
|
Mexico’s growth rate is more likely about 1.7%, the officials reduced projected growth to 1.8%, blaming continued financial sluggishness in the United States under-spending by the Mexican treasury in hurricane and tropical storms devastated Mexico’s shave another percentage off growth the overall economy remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up whe reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are enacted Those include a tax overhaul and opening the oil to foreign investment extortion hinder the business environment. crime and insecurity cost Mexican 16.5 billion
|
Mexico’s growth rate is likely about 1.7%, under-spending by the Mexican treasury hurricane devastated Mexico shave percentage off growth the economy remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up when reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are enacted. Those include a tax overhaul and opening oil to foreign investment crime and insecurity cost Mexicans 16.5 billion
|
Now, however, even government economists have had to dial down the projections. Mexico’s economy contracted in the second quarter for the first time in four years. The growth rate is more likely about 1.7%, the government says, or half the prediction of just 10 months ago -- and a little less than half of last year’s pace. Some private economists put the current rate even lower. Previously, officials reduced projected growth to 1.8%, blaming continued financial sluggishness in the United States, with whose economy Mexico is tightly entwined, and on under-spending by the Mexican treasury in the initial months of the new government. Last week, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray added more bad news. He said the hurricane and tropical storms that devastated parts of Mexico’s two coasts last month could shave another 0.1 percentage point off growth, to 1.7%. The storms killed about 150 people, destroyed farmland and livestock and crippled roads and other infrastructure. On Tuesday, the official Bank of Mexico said its monthly survey of experts showed expectations diminishing even further. Its report put anticipated growth at 1.4%. The government insists the overall economy remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up when wide-ranging reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are finally enacted. Those include a tax overhaul and opening the state oil monopoly to foreign investment. “I’m confident the deceleration is temporary,” Reuters quoted Agustin Carstens, the head of the Bank of Mexico, as saying. He added that Mexico’s “solid macroeconomic pillars” should bring the country out of its slump by early next year. The shaky economic performance comes as violence continues in many parts of the country. Statistics out this week show a significant uptick in kidnappings and extortion, crimes that hinder the business environment. Homicides seemed to be continuing a pattern of declining. The national statistics institute, known by the acronym INEGI, said in a new report that crime and insecurity cost Mexicans roughly $16.5 billion last year, or about 1.34% of GDP. That includes everything from ransom and extortion money paid to the cost of security measures.
| 2,182 |
<h4><strong>also tons of alt causes they can’t solve</h4><p>Wilkinson, 10-1-13 – </strong>Tracy, Columnist with the Los Angeles Times, “Economists dial down projections for Mexico's growth,” LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-economy-pena-nieto-20131001,0,711698.story. </p><p>Now, however, even government economists have had to dial down the projections. <u><mark>Mexico’s</u></mark> economy contracted in the second quarter for the first time in four years. The <u><mark>growth rate is</mark> more <mark>likely</mark> <mark>about 1.7%,</mark> the</u> government says, or half the prediction of just 10 months ago -- and a little less than half of last year’s pace. Some private economists put the current rate even lower. Previously, <u>officials reduced projected growth to 1.8%,</u> <u>blaming continued financial sluggishness in the United States</u>, with whose economy Mexico is tightly entwined, and on <u><mark>under-spending by the Mexican treasury</mark> in</u> the initial months of the new government. Last week, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray added more bad news. He said the <u><mark>hurricane</mark> and tropical storms</u> that <u><mark>devastated</u></mark> parts of <u><mark>Mexico</mark>’s</u> two coasts last month could <u><mark>shave </mark>another</u> 0.1 <u><mark>percentage</u></mark> point <u><mark>off</u></mark> <u><mark>growth</u></mark>, to 1.7%. The storms killed about 150 people, destroyed farmland and livestock and crippled roads and other infrastructure. On Tuesday, the official Bank of Mexico said its monthly survey of experts showed expectations diminishing even further. Its report put anticipated growth at 1.4%. The government insists <u><mark>the</mark> overall <mark>economy</mark> <mark>remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up</mark> <mark>whe</u>n</mark> wide-ranging <u><mark>reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are</mark> </u>finally<u> <mark>enacted</u>. <u>Those include a tax overhaul and opening</mark> the</u> state <u><mark>oil</u></mark> monopoly <u><mark>to foreign investment</u></mark>. “I’m confident the deceleration is temporary,” Reuters quoted Agustin Carstens, the head of the Bank of Mexico, as saying. He added that Mexico’s “solid macroeconomic pillars” should bring the country out of its slump by early next year. The shaky economic performance comes as violence continues in many parts of the country. Statistics out this week show a significant uptick in kidnappings and <u>extortion</u>, crimes that <u>hinder the business environment.</u> Homicides seemed to be continuing a pattern of declining. The national statistics institute, known by the acronym INEGI, said in a new report that <u><mark>crime and insecurity cost Mexican</u>s</mark> roughly $<u><mark>16.5 billion</u><strong></mark> last year, or about 1.34% of GDP. That includes everything from ransom and extortion money paid to the cost of security measures.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
cartels
| 430,906 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,020 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4><strong>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p>Downs 12 <u></strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u><mark>Given this history, the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities<strong></mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,021 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, , would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, </mark>which passed by a 231-192 margin<mark>, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u></mark>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. <mark>"<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,022 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,907 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,023 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
| null |
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4><strong>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u>The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world</u>, the <u><strong>reputational</u></strong> (and possibly economic) <u><strong>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong> some form of <u><strong>soft defection</u>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
4
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,024 |
Consequentialism key to progressivism – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible
| null |
A – identifications don’t change people they just show that there is a counter-movement
|
)
what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states identifications with starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next It is because of a debilitating moralism because it is easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently peace” demonstrations a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy on the evils of the American government Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was The predictable consequences did not matter What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism
|
Americans do not believe anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives identifications allow activists to express a genuine solidarity But these symbolic avowals are not effective It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions because of a debilitating moralism it i easier to oppose a remote evil it exhibits little interest in why Americans think differently they focused their energy on the evils of the American government they alienated anyone What mattered was the expression of righteous indignation The discourse of the left is a universalist discourse it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms This is linked to pacifism
|
B – moralism is satisfied with saying that is wrong but doesn’t do anything about it
C – focus on moralism means the focus goes on what the government did wrong and anyone who did that is alienated
Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)
But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.
| 4,652 |
<h4>Consequentialism key to <u>progressivism</u> – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible</h4><p>A – identifications don’t change people they just show that there is a counter-movement</p><p>B – moralism is satisfied with saying that is wrong but doesn’t do anything about it</p><p>C – focus on moralism means the focus goes on what the government did wrong and anyone who did that is alienated</p><p><strong>Isaac, 02</strong> - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring<u>)</p><p></u>But <u><strong>what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of <mark>Americans</mark>, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who <mark>do not believe</mark> that the discourse of “<mark>anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives</mark>. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states</u></strong>—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious <u><strong><mark>identifications</mark> with</u></strong> Subcommandante Marcos or <u><strong>starving Iraqi children <mark>allow</mark> left <mark>activists to express a genuine solidarity</u></strong></mark> with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. <u><strong><mark>But these symbolic avowals are not</mark> an <mark>effective</mark> way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live</u></strong>. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. <u><strong><mark>It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society</mark> in which it operates</u></strong> (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). <u><strong>Many left <mark>activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions</mark> of) Iraqi</u></strong> or Afghan <u><strong>civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next</u></strong>. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. <u><strong>It is <mark>because of a debilitating moralism</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>because <mark>it i</mark>s</u></strong> easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, <u><strong><mark>easier to</mark> locate and to <mark>oppose a remote evil</mark> than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But <mark>it exhibits little interest in</mark> how and <mark>why</mark> so many <mark>Americans think differently</u></strong></mark>. The “<u><strong>peace” demonstrations</u></strong> organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, <u><strong>a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, <mark>they focused their energy</u></strong></mark> not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather <u><strong><mark>on the evils of the American government</u></strong></mark> and its widely supported response to the terror. <u><strong>Hardly anyone was paying attention, but <mark>they alienated anyone</mark> who was</u></strong>. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. <u><strong>The predictable consequences did not matter</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>What mattered was</mark> simply <mark>the expression of righteous indignation</u></strong></mark> about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But <u><strong>politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity”</u></strong> with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—<u><strong>and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. <mark>The</mark> economic <mark>discourse of the</mark> campus <mark>left is a universalist discourse</mark> of human needs and workers rights; but <mark>it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms</mark> about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. <mark>This</mark> refusal <mark>is linked to</mark> a peculiar strain of <mark>pacifism</mark>, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism</u></strong>.<u> </p></u>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
Case
| 301,621 | 8 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,025 |
Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree
|
Couch, 2012
|
Couch, 2012 (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)
|
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure a study to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either One of the principal scholars Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure
|
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high predicted growth that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ . Crime and corruption tend to be symptoms demonstrating failure a study build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail
|
A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
| 2,375 |
<h4><strong>Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree </h4><p>Couch, 2012</strong> (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>A ‘collapsed’ state</u></mark>, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, <u><mark>suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’</mark>, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’</u>.16 <u><strong><mark>Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico</mark> disappearing like those earlier European states <mark>seems </strong>implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high</mark>er <mark>predicted growth</mark> than either the UK, Germany or the USA; <mark>that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours</mark>,</u> which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; <u><mark>and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities</u>’</mark> that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse<mark>. <u>Crime and corruption tend to be</mark> described not as causes but as <mark>symptoms demonstrating failure</u></mark>. For example, <u><mark>a study</mark> </u>for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting <u>to <mark>build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either</u></mark>.19 <u>One of the principal scholars</u> on the subject, <u>Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger</u>.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. <u>This absence may reflect an assessment <mark>that<strong> numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail</u></strong></mark>. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 <u><strong>Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure</u>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
cartels
| 45,874 | 64 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,026 |
PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee
|
Moran 9/28
|
Moran 9/28/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)
|
Any choice Obama makes will be controversial It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. the nomination probably won't come until after the election If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
|
Any choice Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
|
Any choice for AG Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so the nomination probably won't come until after the election anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
| 958 |
<h4><strong>PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee</h4><p>Moran 9/28<u></strong>/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)</p><p><mark>Any choice</u></mark> for AG <u><mark>Obama makes will be controversial</u>.</mark> <u><mark>It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and <strong>if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available.</mark> </u></strong>That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so <u>the nomination probably won't come until after the election</u> anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. <u><mark>If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck</mark> session, <strong><mark>it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,828 | 6 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,027 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,028 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4><strong>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u><mark>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u></mark>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,029 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| null |
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4><strong>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p>Rico 2014</strong> <u><strong>(Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u>marijuana legalization</u> still <u><strong>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
4
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,030 |
“Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained
| null |
A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it
|
the bombing of Yugoslavia did not come into being in some irresponsible way It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim
|
bombing happened about respect for rights targets of the bombing weren't chosen on moral grounds a purely ethical justification for intervention depoliticizes it. intervention has been justified in the depoliticized language of universal rights men and women are helpless victims, robbed of all identity the ideology of victimization is the real problem The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim
|
B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity
C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim
Zizek, 99 - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)
Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the _Sueddeutscher Zeitung_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.
| 3,578 |
<h4>“Responsibility to the other” <u>depoliticizes action</u> – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained</h4><p>A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it</p><p>B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity</p><p>C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim</p><p><strong>Zizek, 99</strong> - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)</p><p>Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that <u><strong>the <mark>bombing</mark> of Yugoslavia</u></strong>, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this <u><strong>did not come into being in some irresponsible way</u></strong>, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. <u><strong>It <mark>happened about </mark>of <mark>respect for rights</mark>, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states</u></strong>. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." <u><strong>In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning</u></strong>. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the _Sueddeutscher Zeitung_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] <u><strong>The problem is also not that the <mark>targets of the bombing weren't chosen on</mark> entirely <mark>moral grounds</mark>. The real problem is that <mark>a purely</mark> humanitarian, purely <mark>ethical justification for</mark> NATO's <mark>intervention</mark> completely <mark>depoliticizes it.</mark> NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its <mark>intervention has been</mark> cloaked and <mark>justified</mark> exclusively <mark>in the depoliticized language of universal</mark> human <mark>rights</mark>. In this context, <mark>men and women are</mark> no longer political subjects, but <mark>helpless victims, robbed of all</mark> political <mark>identity</mark> and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO</u></strong>. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, <u><strong><mark>the ideology of victimization is the real problem</mark>: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject</u></strong> - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. <u><strong>The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: <mark>The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim</u></strong></mark>. </p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
Case
| 474,469 | 2 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,031 |
No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
cartels
| 430,908 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,032 |
Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights
|
Sharpton 9/29
|
Sharpton 9/29/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas Holder lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements from being dismissed, or altered The principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has had in civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue with the next AG No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. combatted efforts towards voter suppression he principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued
|
Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG, whoever he or she may be. We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas. Throughout his tenure, Holder has consistently lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements in the areas of civil rights and voting rights from being dismissed, or altered somehow. The governing principle that this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder.
| 3,812 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights</h4><p>Sharpton 9/29</strong>/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)</p><p>Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric <u><mark>Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has</mark> ever <mark>had in </mark>the area of <mark>civil rights and voting rights.</u></mark> I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. <u><mark>Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue </mark>on<mark> with the next AG</u></mark>, whoever he or she may be. <u>We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas</u>. Throughout his tenure, <u>Holder</u> has consistently <u>lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights</u> in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. <u><mark>No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing <strong>sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies</strong>.</u></mark> <u>No other AG <mark>combatted efforts towards <strong>voter suppression</mark> with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting</u></strong>. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. <u>The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements </u>in the areas of civil rights and voting rights <u>from being dismissed, or altered</u> somehow. <u><strong>T<mark>he</u></strong></mark> governing <u><strong><mark>principle</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued</u></strong></mark>. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They <u>just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,830 | 6 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,033 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
|
marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,034 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4><strong>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough</strong> and clear enough <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong> possibly held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> exactly <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u><mark>in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u><mark>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable</mark> of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u><mark>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u></mark>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.<strong></mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,035 |
The social location of our authors does not necessarily deny the empirical validity of their claims—they have to prove specific instances of when race has skewed our authors perception of how the world works
|
McWhorter 2k.
|
McWhorter 2k. John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 54-5
|
a considerable amount of black academic work downplays logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present, which is founded not upon intellectual curiosity but upon raising in-group self-esteem classicists easily point out the errors in these claims, only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists” for having even questioned them, neglecting in the process to provide actual answers to insist upon facts is “inauthentic.” The goal here is not to weigh evidence carefully in order to unearth the truth, but to construct interpretations of evidence that bolster a pre-conceived “truth,” Uninterested in any information inapplicable to the construction of the Afrocentric myth and closed to constructive engagement, these people are not is scholars the centrality of victimhood in the black cultural identity subverts this ideal black scholarship is devoted not to general scholarly inquiry about black people, but hronicling black victimhood In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand. The result is a sovereign entity where the outward forms of academia are harnessed to a local set of rules: a Separatist conception of academia. In “black” academia comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation, and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than the empirical soundness of ones conclusions. scholars would be surprised at the sparseness of serious, constructive debate at may black conferences, many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and as such, have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but the very politest and most superficial of criticism the fundamental commitment of much black academic work is not assessment of facts and testing of theories, but chronicling victimhood and reinforcing community self-esteem
|
black academic work downplays logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present classicists point out errors in these claims only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists” to insist upon facts is “inauthentic.” In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand. In “black” academia comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than empirical soundness many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but superficial criticism
|
As the spawn of Victimology, Separatism shares with its progenitor a tendency to be allowed to trump truth in cases that require choosing between them. In this vein, a considerable amount of black academic work downplays logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present, which is founded not upon intellectual curiosity but upon raising in-group self-esteem. Mother Egypt “Afrocentric History,” for example, is primarily founded upon a fragile assemblage of misreadings of classical texts to construct a scenario under which Ancient Egypt was a “black” civilization (was Anwar Sadat a “brother”?), raped by the Ancient Greeks, who therefore owed all notable in their culture to them. Professional classicists easily point out the errors in these claims, only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists” for having even questioned them, neglecting in the process to provide actual answers. Indeed, to insist upon facts – or apparently, to master the complex classical languages in which the original documents were written – is “inauthentic.” The goal here is not to weigh evidence carefully in order to unearth the truth, but to construct interpretations of evidence that bolster a pre-conceived “truth,” like “creation scientists” whose objectivity is decisively crippled by a fundamental conviction that God must be the driver of the universe. Uninterested in any information inapplicable to the construction of the Afrocentric myth and closed to constructive engagement, these people may be many wonderful things, but one thing they are not is scholars. Yet they are respectfully addressed as “professor” by gullible students, and one eminent black undergraduate profiled in Ebony cited a volume of this kind of history as the most important book she had read that year. Ideally, an afrocentric academia is conceivable in which people simply apply the tools of the mainstream academia to illuminating black concerns. This is the vision most defenses of Afrocentric work are based on. However, in practice, the centrality of victimhood in the black cultural identity subverts this ideal. All too often, black scholarship is devoted not to general scholarly inquiry about black people, but a subset of this: Chronicling black victimhood past and present, and to remedy that victimhood, celebration and legitimization of black people past and present. Because black people are no more perfect than anyone else and life past and present is complex, this abridged conception of academic inquiry inherently conflicts with the commitment to mainstream academia to striving for assessment as unbiased as possible. In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand. The result is a sovereign entity where the outward forms of academia – articles, books, conferences, symposia – are harnessed to a local set of rules: a Separatist conception of academia. In “black” academia, as often as not, comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation, and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than the empirical soundness of ones conclusions. There are certainly quite a few excellent black scholars, but overall, Separatist academic standards are pervasive enough to make black conferences quite often perceptibly less rigorous than mainstream ones. Many mainstream scholars would be, or have been, surprised at the sparseness of serious, constructive debate at may black conferences, unaware that because of the grips of victimology and separatism, this kind of debate would be superfluous to the proceedings, and even unwelcome. After four decades, many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and as such, have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but the very politest and most superficial of criticism. Here is the beginnings of the notions at the center of “Afrocentric History” such as that Cleopatra was “black,” that Aristotle stole books from an Egyptian library that wasn’t even built until twenty-five years after he died, etc. Moderate black academics are more likely to say of the most egregious Afrocentric work that “more work needs to be done” than to actually pin it as nonsense, which makes complete sense when we realize that the fundamental commitment of much black academic work is not assessment of facts and testing of theories, but chronicling victimhood and reinforcing community self-esteem
| 4,630 |
<h4><strong>The social location of our authors does not necessarily deny the empirical validity of their claims—they have to prove specific instances of when race has skewed our authors perception of how the world works</h4><p>McWhorter 2k. </strong>John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 54-5</p><p>As the spawn of Victimology, Separatism shares with its progenitor a tendency to be allowed to trump truth in cases that require choosing between them. In this vein, <u><strong>a considerable amount of <mark>black academic work downplays</mark> <mark>logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present</mark>, which is founded not upon intellectual curiosity but upon raising in-group self-esteem</u></strong>. Mother Egypt “Afrocentric History,” for example, is primarily founded upon a fragile assemblage of misreadings of classical texts to construct a scenario under which Ancient Egypt was a “black” civilization (was Anwar Sadat a “brother”?), raped by the Ancient Greeks, who therefore owed all notable in their culture to them. Professional <u><strong><mark>classicists</mark> easily <mark>point out</mark> the <mark>errors in these claims</mark>, <mark>only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists”</mark> for having even questioned them, neglecting in the process to provide actual answers</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>to insist upon facts</u></strong></mark> – or apparently, to master the complex classical languages in which the original documents were written – <u><strong><mark>is “inauthentic.”</mark> The goal here is not to weigh evidence carefully in order to unearth the truth, but to construct interpretations of evidence that bolster a pre-conceived “truth,”</u></strong> like “creation scientists” whose objectivity is decisively crippled by a fundamental conviction that God must be the driver of the universe. <u><strong>Uninterested in any information inapplicable to the construction of the Afrocentric myth and closed to constructive engagement, these people</u></strong> may be many wonderful things, but one thing they <u><strong>are not is scholars</u></strong>. Yet they are respectfully addressed as “professor” by gullible students, and one eminent black undergraduate profiled in Ebony cited a volume of this kind of history as the most important book she had read that year. Ideally, an afrocentric academia is conceivable in which people simply apply the tools of the mainstream academia to illuminating black concerns. This is the vision most defenses of Afrocentric work are based on. However, in practice, <u><strong>the centrality of victimhood in the black cultural identity subverts this ideal</u></strong>. All too often, <u><strong>black scholarship is devoted not to general scholarly inquiry about black people, but</u></strong> a subset of this: C<u><strong>hronicling black victimhood</u></strong> past and present, and to remedy that victimhood, celebration and legitimization of black people past and present. Because black people are no more perfect than anyone else and life past and present is complex, this abridged conception of academic inquiry inherently conflicts with the commitment to mainstream academia to striving for assessment as unbiased as possible. <u><strong><mark>In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand.</mark> The result is a sovereign entity where the outward forms of academia</u></strong> – articles, books, conferences, symposia – <u><strong>are harnessed to a local set of rules: a Separatist conception of academia. <mark>In “black” academia</u></strong></mark>, as often as not, <u><strong><mark>comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation</mark>, <mark>and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than </mark>the <mark>empirical soundness</mark> of ones conclusions.</u></strong> There are certainly quite a few excellent black scholars, but overall, Separatist academic standards are pervasive enough to make black conferences quite often perceptibly less rigorous than mainstream ones. Many mainstream <u><strong>scholars would be</u></strong>, or have been, <u><strong>surprised at the sparseness of serious, constructive debate at may black conferences,</u></strong> unaware that because of the grips of victimology and separatism, this kind of debate would be superfluous to the proceedings, and even unwelcome. After four decades, <u><strong><mark>many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and</mark> as such, <mark>have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but</mark> the very politest and most <mark>superficial</mark> of <mark>criticism</u></strong></mark>. Here is the beginnings of the notions at the center of “Afrocentric History” such as that Cleopatra was “black,” that Aristotle stole books from an Egyptian library that wasn’t even built until twenty-five years after he died, etc. Moderate black academics are more likely to say of the most egregious Afrocentric work that “more work needs to be done” than to actually pin it as nonsense, which makes complete sense when we realize that <u><strong>the fundamental commitment of much black academic work is not assessment of facts and testing of theories, but chronicling victimhood and reinforcing community self-esteem</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
AT: Yancy/Ignore White Scholarship
| 430,909 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,036 |
Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities still criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4><strong>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><mark>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong><mark>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u> for considerable <u>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><mark>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u></mark> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><mark>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></mark> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
4
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,037 |
Their impact ev is all political hype
|
Stewart 2014
|
Stewart 2014 (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004 the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010 This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism other analysts believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that 2013 immigration was down significantly from historical levels This hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at intervals for years along with the boogeyman of terrorism an analysis of the history of plots and the changes in transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis” is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010.¶ This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border is not new. It is something that has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now, along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While other border security analysts have told reporters that they believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded.
| 2,127 |
<h4><strong>Their impact ev is all political hype</h4><p>Stewart 2014</strong> (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)</p><p><u><mark>Lost in</mark> all <mark>the</mark> <mark>media hype over this “border crisis</u></mark>” <u><mark>is the fact that</mark> in <mark>2013</mark> overall <mark>immigration was down significantly from historical</u></mark> <u><mark>levels</u></mark>. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, <u>there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004</u>. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, <u>the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010</u>.¶ <u><mark>This</mark> type of <strong><mark>hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border</u></strong></mark> is not new. It is something that <u><mark>has surfaced at</mark> irregular <mark>intervals</mark> <mark>for years</mark> now</u>, <u><mark>along with</mark> scaremongering using <mark>the boogeyman of terrorism</u></mark>, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While <u>other</u> border security <u>analysts</u> have told reporters that they <u>believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis</u> and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that <u><mark>an analysis of the history of</mark> <mark>plots</mark> directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas <mark>and</mark> an examination of <mark>the changes in</mark> the dynamics of <mark>transnational terrorism</mark> <mark>show such claims to be unfounded</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
cartels
| 220,701 | 15 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,038 |
Collapses the economy
|
Bowling 2013
|
Bowling 2013 (Julia, Research Associate in the Brennan Center’s Justice Program, Mass Incarceration Gets Attention as an Economic Issue (Finally), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/mass-incarceration-gets-attention-economic-issue-finally)
|
mass incarceration has come to be recognized as a fiscal concern the United States government spends an unsustainable $79 billion a year on corrections. Mass incarceration greatly disrupts the American job market Removing people from the labor market lowers the quality of our work force and permanently damages their employment and educational opportunities In addition to gaps in employment and lack of work experience many return to neighborhoods suffering from economic divestment High unemployment among ex-prisoners leads to higher state and federal government assistance payouts, loss of income tax revenue, and drains on spending for other essential programs. The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty.
|
come to be recognized as a fiscal concern U St spends an unsustainable $79 billion a year Mass incarceration greatly disrupts the American job market country.” The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty.
|
This week, in a move surprising to many, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution stating their intent to end mass incarceration. The country’s largest federation of unions now officially opposes long mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent crimes, and supports reforms to help former prisoners reintegrate into society. This announcement will be well received among economists working on criminal justice reform. Long seen as a racial justice issue in the American political arena, mass incarceration has recently, although belatedly, come to be recognized as a fiscal concern. With the world’s largest incarcerated population, the United States government spends an unsustainable $79 billion a year on corrections. But, until now, the understanding of incarceration’s broader economic impact has largely been confined to academia. In the AFL-CIO press release, University of California at Berkeley Economist Steven Pitts put it best: “We cannot organize an economy that provides shared prosperity if we don’t also end mass incarceration.” Mass incarceration greatly disrupts the American job market. Sixty-one percent of people in prison are between 18-39 years old -- in the prime of their working life. Removing able-bodied working-age people from the labor market lowers the quality of our work force and permanently damages their employment and educational opportunities. The formerly incarcerated face a daunting uphill battle with unemployment. In addition to gaps in employment and lack of work experience, the AFL-CIO resolution notes that many re-entering civil society return to neighborhoods, “long suffering from economic divestment, high unemployment, poor infrastructure and isolation.” Most importantly, the formerly incarcerated face stigma and discrimination. Efforts to “ban the box” on employment forms asking about criminal records may have worked in earlier eras, but today a former convict’s past is only a quick Google search away. Given this reality, it is no surprise that 60 percent of formerly incarcerated people are unemployed, compared to 7.3 percent of the general population. High unemployment among ex-prisoners leads to higher state and federal government assistance payouts, loss of income tax revenue, and drains on spending for other essential programs. The diminished employment prospects of formerly incarcerated individuals also have an enormous effect on their partners and children. Currently, 1 in 28 children has a parent in prison. Having an incarcerated parent doubles a child’s chances of experiencing homelessness, and increases the likelihood that they’ll exhibit social problems, academic problems, and be incarcerated themselves. Nobel Prize Winning Economist Joseph Stiglitz noted in the New York Times, “a young American’s life prospects are more dependent on the income and education of his parents than in almost any other advanced country.” The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty. The AFL-CIO’s resolution is an important sign that the biggest players in America’s economy are beginning to wake up to the reality that mass incarceration is as much an economic issue as a criminal justice one. Let’s hope more of those in the political and business arenas make ending mass incarceration a priority.
| 3,371 |
<h4><strong>Collapses the economy</h4><p>Bowling 2013</strong> (Julia, Research Associate in the Brennan Center’s Justice Program, Mass Incarceration Gets Attention as an Economic Issue (Finally), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/mass-incarceration-gets-attention-economic-issue-finally)</p><p>This week, in a move surprising to many, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution stating their intent to end mass incarceration. The country’s largest federation of unions now officially opposes long mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent crimes, and supports reforms to help former prisoners reintegrate into society. This announcement will be well received among economists working on criminal justice reform. Long seen as a racial justice issue in the American political arena, <u>mass incarceration has</u> recently, although belatedly, <u><mark>come to be recognized as a fiscal concern</u></mark>. With the world’s largest incarcerated population, <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates government <mark>spends an <strong>unsustainable $79 billion</strong> a year</mark> on corrections. </u>But, until now, the understanding of incarceration’s broader economic impact has largely been confined to academia. In the AFL-CIO press release, University of California at Berkeley Economist Steven Pitts put it best: “We cannot organize an economy that provides shared prosperity if we don’t also end mass incarceration.” <u><mark>Mass incarceration <strong>greatly disrupts the American job market</u></strong></mark>. Sixty-one percent of people in prison are between 18-39 years old -- in the prime of their working life. <u>Removing</u> able-bodied working-age <u>people from the labor market lowers the quality of our work force and permanently damages their employment and educational opportunities</u>. The formerly incarcerated face a daunting uphill battle with unemployment. <u>In addition to gaps in employment and lack of work experience</u>, the AFL-CIO resolution notes that <u>many</u> re-entering civil society <u>return to neighborhoods</u>, “long <u>suffering from economic divestment</u>, high unemployment, poor infrastructure and isolation.” Most importantly, the formerly incarcerated face stigma and discrimination. Efforts to “ban the box” on employment forms asking about criminal records may have worked in earlier eras, but today a former convict’s past is only a quick Google search away. Given this reality, it is no surprise that 60 percent of formerly incarcerated people are unemployed, compared to 7.3 percent of the general population. <u>High unemployment among ex-prisoners leads to higher state and federal government assistance payouts, loss of income tax revenue, and drains on spending for other essential programs. </u>The diminished employment prospects of formerly incarcerated individuals also have an enormous effect on their partners and children. Currently, 1 in 28 children has a parent in prison. Having an incarcerated parent doubles a child’s chances of experiencing homelessness, and increases the likelihood that they’ll exhibit social problems, academic problems, and be incarcerated themselves. Nobel Prize Winning Economist Joseph Stiglitz noted in the New York Times, “a young American’s life prospects are more dependent on the income and education of his parents than in almost any other advanced <mark>country.” <u>The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty.</mark> </u><strong>The AFL-CIO’s resolution is an important sign that the biggest players in America’s economy are beginning to wake up to the reality that mass incarceration is as much an economic issue as a criminal justice one. Let’s hope more of those in the political and business arenas make ending mass incarceration a priority.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
1
| 859,894 | 14 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,039 |
Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is a model of flexibility
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is a model of flexibility</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong>still <mark>criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></mark> for considerable <u><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,040 |
“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts
|
a clear statement rule against commandeering require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure. be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than categorical constitutional rules difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice Commandeering absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism . Imposing a clear statement rule it checks the power of the court
|
Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance. By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. Thus, they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political [*634] process failure. Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules. The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. Here, the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials, a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.
| 6,405 |
<h4><strong>“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, <u>political safeguards proponents should insist on <mark>a clear statement rule against commandeering</u></mark>. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 <u>By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they <mark>require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance</u></mark>. <u>By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement <mark>forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced</mark>.</u> Thus, <u><mark>they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political</u></mark> [*634] <u><mark>process failure</u>.</mark> Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, <u>they may <mark>be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than</mark> splashier, but less frequently applied <mark>categorical constitutional</mark> <mark>rules</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule</mark> may <mark>mean that <strong>Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement</u></strong>.</mark> n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. <u><mark>Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer"</mark> to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice.</u> Here, <u><mark>the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice</mark> of legislative means</u>. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. <u><mark>Commandeering</mark> hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its <mark>absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process</u>. <u><strong>Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism</mark>. </u>Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. <u>Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution</u>. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. <u>Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies<mark>. Imposing a clear statement rule</mark> against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as <mark>it checks the power of the court</mark>s</u><strong>. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,571 | 9 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,041 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| null |
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4><strong>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u> or certain parts of them. In this way <u>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u> at the national level, <u>including</u> for example the <u>legalisation of cannabis</u> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u>Disregarding</u> all or selected components of <u>the treaties</u>, however, <u>raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control</u>. <u>The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could <strong>threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u>selective application</u> of such a principle <u>would <strong>call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
4
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,042 |
Using experience automatically legitimizes the speaker’s knowledge – non-falsifiable claims prevent discursive inquiry because you cant say no, this destroys education and argumentation
|
Scott ‘91
|
Scott ‘91 (Joan W., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D; University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Assistant Professor; Northwestern University, Assistant Professor; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Associate Professor, Professor; Brown University, Nancy Duke Lewis University Professor, Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women, Founding Director; Institute for Advanced Study, Member, Professor, Harold F. Linder Professor, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), p. 783-84
|
experience preclude inquiry into processes of subject-construction; and they avoid examining the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality, the relevance of the position of subjects to the knowledge they produce Questions are not raised about whether it matters for the history they write that historians are men, women, white, black, straight, or gay; instead the authority of the 'subject of knowledge' by the elimination of everything concerning the speaker" knowledge is legitimated and presented as universal There is no power or politics in these notions of knowledge and experience. it is axiomatic that experience is a reliable source of knowledge because it rests on direct contact between the historian's perception and reality Thinking on his own means owning his own thoughts, and this proprietary relationship guarantees an individual's independence, his ability to read the past correctly, and the authority of the knowledge he produces. experience precedes forms of expression and so provides an escape from a strong structural determination.
