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Crowd out would not be a net reduction
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Erin and Harris 94
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Erin and Harris 94 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson
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policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield
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has been argued that this would lead to a fall in organs donated on altruistic groundsf but nevertheless the introduction a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase
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Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).
| 1,276 |
<h4>Crowd out would not be a net reduction</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 94</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson </p><p>Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such <u>policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem,</u> Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). <u>It <mark>has been argued that this would lead to a fall in</mark> the numbers of <mark>organs donated on </mark>purely humanitarian or<mark> altruistic groundsf but nevertheless </mark>it seems probable that <mark>the introduction </mark>of such <mark>a commercial interest would lead to an <strong>overall increase</strong> </mark>in organ yield</u> (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).</p>
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Contention 3 Solvency
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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regulated payments would not distort donor decisions, unjustly rely on the poor, or crowd out altruisitic giving—default to empirical evidence
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Halpern 10
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Halpern 10 Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns
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Theoretical concerns about paying persons for living kidney donation are not corroborated by empirical evidence.
However, at least 3 concerns exist with regulated payments for living kidney donation. First, payments may represent undue inducements—payments might alter a person’s perception of the risks associated with donation, thereby preventing a fully informed decision to sell a kidney. Second, payments may represent unjust inducements—payments might preferentially influence lower-income persons, thereby creating a market in which organs are acquired from poor persons and provided to those with sufficient financial and social resources to be listed for transplantation. Third, payments may dissuade altruistic donation or cause potential altruistic donors to request payment.
In this study, we used empirical methods to determine the extent to which these concerns might manifest if a regulated market for kidneys were established in the United States.
Discussion
We found no evidence that any of the 3 main concerns with a regulated system of payments for living kidney donation would manifest if such a market were established. Providing payments did not dull persons’ sensitivity to the risks associated with donor nephrectomy, suggesting that payment does not represent an undue inducement— one that would make rational choice difficult. Furthermore, providing payments did not preferentially motivate poorer persons to sell a kidney, suggesting that payment does not represent an unjust inducement— one that would put substantially more pressure on poorer persons than on wealthier persons.
We also found no evidence that introducing monetary incentives would “crowd out” a person’s altruistic incentives to donate.
|
Theoretical concerns about paying persons for living kidney donation are not corroborated by empirical evidence.
In this study we used empirical methods to determine the extent to which these concerns might manifest if a regulated market were established
We found no evidence that any of the 3 main concerns would manifest Providing payments did not dull persons’ sensitivity to the risks payment does not represent an undue inducement— that would make rational choice difficult providing payments did not preferentially motivate poorer persons to sell a kidney, payment does not represent an unjust inducement that would put more pressure on poorer persons
We also found no evidence that introducing monetary incentives would “crowd out”
|
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab
Theoretical concerns about paying persons for living kidney donation are not corroborated by empirical evidence. A real-world test of regulated payments for kidney donation is needed to definitively show whether payment provides a viable and ethical method to increase the supply of kidneys available for transplantation.
The insufficient supply of transplantable kidneys from traditional donors after neurologic determination of death (1, 2) has prompted increasing use of kidneys from the following types of donors: donors after circulatory determination of death (3), donors with risk factors for harboring transmittable infections (4), expanded-criteria donors (that is, those with risk factors, such as older age or hypertension) (5), and living donors related or unrelated to the recipient (6, 7).
Unfortunately, despite these efforts to increase the pool of kidneys, the median time to transplantation, number of patients on the waiting list, and number of patients who die while waiting for an organ continue to increase (8). Thus, for the past decade, ethicists and members of the transplant community have debated the approach of paying healthy persons to become living donors (9 –17). International black markets in organs are almost universally condemned because safeguards to protect donors are largely absent, brokers rather than donors may commandeer most of the payments, and such systems almost invariably entail wealthy travelers purchasing organs from poor natives (18, 19). By contrast, a less well-resolved ethical debate regards a regulated national market for kidneys in which donors receive payment according to a fixed and transparent schedule, organs are allocated according to standard criteria, and standards are set and monitored to ensure appropriate longitudinal care for donors (14, 20).
The potential benefits of such a regulated market are clear. Compared with lifelong dialysis, kidney transplantation from deceased donors substantially increases quality-adjusted life expectancy and is cost-saving (21, 22). Because kidney transplantation from living donors produces greater benefits (6), particularly when done before recipients initiate dialysis (7), even large payments (for example, $100 000) are estimated to be a cost-effective way to increase the supply of kidneys available for transplantation (8, 23).
However, at least 3 concerns exist with regulated payments for living kidney donation. First, payments may represent undue inducements—payments might alter a person’s perception of the risks associated with donation, thereby preventing a fully informed decision to sell a kidney. Second, payments may represent unjust inducements—payments might preferentially influence lower-income persons, thereby creating a market in which organs are acquired from poor persons and provided to those with sufficient financial and social resources to be listed for transplantation. Third, payments may dissuade altruistic donation or cause potential altruistic donors to request payment.
In this study, we did not aim to assess the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of these concerns, but rather we used empirical methods to determine the extent to which these concerns might manifest if a regulated market for kidneys were established in the United States.
Methods
Pilot Study
We developed a baseline description of living kidney donation and assessed its clarity among 51 persons awaiting jury duty in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Pilot study participants most commonly identified the recipient’s relationship to them (78%) and the burdens and risks associated with donation (14%) as the most important considerations governing whether they would donate. Among 7 specific donor risks presented, the possibility that participants would later develop kidney failure was most commonly (91%) cited as the most important.
Instrument Design
After clarifying the final kidney donation description to reflect the feedback from the pilot study participants, we developed scenarios in which we experimentally manipulated the factors identified as important to assess global preferences for donation (24 –27). In these scenarios (Table 1 and Appendix, available at www.annals.org), we varied risk (the percentage of living kidney donors expected to develop renal failure requiring dialysis, transplantation, or both in the future [0.1%, 1%, or 10%]), payment (the money offered for donating a kidney [$0, $10 000, or $100 000]), and recipient of the kidney (either a close family member or the next eligible patient on the waiting list). We chose 0.1% and 1% as lifetime risks for renal failure to approximate available estimates of this risk (28–30). We included the 10% risk because these studies typically excluded higher-risk donors and because donors themselves are often tolerant of greater personal risks (31). We chose the levels of payment to reflect the spectrum of values considered cost-effective (8, 14, 23).
Table 1
Table 1
Proportions of Participants Who Would Donate a Kidney, by Scenario
A full factorial design using these 3 attributes produced 18 scenarios (3 × 3 × 2). However, because responding to 18 scenarios was taxing for some pilot study participants, we randomly assigned participants in the real study to receive one of two 12-scenario packets, as shown in Table 1. In 9 of 12 scenarios in packet 1, the kidney recipient was a family member; in 9 of 12 scenarios in packet 2, the kidney recipient was the next patient on the waiting list. The 2 packets were otherwise identical, and 6 of 18 scenarios were used in both packets. This design reduced respondent burden while retaining the orthogonal relations among attributes, thereby enabling tests of all main effects and hypothesized interactions.
Participants responded to each scenario by stating their willingness to donate a kidney on a 5-point scale ranging from “definitely would not donate” to “definitely would donate.” We used a random-number generator to determine the sequence in which scenarios were presented to each participant to minimize the influence of ordering effects on overall results.
Setting and Participants
Three investigators recruited passengers on the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority regional rail system and urban trolley lines during 5 consecutive weekdays in August 2008 and June 2009. Each day, participants were recruited at a different time and on a different rail or trolley route to enhance the samples’ representativeness of the regional population and to reduce the possibility of duplicate respondents. Starting from opposite ends of the train or trolley, the investigators explained the study objectives to consecutive passengers and solicited their participation. Those who verbally consented were offered a candy bar for completing the questionnaire. The University of Pennsylvania institutional review board approved this study.
For each consenting participant, the investigator first read a standard script describing the risks, benefits, and surgical procedures involved in kidney donation and then answered participants’ questions. We excluded participants from the study if they indicated that they had any of the clinical characteristics listed in Figure 1, which would make them ineligible to donate.
Figure 1
Figure 1
Study flow diagram
Statistical Analysis
We analyzed factors associated with participants’ willingness to donate by using a generalized estimating equation model with an independent working correlation structure and robust variance estimators to account for the clustering of the 12 responses made by each participant (32). We created a dichotomous outcome variable by grouping the original 5-point willingness-to-donate scale into responses of “probably” or “definitely” would donate versus “not sure,” “probably,” or “definitely” would not donate. We also created a random-effects ordinal logistic regression model in which the 5-point outcome was maintained. Because the statistical significance and relative magnitudes of the coefficients for all independent variables were similar in both models, we present only the results of the generalized estimating equation model to best reflect the discrete donation decisions that persons must make.
To determine whether money would encourage greater donation, we examined the main effect of payment on willingness to donate. We evaluated the interaction between risk and payment to examine undue inducement. If money blinds participants to their personal risk, then the effect of risk on willingness to donate should decrease as payments increase, resulting in a negative interaction. We evaluated the interaction between payment and income to examine unjust inducement. If payments influence poorer persons more than richer persons, this influence should manifest as a negative interaction between payment and income.
To determine whether introducing monetary incentives might reduce altruistic donations (that is, donations without payment), we used chi-square tests to compare the proportions of participants who were willing to donate in nonpayment scenarios among those who completed these scenarios before versus after seeing at least one other scenario that offered payment. If financial incentives reduced altruistic donation by making persons believe that charitable acts were unnecessary (33) or by causing potential altruistic donors to request payment, then lower rates of altruistic donation should be observed among persons previously alerted to the possibility of payment than among those not previously alerted.
We conducted analyses in Stata, version 10.1 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas), and SAS, version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina). We forced the following independent variables into the generalized estimating equation model: 3 manipulated scenario attributes (risk, payment, and recipient), participants’ annual household income (entered as a 6-level ordinal variable after confirming that it satisfied the linearity assumption), and 2 hypothesized interaction terms (payment-by-risk and payment-by-income) and terms for the survey packet and interval of the survey. We logarithmically transformed the risk and payment variables to improve model fit. We entered other independent variables and interactions into the model if we found an association with willingness to donate in unadjusted analyses (P < 0.15) or if inclusion of these variables modified the coefficient for the risk attribute by 15% or more. Table 2 describes participant characteristics evaluated for inclusion.
Table 2
Table 2
Participant Characteristics
After producing the generalized estimating equation model, we estimated probabilities of donation across all possible combinations of the 4 primary independent variables: payment, risk, recipient, and income. To do so, we first used conditional standardization to adjust for differences in patterns of all other covariates among comparison groups (34).
Sample Size
The sample size for this study was guided by the hypothesized outcome that would require the most participants to detect—the payment-by-income interaction. A specific interest in comparing only participants in the highest (annual household income >$100 000) and lowest (annual household income ≤$20 000) income strata further guided our sample size. Enrolling 120 eligible participants in these 2 strata combined, with a roughly even distribution between them, would provide greater than 80% power to detect a payment-by-income interaction equivalent to a 12% change in either direction from an anticipated baseline donation rate of 40%. Enrolling a total of 300 participants (across all 6 income strata) would provide greater than 95% power to detect payment-by-income interactions of identical magnitudes when we analyzed all participants. These estimates are based on the recommendation to inflate the required sample size by 50% in order to detect an interaction term rather than a similarly sized main effect (35), and allows for a design effect (to account for the correlated nature of the 12-scenario responses per participant) (36) of 7.15. This latter choice reflects the observed design effect in our pilot study, calculated as 1 + ρ(κ − 1), in which ρ is the intraclass correlation and ρ is the number of scenarios per participant (36).
Validity
We evaluated internal consistency by assessing the proportion of responses that violated the principle of monotonicity (24, 37). This principle holds that participants should never be more willing to donate when a less favorable level of one attribute (for example, higher risk) is offered while the levels of other attributes (for example, payment and recipient) are held constant.
Role of the Funding Source
We received no specific funding for this study.
Results
Among 550 passengers who we asked to participate, 415 consented, of which 409 completed at least 80% of the scenarios (response rate, 74.4%) (Figure 1). We excluded 67 of these participants because they were clinically ineligible to donate. The remaining 342 participants indicated their willingness to donate in 4088 of 4104 scenarios they received (item response rate, 99.6%). We imputed values for the 16 missing observations by using the corresponding participant’s average willingness to donate across other scenarios. This did not change any results compared with the complete case analyses in which we excluded the 15 participants who had 1 or 2 missing ratings each.
Table 2 shows participants’ demographic characteristics. These distributions approximate those of the Philadelphia region (38), except that participants had higher education status.
Factors Associated With Willingness to Donate
In the multivariable generalized estimating equation model (Table 3), we found statistically significant associations with willingness to donate for donating to a family member rather than to the next patient on the waiting list, a lower risk for renal failure (expressed on a logarithmic scale), and a higher payment (also on a logarithmic scale) (each P < 0.001). In addition, willingness to donate was greater among women than among men (P = 0.016) and among participants with incrementally lower annual household incomes (P = 0.028). This effect of income was observed among donations to the next patient on the waiting list (P = 0.020) but not among donations to family members (P = 0.31), resulting in a significant interaction between income and recipient (odds ratio [OR], 1.26 [95% CI, 1.06 to 1.48]).
Table 3
Table 3
Factors Associated with Participants’ Willingness to Donate a Kidney
Undue Inducement
We found no evidence of an interaction between payment and risk across all scenarios (OR, 1.00 [CI, 0.96 to 1.03]) or when stratified among scenarios in which the recipient was a family member (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.94 to 1.04]) or the next patient on the waiting list (OR, 0.97 [CI, 0.93 to 1.01]) (Figure 2). The magnitude of reductions in willingness to donate associated with increased risk for renal failure was virtually identical across payment levels (Figure 2). These results suggest that payment is not an undue inducement for living kidney donation. Similarly, we found no evidence of undue inducement when we restricted the analyses to the 70 least-educated participants (those with high school education or less) (payment-by-risk interaction: OR, 1.02 [CI, 0.96 to 1.08]).
Figure 2
Figure 2
Adjusted proportions of participants willing to donate a kidney to family members and to patients on the waiting list as functions of payment and risk
By contrast, we found a significant interaction (OR, 0.87 [CI, 0.82 to 0.97]) between payment and recipient. The conditionally adjusted probabilities of donating to the next patient on the waiting list increased significantly with increasing levels of payment (29.8% [CI, 19.5% to 42.7%] for $0, 44.1% [CI, 33.1% to 55.7%] for $10 000, and 47.9% [CI, 36.4% to 59.6%] for $100 000), whereas the probabilities of donating to a family member increased only marginally and nonsignificantly with increasing levels of payment (81.2% [CI, 72.3% to 87.8%) for $0, 82.1% [CI, 74.2% to 88.0%] for $10 000, and 82.4% [CI, 74.2% to 88.4%] for $100 000).
Unjust Inducement
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found (OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). Even when we restricted analyses to the 57 participants in the lowest income stratum (annual household income ≤$20 000) and the 66 participants in the highest income stratum (annual household income >$100 000), no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Adjusted proportions of participants willing to donate a kidney to a patient on the waiting list as a function of income and payment.
Payment and Altruistic Donation
We found no evidence that the introduction of payment for organs would reduce altruistic donation. The proportions of scenarios in which participants were willing to donate without payment were similar when we presented these scenarios to participants before (64 of 123 participants [52.0%]) or after (523 of 933 participants [56.1%]) the introduction of monetary incentives (chi-square = 0.71; P = 0.40).
Response Validity
All 3 primary attributes were in the hypothesized direction, supporting the face validity of the results. Of the 3078 possible violations of monotonicity, 214 violations on the risk scale (7.0%) and 273 violations on the payment scale (8.9%) were observed. The median number of violations per participant was 0 (interquartile range, 0 to 1) for both scales.
Go to:
Discussion
We found no evidence that any of the 3 main concerns with a regulated system of payments for living kidney donation would manifest if such a market were established. Providing payments did not dull persons’ sensitivity to the risks associated with donor nephrectomy, suggesting that payment does not represent an undue inducement— one that would make rational choice difficult. Furthermore, providing payments did not preferentially motivate poorer persons to sell a kidney, suggesting that payment does not represent an unjust inducement— one that would put substantially more pressure on poorer persons than on wealthier persons.
Similar to real-world observations from Iran’s partially regulated kidney market (39, 40), we found that poorer persons were more likely than wealthier persons to consider donation to an unrelated donor. However, contrary to both our hypotheses and concerns expressed about the Iranian market (40), we found that poorer persons were more willing to donate independent of payment (Figure 3). Even after restricting our analyses to the poorest and wealthiest participants, we found no evidence that payment influenced these 2 groups differently. This result is consistent with previous observations that payment does not preferentially motivate clinical research participation among poor persons (25). Thus, our results do not corroborate concerns about the ethics of payment per se, but rather they suggest that poorer persons may contribute disproportionately to the supply of organs with or without payment. Reasons for these behaviors, perhaps including differences in the opportunity costs of donating among richer and poorer patients, merit future study.
We also found no evidence that introducing monetary incentives would “crowd out” a person’s altruistic incentives to donate. This result is consistent with a previous public survey that found that payments would encourage kidney donation for monetary reasons far more commonly than it would discourage donation for altruistic reasons (41). Together, these studies cast substantial doubt on the concern that offering payments would undermine altruistic donation. They suggest that systems allowing payment for kidney donors would produce more transplantable organs than systems barring it.