|
experience preclude inquiry into construction avoid examining the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality, the authority of the 'subject of knowledge' elimination of everything concerning the speaker is legitimated and presented as universa
|
The concepts of experience described by Williams preclude inquiry into processes of subject-construction; and they avoid examining the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality, the relevance of the position or situatedness of subjects to the knowledge they produce, and the effects of difference on knowledge. Questions are not raised about, for example, whether it matters for the history they write that historians are men, women, white, black, straight, or gay; instead, as de Certeau writes, "the authority of the 'subject of knowledge' [is measured] by the elimination of everything concerning the speaker" ("H," p. 218). His knowledge, reflecting as it does something apart from him, is legitimated and presented as universal, accessible to all. There is no power or politics in these notions of knowledge and experience. An example of the way "experience" establishes the authority of an historian can be found in R. G. Collingwood's Idea of History, the 1946 classic that has been required reading in historiography courses for several generations. For Collingwood, the ability of the historian to reenact past experience is tied to his autonomy, "where by autonomy I mean the condition of being one's own authority, making statements or taking action on one's own initiative and not because those statements or actions are authorized or prescribed by anyone else."'9 The question of where the historian is situated-who he is, how he is defined in relation to others, what the political effects of his history may be-never enters the discussion. Indeed, being free of these matters seems to be tied to Collingwood's definition of autonomy, an issue so critical for him that he launches into an uncharacteristic tirade about it. In his quest for certainty, the historian must not let others make up his mind for him, Collingwood insists, because to do that means giving up his autonomy as an historian and allowing someone else to do for him what, if he is a scientific thinker, he can only do for himself. There is no need for me to offer the reader any proof of this statement. If he knows anything of historical work, he already knows of his own experience that it is true. If he does not already know that it is true, he does not know enough about history to read this essay with any profit, and the best thing he can do is to stop here and now.20 For Collingwood it is axiomatic that experience is a reliable source of knowledge because it rests on direct contact between the historian's perception and reality (even if the passage of time makes it necessary for the historian to imaginatively reenact events of the past). Thinking on his own means owning his own thoughts, and this proprietary relationship guarantees an individual's independence, his ability to read the past correctly, and the authority of the knowledge he produces. The claim is not only for the historian's autonomy, but also for his originality. Here "experience" grounds the identity of the researcher as an historian. Another, very different use of "experience" can be found in E. P. Thompson's Making of the English Working Class, the book that revolutionized social and labor history. Thompson specifically set out to free the concept of "class" from the ossified categories of Marxist structuralism. For this project "experience" was a key concept. "We explored," Thompson writes of himself and his fellow New Left historians, "both in theory and in practice, those junction-concepts (such as 'need', 'class', and 'determine') by which, through the missing term, 'experience', structure is transmuted into process, and the subject re-enters into history."21 Thompson's notion of experience joined ideas of external influence and subjective feeling, the structural and the psychological. This gave him a mediating influence between social structure and social consciousness. For him experience meant "social being"-the lived realities of social life, especially the affective domains of family and religion and the symbolic dimensions of expression. This definition separated the affective and the symbolic from the economic and the rational. "People do not only experience their own experience as ideas, within thought and its procedures," he maintained, "they also experience their own experience as feeling" ("PT," p. 171). This statement grants importance to the psychological dimension of experience, and it allows Thompson to account for agency. Feeling, Thompson insists, is "handled" culturally as "norms, familial and kinship obligations and reciprocities, as values or (through more elaborated forms) within art and religious beliefs" ("PT," p. 171). At the same time it somehow precedes these forms of expression and so provides an escape from a strong structural determination.
| 4,793 |
<h4>Using experience automatically legitimizes the speaker’s knowledge – non-falsifiable claims prevent discursive inquiry because you cant say no, this destroys education and argumentation </h4><p><u><strong>Scott ‘91</u></strong> (Joan W., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D; University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Assistant Professor; Northwestern University, Assistant Professor; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Associate Professor, Professor; Brown University, Nancy Duke Lewis University Professor, Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women, Founding Director; Institute for Advanced Study, Member, Professor, Harold F. Linder Professor,<strong> </strong>“The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), p. 783-84</p><p>The concepts of <u><mark>experience</u></mark> described by Williams <u><mark>preclude inquiry into</mark> processes of subject-<mark>construction</mark>; and they <mark>avoid examining the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality,</mark> the relevance of the position</u> or situatedness <u>of subjects to the knowledge they produce</u>, and the effects of difference on knowledge. <u>Questions are not raised about</u>, for example, <u>whether it matters for the history they write that historians are men, women, white, black, straight, or gay; instead</u>, as de Certeau writes, "<u><mark>the authority of the 'subject of knowledge'</u></mark> [is measured] <u>by the <mark>elimination of everything concerning the speaker</mark>"</u> ("H," p. 218). His <u>knowledge</u>, reflecting as it does something apart from him, <u><mark>is legitimated and presented as universa</mark>l</u>, accessible to all. <u>There is no power or politics in these notions of knowledge and experience.</u> An example of the way "experience" establishes the authority of an historian can be found in R. G. Collingwood's Idea of History, the 1946 classic that has been required reading in historiography courses for several generations. For Collingwood, the ability of the historian to reenact past experience is tied to his autonomy, "where by autonomy I mean the condition of being one's own authority, making statements or taking action on one's own initiative and not because those statements or actions are authorized or prescribed by anyone else."'9 The question of where the historian is situated-who he is, how he is defined in relation to others, what the political effects of his history may be-never enters the discussion. Indeed, being free of these matters seems to be tied to Collingwood's definition of autonomy, an issue so critical for him that he launches into an uncharacteristic tirade about it. In his quest for certainty, the historian must not let others make up his mind for him, Collingwood insists, because to do that means giving up his autonomy as an historian and allowing someone else to do for him what, if he is a scientific thinker, he can only do for himself. There is no need for me to offer the reader any proof of this statement. If he knows anything of historical work, he already knows of his own experience that it is true. If he does not already know that it is true, he does not know enough about history to read this essay with any profit, and the best thing he can do is to stop here and now.20 For Collingwood <u>it is axiomatic that experience is a reliable source of knowledge because it rests on direct contact between the historian's perception and reality</u> (even if the passage of time makes it necessary for the historian to imaginatively reenact events of the past). <u>Thinking on his own means owning his own thoughts, and this proprietary relationship guarantees an individual's independence, his ability to read the past correctly, and the authority of the knowledge he produces.</u> The claim is not only for the historian's autonomy, but also for his originality. Here "experience" grounds the identity of the researcher as an historian. Another, very different use of "experience" can be found in E. P. Thompson's Making of the English Working Class, the book that revolutionized social and labor history. Thompson specifically set out to free the concept of "class" from the ossified categories of Marxist structuralism. For this project "experience" was a key concept. "We explored," Thompson writes of himself and his fellow New Left historians, "both in theory and in practice, those junction-concepts (such as 'need', 'class', and 'determine') by which, through the missing term, 'experience', structure is transmuted into process, and the subject re-enters into history."21 Thompson's notion of experience joined ideas of external influence and subjective feeling, the structural and the psychological. This gave him a mediating influence between social structure and social consciousness. For him <u>experience</u> meant "social being"-the lived realities of social life, especially the affective domains of family and religion and the symbolic dimensions of expression. This definition separated the affective and the symbolic from the economic and the rational. "People do not only experience their own experience as ideas, within thought and its procedures," he maintained, "they also experience their own experience as feeling" ("PT," p. 171). This statement grants importance to the psychological dimension of experience, and it allows Thompson to account for agency. Feeling, Thompson insists, is "handled" culturally as "norms, familial and kinship obligations and reciprocities, as values or (through more elaborated forms) within art and religious beliefs" ("PT," p. 171). At the same time it somehow <u>precedes</u> these<u> forms of expression and so provides an escape from a strong structural determination.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
Shell – Personal Experience Non-Falsifiable
| 430,910 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,043 |
No bioterrorism and no impact---multiple obstacles
|
Stolar 6
|
Stolar 6 Research Officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (*Alex Stolar: October 2006, “BIOTERRORISM AND US POLICY RESPONSES ASSESSING THE THREAT OF MASS CASUALTY,” http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1659566521IPCS-Special-Report-31.pdf,)//KY
|
Each of these steps presents significant hurdles for terrorists. Acquiring a Category A agent which has the virulence to infect large numbers is very difficult growing, storing, and transporting biological agents requires substantial financial, logistical, and technological resources, as well as highly trained dissemination is the largest hurdle for bioterrorism . It is unlikely that terrorists will have the means, sophistication, logistics, or motivation to carry out a bioterrorist attack. Preparing biological agents very hard and costly. Despite spending millions of dollars cult was unable to develop an effective biological weapon Anthrax attacks in the U S involved very virulent there is apparently no other ‘terrorist’ group that is known to have successfully cultured any pathogen a biological weapon attack is difficult and expensive, and does not suit the modus operandi of the sole group with the means to pursue bioterrorism, Al Al Qaeda favors simple attacks a taboo against using biological weapons exists—not since World War II has one state attacked another with biological weapons. the threat of bioterrorism in the near future is low. Neither terrorists nor states seem likely to use bioweapons for attack it does not seem probable that a mass casualty bioterrorist attack will occur over the next ten years. It is unlikely that states will use a terrorist organization as a conduit to attack another state. If the policies of states and the relevant international regimes are robust, terrorists will be unable to mount bioterror attacks The present circumstances provide great reason for optimism there is no imminent threat of biological terrorism.
|
Acquiring gent which has the virulence to infect large numbers is ifficul biological agents requires substantial financial, logistical, and technological resource . It is unlikely orists will have the means, sophistication, logistics, or motivation to carry out a bioterrorist attac Anthrax attacks involved very virulent there is no ‘terrorist’ group known to have successfully cultured any pathogen Al Qaeda favors simple attacks the threat of bioterrorism is low. It i unlikely that states will use a terrorist organization as a conduit to attack
|
Each of these steps presents significant hurdles for terrorists. Acquiring a strain of a Category A agent which is significantly robust for storage, reproduction, transport, and dispersal, and which has the virulence to infect large numbers to inflict mass casualties is very difficult. Likewise, growing, storing, and transporting biological agents requires substantial financial, logistical, and technological resources, as well as highly trained scientists and technicians. Most of all, according to William Patrick of the US Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, dissemination is the largest hurdle for bioterrorism.4 Indeed, after devoting billions of dollars and years of research, dispersal is still a challenge before US and Russian biological weapons scientists. It is unlikely, at this stage, that terrorists will have the means, sophistication, logistics, or motivation to carry out a bioterrorist attack. Preparing biological agents for an attack is very hard and costly. Despite spending millions of dollars, and several years of work, the Aum Shinrikyo cult was unable to develop an effective biological weapon. Likewise, the 2001 Anthrax attacks in the United States involved very virulent Anthrax spores, but only five persons were killed. More sophisticated spores and dispersal methods would be required for a mass causalty attack. As Professor Milton Leitenberg notes, apart from the Rajneeshee cult attack in 1984, which sickened many, but killed none, “there is apparently no other ‘terrorist’ group that is known to have successfully cultured any pathogen.”5 Moreover, a lingering question is, why would terrorists use bioweapons in an attack? Executing a biological weapon attack is difficult and expensive, and does not suit the modus operandi of the sole group with the means to pursue bioterrorism, Al Qaeda. At present, Al Qaeda favors simple attacks that generate great fear. 9/11 was executed with box cutters; the Madrid train attacks with dynamite purchased from petty criminals6; the London 7/7 bombings utilized simple explosives that could be fashioned with easily available materials and little expertise7; and the terrorists in the recent plot to bomb flights from London to the US intended to use nail polish remover and hair bleach.8 Al Qaeda favors creating great fear at little cost. Why would it stray from this effective formula to bioterrorism which is expensive and of questionable reliability?9 The unavoidable conclusion is that only a nation-state could conduct a bioweapon attack. However, a taboo against using biological weapons exists—not since World War II has one state attacked another with biological weapons. Like non-state actors, states seem to prefer the lower costs and high reliability of conventional weapons or even chemical weapons. Accordingly, it seems the threat of bioterrorism in the near future is low. Neither terrorists nor states seem likely to use bioweapons for attack. Therefore, though possible, it does not seem probable that a mass casualty bioterrorist attack will occur over the next five to ten years. It is unlikely that states will use bioweapons against other states. It is equally unlikely that states will use a terrorist organization as a conduit to attack another state. Only terrorist organizations, operating alone within a weak or failed state, would develop bioweapons for an attack against a state. However, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda presently lack the expertise, logistics, and equipment for a bioterror attack. In the next five years, it is unlikely that terrorists will acquire such capabilities. Beyond that time frame, what stands between terrorists and potent bioweapons are the policies of individual states and multilateral bioweapon non-proliferation regimes. If the policies of states and the relevant international regimes are robust, terrorists will be unable to mount bioterror attacks. If, on the other hand, these policies and regimes are feeble, or even counterproductive, the threat of bioterrorism will be real and grave. The present circumstances provide great reason for optimism. Unlike nuclear terrorism, there is no imminent threat of biological terrorism. houghtful and effective strategies implemented today can eliminate this threat. How often is this case true in international security? How often can strategists say, this threat could be dangerous in a decade, but is not dangerous now, and can be prevented forever if the right steps are taken? One would think that the world, and the US in particular, would seize this opportunity to prevent this future threat; unfortunately, however, America’s biodefense policies since 9/11 are hurting rather than helping efforts to minimize bioterrorism risks. Bioterrorism presents a grave, but not imminent threat to America and the world. American leadership is needed to make sure terrorists never acquire the ability to execute a mass casualty bioattack. Unfortunately, America’s biodefense strategies are currently increasing the risks of bioterrorism. In the years ahead, those American leaders responsible for protecting the US against bioterrorism should heed the maxim which has served so many doctors so well for so long: Primum non nocere.
| 5,226 |
<h4><strong>No bioterrorism and no impact---multiple obstacles</h4><p>Stolar 6 </strong>Research Officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (*Alex Stolar: October 2006, “BIOTERRORISM AND US POLICY RESPONSES ASSESSING THE THREAT OF MASS CASUALTY,” http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1659566521IPCS-Special-Report-31.pdf,)//KY</p><p><u>Each of these steps presents significant hurdles for terrorists. <mark>Acquiring</u></mark> a strain of <u>a Category A a<mark>gent</mark> </u>which is significantly robust for storage, reproduction, transport, and dispersal, and <u><mark>which has the virulence to infect large numbers</mark> </u>to inflict mass casualties<u> <mark>is</mark> very d<mark>ifficul</mark>t</u>. Likewise, <u>growing, storing, and transporting <mark>biological agents requires substantial financial, logistical, and technological resource</mark>s, as well as highly trained </u>scientists and technicians. Most of all, according to William Patrick of the US Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, <u>dissemination is the largest hurdle for bioterrorism</u>.4 Indeed, after devoting billions of dollars and years of research, dispersal is still a challenge before US and Russian biological weapons scientists<u><mark>. It is unlikely</u></mark>, at this stage,<u> that terr<mark>orists will have the means, sophistication, logistics, or motivation to carry out a bioterrorist attac</mark>k. Preparing biological agents </u>for an attack is<u> very hard and costly. Despite spending millions of dollars</u>, and several years of work, the Aum Shinrikyo <u>cult was unable to develop an effective biological weapon</u>. Likewise, the 2001 <u><mark>Anthrax attacks</mark> in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>involved very virulent</mark> </u>Anthrax spores, but only five persons were killed. More sophisticated spores and dispersal methods would be required for a mass causalty attack. As Professor Milton Leitenberg notes, apart from the Rajneeshee cult attack in 1984, which sickened many, but killed none, “<u><mark>there is</mark> apparently <mark>no</mark> other <mark>‘terrorist’ group</mark> that is <mark>known to have successfully cultured any pathogen</u></mark>.”5 Moreover, a lingering question is, why would terrorists use bioweapons in an attack? Executing<u> a biological weapon attack is difficult and expensive, and does not suit the modus operandi of the sole group with the means to pursue bioterrorism, Al</u> Qaeda. At present, <u><mark>Al Qaeda favors simple attacks</mark> </u>that generate great fear. 9/11 was executed with box cutters; the Madrid train attacks with dynamite purchased from petty criminals6; the London 7/7 bombings utilized simple explosives that could be fashioned with easily available materials and little expertise7; and the terrorists in the recent plot to bomb flights from London to the US intended to use nail polish remover and hair bleach.8 Al Qaeda favors creating great fear at little cost. Why would it stray from this effective formula to bioterrorism which is expensive and of questionable reliability?9 The unavoidable conclusion is that only a nation-state could conduct a bioweapon attack. However, <u>a taboo against using biological weapons exists—not since World War II has one state attacked another with biological weapons. </u>Like non-state actors, states seem to prefer the lower costs and high reliability of conventional weapons or even chemical weapons. Accordingly, it seems <u><mark>the threat of bioterrorism</mark> in the near future <mark>is low.</mark> Neither terrorists nor states seem likely to use bioweapons for attack</u>. Therefore, though possible, <u>it does not seem probable that a mass casualty bioterrorist attack will occur over the next </u>five to <u>ten years. </u>It is unlikely that states will use bioweapons against other states. <u><mark>It i</mark>s </u>equally<u> <mark>unlikely that states will use a terrorist organization as a conduit to attack</mark> another state. </u>Only terrorist organizations, operating alone within a weak or failed state, would develop bioweapons for an attack against a state. However, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda presently lack the expertise, logistics, and equipment for a bioterror attack. In the next five years, it is unlikely that terrorists will acquire such capabilities. Beyond that time frame, what stands between terrorists and potent bioweapons are the policies of individual states and multilateral bioweapon non-proliferation regimes. <u>If the policies of states and the relevant international regimes are robust, terrorists will be unable to mount bioterror attacks</u>. If, on the other hand, these policies and regimes are feeble, or even counterproductive, the threat of bioterrorism will be real and grave. <u>The present circumstances provide great reason for optimism</u>. Unlike nuclear terrorism, <u>there is no imminent threat of biological terrorism. </u>houghtful and effective strategies implemented today can eliminate this threat. How often is this case true in international security? How often can strategists say, this threat could be dangerous in a decade, but is not dangerous now, and can be prevented forever if the right steps are taken? One would think that the world, and the US in particular, would seize this opportunity to prevent this future threat; unfortunately, however, America’s biodefense policies since 9/11 are hurting rather than helping efforts to minimize bioterrorism risks. Bioterrorism presents a grave, but not imminent threat to America and the world. American leadership is needed to make sure terrorists never acquire the ability to execute a mass casualty bioattack. Unfortunately, America’s biodefense strategies are currently increasing the risks of bioterrorism. In the years ahead, those American leaders responsible for protecting the US against bioterrorism should heed the maxim which has served so many doctors so well for so long: Primum non nocere. </p>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
cartels
| 285,797 | 7 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,044 |
U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war
|
Friedberg and Schoenfeld 08
|
Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008 [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]
|
Then there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. . Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise give cause for concern there are shades of the 1930s, when global finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices China is perhaps even more fragile its economic growth depend on foreign investment Both will be constricted in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
|
there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. Russia and China's rise give cause for concern. there are shades of the 30s, when global finance ground to a halt peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers rose up rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys Russian stock market has demonstrated fragility China is even more fragile, None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
|
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
| 2,365 |
<h4><strong>U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war</h4><p>Friedberg and Schoenfeld</strong>, 20<strong>08 </strong> [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html<u>]</p><p>Then <mark>there are</u></mark> the dolorous <u><mark>consequences of a</u></mark> potential <u><mark>collapse of the world's financial architecture.</mark> </u>For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos<u>.<mark> Russia</mark>'s new militancy <mark>and China's</mark> seemingly relentless <mark>rise </u></mark>also <u><mark>give cause for concern</u>.</mark> If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario <u><mark>there are shades of the</mark> 19<mark>30s,</mark> <mark>when global</u></mark> trade and <u><mark>finance ground</mark> nearly <mark>to a halt</mark>, the <mark>peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers</mark> led by the remorseless fanatics who <mark>rose up</mark> on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that <mark>rogue states may choose to become</u></mark> ever more <u><mark>reckless with their nuclear toys</mark>, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors</u> even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the <u><mark>Russian stock market has demonstrated</mark> the <mark>fragility</mark> of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices</u>, now driven down by the global slowdown. <u><mark>China is</mark> perhaps <mark>even more fragile</u>,</mark> <u>its economic growth depend</u>ing heavily <u>on foreign investment</u> and access to foreign markets. <u>Both will</u> now <u>be constricted</u>, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest <u>in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. <mark>None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders</mark> of these countrie<strong><mark>s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
1
| 42,129 | 155 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,045 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u><strong>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,046 |
Federalism model solves Ukraine war
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine
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U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).
| 9,859 |
<h4><strong>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u>The idea of a <strong>remaking</strong> of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u>Yatsenyuk</u> <u>reached out to Russophones</u> in the eastern and southern regions, <u>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u>.” <u>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have <strong>encouraged</strong></mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform <strong>along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that <strong>now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism</strong>, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u> this important <u><mark>regional balance</u> <u>and has the opportunity to <strong>formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</strong></mark>. </u>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u>a state-wide</u> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u>comprehensive federalization</u>, <u>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u>. <u>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <strong><mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</strong></mark> </u>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be</strong> <strong>international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are <strong>not short of is</strong></mark> </u>legal<u> <strong><mark>experts on</strong></mark> </u>autonomy<u>, <strong><mark>federalism</strong></mark> </u>and minority rights. The<u> <mark>implementation</mark> </u>of constitutional reform<u> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u>political will and <u><mark>leadership</u></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u> <u>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to <strong>peacefully manage conflict</mark> </strong>and <strong>enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u> not just <u>in Ukraine</u><strong> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 242,776 | 13 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,047 |
Experience denies us the ability to scrutinize your epistemology – this produces a bad model of debate
|
Scott ‘91
|
Scott ‘91 (Joan W., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D; University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Assistant Professor; Northwestern University, Assistant Professor; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Associate Professor, Professor; Brown University, Nancy Duke Lewis University Professor, Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women, Founding Director; Institute for Advanced Study, Member, Professor, Harold F. Linder Professor, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), p. 788-89
|
experience is that reality which demands meaningful response. Experience is taken to be so self-evident that he never defines the term This insists on establishing the importance and independence, the irreducibility of "experience." The absence of definition allows experience to resonate in many ways, but it also allows it to function as a universally understood category-the undefined word creates a sense of consensus by attributing to it an assumed, stable, and shared meaning. Experience establishes the possibility for objective knowledge and for communication among historians This has the effect of removing historians from critical scrutiny as active producers of knowledge.
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Experience is taken to be self-evident absence of definition allows experience to resonate in many ways allows it to function as a universally understood catego This has the effect of removing historians from critical scrutiny as active producers of knowledge
|
By definition, he argues, history is concerned with explanation; it is not a radical hermeneutics, but an attempt to account for the origin, persistence, and disappearance of certain meanings "at particular times and in specific sociocultural situations" ("IH," p. 882). For him explanation requires a separation of experience and meaning: experience is that reality which demands meaningful response. "Experience," in Toews's usage, is taken to be so self-evident that he never defines the term. This is telling in an article that insists on establishing the importance and independence, the irreducibility of "experience." The absence of definition allows experience to resonate in many ways, but it also allows it to function as a universally understood category-the undefined word creates a sense of consensus by attributing to it an assumed, stable, and shared meaning. Experience, for Toews, is a foundational concept. While recognizing that meanings differ and that the historian's task is to analyze the different meanings produced in societies and over time, Toews protects "experience" from this kind of relativism. In doing so he establishes the possibility for objective knowledge and for communication among historians, however diverse their positions and views. This has the effect (among others) of removing historians from critical scrutiny as active producers of knowledge. The insistence on the separation of meaning and experience is crucial for Toews, not only because it seems the only way to account for change, but also because it protects the world from "the hubris of wordmakers who claim to be makers of reality" ("IH," p. 906).
| 1,654 |
<h4>Experience denies us the ability to scrutinize your epistemology – this produces a bad model of debate </h4><p><u><strong>Scott ‘91</u></strong> (Joan W., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D; University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Assistant Professor; Northwestern University, Assistant Professor; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Associate Professor, Professor; Brown University, Nancy Duke Lewis University Professor, Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women, Founding Director; Institute for Advanced Study, Member, Professor, Harold F. Linder Professor,<strong> </strong>“The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), p. 788-89</p><p>By definition, he argues, history is concerned with explanation; it is not a radical hermeneutics, but an attempt to account for the origin, persistence, and disappearance of certain meanings "at particular times and in specific sociocultural situations" ("IH," p. 882). For him explanation requires a separation of experience and meaning: <u>experience is that reality which demands meaningful response.</u> "<u><mark>Experience</u></mark>," in Toews's usage, <u><mark>is taken to be</mark> so <mark>self-evident</mark> that he never defines the term</u>. <u>This</u> is telling in an article that <u>insists on establishing the importance and independence, the irreducibility of "experience." The <mark>absence of definition allows experience to resonate in many ways</mark>, but it also <mark>allows it to function as a universally understood catego</mark>ry-the undefined word creates a sense of consensus by attributing to it an assumed, stable, and shared meaning. Experience</u>, for Toews, is a foundational concept. While recognizing that meanings differ and that the historian's task is to analyze the different meanings produced in societies and over time, Toews protects "experience" from this kind of relativism. In doing so he <u>establishes the possibility for objective knowledge and for communication among historians</u>, however diverse their positions and views. <u><strong><mark>This has the effect</u> </strong></mark>(among others)<strong> <u><mark>of removing historians from critical scrutiny</strong> <strong>as active producers of knowledge</strong></mark>. </u>The insistence on the separation of meaning and experience is crucial for Toews, not only because it seems the only way to account for change, but also because it protects the world from "the hubris of wordmakers who claim to be makers of reality" ("IH," p. 906). </p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
Shell – Personal Experience Non-Falsifiable
| 430,911 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,048 |
legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
| null |
Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u>legalization and decriminalization are terms for <strong>very different proposals</strong> even though they are sometimes conflated</u>. <u>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u>. <u>„Legalization‟ <strong>authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</strong>, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u>.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil</u> (fines, counseling etc), <u>rather than criminal offense</u>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u></strong>.</p>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
t
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,049 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
4
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,050 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marihuana in the United States .
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marihuana in the United States .</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,912 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,051 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,052 |
Using experience to represent the ‘other’ reinforces dominant power relations – fails to affect political change
|
Pedwell ‘2
|
Pedwell ‘2 (Carolyn, PhD and visiting lecturer gender institute at LSE, “MARGINAL RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON LOCATION AND REPRESENTATION: SEEING THE SELF IN THE 'OTHER' AND THE 'OTHER' IN THE SELF :
|
on 12/6/2007)
the strategy of speaking only for one’s self is not only implausible, but likely to lead to the reinscription of dominant relations of power. the idea that one can ‘avoid the problematic of speaking for by retreating into an individualistic realm is based on an illusion there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experiences of others, nor is there a way to demarcate decisively a boundary between my location and all others speaking only from one’s specific experience and location is precisely what discursively colonise others Not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to speak only for themselves without affecting the representation of ‘Others’, but the political advantages of this practice appear negligible.
|
speaking only for one’s self is not only implausible but lead to the reinscription of dominant relations of power there is no neutral place to stand free and clear nor is there a way to demarcate decisively between my location and others’ speaking only from one’s specific experience what discursively colonise others affecting the representation of ‘Others’
|
(INTERSUBJECTIVE) REFLEXIVITY - A METHODOLOGY FOR REPRESENTING
'OTHERS' http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/genderInstitute/pdf/marginalResearch.pdf
accessed on 12/6/2007)
I want to argue that the strategy of speaking only for one’s self is not only implausible, but likely to lead to the reinscription of dominant relations of power. Firstly, as Alcoff (1995: 109) asserts, the idea that one can ‘avoid the problematic of speaking for by retreating into an individualistic realm is based on an illusion.’ She explains, ‘there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which my words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experiences of others, nor is there a way to demarcate decisively a boundary between my location and all others’ (ibid: 108). It is evident that an individual cannot separate her or his own practices of representation from the locations, situations and discursive practices of others. Secondly, it should be clear that speaking only from one’s specific experience and location is precisely what has led feminists to discursively colonise others women in the past. As Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997:12) point out, Speaking only from, about, and in relation to our own (untheorised) positions of relative privilege has, in fact, been part of the problem of feminism, contributing to its false universalising, and imperialising tendencies to the extent that it is hard to reconceptualise ‘speaking for one’s self’ as part of the solution. Not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of how individuals could speak only for themselves without affecting the representation of ‘Others’, but even if it were possible to do so, the political advantages of this practice appear negligible.
| 1,722 |
<h4>Using experience to represent the ‘other’ reinforces dominant power relations – fails to affect political change</h4><p><u><strong>Pedwell ‘2</u></strong> (Carolyn, PhD and visiting lecturer gender institute at LSE, “MARGINAL RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON LOCATION AND REPRESENTATION: SEEING THE SELF IN THE 'OTHER' AND THE 'OTHER' IN THE SELF :</p><p>(INTERSUBJECTIVE) REFLEXIVITY - A METHODOLOGY FOR REPRESENTING</p><p>'OTHERS' http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/genderInstitute/pdf/marginalResearch.pdf</p><p>accessed<u> on 12/6/2007)</p><p></u>I want to argue that <u>the strategy of <mark>speaking only for one’s self is not only implausible</mark>, <mark>but</mark> likely to <mark>lead to the reinscription of dominant relations of power</mark>.</u> Firstly, as Alcoff (1995: 109) asserts, <u>the idea that one can ‘avoid the problematic of speaking for by retreating into an individualistic realm is based on an illusion</u>.’ She explains, ‘<u><mark>there is no neutral place to stand free and clear</mark> in which</u> my<u> words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experiences of others, <mark>nor is there a way to demarcate decisively</mark> a boundary <mark>between my location and</mark> all <mark>others</u>’</mark> (ibid: 108). It is evident that an individual cannot separate her or his own practices of representation from the locations, situations and discursive practices of others. Secondly, it should be clear that <u><mark>speaking only from one’s specific experience</mark> and location is precisely <mark>what</u></mark> has led feminists to <u><mark>discursively colonise others</u></mark> women in the past. As Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997:12) point out, Speaking only from, about, and in relation to our own (untheorised) positions of relative privilege has, in fact, been part of the problem of feminism, contributing to its false universalising, and imperialising tendencies to the extent that it is hard to reconceptualise ‘speaking for one’s self’ as part of the solution. <u>Not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to</u> conceive of how individuals could <u>speak only for themselves without <mark>affecting the representation of ‘Others’</mark>, but</u> even if it were possible to do so, <u>the political advantages of this practice appear negligible.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
Shell – Personal Experience Non-Falsifiable
| 430,913 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,053 |
Nuke war
|
Thompson 14
|
Loren Thompson 4-24-2014 “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
|
this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. the Obama Administration credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO tensions are ratcheting up. successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. It is easy to imagine misjudgments in Ukraine which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives Any deployment could provoke Russian escalation. Misinterpretation of signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
this year’s crisis is a reminder that geopolitical concerns have not vanished Putin might be forced to aid ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence tensions are ratcheting up revisions of Russian military strategy place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” in response to conventional aggression it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate This isn’t saber-rattling It is easy to imagine misjudgments Misinterpretation can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint — poor intel battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and other influences — it seems reasonable to consider because Ukraine is so close there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished. In fact, Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.
| 7,969 |
<h4><strong>Nuke war </h4><p></strong>Loren <strong>Thompson</strong> 4-24-20<strong>14</strong> “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/</p><p>Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, <u><mark>this year’s crisis</mark> over Ukraine <mark>is a reminder that </mark>Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the <mark>geopolitical</mark> sources of its security <mark>concerns have not vanished</u></mark>. In fact, <u>Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine</u> by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then <u>it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. </u>Although <u>the Obama Administration</u> is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its <u>credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir <mark>Putin</mark> has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors</u>. <u>Having fomented <strong>revolt</strong> in eastern Ukraine</u>, <u>Moscow now says it <mark>might be forced to</mark> <strong>come to the <mark>aid</mark> of <mark>ethnic Russians</u></strong></mark> there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). <u><mark>Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence</mark> in the neighborhood</u>, <u>reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO</u>. So little by little,<u> <strong><mark>tensions</strong> are <strong>ratcheting up</mark>. </u></strong>One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that <u>successive <mark>revisions of Russian military strategy</mark> appear “to <mark>place a <strong>greater reliance on nuclear</mark> <mark>weapons”</strong> </mark>to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. </u>A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that <u>Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons <mark>in response to <strong>conventional aggression</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but <mark>it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate</mark> a conflict. <mark>This <strong>isn’t</strong></mark> just Russian <strong><mark>saber-rattling</u></strong></mark>. <u>The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war</u>. <u>The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away</u> from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, <u>and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons</u> in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So <u>improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine</u>. Here are four ways that <u>what started out as a local crisis could turn into something <strong>much worse.</strong> </u>Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. <u><mark>It is easy to imagine</u></mark> similar <u><strong><mark>misjudgments</strong></mark> in Ukraine</u>, <u>which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives</u>. <u>Any</u> sizable <u>deployment</u> of U.S. forces in the region <u>could provoke Russian escalation. </u>Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. <u><mark>Misinterpretation</mark> of </u>such<u> signals <mark>can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides <strong>up the “ladder of escalation” quickly</strong></mark>, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. </u>Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. <u>Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons</u>. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. <u><mark>U.S. policy even envisions <strong>letting allies deliver tactical warheads</strong></mark> against enemy targets.</u> Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. <u>Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. <mark>When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint</mark> in wartime</u> <u><mark>— poor intel</mark>ligence, garbled communication, <mark>battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and</mark> a host of <mark>other influences — it seems reasonable to consider</mark> that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons.</u> And <u><mark>because Ukraine is so close</mark> to the Russian heartland</u> (about 250 miles from Moscow) <u><mark>there’s no telling what might happen <strong>once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed</u></mark>. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 22,852 | 87 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,054 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4><strong>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u>, if still controversial, <u>proposal</u> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <strong><mark>one revenue stream</strong> would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u>. <u>In</u> the context of drugs like <u>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></mark> all, or even many, <u><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs</strong> </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u>because of differing state tax rates, <strong>the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
Adv 1
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,055 |
Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff
|
Lopez 9/25
|
Lopez 9/25/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder)
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana The question enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interferenc the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
|
On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric Holder said in an interview with Yahoo News that it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." The question, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference — arguably the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule, as I explained before. But the process also involves significant scientific and bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
| 1,886 |
<h4>Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff</h4><p><strong>Lopez 9/25<u></strong>/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder) </p><p></u>On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric <u><mark>Holder said</u></mark> in an interview with Yahoo News that <u><mark>it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification</u></mark> in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. <u><strong><mark>A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan</mark>a </u></strong>in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." <u>The question</u>, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, <u>enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs.</u> <u><mark>Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interferenc</mark>e</u> — arguably <u><mark>the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970.</mark> Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. </u>Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, <u><mark>the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule</u></mark>, as I explained before. But <u><mark>the process</u></mark> also <u><mark>involves</u> <u>significant</u></mark> scientific and <u><mark>bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.</p></u></mark>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
t
| 430,915 | 4 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,056 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,914 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,057 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4><strong>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u>, if still controversial, <u>proposal</u> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <strong><mark>one revenue stream</strong> would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u>. <u>In</u> the context of drugs like <u>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></mark> all, or even many, <u><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs</strong> </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u>because of differing state tax rates, <strong>the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></strong></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p>
|
1nc
| null |
LA
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,058 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
|
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
|
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4><strong>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,059 |
No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
Adv 1
| 430,917 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,060 |
Specificity - The energy DA is legitimately harmful in the debate space bc temas focus on prepping each other out instead of engaging in discussion – that’s net worse for your movement
ZOMPETTI 04 Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University [Joseph Zompetti, PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, September] The second major problem with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization. Dana Cloud (1998) poignantly argues that when focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation? If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively2 and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions and incoherent policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded? It is very difficult, if not impossible, to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments, creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination. Or, as Cloud suggests, such therapeutic arguments "deflect [sic] the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems (1998, p. 34). In addition, these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition.While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred as a result of personalizing debate, the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization (and their solutions) than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament. During squad meetings and coaching sessions, one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about whattopicality argument, framework argument, or counter-narrative will be deployed to win the judge's ballot. The problem of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination of more important factors such as resource disparity. Thus, the underlying therapeutic nature of personalized debate, coupled with the competitive component of trying to win debate rounds nullifies any chance at a fruitful and productive discussion about the problems of marginalization and their potential solutions. A focus on the personal – my experience, my narrative, my feelings, how I learn, how I can engage the community – is quite seductive; we all want to know how we fit into the larger policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded?
|
ZOMPETTI 04 The second major problem these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Specificity - The energy DA is legitimately harmful in the debate space bc temas focus on prepping each other out instead of engaging in discussion – that’s net worse for your movement </h4><p><strong>ZOMPETTI 04 </strong>Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University [Joseph Zompetti, PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, September] <u><strong>The</u> <u>second major problem</strong> with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization.</u> Dana <u>Cloud</u> (1998) poignantly <u>argues that when focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake</u> (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). <u>Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation?</u> If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively2 and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions and incoherent policies. On the other hand, <u>we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded?</u> <u>It is very difficult, if not impossible, to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments,</u> creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination. Or, <u>as Cloud suggests, such therapeutic arguments "deflect</u> [sic] <u>the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems</u> (1998, p. 34). In addition, <u><strong>these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition</u></strong>.<u>While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred</u> as a result of personalizing debate, <u>the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization</u> (and their solutions) <u>than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament</u>. <u>During squad meetings and coaching sessions, one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about what</u>topicality argument, <u>framework argument</u>, or counter-narrative <u>will be deployed to win the judge's ballot. The problem of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination of more important factors</u> such as resource disparity. <u>Thus, the underlying therapeutic nature of personalized debate, coupled with the competitive component of trying to win debate rounds nullifies any chance at a fruitful and productive discussion </u>about the problems of marginalization and their potential solutions. <u>A focus on the personal – my experience, my narrative, my feelings, how I learn, how I can engage the community – is quite seductive</u>; <u>we all want to know how we fit into the larger policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious</u>. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded? </p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
Shell – Personal Experience Non-Falsifiable
| 430,916 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,061 |
legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
| null |
Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>legalizing in the US” means marijuana has to be LEGAL IN THE US as a mandate of the plan- if they don’t change the CSA, they can’t be topical</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u>legalization and decriminalization are terms for <strong>very different proposals</strong> even though they are sometimes conflated</u>. <u>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u>. <u>„Legalization‟ <strong>authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</strong>, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u>.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil</u> (fines, counseling etc), <u>rather than criminal offense</u>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u></strong>.</p>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
Link – Courts
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,062 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,918 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,063 |
No impact to failed states - reject their flawed studies
|
Logan and Preble 10
|
Logan and Preble 10 (Justin, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato, and Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato, " Washington’s Newest Bogeyman: Debunking the Fear of Failed States," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer)//NR
|
survey of studies of state failure reveals a methodological wasteland. Because Afghanistan met anyone’s definition of failed state and because it contained a threat, analysts concluded en masse that failed states were threatening countries included on lists of failed states include such strategic non-entities as Congo, Liberia, and East Timor, greater risk of failure is not synonymous with greater consequences of failure the state failure-terrorism link “is less clear than many assume.” scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped together countries that have so little in common that neither academic nor policy should be influenced by this concept the conclusion led to the analysis, rather than vice versa.
|
state failure reveals a methodological wasteland analysts concluded en masse failed states were threatening risk of failure is not synonymous consequences of failure scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped together countries that have so little in common that neither academic nor policy should be influenced
|
A survey of the formal studies of state failure reveals a methodological wasteland. Analysts have created a number of listings of failed states, which have, in fairness, overlapped considerably; all are populated by poor countries, many of which have been wracked by interstate or civil violence.48 However, instead of adhering to basic social-scientific standards of inquiry, in which questions or puzzles are observed and then theories are described and tested using clearly defined independent and dependent variables, analysts began by drawing up a category—failed state—and then attempted to create data sets from which theoretical inferences could be induced. To take one prominent case, the authors of the State Failure Task Force Report contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence chose to adjust their definition of “failed state” after their initial criteria did not produce an adequate data set for the quantitative tests the researchers wanted to perform. After dramatically expanding the definition, the task force produced almost six times more countries that could be coded “failed” as compared with their original criteria and then proceeded with their statistical analysis. They justified this highly questionable decision on the judgment that “events that fall beneath [the] total-collapse threshold often pose challenges to US foreign policy as well.”49 Subsequently, the task force changed its name to the “Political Instability Task Force” and appeared to back away from the term failed state.50 Beyond methodological shortcomings, the lists of failed states reveal only that there are many countries plagued by severe problems. The top 10 states in the 2009 Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy magazine Failed States Index include two countries the United States occupies (Iraq and Afghanistan), one country without any central government to speak of (Somalia), four poor African states (Zimbabwe, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic), two resource-rich but unstable African countries (Sudan and Guinea) and a nuclear-armed Muslim country, population 176 million (Pakistan). The sheer diversity of the countries on the lists makes clear that few policy conclusions could be drawn about a country based on its designation as a failed state. In fact, what has happened is that analysts have seized on an important single data point—Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s—and used it to justify a focus on failed states more broadly. Because Afghanistan met anyone’s definition of failed state and because it clearly contained a threat, analysts concluded en masse that failed states were threatening. When confronted with the reality that the countries regularly included on lists of failed states include such strategic non-entities as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and East Timor, advocates of focusing on state failure routinely point back at the single case that can be justified directly on US national security grounds: Afghanistan.51 Even in Afghanistan, however, remedying the condition of “state failure” would not have eliminated the threat, and eliminating the threat—by killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and his confederates—would not have remedied the “failure.” The fact that expansive claims about the significance of state failure have been used to market studies of the subject, when viewed in light of the diverse and mostly nonthreatening states deemed “failed,” leaves the impression of a bait and switch. For instance, the 2007 update of the Failed States Index promises on the magazine’s cover to explain “why the world’s weakest countries pose the greatest danger.” The opening lines of the article declare that failed states “aren’t just a danger to themselves. They can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away.” Strikingly, then, the article does little to back up or even argue these claims. It instead shrugs that “failing states are a diverse lot” and that “there are few easy answers to their troubles.” By 2009, the index was conceding that “greater risk of failure is not always synonymous with greater consequences of failure,” and that the state failure-terrorism link “is less clear than many have come to assume.”52 Given these concessions undermining the idea that state failure is threatening, one wonders why scholars continue to study failed states at all. As seen above, the countries on lists of failed states are so diverse that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a state’s designation as failed. But the purpose, one would think, of creating a new category of states would be to unify countries that share attributes that can inform either how we think about these states or how we craft policies toward these states. Instead, the scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped together countries that have so little in common that neither academic research nor policy work should be influenced by this concept. Despite repeated claims to the contrary, learning that a task force has deemed a particular state “failed” is not particularly useful. Start with the Conclusions and Work Backward Existing scholarship on state failure seems to indicate that the conclusion led to the analysis, rather than vice versa. Scholars who argue that “failed state” is a meaningful category and/or indicative of threat provide a rationale for American interventionism around the globe. Given the arbitrary creation of the category “failed state” and the extravagant claims about its significance, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that research on failed states constitutes, as one analyst put it, “an eminently political discourse, counseling intervention, trusteeship, and the abandonment of the state form for wide swaths of the globe.”53
10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
| 6,280 |
<h4><u><strong>No impact to failed states - reject their flawed studies</h4><p></u>Logan and Preble 10<u></strong> (Justin, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato, and Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato, " Washington’s Newest Bogeyman: Debunking the Fear of Failed States," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer)//NR</p><p></u>A<u> survey of </u>the formal<u> studies of <mark>state failure reveals a methodological wasteland</mark>. </u>Analysts have created a number of listings of failed states, which have, in fairness, overlapped considerably; all are populated by poor countries, many of which have been wracked by interstate or civil violence.48 However, instead of adhering to basic social-scientific standards of inquiry, in which questions or puzzles are observed and then theories are described and tested using clearly defined independent and dependent variables, analysts began by drawing up a category—failed state—and then attempted to create data sets from which theoretical inferences could be induced. To take one prominent case, the authors of the State Failure Task Force Report contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence chose to adjust their definition of “failed state” after their initial criteria did not produce an adequate data set for the quantitative tests the researchers wanted to perform. After dramatically expanding the definition, the task force produced almost six times more countries that could be coded “failed” as compared with their original criteria and then proceeded with their statistical analysis. They justified this highly questionable decision on the judgment that “events that fall beneath [the] total-collapse threshold often pose challenges to US foreign policy as well.”49 Subsequently, the task force changed its name to the “Political Instability Task Force” and appeared to back away from the term failed state.50 Beyond methodological shortcomings, the lists of failed states reveal only that there are many countries plagued by severe problems. The top 10 states in the 2009 Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy magazine Failed States Index include two countries the United States occupies (Iraq and Afghanistan), one country without any central government to speak of (Somalia), four poor African states (Zimbabwe, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic), two resource-rich but unstable African countries (Sudan and Guinea) and a nuclear-armed Muslim country, population 176 million (Pakistan). The sheer diversity of the countries on the lists makes clear that few policy conclusions could be drawn about a country based on its designation as a failed state. In fact, what has happened is that analysts have seized on an important single data point—Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s—and used it to justify a focus on failed states more broadly.<u> Because Afghanistan met anyone’s definition of failed state and because it </u>clearly<u> contained a threat, <mark>analysts concluded en masse</mark> that <mark>failed states were threatening</u></mark>. When confronted with the reality that the<u> countries </u>regularly<u> included on lists of failed states include such strategic non-entities as </u>the Democratic Republic of the<u> Congo, Liberia, and East Timor, </u>advocates of focusing on state failure routinely point back at the single case that can be justified directly on US national security grounds: Afghanistan.51 Even in Afghanistan, however, remedying the condition of “state failure” would not have eliminated the threat, and eliminating the threat—by killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and his confederates—would not have remedied the “failure.” The fact that expansive claims about the significance of state failure have been used to market studies of the subject, when viewed in light of the diverse and mostly nonthreatening states deemed “failed,” leaves the impression of a bait and switch. For instance, the 2007 update of the Failed States Index promises on the magazine’s cover to explain “why the world’s weakest countries pose the greatest danger.” The opening lines of the article declare that failed states “aren’t just a danger to themselves. They can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away.” Strikingly, then, the article does little to back up or even argue these claims. It instead shrugs that “failing states are a diverse lot” and that “there are few easy answers to their troubles.” By 2009, the index was conceding that “<u>greater <mark>risk of failure is not</mark> </u>always<u> <mark>synonymous</mark> with greater <mark>consequences of failure</u></mark>,” and that<u> the state failure-terrorism link “is less clear than many </u>have come to<u> assume.”</u>52 Given these concessions undermining the idea that state failure is threatening, one wonders why scholars continue to study failed states at all. As seen above, the countries on lists of failed states are so diverse that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a state’s designation as failed. But the purpose, one would think, of creating a new category of states would be to unify countries that share attributes that can inform either how we think about these states or how we craft policies toward these states. Instead, the <u><mark>scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped together countries that have so little in common that neither academic</u></mark> research<u> <mark>nor policy</mark> </u>work<u> <mark>should be influenced</mark> by this concept</u>. Despite repeated claims to the contrary, learning that a task force has deemed a particular state “failed” is not particularly useful. Start with the Conclusions and Work Backward Existing scholarship on state failure seems to indicate that<u> the conclusion led to the analysis, rather than vice versa. </u>Scholars who argue that “failed state” is a meaningful category and/or indicative of threat provide a rationale for American interventionism around the globe. Given the arbitrary creation of the category “failed state” and the extravagant claims about its significance, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that research on failed states constitutes, as one analyst put it, “an eminently political discourse, counseling intervention, trusteeship, and the abandonment of the state form for wide swaths of the globe.”53<u> </p><p></u>10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
LA
| 67,485 | 3 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,064 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4><strong>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system<strong>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,065 |
Specificity- the losing team in policy debate is frustrated that the affirmative requires them to be the sacrificial lamb in the name of creating broader change which undermines any recognition the affirmative hopes the broader community will achieve.
|
Atchison and Panetta, 09
|
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)
|
Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.
|
Competition has been a critical component of intercollegiate debate The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature the losing debaters become collateral damage in the strategy dedicated toward creating community change. the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem
|
Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.
| 1,913 |
<h4>Specificity- the losing team in policy debate is frustrated that the affirmative requires them to be the sacrificial lamb in the name of creating broader change which undermines any recognition the affirmative hopes the broader community will achieve.</h4><p><strong>Atchison and Panetta, 09</strong> (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334<u>)</p><p><mark>Competition has been a critical component of </mark>the interest in <mark>intercollegiate debate</u></mark> from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. <u><mark>The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature </mark>of the community problem. </u>If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then <u><mark>the losing debaters become collateral damage in the </mark>activist <mark>strategy dedicated toward creating community change.</u></mark> <u>One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, <mark>the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change.</mark> <mark>Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community</mark> may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it <mark>does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem</u></mark>. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. <u>An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
Shell – Personal Experience Non-Falsifiable
| 130,833 | 201 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,066 |
Their impact ev is all political hype
|
Stewart 2014
|
Stewart 2014 (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004 the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010 This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism other analysts believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that 2013 immigration was down significantly from historical levels This hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at intervals for years along with the boogeyman of terrorism an analysis of the history of plots and the changes in transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis” is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010.¶ This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border is not new. It is something that has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now, along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While other border security analysts have told reporters that they believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded.
| 2,127 |
<h4><strong>Their impact ev is all political hype</h4><p>Stewart 2014</strong> (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)</p><p><u><mark>Lost in</mark> all <mark>the</mark> <mark>media hype over this “border crisis</u></mark>” <u><mark>is the fact that</mark> in <mark>2013</mark> overall <mark>immigration was down significantly from historical</u></mark> <u><mark>levels</u></mark>. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, <u>there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004</u>. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, <u>the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010</u>.¶ <u><mark>This</mark> type of <strong><mark>hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border</u></strong></mark> is not new. It is something that <u><mark>has surfaced at</mark> irregular <mark>intervals</mark> <mark>for years</mark> now</u>, <u><mark>along with</mark> scaremongering using <mark>the boogeyman of terrorism</u></mark>, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While <u>other</u> border security <u>analysts</u> have told reporters that they <u>believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis</u> and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that <u><mark>an analysis of the history of</mark> <mark>plots</mark> directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas <mark>and</mark> an examination of <mark>the changes in</mark> the dynamics of <mark>transnational terrorism</mark> <mark>show such claims to be unfounded</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
Adv 1
| 220,701 | 15 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,067 |
Court decisions are political and are perceived as such
|
Canon and Johnson 99
|
Canon and Johnson 99 — professor of polisci at UK and vice-presiding judge on the Oklahoma court of appeals, 99- (Bradley C. Canon and Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, 1999, p. 1)
|
judicial policies do not implement themselves. In virtually all instances, courts that formulate policies must rely on nonjudicial actors to transform these policies into action. Inevitably, just as making judicial policies is a political process, so too is the implementation of the policies- the issues are essentially political, and the actors are subject to political pressures.
| null |
President Andrew Jackson, unhappy with a Supreme Court decision, is said to have retorted: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” His remark reminds us of a central fact of American democracy: judicial policies do not implement themselves. In virtually all instances, courts that formulate policies must rely on other courts or on nonjudicial actors to transform these policies into action. Inevitably, just as making judicial policies is a political process, so too is the implementation of the policies- the issues are essentially political, and the actors are subject to political pressures.
| 618 |
<h4>Court decisions are political and are perceived as such</h4><p><strong>Canon and Johnson 99 <u></strong>— professor of polisci at UK and vice-presiding judge on the Oklahoma court of appeals, 99- (Bradley C. Canon and Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, 1999, p. 1)</p><p></u>President Andrew Jackson, unhappy with a Supreme Court decision, is said to have retorted: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” His remark reminds us of a central fact of American democracy: <u>judicial policies do not implement themselves. In virtually all instances, courts that formulate policies must rely on </u>other courts or on <u>nonjudicial actors to transform these policies into action. Inevitably, just as making judicial policies is a political process, so too is the implementation of the policies- the issues are essentially political, and the actors are subject to political pressures.</p></u>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
Link – Courts
| 249,435 | 5 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,068 |
Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran
|
CNN 1/9
|
CNN 1/9/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)
|
Iranian and American negotiators will be eying another showdown in Washington GOP lawmakers are poised to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions the majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap With fewer than two months until agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors supporters know the clock is ticking the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 needed to override a veto A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
, GOP poised t push a bill authorizing additional sanctions majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need fight is already underway f With fewer than two months expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House the four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push . A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
Iranian and American negotiators preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions will also be eying another showdown brewing in Washington. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, GOP lawmakers are poised to wield their new power in the Senate to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions against Iran. But the new 54-member majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need to override a presidential veto, and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap. With fewer than two months until diplomats' March 1 framework agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors, supporters know the clock is ticking to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though Kirk said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican expects a high-profile challenge from the White House and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the four Democrats who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House and allies made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 Democrats needed to override a presidential veto. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."
| 7,128 |
<h4>Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran</h4><p><strong>CNN 1/9</strong>/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)</p><p><u>Iranian and American negotiators</u> preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions <u>will</u> also <u>be eying</u> <u>another showdown</u> brewing <u>in Washington</u>. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal<mark>, <u>GOP</mark> lawmakers are <mark>poised t</mark>o</u> wield their new power in the Senate to <u><mark>push a bill authorizing additional sanctions</mark> </u>against Iran. But <u>the</u> new 54-member <u><mark>majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need</u></mark> to override a presidential veto, <u>and the <strong><mark>fight is already underway</strong> f</mark>or the votes that could fill the gap</u>. <u><mark>With fewer than two months</mark> until</u> diplomats' March 1 framework <u>agreement deadline, and <mark>expecting the <strong>White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors</u></strong></mark>, <u>supporters know the clock is ticking</u> to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, <u><strong><mark>the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran</u></strong></mark>, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though <u><mark>Kirk</u></mark> said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican <u><mark>expects a <strong>high-profile challenge from the White House</u></strong></mark> and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back <mark>the <u>four Democrats</u></mark> who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware <u><mark>rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations <strong>after the White House</strong></mark> </u>and allies<u> <strong><mark>made its push</strong></mark> on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote</u>. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even <u>if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15</u> Democrats <u>needed to override a</u> presidential <u>veto</u><mark>.</mark> And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. <u><mark>A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the <strong>toughest battle yet on this issue</u></strong></mark>, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."</p>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 220,775 | 10 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,069 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,919 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,070 |
Relations high and resilient—specifically sovles their internal link and impact
|
Grobe 2/18 US and Mexico – a strong but difficult relationship” By Dr. Stefan Grobe 18/02/14 http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/18/the-us-and-mexico-a-strong-but-difficult-relationship/)//kyan
|
Grobe 2/18 (Stefan, PhD “ The US and Mexico – a strong but difficult relationship” By Dr. Stefan Grobe 18/02/14 http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/18/the-us-and-mexico-a-strong-but-difficult-relationship/)//kyan
|
scope of US-Mexican relations is broad and goes beyond diplomatic and official contacts and entails extensive commercial, cultural, and educational ties, tourists to Mexico numbered over 20.3 million in 2012 making Mexico the top destination of US travelers. Cooperation between the United States and Mexico along the common border includes state and local problem-solving mechanisms; transportation planning; and institutions to address resource, environment and health issues 21st Century Border Management was created to spur advancements and Mexican border states are active participants in these me Border Liaison Mechanisms operate in “sister city” pairs and have proven to be an effective means of dealing with a variety of local issues including border infrastructure Cooperation on environmental and natural resources issues United States and Mexico have a long history of cooperation on environmental issues, particularly in the border area, where there are serious environmental problems US and Mexico take place under a number of arrangements such as the US-Mexico Border 2012/2020 Program; the North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission; the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Border Health Commission; and a variety of other agreements The International Boundary and Water Commission is an international organization responsible for managing a wide variety of water resource US security cooperation with Mexico Merida Initiative”, both countries have established an unprecedented partnership US cooperation with Mexico under the Merida Initiative directly supports programs to help Mexico train its police forces i Mexico is the United States’ second-largest export marke Mexican investment in the United States has grown by over 11 percent in the past year
|
US-Mexican relations is broad goes beyond diplomati contacts, and entails commercial, cultural, and educational ties Mexico the top destination of US travelers Cooperation along the border includes state and local problem-solving mechanisms titutions to address resource, environment and health issues Merida Initiative”, established an unprecedented partnership Mexican investment in the United States has grown
|
The scope of US-Mexican relations is broad and goes beyond diplomatic and official contacts, and entails extensive commercial, cultural, and educational ties, with over 1.25 billion dollars of two-way trade and roughly one million legal border crossings each day. In addition, a million American citizens live in Mexico. US tourists to Mexico numbered over 20.3 million in 2012 making Mexico the top destination of US travelers. Mexican tourists to the northern neighbor were about 13.4 million in 2011, and they spent some $9.2 billion. Cooperation along the common border Cooperation between the United States and Mexico along the common border includes state and local problem-solving mechanisms; transportation planning; and institutions to address resource, environment and health issues. In 2010, a high level Executive Steering Committee for 21st Century Border Management was created to spur advancements in creating a modern, secure, and efficient border. The multi-agency US-Mexico Binational Group on Bridges and Border Crossings meets twice yearly to improve the efficiency of existing crossings and coordinate planning for new ones. The ten US and Mexican border states are active participants in these meetings. Chaired by consuls from both countries, Border Liaison Mechanisms operate in “sister city” pairs and have proven to be an effective means of dealing with a variety of local issues including border infrastructure, accidental violation of sovereignty by law enforcement officials, charges of mistreatment of foreign nationals, and cooperation in public health matters. Cooperation on environmental and natural resources issues The United States and Mexico have a long history of cooperation on environmental and natural resource issues, particularly in the border area, where there are serious environmental problems caused by rapid population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. Cooperative activities between the US and Mexico take place under a number of arrangements such as the US-Mexico Border 2012/2020 Program; the North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission; the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; the Border Health Commission; and a variety of other agreements that address border health, wildlife and migratory birds, national parks, forests, and marine and atmospheric resources. The International Boundary and Water Commission, created by a treaty between the United States and Mexico, is an international organization responsible for managing a wide variety of water resource and boundary preservation issues. US security cooperation with Mexico With the so-called “Merida Initiative”, both countries have established an unprecedented partnership to address violence and crime while strengthening the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Since 2010, this cooperation has been organized under four strategic pillars. The first pillar aims to disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate and the second pillar focuses on enhancing the capacity of Mexico’s government and institutions to sustain the rule of law. The Merida Initiative’s third pillar aims to improve border management to facilitate legitimate trade and movement of people while thwarting the flow of drugs, arms, and cash. Finally, the fourth pillar seeks to build strong and resilient communities. US cooperation with Mexico under the Merida Initiative directly supports programs to help Mexico train its police forces in modern investigative techniques, promote a culture of lawfulness, and implement key justice reforms. Bilateral economic relations Mexico is the United States’ second-largest export market (after Canada) and third-largest trading partner (after Canada and China). In 2012, two-way merchandise trade reached nearly $500 billion. Mexico’s exports rely heavily on supplying the US market, but the country has also sought to diversify its export destinations. Nearly 78 percent of Mexico’s exports in 2012 went to the United States. In 2012, Mexico was the third-largest supplier of foreign crude oil to the United States, as well as the largest export market for US refined petroleum products and a growing market for US natural gas. Top US exports to Mexico include electrical machinery, nuclear equipment, motor vehicle parts, mineral fuels and oils, and plastics. US companies have invested $101 billion in Mexico. Mexican investment in the United States has grown by over 11 percent in the past year to $27.9 billion. It has grown by over 35 percent the past five years. Mexico is the seventh fastest growing investor country in the United States.
| 4,655 |
<h4>Relations high and resilient—specifically sovles their internal link and impact</h4><p><strong>Grobe 2/18 </strong>(Stefan, PhD “ The<strong> US and Mexico – a strong but difficult relationship” By Dr. Stefan Grobe 18/02/14 http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/18/the-us-and-mexico-a-strong-but-difficult-relationship/)//kyan</p><p></strong>The <u>scope of <mark>US-Mexican relations is broad</mark> and <mark>goes beyond diplomati</mark>c and official <mark>contacts</u>, <u>and entails</mark> extensive <mark>commercial, cultural, and educational ties</mark>,</u> with over 1.25 billion dollars of two-way trade and roughly one million legal border crossings each day. In addition, a million American citizens live in Mexico. US <u>tourists to Mexico numbered over 20.3 million in 2012 making <mark>Mexico the top destination of US travelers</mark>.</u> Mexican tourists to the northern neighbor were about 13.4 million in 2011, and they spent some $9.2 billion. Cooperation along the common border <u><mark>Cooperation</mark> between the United States and Mexico <mark>along the</mark> common <mark>border includes</mark> <mark>state and local problem-solving mechanisms</mark>; transportation planning; and ins<mark>titutions to address resource, environment and health issues</u></mark>. In 2010, a high level Executive Steering Committee for <u>21st Century Border Management was created to spur advancements</u> in creating a modern, secure, and efficient border. The multi-agency US-Mexico Binational Group on Bridges and Border Crossings meets twice yearly to improve the efficiency of existing crossings and coordinate planning for new ones. The ten US <u>and Mexican border states are active participants in these me</u>etings. Chaired by consuls from both countries, <u>Border Liaison Mechanisms operate in “sister city” pairs and have proven to be an effective means of dealing with a variety of local issues including border infrastructure</u>, accidental violation of sovereignty by law enforcement officials, charges of mistreatment of foreign nationals, and cooperation in public health matters. <u>Cooperation on environmental and natural resources issues </u>The <u>United States and Mexico have a long history of cooperation on environmental</u> and natural resource <u>issues, particularly in the border area, where there are serious environmental problems</u> caused by rapid population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. Cooperative activities between the<u> US and Mexico take place under a number of arrangements such as the US-Mexico Border 2012/2020 Program; the North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission; the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation;</u> the <u>Border Health Commission; and a variety of other agreements </u>that address border health, wildlife and migratory birds, national parks, forests, and marine and atmospheric resources. <u>The International Boundary and Water Commission</u>, created by a treaty between the United States and Mexico, <u>is an international organization responsible for managing a wide variety of water resource</u> and boundary preservation issues. <u>US security cooperation with Mexico </u>With the so-called “<u><mark>Merida Initiative”,</mark> both countries have <mark>established an unprecedented partnership</u></mark> to address violence and crime while strengthening the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Since 2010, this cooperation has been organized under four strategic pillars. The first pillar aims to disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate and the second pillar focuses on enhancing the capacity of Mexico’s government and institutions to sustain the rule of law. The Merida Initiative’s third pillar aims to improve border management to facilitate legitimate trade and movement of people while thwarting the flow of drugs, arms, and cash. Finally, the fourth pillar seeks to build strong and resilient communities. <u>US cooperation with Mexico under the Merida Initiative directly supports programs to help Mexico train its police forces i</u>n modern investigative techniques, promote a culture of lawfulness, and implement key justice reforms. Bilateral economic relations <u>Mexico is the United States’ second-largest export marke</u>t (after Canada) and third-largest trading partner (after Canada and China). In 2012, two-way merchandise trade reached nearly $500 billion. Mexico’s exports rely heavily on supplying the US market, but the country has also sought to diversify its export destinations. Nearly 78 percent of Mexico’s exports in 2012 went to the United States. In 2012, Mexico was the third-largest supplier of foreign crude oil to the United States, as well as the largest export market for US refined petroleum products and a growing market for US natural gas. Top US exports to Mexico include electrical machinery, nuclear equipment, motor vehicle parts, mineral fuels and oils, and plastics. US companies have invested $101 billion in Mexico. <u><mark>Mexican investment in the United States has grown</mark> by over 11 percent in the past year</u> to $27.9 billion. It has grown by over 35 percent the past five years. Mexico is the seventh fastest growing investor country in the United States.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
LA
| 430,920 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,071 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4><strong>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u>, if still controversial, <u>proposal</u> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <strong><mark>one revenue stream</strong> would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u>. <u>In</u> the context of drugs like <u>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></mark> all, or even many, <u><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs</strong> </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u>because of differing state tax rates, <strong>the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,072 |
Heres a new impact to their framework - Making debate about personal narratives is self-destructive---making the judges choose between whose personal experiences are more meaningful is VIOLENT and denies the intensity of our individual experiences
|
Subotnik 98
|
Subotnik 98 Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681, Lexis
|
the central message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly What can an academic possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power lives is... ultimately obliterating These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly - destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles. Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others It is because of this conversation-stopping effect that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected. the kinds of issues are too important to be confined to communities of color. it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse
|
the central message is that the minority scholar hurts What can an academic possibly say No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? These words will invite responses only from sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disunite others I hurt," demands for this reason editors, privileged self-destructive articles by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves to gain perspective it precludes the possibility of structured conversation with others this conversation-stopping effect succeeded in limiting academic debate Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, generated a kind of cynicism . It drives the public to the right and ensures CRT is reflexively rejected.
|
Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77¶ [*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.
| 4,136 |
<h4>Heres a new impact to their framework - Making debate about personal narratives is self-destructive---making the judges choose between whose personal experiences are more meaningful is VIOLENT and denies the intensity of our individual experiences</h4><p><strong>Subotnik 98</strong> Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681, Lexis</p><p>Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, <u><strong><mark>the central</u></strong></mark> CRT <u><strong><mark>message is </mark>not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly</u></strong>, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - <u><strong>but <mark>that the minority scholar </mark>himself or herself <mark>hurts</mark> and hurts badly</u></strong>.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. <u><strong><mark>What can an academic</mark> </u></strong>trained to [*694] question and to doubt n72 <u><strong><mark>possibly say</mark> to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?</u></strong> n73 <u><strong>"<mark>No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?</u></strong></mark> "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, <u><strong>writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power</u></strong>... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our <u><strong>lives is... ultimately obliterating</u></strong>." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." <u><strong><mark>These words will </mark>clearly <mark>invite responses only from </mark>fools and <mark>sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, </mark>disconcert and <mark>disunite others</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>"<mark>I hurt,"</mark> in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>it <mark>demands </mark>priority from the reader's conscience. It is <mark>for this reason</mark> that law review <mark>editors, </mark>waiving usual standards, have<mark> privileged </mark>a long trail of undisciplined - even silly</u></strong> n75 <u><strong>- destructive and, above all, <mark>self-destructive</mark> <mark>articles</mark>.</u></strong> n76 <u><strong>Second, <mark>by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt</mark> in a similar way, <mark>"I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves</mark> from their pain in order <mark>to gain perspective</mark> on their condition</u></strong>. n77¶ [*696] <u><strong>Last, as we have seen, <mark>it precludes the possibility of </mark>open and <mark>structured conversation with others</u></strong></mark>. n78 [*697] <u><strong>It is because of <mark>this conversation-stopping effect</u></strong></mark> of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" <u><strong>that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.</u></strong> "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If <u><strong>through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs <mark>succeeded in limiting academic debate</u></strong></mark>, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? <u><strong><mark>Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race,</mark> n80 I suggest, has <mark>generated a kind of cynicism</mark> in white audiences</u></strong> which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs<mark>. <u><strong>It drives the </mark>American <mark>public to the right and ensures</mark> that anything <mark>CRT</mark> offers <mark>is reflexively rejected.</u></strong></mark>¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, <u><strong>the kinds of issues</u></strong> raised by Williams <u><strong>are too important</u></strong> in their implications [*698] for American life <u><strong>to be confined to communities of color.</u></strong> If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, <u><strong>it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse </u></strong>to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
Shell – Personal Experience Non-Falsifiable
| 14,677 | 194 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,073 |
Congress gets the blame for unpopular judicial policies
|
Canon and Johnson 99
|
Canon and Johnson 99 — professor of polisci at UK and vice-presiding judge on the Oklahoma court of appeals, 99- (Bradley C. Canon and Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, 1999, p. 116-117)
|
agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial policies Congress cannot ignore any sizable or prominent groups of constituents. groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress
| null |
More than any other public agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial policies. As a political body, Congress cannot ignore any sizable or prominent groups of constituents. Some groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision or doctrine, and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress. If the pressure is great enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, Congress will, if feasible, take action. At the very least, numerous members of Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups.
| 678 |
<h4>Congress gets the blame for unpopular judicial policies</h4><p><strong>Canon and Johnson 99</strong> — professor of polisci at UK and vice-presiding judge on the Oklahoma court of appeals, 99- (Bradley C. Canon and Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, 1999, p. 116-117)</p><p>More than any other public <u>agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial policies</u>. As a political body, <u>Congress cannot ignore any sizable or prominent groups of constituents.</u> Some <u>groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision</u> or doctrine, <u>and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress</u>. If the pressure is great enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, Congress will, if feasible, take action. At the very least, numerous members of Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups.</p>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
Link – Courts
| 32,309 | 16 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,074 |
No nuclear terror.
|
Chapman 12
|
Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]
|
Given their inability to do something simple Ohio State University professor John Mueller “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” Russia’s devices are no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.