| 20,523 |
<h4>regulated payments would not distort donor decisions, unjustly rely on the poor, or crowd out altruisitic giving—default to <u>empirical evidence</h4><p></u><strong>Halpern 10</strong> Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns</p><p>http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab</p><p><u><strong><mark>Theoretical concerns</strong> about paying persons for living kidney donation <strong>are not corroborated by empirical evidence.</mark> </u></strong>A real-world test of regulated payments for kidney donation is needed to definitively show whether payment provides a viable and ethical method to increase the supply of kidneys available for transplantation.</p><p>The insufficient supply of transplantable kidneys from traditional donors after neurologic determination of death (1, 2) has prompted increasing use of kidneys from the following types of donors: donors after circulatory determination of death (3), donors with risk factors for harboring transmittable infections (4), expanded-criteria donors (that is, those with risk factors, such as older age or hypertension) (5), and living donors related or unrelated to the recipient (6, 7).</p><p>Unfortunately, despite these efforts to increase the pool of kidneys, the median time to transplantation, number of patients on the waiting list, and number of patients who die while waiting for an organ continue to increase (8). Thus, for the past decade, ethicists and members of the transplant community have debated the approach of paying healthy persons to become living donors (9 –17). International black markets in organs are almost universally condemned because safeguards to protect donors are largely absent, brokers rather than donors may commandeer most of the payments, and such systems almost invariably entail wealthy travelers purchasing organs from poor natives (18, 19). By contrast, a less well-resolved ethical debate regards a regulated national market for kidneys in which donors receive payment according to a fixed and transparent schedule, organs are allocated according to standard criteria, and standards are set and monitored to ensure appropriate longitudinal care for donors (14, 20).</p><p>The potential benefits of such a regulated market are clear. Compared with lifelong dialysis, kidney transplantation from deceased donors substantially increases quality-adjusted life expectancy and is cost-saving (21, 22). Because kidney transplantation from living donors produces greater benefits (6), particularly when done before recipients initiate dialysis (7), even large payments (for example, $100 000) are estimated to be a cost-effective way to increase the supply of kidneys available for transplantation (8, 23).</p><p><u>However, at least 3 concerns exist with regulated payments for living kidney donation. First, payments may represent undue inducements—payments might alter a person’s perception of the risks associated with donation, thereby preventing a fully informed decision to sell a kidney. Second, payments may represent unjust inducements—payments might preferentially influence lower-income persons, thereby creating a market in which organs are acquired from poor persons and provided to those with sufficient financial and social resources to be listed for transplantation. Third, payments may dissuade altruistic donation or cause potential altruistic donors to request payment.</p><p><mark>In this study</mark>,</u> we did not aim to assess the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of these concerns, but rather <u><mark>we used empirical methods to determine the extent to which these concerns might manifest if a regulated market</mark> for kidneys <mark>were established</mark> in the United States.</p><p></u>Methods</p><p>Pilot Study</p><p>We developed a baseline description of living kidney donation and assessed its clarity among 51 persons awaiting jury duty in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Pilot study participants most commonly identified the recipient’s relationship to them (78%) and the burdens and risks associated with donation (14%) as the most important considerations governing whether they would donate. Among 7 specific donor risks presented, the possibility that participants would later develop kidney failure was most commonly (91%) cited as the most important.</p><p>Instrument Design</p><p>After clarifying the final kidney donation description to reflect the feedback from the pilot study participants, we developed scenarios in which we experimentally manipulated the factors identified as important to assess global preferences for donation (24 –27). In these scenarios (Table 1 and Appendix, available at www.annals.org), we varied risk (the percentage of living kidney donors expected to develop renal failure requiring dialysis, transplantation, or both in the future [0.1%, 1%, or 10%]), payment (the money offered for donating a kidney [$0, $10 000, or $100 000]), and recipient of the kidney (either a close family member or the next eligible patient on the waiting list). We chose 0.1% and 1% as lifetime risks for renal failure to approximate available estimates of this risk (28–30). We included the 10% risk because these studies typically excluded higher-risk donors and because donors themselves are often tolerant of greater personal risks (31). We chose the levels of payment to reflect the spectrum of values considered cost-effective (8, 14, 23).</p><p>Table 1</p><p>Table 1</p><p>Proportions of Participants Who Would Donate a Kidney, by Scenario</p><p>A full factorial design using these 3 attributes produced 18 scenarios (3 × 3 × 2). However, because responding to 18 scenarios was taxing for some pilot study participants, we randomly assigned participants in the real study to receive one of two 12-scenario packets, as shown in Table 1. In 9 of 12 scenarios in packet 1, the kidney recipient was a family member; in 9 of 12 scenarios in packet 2, the kidney recipient was the next patient on the waiting list. The 2 packets were otherwise identical, and 6 of 18 scenarios were used in both packets. This design reduced respondent burden while retaining the orthogonal relations among attributes, thereby enabling tests of all main effects and hypothesized interactions.</p><p>Participants responded to each scenario by stating their willingness to donate a kidney on a 5-point scale ranging from “definitely would not donate” to “definitely would donate.” We used a random-number generator to determine the sequence in which scenarios were presented to each participant to minimize the influence of ordering effects on overall results.</p><p>Setting and Participants</p><p>Three investigators recruited passengers on the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority regional rail system and urban trolley lines during 5 consecutive weekdays in August 2008 and June 2009. Each day, participants were recruited at a different time and on a different rail or trolley route to enhance the samples’ representativeness of the regional population and to reduce the possibility of duplicate respondents. Starting from opposite ends of the train or trolley, the investigators explained the study objectives to consecutive passengers and solicited their participation. Those who verbally consented were offered a candy bar for completing the questionnaire. The University of Pennsylvania institutional review board approved this study.</p><p>For each consenting participant, the investigator first read a standard script describing the risks, benefits, and surgical procedures involved in kidney donation and then answered participants’ questions. We excluded participants from the study if they indicated that they had any of the clinical characteristics listed in Figure 1, which would make them ineligible to donate.</p><p>Figure 1</p><p>Figure 1</p><p>Study flow diagram</p><p>Statistical Analysis</p><p>We analyzed factors associated with participants’ willingness to donate by using a generalized estimating equation model with an independent working correlation structure and robust variance estimators to account for the clustering of the 12 responses made by each participant (32). We created a dichotomous outcome variable by grouping the original 5-point willingness-to-donate scale into responses of “probably” or “definitely” would donate versus “not sure,” “probably,” or “definitely” would not donate. We also created a random-effects ordinal logistic regression model in which the 5-point outcome was maintained. Because the statistical significance and relative magnitudes of the coefficients for all independent variables were similar in both models, we present only the results of the generalized estimating equation model to best reflect the discrete donation decisions that persons must make.</p><p>To determine whether money would encourage greater donation, we examined the main effect of payment on willingness to donate. We evaluated the interaction between risk and payment to examine undue inducement. If money blinds participants to their personal risk, then the effect of risk on willingness to donate should decrease as payments increase, resulting in a negative interaction. We evaluated the interaction between payment and income to examine unjust inducement. If payments influence poorer persons more than richer persons, this influence should manifest as a negative interaction between payment and income.</p><p>To determine whether introducing monetary incentives might reduce altruistic donations (that is, donations without payment), we used chi-square tests to compare the proportions of participants who were willing to donate in nonpayment scenarios among those who completed these scenarios before versus after seeing at least one other scenario that offered payment. If financial incentives reduced altruistic donation by making persons believe that charitable acts were unnecessary (33) or by causing potential altruistic donors to request payment, then lower rates of altruistic donation should be observed among persons previously alerted to the possibility of payment than among those not previously alerted.</p><p>We conducted analyses in Stata, version 10.1 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas), and SAS, version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina). We forced the following independent variables into the generalized estimating equation model: 3 manipulated scenario attributes (risk, payment, and recipient), participants’ annual household income (entered as a 6-level ordinal variable after confirming that it satisfied the linearity assumption), and 2 hypothesized interaction terms (payment-by-risk and payment-by-income) and terms for the survey packet and interval of the survey. We logarithmically transformed the risk and payment variables to improve model fit. We entered other independent variables and interactions into the model if we found an association with willingness to donate in unadjusted analyses (P < 0.15) or if inclusion of these variables modified the coefficient for the risk attribute by 15% or more. Table 2 describes participant characteristics evaluated for inclusion.</p><p>Table 2</p><p>Table 2</p><p>Participant Characteristics</p><p>After producing the generalized estimating equation model, we estimated probabilities of donation across all possible combinations of the 4 primary independent variables: payment, risk, recipient, and income. To do so, we first used conditional standardization to adjust for differences in patterns of all other covariates among comparison groups (34).</p><p>Sample Size</p><p>The sample size for this study was guided by the hypothesized outcome that would require the most participants to detect—the payment-by-income interaction. A specific interest in comparing only participants in the highest (annual household income >$100 000) and lowest (annual household income ≤$20 000) income strata further guided our sample size. Enrolling 120 eligible participants in these 2 strata combined, with a roughly even distribution between them, would provide greater than 80% power to detect a payment-by-income interaction equivalent to a 12% change in either direction from an anticipated baseline donation rate of 40%. Enrolling a total of 300 participants (across all 6 income strata) would provide greater than 95% power to detect payment-by-income interactions of identical magnitudes when we analyzed all participants. These estimates are based on the recommendation to inflate the required sample size by 50% in order to detect an interaction term rather than a similarly sized main effect (35), and allows for a design effect (to account for the correlated nature of the 12-scenario responses per participant) (36) of 7.15. This latter choice reflects the observed design effect in our pilot study, calculated as 1 + ρ(κ − 1), in which ρ is the intraclass correlation and ρ is the number of scenarios per participant (36).</p><p>Validity</p><p>We evaluated internal consistency by assessing the proportion of responses that violated the principle of monotonicity (24, 37). This principle holds that participants should never be more willing to donate when a less favorable level of one attribute (for example, higher risk) is offered while the levels of other attributes (for example, payment and recipient) are held constant.</p><p>Role of the Funding Source</p><p>We received no specific funding for this study.</p><p>Results</p><p>Among 550 passengers who we asked to participate, 415 consented, of which 409 completed at least 80% of the scenarios (response rate, 74.4%) (Figure 1). We excluded 67 of these participants because they were clinically ineligible to donate. The remaining 342 participants indicated their willingness to donate in 4088 of 4104 scenarios they received (item response rate, 99.6%). We imputed values for the 16 missing observations by using the corresponding participant’s average willingness to donate across other scenarios. This did not change any results compared with the complete case analyses in which we excluded the 15 participants who had 1 or 2 missing ratings each.</p><p>Table 2 shows participants’ demographic characteristics. These distributions approximate those of the Philadelphia region (38), except that participants had higher education status.</p><p>Factors Associated With Willingness to Donate</p><p>In the multivariable generalized estimating equation model (Table 3), we found statistically significant associations with willingness to donate for donating to a family member rather than to the next patient on the waiting list, a lower risk for renal failure (expressed on a logarithmic scale), and a higher payment (also on a logarithmic scale) (each P < 0.001). In addition, willingness to donate was greater among women than among men (P = 0.016) and among participants with incrementally lower annual household incomes (P = 0.028). This effect of income was observed among donations to the next patient on the waiting list (P = 0.020) but not among donations to family members (P = 0.31), resulting in a significant interaction between income and recipient (odds ratio [OR], 1.26 [95% CI, 1.06 to 1.48]).</p><p>Table 3</p><p>Table 3</p><p>Factors Associated with Participants’ Willingness to Donate a Kidney</p><p>Undue Inducement</p><p>We found no evidence of an interaction between payment and risk across all scenarios (OR, 1.00 [CI, 0.96 to 1.03]) or when stratified among scenarios in which the recipient was a family member (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.94 to 1.04]) or the next patient on the waiting list (OR, 0.97 [CI, 0.93 to 1.01]) (Figure 2). The magnitude of reductions in willingness to donate associated with increased risk for renal failure was virtually identical across payment levels (Figure 2). These results suggest that payment is not an undue inducement for living kidney donation. Similarly, we found no evidence of undue inducement when we restricted the analyses to the 70 least-educated participants (those with high school education or less) (payment-by-risk interaction: OR, 1.02 [CI, 0.96 to 1.08]).</p><p>Figure 2</p><p>Figure 2</p><p>Adjusted proportions of participants willing to donate a kidney to family members and to patients on the waiting list as functions of payment and risk</p><p>By contrast, we found a significant interaction (OR, 0.87 [CI, 0.82 to 0.97]) between payment and recipient. The conditionally adjusted probabilities of donating to the next patient on the waiting list increased significantly with increasing levels of payment (29.8% [CI, 19.5% to 42.7%] for $0, 44.1% [CI, 33.1% to 55.7%] for $10 000, and 47.9% [CI, 36.4% to 59.6%] for $100 000), whereas the probabilities of donating to a family member increased only marginally and nonsignificantly with increasing levels of payment (81.2% [CI, 72.3% to 87.8%) for $0, 82.1% [CI, 74.2% to 88.0%] for $10 000, and 82.4% [CI, 74.2% to 88.4%] for $100 000).</p><p>Unjust Inducement</p><p>Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found (OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). Even when we restricted analyses to the 57 participants in the lowest income stratum (annual household income ≤$20 000) and the 66 participants in the highest income stratum (annual household income >$100 000), no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.</p><p>Figure 3</p><p>Figure 3</p><p>Adjusted proportions of participants willing to donate a kidney to a patient on the waiting list as a function of income and payment.</p><p>Payment and Altruistic Donation</p><p>We found no evidence that the introduction of payment for organs would reduce altruistic donation. The proportions of scenarios in which participants were willing to donate without payment were similar when we presented these scenarios to participants before (64 of 123 participants [52.0%]) or after (523 of 933 participants [56.1%]) the introduction of monetary incentives (chi-square = 0.71; P = 0.40).</p><p>Response Validity</p><p>All 3 primary attributes were in the hypothesized direction, supporting the face validity of the results. Of the 3078 possible violations of monotonicity, 214 violations on the risk scale (7.0%) and 273 violations on the payment scale (8.9%) were observed. The median number of violations per participant was 0 (interquartile range, 0 to 1) for both scales.</p><p>Go to:</p><p><u>Discussion</p><p><mark>We found no evidence that any of the 3 main concerns</mark> with a regulated system of payments for living kidney donation <mark>would manifest</mark> if such a market were established. <strong><mark>Providing payments did not dull persons’ sensitivity to the risks</strong></mark> associated with donor nephrectomy, suggesting that <mark>payment does not represent an undue</mark> <mark>inducement—</mark> one <mark>that would make rational choice difficult</mark>. Furthermore, <strong><mark>providing payments did not preferentially motivate poorer persons to sell a kidney,</strong></mark> suggesting that <mark>payment does not represent an unjust inducement</mark>— one <mark>that would put</mark> substantially <mark>more pressure on poorer persons</mark> than on wealthier persons.</p><p></u>Similar to real-world observations from Iran’s partially regulated kidney market (39, 40), we found that poorer persons were more likely than wealthier persons to consider donation to an unrelated donor. However, contrary to both our hypotheses and concerns expressed about the Iranian market (40), we found that poorer persons were more willing to donate independent of payment (Figure 3). Even after restricting our analyses to the poorest and wealthiest participants, we found no evidence that payment influenced these 2 groups differently. This result is consistent with previous observations that payment does not preferentially motivate clinical research participation among poor persons (25). Thus, our results do not corroborate concerns about the ethics of payment per se, but rather they suggest that poorer persons may contribute disproportionately to the supply of organs with or without payment. Reasons for these behaviors, perhaps including differences in the opportunity costs of donating among richer and poorer patients, merit future study.</p><p><u><mark>We also found <strong>no evidence that introducing monetary incentives would “crowd out”</strong></mark> a person’s altruistic incentives to donate.</u> This result is consistent with a previous public survey that found that payments would encourage kidney donation for monetary reasons far more commonly than it would discourage donation for altruistic reasons (41). Together, these studies cast substantial doubt on the concern that offering payments would undermine altruistic donation. They suggest that systems allowing payment for kidney donors would produce more transplantable organs than systems barring it.</p>
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Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,869 | 11 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
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Cedanats
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1
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Emporia State Perretta-Turley
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Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,907 |
Legalize means removal of all restrictions
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Woods 11
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Woods 11 Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis
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("'Legalization' means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").
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n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 ("'Legalization' - which no EU state has yet adopted - means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").
| 404 |
<h4><strong>Legalize means removal of all restrictions</h4><p>Woods 11</strong> Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis</p><p>n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 <u>("'Legalization'</u> - which no EU state has yet adopted - <u>means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage.");</u> Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 <u>("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").</u><strong> </p></strong>
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Neg vs cornell KR
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1nc
|
4
| 430,509 | 7 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,908 |
Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative fails and leads to authoritarian oppression.
|
Barbrook 98
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Barbrook 98 (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html)
|
Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority. , Lenin had advocated direct democracy while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolsheviks. Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics In Deleuze and Guattari's writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies.< Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses - without any formal consent from them - in the fight against capitalism.
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Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for elitism radicals believed in two contradictory concepts , the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority Lenin advocated democracy while instituting totalitarian rule this authoritarianism found its expression in semiotic structuralism
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Techno-nomad TJs are attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Frequence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. This elitism was no accident. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people in the sixties experienced a pronounced 'generation gap' between themselves and their parents. Feeling so isolated, they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority.<14> The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolsheviks. As their 'free radio' experience showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. As in other social movements, Fr=E9quence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution.<15> In Deleuze and Guattari's writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its 'wooden language', the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies.<16> During the sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party.<17> For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the semiotic 'machinic assemblages' of the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, most people supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Yet, as the rappers who wanted to make a show for Frequence Libre discovered, Deleuzoguattarian anarcho-communism even included the censorship of music. By adopting an Althusserian analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses - without any formal consent from them - in the fight against capitalism.
| 3,290 |
<h4><strong>Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative fails and leads to authoritarian oppression. </h4><p>Barbrook 98</strong> (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html)</p><p>Techno-nomad TJs are attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Frequence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how <u><mark>Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for</mark> intellectual <mark>elitism</mark>.</u> This elitism was no accident. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people in the sixties experienced a pronounced 'generation gap' between themselves and their parents. Feeling so isolated, <u>they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young <mark>radicals</mark> simultaneously <mark>believed in two contradictory concepts</mark>. First<mark>, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority</mark>.</u><14> The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. During the 1917 Russian revolution<u>, <mark>Lenin</mark> had <mark>advocated</mark> direct <mark>democracy while</mark> simultaneously <mark>instituting</mark> the <mark>totalitarian rule</mark> of the Bolsheviks. </u>As their 'free radio' experience showed,<u> Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics</u>. As in other social movements, Fr=E9quence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution.<15> <u>In Deleuze and Guattari's writings, <mark>this</mark> deep <mark>authoritarianism found its</mark> theoretical <mark>expression in</mark> their methodology: <mark>semiotic structuralism</mark>.</u> Despite rejecting its 'wooden language', <u>the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory.</u> Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: <u>the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies.<</u>16> During the sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party.<17> For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the semiotic 'machinic assemblages' of the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, most people supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Yet, as the rappers who wanted to make a show for Frequence Libre discovered, Deleuzoguattarian anarcho-communism even included the censorship of music. By adopting an Althusserian analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. <u>Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses - without any formal consent from them<strong> - in the fight against capitalism. </p></u></strong>
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Neg vs Rutgers wm
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1nr
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AT: Root Cause
| 56,878 | 39 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
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Hubervermont
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6
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Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
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Merkle
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1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,909 |
With sales limited to government purchasing transplants under the plan would be based on medical need
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Gill 2
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Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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/v012/12.1gill.html
The international market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,
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horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program
First, in the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,
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Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
The international black market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation, and the popular press has been right to expose it. But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international black market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
| 1,480 |
<h4>With sales limited to government purchasing transplants under the plan would be based on medical need </h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>The international</u> black <u>market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation</u>, and the popular press has been right to expose it. <u>But the <mark>horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program</mark> we propose.</p><p><mark>First, in</mark> our proposal <mark>the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated</mark>. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.</p><p><mark>Second,</mark> the domestic program we propose <mark>involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international</u></mark> black <u><mark>market.</mark> <mark>Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,</u><strong></mark> as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,687 | 5 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,910 |
Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict
|
Ikenberry and Deudney 9
|
Ikenberry and Deudney 9 (Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)
|
the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces , the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are globalization institutions and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides constraints and opportunities that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete. nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. in the twenty-first century the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the U S with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China revisionist states notably China and Russia are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power Many other global institutions are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions The pathway to modernity is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside the liberal international order. The viability of regimes hinges on their ability to sustain economic growth which is crucially dependent on international trade Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people have increasingly joined the world community citizens of autocratic states are participating in transnational networks. the values of "us versus them" become difficult to generate and sustain. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here China Europe, India, Japan, the United States Iran and Russia share a common interest in security . The declining utility of war and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation
|
the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors the most striking features are globalization institutions and interdependence The overall structure provides constraints that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the powers possessing nuclear weapons The prospect of losses has instilled level of restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts trade, investment, and production across international borders raises the costs of war revisionist states, are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo institution are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions their people have increasingly joined the world community the values of us versus them" become difficult to generate China Europe, India, Japan Iran and Russia share a common interest in security The declining utility of and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of cooperation.
|
It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint the picture of an international system marked by rising levels of conflict and competition, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark: "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.
| 9,298 |
<h4><strong>Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict </h4><p>Ikenberry and Deudney 9 </strong>(Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)</p><p>It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint <u><mark>the picture of an international system marked by</u></mark> rising levels of <u><mark>conflict and competition</u></mark>, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook <u><mark>is</u></mark> based on <u><strong><mark>an exaggeration</u></strong></mark> of recent developments <u><mark>and ignores powerful <strong>countervailing factors</mark> and forces</u></strong>. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe<u>, <mark>the most striking features</mark> of the contemporary international landscape <mark>are</u></mark> the intensification of economic <u><strong><mark>globalization</u></strong></mark>, thickening <u><strong><mark>institutions</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>shared problems of <mark>interdependence</strong></mark>. <mark>The</u> <u>overall structure</u></mark> of the international system today <u>is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century</u>. Compared to older orders,<u> the contemporary liberal-centered international order <mark>provides</u></mark> a set of <u><mark>constraints</mark> and opportunities</u> — of pushes and pulls — <u><mark>that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.</u></mark> Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and <u><mark>great-power expansion has become</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>obsolete</strong></mark>.</u> Most important, <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>have transformed great-power war</mark> </u>from a routine feature of international politics <u><mark>into an exercise in <strong>national suicide.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>With all of the</mark> great <mark>powers possessing nuclear weapons</mark> and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces</u>, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. <u><mark>The prospect of</mark> such great <mark>losses has instilled</mark> in the great powers a <mark>level <strong>of</mark> caution and <mark>restraint</strong> that <strong>effectively precludes major revisionist efforts</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory</u> inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the<u> density of <mark>trade, investment, and production</mark> networks <mark>across international borders <strong>raises</mark> even more <mark>the costs of war</strong></mark>. </u>A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But <u>in the twenty-first century</u>, <u>the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states</u> in Europe and East Asia <u>whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China</u> or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially <u><mark>revisionist</u></mark> autocratic <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> most <u>notably China and Russia</u>, <u><mark>are</u></mark> already substantial players and <u><strong><mark>stakeholders</strong> in</u></mark> <u><mark>an</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>ensemble of global institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that make up the status quo</mark>, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power</u>). <u>Many other global <mark>institution</mark>s</u>, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, <u><mark>are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice <strong>only by buying into the institutions</u></strong></mark>. <u>The pathway to modernity</u> for rising states <u>is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside</u> and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of <u>the liberal international order.</u> The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. <u>The </u>domestic <u>viability of</u> these <u>regimes hinges on their ability to sustain</u> high <u>economic growth</u> rates, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is crucially dependent on international trade</u> and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. <u>Not only have these states joined the world economy, but <mark>their people</u></mark> — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — <u><mark>have increasingly joined the world community</u></mark>. In large and growing numbers, <u>citizens of autocratic</u> capitalist <u>states are participating in</u> a sprawling array of <u>transnational </u>educational, business, and avocational <u>networks.</u> As individuals are socialized into <u><mark>the values</u></mark> and orientations <u><mark>of</u></mark> these networks, stark: <u>"<mark>us versus them"</u></mark> cleavages <u><mark>become</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>difficult to generate</mark> and sustain</strong>.</u> As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. <u>These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here</u>. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong>, <strong>India</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong></mark>,</u> and <u>the United States</u>, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. These states <u><strong><mark>share a common interest</strong> in</u></mark> price stability and supply <u><mark>security</u></mark> that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building<u>.</u> Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. <u><strong><mark>The declining utility of</mark> war</u></strong>, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, <u><mark>and emerging</u></mark> resource and <u><mark>environmental interdependencies</u></mark> together <u><strong><mark>undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability</u></strong></mark> based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, <u><mark>the conditions of the twenty-first century <strong>point to the renewed value</strong> of</mark> international integration and <mark>cooperation</u>.</p></mark>
|
Contention 4: no war
| null | null | 18,192 | 80 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,911 |
violation – the conditional nature of the plan text is a restriction
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>violation – the conditional nature of the plan text is a restriction</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
4
| 430,870 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,912 |
Empirically, sales would not be primarily from the poor. All income groups would participate.