Mexico’s growth rate is more likely about 1.7%, the officials reduced projected growth to 1.8%, blaming continued financial sluggishness in the United States under-spending by the Mexican treasury in hurricane and tropical storms devastated Mexico’s shave another percentage off growth the overall economy remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up whe reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are enacted Those include a tax overhaul and opening the oil to foreign investment extortion hinder the business environment. crime and insecurity cost Mexican 16.5 billion
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure a study to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either One of the principal scholars Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
|
Given their inability to do something simple “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.
Mexico’s growth rate is likely about 1.7%, under-spending by the Mexican treasury hurricane devastated Mexico shave percentage off growth the economy remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up when reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are enacted. Those include a tax overhaul and opening oil to foreign investment crime and insecurity cost Mexicans 16.5 billion
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high predicted growth that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ . Crime and corruption tend to be symptoms demonstrating failure a study build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail
|
Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.
No interal link to Haddick—he’s writing about a mexico collapse—their cards only say some violence—also tons of alt cuases they can’t solve
Wilkinson, 10-1-13 – Tracy, Columnist with the Los Angeles Times, “Economists dial down projections for Mexico's growth,” LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-economy-pena-nieto-20131001,0,711698.story.
Now, however, even government economists have had to dial down the projections. Mexico’s economy contracted in the second quarter for the first time in four years. The growth rate is more likely about 1.7%, the government says, or half the prediction of just 10 months ago -- and a little less than half of last year’s pace. Some private economists put the current rate even lower. Previously, officials reduced projected growth to 1.8%, blaming continued financial sluggishness in the United States, with whose economy Mexico is tightly entwined, and on under-spending by the Mexican treasury in the initial months of the new government. Last week, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray added more bad news. He said the hurricane and tropical storms that devastated parts of Mexico’s two coasts last month could shave another 0.1 percentage point off growth, to 1.7%. The storms killed about 150 people, destroyed farmland and livestock and crippled roads and other infrastructure. On Tuesday, the official Bank of Mexico said its monthly survey of experts showed expectations diminishing even further. Its report put anticipated growth at 1.4%. The government insists the overall economy remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up when wide-ranging reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are finally enacted. Those include a tax overhaul and opening the state oil monopoly to foreign investment. “I’m confident the deceleration is temporary,” Reuters quoted Agustin Carstens, the head of the Bank of Mexico, as saying. He added that Mexico’s “solid macroeconomic pillars” should bring the country out of its slump by early next year. The shaky economic performance comes as violence continues in many parts of the country. Statistics out this week show a significant uptick in kidnappings and extortion, crimes that hinder the business environment. Homicides seemed to be continuing a pattern of declining. The national statistics institute, known by the acronym INEGI, said in a new report that crime and insecurity cost Mexicans roughly $16.5 billion last year, or about 1.34% of GDP. That includes everything from ransom and extortion money paid to the cost of security measures.
Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree
Couch, 2012 (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)
A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
| 7,392 |
<h4><strong>No nuclear terror.</h4><p>Chapman 12<u></strong><mark> [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]</p><p>Given their inability to do something simple</u></mark> — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued <u>Ohio State University professor John Mueller</u> in a presentation at the University of Chicago, <u><mark>“the likelihood</u></mark> that <u><mark>a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems</u></mark> to be <u><strong><mark>vanishingly small.”</u></strong></mark> The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from <u>Russia’s</u> inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those <u>devices are</u> probably <u>no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards</u> designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of <u><mark>building a bomb</u></mark>. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It <u><mark>requires millions </u></mark>of dollars, <u><mark>a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus</u></mark> people with <u><mark>specialized skills</u></mark>, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. <u><mark>Assuming</u></mark> the <u><mark>jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.</u></mark> Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like <u><mark>every</u></mark> other <u><mark>step</u></mark> in the entire process, <u><mark>means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.</u></mark> That has heartening implications. If <u><mark>al-Qaida </u></mark>embarks on the project, it <u><mark>has <strong>only a minuscule chance</u></strong></mark> of seeing it bear fruit. <u><mark>Given the formidable odds, <strong>it</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>won’t bother.</p><p></u></mark>No interal link to Haddick—he’s writing about a mexico collapse—their cards only say some violence—also tons of alt cuases they can’t solve</p><p>Wilkinson, 10-1-13 – </strong>Tracy, Columnist with the Los Angeles Times, “Economists dial down projections for Mexico's growth,” LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mexico-economy-pena-nieto-20131001,0,711698.story. </p><p>Now, however, even government economists have had to dial down the projections. <u><mark>Mexico’s</u></mark> economy contracted in the second quarter for the first time in four years. The <u><mark>growth rate is</mark> more <mark>likely</mark> <mark>about 1.7%,</mark> the</u> government says, or half the prediction of just 10 months ago -- and a little less than half of last year’s pace. Some private economists put the current rate even lower. Previously, <u>officials reduced projected growth to 1.8%,</u> <u>blaming continued financial sluggishness in the United States</u>, with whose economy Mexico is tightly entwined, and on <u><mark>under-spending by the Mexican treasury</mark> in</u> the initial months of the new government. Last week, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray added more bad news. He said the <u><mark>hurricane</mark> and tropical storms</u> that <u><mark>devastated</u></mark> parts of <u><mark>Mexico</mark>’s</u> two coasts last month could <u><mark>shave </mark>another</u> 0.1 <u><mark>percentage</u></mark> point <u><mark>off</u></mark> <u><mark>growth</u></mark>, to 1.7%. The storms killed about 150 people, destroyed farmland and livestock and crippled roads and other infrastructure. On Tuesday, the official Bank of Mexico said its monthly survey of experts showed expectations diminishing even further. Its report put anticipated growth at 1.4%. The government insists <u><mark>the</mark> overall <mark>economy</mark> <mark>remains healthy, will avoid recession and will pick up</mark> <mark>whe</u>n</mark> wide-ranging <u><mark>reforms proposed by Peña Nieto are</mark> </u>finally<u> <mark>enacted</u>. <u>Those include a tax overhaul and opening</mark> the</u> state <u><mark>oil</u></mark> monopoly <u><mark>to foreign investment</u></mark>. “I’m confident the deceleration is temporary,” Reuters quoted Agustin Carstens, the head of the Bank of Mexico, as saying. He added that Mexico’s “solid macroeconomic pillars” should bring the country out of its slump by early next year. The shaky economic performance comes as violence continues in many parts of the country. Statistics out this week show a significant uptick in kidnappings and <u>extortion</u>, crimes that <u>hinder the business environment.</u> Homicides seemed to be continuing a pattern of declining. The national statistics institute, known by the acronym INEGI, said in a new report that <u><mark>crime and insecurity cost Mexican</u>s</mark> roughly $<u><mark>16.5 billion</u><strong></mark> last year, or about 1.34% of GDP. That includes everything from ransom and extortion money paid to the cost of security measures.</p><p>Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree </p><p>Couch, 2012</strong> (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>A ‘collapsed’ state</u></mark>, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, <u><mark>suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’</mark>, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’</u>.16 <u><strong><mark>Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico</mark> disappearing like those earlier European states <mark>seems </strong>implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high</mark>er <mark>predicted growth</mark> than either the UK, Germany or the USA; <mark>that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours</mark>,</u> which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; <u><mark>and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities</u>’</mark> that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse<mark>. <u>Crime and corruption tend to be</mark> described not as causes but as <mark>symptoms demonstrating failure</u></mark>. For example, <u><mark>a study</mark> </u>for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting <u>to <mark>build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either</u></mark>.19 <u>One of the principal scholars</u> on the subject, <u>Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger</u>.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. <u>This absence may reflect an assessment <mark>that<strong> numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail</u></strong></mark>. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 <u><strong>Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
Adv 1
| 18,931 | 81 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,075 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis<u>/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,076 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4><strong>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,077 |
Latin America is stable and democratic now
|
The Guardian 09
|
The Guardian 09 Why Latin America's left keeps winning Washington's foreign policy establishment has been proven wrong. Latin America is more stable and democratic than ever Share 64 Mark Weisbrot guardian.co.uk, Friday 1 May 2009 14.00 EDT http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/apr/30/ecuador-election-economy
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Ecuador and Bolivia are now more politically stable than they have been for decades. They are also more democratic than they have ever been. most of Latin America is going through a democratic transition that is likely to prove every bit as important as the one that brought an end to the dictatorships that plagued many countries through the first four decades of the post-second world war era The left governments have mostly succeeded where their neoliberal predecessors failed Left governments have also taken greater control over their natural resources (Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela) and delivered on their promises to share the income from these resources with the poor. This is the way democracy is supposed to work: people voted for change and got quite a bit of what they voted for We should not be surprised if most Latin American voters stick with the left through hard times.
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Ecuador and Bolivia are now more politically stable than they have been for decades. They are more democratic of Latin America is going through a democratic transition The left governments have mostly succeeded where their neoliberal predecessors failed Left governments have also taken greater control over their and delivered on their promises to share the income from with the poor.
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The Times (and Washington's foreign policy establishment) have proven to be wrong, as Ecuador and Bolivia are now more politically stable than they have been for decades. (Ecuador has had nine presidents over the last 15 years). They are also more democratic than they have ever been. In fact, most of Latin America is going through a democratic transition that is likely to prove every bit as important as the one that brought an end to the dictatorships that plagued many countries through the first four decades of the post-second world war era. Ironically, the region's economic performance was vastly better in the era of the dictatorships, because the governments of that era generally had more effective economic policies than the formally democratic but neoliberal governments that replaced them. A few years ago there were fears, backed by polling data, that people would become nostalgic for the days of real (not imagined) authoritarian governments because of the much greater improvements in living standards during that era. Instead, they chose to vote for left governments who extended democracy from politics to economic and social policy. The left governments have mostly succeeded where their neoliberal predecessors failed. Partly they have benefited from an acceleration in world economic growth during most of the last five years. But they have also changed their economic policies in ways that increased economic growth. Argentina's economy grew more than 60% in six years and Venezuela's by 95%. These are enormous growth rates even taking into account these countries' prior recessions, and allowed for large reductions in poverty. Left governments have also taken greater control over their natural resources (Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela) and delivered on their promises to share the income from these resources with the poor. This is the way democracy is supposed to work: people voted for change and got quite a bit of what they voted for, with reasonable expectations of more to come. We should not be surprised if most Latin American voters stick with the left through hard times. Who else is going to defend their interests?
| 2,153 |
<h4>Latin America is stable and democratic now</h4><p><strong>The Guardian 09</strong> Why Latin America's left keeps winning Washington's foreign policy establishment has been proven wrong. Latin America is more stable and democratic than ever Share 64 Mark Weisbrot guardian.co.uk, Friday 1 May 2009 14.00 EDT http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/apr/30/ecuador-election-economy</p><p>The Times (and Washington's foreign policy establishment) have proven to be wrong, as <u><mark>Ecuador and Bolivia are now more politically stable than they have been for decades.</u></mark> (Ecuador has had nine presidents over the last 15 years). <u><mark>They</mark> <mark>are</mark> also <mark>more democratic</mark> than they have ever been. </u>In fact, <u>most <mark>of Latin America is going through a democratic transition</mark> that is likely to prove every bit as important as the one that brought an end to the dictatorships that plagued many countries through the first four decades of the post-second world war era</u>. Ironically, the region's economic performance was vastly better in the era of the dictatorships, because the governments of that era generally had more effective economic policies than the formally democratic but neoliberal governments that replaced them. A few years ago there were fears, backed by polling data, that people would become nostalgic for the days of real (not imagined) authoritarian governments because of the much greater improvements in living standards during that era. Instead, they chose to vote for left governments who extended democracy from politics to economic and social policy. <u><mark>The left governments have mostly succeeded where their neoliberal predecessors failed</u></mark>. Partly they have benefited from an acceleration in world economic growth during most of the last five years. But they have also changed their economic policies in ways that increased economic growth. Argentina's economy grew more than 60% in six years and Venezuela's by 95%. These are enormous growth rates even taking into account these countries' prior recessions, and allowed for large reductions in poverty. <u><mark>Left governments have also taken greater control over their</mark> natural resources (Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela) <mark>and delivered on their promises to share the income from</mark> these resources <mark>with the poor.</mark> This is the way democracy is supposed to work: people voted for change and got quite a bit of what they voted for</u>, with reasonable expectations of more to come. <u>We should not be surprised if most Latin American voters stick with the left through hard times.</u> Who else is going to defend their interests?</p>
|
1nc
| null |
LA
| 430,922 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,078 |
Adversarial method is often inappropriate for understanding race issues
|
Menkel 96
|
Menkel 96 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown and UCLA Law Schools and CoDirect or, UCLA Center for Conflict Resolution. William & Mary Law Review October, 1996 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 W.M. KECK FOUNDATION FORUM ON THE TEACHING OF LEGAL ETHICS: THE TROUBLE WITH THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN A POSTMODERN, MULTICULTURAL WORLD lexis
|
the complexities of modern life for example strong race issues contribute to the problematic result that different people will interpret the same "fact" in different ways. Because of such interpretive differences I find not only the structures of the adversary system wanting, but also how we think about the people within those structures. Modern scholars have questioned each of the following assumptions underlying the use of the adversary system objectivity, neutrality, argument by opposition and refutation and fairness. Lay people claim a crisis of legitimacy when the "race card" is deemed more important than any other factor As scholars, we must take these criticisms seriously. Multiculturalism, and all of the controversy that it has spawned in the universities has at least reminded us that there is demographic, as well as epistemological, "positionality" and we do not all see things the same way. With a healthy respect for the new knowledge about knowledge, we need to examine whether the adversary system helps or hinders the way we sort out disputes, differences, misunderstandings, and wrongdoings. scholars have criticized modern adversarialism for the ways it teaches people to act toward each other. I am more concerned that the rhetoric and structure of adversarial discourse prevent not just better and nicer behavior, n30 [*11] but more accurate and open thinking
|
strong race issues contribute to the problematic result that different people will interpret the same "fact" in different ways I find not only the structures of the adversary system wanting, but also how we think about the people within those structures. Modern scholars questioned assumptions underlying the use of the adversary system objectivity, neutrality, argument by opposition and refutation Lay people claim a crisis of legitimacy when the "race card" is deemed more important than any other factor With a healthy respect for the new knowledge about knowledge, we need to examine whether the adversary system helps or hinders the way we sort out disputes, differences, misunderstandings, and wrongdoing adversarial discourse prevent more accurate and open thinking
|
Even if some form of the adversary system was defensible in particular settings n10 for purposes of adjudication, n11 the "ad-versary" model employed in the courtroom has bled inappropriately into and infected other aspects of lawyering, including negotia-tions carried on both "in the shadow of the court" n12 and outside [*8] of it in lawyers' transactional work. n13 Even in situations that call simply for factual determinations, the complexities of modern life for example, the strong race issues implicated in several recent, notorious American cases n14 contribute to the problematic result that different people will interpret the same "fact" in different ways. n15 Because of such interpretive differences, therefore, I find not only the structures of the adversary system wanting, but also how we think about the people within those structures. Modern scholars outside of, as well as within, law have questioned each of the following assumptions underlying the use of the adversary system objectivity, neutrality, argument by opposition and refutation, appeals to common and shared values, and fairness. n16 In my view, it is time for us to examine how these [*9] assumptions, which often are not "true," have affected our legal system. Lay people claim a crisis of legitimacy in the legal system, especially, for example, when the "race card" is deemed more important than any other factor in a trial, n17 often not trusting jury verdicts. As scholars, we must take these criticisms seriously. Multiculturalism, and all of the controversy that it has spawned in the universities, n18 has at least reminded us that there is demographic, as well as epistemological, "positionality" n19 and we do not all see things the same way. With a healthy respect for the new knowledge about knowledge, we need to examine whether the adversary system helps or hinders the way we sort out disputes, differences, misunderstandings, and wrongdoings. Furthermore, the complexities of both modern life and modern lawsuits have shown us that disputes often have more than two sides in the sense that legal disputes and transactions involve [*10] many more than two parties. Procedures and forms like interpleader, joinder, consolidation, and class actions have attempted to allow more than just plaintiffs' and defendants' voices to be heard, all the while structuring the discourse so t hat parties ultimately must align themselves on one side of the adversarial line or another. Multiparty, multiplex n20 lawsuits or disputes may be distorted when only two sides are possible. Consider all of the multiparty and complex policy i ssues that courts contend with in environmental clean-up and siting, n21 labor disputes in the public sector, n22 consumer actions, n23 antitrust actions, n24 mass torts, n25 school fi-nancing and desegregation, n26 and other civil rights issues, n27 to name a few examples. Finally, scholars have criticized modern adversarialism for the ways it teaches people to act toward each other. n28 Although I share some of the critics' views regarding the incivility of lawyers, n29 I am more concerned that the rhetoric and structure of adversarial discourse prevent not just better and nicer behavior, n30 [*11] but more accurate and open thinking.
| 3,266 |
<h4>Adversarial method is often inappropriate for understanding race issues</h4><p><strong>Menkel 96</strong> Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown and UCLA Law Schools and CoDirect or, UCLA Center for Conflict Resolution. William & Mary Law Review October, 1996 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 W.M. KECK FOUNDATION FORUM ON THE TEACHING OF LEGAL ETHICS: THE TROUBLE WITH THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN A POSTMODERN, MULTICULTURAL WORLD lexis</p><p>Even if some form of the adversary system was defensible in particular settings n10 for purposes of adjudication, n11 the "ad-versary" model employed in the courtroom has bled inappropriately into and infected other aspects of lawyering, including negotia-tions carried on both "in the shadow of the court" n12 and outside [*8] of it in lawyers' transactional work. n13 Even in situations that call simply for factual determinations, <u>the complexities of modern life for example</u>, the <u><mark>strong race issues</u></mark> implicated in several recent, notorious American cases n14 <u><mark>contribute to the problematic result that different people will interpret the same "fact" in different ways</mark>. </u>n15 <u>Because of such interpretive differences</u>, therefore, <u><mark>I find not only the structures of the adversary system wanting, but also how we think about the people within those structures.</mark> <mark>Modern scholars</u></mark> outside of, as well as within, law <u>have <mark>questioned</mark> each of the following <mark>assumptions underlying the use of the adversary system objectivity, neutrality, argument by opposition and refutation</u></mark>, appeals to common and shared values, <u>and fairness.</u> n16 In my view, it is time for us to examine how these [*9] assumptions, which often are not "true," have affected our legal system. <u><mark>Lay people claim a crisis of legitimacy</u></mark> in the legal system, especially, for example, <u><mark>when the "race card" is deemed more important than any other factor</mark> </u>in a trial, n17 often not trusting jury verdicts. <u>As scholars, we must take these criticisms seriously. Multiculturalism, and all of the controversy that it has spawned in the universities</u>, n18 <u>has at least reminded us that there is demographic, as well as epistemological, "positionality" </u>n19 <u>and we do not all see things the same way. <mark>With a healthy respect for the new knowledge about knowledge, we need to examine whether the adversary system helps or hinders the way we sort out disputes, differences, misunderstandings, and wrongdoing</mark>s. </u>Furthermore, the complexities of both modern life and modern lawsuits have shown us that disputes often have more than two sides in the sense that legal disputes and transactions involve [*10] many more than two parties. Procedures and forms like interpleader, joinder, consolidation, and class actions have attempted to allow more than just plaintiffs' and defendants' voices to be heard, all the while structuring the discourse so t hat parties ultimately must align themselves on one side of the adversarial line or another. Multiparty, multiplex n20 lawsuits or disputes may be distorted when only two sides are possible. Consider all of the multiparty and complex policy i ssues that courts contend with in environmental clean-up and siting, n21 labor disputes in the public sector, n22 consumer actions, n23 antitrust actions, n24 mass torts, n25 school fi-nancing and desegregation, n26 and other civil rights issues, n27 to name a few examples. Finally, <u>scholars have criticized modern adversarialism for the ways it teaches people to act toward each other.</u> n28 Although I share some of the critics' views regarding the incivility of lawyers, n29 <u>I am more concerned that the rhetoric and structure of <mark>adversarial discourse prevent</mark> not just better and nicer behavior, n30 [*11] but <mark>more accurate and open thinking</u></mark>.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
2NC – Turns Racism
| 430,921 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,079 |
Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage
|
Francis 2014
|
Francis 2014 (David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous)
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
dangerously beholden" to the Saudis and the rest of OPEC, as Senator Kerry claims? No more than we are "dangerously beholden" to the guys who run grocery stores the Saudis (like most of the rest of OPEC) need the revenues produced by the oil trade to keep from starving. Given the lack of any other particularly profitable industry within Arab OPEC member states, oil producers need the money generated by oil sales more than oil consumers need the petroleum. not once has an OPEC member state chosen to pursue political objectives rather than profit maximizing objectives when making decisions about oil production. The idea that oil sheiks decide how much to pump based on their feelings towards the West is a self-serving myth perpetuated by oil regimes All that happened during 1973 oil embargo, for instance, is that instead of buying oil from OPEC, the United States bought oil from other market actors that bought oil from OPEC and shifted consumption to non-OPEC producer Sheik Yamani conceded later, the embargo "did not imply that we could reduce imports to the United States ... the world is really just one market
US production of liquid petroleum is surpassing its previous peak, reached in 1970, in the latest landmark for the country’s shale oil boom. Four decades of decline in US oil output have been reversed in just five years of growth. Petroleum production, including crude oil and related liquids, known as condensate, and natural gas liquids (NGLs) such as ethane, was 11.27m barrels per day in April, almost equalling the peak of 11.3m b/d reached as an average for 1970. Recent growth rates suggest that it has now exceeded that figure. , the rebound in US output has refuted claims that it was in irreversible long-term decline. Forecasts from the US Energy Information Administration suggest that crude production will also come close to its 1970 peak in the next few years The US is already the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, taken together, and is one of the top three in terms of oil alone, alongside Russia and Saudi Arabia. The US oil industry has been transformed by the innovations of smaller independent companies that pioneered the development of shale oil in the Bakken formation of North Dakota and the Eagle Ford in south Texas. Advances in the techniques of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have made it possible to extract previously inaccessible resources, and high oil prices made it commercially attractive. it was difficult to predict how far US production would continue to rise. He added that the technology was evolving at an accelerating rate, and it was “not beyond the bounds of possibility that we could be producing 20m b/d in 2020”.
It has been three years since US President Barack Obama announced his intent to “pivot” strategically to Asia there has been little progress toward implementing this strategy. And yet Mr Obama is now visiting some of America’s stalwart allies in the Asia Pacific on a weeklong tour One question on everybody’s mind is: can the US president convince increasingly sceptical allies that he is committed to Asia’s future? But the real question should be: does it need to? the international news cycle is focused on eastern Europe where Russia is making splashes in its backyard Ukrainian pool. In the Middle East and South Asia, where the US spent all of last decade fighting wars, the situation is not cooling either. In stark comparison, the Asia Pacific region is characterised by relatively cordial and peaceable relations between the various countries. None have taken drastic military actions for decades and transnational militancy is almost unheard of. The worst events usually arise from natural disasters which are becoming easier to deal with as each nations grows in prosperity. the security situation in the Asia Pacific is actually one of the safest in the world. Most of the economies are growing stronger each year, largely on their own steam. Trade is booming and standard of living is rising. Yet Mr Obama is looking at the region from an American point of view. He wants the region to keep relying on America militarily and economically So after three years and little evidence of regional initiatives or commitment of military resources, perhaps Mr Obama is beginning to recognise the limits of US dependency. He will have his hands full with a diverse agenda as he tries to balance a defence commitment with US allies and console China that this updated defence structure is not directed at them. But he won’t be able to have it both ways The US is changing in the eyes of the Asia Pacific governments and is probably more considered as a back-up option, rather than the first port-of-call. Japan is taking good care of itself militarily, as are the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China. This attitude is in part a response to a US retreat from overstretched commitments around the world but there is also a sense that Asia does not need the US as much as it did in the past.
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decriminalization would push the price of pot down taking away a key revenue stream for cartels It’s forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests cartels are stealing from energy companies a practice common in West Africa the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May Los Zetas are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from the state oil company
not once has an OPEC member state chosen to pursue political objectives rather than profit maximizing objectives The idea that oil sheiks decide how much to pump based on their feelings towards the West is a self-serving myth perpetuated by oil regimes during 1973 oil embargo the United States shifted consumption to non-OPEC producers
US production of petroleum is surpassing its previous peak in 1970, in the latest landmark for the shale oil boom. Four decades of decline have been reversed in five years of growth the rebound in US output refuted claims that it was in irreversible decline US is the world’s largest producer of oil and gas and one of the top three in oil alone US oil has been transformed by innovations of smaller companies Advances in fracturing and horizontal drilling made it possible to extract previously inaccessible resources, and high oil prices made it commercially attractive the tech was evolving at an accelerating rate, and we could be producing 20m b/d in 2020
the Asia Pacific region is characterised by peaceable relations None have taken drastic military actions for decades The worst events arise from natural disasters the security situation in the Asia Pacific is actually one of the safest in the world economies are growing stronger each year Japan is taking good care of itself militarily, as are Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China there is also a sense that Asia does not need the US
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Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
No impact to oil dependence
Taylor, 4 – senior fellow at the CATO institute (Jerry, “energy independence? Kerry’s dreaming,” August 24, 2004)
Are we then "dangerously beholden" to the Saudis and the rest of OPEC, as Senator Kerry claims? No more than we are "dangerously beholden" to the guys who run grocery stores. Sure, we need the oil to keep the economy going, but the Saudis (like most of the rest of OPEC) need the revenues produced by the oil trade to keep from starving. Given the lack of any other particularly profitable industry within Arab OPEC member states, oil producers need the money generated by oil sales more than oil consumers need the petroleum. That explains why over the entire history of the cartel, not once has an OPEC member state chosen to pursue political objectives rather than profit maximizing objectives when making decisions about oil production. The idea that oil sheiks decide how much to pump based on their feelings towards the West is a self-serving myth perpetuated by oil regimes that want foreign policy brownie points for doing what they must do regardless. Simply reducing the amount of oil we import from the Middle East would likewise accomplish nothing. A Saudi production cutback would increase the cost of oil produced in Texas, Mexico, and Russia just as much as it would increase the cost of oil produced in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, if we don't buy Saudi oil, somebody else would. Given the global nature of the marketplace, what matters is overall supply and demand, not who provides the supply or who makes the demand. But wouldn't we be less vulnerable to some future embargo were we less dependent on Middle East oil? No. All that happened during 1973 oil embargo, for instance, is that instead of buying oil from OPEC, the United States bought oil from other market actors that bought oil from OPEC and shifted consumption to non-OPEC producers (whose old customers shifted to OPEC). It was the production cutback that accompanied the embargo - not the embargo itself - that drove the resulting oil spike. As Sheik Yamani conceded later, the embargo "did not imply that we could reduce imports to the United States ... the world is really just one market. So the embargo was more symbolic than anything else."
Energy independence now
Crooks, 6/15 (Ed, US Industry and Energy Editor at the Financial Times, Financial Times, US petroleum production hits 44-year high, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/37afc468-f48f-11e3-a143-00144feabdc0.html#axzz36KkpIQlM, 6/15/14, //gf)
Nomac Drilling Corp. derrick man Justin Spruell, right, climbs down from an overhead platform after connecting a section of drill pipe on a Chesapeake Energy Corp. natural gas drill site in Bradford County, Pennsylvania, U.S., on Tuesday, April 6, 2010©Bloomberg US production of liquid petroleum is surpassing its previous peak, reached in 1970, in the latest landmark for the country’s shale oil boom. Four decades of decline in US oil output have been reversed in just five years of growth. Petroleum production, including crude oil and related liquids, known as condensate, and natural gas liquids (NGLs) such as ethane, was 11.27m barrels per day in April, almost equalling the peak of 11.3m b/d reached as an average for 1970. Recent growth rates suggest that it has now exceeded that figure. The composition of US production today is not the same as in the early 1970s, in that it has a higher proportion of NGLs, which have a lower energy content and value than crude oil. Crude production of 8.3m b/d in April was still well short of its record high of 10m b/d in November 1970. Even so, the rebound in US output has refuted claims that it was in irreversible long-term decline. Forecasts from the US Energy Information Administration suggest that crude production will also come close to its 1970 peak in the next few years. The US is already the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, taken together, and is one of the top three in terms of oil alone, alongside Russia and Saudi Arabia. The US boom is in sharp contrast to oil production elsewhere in the world, which is constrained by decline in mature areas such as the North Sea and political and security issues in countries such as Iraq and Syria. UK oil production has continued a steep decline in recent years, falling by more than two-thirds from its high point of just under 3m b/d in 1999. The turmoil in northern Iraq, affecting some of the country’s principal oil-producing areas, sent the price of Brent crude up 4 per cent last week, its biggest one-week rise since July last year. The price of US benchmark West Texas Intermediate crude has also risen, showing how, in spite of being an increasingly important producer, the US is not immune to the effects of disruption in world markets. The rise in world oil prices is, however, being curbed by US production, which over 2005-13 accounted for almost all of the increase in global supply. The US oil industry has been transformed by the innovations of smaller independent companies that pioneered the development of shale oil in the Bakken formation of North Dakota and the Eagle Ford in south Texas. Advances in the techniques of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have made it possible to extract previously inaccessible resources, and high oil prices made it commercially attractive. Philip Verleger, an energy economist, said that it was difficult to predict how far US production would continue to rise. He added that the technology was evolving at an accelerating rate, and it was “not beyond the bounds of possibility that we could be producing 20m b/d in 2020”. However, the US government’s EIA has predicted that production will peak again around 2020 and then start to decline. Mark Lewis, an energy analyst at Kepler Cheuvreux, said that because the most attractive reserves had been drilled first, and the output from old shale wells declined very quickly, future production growth would be more difficult to achieve. Predictions that the US could surpass Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production of about 9.7m b/d and sustain that for a long time were “completely overblown”, he added.
No impact pivot
Smith 4/24 (Nathan, staff writer “Does Asia need the US 'pivot' after all?” The National Business Review 4/24/14 <http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/does-asia-need-us-pivot-after-all-ns-155210>)
It has been three years since US President Barack Obama announced his intent to “pivot” strategically to Asia. Perhaps because of the dozens of the world’s burning conflict zones or whether the “pivot” plans were simple rhetoric, there has been little progress toward implementing this strategy. And yet Mr Obama is now visiting some of America’s stalwart allies in the Asia Pacific on a weeklong tour. He will stop in at Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines on a mission to reassure these nations that the US has not forgotten them. One question on everybody’s mind is: can the US president convince increasingly sceptical allies that he is committed to Asia’s future? But the real question should be: does it need to? It can’t be easy being the US president. The world is a fluid place and America has fingers in most pies. Right now, the international news cycle is focused on eastern Europe where Russia is making splashes in its backyard Ukrainian pool. In the Middle East and South Asia, where the US spent all of last decade fighting wars, the situation is not cooling either. A calmer region, in contrast In stark comparison, the Asia Pacific region is characterised by relatively cordial and peaceable relations between the various countries. None have taken drastic military actions for decades and transnational militancy is almost unheard of. The worst events usually arise from natural disasters which are becoming easier to deal with as each nations grows in prosperity. Taking a step back, and putting the simmering maritime disputes aside for a moment, the security situation in the Asia Pacific is actually one of the safest in the world. Most of the economies are growing stronger each year, largely on their own steam. Trade is booming and standard of living is rising. Yet Mr Obama is looking at the region from an American point of view. He wants the region to keep relying on America militarily and economically. But he also sees the reality: a region growing almost self-sufficiently without too much input from the world’s largest economy. Many elites in Asia want more American focus too, especially to counter a rising China. Mr Obama agrees with them, at least in theory, but his actions seem to belie a different path and a more nuanced strategy. Looking again at details of the US planned defense spending reveals the Obama administration never meant to spend more that $US10 billion in additional military resources as part of the “pivot” this year. So after three years and little evidence of regional initiatives or commitment of military resources, perhaps Mr Obama is beginning to recognise the limits of US dependency. He will have his hands full with a diverse agenda as he tries to balance a defence commitment with US allies and console China that this updated defence structure is not directed at them. But he won’t be able to have it both ways. The US is changing in the eyes of the Asia Pacific governments and is probably more considered as a back-up option, rather than the first port-of-call. Japan is taking good care of itself militarily, as are the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China. This attitude is in part a response to a US retreat from overstretched commitments around the world but there is also a sense that Asia does not need the US as much as it did in the past.
| 12,857 |
<h4><strong>Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage</h4><p>Francis 2014 </strong>(David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous<u>)</p><p>Wider <mark>decriminalization would push the price of pot down</mark>, <mark>taking away a key revenue stream for cartels</mark> like Los Zetas and La Familia. </u>It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> also <mark>forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa</mark>, <mark>upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests</mark>.</u></strong> A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. <u>Grayson also said that the <mark>cartels are stealing from energy companies</mark>, <mark>a practice</mark> more <mark>common in West Africa</mark> than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, <mark>the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May</mark> in Veracruz alone. “<mark>Los Zetas</mark>, in particular, <mark>are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from</mark> Pemex, <mark>the state oil company<strong></mark>. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.” </p><p></u>No impact to oil dependence</p><p>Taylor, 4</strong> – senior fellow at the CATO institute (Jerry, “energy independence? Kerry’s dreaming,” August 24, 2004)</p><p>Are we then "<u>dangerously beholden" to the Saudis and the rest of OPEC, as Senator Kerry claims? No more than we are "dangerously beholden" to the guys who run grocery stores</u>. Sure, we need the oil to keep the economy going, but <u>the Saudis (like most of the rest of OPEC) need the revenues produced by the oil trade to keep from starving. Given the lack of any other particularly profitable industry within Arab OPEC member states, oil producers need the money generated by oil sales more than oil consumers need the petroleum.</u> That explains why over the entire history of the cartel, <u><mark>not once has an OPEC member state chosen to pursue political objectives rather than profit maximizing objectives</mark> when making decisions about oil production. <mark>The idea that oil sheiks decide how much to pump based on their feelings towards the West is a self-serving myth perpetuated by oil regimes</u></mark> that want foreign policy brownie points for doing what they must do regardless. Simply reducing the amount of oil we import from the Middle East would likewise accomplish nothing. A Saudi production cutback would increase the cost of oil produced in Texas, Mexico, and Russia just as much as it would increase the cost of oil produced in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, if we don't buy Saudi oil, somebody else would. Given the global nature of the marketplace, what matters is overall supply and demand, not who provides the supply or who makes the demand. But wouldn't we be less vulnerable to some future embargo were we less dependent on Middle East oil? No. <u>All that happened <mark>during 1973 oil embargo</mark>, for instance, is that instead of buying oil from OPEC, <mark>the United States</mark> bought oil from other market actors that bought oil from OPEC and <mark>shifted consumption to non-OPEC producer</u>s</mark> (whose old customers shifted to OPEC). It was the production cutback that accompanied the embargo - not the embargo itself - that drove the resulting oil spike. As <u>Sheik Yamani conceded later, the embargo "did not imply that we could reduce imports to the United States ... the world is really just one market</u><strong>. So the embargo was more symbolic than anything else."</p><p>Energy independence now</p><p>Crooks, 6/15 </strong>(Ed, US Industry and Energy Editor at the Financial Times, Financial Times, US petroleum production hits 44-year high, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/37afc468-f48f-11e3-a143-00144feabdc0.html#axzz36KkpIQlM, 6/15/14, //gf)</p><p>Nomac Drilling Corp. derrick man Justin Spruell, right, climbs down from an overhead platform after connecting a section of drill pipe on a Chesapeake Energy Corp. natural gas drill site in Bradford County, Pennsylvania, U.S., on Tuesday, April 6, 2010©Bloomberg <u><mark>US production of</mark> liquid <mark>petroleum is surpassing its previous peak</mark>, reached <mark>in 1970, in the latest landmark for the</mark> country’s <mark>shale oil boom. Four decades of decline</mark> in US oil output <mark>have been reversed in</mark> just <strong><mark>five years of growth</strong></mark>. Petroleum production, including crude oil and related liquids, known as condensate, and natural gas liquids (NGLs) such as ethane, was 11.27m barrels per day in April, almost equalling the peak of 11.3m b/d reached as an average for 1970. Recent growth rates suggest that it has now exceeded that figure. </u>The composition of US production today is not the same as in the early 1970s, in that it has a higher proportion of NGLs, which have a lower energy content and value than crude oil. Crude production of 8.3m b/d in April was still well short of its record high of 10m b/d in November 1970. Even so<u>, <mark>the rebound in US output</mark> has <strong><mark>refuted claims</strong> that it was in irreversible</mark> long-term <mark>decline</mark>. Forecasts from the US Energy Information Administration suggest that crude production will also come close to its 1970 peak in the next few years</u>. <u>The <mark>US is</mark> already <mark>the world’s <strong>largest producer of oil and gas</strong></mark>, taken together, <mark>and</mark> is <mark>one of the <strong>top three</strong> in</mark> terms of <mark>oil alone</mark>, alongside Russia and Saudi Arabia. </u>The US boom is in sharp contrast to oil production elsewhere in the world, which is constrained by decline in mature areas such as the North Sea and political and security issues in countries such as Iraq and Syria. UK oil production has continued a steep decline in recent years, falling by more than two-thirds from its high point of just under 3m b/d in 1999. The turmoil in northern Iraq, affecting some of the country’s principal oil-producing areas, sent the price of Brent crude up 4 per cent last week, its biggest one-week rise since July last year. The price of US benchmark West Texas Intermediate crude has also risen, showing how, in spite of being an increasingly important producer, the US is not immune to the effects of disruption in world markets. The rise in world oil prices is, however, being curbed by US production, which over 2005-13 accounted for almost all of the increase in global supply. <u>The <mark>US oil </mark>industry <mark>has been transformed by</mark> the <mark>innovations of smaller</mark> independent <mark>companies</mark> that pioneered the development of shale oil in the Bakken formation of North Dakota and the Eagle Ford in south Texas. <mark>Advances in</mark> the techniques of hydraulic <strong><mark>fracturing</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>horizontal drilling</strong></mark> have <mark>made it possible to extract previously inaccessible resources, and high oil prices made it <strong>commercially attractive</strong></mark>. </u>Philip Verleger, an energy economist, said that <u>it was difficult to predict how far US production would continue to rise. He added that <mark>the tech</mark>nology <mark>was <strong>evolving</strong> at an accelerating rate, and </mark>it was “not beyond the bounds of possibility that <mark>we could be producing 20m b/d in 2020</mark>”.</u><strong> However, the US government’s EIA has predicted that production will peak again around 2020 and then start to decline. Mark Lewis, an energy analyst at Kepler Cheuvreux, said that because the most attractive reserves had been drilled first, and the output from old shale wells declined very quickly, future production growth would be more difficult to achieve. Predictions that the US could surpass Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production of about 9.7m b/d and sustain that for a long time were “completely overblown”, he added.</p><p>No impact pivot </p><p>Smith 4/24 </strong>(Nathan, staff writer “Does Asia need the US 'pivot' after all?” The National Business Review 4/24/14 <http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/does-asia-need-us-pivot-after-all-ns-155210>)</p><p><u>It has been three years since US President Barack Obama announced his intent to “pivot” strategically to Asia</u>. Perhaps because of the dozens of the world’s burning conflict zones or whether the “pivot” plans were simple rhetoric, <u>there has been little progress toward implementing this strategy. And yet Mr Obama is now visiting some of America’s stalwart allies in the Asia Pacific on a weeklong tour</u>. He will stop in at Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines on a mission to reassure these nations that the US has not forgotten them. <u>One question on everybody’s mind is: can the US president convince increasingly sceptical allies that he is committed to Asia’s future? But the real question should be: does it need to? </u>It can’t be easy being the US president. The world is a fluid place and America has fingers in most pies. Right now, <u>the international news cycle is focused on eastern Europe where Russia is making splashes in its backyard Ukrainian pool. In the Middle East and South Asia, where the US spent all of last decade fighting wars, the situation is not cooling either. </u>A calmer region, in contrast <u>In stark comparison, <mark>the Asia Pacific region is characterised by</mark> relatively cordial and <mark>peaceable relations</mark> between the various countries. <mark>None have taken drastic military actions for decades</mark> and transnational militancy is almost unheard of. <mark>The worst events</mark> usually <mark>arise from natural disasters </mark>which are becoming easier to deal with as each nations grows in prosperity. </u>Taking a step back, and putting the simmering maritime disputes aside for a moment, <u><mark>the security situation in the Asia Pacific is actually one of the <strong>safest in the world</strong></mark>. Most of the <mark>economies are growing stronger each year</mark>, largely on their own steam. Trade is booming and standard of living is rising. Yet Mr Obama is looking at the region from an American point of view. He wants the region to keep relying on America militarily and economically</u>. But he also sees the reality: a region growing almost self-sufficiently without too much input from the world’s largest economy. Many elites in Asia want more American focus too, especially to counter a rising China. Mr Obama agrees with them, at least in theory, but his actions seem to belie a different path and a more nuanced strategy. Looking again at details of the US planned defense spending reveals the Obama administration never meant to spend more that $US10 billion in additional military resources as part of the “pivot” this year. <u>So after three years and little evidence of regional initiatives or commitment of military resources, perhaps Mr Obama is beginning to recognise the limits of US dependency. He will have his hands full with a diverse agenda as he tries to balance a defence commitment with US allies and console China that this updated defence structure is not directed at them. But he won’t be able to have it both ways</u>. <u>The US is changing in the eyes of the Asia Pacific governments and is probably more considered as a back-up option, rather than the first port-of-call. <mark>Japan is taking good care of itself militarily, as are</mark> the <mark>Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China</mark>. This attitude is in part a response to a US retreat from overstretched commitments around the world but <mark>there is also a sense that Asia does not need the US</mark> as much as it did in the past<strong>.</p></u></strong>
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Neg vs NW OW
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1NC
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Cartels
| 431,057 | 41 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
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Kentucky
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1
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Northwestern OBrien-Worku
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Gannon
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Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,080 |
State immigration regulations kill the economy- uncertainty and inability to operate across state lines
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Fitz 10
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Fitz 10 (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)
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The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniable Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules and regulations governing hiring practices. And requiring U.S. citizens traveling throughout the country to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion
]
Then there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. . Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise give cause for concern there are shades of the 1930s, when global finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices China is perhaps even more fragile its economic growth depend on foreign investment Both will be constricted in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
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The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniabl . Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules governing hiring requiring U.S. citizens to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns
there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. Russia and China's rise give cause for concern. there are shades of the 30s, when global finance ground to a halt peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers rose up rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys Russian stock market has demonstrated fragility China is even more fragile, None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
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The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniable. Congress’s power to establish the nation’s immigration policy was enshrined in the Constitution because of the critical foreign policy implications that it triggers. But there are equally significant practical implications in modern America. Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules and regulations governing hiring practices. And requiring U.S. citizens traveling throughout the country to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns and constitutional questions. This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion. It is time to put the brakes on this movement once and for all, and the administration’s brief in Candelaria is an important first step.
U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war
Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008 [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
| 3,665 |
<h4><strong>State immigration regulations kill the economy- uncertainty and inability to operate across state lines</h4><p>Fitz 10</strong> (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniabl</mark>e</u></strong>. Congress’s power to establish the nation’s immigration policy was enshrined in the Constitution because of the critical foreign policy implications that it triggers. But there are equally significant practical implications in modern America<mark>. <u><strong>Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules</mark> and regulations <mark>governing hiring</mark> practices. And <mark>requiring U.S. citizens</mark> traveling throughout the country <mark>to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns</u></strong></mark> and constitutional questions. <u><strong>This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion</u>. It is time to put the brakes on this movement once and for all, and the administration’s brief in Candelaria is an important first step.</p><p>U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war</p><p>Friedberg and Schoenfeld</strong>, 20<strong>08 </strong> [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html<u>]</p><p>Then <mark>there are</u></mark> the dolorous <u><mark>consequences of a</u></mark> potential <u><mark>collapse of the world's financial architecture.</mark> </u>For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos<u>.<mark> Russia</mark>'s new militancy <mark>and China's</mark> seemingly relentless <mark>rise </u></mark>also <u><mark>give cause for concern</u>.</mark> If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario <u><mark>there are shades of the</mark> 19<mark>30s,</mark> <mark>when global</u></mark> trade and <u><mark>finance ground</mark> nearly <mark>to a halt</mark>, the <mark>peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers</mark> led by the remorseless fanatics who <mark>rose up</mark> on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that <mark>rogue states may choose to become</u></mark> ever more <u><mark>reckless with their nuclear toys</mark>, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors</u> even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the <u><mark>Russian stock market has demonstrated</mark> the <mark>fragility</mark> of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices</u>, now driven down by the global slowdown. <u><mark>China is</mark> perhaps <mark>even more fragile</u>,</mark> <u>its economic growth depend</u>ing heavily <u>on foreign investment</u> and access to foreign markets. <u>Both will</u> now <u>be constricted</u>, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest <u>in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. <mark>None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders</mark> of these countrie<strong><mark>s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Neg vs MSU BP
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1NC
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Adv 2
| 42,129 | 155 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
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4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,081 |
The Supreme Court influences the agenda-it’s perceived
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Flemming 97
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Flemming 97 — Professor of polisci at Texas A & M, 97-(Roy Flemming, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, Number 4, American Journal of Political Science)
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. The Supreme Court may be more effective in drawing attention to issues and identifying problems The judicial venue may increase issue visibility and legitimacy for issue advocates Supreme Court decisions confer and remove benefits, both material and symbolic, and can under some circumstances rearrange the distribution of political influence Decisions that rearrange political benefits may, draw other political institutions into the fray, as well as amplify both public and media attention. certain circumstances he Supreme Court may profoundly affect the agenda setting process in the United States, and constitute an institutional source of change in American public policy and politics.
| null |
In this study we focus on the United States Supreme Court as a bellwether of systemic attention to policy issues. In Federalist 78, Hamilton offered his by now famous and often repeated opinion that the Court would be "the least dangerous branch." Without the power of the sword or purse at its disposal, the Court's authority in American politics would ultimately depend on its ability to persuade. The Supreme Court, however, may be more effective in drawing attention to issues and identifying problems than in changing preferences about them (cf. Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra 1995). The judicial venue may increase issue visibility and legitimacy for issue advocates. As with other United States political institutions, Supreme Court decisions confer and remove benefits, both material and symbolic, and can under some circumstances rearrange the distribution of political influence. When decisions rearrange political benefits and influence, the response is predictably a continuation of conflict. Decisions that rearrange political benefits or influence in the extreme, as for example in cases involving school desegregation, flag-burning, or public school prayer, often expand the scope of conflict by activating new groups and accentuating old rivalries. These processes may, in turn, draw other political institutions into the fray, as well as amplify both public and media attention. Thus, under certain circumstances he Supreme Court may profoundly affect the agenda setting process in the United States, and in doing so constitute an institutional source of change in American public policy and politics.
| 1,622 |
<h4>The Supreme Court influences the agenda-it’s perceived</h4><p><strong>Flemming 97<u></strong> — Professor of polisci at Texas A & M, 97-(Roy Flemming, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, Number 4, American Journal of Political Science)</p><p></u>In this study we focus on the United States Supreme Court as a bellwether of systemic attention to policy issues. In Federalist 78, Hamilton offered his by now famous and often repeated opinion that the Court would be "the least dangerous branch." Without the power of the sword or purse at its disposal, the Court's authority in American politics would ultimately depend on its ability to persuade<u>. The Supreme Court</u>, however, <u>may be more effective in drawing attention to issues and identifying problems</u> than in changing preferences about them (cf. Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra 1995). <u>The judicial venue may increase issue visibility and legitimacy for issue advocates</u>. As with other United States political institutions, <u>Supreme Court decisions confer and remove benefits, both material and symbolic, and can under some circumstances rearrange the distribution of political influence</u>. When decisions rearrange political benefits and influence, the response is predictably a continuation of conflict. <u>Decisions that rearrange political benefits</u> or influence in the extreme, as for example in cases involving school desegregation, flag-burning, or public school prayer, often expand the scope of conflict by activating new groups and accentuating old rivalries. These processes <u>may,</u> in turn, <u>draw other political institutions into the fray, as well as amplify both public and media attention.</u> Thus, under <u>certain circumstances he Supreme Court may profoundly affect the agenda setting process in the United States,</u> <u>and</u> in doing so <u>constitute an institutional source of change in American public policy and politics.</p></u>
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Neg vs cornell KR
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2nc/1nr
|
Link – Courts
| 73,820 | 8 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,082 |
New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction
|
Borger 12/31
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Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment.
|
no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.
| 3,580 |
<h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p>
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1nc
| null |
1
| 171,429 | 23 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,083 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
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Schwartz 2013
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Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4><strong>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.<strong></mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,084 |
Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree
|
Couch, 2012
|
Couch, 2012 (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)
|
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure a study to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either One of the principal scholars Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure
|
A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high predicted growth that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ . Crime and corruption tend to be symptoms demonstrating failure a study build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail
|
A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
| 2,375 |
<h4>Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree </h4><p><strong>Couch, 2012</strong> (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>A ‘collapsed’ state</u></mark>, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, <u><mark>suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’</mark>, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’</u>.16 <u><strong><mark>Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico</mark> disappearing like those earlier European states <mark>seems </strong>implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high</mark>er <mark>predicted growth</mark> than either the UK, Germany or the USA; <mark>that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours</mark>,</u> which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; <u><mark>and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities</u>’</mark> that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse<mark>. <u>Crime and corruption tend to be</mark> described not as causes but as <mark>symptoms demonstrating failure</u></mark>. For example, <u><mark>a study</mark> </u>for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting <u>to <mark>build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either</u></mark>.19 <u>One of the principal scholars</u> on the subject, <u>Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger</u>.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. <u>This absence may reflect an assessment <mark>that<strong> numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail</u></strong></mark>. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 <u><strong>Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure</u></strong>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
LA
| 45,874 | 64 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,085 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection
|
Renogotiation vs. Withdrawl
| null |
Renogotiation vs. Withdrawl
| 27 |
<h4><strong>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> <u><strong>(Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p></strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u>The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world</u>, the <u><strong>reputational</u></strong> (and possibly economic) <u><strong>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong> some form of <u><strong>soft defection</p><p>Renogotiation vs. Withdrawl </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Treaties
| 430,923 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,086 |
Counter advocacy trumps the aff – empirics prove real solvency – the aff never materializes change
|
Abdullah and McCormack 8’
|
Abdullah and McCormack 8’ (Carolyne Miller and Susan, “Facing Racism in a Diverse Nation”, Everyday Democracy is a national organization that helps local communities find ways for all kinds of people to think, talk and work together to solve problems. They work with neighborhoods, cities and towns, regions, and states, helping them pay particular attention to how racism and ethnic differences affect the problems they address, http://www.dec17.org/Facing_Racism.pdf, p 1-11)
|
Changes in individual behavior and attitudes Many people have begun to speak out against negative stereotypes People are more likely to interrupt or question actions that are hurtful to others. New relationships and networks The City of Fayetteville, North Carolina, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville Technical Community College, and the school district partnered to create a new firehouse and a new fire sciences program. Their goal is to bring more people of color into the city’s fire department Institutional changes Based on ideas and relationships from dialogues, the city of Springfield, Illinois, changed its hiring practices and is working to create a more diverse city work force. Changes in public policy The state of Vermont passed a statewide anti-harassment law. Calls of support from many program participants, from all walks of life, helped make this possible. Changes in community dynamics Since 1996, in Aurora, Illinois, at least 4,000 people have taken part in dialogue and action on issues of racism and diversity help create a community where people of different races now mix more easily
|
Many people have begun to speak out against negative stereotypes The City of Fayetteville, North Carolina, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville Technical Community College, and the school district partnered to create a new firehouse Their goal is to bring more people of color into the city’s fire department. Based on dialogues, the city of Springfield, Illinois, changed its hiring practices and is working to create a more diverse city work force The state of Vermont passed a statewide anti-harassment law. Calls of support from many program participants helped make this possible Since 1996, in Aurora, Illinois, at least 4,000 people have taken part in dialogue and action on issues of racism and diversity to help create a community where people of different races now mix more easily
|
Examples of Program Outcomes Changes in individual behavior and attitudes Many people have begun to speak out against negative stereotypes. People are more likely to interrupt or question actions that are hurtful to others. New relationships and networks The City of Fayetteville, North Carolina, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville Technical Community College, and the school district partnered to create a new firehouse and a new fire sciences program. Their goal is to bring more people of color into the city’s fire department. Institutional changes Based on ideas and relationships from dialogues, the city of Springfield, Illinois, changed its hiring practices and is working to create a more diverse city work force. Changes in public policy The state of Vermont passed a statewide anti-harassment law. Calls of support from many program participants, from all walks of life, helped make this possible. Changes in community dynamics Since 1996, in Aurora, Illinois, at least 4,000 people have taken part in dialogue and action on issues of racism and diversity. The city and many public officials have taken the lead to help create a community where people of different races now mix more easily. Bullying is decreasing in the schools where students, from middle school on up, are involved in dialogue. And neighborhood groups have resolved a range of issues.
| 1,374 |
<h4>Counter advocacy trumps the aff – empirics prove real solvency – the aff never materializes change</h4><p><strong>Abdullah and McCormack 8’</strong> (Carolyne Miller and Susan, “Facing Racism in a Diverse Nation”, Everyday Democracy is a national organization that helps local communities find ways for all kinds of people to think, talk and work together to solve problems. They work with neighborhoods, cities and towns, regions, and states, helping them pay particular attention to how racism and ethnic differences affect the problems they address, http://www.dec17.org/Facing_Racism.pdf, p 1-11)</p><p>Examples of Program Outcomes <u>Changes in individual behavior and attitudes <mark>Many people have begun to speak out against negative stereotypes</u></mark>. <u>People are more likely to interrupt or question actions that are hurtful to others. New relationships and networks <mark>The City of Fayetteville, North Carolina, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville Technical Community College, and the school district partnered to create a new firehouse</mark> and a new fire sciences program. <mark>Their goal is to bring more people of color into the city’s fire department</u>.</mark> <u>Institutional changes <mark>Based on</mark> ideas and relationships from <mark>dialogues, the city of Springfield, Illinois, changed its hiring practices and is working to create a more diverse city work force</mark>.</u> <u>Changes in public policy <mark>The state of Vermont passed a statewide anti-harassment law. Calls of support from many program participants</mark>, from all walks of life, <mark>helped make this possible</mark>. Changes in community dynamics <mark>Since 1996, in Aurora, Illinois, at least 4,000 people have taken part in dialogue and action on issues of racism and diversity</u></mark>. The city and many public officials have taken the lead <mark>to<u> help create a community where people of different races now mix more easily</u><strong></mark>. Bullying is decreasing in the schools where students, from middle school on up, are involved in dialogue. And neighborhood groups have resolved a range of issues.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
2NC – Turns Racism
| 430,924 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,087 |
States would be REALLY MEAN to immigrants- state control causes patchwork- links to all of our turns and takes out any solvency
|
Fitz 10
|
Fitz 10 (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)
|
in Candelaria the United States argued that Arizona had overstepped its authority by establishing a parallel employer-sanctions law. He stated that the state law was explicitly preempted by federal law and that the underlying court decision should be reversed. This is an important signal and a critical first step in halting the growth of state and local immigration legislation the administration now has an opportunity to provide a more expansive articulation of its views on federal preemption of immigration regulation The United States has witnessed an unprecedented explosion of activity by state and local governments seeking to legislate in the immigration arena These state and local efforts have been counterproductive the Supreme Court could have embraced the 9th Circuit’s reasoning and ruling would have charted the country on a disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies The administration argued that Arizona’s law imposing sanctions on employers that hire undocumented workers thwarts Congress’s careful balancing of interests in establishing a national employer sanctions regime. That line of argument can and should be extended to other state and local efforts to legislate in the immigration arena
S.B. 1070 necessarily antagonizes foreign governments and their populations making them less willing to negotiate, cooperate with, or support the United States across a broad range of important foreign policy issues immigration policy can directly affect the United States' ability to negotiate and implement favourable trade and investment agreements, to coordinate disaster response arrangements, to secure cooperation on counterterrorism or drug trafficking and to obtain cooperation in international bodies on priority U.S. goals such as nuclear non-proliferation, among other important U.S. interests The law has already complicated our efforts to pursue broader U.S. priorities. S.B. 1070's impact is likely to be most acute, moreover, among our many important democratic allies, as those governments are most likely to be responsive to the concerns of their constituents and the treatment of their own nationals abroad.
|
the state law was preempted by federal law This is an important signal and a critical first step in halting the growth of state immigration legislation The United States has witnessed an unprecedented explosion of activity by state governments seeking to legislate in immigration the Supreme Court’s could embrace the 9th Circuit’s ruling would have charted the country on a disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies Arizona’s law thwarts Congress’s balancing of interests That line of argument can and should be extended to other state efforts
S.B. 1070 necessarily antagonizes foreign governments and their populations making them less willing to cooperate with, or support the United States across a broad range of important foreign policy issues immigration policy directly affect the United States' ability to negotiate and implement favourable trade agreements, to secure cooperation on counterterrorism and obtain cooperation on priority U.S. goals such as nuclear non-proliferation The law has already complicated our efforts to pursue broader U.S. priorities.
|
The Obama administration recently waded in to the debate over whether states can legislate in the immigration arena in a brief filed with the Supreme Court. The case, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, involves a challenge to an Arizona law passed in 2007 that requires employers to use a national electronic employment verification system called E-verify and establishes a state-level sanctions regime for employing undocumented workers. The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the law, but the plaintiffs sought review of that decision with the Supreme Court, and the Court formally requested the administration’s views on the issues raised in the appeal. The acting solicitor general of the United States argued (correctly) that Arizona had overstepped its authority by establishing a parallel employer-sanctions law. He stated that the state law was explicitly preempted by federal law and that the underlying court decision should be reversed. This is an important signal and a critical first step in halting the growth of state and local immigration legislation. Given the current developments in Arizona and elsewhere in the country, the administration now has an opportunity, and a responsibility, to provide a more expansive articulation of its views on federal preemption of immigration regulation and enforcement by the states. Proliferation of laws and ordinances The United States has witnessed an unprecedented explosion of activity by state and local governments seeking to legislate in the immigration arena since the last congressional attempt at comprehensive federal immigration reform failed three years ago. These initiatives range from statewide employment restrictions, to municipal regulations prohibiting housing rentals based on immigration status, and requiring state and local police to enforce immigration laws. These efforts reflect a sense of lost control and legitimate anger with the federal government’s failure to do its job. They are also an expression of fear and frustration with rapidly changing demographics that bring local resourcing challenges and create cultural tensions. And individuals and organizations driving an anti-immigrant agenda are the ones stoking these fears and egging on or initiating state and local legislative efforts. These state and local efforts have been counterproductive, as is often the case when actions are the product of fear, anger, or frustration. They have divided communities, triggered costly litigation, and failed to solve the problems they were supposed to address. Perhaps the only constructive thing to come from them is the spotlight they have shined on the consequences of federal inaction. An excellent case in point is the recent legislation in Arizona, S.B.1070, which has caused a national uproar. It has alienated the fastest growing ethnic group in the state, precipitated a barrage of lawsuits requiring the state to hire a private legal defense firm, and will not begin to solve the challenges posed by illegal immigration into the state. Public opinion polling confirms that there is majority support for S.B. 1070 in the state. But it also shows there is much stronger opposition from Latinos, who make up 30 percent of Arizona’s population and view the measure as an offensive invitation to racial profiling. And there is significantly broader and deeper support among all Arizonans for a comprehensive federal solution rather than the divisive S.B. 1070. The law hasn’t even gone in to effect and it has already ignited racial tensions and invited a national backlash with significant economic consequences. Arizona’s law has captured the eye of the national media because of the emotional cauldron ignited by its extremism, but similar stories are unfolding in states and communities throughout the country. The divisiveness and growing pervasiveness of these counterproductive measures demands a federal response. The administration’s response to Candelaria: A small but important first step It is safe to assume that the administration would have preferred to address the federalism issues presented by this burgeoning state and local immigration movement by enacting federal comprehensive immigration reform. But with comprehensive immigration reform legislation stuck in neutral and the Supreme Court’s term expiring, a response to the Court on Candelaria became due. The administration had three basic choices: (1) it could have skirted the substantive questions and argued that the issues were not ripe for Court review, (2) it could have embraced the 9th Circuit’s reasoning and ruling, or (3) it could have done what it did and argue that the measure was preempted by federal immigration law. The first option would have been deeply unsatisfying to all parties because it would have left us in the dark about the administration’s view on immigration regulation by state and local governments. And that continued silence would have further emboldened other states to pursue similar measures. The second option would have charted the country on a disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies. Such a course would eventually confront constitutional hurdles regardless of the administration’s legal views. After all, the central impetus behind the Constitutional convention and ultimate ratification of our founding document was the manifest need for national uniformity in such matters. The administration’s adoption of the third approach was plainly the correct move from both a policy and legal standpoint. The administration argued that Arizona’s law imposing sanctions on employers that hire undocumented workers thwarts Congress’s careful balancing of interests in establishing a national employer sanctions regime. That line of argument can and should be extended to other state and local efforts to legislate in the immigration arena.
State immigration laws also turns your heg and terrorism impacts
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
10.Second, S.B. 1070 necessarily antagonizes foreign governments and their populations, both at home and in the U.S., likely making them less willing to negotiate, cooperate with, or support the United States across a broad range of important foreign policy issues. U.S. immigration policy and treatment of foreign nationals can directly affect the United States' ability to negotiate and implement favourable trade and investment agreements, to coordinate disaster response arrangements, to secure cooperation on counterterrorism or drug trafficking operations, and to obtain cooperation in international bodies on priority U.S. goals such as nuclear non-proliferation, among other important U.S. interests. The law has already complicated our efforts to pursue broader U.S. priorities. S.B. 1070's impact is likely to be most acute, moreover, among our many important democratic allies, as those governments are most likely to be responsive to the concerns of their constituents and the treatment of their own nationals abroad.
| 7,631 |
<h4><strong>States would be REALLY MEAN to immigrants- state control causes patchwork- links to all of our turns and takes out any solvency</h4><p>Fitz 10</strong> (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)</p><p>The Obama administration recently waded <u><strong>in</u></strong> to the debate over whether states can legislate in the immigration arena in a brief filed with the Supreme Court. The case, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. <u><strong>Candelaria</u></strong>, involves a challenge to an Arizona law passed in 2007 that requires employers to use a national electronic employment verification system called E-verify and establishes a state-level sanctions regime for employing undocumented workers. The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the law, but the plaintiffs sought review of that decision with the Supreme Court, and the Court formally requested the administration’s views on the issues raised in the appeal. The acting solicitor general of <u><strong>the United States argued</u></strong> (correctly) <u><strong>that Arizona had overstepped its authority by establishing a parallel employer-sanctions law. He stated that <mark>the state law was</mark> explicitly <mark>preempted by federal law</mark> and that the underlying court decision should be reversed. <mark>This is an </strong>important signal<strong> and a critical first step in halting the growth of state</mark> and local <mark>immigration legislation</u></strong></mark>. Given the current developments in Arizona and elsewhere in the country, <u><strong>the administration now has an opportunity</u></strong>, and a responsibility, <u><strong>to provide a more expansive articulation of its views on federal preemption of immigration regulation</u></strong> and enforcement by the states. Proliferation of laws and ordinances <u><strong><mark>The United States has witnessed an </strong>unprecedented explosion<strong> of activity by state</mark> and local <mark>governments seeking to legislate in</mark> the <mark>immigration</mark> arena</u></strong> since the last congressional attempt at comprehensive federal immigration reform failed three years ago. These initiatives range from statewide employment restrictions, to municipal regulations prohibiting housing rentals based on immigration status, and requiring state and local police to enforce immigration laws. These efforts reflect a sense of lost control and legitimate anger with the federal government’s failure to do its job. They are also an expression of fear and frustration with rapidly changing demographics that bring local resourcing challenges and create cultural tensions. And individuals and organizations driving an anti-immigrant agenda are the ones stoking these fears and egging on or initiating state and local legislative efforts. <u><strong>These state and local efforts have been counterproductive</u></strong>, as is often the case when actions are the product of fear, anger, or frustration. They have divided communities, triggered costly litigation, and failed to solve the problems they were supposed to address. Perhaps the only constructive thing to come from them is the spotlight they have shined on the consequences of federal inaction. An excellent case in point is the recent legislation in Arizona, S.B.1070, which has caused a national uproar. It has alienated the fastest growing ethnic group in the state, precipitated a barrage of lawsuits requiring the state to hire a private legal defense firm, and will not begin to solve the challenges posed by illegal immigration into the state. Public opinion polling confirms that there is majority support for S.B. 1070 in the state. But it also shows there is much stronger opposition from Latinos, who make up 30 percent of Arizona’s population and view the measure as an offensive invitation to racial profiling. And there is significantly broader and deeper support among all Arizonans for a comprehensive federal solution rather than the divisive S.B. 1070. The law hasn’t even gone in to effect and it has already ignited racial tensions and invited a national backlash with significant economic consequences. Arizona’s law has captured the eye of the national media because of the emotional cauldron ignited by its extremism, but similar stories are unfolding in states and communities throughout the country. The divisiveness and growing pervasiveness of these counterproductive measures demands a federal response. The administration’s response to Candelaria: A small but important first step It is safe to assume that the administration would have preferred to address the federalism issues presented by this burgeoning state and local immigration movement by enacting federal comprehensive immigration reform. But with comprehensive immigration reform legislation stuck in neutral and <u><strong><mark>the Supreme Court</u></strong>’s</mark> term expiring, a response to the Court on Candelaria became due. The administration had three basic choices: (1) it could have skirted the substantive questions and argued that the issues were not ripe for Court review, (2) it <u><strong><mark>could</mark> have <mark>embrace</mark>d <mark>the 9th Circuit’s</mark> reasoning and <mark>ruling</u></strong></mark>, or (3) it could have done what it did and argue that the measure was preempted by federal immigration law. The first option would have been deeply unsatisfying to all parties because it would have left us in the dark about the administration’s view on immigration regulation by state and local governments. And that continued silence would have further emboldened other states to pursue similar measures. The second option <u><strong><mark>would have charted the country on a </strong>disastrous course back to the Articles of Confederation<strong> by endorsing the right of each state to establish its own immigration policies</u></strong></mark>. Such a course would eventually confront constitutional hurdles regardless of the administration’s legal views. After all, the central impetus behind the Constitutional convention and ultimate ratification of our founding document was the manifest need for national uniformity in such matters. The administration’s adoption of the third approach was plainly the correct move from both a policy and legal standpoint. <u><strong>The administration argued that <mark>Arizona’s law</mark> imposing sanctions on employers that hire undocumented workers <mark>thwarts Congress’s</mark> careful <mark>balancing of interests</mark> in establishing a national employer sanctions regime. <mark>That line of argument can and should be extended to other state</mark> and local <mark>efforts</mark> to legislate in the immigration arena</u>.</p><p>State immigration laws also turns your heg and terrorism impacts </p><p>Steinberg 2010</strong> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>10.Second, <u><strong><mark>S.B. 1070 necessarily antagonizes foreign governments and their populations</u></strong></mark>, both at home and in the U.S., likely <u><strong><mark>making them less willing to</mark> negotiate, <mark>cooperate with, or support the United States across a broad range of important foreign policy issues</u></strong></mark>. U.S. <u><strong><mark>immigration policy</u></strong></mark> and treatment of foreign nationals <u><strong>can <mark>directly affect the United States' ability to negotiate and implement favourable trade</mark> and investment <mark>agreements,</mark> to coordinate disaster response arrangements, <mark>to secure cooperation on counterterrorism</mark> or drug trafficking</u></strong> operations, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> to <mark>obtain cooperation</mark> in international bodies <mark>on priority U.S. goals such as nuclear non-proliferation</mark>, among other important U.S. interests</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The law has already complicated our efforts to pursue broader U.S. priorities.</mark> S.B. 1070's impact is likely to be most acute, moreover, among our many important democratic allies, as those governments are most likely to be responsive to the concerns of their constituents and the treatment of their own nationals abroad.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
Adv 2
| 430,926 | 2 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,088 |
Supreme court decisions influence the agenda-they create media attention
|
Flemming 97
|
Flemming 97 — Professor of polisci at Texas A & M, 97-(Roy Flemming, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, Number 4, American Journal of Political Science)
|
decisions that touch "with particular immediacy the main question of the day" are important. such decisions focus more intently the beacon of the press or the media's spotlight on current controversies and give them greater visibility, thus altering the priorities of the systemic agenda. Court opinions draw attention to issues on the fringes of the systemic agenda or bring new issues into the limelight these decisions establish a necessary precondition for change
| null |
Bickel and Schmidt (1984, 85) suggested that decisions that touch "with particular immediacy the main question of the day" are important. This means that the importance of decisions varies with the context of the time when the Court issues them. To borrow Lippman's famous metaphor, such decisions focus more intently the beacon of the press or the media's spotlight on current controversies and give them greater visibility, thus altering the priorities of the systemic agenda. Court opinions also might draw attention to issues on the fringes of the systemic agenda or perhaps occasionally bring new issues into the limelight. In either case, one might argue these decisions at least establish a necessary precondition for change even if the odds of change depend on many other factors and the actual impact occurs much later (Johnson and Canon 1984). Hindsight, of course, easily reveals the latent importance of an opinion. The historical importance of decisions, however, must not be confused with or allowed to overshadow contemporary appraisals of which opinions were significant and which were not.8 The identification of contemporaneous politically significant cases raises various difficulties, not all of which can be satisfactorily resolved (Cook 1993)
| 1,264 |
<h4>Supreme court decisions influence the agenda-they create media attention</h4><p><strong>Flemming 97</strong> — Professor of polisci at Texas A & M, 97-(Roy Flemming, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, Number 4, American Journal of Political Science)</p><p>Bickel and Schmidt (1984, 85) suggested that <u>decisions that touch "with particular immediacy the main question of the day" are important.</u> This means that the importance of decisions varies with the context of the time when the Court issues them. To borrow Lippman's famous metaphor, <u>such decisions focus more intently the beacon of the press or the media's spotlight on current controversies and give them greater visibility, thus altering the priorities of the systemic agenda. Court opinions</u> also might <u>draw attention to issues on the fringes of the systemic agenda or </u>perhaps occasionally <u>bring new issues into the limelight</u>. In either case, one might argue <u>these decisions</u> at least <u>establish a necessary precondition for change</u> even if the odds of change depend on many other factors and the actual impact occurs much later (Johnson and Canon 1984). Hindsight, of course, easily reveals the latent importance of an opinion. The historical importance of decisions, however, must not be confused with or allowed to overshadow contemporary appraisals of which opinions were significant and which were not.8 The identification of contemporaneous politically significant cases raises various difficulties, not all of which can be satisfactorily resolved (Cook 1993)</p>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
Link – Courts
| 132,594 | 4 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,089 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.</h4>
| null | null | null | 430,925 | 1 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,090 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize nearly all marijuana through non-profit state-run retail stores that source from small-scale cultivators and are regulated by public health and substance abuse professionals.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize nearly all marijuana through non-profit state-run retail stores that source from small-scale cultivators and are regulated by public health and substance abuse professionals. </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,927 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,091 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
|
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
|
without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4><strong>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,092 |
Hegemony is unsustainable
|
Layne, 12
|
Layne, 12 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS)
|
it now is evident that the declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the U S and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status.