|
Halpern 10
|
Halpern 10 Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns
|
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found Even when we restricted analyses to the lowest income stratum and the highest income stratum no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.
|
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found Even when we restricted analyses to the lowest income stratum and the highest no significant interaction emerged
|
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab
Unjust Inducement
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found (OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). Even when we restricted analyses to the 57 participants in the lowest income stratum (annual household income ≤$20 000) and the 66 participants in the highest income stratum (annual household income >$100 000), no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.
| 1,068 |
<h4><strong>Empirically, sales would not be primarily from the poor. All income groups would participate.</h4><p>Halpern 10</strong> Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns</p><p>http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab</p><p>Unjust Inducement</p><p><u><mark>Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so <strong>evenly</strong> across the 6 income strata,</mark> such that <mark>no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found</mark> </u>(OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). <u><mark>Even when we restricted analyses to the</u></mark> 57 participants in the <u><mark>lowest income stratum</u></mark> (annual household income ≤$20 000) <u><mark>and the</u></mark> 66 participants in the <u><mark>highest</mark> income stratum</u> (annual household income >$100 000), <u><mark>no significant interaction emerged</mark> (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,596 | 4 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,913 |
Authoritarianism turns the K – causes injustice, violence, environmental degradation, racism, and economic segregation
|
Maiese 3
|
Maiese 3 – M.A. Candidate in Philosophy at the University of Colorado (Michelle, “Social Structural Change”, July 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/social-structural-changes, RSpec)
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there is much conflict within states, characterized by a general breakdown of government Bad governance must be corrected one type of social structural change is democratization social structural changes contribute to the establishment of participatory nation-building processes by fostering democratic development, nonviolent and just dispute resolution systems, the participation of the population, and rule of law Societies develop a "workable political system in which the multiple social groups can participate to their satisfaction. This mitigate violent intrastate conflict citizens are alienated from the institutions and practices of governance civic life have disintegrated it is a sign of an oppressive regime civil society address persistent destructive injustice, poverty, violence environmental degradation dialogue and reconciliation peace across cultures values of caring, tolerance, and cooperation People who care about community are less likely to participate in mindless development, environmental pollution, and racial and economic segregation. Various types of structural reform aim to strengthen community and civil society. These measures strive to foster public participation and create institutions of governance that can "become vehicles not just for making and enacting policy decisions but for fostering citizenship."[27] Such measures include forums for meaningful public engagement, real opportunities for community members to communicate with public officials, and other forms of inclusive governance.
Trapani, 2002
, Lexis)
in important ways, the eroticization and abjection of the Native American cannot serve as a technology of dominance if the distinct and discernible "Indian" has disappeared or been eroded by Anglo-Euramerican colonization. Thus, the possibility that the Anglo-Euramerican would be denied the opportunity to resource the primitive because there are no more "pure primitives" results in a crisis. Derrida noted that the center of a "sign" structure is that very thing which escapes notice because all others revolve around it The institutionalization of the sign "Indian," preserves a legal sovereign authority (the Anglo-Euramerican arbiter of "fact") and ensures that departures from the standard are denigrated in the name of the sanctity of the archive. Even as the recognition records are guarded by the Anglo-Euramerican agents, it is done in a way made to appear natural and without interference because the original assumption, the pre-condition for the existence of the archive, is effaced. In an absolute manner, anything that threatens the homogeneity of the archive also threatens the invisibility of the center. In this case the threat is the presumption of Anglo-Euramerican plenitude because it might reveal the interested and essential act of violence by which the archive is "housed." By excluding the "inauthentic" from the archive, the assumptions of (racial) Anglo-Euramerican superiority are elided and made to disappear in the technocratic determination of the (Indian) Spivak urges caution to those that equate constitutional acts with a concomitant level of justice even though those acts might be done "in their name." it is because constitutions can only operate by coding a person "intoa rational abstraction manipulable according to the principle of reason" that they operate at a level apart from the subject, or the universal-in-singular ethical agent." while legislative acts, and in particular the "highest" of those acts - which appeal to the spirit of "The People" - might offer the promise of the legitimation of their recipient, they do so in name only. they may not alter the material conditions which positioned the subject in need of redress in the first place. these constitutional moments code the intended benefactor along the model of simulated persons so that to qualify for the right or privilege extended, the subject must conform to the abstraction. the codes work by abstracting the critical differences between the petitioning group and the authorizing agent, so that even as they may "succeed" in garnering legal "cover" in one arena, they are also constituted as a vulnerable and radically Other that depends on a potentially capricious dominant authority for protection. code can only "recognize" Native Americans because they are already recognizable. As such, historically embedded notions of what a proper tribe may "look like" provides privilege for some tribes while denigrating others.
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there is conflict characterized by a breakdown of government democratization contribute to participatory nation-building processes by development, nonviolent resolution systems participation of the population, and rule of law civic life disintegrated is a sign of an oppressive regime civil society address injustice, poverty, violence environmental degradation peace caring, tolerance, and cooperation People who care are less likely to participate in racial and economic segregation
Spivak urges caution to those that equate constitutional acts with a concomitant level of justice even though those acts might be done "in their name constitutions can only operate by coding a person "intoa rational abstraction manipulable according to the principle of reason while acts offer the legitimation of their recipient, they do so in name only. they may not alter the material conditions which positioned the subject in need of redress in the first place these code the intended benefactor along the model of simulated persons so that to qualify for the right the subject must conform to the abstraction they are uted as a vulnerable and radically Other that depends on a potentially capricious dominant authority for protection
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Today, there is much conflict within states, characterized by a general breakdown of government, as well as economic privation and civil strife.[18] Bad governance is a form of injustice that must be corrected. Thus, one very broad type of social structural change is state reform and democratization. State reform must involve more than just reorganization of the administrative system or the system of resource allocation. These social structural changes should contribute to the establishment of participatory nation-building processes by fostering democratic development, nonviolent and just dispute resolution systems, the participation of the population, and rule of law.[19] In some cases, parties are chiefly concerned with replacing or altering existing legal and political institutions. Reform of government institutions typically involves measures aimed at democratization and increased political participation.[20] Societies strive to develop a "workable political system in which the multiple social groups can participate to their satisfaction."[21] This sort of state reform has the potential to mitigate and heal the effects of violent intrastate conflict, as well as prevent future conflict. One type of structural change is the strengthening of civil society. Civil society involves various sectors, including the business world, trade unions, women's groups, churches, and human rights activists.[22] In many societies, citizens are alienated from the institutions and practices of governance, and public institutions are unable to solve social problems.[23] Community relationships and civic life either do not exist or have disintegrated. When civil society is absent or inactive, it is a sign of an oppressive regime. Many think that strengthening community and civil society is one way to address persistent social problems such as destructive injustice, poverty, violence, and environmental degradation.[24] Strong civil society can promote dialogue and reconciliation, foster good governance, and build peace across cultures.[25] It can also foster the values of caring, tolerance, and cooperation, and encourage public discourse and broad participation in the construction of public policy.[26] People who care about community are less likely to participate in mindless development, environmental pollution, and racial and economic segregation. Various types of structural reform aim to strengthen community and civil society. These measures strive to foster public participation and create institutions of governance that can "become vehicles not just for making and enacting policy decisions but for fostering citizenship."[27] Such measures include forums for meaningful public engagement, real opportunities for community members to communicate with public officials, and other forms of inclusive governance.
Trapani, 2002
(William, Asst. Professor in Department of Communication Studies (Rhetorical Theory and Criticism, Critical and Cultural Theory, and the Rhetoric of Visual Culture) @ Wayne State University, Winter, “RE/COGNIZING NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF MANIFEST MANNERS,” The Journal of Law in Society, Lexis)
The "serious consequences" discussed are the possibility that an impure and potentially uncontrollable Native population might run rampant, disrupting the guardian/ward, or, perhaps worse, the potential vanishing of real or "proper" Indians. Vizenor's claim that the Anglo-Euramerican sense of plenitude needs a witness or the presencing of the Other appears particularly pertinent here. n39 From the first contacts between the indigenous people of the continent and the Anglo-Euramerican, the primitive body (politic) of the Indian has been used as that witness. But, in important ways, the eroticization and abjection of the Native American cannot serve as a technology of dominance if the distinct and discernible "Indian" has disappeared or been eroded by Anglo-Euramerican colonization. Thus, the possibility that the Anglo-Euramerican would be denied the opportunity to resource the primitive because there are no more "pure primitives" results in a crisis. Jacques Derrida noted that the center of a "sign" structure is that very thing which escapes notice because all others revolve around it in Copernican fashion. n40 The institutionalization of the sign "Indian," preserves a legal sovereign authority (the Anglo-Euramerican arbiter of "fact") and ensures that departures from the standard are denigrated in the name of the sanctity of the archive. Even as the recognition records are guarded by the Anglo-Euramerican agents, it is done in a way made to appear natural and without interference because the original assumption, the pre-condition for the existence of the archive, is effaced. In an absolute manner, anything that threatens the homogeneity of the archive also threatens the invisibility of the center. In this case the threat is the presumption of Anglo-Euramerican plenitude because it might reveal the interested and essential act of violence by which the archive is "housed." By excluding the "inauthentic" from the archive, [*19] the assumptions of (racial) Anglo-Euramerican superiority are elided and made to disappear in the technocratic determination of the (Indian) Proper name. Given all of this, what is at stake for Native Americans in the federal recognition process, and what is the likelihood that recognition offers the "redemption" non-recognized tribes increasingly appear to be ascribing to it? In her essay, Scattered Speculations on the Question of Cultural Studies, Gayatri Spivak urges caution to those that equate constitutional acts with a concomitant level of justice even though those acts might be done "in their name." Indeed, she suggests, it is because constitutions can only operate by coding a person "intoa rational abstraction manipulable according to the principle of reason" that they operate at a level apart from the subject, or the universal-in-singular ethical agent." n41 Put differently, while legislative acts, and in particular the "highest" of those acts - which appeal to the spirit of "The People" - might offer the promise of the legitimation of their recipient, they do so in name only. Furthermore, they may not alter the material conditions which positioned the subject in need of redress in the first place. Like a computer program, these constitutional moments code the intended benefactor along the model of simulated persons so that to qualify for the right or privilege extended, the subject must conform to the abstraction. Moreover, the codes work by abstracting the critical differences between the petitioning group and the authorizing agent, so that even as they may "succeed" in garnering legal "cover" in one arena, they are also constituted as a vulnerable and radically Other that depends on a potentially capricious dominant authority for protection. How might such a "coding" be operative in the Native American case? First, because the recognition criteria presume models of governmentality "recognizable" and akin to the Anglo-Euramerican model, potential applicants must demonstrate that they match a particular form of tribal organization. There must be a centralized leadership, indeed, an "autonomous" one according to the code, which has existed over time. That organizing body must "behave" in ways roughly analogous to the Anglo- Euramerican model: it must register its [*20] "citizen-members," it must detail and record their ancestry and life practices in a similar way to the dominant society (e.g. record births, deaths, marriages, etc.), and it must strive to maintain a sense of continuous coherence from the moment of European contact. In other words, the code can only "recognize" Native Americans because they are already recognizable. As such, historically embedded notions of what a proper tribe may "look like" provides privilege for some tribes while denigrating others.
| 7,953 |
<h4><strong>Authoritarianism turns the K – causes injustice, violence, environmental degradation, racism, and economic segregation</h4><p>Maiese 3</strong> – M.A. Candidate in Philosophy at the University of Colorado (Michelle, “Social Structural Change”, July 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/social-structural-changes, RSpec)</p><p>Today, <u><mark>there is</mark> much <strong><mark>conflict</strong></mark> within states, <mark>characterized by a</mark> general <strong><mark>breakdown of government</u></strong></mark>, as well as economic privation and civil strife.[18] <u>Bad governance</u> is a form of injustice that <u>must be corrected</u>. Thus, <u>one</u> very broad <u>type of <strong>social structural change</strong> is</u> state reform and <u><strong><mark>democratization</u></strong></mark>. State reform must involve more than just reorganization of the administrative system or the system of resource allocation. These <u>social structural changes</u> should <u><mark>contribute to</mark> the establishment of <mark>participatory nation-building processes by</mark> fostering <strong>democratic <mark>development</strong>, <strong>nonviolent</mark> and just dispute <mark>resolution systems</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>participation of the population</strong>, and <strong>rule of law</u></strong></mark>.[19] In some cases, parties are chiefly concerned with replacing or altering existing legal and political institutions. Reform of government institutions typically involves measures aimed at democratization and increased political participation.[20] <u>Societies</u> strive to <u>develop a "workable political system in which the multiple social groups can participate to their satisfaction.</u>"[21] <u>This</u> sort of state reform has the potential to <u>mitigate</u> and heal the effects of <u><strong>violent intrastate conflict</u></strong>, as well as prevent future conflict. One type of structural change is the strengthening of civil society. Civil society involves various sectors, including the business world, trade unions, women's groups, churches, and human rights activists.[22] In many societies, <u>citizens are <strong>alienated</strong> from the institutions and practices of governance</u>, and public institutions are unable to solve social problems.[23] Community relationships and <u><strong><mark>civic life</u></strong></mark> either do not exist or <u><strong>have <mark>disintegrated</u></strong></mark>. When civil society is absent or inactive, <u>it <mark>is a sign of an <strong>oppressive regime</u></strong></mark>. Many think that strengthening community and <u><mark>civil society</u></mark> is one way to <u><mark>address</mark> persistent</u> social problems such as <u><strong>destructive <mark>injustice, poverty, violence</u></strong></mark>,<strong> </strong>and<strong> <u><mark>environmental degradation</u></strong></mark>.[24] Strong civil society can promote <u><strong>dialogue and reconciliation</u></strong>, foster good governance, and build <u><strong><mark>peace</mark> across cultures</u></strong>.[25] It can also foster the <u><strong>values of <mark>caring, tolerance,</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark>, and encourage public discourse and broad participation in the construction of public policy.[26] <u><mark>People who care</mark> about community <mark>are less likely to participate in</mark> mindless development, environmental pollution, and <strong><mark>racial and economic segregation</mark>. Various types of structural reform aim to strengthen community and civil society. These measures strive to foster public participation and create institutions of governance that can "become vehicles not just for making and enacting policy decisions but for fostering citizenship."[27] Such measures include forums for meaningful public engagement, real opportunities for community members to communicate with public officials, and other forms of inclusive governance.</p><p>Trapani, 2002</p><p></u></strong>(William, Asst. Professor in Department of Communication Studies (Rhetorical Theory and Criticism, Critical and Cultural Theory, and the Rhetoric of Visual Culture) @ Wayne State University, Winter, “RE/COGNIZING NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF MANIFEST MANNERS,” The Journal of Law in Society<u><strong>, Lexis)</p><p></u></strong>The "serious consequences" discussed are the possibility that an impure and potentially uncontrollable Native population might run rampant, disrupting the guardian/ward, or, perhaps worse, the potential vanishing of real or "proper" Indians. Vizenor's claim that the Anglo-Euramerican sense of plenitude needs a witness or the presencing of the Other appears particularly pertinent here. n39 From the first contacts between the indigenous people of the continent and the Anglo-Euramerican, the primitive body (politic) of the Indian has been used as that witness. But, <u><strong>in important ways, the eroticization and abjection of the Native American cannot serve as a technology of dominance if the distinct and discernible "Indian" has disappeared or been eroded by Anglo-Euramerican colonization. Thus, the possibility that the Anglo-Euramerican would be denied the opportunity to resource the primitive because there are no more "pure primitives" results in a crisis. </u></strong>Jacques <u><strong>Derrida noted that the center of a "sign" structure is that very thing which escapes notice because all others revolve around it</u></strong> in Copernican fashion. n40 <u><strong>The institutionalization of the sign "Indian," preserves a legal sovereign authority (the Anglo-Euramerican arbiter of "fact") and ensures that departures from the standard are denigrated in the name of the sanctity of the archive. Even as the recognition records are guarded by the Anglo-Euramerican agents, it is done in a way made to appear natural and without interference because the original assumption, the pre-condition for the existence of the archive, is effaced. In an absolute manner, anything that threatens the homogeneity of the archive also threatens the invisibility of the center. In this case the threat is the presumption of Anglo-Euramerican plenitude because it might reveal the interested and essential act of violence by which the archive is "housed." By excluding the "inauthentic" from the archive,</u></strong> [*19] <u><strong>the assumptions of (racial) Anglo-Euramerican superiority are elided and made to disappear in the technocratic determination of the (Indian)</u></strong> Proper name.<u><strong> </u></strong>Given all of this, what is at stake for Native Americans in the federal recognition process, and what is the likelihood that recognition offers the "redemption" non-recognized tribes increasingly appear to be ascribing to it? In her essay, Scattered Speculations on the Question of Cultural Studies, Gayatri <u><strong><mark>Spivak urges caution to those that equate constitutional acts with a concomitant level of justice even though those acts might be done "in their name</mark>." </u></strong>Indeed, she suggests, <u><strong>it is because <mark>constitutions can only operate by coding a person "intoa rational abstraction manipulable according to the principle of reason</mark>" that they operate at a level apart from the subject, or the universal-in-singular ethical agent."</u></strong> n41 Put differently, <u><strong><mark>while</mark> legislative <mark>acts</mark>, and in particular the "highest" of those acts - which appeal to the spirit of "The People" - might <mark>offer</mark> the promise of <mark>the legitimation of their recipient, they do so in name only.</u></strong></mark> Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they may not alter the material conditions which positioned the subject in need of redress in the first place</mark>. </u></strong>Like a computer program, <u><strong><mark>these</mark> constitutional moments <mark>code the intended benefactor along the model of simulated persons so that to qualify for the right</mark> or privilege extended, <mark>the subject must conform to the abstraction</mark>.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>the codes work by abstracting the critical differences between the petitioning group and the authorizing agent, so that even as they may "succeed" in garnering legal "cover" in one arena, <mark>they are</mark> also constit<mark>uted as a vulnerable and radically Other that depends on a potentially capricious dominant authority for protection</mark>. </u></strong>How might such a "coding" be operative in the Native American case? First, because the recognition criteria presume models of governmentality "recognizable" and akin to the Anglo-Euramerican model, potential applicants must demonstrate that they match a particular form of tribal organization. There must be a centralized leadership, indeed, an "autonomous" one according to the code, which has existed over time. That organizing body must "behave" in ways roughly analogous to the Anglo- Euramerican model: it must register its [*20] "citizen-members," it must detail and record their ancestry and life practices in a similar way to the dominant society (e.g. record births, deaths, marriages, etc.), and it must strive to maintain a sense of continuous coherence from the moment of European contact. In other words, the <u><strong>code can only "recognize" Native Americans because they are already recognizable. As such, historically embedded notions of what a proper tribe may "look like" provides privilege for some tribes while denigrating others.</p></u></strong>
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Neg vs Rutgers wm
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1nr
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AT: Root Cause
| 257,893 | 5 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
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Hubervermont
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6
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Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
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Merkle
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1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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742,914 |
Nuclear deterrence checks – all states are rational
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Tepperman 9
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Tepperman 9 (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, 9/7, p.lexis)
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A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and m a d is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring leaders all came to the same safe conclusion the Cuban missile crisis both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations Ganguly found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962
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A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not make the world more dangerous nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 there's never been a nuclear war between two states all states are rational Their leaders tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate Nuclear weapons mak the costs of war obvious and unacceptable Even the craziest tin-pot dictator accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" The iron logic of deterrence and m a d led to nuclear peace nuclear powers have avoided direct combat, and they always will. There have been near misses, but a close look is fundamentally reassuring leaders all came to the same safe conclusion The record shows nuclear enemies slide toward war, then pull back The best example is India and Pakistan Getting weapons didn't lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. the two sides have never fought another war, despite provocations
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A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring--because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.