|
The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact drivers of American decline is the emergence of new great powers and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia the rise of China—is the most tangible evidence of the erosion of power Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the dollar’s hold on reserve currency status
|
Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status.
| 1,507 |
<h4>Hegemony is unsustainable</h4><p><strong>Layne, 12</strong> - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, <u><strong>it now is evident that</u></strong> both <u><strong>the</u></strong> 1980s <u><strong>declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right</u></strong> after all. <u><strong><mark>The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun.</mark> The Great Recession has underscored the reality of</u></strong> US <u><strong>decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise.</u></strong> To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say <u><strong><mark>the Great Recession has</u></strong></mark> both <u><strong><mark>accelerated</u></strong></mark> the causal <u><strong><mark>forces driving</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>trends and magnified their impact</mark>. There are two <mark>drivers of American decline</mark>, one external and one domestic. The external</u></strong> driver of US decline <u><strong><mark>is the emergence of new great powers</mark> in world politics <mark>and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia</mark>.</u></strong> In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: <u><strong><mark>the rise of</mark> new great powers—especially <mark>China—is</mark> in itself <mark>the most tangible evidence of the erosion of</mark> the United States’ <mark>power</mark>. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. <mark>Domestically, the driver of change is the</u></strong></mark> relative—and in some ways absolute—<u><strong><mark>decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis</mark> confronting the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> increasing <mark>doubts about the dollar’s</mark> long-term <mark>hold on reserve currency status</mark>.</p></u></strong>
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1nc
| null |
LA
| 127,282 | 17 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,093 |
Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
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If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities still criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4><strong>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><mark>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong><mark>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u> for considerable <u>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><mark>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u></mark> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><mark>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></mark> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Treaties
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,094 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP alone maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
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Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
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the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4><strong>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP alone maintains compliance</h4><p>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
CP
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,095 |
That outweighs—Anti-politics will re-entrench the worst aspects of the status quo
|
McCann and Szalay 5 (Sean, Associate professor of English and Director of American Studies at Wesleyan University & Michael, Associate professor of English and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18.2, p. 456-459)
|
McCann and Szalay 5 (Sean, Associate professor of English and Director of American Studies at Wesleyan University & Michael, Associate professor of English and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18.2, p. 456-459)
|
antipathy to the public sphere might be fairly called an antipolitical version of cultural activism 93 systematically downplayed the role to be played by the formal institutions of political action (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press) The upshot was not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly a denunciation of public debate and political disagreement Such attitudes have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge however its consequences appear imperceptible this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal.109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking, deserve the scrutiny the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction that ordinary language is in some significant way a prison house; and, above all, the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance—all of these notions deserve to be seen for what they have become: less concepts that might ever be evaluated or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy.
|
antipathy to the public sphere called an antipolitical, cultural activism downplayed formal institutions of political action The upshot was a denunciation of debate and political disagreement the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction language is a prison the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance these become: less concepts evaluated
|
No surprise, then, that as in the larger development of professionalism generally, the U.S. literary academy's embrace of the attitudes associated with Foucault has tended to follow him toward an antipathy to the public sphere and to what, following Foucault's own optimistic prediction that "we are perhaps experiencing the end of politics," might be fairly called an antipolitical, or at least an antigovernmental, version of cultural activism.93In keeping with the directions charted by the New Left and the counterculture, Foucault, along with his American followers, systematically downplayed the role to be played by the formal institutions of political action (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press) in order to emphasize the importance of what he called "moral" issues.94 Pointing in his own defense of the "professional and technological class" to an inherent conflict between the powers of "the sovereign" and "matters of professional competence," Paul Goodman had suggested that "'sovereignty' and 'law'" might have become "outmoded concepts."95 Foucault made a far more radical version of a similar point. In the same interview in which he invoked the "specific intellectual," Foucault made his famous call "to cut off the King's head"—to refuse, that is, to pose political issues with reference to "the State" or "in terms of . . . sovereignty." (Ironically, but not surprisingly, he suggested just as American New Leftists had that, if the state were relatively unimportant, "the university and the academic" by comparison might be "privileged points of intersection" in contemporary political struggle.)96 The upshot was not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly a denunciation of public debate and political disagreement about the proper aims of the state or the just purposes of law. Explaining what he had learned from the events of 1968 by remarking that he would not "play the part of one who prescribes solutions," Foucault suggested instead that the true intellectual refused to engage in public debate or political polemic, declined to play "the role of alter-ego" to "the political party," and preferred instead to reveal issues to be "of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators." "I play my role at the moment I make problems evident in all their complexity, by provoking doubts and uncertainties and calling for profound changes"—changes presumably of the "heterotopic" variety that would "stop words in their tracks." Society should be left to work out its own problems, without the interference of ideologues or governments and even ideally without deliberation or debate at all. "The most important thing is that . . . [problems] be tested and stirred up so deep within society to the point that society allows a new balance of relations to flourish by itself."97 It is difficult not to see in that remark the mystified vision of society common to libertarian philosophies, where progress is brought about solely through the combined interaction of individual choices and the instrumentalities of the state turn out to be irrelevant. And indeed, during the seventies and eighties—when his seminar briefly considered the founding voices of contemporary libertarianism, Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek—Foucault moved ever more [End Page 458] radically away from political issues and ever more completely toward a therapeutic emphasis on, as he famously put it, the care of the self.98 In the late sixties and early seventies, New Left thinkers like Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman similarly argued that the elision of personal emancipation and political change was one of the principal accomplishments of the countercultural left. Genuine change would come about only when the movement abandoned a "politics of guilt"—built around the "liberal-reformist" desire to alleviate injustice—and fully committed instead to "personal liberation." "The revolution," they declared, "is about our lives."99 Though less grandiosely, the late Foucault says much the same. "Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself," he suggests, a premise consistent with the aim of his late work to replace an emphasis on "political institutions" with a private "exercise of the self on the self."100 Foucault's is merely the most striking version of a widely shared retreat away from public debate and civic engagement and toward a commitment to personal freedom. The libertarian premises that appear explicitly in his work are articulated in less direct ways throughout the whole range of poststructuralist theory. These premises are evident, for example, in Jean-François Lyotard's embrace of a "postmodern condition" that, as he recognized, corresponds to the increasing displacement of seemingly "permanent institutions" by "the temporary contract"—a development that he acknowledged makes efforts to contest injustice or inequality appear unlikely.101They appear more abstractly in Gilles Deleuze's analogous defense of a masochistic freedom of contract against the sadistic domination of institutions.102 And they crop up throughout a range of theories that invoke the singular, the individual, and the inassimilable against the basic elements (norms, institutions, deliberation) of the public realm.103 At the core of the poststructuralist consensus, as Lyotard noted, stands the shared premise that "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value."104 Such attitudes have long since become commonplace features of the American literary academy, whose attraction to the recondite discourse and libertarian sentiments of poststructuralist philosophy have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge to contemporary society. If, however, that challenge always appears profound—cutting, as Foucault said, to "the fundamental codes of a culture"—its consequences by the same token inevitably appear imperceptible, and put off for a future accounting.105 What lies between the apocalyptic and the mundane, of course—in that place otherwise occupied by formal political organization or the state—is mystery. It is difficult to fault academic literary intellectuals for being drawn [End Page 459] to the allure of that mystery. After all, few have easy access to Washington or the local statehouse. They do not as a group command much in the way of economic power. Nor do they have many strong connections to other constituencies. Turning that marginality into a source of authority, however, many academic humanists see the political universe entirely in symbolic terms, imagining, like Mailer, Mills and the New Left, that to change the cultural apparatus could be to change the world—that to provide, as Mills put it, "alternative definitions of reality" could itself be the most radically political of acts.106 As our political and economic world has been shaped more and more by the prevalence of inegalitarian private agreements and weak public institutions, this longing for cultural power has left literary academics with ever less to say. Indeed, by at least one account, having nothing to say is how the academic left stays true to the sixties. Refusing to don "the pose of the ethically communicative replicant," Lauren Berlant suggests, is the way to remain "'68 or something." To resist "the bureaucratic impulse" one must embrace "the sublime productivities of political failure" and say "'something unspeakable.'"107 That, we believe, is the dead end of cultural politics and an impasse long since time to step around. No doubt this notion will seem mistaken to many of our contemporaries. Those like Eric Lott who think that "the 60s" lives on most powerfully in a commitment to refuse the "liberal analytical division between symbolic politics and real politics" will continue to believe that "the realest way to intervene in matters of state" is to offer "continuing revelations" of the fact that "our relation to the state is by definition coerced, thus distant, thus mystified, thus, perforce, imaginary."108 Readers who agree with this assessment might also agree with the editors of the recent volume Left Legalism/Left Critique who, believing that the most acute danger to "the left" today is not the vast power of the radical right but the fact that left ambitions have become "nearly indistinguishable from mainstream liberal ones," also believe that criticisms of postmodern radicalism betray an "impoverished understanding." But this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal.109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking, we believe, deserve the scrutiny of the type offered by the essays in this volume. The simplistic visions of both "reason" and "the state"; the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction that ordinary language is in some significant way a prison house; and, above all, the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance—all of these notions deserve to be seen for what they have become: less concepts that might ever be evaluated or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy.
| 9,491 |
<h4><strong>That outweighs—Anti-politics will <u>re-entrench</u> the worst aspects of the <u>status quo</h4><p></u>McCann and Szalay 5<u> (Sean, Associate professor of English and Director of American Studies at Wesleyan University & Michael, Associate professor of English and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 18.2, p. 456-459) </p><p></u></strong>No surprise, then, that as in the larger development of professionalism generally, the U.S. literary academy's embrace of the attitudes associated with Foucault has tended to follow him toward an <u><mark>antipathy to the public sphere</u></mark> and to what, following Foucault's own optimistic prediction that "we are perhaps experiencing the end of politics," <u>might be fairly <mark>called an antipolitical</u>,</mark> or at least an antigovernmental, <u>version of <mark>cultural activism</u></mark>.<u>93</u>In keeping with the directions charted by the New Left and the counterculture, Foucault, along with his American followers,<u> systematically <strong><mark>downplayed</strong></mark> the role to be played by the <strong><mark>formal institutions of political action</strong></mark> (the state, but also parties, organizations, and the press)</u> in order to emphasize the importance of what he called "moral" issues.94 Pointing in his own defense of the "professional and technological class" to an inherent conflict between the powers of "the sovereign" and "matters of professional competence," Paul Goodman had suggested that "'sovereignty' and 'law'" might have become "outmoded concepts."95 Foucault made a far more radical version of a similar point. In the same interview in which he invoked the "specific intellectual," Foucault made his famous call "to cut off the King's head"—to refuse, that is, to pose political issues with reference to "the State" or "in terms of . . . sovereignty." (Ironically, but not surprisingly, he suggested just as American New Leftists had that, if the state were relatively unimportant, "the university and the academic" by comparison might be "privileged points of intersection" in contemporary political struggle.)96 <u><mark>The upshot was</mark> not just a dismissal of the formal sphere of political action and a consignment of the legitimate powers of government to the ash heap of history, but increasingly <strong><mark>a denunciation of </mark>public <mark>debate and political disagreement</u></strong></mark> about the proper aims of the state or the just purposes of law. Explaining what he had learned from the events of 1968 by remarking that he would not "play the part of one who prescribes solutions," Foucault suggested instead that the true intellectual refused to engage in public debate or political polemic, declined to play "the role of alter-ego" to "the political party," and preferred instead to reveal issues to be "of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators." "I play my role at the moment I make problems evident in all their complexity, by provoking doubts and uncertainties and calling for profound changes"—changes presumably of the "heterotopic" variety that would "stop words in their tracks." Society should be left to work out its own problems, without the interference of ideologues or governments and even ideally without deliberation or debate at all. "The most important thing is that . . . [problems] be tested and stirred up so deep within society to the point that society allows a new balance of relations to flourish by itself."97 It is difficult not to see in that remark the mystified vision of society common to libertarian philosophies, where progress is brought about solely through the combined interaction of individual choices and the instrumentalities of the state turn out to be irrelevant. And indeed, during the seventies and eighties—when his seminar briefly considered the founding voices of contemporary libertarianism, Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek—Foucault moved ever more [End Page 458] radically away from political issues and ever more completely toward a therapeutic emphasis on, as he famously put it, the care of the self.98 In the late sixties and early seventies, New Left thinkers like Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman similarly argued that the elision of personal emancipation and political change was one of the principal accomplishments of the countercultural left. Genuine change would come about only when the movement abandoned a "politics of guilt"—built around the "liberal-reformist" desire to alleviate injustice—and fully committed instead to "personal liberation." "The revolution," they declared, "is about our lives."99 Though less grandiosely, the late Foucault says much the same. "Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself," he suggests, a premise consistent with the aim of his late work to replace an emphasis on "political institutions" with a private "exercise of the self on the self."100 Foucault's is merely the most striking version of a widely shared retreat away from public debate and civic engagement and toward a commitment to personal freedom. The libertarian premises that appear explicitly in his work are articulated in less direct ways throughout the whole range of poststructuralist theory. These premises are evident, for example, in Jean-François Lyotard's embrace of a "postmodern condition" that, as he recognized, corresponds to the increasing displacement of seemingly "permanent institutions" by "the temporary contract"—a development that he acknowledged makes efforts to contest injustice or inequality appear unlikely.101They appear more abstractly in Gilles Deleuze's analogous defense of a masochistic freedom of contract against the sadistic domination of institutions.102 And they crop up throughout a range of theories that invoke the singular, the individual, and the inassimilable against the basic elements (norms, institutions, deliberation) of the public realm.103 At the core of the poststructuralist consensus, as Lyotard noted, stands the shared premise that "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value."104 <u>Such attitudes </u>have long since become commonplace features of the American literary academy, whose attraction to the recondite discourse and libertarian sentiments of poststructuralist philosophy <u>have been matched only by the frequently reiterated conviction that merely adopting that language amounts to a political challenge</u> to contemporary society. If, <u>however</u>, that challenge always appears profound—cutting, as Foucault said, to "the fundamental codes of a culture"—<u>its consequences</u> by the same token inevitably <u>appear imperceptible</u>, and put off for a future accounting.105 What lies between the apocalyptic and the mundane, of course—in that place otherwise occupied by formal political organization or the state—is mystery. It is difficult to fault academic literary intellectuals for being drawn [End Page 459] to the allure of that mystery. After all, few have easy access to Washington or the local statehouse. They do not as a group command much in the way of economic power. Nor do they have many strong connections to other constituencies. Turning that marginality into a source of authority, however, many academic humanists see the political universe entirely in symbolic terms, imagining, like Mailer, Mills and the New Left, that to change the cultural apparatus could be to change the world—that to provide, as Mills put it, "alternative definitions of reality" could itself be the most radically political of acts.106 As our political and economic world has been shaped more and more by the prevalence of inegalitarian private agreements and weak public institutions, this longing for cultural power has left literary academics with ever less to say. Indeed, by at least one account, having nothing to say is how the academic left stays true to the sixties. Refusing to don "the pose of the ethically communicative replicant," Lauren Berlant suggests, is the way to remain "'68 or something." To resist "the bureaucratic impulse" one must embrace "the sublime productivities of political failure" and say "'something unspeakable.'"107 That, we believe, is the dead end of cultural politics and an impasse long since time to step around. No doubt this notion will seem mistaken to many of our contemporaries. Those like Eric Lott who think that "the 60s" lives on most powerfully in a commitment to refuse the "liberal analytical division between symbolic politics and real politics" will continue to believe that "the realest way to intervene in matters of state" is to offer "continuing revelations" of the fact that "our relation to the state is by definition coerced, thus distant, thus mystified, thus, perforce, imaginary."108 Readers who agree with this assessment might also agree with the editors of the recent volume Left Legalism/Left Critique who, believing that the most acute danger to "the left" today is not the vast power of the radical right but the fact that left ambitions have become "nearly indistinguishable from mainstream liberal ones," also believe that criticisms of postmodern radicalism betray an "impoverished understanding." But <u>this attitude strikes us as exactly wrong. It is the romantic appeal to "the disruptive, disorienting" force of "vertiginous knowledge" that is impoverished; the fascination with the authority of "political inarticulateness" that is hackneyed and banal.109 All the trappings of this sort of thinking,</u> we believe,<u> deserve the scrutiny </u>of the type offered by the essays in this volume. The simplistic visions of both "reason" and "the state";<u> <mark>the related dismissal of formal politics; the conviction </mark>that ordinary <mark>language is</mark> in some significant way <mark>a prison</mark> house; and, above all, <mark>the inflation of self-realization to revolutionary importance</mark>—all of <mark>these </mark>notions deserve to be seen for what they have <strong><mark>become: less concepts </mark>that might ever be<mark> evaluated</mark> or tested than aspects of a cherished and ultimately comforting folklore of the late capitalist economy. </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
2NC – Turns Racism
| 423,587 | 9 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,096 |
Obama is velcro and will only get blamed---no credit
|
Nicholas & Hook 10
|
Nicholas & Hook 10 Peter and Janet, Staff Writers---LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3
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If Reagan was Teflon Obama is made of Velcro.¶ terms, Reagan eluded much responsibility Obama has become ensnared in blame.¶ Hoping to better insulate Obama House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile But Obama remains the colossus of his administration What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting.¶ Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss.¶ But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda.
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Obama is made of Velcro. Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to insulate Obama aides have sought to give other officials a higher profile But Obama remains the colossus What's not sticking is a track record that his predecessors envy. Political dividends have been fleeting Insulating the president has proved impossible Reagan's Cabinet often took the blame, shielding the boss But the Obama admin is one man No Cabinet secretary has emerged as a surrogate more falls to Obama Everything sticks to him
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If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro.¶ Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame.¶ Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape¶ What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting.¶ Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."¶ Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration.¶ Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants.¶ Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole.¶ "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said.¶ But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish.¶ Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal."¶ Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise.¶ A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year.¶ At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways.¶ Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower.¶ Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize.¶ Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in.¶ "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit.¶ Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss.¶ But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end.¶ So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding.¶ Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times.¶ "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen."¶ A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions.¶ But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda.
| 6,007 |
<h4>Obama is velcro and will only get blamed---no credit</h4><p><strong>Nicholas & Hook 10<u></strong> Peter and Janet, Staff Writers---LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3</p><p>If</u> Ronald <u>Reagan was</u> the classic <u>Teflon</u> president, Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama is made of Velcro.</mark>¶ </u></strong>Through two <u>terms, Reagan eluded much</u> of the <u>responsibility</u> for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, <u><mark>Obama has become <strong>ensnared in blame</strong>.</mark>¶ <mark>Hoping to</mark> <strong>better <mark>insulate Obama</u></strong></mark>, White <u>House <mark>aides have sought to <strong>give other</mark> Cabinet <mark>officials a higher profile</u></strong></mark> and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ <u><strong><mark>But Obama remains the colossus</mark> of his administration</u></strong> — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape¶ <u><mark>What's <strong>not sticking</mark> to Obama</strong> <mark>is a</mark> legislative <mark>track record that his</mark> recent <mark>predecessors</mark> might <mark>envy. <strong>Political dividends</strong></mark> from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill <strong><mark>have been fleeting</strong></mark>.¶ </u>Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."¶ <u>Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact</u>. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration.¶ Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants.¶ <u>Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer</u>. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole.¶ "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said.¶ But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish.¶ Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal."¶ Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise.¶ A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year.¶ At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways.¶ Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower.¶ Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize.¶ Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in.¶ "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit.¶ <u><strong><mark>Insulating the president</mark> from bad news <mark>has proved impossible</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. <strong><mark>Reagan's Cabinet</mark> officials <mark>often took the blame, shielding the boss</strong></mark>.¶ <mark>But</u> <u><strong>the</u> <u>Obama admin</mark>istration <mark>is</mark> about <mark>one man</strong></mark>. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. <strong><mark>No Cabinet secretary has emerged as a</mark>n adequate <mark>surrogate</u></strong></mark>. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end.¶ So, <u><strong><mark>more falls to Obama</mark>, reinforcing the Velcro effect: <mark>Everything sticks to him</u></strong></mark>. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding.¶ Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times.¶ "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen."¶ A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions.¶ <u><strong>But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
2nc/1nr
|
Link – Courts
| 182,244 | 57 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,097 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,928 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,098 |
The federal government established the organ transplant system and contracts with non-governmental organizations to operate it.
|
Schwark 11
|
Schwark 11 DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis
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In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act NOTA established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operates in the U S NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of H H to provide for the establishment and operation of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network which oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country. Some of the OPTN's other duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs; maintaining a national system to match people on the waiting list with available organs; establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system; and coordinating for the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations to transplant centers Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing to administer the OPTN HHS") contracted with UNOS in 1986 and has renewed the contract four times.
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In 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operate the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ther duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs n66 maintaining a national system to match people establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing to administer the OPT
|
The National Organ Transplantation Act In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act amid fears of a commercial market in kidneys. n58 Congress also hoped the legislation would alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. n59 NOTA is an important piece of transplant legislation for several reasons. First, it firmly rejected the idea of an organ market by forbidding the sale of human organs in interstate commerce. n60 Lawmakers were worried that a market system would prey upon the poor as a source for organs. n61 Another important part of NOTA was the creation of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation ("Task Force"), which was charged with "conduct[ing] comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation." n62 The Task Force recommended that hospitals "adopt routine inquiry/required request policies and procedures for identifying potential organ and tissue donors and for providing next-of-kin with appropriate opportunities for donation." n63 Congress adopted the [*331] recommendation, and as a result, hospitals can forfeit Medicaid and Medicare funding if they fail to establish "written protocols for the identification of potential organ donors." n64 NOTA also established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operates in the United States. NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to provide for the establishment and operation of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), which oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country. n65 Some of the OPTN's other duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs; n66 maintaining a national system to match people on the waiting list with available organs; n67 establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system; n68 working actively on ways to "increase the supply of organs;" n69 and coordinating for the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations ("OPOs") to transplant centers. n70 NOTA allows the Secretary to make grants for the planning of qualified OPOs. n71 The duties of the OPOs include arranging the acquisition and preservation of all donated organs, identifying potential donors, providing or arranging for the [*332] transportation of donated organs to transplant centers that participate in the OPTN, and determining the quality standards for the acquisition of organs. n72 The nation is divided into sixty-three areas composed of eleven regions under the current system, with huge disparities in waiting times from region to region. n73 In 2006 alone, 7,191 candidates died while waiting for an organ. n74 This figure demonstrates that almost twenty people on the national waiting list die each day while waiting for an organ. Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), an existing central registry of potential kidney recipients, to administer the OPTN. n75 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") contracted with UNOS in 1986 and has renewed the contract four times. n76 In 1998, the HHS released what it called the "Final Rule," which established that "human organs donated for transplantation are a public trust." n77 The Final Rule's stated purpose is "encouraging organ donation; developing an organ allocation system that functions as much as technologically feasible on a nationwide basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of the OPTN . . . and, providing better information about transplantation to patients, families and health care providers." n78 The three main performance goals of the Final Rule are "objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant centers" to ensure that patients within similar states of illness are listed at the same time; standardized "medical status" categories to group transplant candidates by medical urgency; and allocation policies that ensure equitable "organ distribution to those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound medical judgment," without regard to their geographic location. n79 Though these goals appear noble, they have unfortunately been unable to cure the most pressing issue - a lack of transplantable organs.