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<h4>Nuclear deterrence checks – all states are rational </h4><p><strong>Tepperman 9</strong> (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, 9/7, p.lexis)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A growing and compelling body of research</strong> suggests that nuclear weapons may not</mark>, in fact, <mark>make the world more dangerous</u></mark>, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, <u><mark>nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945</mark>. Second, <mark>there's never been a nuclear</mark>, or even a nonnuclear, <mark>war between two states </mark>that possess them</u>. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that <u><mark>all states are <strong>rational</mark> on some basic level</strong>. <mark>Their leaders</mark> may be <strong>stupid</strong>, <strong>petty</strong>, <strong>venal</strong>, <strong>even evil</strong>, but they <mark>tend to do things only when they're <strong>pretty sure they can get away with them</strong></mark>. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. <strong><mark>Not even Hitler or Saddam</strong> waged wars they didn't think they could win</mark>. The problem historically has been that <mark>leaders often make the <strong>wrong gamble and underestimate</strong></mark> the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. <mark>Nuclear weapons</mark> change all that by <mark>mak</mark>ing <mark>the costs of war <strong>obvious</strong></mark>, inevitable, <strong><mark>and unacceptable</u></strong></mark>. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. <u><mark>Even the <strong>craziest tin-pot dictator</strong></mark> is forced to <mark>accept that war with a nuclear state is <strong>unwinnable</strong></mark> and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, <mark>"<strong>Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything</strong>?"</mark> Why indeed? <mark>The iron logic of deterrence and <strong>m</u></strong></mark>utually <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssured <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u>is so compelling, it's <mark>led to</mark> what's known as the <strong><mark>nuclear peace</u></strong></mark>: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, <u>the <mark>nuclear powers have</mark> scrupulously <strong><mark>avoided direct combat</strong>, and</mark> there's very good reason to think <strong><mark>they always will</strong>. There have been</mark> some <mark>near misses, but</u> <u>a close look</mark> at these cases <strong><mark>is fundamentally reassuring</u></strong></mark>--because in each instance, very different <u><strong><mark>leaders all came to the same safe conclusion</u></strong></mark>. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: <u>the Cuban missile crisis</u>. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But <u>both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have <strong>meant curtains</u></strong> for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." <u><mark>The record</mark> since then <mark>shows</mark> the same pattern repeating: <mark>nuclear</mark>-armed <mark>enemies slide toward war, <strong>then pull back</strong></mark>, always for the same reasons. <mark>The best</mark> recent <mark>example is India and Pakistan</u></mark>, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. <u><mark>Getting</mark> their hands on <mark>weapons</mark> of mass destruction <mark>didn't</mark> do anything to <mark>lessen their animosity. But it did <strong>dramatically mellow their behavior</strong>.</mark> Since acquiring atomic weapons, <mark>the two sides have never fought another war, <strong>despite</mark> severe <mark>provocations</u></strong></mark> (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit <u>Ganguly</u>, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has <u>found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962</u>. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.</p>
|
Contention 4: no war
| null | null | 18,360 | 140 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,915 |
they’re effectually topic –
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>they’re effectually topic – </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
4
| 430,871 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,916 |
The government pays for dialysis and transplants—transplants also allows dialysis patients to regain their value to life
|
Goodwin 9
|
Goodwin 9 MICHELE GOODWIN, Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of Minnesota and NEVIN GEWERTZ, J.D., University of Chicago (2009) LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:251 Fall 2009] RETHINKING COLORBLIND STATE ACTION: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON RACIAL PREFERENCES http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1552&context=lcp
|
In addition, considering the federal savings from removing from dialysis, roughly $60–$90,000 is saved per year, per patient . Transplantation is not only the optimal medical treatment but also the most cost-effective treatment for patients suffering from kidney failure. The federal government funds both dialysis treatment and transplantation procedures for almost all Americans. moving Black patients off of dialysis allows them to regain their lives and economic potential. The costs of dialysis impact daily life. Treatments take at least three days per week and several hours each session, diminishing quality of life
|
considering the federal savings from removin from dialysis, roughly 90,000 is saved per year, per The federal government funds both dialysis treatment and transplantation procedures for almost all Americans , moving patients off of dialysis allows them to regain their lives The costs of dialysis impact daily life. Treatments take at least three days per week and several hours each session, diminishing quality of life
|
In 2004, Blacks accounted for 38.3 million people in the United States,85 and their GDP per capita was $17,728.86 Even when completely accounting for costs saved from medical care and dialysis treatments, removing just one thousand Blacks from organ waitlists each year could add $17 million in purchasing power to the U.S. economy. If 2,225 organs are successfully transplanted,87 approximately $40 million in purchasing power would be added to the U.S. economy. In addition, considering the federal savings from removing Blacks from dialysis, roughly $60–$90,000 is saved per year, per Black patient.88 Again, if only 100 African Americans were removed from dialysis, $6–9 million dollars would be saved in the first year alone. Over five years, the savings could multiply up to $35–45 million dollars by simply removing 100 African Americans from dialysis. Consequently, if 100 Black patients successfully received a donated organ and were removed from dialysis, the net economic gain over five years could be $46.7 million. There is reason to believe that such numbers are underestimated. Transplantation is not only the optimal medical treatment but also the most cost-effective treatment for patients suffering from kidney failure. The federal government funds both dialysis treatment and transplantation procedures for almost all Americans.89 Yet, after assuming such burdens, the Health Care Financing Administration noted that transplantation was the most cost-effective means of treating patients with irreversible kidney failure.90 Medicare direct dialysis costs routinely exceed $55,000 per patient per year.91 Illustratively, congressional efforts to legalize paired kidney donation, which may spur transplants, could save $500 million over a ten-year period.92 More important, moving Black patients off of dialysis allows them to regain their lives and economic potential. The costs of dialysis extend beyond financial—they impact daily life. Treatments usually take at least three days per week and several hours each session, diminishing both quality of life and work potential.93
| 2,096 |
<h4>The government pays for dialysis and transplants—transplants also allows dialysis patients to regain their <u>value to life</u> </h4><p><strong>Goodwin 9</strong> MICHELE GOODWIN, Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of Minnesota and NEVIN GEWERTZ, J.D., University of Chicago (2009) LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:251 Fall 2009] RETHINKING COLORBLIND STATE ACTION: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON RACIAL PREFERENCES http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1552&context=lcp</p><p>In 2004, Blacks accounted for 38.3 million people in the United States,85 and their GDP per capita was $17,728.86 Even when completely accounting for costs saved from medical care and dialysis treatments, removing just one thousand Blacks from organ waitlists each year could add $17 million in purchasing power to the U.S. economy. If 2,225 organs are successfully transplanted,87 approximately $40 million in purchasing power would be added to the U.S. economy.<u> In addition, <mark>considering the federal savings from removin</mark>g </u>Blacks<u> <mark>from dialysis, roughly</mark> $60–$<mark>90,000 is saved per year, per</mark> </u>Black<u> patient</u>.88 Again, if only 100 African Americans were removed from dialysis, $6–9 million dollars would be saved in the first year alone. Over five years, the savings could multiply up to $35–45 million dollars by simply removing 100 African Americans from dialysis. Consequently, if 100 Black patients successfully received a donated organ and were removed from dialysis, the net economic gain over five years could be $46.7 million. There is reason to believe that such numbers are underestimated<u>. Transplantation is not only the optimal medical treatment but also the most cost-effective treatment for patients suffering from kidney failure. <strong><mark>The federal government funds both dialysis treatment and transplantation procedures for almost all Americans</mark>.</u></strong>89 Yet, after assuming such burdens, the Health Care Financing Administration noted that transplantation was the most cost-effective means of treating patients with irreversible kidney failure.90 Medicare direct dialysis costs routinely exceed $55,000 per patient per year.91 Illustratively, congressional efforts to legalize paired kidney donation, which may spur transplants, could save $500 million over a ten-year period.92 More important<mark>, <u>moving</mark> Black <mark>patients off of dialysis allows them to <strong>regain their lives</strong></mark> and economic potential. <mark>The costs of dialysis</mark> </u>extend beyond financial—they <u><mark>impact daily life. Treatments</u></mark> usually <u><mark>take at least three days per week and several hours each session, diminishing</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>quality of life</u></strong></mark> and work potential.93</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,874 | 1 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,917 |
Great power war is obsolete and small conflicts will not escalate
|
Mandelbaum 99
|
Mandelbaum 99 (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR, Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)
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major war is obsolete this kind of war, is more than unlikely Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete costs have risen and the benefits have shriveled because of nuclear weapons benefits now seem non-existent The traditional motives for warfare are extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone as a paying proposition ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged are in steep decline the ideology that is now in the ascendant liberalism, tends to be pacific three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely One of these is the rise of democracy democracies tend to be peaceful. a post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy common security negotiated arms limits that reduce insecurity through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack the distinction between powerful states and the less powerful ones now is far less important in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed. The great chess game of international politics is finished A pawn is now just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king
|
major war is obsolete this kind of war, is more than unlikely costs have risen and the benefits have shriveled. because of nuclear weapon benefits, now seem, at non-existent the ideology that is now in the ascendant liberalism, tends to be pacific developments have made major war even less likely One is the rise of democracy democracies, tend to be peaceful post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy common security the distinction between powerful states and the less powerful now is far less important there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed
|
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I mean war waged by the most powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been, their consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, this kind of war, is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, “ Major war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst.” Why is this so? Most simply, the costs have risen and the benefits of major war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this century of nuclear weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the benefits, these now seem, at least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare are in retreat, if not extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, as a paying proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But the ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own, liberalism, tends to be pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of these is the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldn’t go that far. I don’t believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now it’s true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that a post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. It’s not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is the novel distinction between the periphery and the core, between the powerful states and the less powerful ones. This was previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article again, “ While for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed. The great chess game of international politics is finished, or at least suspended. A pawn is now just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king.”
| 5,777 |
<h4>Great power war is <u>obsolete</u> and small conflicts <u>will not escalate</h4><p></u><strong>Mandelbaum 99</strong> (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR, Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)</p><p>My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that <u><mark>major war is <strong>obsolete</u></strong></mark>. By major war, I mean war waged by the most powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been, their consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, <u><mark>this kind of war, is</u></mark> obsolete; less than impossible, but <u><strong><mark>more than unlikely</u></strong></mark>. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, “ Major war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. <u>Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete</u>. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst.” Why is this so? Most simply, the <u><strong><mark>costs have</strong> risen and the benefits</u></mark> of major war <u><mark>have shriveled</u>.</mark> The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high <u><mark>because of</u></mark> the advent in the middle of this century of <u><mark>nuclear weapon</mark>s</u>, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the <u><mark>benefits</u>,</mark> these <u><mark>now seem</u>, at</mark> least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to <u><strong><mark>non-existent</u></strong></mark>. <u>The traditional motives for warfare are</u> in retreat, if not <u>extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone</u>, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, <u>as a paying proposition</u>. And as for the <u>ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged</u> in the past, these <u>are in steep decline</u>. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But <u><mark>the ideology that is now in the ascendant</u></mark>, our own, <u><strong><mark>liberalism, tends to be pacific</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, I would argue that <u>three post-Cold War <mark>developments have made major war even less likely</u></mark> than it was after 1945. <u><mark>One</mark> of these <mark>is the rise of democracy</u></mark>, for <u><mark>democracies</u>,</mark> I believe, <u><mark>tend to be peaceful</mark>.</u> Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldn’t go that far. I don’t believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now it’s true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that <u>a <mark>post-Cold War innovation <strong>counteracts the effects of anarchy</u></strong></mark>. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, <u><strong><mark>common</strong> security</u></mark>. By common security I mean a regime of <u>negotiated arms limits that reduce</u> the <u>insecurity</u> that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and <u>through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack</u>. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. It’s not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is <u><mark>the</u></mark> novel <u><mark>distinction between</u></mark> the periphery and the core, between the <u><mark>powerful states and the less powerful</mark> ones</u>. This was previously a cause of conflict and <u><mark>now is <strong>far less important</u></strong></mark>. To quote from the article again, “ While for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, <u>in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, <mark>there is <strong>no great-power conflict</strong> into which the many local conflicts that have erupted <strong>can be absorbed</strong></mark>. The great chess game of international politics is finished</u>, or at least suspended. <u>A pawn is now just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king</u>.”</p>
|
Contention 4: no war
| null | null | 218,453 | 14 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,918 |
grounds-conditionality moots disad links
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>grounds-conditionality moots disad links </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
4
| 430,873 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,919 |
Most transplants are paid for by third parties—no individual costs for surgery
|
Beard et al 13
|
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
|
in almost all countries, the greater part of all solid organ transplants are financed by public money. Even in the United States, where there is no system of universal health care payment, the ESRD) program and allied programs pay these costs in most cases (private payers are involved in at most 10 percent of transplants)
|
greater part of all solid organ transplants are financed by public money Even in the United States , the ESRD) program pay these costs in most cases (private payers are involved in at most 10 percent of transplants
|
These considerations lead us immediately to the problem of what is being supplied and what is being demanded. Clearly, organs are inputs to transplants, so their demand is derived—that is, arises from—and depends on the demand for something else. Further, transplants arc desired by people who, by and large, do not pay for them: in almost all countries, the greater part of all solid organ transplants are financed by public money. In countries with national insurance funds, dialysis, pre- and postoperative care, transplantation costs, organ procure¬ment costs, and drug therapy are all publicly financed. Even in the United States, where there is no system of universal health care payment, the End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program and allied programs pay these costs in most cases (private payers are involved in at most 10 percent of transplants).1 Third-party payment is by no means rare in the medical industries, but it does raise the conventional problems of moral hazard and inefficiency.
| 1,001 |
<h4>Most transplants are paid for by third parties—no individual costs for surgery </h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p>These considerations lead us immediately to the problem of what is being supplied and what is being demanded. Clearly, organs are inputs to transplants, so their demand is derived—that is, arises from—and depends on the demand for something else. Further, transplants arc desired by people who, by and large, do not pay for them: <u>in almost all countries, the <mark>greater part of all solid organ transplants are financed by public money</mark>.</u> In countries with national insurance funds, dialysis, pre- and postoperative care, transplantation costs, organ procure¬ment costs, and drug therapy are all publicly financed. <u><mark>Even in the United States</mark>, where there is no system of universal health care payment<mark>, the</u></mark> End Stage Renal Disease (<u><mark>ESRD) program</mark> and allied programs <mark>pay these costs in most cases (private payers are involved in at most 10 percent of transplants</mark>)</u>.1 Third-party payment is by no means rare in the medical industries, but it does raise the conventional problems of moral hazard and inefficiency.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,875 | 1 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,920 |
Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction
|
Socol 11 (
|
Socol 11 (Yehoshua (Ph.D.), an inter-disciplinary physicist, is an expert in electro-optics, high-energy physics and applications, and material science and Moshe Yanovskiy, Jan 2, “Nuclear Proliferation and Democracy”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/nuclear_proliferation_and_demo.html)
|
consequences of use of nuclear weapons would not be great Casualties are estimated at 25,000 civil defense measures, decrease numbers by an order of magnitude There is little doubt that a nation determined to survive would not succumb to losses. fallout worldwide is exaggeration In Japan less than 1,000 cancer cases were recorded in 100,000 survivors - Due to the intensity of nuclear conflict would not last , anticipate winners within days
|
consequences of use of nuclear weapons would not be great Casualties are estimated at 25,000 civil defense measures decrease numbers by an order of magnitude a nation determined to survive would not succumb to losses fallout worldwide is exaggeration In Japan less than 1,000 cancer cases were recorded in 100,000 survivors Due to the intensity nuclear conflict would not last anticipate winners within days
|
Nuclear proliferation should no longer be treated as an unthinkable nightmare; it is likely to be the future reality. Nuclear weapons have been acquired not only by an extremely poor per capita but large country such as India, but also by even poorer and medium-sized nations such as Pakistan and North Korea. One could also mention South Africa, which successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal despite economic sanctions (the likes of which have not yet been imposed on Iran). It is widely believed that sanctions and rhetoric will not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that many countries, in the Middle East and beyond, will act accordingly (see, e.g., recent Heritage report). Nuclear Warfare -- Myths And Facts The direct consequences of the limited use of nuclear weapons -- especially low-yield devices most likely to be in the hands of non-state actors or irresponsible governments -- would probably not be great enough to bring about significant geopolitical upheavals. Casualties from a single 20-KT nuclear device are estimated [1] at about 25,000 fatalities with a similar number of injured, assuming a rather unfortunate scenario (the center of a large city, with minimal warning). Scaling the above toll to larger devices or to a larger number of devices is less than linear. For example, it has been estimated that it would take as many as eighty devices of 20-KT yield each to cause 300,000 civilian fatalities in German cities (a result actually achieved by Allied area attacks, or carpet-bombings, during the Second World War). A single 1-MT device used against Detroit has been estimated by U.S. Congress OTA to result in about 220,000 fatalities. It is anticipated that well-prepared civil defense measures, based on rather simple presently known techniques, would decrease these numbers by maybe an order of magnitude (as will be discussed later). There is little doubt that a nation determined to survive and with a strong sense of its own destiny would not succumb to such losses. It is often argued that the fallout effects of even the limited use of nuclear weapons would be worldwide and would last for generations. This is an exaggeration. The following facts speak for themselves. -- In Japan, as assessed by REFR, less than 1,000 excess cancer cases (i.e., above the natural occurrence) were recorded in over 100,000 survivors over the past sixty years -- compared with about 110,000 immediate fatalities in the two atomic bombings. No clinical or even sub-clinical effects were discovered in the survivors' offspring. -- In the Chernobyl area, as assessed by IAEA, only fifteen cancer deaths can be directly attributed to fallout radiation. No radiation-related increase in congenital formations was recorded. Nuclear Conflict -- Possible Scenarios With reference to a possible regional nuclear conflict between a rogue state and a democratic one, the no-winner (mutual assured destruction) scenario is probably false. An analysis by Anthony Cordesman, et al. regarding a possible Israel-Iran nuclear conflict estimated that while Israel might survive an Iranian nuclear blow, Iran would certainly not survive as an organized society. Even though the projected casualties cited in that study seem to us overstated, especially as regards Israel, the conclusion rings true. Due to the extreme high intensity ("above-conventional") of nuclear conflict, it is nearly certain that such a war, no matter its outcome, would not last for years, as we have become accustomed to in current low-intensity conflicts. Rather, we should anticipate a new geo-political reality: the emergence of clear winners and losers within several days, or at most weeks after the initial outbreak of hostilities. This latter reality will most probably contain fewer nuclear-possessing states than the former.