| 4,327 |
<h4>The federal government established the organ transplant system and contracts with non-governmental organizations to operate it.</h4><p><strong>Schwark 11</strong> DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis</p><p>The National Organ Transplantation Act <u><mark>In 1984</mark>, Congress passed the <mark>National Organ Transplantation Act</u></mark> amid fears of a commercial market in kidneys. n58 Congress also hoped the legislation would alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. n59 NOTA is an important piece of transplant legislation for several reasons. First, it firmly rejected the idea of an organ market by forbidding the sale of human organs in interstate commerce. n60 Lawmakers were worried that a market system would prey upon the poor as a source for organs. n61 Another important part of NOTA was the creation of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation ("Task Force"), which was charged with "conduct[ing] comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation." n62 The Task Force recommended that hospitals "adopt routine inquiry/required request policies and procedures for identifying potential organ and tissue donors and for providing next-of-kin with appropriate opportunities for donation." n63 Congress adopted the [*331] recommendation, and as a result, hospitals can forfeit Medicaid and Medicare funding if they fail to establish "written protocols for the identification of potential organ donors." n64 <u>NOTA</u> also <u><mark>established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operate</mark>s in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of</u> the Department of <u>H</u>ealth and <u>H</u>uman <strong>S</strong>ervices <u>to provide for the establishment and operation of <mark>the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network</mark> </u>("OPTN"), <u>which oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country.</u> n65 <u>Some of the OPTN's o<mark>ther duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs</mark>;</u> <mark>n66 <u>maintaining a national system to match people</mark> on the waiting list with available organs;</u> n67 <u><mark>establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system</mark>; </u>n68 working actively on ways to "increase the supply of organs;" n69 <u>and coordinating for the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations </u>("OPOs") <u>to transplant centers</u>. n70 NOTA allows the Secretary to make grants for the planning of qualified OPOs. n71 The duties of the OPOs include arranging the acquisition and preservation of all donated organs, identifying potential donors, providing or arranging for the [*332] transportation of donated organs to transplant centers that participate in the OPTN, and determining the quality standards for the acquisition of organs. n72 The nation is divided into sixty-three areas composed of eleven regions under the current system, with huge disparities in waiting times from region to region. n73 In 2006 alone, 7,191 candidates died while waiting for an organ. n74 This figure demonstrates that almost twenty people on the national waiting list die each day while waiting for an organ. <u><mark>Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing</u></mark> ("UNOS"), an existing central registry of potential kidney recipients, <u><mark>to administer the OPT</mark>N</u>. n75 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("<u>HHS") contracted with UNOS in 1986 and has renewed the contract four times.</u> n76 In 1998, the HHS released what it called the "Final Rule," which established that "human organs donated for transplantation are a public trust." n77 The Final Rule's stated purpose is "encouraging organ donation; developing an organ allocation system that functions as much as technologically feasible on a nationwide basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of the OPTN . . . and, providing better information about transplantation to patients, families and health care providers." n78 The three main performance goals of the Final Rule are "objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant centers" to ensure that patients within similar states of illness are listed at the same time; standardized "medical status" categories to group transplant candidates by medical urgency; and allocation policies that ensure equitable "organ distribution to those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound medical judgment," without regard to their geographic location. n79 Though these goals appear noble, they have unfortunately been unable to cure the most pressing issue - a lack of transplantable organs.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,853 | 2 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,099 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4><strong>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system<strong>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,100 |
No guarantee the US would Re accede into the treaty later on OR a signal for withdrawal, they just straight violate
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>No guarantee the US would Re accede into the treaty later on OR a signal for withdrawal, they just straight violate </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Treaties
| 430,929 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,101 |
b. Turns the case—A retreat from politics makes authoritarianism inevitable because the government will just side step oppression because there is no deliberation on it, that’s 1NC Boggs
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>b. Turns the case—A retreat from politics makes authoritarianism <u>inevitable</u> because the government will just <u>side step</u> oppression because there is <u>no deliberation</u> on it, that’s 1NC Boggs</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
2NC – Turns Racism
| 430,930 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,102 |
Decline causes peaceful retrenchment—prolonging hegemony makes a stable transition less likely
|
MacDonald, 11
|
MacDonald, 11 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)
|
Our findings are directly relevant to an impending great power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record the U S should be able to retrench In the next few years, the U S is ripe to overhaul its military shift burdens to its allies, and decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this fearing the erosion of U.S. credibility Yet our analysis suggests retrenchment need not signal weakness Holding on to expensive commitments for the sake of reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some observers dispute argu that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this hegemonic powers should find it easier to manage acute relative decline Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions and they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation hegemonic powers should be able to identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations the empirical record supports these conclusions periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone similar factors may cushion the impending Sino-American transition Both are large secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition the U S will experience a "moderate" decline Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The U S would still possess of a third of the share of great power GDP and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy it is unclear how Beijing could consolidate or expand its advantageous position through confrontation
|
Our findings are relevant to power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee conflict analysis suggests grounds for optimism the U S is ripe to overhaul its military and decrease international commitments It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes and settle these more amicably retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to commitments for reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some argu hegemonic transitions are conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens any state that tries them hegemonic powers eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities the empirical record supports these conclusions hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone The U S would have little to gain from provoking a crisis China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness
|
Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation
| 4,514 |
<h4>Decline causes <u>peaceful retrenchment</u>—<u>prolonging</u> hegemony makes a <u>stable transition</u> less likely </h4><p><strong>MacDonald, 11</strong> - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?:<u> The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p><mark>Our findings are</mark> directly <mark>relevant to</u></mark> what appears to be <u><strong>an impending great <mark>power transition</u></strong> <u>between China and the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. <u><mark>Many scholars foresee</mark> major <mark>conflict</mark> during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition</u>. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 <u>Contrary to these predictions, our <mark>analysis suggests</u></mark> some <u><strong><mark>grounds for optimism</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Based on the historical track record</u> of great powers facing acute relative decline, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should be able to</u> <u>retrench</u> in the coming decades. <u><strong>In the next few years,</u></strong> <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is ripe to overhaul its military</u></mark>, <u>shift burdens to its allies, <mark>and</u></mark> work to <u><mark>decrease</mark> costly <mark>international commitments</mark>.</u> <u><mark>It is</u> <u><strong>likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes</u></strong></mark> <u>than the average great power <mark>and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>settle these</mark> disputes <mark>more amicably</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Some might view this</u> prospect with apprehension, <u>fearing the</u> steady <u><strong>erosion of U.S. credibility</u></strong>. <u>Yet our analysis suggests</u> that <u><strong><mark>retrenchment need not signal weakness</u></strong>. <u><strong>Holding on to</u></strong></mark> exposed and <u>expensive <strong><mark>commitments</mark> </u></strong>simply <u><mark>for</mark> the sake of</u> one's <u><mark>reputation is a</u> <u><strong>greater geopolitical gamble</u></strong></mark> than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. <u><mark>Some</mark> observers</u> might <u>dispute</u> our conclusions, <u><mark>argu</u></mark>ing <u>that</u> <u><mark>hegemonic transitions are</mark> more <mark>conflict prone</u></mark> than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that <u><mark>there are</u> <u><strong>deductive and empirical reasons</u></strong> <u>to doubt this</u></mark> argument. Theoretically, <u>hegemonic powers should</u> actually <u>find it easier to</u> <u>manage acute relative decline</u>. <u><mark>Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability</u>, <u>which</u> <u><strong>threatens</mark> grave harm</u></strong> <u>to <mark>any state that tries</mark> to cross <mark>them</u></mark>. Further, <u>they are</u> <u>no longer the top target for balancing coalitions</u>, <u>and</u> recovering hegemons may be influential because <u>they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation</u>. In addition, <u><mark>hegemonic powers</u></mark>, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they <u>should be able to</u> more readily <u>identify and <mark>eliminate extraneous burdens</u> <u><strong>without exposing vulnerabilities</u></strong></mark> <u>or exciting domestic populations</u>. We believe <u><mark>the empirical record supports these conclusions</u></mark>. In particular, <u>periods of <mark>hegemonic transition</u> <u><strong>do not appear more conflict prone</u></strong></mark> than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, <u>similar factors may</u> work to <u>cushion the impending Sino-American transition</u>. <u>Both are large</u>, relatively <u>secure continental great powers, a fact that</u> <u>mitigates potential geopolitical competition</u>.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will</u> <u><strong>experience a "moderate" decline</u></strong>, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 <u>Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline</u> relative to China, the <u><strong>incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.</u></strong> <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>would still possess</u> upwards <u>of a third of the share of great power GDP</u>, <u>and <mark>would have</u> <u><strong>little to gain from provoking a crisis</u></strong></mark> <u>over a peripheral issue</u>. Conversely, <u><mark>China has</u> <u><strong>few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness</u></strong></mark>.96 <u>Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy</u>, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, <u>it is unclear how Beijing could</u> hope to <u>consolidate or expand its</u> increasingly <u>advantageous position through</u> direct <u>confrontation</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
LA
| 97,153 | 117 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
| 2 |
743,103 |
This is a new net benefit for us- 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities- solves the tax burden and ensures local acceptance and economic development
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Leff 2014
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Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
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the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses very little scholarly attention has been paid to the federal tax situation a properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under 501(c)(4 which exempts social welfare" organizations social welfare organizations are exempt from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income - § 280E does not affect them qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem. these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions for commercial development in the neighborhood Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals While operating for tax-exempt purposes would entail change of operations the benefits exceed the burdens there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying the public policy doctrine applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana laws the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support. federal tax laws provide federal incentives to align state and local policy objectives. I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana
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properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(4 which exempts social welfare" organizations from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales, an a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals the benefits exceed the burdens. there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support federal tax laws, provide federal incentives to align state and local policy obj
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In the past decade and a half, twenty states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. n1 Last November, Colorado n2 and Washington n3 became the first states to legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana, and more states are considering following their lead. n4 The trend appears to be toward liberalization of state marijuana laws not just for medical purposes, but to advance a number of other state policy goals, including reducing crime, improving blighted neighborhoods, giving opportunities to youth impacted by the drug trade, increasing marijuana users' safety, and raising state and local government revenue. n5 Currently, federal laws prevent states from achieving their policy objectives. Legal scholars have focused on the conflict created by the fact that selling marijuana is a federal crime. n6 But, marijuana industry insiders do not cite federal criminal law as the biggest impediment to the development of a legitimate marijuana industry. Instead, the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses and could push the entire industry underground." n7 To date, very little scholarly attention has been [*526] paid to the federal tax situation of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n8 This Article proposes the first tax strategy that entirely solves the "tax situation" for state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. In the early 1980s, Congress added § 280E to the Internal Revenue Code, n9 largely for the purpose of punishing drug dealers. n10 Section 280E provides that sellers of controlled substances must pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of their net income. n11 This way of calculating taxable income produces much higher taxes than those faced by any other business, which was presumably okay when it applied only to drug dealers. Now that the provision applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business. n12 Unlike the Department of Justice, which has not generally pursued criminal charges against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, n13 the Internal Revenue Service has been vigorously enforcing § 280E against those same people. n14 It is this active enforcement of § 280E that has the marijuana industry so alarmed. [*527] I argue that a properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts so-called "social welfare" organizations. n15 Since social welfare organizations, like charities, n16 are exempt from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income - § 280E does not affect them. n17 Therefore, qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem. At the same time, however, these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales, an important motivation for legalization in states like Colorado and Washington. n18 To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-related political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial manner. First, any organization seeking § 501(c)(4) status must be operated for a proper tax-exempt purpose. I propose that a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions for commercial development in the neighborhood. Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals in distressed neighborhoods all over the country, and the IRS has developed criteria for determining when retail operations primarily advance social welfare purposes, and when such purposes are ancillary to a private business purpose. n19 While operating for tax-exempt purposes like these would entail a significant change of operations for any existing marijuana seller, the benefits of doing so may well exceed the burdens. A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its profits to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political activities it engages in; and it may have [*528] to operate in a less "commercial" manner than ordinary, for-profit marijuana sellers. Some of these requirements could have a significant impact on how a marijuana seller operates its business. For example, the fact that it cannot distribute profits to owners or managers may affect its ability to raise start-up capital. n20 Other requirements would likely have little impact. For example, it is unlikely that a marijuana seller would want to devote the majority of its time, energy, or money to a political campaign. But whether the restrictions associated with tax-exempt status are onerous or easy from an operational standpoint, the point is that there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying with all of them. Even once an organization has met these four statutory requirements for exemption, however, the Supreme Court has held that the common law "public policy doctrine" prevents organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable purposes are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy. n21 Because marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3). However, this Article makes the novel argument that the public policy doctrine applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations even if they would be barred from organizing under § 501(c)(3). n22 Even though the public policy doctrine does not apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations, it is plausible that the concept of social welfare excludes certain illegal activities. I argue that the proper measure of social welfare is local, rather than national, and while state or local law may be relevant to such a determination, inconsistent federal law is not. This novel argument is more than just a clever strategy - a "tax loophole" so to speak - to avoid the impact of § 280E. Rather, IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana [*529] laws. The recent legalization movements identify many state policy goals relating to local issues, like crime reduction, neighborhood improvement, and state and local tax revenue. n23 However, as the state-sanctioned marijuana industry matures and states begin the process of creating regulations for the industry, it is becoming more and more clear that the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well. n24 A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support. n25 The federal tax laws, therefore, provide federal incentives to align state and local policy objectives. The IRS could promote state and local policy harmonization by permitting community-based nonprofits to sell marijuana, but only when local community groups favored it in states in which it is legal. This would surely be a better position for the IRS than its current role as a lightning rod of conflict between state and federal policy objectives. In this Article, I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states. But I should be clear that I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana. Current federal policy is that the sale and use of marijuana is bad for individuals and society, and apparently the majority of states still agree. A minority of states have legalized or decriminalized marijuana, but only for medical purposes, and only two states have so far taken the dramatic step of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes. n26 Presumably, we will know more in the future about whether legalizing marijuana is a good or bad policy. We do know, however, that public opinion on marijuana legalization is changing rapidly. In April 2013, a Pew research poll found that 52% of Americans favored marijuana legalization, and a staggering 72% reported that the costs of enforcing marijuana prohibitions exceed the value to [*530] society. n27 More importantly, 60% of respondents said that "the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting the use of marijuana in states where it is legal," while only 35% say it should. n28 In the context of rapidly changing public opinion, it would not be surprising if the federal government was leery of direct confrontation with the states over marijuana policy. In that context, a legitimate mechanism for federal involvement in channeling marijuana selling activities in socially beneficial directions - like the one proposed in this Article - may be preferable to enforcement of federal criminal marijuana laws. n29
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<h4><strong>This is a new net benefit for us- 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities- solves the tax burden and ensures local acceptance and economic development</h4><p>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>In the past decade and a half, twenty states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. n1 Last November, Colorado n2 and Washington n3 became the first states to legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana, and more states are considering following their lead. n4 The trend appears to be toward liberalization of state marijuana laws not just for medical purposes, but to advance a number of other state policy goals, including reducing crime, improving blighted neighborhoods, giving opportunities to youth impacted by the drug trade, increasing marijuana users' safety, and raising state and local government revenue. n5 Currently, federal laws prevent states from achieving their policy objectives. Legal scholars have focused on the conflict created by the fact that selling marijuana is a federal crime. n6 But, marijuana industry insiders do not cite federal criminal law as the biggest impediment to the development of a legitimate marijuana industry. Instead, <u>the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses </u>and could push the entire industry underground." n7 To date, <u>very little scholarly attention has been</u> [*526] <u>paid to the federal tax situation</u> of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n8 This Article proposes the first tax strategy that entirely solves the "tax situation" for state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. In the early 1980s, Congress added § 280E to the Internal Revenue Code, n9 largely for the purpose of punishing drug dealers. n10 Section 280E provides that sellers of controlled substances must pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of their net income. n11 This way of calculating taxable income produces much higher taxes than those faced by any other business, which was presumably okay when it applied only to drug dealers. Now that the provision applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business. n12 Unlike the Department of Justice, which has not generally pursued criminal charges against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, n13 the Internal Revenue Service has been vigorously enforcing § 280E against those same people. n14 It is this active enforcement of § 280E that has the marijuana industry so alarmed. [*527] I argue that <u>a <mark>properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of</u> § <u>280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under</u> § <u>501(c)(4</u></mark>) of the Internal Revenue Code, <u><mark>which exempts</mark> </u>so-called "<u><mark>social welfare" organizations</u></mark>. n15 Since <u>social welfare organizations</u>, like charities, n16 <u>are exempt <mark>from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income</mark> - § 280E does not affect them</u>. n17 Therefore, <u><strong>qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem.</u></strong> At the same time, however, <u><mark>these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales</u>, an</mark> important motivation for legalization in states like Colorado and Washington. n18 To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-related political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial manner. First, any organization seeking § 501(c)(4) status must be operated for a proper tax-exempt purpose. I propose that <u><mark>a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions</mark> for commercial development in the neighborhood</u>. <u><mark>Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals</u></mark> in distressed neighborhoods all over the country, and the IRS has developed criteria for determining when retail operations primarily advance social welfare purposes, and when such purposes are ancillary to a private business purpose. n19 <u>While operating for tax-exempt purposes</u> like these <u>would entail</u> a significant <u>change of operations</u> for any existing marijuana seller, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>benefits</u></strong></mark> of doing so may well <u><strong><mark>exceed the burdens</u></strong>.</mark> A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its profits to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political activities it engages in; and it may have [*528] to operate in a less "commercial" manner than ordinary, for-profit marijuana sellers. Some of these requirements could have a significant impact on how a marijuana seller operates its business. For example, the fact that it cannot distribute profits to owners or managers may affect its ability to raise start-up capital. n20 Other requirements would likely have little impact. For example, it is unlikely that a marijuana seller would want to devote the majority of its time, energy, or money to a political campaign. But whether the restrictions associated with tax-exempt status are onerous or easy from an operational standpoint, the point is that <u><strong><mark>there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying</mark> </u></strong>with all of them. Even once an organization has met these four statutory requirements for exemption, however, the Supreme Court has held that the common law "public policy doctrine" prevents organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable purposes are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy. n21 Because marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3). However, this Article makes the novel argument that <u>the public policy doctrine</u> <u>applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations</u> even if they would be barred from organizing under § 501(c)(3). n22 Even though the public policy doctrine does not apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations, it is plausible that the concept of social welfare excludes certain illegal activities. I argue that the proper measure of social welfare is local, rather than national, and while state or local law may be relevant to such a determination, inconsistent federal law is not. This novel argument is more than just a clever strategy - a "tax loophole" so to speak - to avoid the impact of § 280E. Rather, <u>IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana</u> [*529] <u>laws</u>. The recent legalization movements identify many state policy goals relating to local issues, like crime reduction, neighborhood improvement, and state and local tax revenue. n23 However, as the state-sanctioned marijuana industry matures and states begin the process of creating regulations for the industry, it is becoming more and more clear that <u>the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well</u>. n24 <u><mark>A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect <strong>ties federal approval to local support</strong></mark>. </u>n25 The <u><mark>federal tax laws</u>,</mark> therefore, <u><mark>provide federal incentives to <strong>align state and local policy obj</mark>ectives</strong>.</u> The IRS could promote state and local policy harmonization by permitting community-based nonprofits to sell marijuana, but only when local community groups favored it in states in which it is legal. This would surely be a better position for the IRS than its current role as a lightning rod of conflict between state and federal policy objectives. In this Article, <u>I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states</u>. But I should be clear that <u><strong>I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana</u>. Current federal policy is that the sale and use of marijuana is bad for individuals and society, and apparently the majority of states still agree. A minority of states have legalized or decriminalized marijuana, but only for medical purposes, and only two states have so far taken the dramatic step of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes. n26 Presumably, we will know more in the future about whether legalizing marijuana is a good or bad policy. We do know, however, that public opinion on marijuana legalization is changing rapidly. In April 2013, a Pew research poll found that 52% of Americans favored marijuana legalization, and a staggering 72% reported that the costs of enforcing marijuana prohibitions exceed the value to [*530] society. n27 More importantly, 60% of respondents said that "the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting the use of marijuana in states where it is legal," while only 35% say it should. n28 In the context of rapidly changing public opinion, it would not be surprising if the federal government was leery of direct confrontation with the states over marijuana policy. In that context, a legitimate mechanism for federal involvement in channeling marijuana selling activities in socially beneficial directions - like the one proposed in this Article - may be preferable to enforcement of federal criminal marijuana laws. n29</p></strong>
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Neg vs MSU BP
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2NC
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CP
| 430,845 | 3 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
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N
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Kentucky
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4
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Michigan State Brill-Prete
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Justice
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T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,104 |
Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support
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Kleiman 2014
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Kleiman 2014 (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)
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The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. legalization it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change.
we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically bracketed out’ by the method itself this approach is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance the proposed tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect is that it automatically disqualifies all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse This is where we can see clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure the advocated adoption of the framework is equivalent to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. such treatment inevitably always favours the established order by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants it ought to be obvious that to consent not to question the structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations of that order the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order in substantive terms This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes. value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’? Once, such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted
our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the president Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only effective ones any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile We share in the responsibility for violence in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence
the aim was the construction of a universally-valid theoretical corpus irrespective of the social and the historical. Nowhere is this detachment more apparent than in the tendency of the financial sector nowadays to hire physics- and mathematics-graduates, totally innocent of the actual workings of the economy, formalisation has created a whole generation of so-called idiot savants, scientists with excellent technical skills but without true knowledge of the functioning of the economy these scholars ‘resemble Locke’s definition of a madman: someone “reasoning correctly from erroneous Premises” in a study by Klamer and Colander of the five most-distinguished doctoral programmes in economics in American universities students thought that knowledge of techniques and not of the real economy was the basic prerequisite for success in their doctorate-programme economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing with economic problems’ The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess’ ‘Useless but true’: in these three words of Krugman can be found what is essentially wrong with modern economics: it is all about theoretical exercises, mostly taking a mathematical form, which may be valid mathematically, although the analytical robustness of some of these models is also questionable, but useless in any other sense and empty of any practical relevance. This is the problem of formalism in economics, the triumph of form over substance
Keynesian policies also serve an important diversionary function. Governments appear to be working mightily to “overcome the economic crisis” by implementing those policies with great fanfare. They thereby distract publics from yet another repetition of the normal capitalist’s cyclical downturn. Exploding national debts constitute an elaborate diversionary political theater. politicians express compassion, and/or anger about unemployment foreclosures, bankruptcies, poverty, etc. They engage in heavily publicized debates over appropriate policies These theatrics usually absorb the political energies of many left and right forces that might otherwise, separately or together, make the capitalist system itself the object of opposition, struggle, and transformation.
“Keynesianism provides no solution to the crisis of capitalism,” Workers Power, 6/12/2012, http://www.workerspower.net/keynesianism-provides-no-solution-to-the-crisis-of-capitalism
state interventions have only served to delay the inevitable corrective devaluation. Today our choices are couched in a choice between austerity and Keynesian delay tactics. Neither provides credible solutions for the millions who continue to suffer from what is fast becoming the worst economic crisis in history. For Marxists, there is a solution, one that is not based on the countless failed experiments that seek to rationalize a market based on the atomized self-interest of the profit-motive it is based on the destruction of this system and its replacement with a more advanced economic model directed by the masses and decided according to the needs of the people. socialism, is the only one that can banish the recurring human catastrophe brought by each capitalist crisis to the history books.
“Neoliberalism - Mexico - A neoliberal experiment” 12/22/2011 http://mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is the dominant economic, social and political model of our time - the latest phase of capitalism western-style representative governments have largely abandoned their roles as representatives of and mediators among a range of social actors. The role of the state is limited to administering poverty and managing social discord so that neither interferes with corporate profits. Disputed social territory is increasingly left to "market mechanisms," Neoliberalism is characterized by easy movement of money and goods across borders, but strict control of people The South provides cheap labor, cheap commodities and, increasingly, cheap industrial products for consumers in Europe and North America. Neoliberalism finds its roots in the so-called Washington consensus, which is nothing more than a class consensus that extends across borders Conniving governments from the South are often representative democracies, but only in the formal sense of a democracy that can be purchased by local elites and "democracy-building" programs sponsored by the Agency for International Development the "democracy" that is integral to the Washington consensus has very little to do with civil society ordering the affairs of a nation, and everything to do with control of key economic and political decisions by local elites. There are no better examples than the United States and Mexico In the constellation of forces during most of the last decade, neither president Bush nor Fox or Calderon won a majority of the vote in their elections Wall Street owns Obama the Sinaloa cartel owns Calderon economic power exercises day-to-day control Corporate-centered globalization, the everyday operational face of the neoliberal model, is impressive in its reach and level of absolute greed In the 70s countries in this hemisphere averaged 4.5% growth in cumulative g n p In the 80s average growth declined to 3.5%, and in the 1990s average growth declined to 2.5%. as a general marker it gives us an idea of where we're headed. And even by neoliberal standards, we appear to be headed in the wrong direction!) While most of us are treading water or getting progressively poorer, the neoliberal model has resulted in an historically unparalleled concentration of wealth and power in the hands of transnational corporations, their shareholders, and the political and technical elites who oversee the system. Between 1982 and 1996, real wages in Mexico decreased by an astounding 80%, reversing slightly in the late 1990s, then declining again at the turn of the century, for a cumulative loss of over two-thirds over a period of two decades. In 2004, the minimum wage in Mexico is equivalent to about US$3.96 per day. In a country where prices at WalMart, the largest retailer and employer in Mexico, are typically equal to or higher than WalMart prices in Houston, Mexico's minimum wage doesn't buy much. Yet Mexico's minimum wage remains among the lowest in the world.
definitionally
We are not free, yet we are autonomous. We are constrained by the historical circumstances into which we are born each and every one of us also participates in and thereby confirms the legitimacy of those structures along with the violence they sustain Insofar as we are socially constituted, we are constrained by the historical and institutional forces that construct us. As political agents, we realize our autonomy as we interrupt and contest the historical and institutional conditions that regulate and organize the frames of reference through which we think and act. This structure of rupture and continuity is the modern narrative par excellence. Jameson neatly summarizes the narrative condition of modernity as the dialectic between the modality of rupture that inaugurates a new period and the definition of that new period in turn by continuity everything continues to stay the same because this narrative produces a virulent strain of amnesia. Every change or historical rupture contains within it the dialectical narrative structure of modernity such that the New and the period it launches into existence are mere ritual. What persists is the condition of violence embedded in neoliberal capitalism as it robs each and every one of us (other species and ecosystems included) of a future. the optimistic feeling of newness it generates are merely a distraction underpinning the massive environmental changes happening around the world, of which climate change is an important factor, is an unchanging socioeconomic condition and the magnitude of this situation is that of a political crisis the human race is currently in the middle of an earth-shattering historical moment. Glaciers in the Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, and Alps are receding. The social impact of environmental change is now acute, with the I O M predicting there will be two hundred million environmental refugees by 2050, with estimates expecting as many as up to one billion We are poised between needing to radically transform how we live and becoming extinct. If we continue at the current rate of GHG emissions growth, we will be on course for a devastating scenario We need to change course now The political problem is less clear, because of its philosophical implications. Political philosophy examines how these questions are dealt with and the assumptions upon which they are premised. It studies the myriad ways in which individuals, corporations leaders NGOs), and communities respond to environmental change political philosophy considers how these responses reinforce social and economic structures of power the neoliberal paradigm of economic activity advances deregulation, competition, individualism, and privatization, all the while rolling back on social services and producing widespread inequities and uneven patterns of development and social prosperity by focusing too much on free-market solutions to the detriment of the world's most vulnerable we make these preconditions negotiable: the free market is left to negotiate our future for us
, it is the radical populist Right which usually breaks the ( ) liberal-democratic consensus, the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals we should insist more than ever on the democratic consensus any criticism helps the New Right!” we should reject this blackmail, in order to be a true “realist”, we must consider breaking out of the constraints of what appears “possible
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Could such a plan garner support in Washington Certainly not given a dysfunctional Congress in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient it’s been slow going in other states where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it could be many years before or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change
the proposed tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded it automatically disqualifies all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse the advocated adoption of the framework is equivalent to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter such treatment always favours the established order value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is impossible to bring them into focus without openly contesting the framework as a whole.
our habit of focusing on the stage tends to obscure our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our `powerlessness’ many of those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the president any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out We share in the responsibility violence
Nowhere is detachment more apparent than in the tendency of the financial sector to hire physics- and math grad s, innocent of the actual workings of the economy in a study by Klamer and Colander of the five most-distinguished doctoral programmes in American universities students thought knowledge of techniques and not of the real economy was the basic prerequisite for success Useless but true’ economics is all about theoretical exercises which may be valid mathematically but empty of practical relevance
Governments appear to be working to “overcome the crisis” by implementing policies with great fanfare. They distract publics from another repetition of normal cyclical downturn. Exploding debts constitute diversionary political theater. politicians express compassion or anger about unemployment foreclosures theatrics absorb political energies of forces that might otherwise make the system itself the object of transformation
state interventions only delay inevitable corrective devaluation Neither provides credible solutions for the millions who continue to suffer from the worst economic crisis in history. For Marxists, there is a solution not based on failed experiments that seek to rationalize a market based on atomized self-interest of profit based on the destruction of this system and its replacement with a more advanced model directed by the masses
The role of the state is limited to administering poverty and managing social discord so that neither interferes with corporate profits. Disputed social territory is left to "market mechanisms," Neoliberalism is characterized by easy movement of money and goods but strict control of people governments from the South are representative democracies, but only in the formal sense that can be purchased by local elites democracy has very little to do with civil society and everything to do with control of economic and political decisions by elites Wall Street owns Obama economic power exercises day-to-day control Corporate-centered globalization is impressive in reach and greed In the 1970s 4.5% growth In 1980s 3.5%, in the 1990s 2.5%. it gives us an idea of where we're headed the neoliberal model has resulted in an historically unparalleled concentration of wealth and power in the hands of transnational corporations minimum wage in Mexico is equivalent to $3.96 per day
We are not free, yet we are autonomous. We are constrained by historical circumstances each of us participates in and confirms the legitimacy of those structures As political agents, we realize autonomy as we contest conditions that organize the frames of reference through which we think and act Jameson summarizes the narrative condition of modernity as the dialectic between rupture and continuity everything continues to stay the same because this narrative produces virulent amnesia such that the New are mere ritual. What persists is the condition of violence embedded in capitalism as it robs every one of us of a future. the optimistic feeling of newness are merely a distraction We need to change course now by focusing on free-market solutions to the detriment of the world's most vulnerable the free market is left to negotiate our future for us
the radical populist Right breaks the liberal-democratic consensus the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals any criticism helps the New Right!” we should reject this blackmail in order to be a true “realist”, we must consider breaking out of the constraints of what appears “possible
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How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. Could such a plan garner enough support in Washington to become law? Certainly not now, given a dysfunctional Congress, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient. But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though legalization has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, it’s been slow going in other states in which legalization has to go through the legislature, where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it. So it could be many years before legalization reaches the rest of the country or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change. That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”
Saying it’s a good idea to not question is ludicrous --- if we win your ideology is problematic then the K already implicates your framework
Meszaros ’89 Istvan Meszaros, Chair of philosophy @ U. of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, 1989 p. 232-234
Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed Wertfeihert or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded (or suitably ‘bracketed out’) by the scientifically adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complication and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character. In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology (and ‘meta-theory’) is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded from this rational discourse as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For – far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter. Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. 6.1.2 Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be fairly obvious that to consent not to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms. This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems not on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes. In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the ruling ideology. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’? Once, though, such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted. This is why the allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at time completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical interrelationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.
Assuming the role of the legislator lets us off the hook for our own responsibility in shaping social change and reinforces powerlessness.
Kappeler, 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)
`We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
Economic theory is structured to conceal basic structural problems and doesn’t spill over to effective policy or market stability
Fine and Milonakis ’11 Ben Fine, SOAS, University of London, Dimitris Milonakis, University of Crete, “‘Useless but True’: Economic Crisis and the Peculiarities of Economic Science,” Historical Materialism 19.2 (2011) pp. 3-31
This process of formalisation and mathematisation has as a prerequisite the, at least implicit, if putative, excision of the social and the historical element from economic theorising, as manifested in the transition from political economy to economics, leading to an almost brand-new scientific body totally detached from its historical and social setting. In other words, the aim was the construction of a universally-valid theoretical corpus irrespective of the social and the historical. Nowhere is this detachment more apparent than in the tendency of the financial sector nowadays to hire physics- and mathematics-graduates, totally innocent of the actual workings of the economy, what the Wall Street Journal reporter Scott Patterson has called in his recent book ‘the quants’, where he describes ‘how the new breed of math whizzes conquered Wall Street and nearly destroyed it’.19 As Greenspan himself has said in his testimony in front of the US-Congress a month after the financial crash of September 2008, it was the failure to properly price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk management and pricing system has evolved, combining the best insights of mathematicians and finance experts supported by major advances in computer and communications technology. . . . This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer of last year.20 This process of formalisation has created a whole generation of so-called idiot savants, scientists with excellent technical skills but without true knowledge of the functioning of the economy. As Taleb puts it, these scholars ‘resemble Locke’s definition of a madman: someone “reasoning correctly from erroneous Premises” ‘.21 This problem was raised dramatically in a study by Klamer and Colander of the five most-distinguished doctoral programmes in economics in American universities, based upon questionnaires given to Ph.D.-candidates to answer, and interviews with them. One of the conclusions of the research is stunning. Of those questioned, only 3.4 per cent thought that knowledge about the real economy was very important for success in the doctorate-programme, while 57 per cent thought that excellence in mathematics to be very important. In other words, the students thought that knowledge of techniques and not of the real economy was the basic prerequisite for success in their doctorate-programme.22 The sickness of modern economics has been the subject of increasing attack by a series of leading mainstream-economists from before the crisis. Even Milton Friedman deplored the way in which, ‘economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing with economic problems’.23 Similarly Buiter, writing after the crisis, talks about ‘the unfortunate uselessness of most “state of the art” academic monetary economics’,24 and, for Paul Krugman, ‘the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive looking mathematics, for truth. . . . The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess’.25 What is amazing is that these last words come from one of the main practitioners of the economics he is criticising and after he had himself been amply rewarded with a Nobel Prize for this. What is even more amazing is that Krugman had already tried to make a mockery of this fatal tendency in economics early on in 1978 when he wrote a sarcastic article entitled ‘The Theory of Interstellar Trade’. In his abstract we read: This paper extends interplanetary trade theory to an interstellar setting. It is chiefly concerned with the following question: how should interest charges on goods in transit be computed when the goods travel at close to the speed of light? This is a problem because the time taken in transit will appear less to an observer travelling with the goods than to a stationary observer. A solution is derived from economic theory, and two useless but true theorems are proved.26 ‘Useless but true’: in these three words of Krugman can be found what is essentially wrong with modern economics: it is all about theoretical exercises, mostly taking a mathematical form, which may be valid mathematically, although the analytical robustness of some of these models is also questionable, but useless in any other sense and empty of any practical relevance. This is the problem of formalism in economics, the triumph of form over substance.
Keynesian policies distract the public from the problems of the economy by giving the cutthroat nature of capitalist politics a compassionate face
Wolff ’11 Richard D. Wolff, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “The Keynesian Revival: A Marxian Critique,” Alternate Routes, Vol 22 (2011), http://www.alternateroutes.ca/index.php/ar/article/view/14420
Besides their secondary role, Keynesian policies also serve an important diversionary function. Governments appear to be working mightily to “overcome the economic crisis” by implementing those policies with great fanfare. They thereby distract publics from yet another repetition of the normal capitalist’s cyclical downturn. Exploding national debts, like other Keynesian policy programs constitute an elaborate diversionary political theater. As capitalist crises deepen and last, politicians of most persuasions increasingly express concern, compassion, and/or anger about mass unemployment, home foreclosures, bankruptcies, poverty, etc. They engage in heavily publicized debates and legislative contests over the appropriate monetary, fiscal, regulatory, subsidy, bailout, capital control, and private-enterprise- take-over policies to be executed by the state. These theatrics usually absorb the political energies of many left and right forces that might otherwise, separately or together, make the capitalist system itself the object of opposition, struggle, and transformation. Left-tilting inflections of Keynesian policies often include, for example, direct state subsidies to or hiring’s of un/underemployed workers, controls over private investment flows, and enterprise nationalizations. Right-tilting inflections often include, for example, restrictions on immigration, reduced taxes on small businesses, and spending on business-friendly infrastructure construction.
The aff only delays the inevitable --- Marxism alone is the sole viable alternative
Workers Power ’12 “Keynesianism provides no solution to the crisis of capitalism,” Workers Power, 6/12/2012, http://www.workerspower.net/keynesianism-provides-no-solution-to-the-crisis-of-capitalism
The massive state interventions have only served to delay the inevitable corrective devaluation. Today our choices are couched in terms of a choice between neo-liberal austerity and, increasingly, Keynesian delay tactics. Neither provides credible solutions for the millions who continue to suffer from what is fast becoming the worst economic crisis in history. For Marxists, there is a solution, one that is not based on the countless failed experiments that seek to rationalize a market based on the atomized self-interest of the profit-motive. Rather it is based on the destruction of this system and its replacement with a more advanced economic model – one directed by the masses of workers and oppressed and decided according to the needs of the people. This system, socialism, is the only one that can banish the recurring human catastrophe brought by each capitalist crisis to the history books.
Capital overdetermines their project of economic engagement --- all social connections are underwritten by neoliberal labor relations --- nothing less than total criticism can confront inequality
Mexican Solidarity Network ’11 “Neoliberalism - Mexico - A neoliberal experiment” 12/22/2011 http://mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is the dominant economic, social and political model of our time - the latest phase of capitalism. In the neoliberal era, western-style representative governments have largely abandoned their (at least theoretical) roles as representatives of and mediators among a range of social actors. Joachim Hirsch refers to the "national competitive state" in which government represents the interests of capital at the expense of popular sectors of society. The role of the state is limited to administering poverty and managing social discord so that neither interferes with corporate profits. Disputed social territory - including personal security, public education, social security, public health programs, environmental protection, labor rights, etc. - is increasingly left to "market mechanisms," as the state abandons its role, however marginal that role may be historically, as benefactor (promoter of social programs) and protector of those sectors ravaged by market mechanisms (the homeless, the poor and the unemployed, to name but a few). Neoliberalism is characterized by easy movement of money and goods across borders, but strict control of people (or "labor markets" in the logic of capitalism). The South provides cheap labor, cheap commodities and, increasingly, cheap industrial products for consumers in Europe and North America. Neoliberalism finds its roots in the so-called Washington consensus, which is nothing more than a class consensus that extends across borders. Conniving governments from the South are often representative democracies, but only in the formal sense of a democracy that can be purchased by local elites and "democracy-building" programs sponsored by the Agency for International Development. The governments are indeed representative. The problem is who they represent! Democracy is a principle worth defending and, in fact, worth dying for. But the "democracy" that is integral to the Washington consensus has very little to do with civil society ordering the affairs of a nation, and everything to do with control of key economic and political decisions by local elites. There are no better examples than the United States and Mexico. In the constellation of forces during most of the last decade, neither president George W. Bush nor presidents Fox or Calderon even won a majority of the vote in their respective elections - not that voting has a whole lot to do with democracy when nearly unlimited money can build a surrealistic view of the most important political issues of the day that often bares little resemblance to reality. In the final analysis, Wall Street owns Barack Obama, the Sinaloa cartel owns Felipe Calderon, and the rest of us are left with precious little to say about the important affairs of our countries. While military power is occasionally (and from recent experience, increasingly) necessary to maintain the Washington consensus, economic power exercises day-to-day control. Corporate-centered globalization, the everyday operational face of the neoliberal model, is impressive in its reach and level of absolute greed. The neoliberal model has been predominant in this hemisphere for a third of a century (depending on the country in question) and there is sufficient data available for an even-handed evaluation. Though the elites throughout the hemisphere exercise their influence through the mainstream media to obscure reality with platitudes and slogans in an effort to convince the masses that the neoliberal model is the only and best model, the facts speak eloquently. In the 1970s, countries in this hemisphere averaged 4.5% growth in cumulative gross national product. In the 1980s, average growth declined to 3.5%, and in the 1990s average growth declined to 2.5%. (Gross National Product is, at best, an imperfect indicator of improving standards of living - for example, the environmental disaster caused by the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaskan waters added to the GNP of the US for several years because the cleanup generated economic activity. And with increasing concentrations of wealth in the hands of a small elite, growth in GNP correlates even less with the economic well-being of the masses. But as a general marker it gives us an idea of where we're headed. And even by neoliberal standards, we appear to be headed in the wrong direction!) So why is there a Washington consensus if economic growth is actually slowing? The key element here is the understanding of the Washington consensus as a class consensus across borders. While most of us are treading water or getting progressively poorer, the neoliberal model has resulted in an historically unparalleled concentration of wealth and power in the hands of transnational corporations, their shareholders, and the political and technical elites who oversee the system. Again, the facts speak eloquently. Between 1982 and 1996, real wages in Mexico decreased by an astounding 80%, reversing slightly in the late 1990s, then declining again at the turn of the century, for a cumulative loss of over two-thirds over a period of two decades. In 2004, the minimum wage in Mexico is equivalent to about US$3.96 per day. In a country where prices at WalMart, the largest retailer and employer in Mexico, are typically equal to or higher than WalMart prices in Houston, Mexico's minimum wage doesn't buy much. Yet Mexico's minimum wage remains among the lowest in the world.