| 3,823 |
<h4><strong>Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction </h4><p>Socol 11 (</strong>Yehoshua (Ph.D.), an inter-disciplinary physicist, is an expert in electro-optics, high-energy physics and applications, and material science and Moshe Yanovskiy, Jan 2, “Nuclear Proliferation and Democracy”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/nuclear_proliferation_and_demo.html)</p><p>Nuclear proliferation should no longer be treated as an unthinkable nightmare; it is likely to be the future reality. Nuclear weapons have been acquired not only by an extremely poor per capita but large country such as India, but also by even poorer and medium-sized nations such as Pakistan and North Korea. One could also mention South Africa, which successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal despite economic sanctions (the likes of which have not yet been imposed on Iran). It is widely believed that sanctions and rhetoric will not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that many countries, in the Middle East and beyond, will act accordingly (see, e.g., recent Heritage report). Nuclear Warfare -- Myths And Facts The direct<u> <strong><mark>consequences of</u></strong></mark> the limited <u><strong><mark>use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> -- especially low-yield devices most likely to be in the hands of non-state actors or irresponsible governments -- <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>not be great</strong></mark> </u>enough to bring about significant geopolitical upheavals. <u><mark>Casualties</u></mark> from a single 20-KT nuclear device<u> <strong><mark>are </strong>estimated</mark> </u>[1]<u> <mark>at</mark> </u>about<u> <mark>25,000</mark> </u>fatalities with a similar number of injured, assuming a rather unfortunate scenario (the center of a large city, with minimal warning). Scaling the above toll to larger devices or to a larger number of devices is less than linear. For example, it has been estimated that it would take as many as eighty devices of 20-KT yield each to cause 300,000 civilian fatalities in German cities (a result actually achieved by Allied area attacks, or carpet-bombings, during the Second World War). A single 1-MT device used against Detroit has been estimated by U.S. Congress OTA to result in about 220,000 fatalities. It is anticipated that well-prepared<u> <mark>civil defense measures</mark>,</u> based on rather simple presently known techniques, would<u> <mark>decrease</u></mark> these <u><mark>numbers by</u></mark> maybe <u><mark>an order of magnitude</u></mark> (as will be discussed later). <u>There is little doubt that</u> <u><mark>a nation determined to survive</u></mark> and with a strong sense of its own destiny <u><mark>would <strong>not succumb</strong> to</mark> </u>such<u> <mark>losses</mark>.</u> It is often argued that the<u> <mark>fallout</mark> </u>effects<u> </u>of even the limited use of nuclear weapons would be <u><mark>worldwide</u></mark> and would last for generations. This<u> <mark>is</mark> </u>an<u> <strong><mark>exaggeration</u></strong></mark>. The following facts speak for themselves. -- <u><mark>In Japan</u></mark>, as assessed by REFR, <u><mark>less than 1,000</mark> </u>excess<u> <mark>cancer cases</mark> </u>(i.e., above the natural occurrence) <u><mark>were recorded in</mark> </u>over<u> <mark>100,000 survivors </u></mark>over the past sixty years<u> -</u>- compared with about 110,000 immediate fatalities in the two atomic bombings. No clinical or even sub-clinical effects were discovered in the survivors' offspring. -- In the Chernobyl area, as assessed by IAEA, only fifteen cancer deaths can be directly attributed to fallout radiation. No radiation-related increase in congenital formations was recorded. Nuclear Conflict -- Possible Scenarios With reference to a possible regional nuclear conflict between a rogue state and a democratic one, the no-winner (mutual assured destruction) scenario is probably false. An analysis by Anthony Cordesman, et al. regarding a possible Israel-Iran nuclear conflict estimated that while Israel might survive an Iranian nuclear blow, Iran would certainly not survive as an organized society. Even though the projected casualties cited in that study seem to us overstated, especially as regards Israel, the conclusion rings true. <u><mark>Due to the</mark> </u>extreme high<u> <mark>intensity</u></mark> ("above-conventional") <u>of <mark>nuclear conflict</u></mark>, it is nearly certain that<u> </u>such a war, no matter its outcome, <u><strong><mark>would not last</strong> </u></mark>for years<u>,</u> as we have become accustomed to in current low-intensity conflicts. Rather, we should<u> <mark>anticipate</mark> </u>a new geo-political reality: the emergence of<u> </u>clear<u> <mark>winners </u></mark>and losers<u> <strong><mark>within</strong></mark> </u>several<u> <strong><mark>days</u></strong></mark>, or at most weeks after the initial outbreak of hostilities. This latter reality will most probably contain fewer nuclear-possessing states than the former.</p>
|
Contention 4: no war
| null | null | 152,207 | 51 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,921 |
Interpretation-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Interpretation-</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,876 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,922 |
limits- they can garner advantages off of conditionality, that explodes neg research burden
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>limits- they can garner advantages off of conditionality, that explodes neg research burden </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
4
| 430,877 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,923 |
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
|
Hughes 9
|
Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
|
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
|
A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences
|
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,256 | 14 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,924 |
No nuke winter – studies
|
Seitz 11
|
Seitz 11 (Russell, Harvard University Center for International Affairs visiting scholar, “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,” Nature, 7-7-11, Vol 475, pg37)
|
Robock's potential climate disaster rested on a one-dimensional model that overestimate the smoke Some regarded this prediction as mythology Rathjens of M I T protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst misrepresentation of science in my memory climatologist Emanuel observed “ notorious lack of scientific integrity” , the projected worst-case numbers call 'nuclear winter' into question.
|
Robock's potential climate disaster rested on a one-dimensional model that overestimate smoke Some regarded this prediction as mythology Rathjens of M I T protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst misrepresentation of science in my memory climatologist Emanuel observed notorious lack of scientific integrity” the projected worst-case numbers call 'nuclear winter' into question.
|
Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory,” (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had “become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity” (Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question.
| 1,811 |
<h4>No nuke winter – studies</h4><p><strong>Seitz 11 <u></strong>(Russell, Harvard University Center for International Affairs visiting scholar, “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,” Nature, 7-7-11, Vol 475, pg37)</p><p></u>Alan <u><strong><mark>Robock's</strong></mark> </u>contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This<u> <mark>potential climate disaster</u></mark>, popularized in Science in 1983, <u><mark>rested on</mark> </u>the output of<u> <mark>a <strong>one-dimensional model</strong> that </u></mark>was later shown to<u> <strong><mark>overestimate </mark>the <mark>smoke</u></strong></mark> a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). <u><mark>Some regarded this </u></mark>apocalyptic<u> <mark>prediction as</mark> </u>an exercise in<u> <mark>mythology</u></mark>. George <u><mark>Rathjens of</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>M</u></strong></mark>assachusetts <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>nstitute of <u><strong><mark>T</u></strong></mark>echnology <u><mark>protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst</mark> </u>example of the<u> <strong><mark>misrepresentation of scienc</strong>e</mark> </u>to the public<u> <strong><mark>in my memory</u></strong></mark>,” (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/yujz84) and<u> <mark>climatologist</u></mark> Kerry <u><mark>Emanuel</mark> <mark>observed</u></mark> that<u> </u>the subject had<u> “</u>become<u> <mark>notorious </u></mark>for its<u> <strong><mark>lack of scientific integrity</strong>”</u></mark> (Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983<u>, <mark>the <strong>projected</strong> worst-case </u></mark>cooling has fallen<u> </u>from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to<u> <mark>numbers</mark> </u>so unseasonably small as to<u> <mark>call</mark> </u>the very term<u> <mark>'nuclear winter' into question.</mark> </p></u>
|
Contention 4: no war
| null | null | 64,752 | 188 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,925 |
voters for competitive equity and education
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>voters<u> for competitive equity and education</h4></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
4
| 430,878 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,926 |
“Legalize” means the plan must mandate marijuana is legal in the US
|
Quinn 1992
|
Quinn 1992 (Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis)
|
we are satisfied the term "legalize" correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity see also Black's Law legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. we do not construe the word "legalize" as suggesting that the cities retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. Nothing persuades us that the choice of language is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent
|
legalize expresses the true intent and meaning legalize means "to make legal or lawful legalize expresses cities will be required to legislate to make legal we do not construe the word "legalize" as suggesting cities retain the discretion to legalize or prohibit
|
Turning to Verlo's claim, we are satisfied that the Board's use of the term "legalize" in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); see also Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful"). In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. Contrary to Verlo's argument, we do not construe the word "legalize" as somehow suggesting that the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." Nothing in the record persuades us that the Board's choice of language in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.
| 1,748 |
<h4><strong>“Legalize” means the plan must mandate marijuana is legal in the US</h4><p>Quinn 1992</strong> (Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis)</p><p>Turning to Verlo's claim, <u>we are satisfied</u> that the Board's use of <u>the term "<mark>legalize</mark>"</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u>correctly and fairly <mark>expresses the <strong>true intent and meaning</strong></mark> </u>of the proposed constitutional amendment. <u>The word "legalize" means "<strong>to make legal" or "to give legal validity</strong> </u>or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); <u>see also Black's Law</u> Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (<u><mark>legalize means "<strong>to make legal or lawful</strong></mark>" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful</u>"). <u>In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming</u> in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," <u>the word "<mark>legalize</mark>" <mark>expresses</mark> the sense that these <mark>cities will be <strong>required </strong>to legislate</mark> so as <mark>to</mark> <mark>make</mark> limited gaming <mark>legal</mark> within their respective municipalities. </u>Contrary to Verlo's argument, <u><mark>we <strong>do not construe the word "legalize" as</u></strong></mark> somehow <u><strong><mark>suggesting</mark> that the <mark>cities</u></strong></mark> of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will <u><strong><mark>retain the discretion</strong></mark> either <mark>to legalize or</mark> to <mark>prohibit</mark> limited gaming</u> <u>as they see fit.</u> The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." <u>Nothing</u> in the record <u>persuades us that the</u> Board's <u>choice of language</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u>is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent</u><strong> and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,284 | 78 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,927 |
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
|
Jaycox 12
|
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
|
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,255 | 14 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,928 |
Violation- only removing federal control DOESN’T legalize. It’s still illegal in 48 states. “Legalization in the US” being about JUST the feds is ridiculous
|
Kreit 2010
|
Kreit 2010 (Alex, Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chapman Law Review 555, October)
|
the debate about legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws. to ask if the federal government should legalize marijuana is to ask an essentially irrelevant question- because it misunderstands the role of the federal law in shaping drug policy the federal government simply does not have the power to effect such a change Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal criminal penalties for possessing, manufacturing, or selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country because all fifty states have their own laws criminalizing the sale of marijuana. if the federal government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana That would not be "legalization" of the drug inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless and until that state also changed its laws unless the federal government decided to preempt state law it could not unilaterally "legalize" a controlled substance even if it wanted to
|
debate about legalizing marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws it misunderstands the role of the federal law the federal government does not have the power to effect such a change Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal penalties the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country That would not be "legalization" of the drug
|
In an important sense, however, the debate about legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws. Indeed, to ask if the federal government should legalize marijuana is to ask an essentially irrelevant question-irrelevant not because it is unimportant or on the political fringe (certainly, if the polling is to be believed, it is not), but because it misunderstands the role of the federal law in shaping drug policy. Whether or not legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana is a good idea, the federal government simply does not have the power to effect such a change. Imagine, for example, that every federal elected official decided tomorrow that marijuana should be taxed and regulated like alcohol. Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal criminal penalties for possessing, manufacturing, or selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in the country because all fifty states have their own laws criminalizing the sale of marijuana.30 To be sure, if the federal government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana, it would have a substantial impact on the enforcement of marijuana laws in the United States. That impact, however, would not be "legalization" of the drug inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless and until that state also changed its laws. In short, unless the federal government decided to preempt state law,31 it could not unilaterally "legalize" a controlled substance even if it wanted to.
| 1,579 |
<h4><strong>Violation- only removing federal control DOESN’T legalize. It’s still illegal in 48 states. “Legalization in the US” being about JUST the feds is ridiculous</h4><p>Kreit 2010</strong> (Alex, Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chapman Law Review 555, October)</p><p>In an important sense, however, <u>the <mark>debate about <strong>legalizing</strong></mark> or decriminalizing <strong><mark>marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of federal drug laws</strong></mark>.</u> Indeed, <u>to ask if the federal government should legalize marijuana is to ask an essentially irrelevant question-</u>irrelevant not because it is unimportant or on the political fringe (certainly, if the polling is to be believed, it is not), but <u><strong>because <mark>it misunderstands the role of the federal law </mark>in shaping drug policy</u></strong>. Whether or not legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana is a good idea, <u><strong><mark>the federal government</mark> simply <mark>does not have the power to effect such a change</u></strong></mark>. Imagine, for example, that every federal elected official decided tomorrow that marijuana should be taxed and regulated like alcohol. <u><mark>Even if they were to pass legislation that removed all federal</mark> criminal <mark>penalties</mark> for possessing, manufacturing, or selling marijuana, <mark>the drug would <strong>still be illegal everywhere in the country</u></strong></mark> <u>because all fifty states have their own laws criminalizing the sale of marijuana.</u>30 To be sure, <u>if the federal government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana</u>, it would have a substantial impact on the enforcement of marijuana laws in the United States. <u><mark>That</u></mark> impact, however, <u><strong><mark>would not be "legalization" of the drug </mark>inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any state unless and until that state also changed its laws</u></strong>. In short, <u>unless the federal government decided to preempt state law</u>,31 <u>it could not unilaterally "legalize" a controlled substance even if it wanted to</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 50,460 | 28 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,929 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
| null |
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4><strong>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u>The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world</u>, the <u><strong>reputational</u></strong> (and possibly economic) <u><strong>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong> some form of <u><strong>soft defection</u>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
3
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,930 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
|
Bowden 13
|
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
|
Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking
|
[*452] Introduction
[*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
| 1,550 |
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction</p><p>[*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p><strong> </p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,258 | 14 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,931 |
Our counter advocacy is to create a forum in which to discuss the cultural connection or interlocutor between white institutional space and property value
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Our counter advocacy is to create a forum in which to discuss the cultural connection or interlocutor between white institutional space and property value</h4>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
2
| 430,879 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,932 |
Reasons to vote-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Reasons to vote-</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,880 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,933 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| null |
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4><strong>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u>marijuana legalization</u> still <u><strong>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
3
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,934 |
And that market is widespread and expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation
|
Samadi 2012
|
Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)
|
the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
|
WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower
|
Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable
| 2,662 |
<h4><strong>And that market is <u>widespread and expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u><strong> </p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 267,351 | 8 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,935 |
Ground- core neg positions like cartel shift and “marijuana bad” are dependent on legal markets in the entire US- they permit affs to just defend SQ markets in Colorado and Washington which makes DAs impossible
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Ground- core neg positions like cartel shift and “marijuana bad” are dependent on legal markets in the entire US- they permit affs to just defend SQ markets in Colorado and Washington which makes DAs impossible</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,881 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,936 |
Their criticisms within the debate space only cause problems
ZOMPETTI 04 Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University [Joseph Zompetti, PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, September] Many, if not most, of the complaints heard in debate rounds have merit. As a community, we must address the issues of exclusivity, tolerance, respect and diversity. However, when debaters make arguments about these issues in debate rounds, the arguments become personalized, often seen as attacks against specific individuals, namely the "other" team (in arguments such as "you don't address your privilege," or "you don't do anything or aren't doing enough for diversity"). The so-called "Other" that debaters refer to as being marginalized becomes transferred onto "other" individuals and teams as the competitive structure of a debate necessitates.The point, then, is not that these complaints and concerns should not be discussed, but that they should not be discussed in actual debate rounds. I should also add that since diversity is still an on-going concern, we must question the efficacy of personalized debating at generally improving diversity in our community. Even if other solutions fall short as well, they at least avoid the pitfalls of personalized debating that I now begin to explore. Interjecting the personalized into debate rounds has become highly problematic. As discussions on eDebate demonstrate1 and my own discussions with folks who have judged teams like Louisville1 suggest, these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment. To be fair, these arguments have also facilitated much soul-searching and self-reflexivity in the community. However,except for the Urban Debate League (UDL) movement2 little, if anything, is being done to correct for inadequacies and inequities in the community, contrary to the appeal of the personalized arguments. In fact, any benefits from the personalization of debate can be accrued from enhancing other strategies: larger community discussions (as evidenced by some messages on eDebate),3 discussion fora at national tournaments,4 special high school debate institutes,5 clear directives and discussion during the CEDA and NDT business and roundtable meetings,6 more sensitive topic selection,7 etc. The drawbacks to personalizing debate, however, are, in my opinion,enormous. I will elaborate on two significant problems of engaging the personal in actual debate rounds: victimhood and therapy rhetoric.
|
ZOMPETTI 04 The so-called "Other" that debaters refer to as being marginalized becomes transferred onto "other" individuals and teams as the competitive structure of a debate necessitates Interjecting these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment. my opinion enormous
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Their criticisms within the debate space only cause problems</h4><p><strong>ZOMPETTI 04 </strong>Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University [Joseph Zompetti, PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, September] <u>Many, if not most, of the complaints heard in debate rounds have merit. As a community, we must address the issues of exclusivity, tolerance, respect and diversity. However, when debaters make arguments about these issues in debate rounds, the arguments become personalized, often seen as attacks against specific individuals, namely the "other" team</u> (in arguments such as "you don't address your privilege," or "you don't do anything or aren't doing enough for diversity"). <u><strong><mark>The so-called "Other" that debaters refer to as being marginalized becomes transferred onto "other" individuals and teams as the competitive structure of a debate necessitates</u></strong>.<u></mark>The point,</u> then<u>, is not that these complaints and concerns should not be discussed, but that they should not be discussed in actual debate rounds</u>. I should also add that <u>since diversity is still an on-going concern, we must question the efficacy of personalized debating at generally improving diversity in our community</u>. <u>Even if other solutions fall short as well, they at least avoid the pitfalls of personalized debating</u> that I now begin to explore. <u><strong>Interjecting</strong> the personalized into debate rounds has become highly problematic</u>. As discussions on eDebate demonstrate1 and my own discussions with folks who have judged teams like Louisville1 suggest, <u><strong><mark>these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment</mark>.</u></strong> To be fair, these arguments have also facilitated much soul-searching and self-reflexivity in the community. However,<u>except for the</u> Urban Debate League (<u>UDL</u>) <u>movement2</u> <u>little, if anything, is being done to correct for inadequacies and inequities in the community, contrary to the appeal of the personalized arguments. In fact, any benefits from the personalization of debate can be accrued from enhancing other strategies: larger community discussions (as evidenced by some messages on eDebate),3 discussion fora at national tournaments,4 special high school debate institutes,5 clear directives and discussion during the CEDA and NDT business and roundtable meetings,6 more sensitive topic selection,7 etc. The drawbacks to personalizing debate, however, are, in <strong>my opinion</strong>,<strong>enormous</strong>.</u> I will elaborate on two significant problems of engaging the personal in actual debate rounds: victimhood and therapy rhetoric. </p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
2
| 430,882 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,937 |
Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities still criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4><strong>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><mark>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong><mark>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u> for considerable <u>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><mark>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u></mark> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><mark>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></mark> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
3
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,938 |
The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery
|
Delmonico 3
|
Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts
|
the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. The most disturbing issue of organ sales is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world
|
exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery pressures put by organ brokers provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers
|
General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of
Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)
WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco
Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. The most disturbing issue of organ sales to both Christian and secular ethicists is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002).
| 1,963 |
<h4><strong>The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance <u>the <mark>exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery</u></mark>, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). <u>The <mark>pressures put by organ brokers</mark> upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to <mark>provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy.</mark> </u>Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, <u>the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor <mark>makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice</mark>. </u>These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. <u>The most disturbing issue of organ sales </u>to both Christian and secular ethicists <u>is the <mark>formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy</mark>.</u> This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that <u><mark>they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce</mark>, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery <mark>medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers</mark> in many parts of the world</u> (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002). </p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,260 | 15 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,939 |
Bidirectionality- they justify “conservative backlash” affs that read advantages about PREVENTING further state legalization
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Bidirectionality- they justify “conservative backlash” affs that read advantages about PREVENTING further state legalization</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,883 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,940 |
Adversarial discourse limits knowledge and understanding
|
Tannen 2
|
Tannen 2 Deborah Tannen, Linguistics Department, Georgetown University, Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 1651–1669Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 1651–1669 "Agonism in academic discourse" Elsevier
|
there is much wrong with the metaphorical assignment of research to warring camps. It obscures the aspects of disparate work that overlap and can learn from each other. It obscures the complexity of research In other words, scholars eager not only to make themselves right but also to make others wrong risk distorting and misrepresenting their opponents’ views – and setting us all back in our common quest for understanding and knowledge. another way that framing academic discourse as a metaphorical battle results in less knowledge rather than more: It wastes scholars’ time and talent. Critics spend large amounts of energy looking for faults in others’ work that could better be spent building on it, or developing their own work in new directions. At the same time, those who are the object of agonistic attack are forced to expend energy dispelling misrepresentations of their work, energy that could better be spent doing new creative work or incorporating the insights of genuine critics—those who represent the work accurately but raise significant questions and offer competing research findings. Another way that the agonistic conventions of academe result in the loss of creative work is that many scholars are discouraged from presenting or publishing their work, or from contributing to oral interaction, by the agonistic tone of academic discourse. There is yet another way in which our agonistic conventions result in loss of knowledge and understanding. As an anonymous reviewer of this paper commented, American academic discourse can function ‘‘like a kind of bullying to conform to a norm/trend. It’s when you have a different point of view than the trendy barbies that you get shot down, not if you’re in the in group’’
|
warring camps obscures the aspects of disparate work that overlap and can learn from each other. It obscures the complexity of research words, scholars eager not only to make themselves right but also to make others wrong risk distorting and misrepresenting their opponents’ views – and setting us all back in our common quest for understanding and knowledge It wastes scholars’ time and talent. Critics spend large amounts of energy looking for faults in others’ work that could better be spent building on it, or developing their own work in new directions those who are the object of agonistic attack are forced to expend energy dispelling misrepresentations of their work, energy that could better be spent doing new creative work or incorporating the insights of genuine critics—those who represent the work accurately but raise significant questions many scholars are discouraged from presenting or publishing their work, or from contributing to oral interaction, by the agonistic tone of academic discourse American academic discourse can function ‘‘like a kind of bullying to conform to a norm/trend. It’s when you have a different point of view than the trendy barbies that you get shot down, not if you’re in the in group’
|
There is something so appealing about conceptualizing differing approaches as warring camps that such dichotomies are readily picked up and echoed by others. This happens precisely because warring-camps dichotomies appeal to our sense of how knowledge should be organized. It feels ‘natural’ and ‘right’. It feels right because it reflects our agonistic ideology. But because it feels right does not mean it is right. On the contrary, there is much wrong with the metaphorical assignment of research to warring camps. It obscures the aspects of disparate work that overlap and can learn from each other. It obscures the complexity of research. These dichotomies imply that only one framework can apply, when in the vast majority of instances, both can. I am reminded here of a comment attributed to Kenneth Pike, which I heard from A. L. Becker: Most scholars are wrong not in what they assert but in what they deny. In other words, scholars eager not only to make themselves right but also to make others wrong risk distorting and misrepresenting their opponents’ views – and setting us all back in our common quest for understanding and knowledge. 6. The expense of time, spirit, and creativity There is yet another way that framing academic discourse as a metaphorical battle results in less knowledge rather than more: It wastes scholars’ time and talent. Critics spend large amounts of energy looking for faults in others’ work that could better be spent building on it, or developing their own work in new directions. At the same time, those who are the object of agonistic attack are forced to expend energy dispelling misrepresentations of their work, energy that could better be spent doing new creative work or incorporating the insights of genuine critics—those who represent the work accurately but raise significant questions and offer competing research findings. Another way that the agonistic conventions of academe result in the loss of creative work is that many scholars are discouraged from presenting or publishing their work, or from contributing to oral interaction, by the agonistic tone of academic discourse. Herring (1996) examined the postings on the electronic ‘linguist’ list. At one point, a rancorous, polarized debate broke out. Herring sent a questionnaire to list subscribers, asking their views of the debate and why they did not contribute, if they didn’t. She found that 73 percent of respondents who said they had not taken part in the debate gave ‘‘intimidation’’ as the reason.5 There is yet another way in which our agonistic conventions result in loss of knowledge and understanding. As an anonymous reviewer of this paper commented, American academic discourse can function ‘‘like a kind of bullying to conform to a norm/trend. It’s when you have a different point of view than the trendy barbies that you get shot down, not if you’re in the in group’’. I would add, however, that feeling safe within the confines of one group does not protect you from attack by an opposing group. Quite the contrary, when bullets are flying, nearly everyone feels vulnerable and edgy, even if they are temporarily protected by fortress walls.
| 3,171 |
<h4>Adversarial discourse limits knowledge and understanding </h4><p><strong>Tannen 2</strong> Deborah Tannen, Linguistics Department, Georgetown University, Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 1651–1669Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 1651–1669 "Agonism in academic discourse" Elsevier</p><p>There is something so appealing about conceptualizing differing approaches as warring camps that such dichotomies are readily picked up and echoed by others. This happens precisely because warring-camps dichotomies appeal to our sense of how knowledge should be organized. It feels ‘natural’ and ‘right’. It feels right because it reflects our agonistic ideology. But because it feels right does not mean it is right. On the contrary, <u>there is much wrong with the metaphorical assignment of research to <mark>warring camps</mark>. It <mark>obscures the aspects of disparate work that overlap and can learn from each other. It obscures the complexity of research</u></mark>. These dichotomies imply that only one framework can apply, when in the vast majority of instances, both can. I am reminded here of a comment attributed to Kenneth Pike, which I heard from A. L. Becker: Most scholars are wrong not in what they assert but in what they deny. <u>In other <mark>words, scholars eager not only to make themselves right but also to make others wrong risk distorting and misrepresenting their opponents’ views – and setting us all back in our common quest for understanding and knowledge</mark>. </u>6. The expense of time, spirit, and creativity There is yet <u>another way that framing academic discourse as a metaphorical battle results in less knowledge rather than more: <mark>It wastes scholars’ time and talent. Critics spend large amounts of energy looking for faults in others’ work that could better be spent building on it, or developing their own work in new directions</mark>. At the same time, <mark>those who are the object of agonistic attack are forced to expend energy dispelling misrepresentations of their work, energy that could better be spent doing new creative work or incorporating the insights of genuine critics—those who represent the work accurately but raise significant questions</mark> and offer competing research findings. Another way that the agonistic conventions of academe result in the loss of creative work is that <mark>many scholars are discouraged from presenting or publishing their work, or from contributing to oral interaction, by the agonistic tone of academic discourse</mark>. </u>Herring (1996) examined the postings on the electronic ‘linguist’ list. At one point, a rancorous, polarized debate broke out. Herring sent a questionnaire to list subscribers, asking their views of the debate and why they did not contribute, if they didn’t. She found that 73 percent of respondents who said they had not taken part in the debate gave ‘‘intimidation’’ as the reason.5 <u>There is yet another way in which our agonistic conventions result in loss of knowledge and understanding. As an anonymous reviewer of this paper commented, <mark>American academic discourse can function ‘‘like a kind of bullying to conform to a norm/trend. It’s when you have a different point of view than the trendy barbies that you get shot down, not if you’re in the in group’</mark>’</u>. I would add, however, that feeling safe within the confines of one group does not protect you from attack by an opposing group. Quite the contrary, when bullets are flying, nearly everyone feels vulnerable and edgy, even if they are temporarily protected by fortress walls.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
2
| 430,884 | 42 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,941 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| null |
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4><strong>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u> or certain parts of them. In this way <u>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u> at the national level, <u>including</u> for example the <u>legalisation of cannabis</u> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u>Disregarding</u> all or selected components of <u>the treaties</u>, however, <u>raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control</u>. <u>The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could <strong>threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u>selective application</u> of such a principle <u>would <strong>call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
3
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,942 |
The illicit organ market is colonial in nature
|
Delmonico 3
|
Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts
|
The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients.
|
The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients
|
General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of
Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)
WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco
For several years, one of us (Nancy Scheper-Hughes [2003]) has been actively involved in multi-sited, ethnographic field research in nine countries on the global traffic in human organs. The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients. Residents of Japan, the Gulf States in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), Israel, Western Europe, and North America now travel in individually tailored or in organized group packages to medical centers in India, China, the Philippines, South America, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to purchase kidneys that are not available locally or legally. They are aided in their quest by a new class of organ brokers, some of whom operate on the Internet.
| 1,200 |
<h4><strong>The illicit organ market is colonial in nature</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>For several years, one of us (Nancy Scheper-Hughes [2003]) has been actively involved in multi-sited, ethnographic field research in nine countries on the global traffic in human organs. <u><mark>The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients</mark>. </u>Residents of Japan, the Gulf States in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), Israel, Western Europe, and North America now travel in individually tailored or in organized group packages to medical centers in India, China, the Philippines, South America, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to purchase kidneys that are not available locally or legally. They are aided in their quest by a new class of organ brokers, some of whom operate on the Internet.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,259 | 4 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,943 |
Education- Kreit ev proves ALL the literature looks at regulations and markets at a STATE level- critical to in-depth counterplan and regulation-based DA debates- they only give the neg politics and Ks
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u><strong>Education- Kreit ev proves ALL the literature looks at regulations and markets at a STATE level- critical to in-depth counterplan and regulation-based DA debates- they only give the neg politics and Ks</h4></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
1
| 430,885 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,944 |
Counter advocacy solves
|
Abdullah and McCormack 8’
|
Abdullah and McCormack 8’ (Carolyne Miller and Susan, “Facing Racism in a Diverse Nation”, Everyday Democracy is a national organization that helps local communities find ways for all kinds of people to think, talk and work together to solve problems. They work with neighborhoods, cities and towns, regions, and states, helping them pay particular attention to how racism and ethnic differences affect the problems they address, http://www.dec17.org/Facing_Racism.pdf, p 1-11)
|
If we are going to make progress in our communities and our country, people from all backgrounds and views must work together to address racism and inequities. We need democratic dialogue, organized on a large scale, so that people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds can: > Listen respectfully to one another. dialogue, people can share experiences and concerns, and rethink stereotypes. They can understand one another better, and build relationships that help them work together. When people learn more about public problems and explore disagreements, they begin to find common concerns. Then, they find out that they can work together, and they begin to solve problems. Come up with practical ways to address racism and inequities Strong, community-based organizing helps them work with others to connect their talk to action. Dialogue on racism can lead to democratic problem solving on many issues in the community — education, community-police relations, poverty, and others. Some may join other communities — to come up with regional and even national solutions Together, we can build strong communities where everyone has a voice.
|
people from all backgrounds and views must work together to address racism and inequities We need democratic dialogue so that people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds can: > Listen respectfully to one another people can share experiences and concerns, and rethink stereotypes. They can understand one another better, and build relationships that help them work together When people learn more about public problems and explore disagreements, they begin to find common concerns. Then, they find out that they can work together, and they begin to solve problems Strong, community-based organizing helps them work with others to connect their talk to action Dialogue on racism can lead to democratic problem solving on many issues in the community — education, community-police relations, poverty, and others Some may join other communities to come up with regional and even national solutions
|
If we are going to make progress in our communities and our country, people from all backgrounds and views must work together to address racism and inequities. We need democratic dialogue, organized on a large scale, so that people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds can: > Listen respectfully to one another. Through dialogue, people can share experiences and concerns, and rethink stereotypes. They can understand one another better, and build relationships that help them work together. > Look at different sides of an issue and explore common concerns. When people learn more about public problems and explore disagreements, they begin to find common concerns. Then, they find out that they can work together, and they begin to solve problems. > Come up with practical ways to address racism and inequities. Through dialogue, people develop new community networks and new ideas for action and change. Strong, community-based organizing helps them work with others to connect their talk to action. > Take action on their ideas, and test their solutions over the long run. Dialogue on racism can lead to democratic problem solving on many issues in the community — education, community-police relations, poverty, and others. Over years, communities can begin to take stock of their progress. Some may join other communities — in their state and around the country — to come up with regional and even national solutions. A growing number of communities are creating ongoing democratic dialogue and action on racism. They are finding ways to involve people from all racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, all political beliefs, all faiths, all education levels, all income levels, and all walks of life. They are finding ways to move from dialogue to individual change and collective action. As more of us move ahead with this challenging work, we will find ways to honor the ideals of equality and justice. Together, we can build strong communities where everyone has a voice.
| 1,982 |
<h4>Counter advocacy solves</h4><p><strong>Abdullah and McCormack 8’</strong> (Carolyne Miller and Susan, “Facing Racism in a Diverse Nation”, Everyday Democracy is a national organization that helps local communities find ways for all kinds of people to think, talk and work together to solve problems. They work with neighborhoods, cities and towns, regions, and states, helping them pay particular attention to how racism and ethnic differences affect the problems they address, http://www.dec17.org/Facing_Racism.pdf, p 1-11)</p><p><u>If we are going to make progress in our communities and our country, <mark>people from all backgrounds and views must work together to address racism and inequities</mark>.</u> <u><mark>We need democratic dialogue</mark>, organized on a large scale, <mark>so that people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds can: > Listen respectfully to one another</mark>.</u> Through <u>dialogue, <mark>people can share experiences and concerns, and rethink stereotypes. They can understand one another better, and build relationships that help them work together</mark>.</u> > Look at different sides of an issue and explore common concerns. <u><mark>When people learn more about public problems and explore disagreements, they begin to find common concerns. Then, they find out that they can work together, and they begin to solve problems</mark>.</u> > <u>Come up with practical ways to address racism and inequities</u>. Through dialogue, people develop new community networks and new ideas for action and change. <u><mark>Strong, community-based organizing helps them work with others to connect their talk to action</mark>.</u> > Take action on their ideas, and test their solutions over the long run. <u><mark>Dialogue on racism can lead to democratic problem solving on many issues in the community — education, community-police relations, poverty, and others</mark>.</u> Over years, communities can begin to take stock of their progress. <u><mark>Some may join other communities</mark> </u>— in their state and around the country<u> — <mark>to come up with regional and even national solutions</u></mark>. A growing number of communities are creating ongoing democratic dialogue and action on racism. They are finding ways to involve people from all racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, all political beliefs, all faiths, all education levels, all income levels, and all walks of life. They are finding ways to move from dialogue to individual change and collective action. As more of us move ahead with this challenging work, we will find ways to honor the ideals of equality and justice. <u>Together, we can build strong communities where everyone has a voice.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
2
| 430,887 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,945 |
The illicit market is apartheid medicine
|
SCHEPER-HUGHES 3
|
SCHEPER-HUGHES 3 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where she directs the doctoral program in Critical Studies in Medicine, Science, and the Body. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL . 2, NO. 2 (JUNE2003), 197–226 Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/ pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =97cebe61-9315-4e5e-b8db-f7372c8a971e%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=117
|
We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known
|
We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known
|
This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.
| 1,067 |
<h4>The illicit market is apartheid medicine</h4><p><strong>SCHEPER-HUGHES 3</strong> Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where she directs the doctoral program in Critical Studies in Medicine, Science, and the Body. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL . 2, NO. 2 (JUNE2003), 197–226 Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/ pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =97cebe61-9315-4e5e-b8db-f7372c8a971e%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=117</p><p>This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. <u><mark>We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known</u></mark> – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 171,178 | 30 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,946 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
3
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,947 |
The criticism of US power and liberal institutions collapses hege
Sowell 6 [Thomas Sowell, Senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, “Where is the West?” 11-19-2006, http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell110906.php3] European nations protesting Saddam Hussein's death sentence, as they protested against forcing secrets out of captured terrorists, should tell us all we need to know about the internal degeneration of western society, where so many confuse squeamishness with morality. Two generations of being insulated from the reality of the international jungle, of not having to defend their own survival because they have been living under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, have allowed too many Europeans to grow soft and indulge themselves in illusions about brutal realities and dangers. The very means of their salvation have been demonized for decades in anti-nuclear movements and protesters calling themselves "anti-war." But there is a huge difference between being anti-war in words and being anti-war in deeds. How many times, in its thousands of years of history, has Europe gone 60 years without a major war, as it has since World War II? That peace has been due to American nuclear weapons, which was all that could deter the Soviet Union's armies from marching right across Europe to the Atlantic Ocean. Having overwhelming military force on your side, and letting your enemies know that you have the guts to use it, is being genuinely anti-war. Chamberlain's appeasement brought on World War II and Reagan's military buildup ended the Cold War. The famous Roman peace of ancient times did not come from negotiations, cease-fires, or pretty talk. It came from the Roman Empire's crushing defeat and annihilation of Carthage, which served as a warning to anyone else who might have had any bright ideas about messing with Rome. Only after the Roman Empire began to lose its own internal cohesion, patriotism and fighting spirit over the centuries did it begin to succumb to its external enemies and finally collapse. That seems to be where western civilization is heading today. Inte nal cohesion? Not only does much of today's generation in western societies have a "do your own thing" attitude, defying rules and flouting authority are glorified and Balkanization through "multiculturalism" has become dogma. Patriotism? Not only is patriotism disdained, the very basis for pride in one's country and culture is systematically undermined in our educational institutions at all levels. The achievements of western civilization are buried in histories that portray every human sin found here as if they were peculiarities of the west. The classic example is slavery, which existed all over the world for thousands of years and yet is incessantly depicted as if it was a peculiarity of Europeans enslaving Africans. Barbary pirates alone brought twice as many enslaved Europeans to North Africa as there were Africans brought in bondage to the United States and the American colonies from which it was formed. How many schools and colleges are going to teach that, going against political correctness and undermining white guilt? How many people have any inkling that it was precisely western civilization which eventually turned against slavery and began stamping it out when non-western societies still saw nothing wrong with it? How can a generation be expected to fight for the survival of a culture or a civilization that has been trashed in its own institutions, taught to tolerate even the intolerance of other cultures brought into its own midst, and conditioned to regard any instinct to fight for its own survival as being a "cowboy"? Western nations that show any signs of standing up for self-preservation are rare exceptions. The United States and Israel are the only western nations which have no choice but to rely on self-defense — and both are demonized, not only by our enemies but also by many in other western nations. Australia recently told its Muslim population that, if they want to live under Islamic law, then they should leave Australia. That makes three western nations that have not yet completely succumbed to the corrosive and suicidal trends of our times. If and when we all succumb, will the epitaph of western civilization say that we had the power to annihilate our enemies but were so paralyzed by confusion that we ended up being annihilated ourselves?
|
Sowell 6
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The criticism of US power and liberal institutions collapses hege</h4><p><strong>Sowell 6</strong> [Thomas Sowell, Senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, “Where is the West?” 11-19-2006, http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell110906.php3] European nations protesting Saddam Hussein's death sentence, as they protested against forcing secrets out of captured terrorists, should tell us all we need to know about the internal degeneration of western society, where so many confuse squeamishness with morality. <u><mark>Two generations</mark> of being <mark>insulated from the reality of the international</mark> jungle</u>, of not having to defend their own survival because they have been living under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, <u><mark>have allowed</u></mark> too many Europeans to grow soft and indulge themselves in <u><mark>illusions about</mark> brutal realities and <mark>dangers.</mark> </u>The very means of their salvation have been demonized for decades in anti-nuclear movements and protesters calling themselves "anti-war." But there is a huge difference between being anti-war in words and being anti-war in deeds. <u><mark>How many times</mark>, in its thousands of years of history, <mark>has Europe gone 60 years without a major war</mark>, as it has since World War II</u>? That peace has been due to American nuclear weapons, which was all that could deter the Soviet Union's armies from marching right across Europe to the Atlantic Ocean. <u><mark>Having</mark> overwhelming <mark>military force on your side</mark>, and letting your enemies know that you have the guts to use it, <mark>is being genuinely anti-war</mark>. Chamberlain's appeasement brought on World War II and Reagan's military buildup ended the Cold War. The famous Roman peace</u> of ancient times did not come from negotiations, cease-fires, or pretty talk. It <u>came from the Roman Empire's crushing defeat and annihilation of Carthage, which served as a warning to anyone else</u> who might have had any bright ideas about messing with Rome. Only after the Roman Empire began to lose its own internal cohesion, patriotism and fighting spirit over the centuries did it begin to succumb to its external enemies and finally collapse. That seems to be where western civilization is heading today. Inte nal cohesion? Not only does much of today's generation in western societies have a "do your own thing" attitude, defying rules and flouting authority are glorified and Balkanization through "multiculturalism" has become dogma. Patriotism? Not only is patriotism disdained, the very basis for pride in one's country and culture is systematically undermined in our educational institutions at all levels. <u><mark>The achievements of western civilization are buried in histories that portray every human sin found here as if they were peculiarities of the west. The classic example is slavery, which existed all over the world for thousands of years</mark> and yet is incessantly depicted as if it was a peculiarity of Europeans enslaving Africans.</u> Barbary pirates alone brought twice as many enslaved Europeans to North Africa as there were Africans brought in bondage to the United States and the American colonies from which it was formed. How many schools and colleges are going to teach that, going against political correctness and undermining white guilt? How many people have any inkling that it was precisely western civilization which eventually turned against slavery and began stamping it out when non-western societies still saw nothing wrong with it? How can a generation be expected to fight for the survival of a culture or a civilization that has been trashed in its own institutions, taught to tolerate even the intolerance of other cultures brought into its own midst, and conditioned to regard any instinct to fight for its own survival as being a "cowboy"? Western nations that show any signs of standing up for self-preservation are rare exceptions. The United States and Israel are the only western nations which have no choice but to rely on self-defense — and both are demonized, not only by our enemies but also by many in other western nations. Australia recently told its Muslim population that, if they want to live under Islamic law, then they should leave Australia. That makes three western nations that have not yet completely succumbed to the corrosive and suicidal trends of our times. <u><mark>If </u>a</mark>nd when <u><mark>we</u></mark> all <u><mark>succumb</u>, <u>will the epitaph of western civilization say that we had the power to annihilate our enemies but were so paralyzed</mark> </u>by confusion that <u><mark>we</mark> ended up being <mark>annihilated ourselves?<strong></mark> </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
3
| 430,886 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,948 |
Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight
|
Mataconis 9/27
|
Mataconis 9/27/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)
|
Holder’s resignation places the administration in a quandary If Republicans gain control of the Senate the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly the president would have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority it would pose problems for the administration the confirmation process would be brutal the president would get a new attorney general, but not someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the lame-duck It won’t be easy the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Republicans could try to run out the clock through procedural motions and holds there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year
|
most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the - lame-duck It won’t be easy. we’re talking about maybe four weeks the Senate will be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote , and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done Republicans could try to run out the clock there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination before the end of this year
|
As I noted yesterday, Holder’s resignation at this late date places the administration in something of a quandary. If Republicans gain control of the Senate in November, then the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly. At the very least, the president would likely have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, it would still pose political problems for the administration. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, the confirmation process would likely be brutal. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, the president would likely get a new attorney general, but it would most assuredly not be someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will attempt bring the nomination before the Senate during the upcoming post-election lame-duck session. It won’t be easy. Right now, the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate Republicans could do to stop the nomination, although they could try to to delay it or even run out the clock on the Senate’s session through procedural motions and the use of holds, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.