The perm’s institutionalization definitionally cedes agency to the unequal forces of the free market
Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 2-5
The fable provides an intriguing persp ective on freedom and autonomy. The golem has no freedom: it is the rabbi who brings it to life and sentences it to death. Yet by returning the creature to earth, the rabbi holds the golem accountable for the destruction it wrought despite not being free. This is the basic premis e of this book. We are not free, yet we are autonomous. We are constrained by the historical circumstances into which we are born, along with the institutions and structures that contain us. Nonetheless, each and every one of us also participates in and thereby confirms the legitimacy of those selfsame institutions and structures that dominate us, along with the violence they sustain.3 In this way, we are both the rabbi creator and the creature creation. Insofar as we are socially constituted, we are constrained by the historical and institutional forces that construct us. As political agents, we realize our autonomy as we interrupt and contest the historical and institutional conditions that regulate and organize the frames of reference through which we think and act. This structure of rupture and continuity is the modern narrative par excellence. Fredric Jameson neatly summarizes the narrative condition of modernity as the dialectic between the modality of rupture that inaugurates a new period and the definition of that new period in turn by continuity.4 The ironical outcome, as I describe it in the pages that follow, is that despite the narrative category driving change in the modern world, everything continues to stay the same-perhaps because what this narrative produces is a virulent strain of amnesia. Every change or historical rupture contains within it the dialectical narrative structure of modernity such that the New and the period it launches into existence are mere ritual. What persists is the condition of violence embedded in neoliberal capitalism as it robs each and every one of us (other species and ecosystems included) of a future. The narrative of modernity and the optimistic feeling of newness it generates are merely a distraction. Distractions such as decarbonizing the free-market economy, buying carbon offsets, handing out contraceptives to poor women in developing countries, drinking tap water in place of bottled water, changing personal eating habits, installing green roofs on city hall, and expressing moral outrage at British Petroleum (BP) for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, although well meaning, are merely symptomatic of the uselessness of free-market "solutions" to environmental change. Indeed, such widespread distraction leads to denial. With the proclamation of the twenty- first century to be the era of climate change, the Trojan horse of neoliberal restructuring entered the political arena of climate change talks and policy, and a more virulent strain of capital accumulation began . For this reason, delegates from the African nations, with the support of the Group of 77 (developing countries), walked out of the 2009 United Nations (UN) climate talks in Copenhagen, accusing rich countries of dragging their heels on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and destroying the mechanism through which this reduction can be achieved-the Ky oto Protocol. In the absence of an internationally birfding agreement on emissions reductions, all individual actions taken to reduce emissions-a flat global carbon tax, recycling, hyb rid cars, carbon offsets, a few solar panels here and there, and so on-are mere theatrics. In this book, I argue that underpinning the massive environmental changes happening around the world, of which climate change is an important factor, is an unchanging socioeconomic condition (neoliberal capitalism), and the magnitude of this situation is that of a political crisis. So, at the risk of extending my literary license too far, it is fair to say that the human race is currently in the middle of an earth-shattering historical moment. Glaciers in the Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, and Alps are receding. The social impact of environmental change is now acute, with the International Organization for Migration predicting there will be approximately two hundred million environmental refugees by 2050, with estimates expecting as many as up to one billion.5 We are poised between needing to radically transform how we live and becoming extinct. Modern (postindustrial) society inaugurated what geologists refer to as the ''Anthropocene age;' when human activities began to drive environmental change, replacing the Holocene, which for the previous ten thousand years was the era when the earth regulated the environment. 6 Since then people have been pumping GHGs into the atmosphere at a faster rate than the earth can reabsorb them. If we remain on our current course of global GHG emissions, the earth's average climate will rise 3°C by the end of the twenty-first century (with a 2 to 4.5° probable range of uncertainty) . The warmer the world gets, the less effectively the earth's biological systems can absorb carbon. The more the earth's climate heats up, the more carbon dioxide (C02) plants and soils will release; this fe edback loop will further increase climate heating. When carbon feedback is factored into the climate equation, climate models predict that the rise in average climate temperature will be 6°C by 2100 (with a 4 to 8°C probable range of uncertainty) .7 For this reason, even if emissions were reduced from now on by approximately 3 percent annually, there is only a fifty-fifty chance that we can stay within the 2°C benchmark set by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. However, given that in 2010 the world's annual growth rate of atmospheric carbon was the largest in a decade, bringing the world's C02 concentrations to 389.6 parts per million (ppm) and pushing concentrations to 39 percent higher than what they were in 1750 at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (approximately 278 ppm), and that there is no sign of growth slowing, then even the fifty-fifty window of opportunity not to exceed 2°C warming is quickly closing. If we continue at the current rate of GHG emissions growth, we will be on course for a devastating scenario.8 We need to change course now.9 Climate change poses several environmental problems, many of which now have a clear focus. The scientific problem: How can the high amounts of C02 in the atmosphere causing the earth's climate to change be lowered to 350 ppm? The economic problem: How can the economy be decarbonized while addressing global economic disparities? The social problem: How can human societies change their climate-altering behaviors and adapt to changes in climate?10 The cultural problem: How can commodity culture be reigned in? The problem policymakers face: What regulations can be introduced to inhibit environmental degradation, promote GHG reductions, and assist the people, species, and ecosystems most vulnerable to environmental change? The political problem is less clear, however, perhaps because of its philosophical implications. Political philosophy examines how these questions are dealt with and the assumptions upon which they are premised. It studies the myriad ways in which individuals, corporations, the world's leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and communities respond to climate change and the larger issue of environmental change characteristic of the Anthropocene age. More important, political philosophy considers how these responses reinforce social and economic structures of power. In light of this consideration, how do we make the dramatic and necessary changes needed to adapt equitably to environmental change without the economically powerful claiming ownership over the collective impetus and goals that this historical juncture presents? By drawing attention to the political problem of equality in the context of environmental change, I need to stress that I am not a market Luddite; rather, I am critical of the neoliberal paradigm of economic activity that advances deregulation, competition, individualism, and privatization, all the while rolling back on social services and producing widespread inequities and uneven patterns of development and social prosperity. I am also not intending to make negotiable the "non-negotiable planetary preconditions that humanity needs to respect in order to avoid the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental change at continental to global scales:'11 Indeed, my argument is that by focusing too much on free-market solutions to the detriment of the world's most vulnerable (the poor, other species, ecosystems, and future generations), we make these preconditions negotiable: the free market is left to negotiate our future for us.
Reject their political fearmongering
Zizek ‘2 Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2002, Revolution at the Gates, p. 302
It is true that, today, it is the radical populist Right which usually breaks the (still) prevailing liberal-democratic consensus, gradually making acceptable hitherto excluded ideas (the partial justification of Fascism, the need to constrain abstract citizenship on grounds of ethnic identity, etc.). However, the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals: “We shouldn’t play with fire: against the new Rightist onslaught, we should insist more than ever on the democratic consensus — any criticism of it, wittingly or unwittingly, helps the New Right!” This is the key line of separation: we should reject this blackmail, taking the risk of disturbing the liberal consensus, even up to questioning the very notion of democracy. The ultimate answer to the criticism that radical Left proposals are utopian should thus be that, today, the true utopia is the belief that the present liberal-democratic capitalist consensus can go on indefinitely, without radical change. We are therefore back with the old ‘68 slogan “So yons realistes, demandons l’impossible!”: in order to be a true “realist”, we must consider breaking out of the constraints of what appears “possible” (or, as we usually put it, “feasible”).
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<h4><strong>Link shield - Federal legalization has LITERALLY no support</h4><p>Kleiman 2014</strong> (Mark, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash out of Cannabis legalization, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)</p><p>How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. <u>The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system</u>—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation. <u><mark>Could such a plan garner</u></mark> enough <u><mark>support in Washington</u></mark> to become law? <u><strong><mark>Certainly not</u></strong></mark> now, <u><mark>given a dysfunctional Congress</mark>, an administration with no taste for engaging one more culture war issue, and <mark>in the absence of a powerful national organization with a nuanced view of cannabis policy and the muscle to make that view politically salient</mark>.</u> But there is a mutually beneficial deal waiting to be made. Though <u>legalization</u> has made headway in states with strong initiative provisions in their constitutions, <u><mark>it’s been slow going in other states </mark>in which legalization has to go through the legislature, <mark>where anti-pot law enforcement groups can easily block it</mark>.</u> So <u>it <mark>could be many years before</mark> legalization reaches the rest of the country <mark>or gets formal federal approval that removes the stigma</u></mark> of (even unpunished) lawbreaking from cannabis users. Rather than wait, legalization advocates might be willing to accept something short of full commercialization; some of them actually prefer a noncommercial system. Meanwhile, those who have been opponents of legalization heretofore might—with the writing now on the wall—decide that a tightly regulated and potentially reversible system of legal availability is the least-bad out-come available. The current political situation seems anomalous. Public opinion continues to move against cannabis prohibition, but <u><strong><mark>no national-level figure of any standing is willing to speak out for change</mark>.</u> That’s unlikely to last. Soon enough, candidates for president are going to be asked their positions on marijuana legalization. They’re going to need a good answer. I suggest something like this: “I’m not against all legalization; I’m against dumb legalization.”</p><p>Saying it’s a good idea to not question is ludicrous --- if we win your ideology is problematic then the K already implicates your framework</p><p>Meszaros ’89 </strong>Istvan Meszaros, Chair of philosophy @ U. of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, 1989 p. 232-234</p><p>Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed Wertfeihert or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, <u>we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated</u> methodological <u>framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically</u> excluded (or suitably ‘<u>bracketed out’</u>) <u>by the</u> scientifically adequate <u>method itself</u>, thereby saving one from unnecessary complication and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character. In reality, of course, <u>this approach</u> to methodology <u>is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance</u>. Since, however, the plane of methodology (and ‘meta-theory’) is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, <u><mark>the proposed</u></mark> methodological <u><mark>tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded</u></mark> from this rational discourse <u>as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect</u> of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach <u>is that <mark>it automatically disqualifies</u></mark>, in the name of methodology itself, <u><mark>all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse</u></mark>. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. <u>This is where we can see</u> more <u>clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure</u>. For – far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry – <u><mark>the advocated</u></mark> general <u><mark>adoption of the</u></mark> allegedly neutral methodological <u><mark>framework is equivalent</u></mark>, in fact, <u><mark>to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter</u></mark>. Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. <strong>6.1.2 </strong>Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or by <u>putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality.</u> For <u><mark>such treatment</u></mark> of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – <u>inevitably <mark>always favours the established order</u></mark>. And it does so <u>by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants</u>, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake <u>it ought to be</u> fairly <u>obvious that to consent not to question the </u>fundamental <u>structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations</u> (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) <u>of that order</u>. Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, <u>the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order</u> of society <u>in substantive terms</u>. <u>This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems</u> not on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but <u>as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes.</u> In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the ruling ideology. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its <u><mark>value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is</u></mark> virtually <u><mark>impossible to bring them into</mark> the <mark>focus</mark> of the discussion <mark>without openly contesting the framework as a whole</u>.</mark> For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. <u>And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable</u> – methodologically sanctioned – <u>credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’? Once,</u> though, <u>such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted</u><strong>. This is why the allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at time completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical interrelationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.</p><p>Assuming the role of the legislator lets us off the hook for our own responsibility in shaping social change and reinforces powerlessness.</p><p>Kappeler, 95</strong> (<strong>Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)</p><p></strong>`We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet <u><mark>our habit of focusing on the stage</mark> where the major dramas of power take place <mark>tends to obscure</mark> our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and <mark>our own responsibility - leading to the</mark> well-known <mark>illusion of our</mark> apparent <mark>`powerlessness’</mark> and</u> its accompanying phenomenon,<u> our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens</u> - even more so those of other nations - <u>have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for </u>such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, <u>it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, </u>or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. <u>Which is why <mark>many of those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were</u></mark> the general, the prime minister, <u><mark>the president</u></mark>, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' <u>Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only </u>worthwhile and<u> </u>truly <u>effective ones</u>, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all<strong>, <u></strong><mark>any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out</mark> in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile</u>. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. <u><mark>We share in the responsibility</mark> for</u> this war and its <u><mark>violence</mark> in the way </u>we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way<u> we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence</u><strong>.</p><p>Economic theory is structured to conceal basic structural problems and doesn’t spill over to effective policy or market stability</p><p>Fine and Milonakis ’11 </strong>Ben Fine, SOAS, University of London, Dimitris Milonakis, University of Crete, “‘Useless but True’: Economic Crisis and the Peculiarities of Economic Science,” Historical Materialism 19.2 (2011) pp. 3-31</p><p>This process of formalisation and mathematisation has as a prerequisite the, at least implicit, if putative, excision of the social and the historical element from economic theorising, as manifested in the transition from political economy to economics, leading to an almost brand-new scientific body totally detached from its historical and social setting. In other words, <u>the aim was the construction of a universally-valid theoretical corpus irrespective of the social and the historical. <mark>Nowhere is </mark>this <mark>detachment</mark> <mark>more apparent than in the tendency of the financial sector</mark> nowadays <mark>to hire physics- and</mark> <mark>math</mark>ematics-<mark>grad</mark>uate<mark>s,</mark> totally <mark>innocent of the actual workings of the economy</mark>,</u> what the Wall Street Journal reporter Scott Patterson has called in his recent book ‘the quants’, where he describes ‘how the new breed of math whizzes conquered Wall Street and nearly destroyed it’.19 As Greenspan himself has said in his testimony in front of the US-Congress a month after the financial crash of September 2008, it was the failure to properly price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk management and pricing system has evolved, combining the best insights of mathematicians and finance experts supported by major advances in computer and communications technology. . . . This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer of last year.20 This process of <u>formalisation has created a whole generation of so-called idiot savants, scientists with excellent technical skills but without true knowledge of the functioning of the economy</u>. As Taleb puts it, <u>these scholars ‘resemble Locke’s definition of a madman: someone “reasoning correctly from erroneous Premises”</u> ‘.21 This problem was raised dramatically <u><mark>in a study by Klamer and Colander of the five most-distinguished doctoral programmes </mark>in economics <mark>in American universities</u></mark>, based upon questionnaires given to Ph.D.-candidates to answer, and interviews with them. One of the conclusions of the research is stunning. Of those questioned, only 3.4 per cent thought that knowledge about the real economy was very important for success in the doctorate-programme, while 57 per cent thought that excellence in mathematics to be very important. In other words, the <u><mark>students thought</mark> that <mark>knowledge of techniques and not of the real economy was the basic prerequisite for success</mark> in their doctorate-programme</u>.22 The sickness of modern economics has been the subject of increasing attack by a series of leading mainstream-economists from before the crisis. Even Milton Friedman deplored the way in which, ‘<u>economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing with economic problems’</u>.23 Similarly Buiter, writing after the crisis, talks about ‘the unfortunate uselessness of most “state of the art” academic monetary economics’,24 and, for Paul Krugman, ‘the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive looking mathematics, for truth. . . . <u>The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess’</u>.25 What is amazing is that these last words come from one of the main practitioners of the economics he is criticising and after he had himself been amply rewarded with a Nobel Prize for this. What is even more amazing is that Krugman had already tried to make a mockery of this fatal tendency in economics early on in 1978 when he wrote a sarcastic article entitled ‘The Theory of Interstellar Trade’. In his abstract we read: This paper extends interplanetary trade theory to an interstellar setting. It is chiefly concerned with the following question: how should interest charges on goods in transit be computed when the goods travel at close to the speed of light? This is a problem because the time taken in transit will appear less to an observer travelling with the goods than to a stationary observer. A solution is derived from economic theory, and two useless but true theorems are proved.26 <u>‘<mark>Useless but true’</mark>: in these three words of Krugman can be found what is essentially wrong with modern <mark>economics</mark>: it <mark>is all about theoretical exercises</mark>, mostly taking a mathematical form, <mark>which may be valid mathematically</mark>, although the analytical robustness of some of these models is also questionable, <mark>but</mark> useless in any other sense and <mark>empty of</mark> any <mark>practical relevance</mark>. This is the problem of formalism in economics, the triumph of form over substance</u><strong>.</p><p>Keynesian policies distract the public from the problems of the economy by giving the cutthroat nature of capitalist politics a compassionate face</p><p>Wolff ’11 </strong>Richard D. Wolff, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “The Keynesian Revival: A Marxian Critique,” Alternate Routes, Vol 22 (2011), http://www.alternateroutes.ca/index.php/ar/article/view/14420</p><p>Besides their secondary role, <u>Keynesian policies also serve an important diversionary function. <mark>Governments appear to be working</mark> mightily <mark>to “overcome the</mark> economic <mark>crisis” by implementing</mark> those <mark>policies with great fanfare. They</mark> thereby <mark>distract publics from</mark> yet <mark>another repetition of </mark>the <mark>normal</mark> capitalist’s <mark>cyclical downturn. Exploding</mark> national <mark>debts</u></mark>, like other Keynesian policy programs <u><mark>constitute</mark> an elaborate <mark>diversionary political theater.</mark> </u>As capitalist crises deepen and last, <u><mark>politicians</u></mark> of most persuasions increasingly <u><mark>express</u></mark> concern, <u><mark>compassion</mark>, and/<mark>or anger about</mark> </u>mass<u> <mark>unemployment</u></mark>, home <u><mark>foreclosures</mark>, bankruptcies, poverty, etc. They engage in heavily publicized debates</u> and legislative contests <u>over</u> the <u>appropriate</u> monetary, fiscal, regulatory, subsidy, bailout, capital control, and private-enterprise- take-over <u>policies</u> to be executed by the state. <u>These <mark>theatrics</mark> usually <mark>absorb</mark> the <mark>political energies of</mark> many left and right <mark>forces that might otherwise</mark>, separately or together, <mark>make the</mark> capitalist <mark>system itself the object of</mark> opposition, struggle, and <mark>transformation</mark>. </u><strong>Left-tilting inflections of Keynesian policies often include, for example, direct state subsidies to or hiring’s of un/underemployed workers, controls over private investment flows, and enterprise nationalizations. Right-tilting inflections often include, for example, restrictions on immigration, reduced taxes on small businesses, and spending on business-friendly infrastructure construction.</p><p>The aff only delays the inevitable --- Marxism alone is the sole viable alternative</p><p>Workers Power ’12 <u></strong>“Keynesianism provides no solution to the crisis of capitalism,” Workers Power, 6/12/2012, http://www.workerspower.net/keynesianism-provides-no-solution-to-the-crisis-of-capitalism</p><p></u>The massive <u><mark>state interventions</mark> have <mark>only</mark> served to <mark>delay</mark> the <mark>inevitable corrective devaluation</mark>. Today our choices are couched in</u> terms of <u>a choice between</u> neo-liberal <u>austerity and</u>, increasingly, <u>Keynesian delay tactics. <mark>Neither provides credible solutions for the millions who continue to suffer from</mark> what is fast becoming <mark>the worst economic crisis in history. For Marxists, there is a solution</mark>, one that is <mark>not based on </mark>the countless <mark>failed experiments that seek to rationalize a market based on</mark> the <mark>atomized self-interest of</mark> the <mark>profit</mark>-motive</u>. Rather <u>it is <mark>based on the destruction of this system and its replacement with a more advanced</mark> economic <mark>model</u></mark> – one <u><mark>directed by the masses</u></mark> of workers and oppressed <u>and decided according to the needs of the people.</u> This system, <u><strong>socialism, is the only one that can banish the recurring human catastrophe brought by each capitalist crisis to the history books.</p><p></u>Capital overdetermines their project of economic engagement --- all social connections are underwritten by neoliberal labor relations --- nothing less than total criticism can confront inequality</p><p>Mexican Solidarity Network ’11 <u></strong>“Neoliberalism - Mexico - A neoliberal experiment” 12/22/2011 http://mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism</p><p>Neoliberalism is the dominant economic, social and political model of our time - the latest phase of capitalism</u>. In the neoliberal era, <u>western-style representative governments have largely abandoned their</u> (at least theoretical) <u>roles as representatives of and mediators among a range of social actors.</u> Joachim Hirsch refers to the "national competitive state" in which government represents the interests of capital at the expense of popular sectors of society. <u><mark>The role of the state is limited to administering poverty and managing social discord so that neither interferes with corporate profits.</u> <u>Disputed social territory</u></mark> - including personal security, public education, social security, public health programs, environmental protection, labor rights, etc. - <u><mark>is</mark> increasingly <mark>left to "market mechanisms,"</u></mark> as the state abandons its role, however marginal that role may be historically, as benefactor (promoter of social programs) and protector of those sectors ravaged by market mechanisms (the homeless, the poor and the unemployed, to name but a few). <u><mark>Neoliberalism is characterized by easy movement of money and goods</mark> across borders, <mark>but strict control of people</u></mark> (or "labor markets" in the logic of capitalism). <u>The South provides cheap labor, cheap commodities and, increasingly, cheap industrial products for consumers in Europe and North America. Neoliberalism finds its roots in the so-called Washington consensus, which is nothing more than a class consensus that extends across borders</u>. <u>Conniving <mark>governments from the South are</mark> often <mark>representative democracies, but only in the formal sense</mark> of a democracy <mark>that can be purchased by local elites</mark> and "democracy-building" programs sponsored by the Agency for International Development</u>. The governments are indeed representative. The problem is who they represent! Democracy is a principle worth defending and, in fact, worth dying for. But <u>the "<mark>democracy</mark>" that is integral to the Washington consensus <mark>has very little to do with civil society</mark> ordering the affairs of a nation, <mark>and everything to do with control of </mark>key <mark>economic and political decisions by </mark>local <mark>elites</mark>. There are no better examples than the United States and Mexico</u>. <u>In the constellation of forces during most of the last decade, neither president</u> George W. <u>Bush nor</u> presidents <u>Fox or Calderon</u> even <u>won a majority of the vote in their</u> respective <u>elections</u> - not that voting has a whole lot to do with democracy when nearly unlimited money can build a surrealistic view of the most important political issues of the day that often bares little resemblance to reality. In the final analysis, <u><mark>Wall Street owns</u></mark> Barack <u><mark>Obama</u></mark>, <u>the Sinaloa cartel owns</u> Felipe <u>Calderon</u>, and the rest of us are left with precious little to say about the important affairs of our countries. While military power is occasionally (and from recent experience, increasingly) necessary to maintain the Washington consensus, <u><mark>economic power exercises day-to-day control</u></mark>. <u><mark>Corporate-centered globalization</mark>, the everyday operational face of the neoliberal model, <mark>is impressive in</mark> its <mark>reach and</mark> level of absolute <mark>greed</u></mark>. The neoliberal model has been predominant in this hemisphere for a third of a century (depending on the country in question) and there is sufficient data available for an even-handed evaluation. Though the elites throughout the hemisphere exercise their influence through the mainstream media to obscure reality with platitudes and slogans in an effort to convince the masses that the neoliberal model is the only and best model, the facts speak eloquently. <u><mark>In the</u></mark> <mark>19<u>70s</u></mark>, <u>countries in this hemisphere averaged <mark>4.5% growth</mark> in cumulative</u> <u>g</u>ross <u>n</u>ational <u>p</u>roduct. <u><mark>In</mark> the</u> <mark>19<u>80s</u></mark>, <u>average growth declined to <mark>3.5%,</mark> and <mark>in the 1990s</mark> average growth declined to <mark>2.5%.</u></mark> (Gross National Product is, at best, an imperfect indicator of improving standards of living - for example, the environmental disaster caused by the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaskan waters added to the GNP of the US for several years because the cleanup generated economic activity. And with increasing concentrations of wealth in the hands of a small elite, growth in GNP correlates even less with the economic well-being of the masses. But <u>as a general marker <mark>it gives us an idea of where we're headed</mark>. And even by neoliberal standards, we appear to be headed in the wrong direction!) </u>So why is there a Washington consensus if economic growth is actually slowing? The key element here is the understanding of the Washington consensus as a class consensus across borders. <u>While most of us are treading water or getting progressively poorer, <mark>the neoliberal model has resulted in an historically unparalleled concentration of wealth and power in the hands of transnational corporations</mark>, their shareholders, and the political and technical elites who oversee the system. </u>Again, the facts speak eloquently. <u>Between 1982 and 1996, real wages in Mexico decreased by an astounding 80%, reversing slightly in the late 1990s, then declining again at the turn of the century, for a cumulative loss of over two-thirds over a period of two decades. In 2004, the <mark>minimum wage in Mexico is equivalent to</mark> about US<mark>$3.96 per day<strong></mark>. In a country where prices at WalMart, the largest retailer and employer in Mexico, are typically equal to or higher than WalMart prices in Houston, Mexico's minimum wage doesn't buy much. Yet Mexico's minimum wage remains among the lowest in the world.</p><p></u>The perm’s institutionalization <u>definitionally</u> cedes agency to the unequal forces of the free market</p><p>Parr ’13 </strong>Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 2-5</p><p>The fable provides an intriguing persp ective on freedom and autonomy. The golem has no freedom: it is the rabbi who brings it to life and sentences it to death. Yet by returning the creature to earth, the rabbi holds the golem accountable for the destruction it wrought despite not being free. This is the basic premis e of this book. <u><mark>We are not free, yet we are autonomous. We are constrained by</mark> the <mark>historical circumstances</mark> into which we are born</u>, along with the institutions and structures that contain us. Nonetheless, <u><mark>each</mark> and every one <mark>of us</mark> also <mark>participates in and</mark> thereby <mark>confirms the legitimacy of those</u></mark> selfsame institutions and <u><mark>structures</u></mark> that dominate us, <u>along with the violence they sustain</u>.3 In this way, we are both the rabbi creator and the creature creation. <u>Insofar as we are socially constituted, we are constrained by the historical and institutional forces that construct us. <mark>As political agents, we realize</mark> our <mark>autonomy as we</mark> interrupt and <mark>contest</mark> the historical and institutional <mark>conditions that</mark> regulate and <mark>organize the frames of reference through which we think and act</mark>. This structure of rupture and continuity is the modern narrative par excellence. </u>Fredric <u><mark>Jameson</mark> neatly <mark>summarizes the narrative condition of modernity as the dialectic between</mark> the modality of <mark>rupture</mark> that inaugurates a new period <mark>and</mark> the definition of that new period in turn by <mark>continuity</u></mark>.4 The ironical outcome, as I describe it in the pages that follow, is that despite the narrative category driving change in the modern world, <u><mark>everything continues to stay the same</u></mark>-perhaps <u><mark>because</u></mark> what <u><mark>this narrative produces</u></mark> is <u>a <mark>virulent</mark> strain of <mark>amnesia</mark>. Every change or historical rupture contains within it the dialectical narrative structure of modernity <mark>such that the New</mark> and the period it launches into existence <mark>are mere ritual. What persists is the condition of violence embedded in</mark> neoliberal <mark>capitalism as it robs </mark>each and <mark>every one of us</mark> (other species and ecosystems included) <mark>of a future.</mark> </u>The narrative of modernity and <u><mark>the optimistic feeling of newness</mark> it generates <mark>are merely a distraction</u></mark>. Distractions such as decarbonizing the free-market economy, buying carbon offsets, handing out contraceptives to poor women in developing countries, drinking tap water in place of bottled water, changing personal eating habits, installing green roofs on city hall, and expressing moral outrage at British Petroleum (BP) for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, although well meaning, are merely symptomatic of the uselessness of free-market "solutions" to environmental change. Indeed, such widespread distraction leads to denial. With the proclamation of the twenty- first century to be the era of climate change, the Trojan horse of neoliberal restructuring entered the political arena of climate change talks and policy, and a more virulent strain of capital accumulation began . For this reason, delegates from the African nations, with the support of the Group of 77 (developing countries), walked out of the 2009 United Nations (UN) climate talks in Copenhagen, accusing rich countries of dragging their heels on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and destroying the mechanism through which this reduction can be achieved-the Ky oto Protocol. In the absence of an internationally birfding agreement on emissions reductions, all individual actions taken to reduce emissions-a flat global carbon tax, recycling, hyb rid cars, carbon offsets, a few solar panels here and there, and so on-are mere theatrics. In this book, I argue that <u>underpinning the massive environmental changes happening around the world, of which climate change is an important factor, is an unchanging socioeconomic condition</u> (neoliberal capitalism), <u>and the magnitude of this situation is that of a political crisis</u>. So, at the risk of extending my literary license too far, it is fair to say that <u>the human race is currently in the middle of an earth-shattering historical moment. Glaciers in the Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, and Alps are receding. The social impact of environmental change is now acute, with the</u> <u>I</u>nternational <u>O</u>rganization for <u>M</u>igration <u>predicting there will be</u> approximately <u>two hundred million environmental refugees by 2050, with estimates expecting as many as up to one billion</u>.5 <u>We are poised between needing to radically transform how we live and becoming extinct. </u>Modern (postindustrial) society inaugurated what geologists refer to as the ''Anthropocene age;' when human activities began to drive environmental change, replacing the Holocene, which for the previous ten thousand years was the era when the earth regulated the environment. 6 Since then people have been pumping GHGs into the atmosphere at a faster rate than the earth can reabsorb them. If we remain on our current course of global GHG emissions, the earth's average climate will rise 3°C by the end of the twenty-first century (with a 2 to 4.5° probable range of uncertainty) . The warmer the world gets, the less effectively the earth's biological systems can absorb carbon. The more the earth's climate heats up, the more carbon dioxide (C02) plants and soils will release; this fe edback loop will further increase climate heating. When carbon feedback is factored into the climate equation, climate models predict that the rise in average climate temperature will be 6°C by 2100 (with a 4 to 8°C probable range of uncertainty) .7 For this reason, even if emissions were reduced from now on by approximately 3 percent annually, there is only a fifty-fifty chance that we can stay within the 2°C benchmark set by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. However, given that in 2010 the world's annual growth rate of atmospheric carbon was the largest in a decade, bringing the world's C02 concentrations to 389.6 parts per million (ppm) and pushing concentrations to 39 percent higher than what they were in 1750 at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (approximately 278 ppm), and that there is no sign of growth slowing, then even the fifty-fifty window of opportunity not to exceed 2°C warming is quickly closing. <u>If we continue at the current rate of GHG emissions growth, we will be on course for a devastating scenario</u>.8 <u><mark>We need to change course now</u></mark>.9 Climate change poses several environmental problems, many of which now have a clear focus. The scientific problem: How can the high amounts of C02 in the atmosphere causing the earth's climate to change be lowered to 350 ppm? The economic problem: How can the economy be decarbonized while addressing global economic disparities? The social problem: How can human societies change their climate-altering behaviors and adapt to changes in climate?10 The cultural problem: How can commodity culture be reigned in? The problem policymakers face: What regulations can be introduced to inhibit environmental degradation, promote GHG reductions, and assist the people, species, and ecosystems most vulnerable to environmental change? <u>The political problem is less clear,</u> however, perhaps <u>because of its philosophical implications. Political philosophy examines how these questions are dealt with and the assumptions upon which they are premised. It studies the myriad ways in which individuals, corporations</u>, the world's <u>leaders</u>, nongovernmental organizations (<u>NGOs), and communities respond to</u> climate change and the larger issue of <u>environmental change</u> characteristic of the Anthropocene age. More important, <u>political philosophy considers how these responses reinforce social and economic structures of power</u>. In light of this consideration, how do we make the dramatic and necessary changes needed to adapt equitably to environmental change without the economically powerful claiming ownership over the collective impetus and goals that this historical juncture presents? By drawing attention to the political problem of equality in the context of environmental change, I need to stress that I am not a market Luddite; rather, I am critical of <u>the neoliberal paradigm of economic activity</u> that <u>advances deregulation, competition, individualism, and privatization, all the while rolling back on social services and producing widespread inequities and uneven patterns of development and social prosperity</u>. I am also not intending to make negotiable the "non-negotiable planetary preconditions that humanity needs to respect in order to avoid the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental change at continental to global scales:'11 Indeed, my argument is that <u><mark>by focusing</mark> too much <mark>on free-market solutions to the detriment of the world's most vulnerable</u></mark> (the poor, other species, ecosystems, and future generations), <u>we make these preconditions negotiable: <mark>the free market is</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>left to negotiate our future for us</u></mark>.</p><p>Reject their political fearmongering</p><p>Zizek ‘2 </strong>Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2002, Revolution at the Gates, p. 302</p><p>It is true that, today<u>, it is <mark>the radical populist Right</mark> which usually <mark>breaks the</mark> (</u>still<u>) </u>prevailing<u> <mark>liberal-democratic consensus</mark>, </u>gradually making acceptable hitherto excluded ideas (the partial justification of Fascism, the need to constrain abstract citizenship on grounds of ethnic identity, etc.). However, <u><mark>the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals</u></mark>: “We shouldn’t play with fire: against the new Rightist onslaught, <u>we should insist more than ever on the democratic consensus</u> — <u><mark>any criticism</u></mark> of it, wittingly or unwittingly, <u><mark>helps the New Right!”</u></mark> This is the key line of separation: <u><mark>we should reject this blackmail</mark>,</u> taking the risk of disturbing the liberal consensus, even up to questioning the very notion of democracy. The ultimate answer to the criticism that radical Left proposals are utopian should thus be that, today, the true utopia is the belief that the present liberal-democratic capitalist consensus can go on indefinitely, without radical change. We are therefore back with the old ‘68 slogan “So yons realistes, demandons l’impossible!”: <u><mark>in order to be a true “realist”, we must consider breaking out of the constraints of what appears “possible</u></mark>” (or, as we usually put it, “feasible”).</p>
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