| 2,670 |
<h4><strong>Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight</h4><p>Mataconis 9/27</strong>/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)</p><p>As I noted yesterday, <u>Holder’s resignation</u> at this late date <u>places the administration in</u> something of <u>a quandary</u>. <u>If Republicans gain control of the Senate</u> in November, then <u>the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly</u>. At the very least, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority</u>, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, <u>it would</u> still <u>pose</u> political <u>problems for the administration</u>. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, <u>the confirmation process would </u>likely <u>be brutal</u>. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>get a new attorney general, but</u> it would most assuredly <u><strong>not</u></strong> be <u><strong>someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. </u></strong>It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that <u><mark>most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will</u></mark> attempt <u><mark>bring the nomination</u></mark> before the Senate <u><mark>during the</u></mark> upcoming post<mark>-</mark>election<mark> <u>lame-duck</u></mark> session. <u><strong><mark>It won’t be easy</u></strong>.</mark> Right now, <u>the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas.</u> In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most <u><mark>we’re talking about maybe four weeks </mark>in which <mark>the Senate will </mark>actually <mark>be in session</u>. <u>That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote </mark>in the Judiciary Committee<mark>, and send the nomination to the floor</u>, <u><strong>but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done</mark>.</u></strong> Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> could do to stop the nomination, although they <u><mark>could try to</u></mark> to delay it or even <u><strong><mark>run out the clock</u></strong></mark> on the Senate’s session <u>through procedural motions and</u> the use of <u>holds</u>, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, <u><mark>there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination </mark>through the Senate <mark>before the end of this year</u><strong></mark>, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.</p></strong>
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Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,827 | 4 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,949 |
Interp - Legalize means removing from the books
|
Heaps & Swartz 1994
|
Melody M. Heaps & James A. Swartz 1994 (Heapsis the founder and president of Treatment Alternative for Special Clients, Ph.D, Swartz is presently Director of Research at the Illinois Treatment Alternative for Special Clients (TASC) program and an associate faculty member of the Illinois School of Professional Psychology. University of Chicago Legal Forum 1994 1994 U Chi Legal F 175 ARTICLE: TOWARD A RATIONAL DRUG POLICY: SETTING NEW PRIORITIES)
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Legalization is removing or repealing statutory proscriptions entirely possessing marijuana becomes legal under the rubric of legalization
|
Legalization is removing statutory proscriptions entirely possessing marijuana becomes legal under the rubric
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n7 The term "decriminalization" should not be mistaken as being equivalent to "legalization." As Professor Kraska has written (albeit in an article that ultimately argues against decriminalization): The terms "decriminalization" and "legalization" are often confused. Decriminalization is the reduction in severity of a criminal offense and the penalty associated with that offense. Marijuana possession, for instance, might be decriminalized from a felony offense to a misdemeanor. Legalization, on the other hand, is exactly what the word implies: removing or repealing statutory proscriptions entirely. To wit, possessing marijuana, once a criminal offense, becomes legal under the rubric of legalization.
| 712 |
<h4><strong>Interp - Legalize means <u>removing from the books</h4><p></u></strong>Melody M. <strong>Heaps &</strong> James A. <strong>Swartz 1994</strong> (Heapsis the founder and president of Treatment Alternative for Special Clients, Ph.D, Swartz is presently Director of Research at the Illinois Treatment Alternative for Special Clients (TASC) program and an associate faculty member of the Illinois School of Professional Psychology. University of Chicago Legal Forum 1994 1994 U Chi Legal F 175 ARTICLE: TOWARD A RATIONAL DRUG POLICY: SETTING NEW PRIORITIES)</p><p>n7 The term "decriminalization" should not be mistaken as being equivalent to "legalization." As Professor Kraska has written (albeit in an article that ultimately argues against decriminalization): The terms "decriminalization" and "legalization" are often confused. Decriminalization is the reduction in severity of a criminal offense and the penalty associated with that offense. Marijuana possession, for instance, might be decriminalized from a felony offense to a misdemeanor. <u><mark>Legalization</u></mark>, on the other hand, <u><mark>is</u></mark> exactly what the word implies: <u><strong><mark>removing</mark> or repealing <mark>statutory proscriptions entirely</u></strong></mark>. To wit, <u><mark>possessing marijuana</u></mark>, once a criminal offense, <u><mark>becomes legal under the rubric</mark> of legalization</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
5
| 430,569 | 12 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,950 |
Plan solves 2 internal links--
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,888 | 1 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,951 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4><strong>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p>Downs 12 <u></strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u><mark>Given this history, the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities<strong></mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,952 |
Violation – the aff keeps CSA legal
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Violation – the aff keeps CSA legal </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
5
| 430,889 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,953 |
Heg checks nuclear war and promotes liberalism-solves your impacts
|
Thayer 6
|
Thayer 6 Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy, Nov/Dec. 2006, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=9de1b0dc-ee3a-4a18-8fae-6cec07304a28%40sessionmgr10&vid=1&hid=12&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLGNwaWQmY3VzdGlkPXM5MDg0MDU3JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=f5h&AN=23271168)//AM
|
the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted declaring that the United States is "going home does not mean that others will respect American wishes To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.¶ U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders countries want to align themselves with the United States doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia Wars still occur , but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.¶ Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit,
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ensuring American primacy network of allies is reassured and protected retrenchment will make the U S less secure threats will exist no matter what threats must be confronted declaring the U S is "going home emboldens aggression conventional and strategic military power is what protects the country America, commands the "global commons" allowing the U S to project countries want to align themselves with the U S peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without U.S. power it. they are wrong Appalling things happen when international orders collapse Without U.S. power, the liberal order will end American primacy helps keep complicated relationships aligned Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly great power wars American power gives the U S the ability to spread liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerne an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, economic stability and prosperity stems from this
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So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.¶ A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.¶ In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.¶ And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.¶ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.( n2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.¶ A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.¶ U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.¶ China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶ THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.¶ Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)."¶ Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.¶ Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.¶ Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.¶ Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.¶ Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.
| 11,540 |
<h4>Heg checks nuclear war and promotes liberalism-solves your impacts</h4><p><strong>Thayer 6</strong> Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy, Nov/Dec. 2006, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=9de1b0dc-ee3a-4a18-8fae-6cec07304a28%40sessionmgr10&vid=1&hid=12&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLGNwaWQmY3VzdGlkPXM5MDg0MDU3JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=f5h&AN=23271168)//AM</p><p>So <u>the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy</u>. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.¶ A GRAND strategy of <u><mark>ensuring American primacy</mark> takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests</u>. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that <u>Washington's worldwide <mark>network of allies is reassured and protected</mark>. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens.</u> Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.¶ <u>In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, <mark>retrenchment will make the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>less secure</u></mark> than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because <u><mark>threats will exist no matter what</mark> role America chooses to play in international politics</u>. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. <u>Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that <mark>threats must be confronted</u></mark>. Simply by <u><mark>declaring</mark> that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is "going home</u></mark>", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, <u>does not mean that others will respect American wishes</u> to retreat. <u>To make such a declaration implies weakness and <mark>emboldens aggression</u></mark>. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, <u>predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong</u>. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then <u>the <mark>conventional and strategic military power</mark> of the United States <mark>is what protects the country</mark> from such threats.¶ </u>And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.¶ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, <u>U.S. primacy is secured because <mark>America,</mark> at present, <mark>commands the "global commons"</mark>--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--<mark>allowing the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to project</mark> its power far from its borders</u>, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.( n2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.¶ A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that <u><mark>countries want to align themselves with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because <u>doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ </u>Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.¶ <u>U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics,</u> allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). <u>Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents</u>. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.¶ China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶ THROUGHOUT HISTORY, <u><mark>peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power</u></mark>--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.¶ <u><mark>Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade</mark>, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for <mark>human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without</mark> the current amount of <mark>U.S. power </mark>behind <mark>it.</mark> In that <mark>they are </mark>dead <mark>wrong</mark> and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: <mark>Appalling things happen when international orders collapse</mark>.</u> The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. <u><mark>Without U.S. power, the liberal order</mark> created by the United States <mark>will end</mark> just as assuredly</u>. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)."¶ Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. <u>In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world</u>. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, <u><mark>American primacy helps keep</mark> a number of <mark>complicated relationships aligned</mark>--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia</u>. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. <u>Wars still occur</u> where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur<u>, but a <mark>Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly</mark> war's worst form: <mark>great power wars</mark>.¶ Second, <mark>American power gives the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>the ability to spread</mark> democracy and other elements of its ideology of <mark>liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerne</mark>d</u> as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.¶ Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.¶ Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.¶ Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. <u>With its allies, the United States has labored to create <mark>an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce,</mark> respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The <mark>economic stability and prosperity</mark> that <mark>stems from this</mark> economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit,</u><strong> particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
3
| 179,686 | 62 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,954 |
First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
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By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
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By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ, this would become much less commonplace.
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By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes<u> a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like <mark>this would become much less commonplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,955 |
NOW – US imperialism is flawed but is still the greatest force for good – it checks vastly more racist and less reflexive regimes -
|
Boot 3
|
Boot 3 (Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-imperialism-force-good/p5959)
|
All of those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily be handled. They are backed up by the resources of the world's richest economy America can outspend and outmuscle any competing faction The greatest danger is that America won't use all of its power for fear of the "I" word -- imperialism. the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice
|
those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily be handled The greatest danger is that America won't use power for fear of -- imperialism U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama t
|
What is the greatest danger facing America as it tries to rebuild Iraq: Shiite fundamentalism? Kurdish separatism? Sunni intransigence? Turkish, Syrian, Iranian or Saudi Arabian meddling? All of those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily be handled. More than 125,000 U.S. troops occupy Mesopotamia. They are backed up by the resources of the world's richest economy. In a contest for control of Iraq, America can outspend and outmuscle any competing faction. The greatest danger is that America won't use all of its power for fear of the "I" word -- imperialism. When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building," Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether he wears women's underwear. "We don't seek empires," he replied huffily. "We're not imperialistic. We never have been." That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the "empire of liberty" expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from "sea to shining sea," the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building" experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice.
| 2,624 |
<h4>NOW – US imperialism is flawed but is still the greatest force for good – it checks vastly more racist and less reflexive regimes - </h4><p><strong>Boot 3 </strong>(Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-imperialism-force-good/p5959)</p><p>What is the greatest danger facing America as it tries to rebuild Iraq: Shiite fundamentalism? Kurdish separatism? Sunni intransigence? Turkish, Syrian, Iranian or Saudi Arabian meddling? <u>All of <mark>those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily be handled</mark>.</u> More than 125,000 U.S. troops occupy Mesopotamia. <u>They are backed up by the resources of the world's richest economy</u>. In a contest for control of Iraq, <u>America can outspend and outmuscle any competing faction</u>. <u><mark>The greatest danger is that America won't use</mark> all of its <mark>power for fear of</mark> the "I" word <mark>-- imperialism</mark>.</u> When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building," Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether he wears women's underwear. "We don't seek empires," he replied huffily. "We're not imperialistic. We never have been." That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the "empire of liberty" expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from "sea to shining sea," the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, <u>the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation</u>." But when Americans are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building" experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, <u><strong><mark>U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama</u></strong></mark>. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, <u><mark>t</mark>here's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice</u>.<strong> </p></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
3
| 163,744 | 13 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,956 |
Standards –
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Standards –</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
5
| 430,890 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,957 |
PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee
|
Moran 9/28
|
Moran 9/28/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)
|
Any choice Obama makes will be controversial It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. the nomination probably won't come until after the election If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
|
Any choice Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
|
Any choice for AG Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so the nomination probably won't come until after the election anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
| 958 |
<h4><strong>PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee</h4><p>Moran 9/28<u></strong>/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)</p><p><mark>Any choice</u></mark> for AG <u><mark>Obama makes will be controversial</u>.</mark> <u><mark>It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and <strong>if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available.</mark> </u></strong>That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so <u>the nomination probably won't come until after the election</u> anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. <u><mark>If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck</mark> session, <strong><mark>it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,828 | 6 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,958 |
Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
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Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,264 | 17 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,959 |
Whiteness isn’t the root cause of all these internal links - That over-determines – specific contexts key for war scenarios.
|
Sagan 2K
|
Sagan 2K
Scott D. Sagan – Department of Political Science, Stanford University – ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE – 2000 – available via: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/sagan.doc
|
it is essential to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination." it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war and argue that the war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. this tendency eliminates the role of contingency and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways During the Cuban Missile Crisis a bizarre false warning in U.S. radar systems led officers to believe that a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida. imagine this resulted in "retaliation How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III? One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given deep hostility of conflicting ideology nuclear war would have occurred eventually f not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin, From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.
|
it is essential to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war this eliminates contingency and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways War was overdetermined: given deep hostility of t conflicting ideology
|
To make reasonable judgements in such matters it is essential, in my view, to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination." Looking backwards at historical events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war and argue that the likelihood of conflict was so high that the war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. If taken too far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors. The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a bizarre false warning incident in the U.S. radar systems facing Cuba led officers at the North American Air Defense Command to believe that the U.S. was under attack and that a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida. Now imagine the counterfactual event that this false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and resulted in a U.S. nuclear "retaliation" against the Russians. How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III? One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given the deep political hostility of the two superpowers, the conflicting ideology, the escalating arms race, nuclear war would have occurred eventually. If not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin, or the Middle East, or Korea. From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.
| 1,810 |
<h4>Whiteness isn’t<strong> the root cause of all these internal links - That over-determines – specific contexts key for war scenarios.</h4><p>Sagan 2K</p><p></strong>Scott D. Sagan – Department of Political Science, Stanford University – ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE – 2000 – available via: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/sagan.doc</p><p>To make reasonable judgements in such matters <u><mark>it is essential</u></mark>, in my view, <u><mark>to avoid the common "fallacy of</mark> <mark>overdetermination</mark>." </u> Looking backwards at historical events, <u><mark>it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war</mark> and argue that the</u> likelihood of conflict was so high that the <u>war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. </u> If taken too far, however, <u><mark>this </mark>tendency <mark>eliminates </mark>the role of<mark> contingency</u></mark> in history <u><mark>and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways</u></mark> that were present to historical actors. The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. <u>During the</u> 1962 <u>Cuban Missile Crisis</u>, <u>a bizarre false warning </u>incident <u>in</u> the <u>U.S. radar systems</u> facing Cuba <u>led officers</u> at the North American Air Defense Command <u>to believe that</u> the U.S. was under attack and that <u>a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida.</u> Now <u>imagine</u> the counterfactual event that <u>this</u> false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and <u>resulted in</u> a U.S. nuclear <u>"retaliation</u>" against the Russians. <u>How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III?</u> <u>One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. <mark>War was overdetermined: given</u></mark> the <u><mark>deep</u></mark> political <u><mark>hostility of</u> t</mark>he two superpowers, the <u><mark>conflicting ideology</u></mark>, the escalating arms race, <u>nuclear war would have occurred eventually</u>. I<u>f not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin,</u> or the Middle East, or Korea. <u>From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.<strong> </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
3
| 126,890 | 37 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,960 |
Grounds – removing csa key to disad links
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Grounds – removing csa key to disad links</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
5
| 430,891 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,961 |
Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights
|
Sharpton 9/29
|
Sharpton 9/29/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas Holder lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements from being dismissed, or altered The principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has had in civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue with the next AG No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. combatted efforts towards voter suppression he principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued
|
Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG, whoever he or she may be. We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas. Throughout his tenure, Holder has consistently lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements in the areas of civil rights and voting rights from being dismissed, or altered somehow. The governing principle that this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder.
| 3,812 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights</h4><p>Sharpton 9/29</strong>/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)</p><p>Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric <u><mark>Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has</mark> ever <mark>had in </mark>the area of <mark>civil rights and voting rights.</u></mark> I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. <u><mark>Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue </mark>on<mark> with the next AG</u></mark>, whoever he or she may be. <u>We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas</u>. Throughout his tenure, <u>Holder</u> has consistently <u>lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights</u> in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. <u><mark>No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing <strong>sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies</strong>.</u></mark> <u>No other AG <mark>combatted efforts towards <strong>voter suppression</mark> with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting</u></strong>. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. <u>The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements </u>in the areas of civil rights and voting rights <u>from being dismissed, or altered</u> somehow. <u><strong>T<mark>he</u></strong></mark> governing <u><strong><mark>principle</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued</u></strong></mark>. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They <u>just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,830 | 6 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,962 |
Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite
|
Kaserman, 7
|
Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
|
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives have cited abuses and high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets
|
some opponents of the use of financial incentives ited buses to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized.
|
Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors have cited various human rights abuses and extraordinarily high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets. n32 This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized. Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.
| 2,002 |
<h4>Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite</h4><p><strong>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p><u>In a truly ironic twist of logic, <mark>some opponents of the use of financial incentives</u></mark> for cadaveric organ donors <u>have c<mark>ited</mark> </u>various human rights <u>a<mark>buses</mark> and </u>extraordinarily <u>high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely <mark>to accompany legalized organ markets</u></mark>. n32 <u><mark>This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion</mark>. <mark>This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized</u>.</mark> Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. <u>Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets</u><strong>. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors. </p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,263 | 5 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,963 |
Sentencing reform key to US credibility
|
CGS 2013
|
CGS 2013 (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare.
| 569 |
<h4><strong>Sentencing reform key to US credibility</h4><p>CGS 2013</strong> (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)</p><p><u>The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates</u>. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. <u><mark>The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform</u>,</mark> and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit <u><mark>prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society</u>. <u><strong>As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,865 | 7 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,964 |
Limits – their mechanism means we have to research every governmental agency
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Limits – their mechanism means we have to research every governmental agency </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
5
| 430,892 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,965 |
Collapse of US hege isn’t some post-hege utopia – it’s a fill-in by China
|
Horner and Leiken 6 economic imperialist That kills democracy and leads to protectionism and arms races
|
Horner and Leiken 6 (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_) And the corollary to this, I suppose, is that the only non-white people in the world who really matter, say, in running the international economy are either Japanese or Chinese. Or maybe they’re Korean, but let’s just say for the sake of this argument the Chinese now. It used to be the Japanese had a certain purchase in their model. So the Chinese have a certain thing going for themselves. They’re not European, they’re not American, they’re not white. They have another advantage in the fact that they call their system socialism and that they call their ruling party communist. And this, as Jaime suggests, with respect to their actual conduct, you see, allows them to say or allows them to claim, allows them to think that what they do – that their economic expansion in the world is somehow different in kind from the Western economic expansion of the 19th and 20th century, and that China’s multinational banks and corporations, who are very active in Latin America is something different, and so on, even as, analytically speaking, Hobson or Lenin would recognize China as a kind of economic imperialist power. It imports primary products; it’s a creditor; it exports finished goods; it exploits its own and other countries’ cheap labor, is what it does do; it invests in and wants to control critical infrastructure like ports, airports, highways, telecommunications; and it uses its political influence – that is to say corrupts local political systems to protect its economic interests. But there may – for all of this now, I think we’re already beginning to see the signs of the certain self-limiting aspect of it. As Chair Mao himself once wrote, you see, “Wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance.” And we can’t be surprised therefore that there are resentments already building in Brazil about the terms of trade, or in Mexico about the fact that China is a competitor for the American market. And countries which export primary products are not happy to see the Chinese drifting vaguely into the group of importers, trying to use their own strong position in the market – I think the technical term for this is monopsonist – position to somehow bargain with exporters for price constraints. And therefore it does seem that the countries are on the receiving end of this sort of thing, wherever they are, tend to seek balance. In this case the so-called stronger parties are China and the United States, and presumably it is in the space between them that one finds ones own opportunities as countries in this situation always have ever since 1945.That kills democracy and leads to protectionism and arms races
|
there are several negative impacts of China’s involvement for Latin America terms of trade switch China’s manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing more than it imports Argentina is a key example where the imports of Chinese goods have been growing very, very rapidly compared to the exports to China China managed to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it market economy status which meant anti-dumping legislation would be substantially diminished this gave China much more access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods it’s going to tip the scales much more in favor of China, which doesn’t abide by all the free trade rules It’s highly protectionist steals intellectual property because of the commodities boom the chances of Latin America enacting economic reforms to make the economies more globally competitive are now reduced Chinese relationships with countries like Venezuela works to undermine democracy in the region and strengthens countries not democratic scholars were claiming that the relationship with U.S. was bad for Latin America that’s China and Latin America now democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is not supportive of that Arms race – it’s supporting countries like Venezuela Chinese behavior is also consolidating the Latin American left
|
there are negative impacts of China’s involvement for Latin America it’s going to tip the scales much more in favor of China It’s highly protectionist; steals intellectual property because of the commodities boom – the chances of Latin America enacting economic reforms t are reduced Chinese relationships works to undermine democracy democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is not supportive of that Arms race – it’s supporting countries like Venezuela,
|
Horner and Leiken 6 (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_)But in any case, so Latin America welcomes the chance to kind of reduce its dependence on us. But there are several rather negative impacts or even potential impacts of China’s involvement in Latin America for Latin America. First of all, right now, although Latin America has benefited tremendously by China’s huge imports from the region, 2006 may turn out to be the first year where the terms of trade switch because China’s exports, manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing very, very rapidly. I thought I had the numbers here but I don’t. But anyway, this year may be the year where Latin America sells more to Latin America than it imports. This clearly is changing. Argentina is a key example where the imports of Chinese goods into Argentina have been growing very, very rapidly compared to the exports to China. The other way in which the involvement in China will work against Latin America, and maybe already has, is that China managed – when it was promising all these great trade benefits and agreements – managed to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it a – to label it a – give it market economy status, which meant that anti-dumping legislation under the WTO rules would be – the impact of them would be substantially diminished. They couldn’t bring – Latin American countries couldn’t bring those kinds of charges. So as a result, this gave China much more access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods. Even the United States and Europe didn’t give China the market economy status, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile did. And I think Ecuador recently joined in. So this is going to hurt Latin America because it’s going to tip the scales much more in favor of China, which doesn’t exactly abide by all the free trade kinds of rules. It’s highly protectionist; also, it steals a lot of intellectual property and the like. The other problem with the relationship is that because of the commodities boom, et cetera, Latin America – the chances of Latin America enacting the kinds of economic reforms that are necessary in order to make the Latin American economies more globally competitive are now reduced, with the exception of Chile – everything is always with the exception of Chile. But with the exception of Chile, which is setting aside some of the revenues from the commodities boom for times when the commodities boom is not with us, most of Latin America is just spending the money, taking it in but not thinking ahead, not planning, not using it to make Latin America more economically competitive globally. So these are chickens hat are going to come home to roost. The other negative for Latin America is that obviously Chinese relationships with countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, et cetera, works to undermine democracy in the region and strengthens countries that are not exactly pro-democratic or anti-military or whatever. And, of course, I’m someone who grew up – went to graduate school during the days of dependency theory, where the Latin American scholars were claiming that – coming from the left – that the relationship with U.S. and multinational corporations, et cetera, was bad for Latin America. The terms of trade were bad; that Latin America was being reinforced as a producer of commodities, whereas the United States was selling manufacturers to Latin America. Well, guess what? I mean, that’s China and Latin America now. I mean, you could make the argument that the economic relationship with China is reinforcing Latin America’s traditional role as a commodities producer, and is favoring Chinese efforts to sell manufacturers, which supposedly have, in general, better terms of trade. Finally the issue of, is it good or bad for the United States, China’s relationship with Latin America? I mean, some of this is already obvious, that it helps the United States’ interests in the region to the extent that China helps Latin America grow and stabilize. China is not interested in having a chaotic, unstable Latin America for reasons of its own, and that of course is good for the United States, too. But on the other hand, if you look at the pillars – I mean, a lot of people say that the United States has no policy toward Latin America so there is no way we can even identify what the pillars of the policy are, but I do think we do have a policy toward Latin America. Whether or not it’s the right one or whether or not we’re doing enough is another issue. But support for democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is not supportive of that. Support for market economies – China is in a sense kind of neutral. Some of them are being supported; some of them are not. Arms race – it’s helping in terms of supporting countries like Venezuela, et cetera. In terms of support for the Latin American left – we don’t care about the Latin American left in general as long as they’re democratic. Well, the Chinese behavior is also consolidating the – or helping to consolidate the not-good Latin American left.
| 5,472 |
<h4>Collapse of US hege isn’t some post-hege utopia – it’s a fill-in by China </h4><p><strong>Horner and Leiken 6</strong> (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_)<strong> </strong>And the corollary to this, I suppose, is that the only non-white people in the world who really matter, say, in running the international economy are either Japanese or Chinese. Or maybe they’re Korean, but let’s just say for the sake of this argument the Chinese now. It used to be the Japanese had a certain purchase in their model. So <u>the <mark>Chinese</mark> have a certain thing going for themselves. They’re not European, they’re not American, they’re not white</u>. They have another advantage in <u>the fact that they call their system socialism</u> and that they call their ruling party communist. And this, as Jaime suggests, <u>with respect to their actual <mark>conduct</u>,</mark> you see, <u><mark>allows them to</u></mark> say or allows them to <u><mark>claim</u>,</mark> allows them to think that what they do – <u><mark>that their</mark> economic e<mark>xpansion</mark> in the world <mark>is</u> s</mark>omehow <u><mark>different</u></mark> in kind <u>from the Western economic expansion of the 19th and 20th century, and that China’s multinational</u> banks and <u>corporations</u>, who are very <u>active in Latin America is</u> something <u>different</u>, and so on, <u>even as</u>, analytically speaking, Hobson or <u><mark>Lenin would recognize China as a</u></mark> kind of <u><strong><mark>economic imperialist</strong> power</u>.</mark> It imports primary products; <u><mark>it’s a creditor</u>;</mark> it exports finished goods; <u><mark>it exploits</u></mark> its own and other countries’ <u><mark>cheap labor</u></mark>, is what it does do; <u><mark>it invests in and wants to control</u></mark> critical infrastructure like ports, airports, highways, telecommunications; <u>and</u> it <u>uses its political influence</u> – that is to say corrupts local political systems to protect its economic interests. But there may – for all of this now, I think we’re already beginning to see the signs of the certain self-limiting aspect of it. As Chair Mao himself once wrote, you see, “Wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance.” And we can’t be surprised therefore that <u>there are resentments</u> already building <u>in Brazil about the terms of trade, or in Mexico </u>about the fact <u>that <mark>China is a competitor for the American market</u></mark>. And <u>countries which export primary products are not happy to see the Chinese drifting</u> vaguely <u>into the</u> group of <u>importers</u>, trying to use their own strong position in the market – I think the technical term for this is monopsonist – position <u>to</u> somehow <u>bargain</u> with exporters <u>for price constraints</u>. And therefore it does seem that the countries are on the receiving end of this sort of thing, wherever they are, tend to seek balance. In this case the so-called stronger parties are China and the United States, and presumably it is in the space between them that one finds ones own opportunities as countries in this situation always have ever since 1945.<strong>That kills democracy and leads to protectionism and arms races</p><p>Horner and Leiken 6</strong> (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_)But in any case, so Latin America welcomes the chance to kind of reduce its dependence on us. But <u><mark>there are</mark> several</u> rather <u><mark>negative impacts</u></mark> or even potential impacts <u><mark>of China’s involvement</u></mark> in Latin America <u><mark>for Latin America</u></mark>. First of all, right now, although Latin America has benefited tremendously by China’s huge imports from the region, 2006 may turn out to be the first year where the <u>terms of trade switch</u> because <u>China’s</u> exports, <u>manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing</u> very, very rapidly. I thought I had the numbers here but I don’t. But anyway, this year may be the year where Latin America sells <u>more</u> to Latin America <u>than it imports</u>. This clearly is changing. <u>Argentina is a key example where the imports of Chinese goods</u> into Argentina <u>have been growing very, very rapidly compared to the exports to China</u>. The other way in which the involvement in China will work against Latin America, and maybe already has, is that <u>China managed</u> – when it was promising all these great trade benefits and agreements – managed <u>to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it</u> a – to label it a – give it <u>market economy status</u>, <u>which meant</u> that <u>anti-dumping legislation</u> under the WTO rules would be – the impact of them <u>would be substantially diminished</u>. They couldn’t bring – Latin American countries couldn’t bring those kinds of charges. So as a result, <u>this gave China much more access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods</u>. Even the United States and Europe didn’t give China the market economy status, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile did. And I think Ecuador recently joined in. So this is going to hurt Latin America because <u><mark>it’s going to tip the scales much more in favor of China</mark>, which doesn’t</u> exactly <u>abide by all the free trade</u> kinds of <u>rules</u>. <u><mark>It’s <strong>highly protectionist</u></strong>;</mark> also, it <u><mark>steals</u></mark> a lot of <u><mark>intellectual property</u></mark> and the like. The other problem with the relationship is that <u><mark>because of the commodities boom</u></mark>, et cetera, Latin America <mark>– <u>the chances of Latin America enacting</u></mark> the kinds of <u><mark>economic reforms</u> t</mark>hat are necessary in order <u>to make the</u> Latin American <u>economies more globally competitive <mark>are</mark> now <strong><mark>reduced</u></strong></mark>, with the exception of Chile – everything is always with the exception of Chile. But with the exception of Chile, which is setting aside some of the revenues from the commodities boom for times when the commodities boom is not with us, most of Latin America is just spending the money, taking it in but not thinking ahead, not planning, not using it to make Latin America more economically competitive globally. So these are chickens hat are going to come home to roost. The other negative for Latin America is that obviously <u><strong><mark>Chinese relationships</strong></mark> with countries like Venezuela</u>, Bolivia, et cetera, <u><mark>works to <strong>undermine democracy</strong></mark> in the region and strengthens countries</u> that are <u>not</u> exactly pro-<u>democratic</u> or anti-military or whatever. And, of course, I’m someone who grew up – went to graduate school during the days of dependency theory, where the Latin American <u>scholars were claiming that</u> – coming from the left – that <u>the relationship with U.S.</u> and multinational corporations, et cetera, <u>was bad for Latin America</u>. The terms of trade were bad; that Latin America was being reinforced as a producer of commodities, whereas the United States was selling manufacturers to Latin America. Well, guess what? I mean, <u>that’s China and Latin America now</u>. I mean, you could make the argument that the economic relationship with China is reinforcing Latin America’s traditional role as a commodities producer, and is favoring Chinese efforts to sell manufacturers, which supposedly have, in general, better terms of trade. Finally the issue of, is it good or bad for the United States, China’s relationship with Latin America? I mean, some of this is already obvious, that it helps the United States’ interests in the region to the extent that China helps Latin America grow and stabilize. China is not interested in having a chaotic, unstable Latin America for reasons of its own, and that of course is good for the United States, too. But on the other hand, if you look at the pillars – I mean, a lot of people say that the United States has no policy toward Latin America so there is no way we can even identify what the pillars of the policy are, but I do think we do have a policy toward Latin America. Whether or not it’s the right one or whether or not we’re doing enough is another issue. But support for <u><strong><mark>democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is not supportive of that</u></strong></mark>. Support for market economies – China is in a sense kind of neutral. Some of them are being supported; some of them are not. <u><strong><mark>Arms race</strong> – it’s</u></mark> helping in terms of <u><mark>supporting countries like Venezuela</u>,</mark> et cetera. In terms of support for the Latin American left – we don’t care about the Latin American left in general as long as they’re democratic. Well, the <u>Chinese behavior is also consolidating the</u> – or helping to consolidate the not-good <u>Latin American left</u>.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
3
| 298,722 | 2 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,966 |
Specifically, debate over organ sales is necessary given shortages
|
Smith 11
|
Smith 11 Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html
|
Professor John Harris, an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate of an organ market long overdue. Professor Bell, former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons
|
an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate of an organ market long overdue former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs
|
Professor John Harris, an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate and the introduction of an organ market are long overdue. "Morality demands it," he said. "It's time to consider it because this country, to its eternal shame, has allowed a completely unnecessary shortage for 30 years. Thousands of people die each year [internationally] for want of organs. That's the measure of the urgency of the problem. "Being paid doesn't nullify altruism – doctors aren't less caring because they are paid. With the current system, everyone gets paid except for the donor." Professor Harris has developed proposals for an ethical market in organs in which donors would be paid as part of a regulated system. Such a system, he said, would have to be controlled within a strictly defined community, probably the UK but possibly extended to the EU, so every organ could be accounted for. No imports would be allowed. The NHS would be the sole supplier and would distribute organs as it does other treatments – ability to pay would not be a factor. Consent would be required for every donation and would have to be rigorously carried out to ensure no donor was subjected to untoward pressure. Professor Sir Peter Bell, former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons but now retired from practice, wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again.[…] There is a great shortage of organs." There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"
| 2,224 |
<h4><strong>Specifically, debate over organ sales is necessary given shortages</h4><p>Smith 11</strong> Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html</p><p><u>Professor John Harris, <mark>an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate</mark> </u>and the introduction <u><mark>of an organ market</mark> </u>are <u><mark>long overdue</mark>.</u> "Morality demands it," he said. "It's time to consider it because this country, to its eternal shame, has allowed a completely unnecessary shortage for 30 years. Thousands of people die each year [internationally] for want of organs. That's the measure of the urgency of the problem. "Being paid doesn't nullify altruism – doctors aren't less caring because they are paid. With the current system, everyone gets paid except for the donor." Professor Harris has developed proposals for an ethical market in organs in which donors would be paid as part of a regulated system. Such a system, he said, would have to be controlled within a strictly defined community, probably the UK but possibly extended to the EU, so every organ could be accounted for. No imports would be allowed. The NHS would be the sole supplier and would distribute organs as it does other treatments – ability to pay would not be a factor. Consent would be required for every donation and would have to be rigorously carried out to ensure no donor was subjected to untoward pressure. <u>Professor</u> Sir Peter <u>Bell, <mark>former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons</u></mark> but now retired from practice, <u><mark>wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again</u></mark>.[…] There is a great shortage of organs." There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). <u><mark>Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs</mark>. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons</u>. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme<strong>?"</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,265 | 4 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,967 |
Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran
|
CNN 1/9
|
CNN 1/9/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)
|
Iranian and American negotiators will be eying another showdown in Washington GOP lawmakers are poised to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions the majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap With fewer than two months until agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors supporters know the clock is ticking the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 needed to override a veto A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
, GOP poised t push a bill authorizing additional sanctions majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need fight is already underway f With fewer than two months expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House the four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push . A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
|
Iranian and American negotiators preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions will also be eying another showdown brewing in Washington. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, GOP lawmakers are poised to wield their new power in the Senate to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions against Iran. But the new 54-member majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need to override a presidential veto, and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap. With fewer than two months until diplomats' March 1 framework agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors, supporters know the clock is ticking to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though Kirk said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican expects a high-profile challenge from the White House and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the four Democrats who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House and allies made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 Democrats needed to override a presidential veto. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."
| 7,128 |
<h4>Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran</h4><p><strong>CNN 1/9</strong>/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)</p><p><u>Iranian and American negotiators</u> preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions <u>will</u> also <u>be eying</u> <u>another showdown</u> brewing <u>in Washington</u>. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal<mark>, <u>GOP</mark> lawmakers are <mark>poised t</mark>o</u> wield their new power in the Senate to <u><mark>push a bill authorizing additional sanctions</mark> </u>against Iran. But <u>the</u> new 54-member <u><mark>majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need</u></mark> to override a presidential veto, <u>and the <strong><mark>fight is already underway</strong> f</mark>or the votes that could fill the gap</u>. <u><mark>With fewer than two months</mark> until</u> diplomats' March 1 framework <u>agreement deadline, and <mark>expecting the <strong>White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors</u></strong></mark>, <u>supporters know the clock is ticking</u> to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, <u><strong><mark>the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran</u></strong></mark>, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though <u><mark>Kirk</u></mark> said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican <u><mark>expects a <strong>high-profile challenge from the White House</u></strong></mark> and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back <mark>the <u>four Democrats</u></mark> who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware <u><mark>rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations <strong>after the White House</strong></mark> </u>and allies<u> <strong><mark>made its push</strong></mark> on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote</u>. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even <u>if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15</u> Democrats <u>needed to override a</u> presidential <u>veto</u><mark>.</mark> And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. <u><mark>A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the <strong>toughest battle yet on this issue</u></strong></mark>, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."</p>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 220,775 | 10 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,968 |
Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight
|
Mataconis 9/27
|
Mataconis 9/27/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)
|
Holder’s resignation places the administration in a quandary If Republicans gain control of the Senate the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly the president would have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority it would pose problems for the administration the confirmation process would be brutal the president would get a new attorney general, but not someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the lame-duck It won’t be easy the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Republicans could try to run out the clock through procedural motions and holds there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year
|
most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the - lame-duck It won’t be easy. Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until hristm most we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done Republicans could try to run out the clock there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year
|
As I noted yesterday, Holder’s resignation at this late date places the administration in something of a quandary. If Republicans gain control of the Senate in November, then the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly. At the very least, the president would likely have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, it would still pose political problems for the administration. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, the confirmation process would likely be brutal. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, the president would likely get a new attorney general, but it would most assuredly not be someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will attempt bring the nomination before the Senate during the upcoming post-election lame-duck session. It won’t be easy. Right now, the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate Republicans could do to stop the nomination, although they could try to to delay it or even run out the clock on the Senate’s session through procedural motions and the use of holds, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.
| 2,670 |
<h4><strong>Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight</h4><p>Mataconis 9/27</strong>/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)</p><p>As I noted yesterday, <u>Holder’s resignation</u> at this late date <u>places the administration in</u> something of <u>a quandary</u>. <u>If Republicans gain control of the Senate</u> in November, then <u>the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly</u>. At the very least, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority</u>, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, <u>it would</u> still <u>pose</u> political <u>problems for the administration</u>. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, <u>the confirmation process would </u>likely <u>be brutal</u>. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>get a new attorney general, but</u> it would most assuredly <u><strong>not</u></strong> be <u><strong>someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. </u></strong>It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that <u><mark>most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will</u></mark> attempt <u><mark>bring the nomination</u></mark> before the Senate <u><mark>during the</u></mark> upcoming post<mark>-</mark>election<mark> <u>lame-duck</u></mark> session. <u><strong><mark>It won’t be easy</u></strong>.</mark> Right now, <u>the <mark>Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until</mark> some time before C<mark>hristm</mark>as.</u> In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at <mark>most <u>we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session</u>. <u>That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor</u>, <u><strong>but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done</mark>.</u></strong> Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> could do to stop the nomination, although they <u><mark>could try to</u></mark> to delay it or even <u><strong><mark>run out the clock</u></strong></mark> on the Senate’s session <u>through procedural motions and</u> the use of <u>holds</u>, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, <u><mark>there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year</u><strong></mark>, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 430,827 | 4 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,969 |
Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, anti- Americanism is becoming entrenched America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is a core challenge for the global rule of law
|
America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power U S must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, , a core challenge for global rule of law
|
The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, and that anti- Americanism increasingly is becoming entrenched in the twenty-first century. 3 4 America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, and must remain, a core challenge for all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are the guardians of tomorrow's global rule of law
| 2,254 |
<h4><strong>Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions</h4><p>Koh 2007</strong> <u><strong>(Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)</p><p></u></strong>The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that <u>the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11,</u> and that <u>anti- Americanism</u> increasingly <u>is becoming entrenched</u> in the twenty-first century. 3 4 <u><strong><mark>America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power</u></strong></mark>. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of </mark>international law and <mark>multilateral cooperation, <strong>holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others</u></strong></mark> .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, <u>America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation</u> and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. <u><mark>Protecting our human rights system and reputation is</u>, </mark>and must remain<mark>, <u><strong>a core challenge</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are <u>the</u> guardians of tomorrow's <u><strong><mark>global rule of law</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 430,866 | 7 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,970 |
Chinese imperialism kills the economy and causes mercantalism—causes transition wars, poverty and ecological destruction
|
POSEN, 9
|
POSEN, 9 - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf)
|
US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism Is there an alternative economic model? the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises is doable even by the poorest countries Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category The Chinese model is in part mercantilism . That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change
|
US power have been based largely on American relative economic size and success prosperity at home underpinned that there were benefits to following the American mode global integration on American terms has been increasingly dominant The global financial crisis will accelerate trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. American economic leadership has been eroded by the rise of major economies The Chinese model is mercantilism That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict Failure to act bears risks: first, that China will divert countries relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient reduce growth and the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change
|
In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country's detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.
| 10,200 |
<h4>Chinese imperialism kills the economy and causes mercantalism—causes transition wars, poverty and ecological destruction</h4><p><strong>POSEN, 9</strong> - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf)</p><p>In the postwar period, <u><mark>US power</mark> and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, <mark>have been based largely on American relative economic size and success</u></mark>. <u>These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration</u>. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), <u>this combination produced generally growing <mark>prosperity at home</mark> </u>and abroad, and<u> <mark>underpinned </mark>the idea <mark>that there were benefits to</mark> other countries of <mark>following the American mode</mark>l and playing by American rules</u>. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. <u>With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, <mark>global integration on American terms</mark> through American leadership <mark>has been increasingly dominant</mark> for the last two decades</u>. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. <u><mark>The global financial</mark> system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed.</u> In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, <u>the <mark>crisis will accelerate</mark> at least temporarily two related long-term <mark>trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements</u>.</mark> First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, <u><mark>American</mark> global <mark>economic leadership has been eroded</mark> over the long-term <mark>by the rise of major</mark> emerging market <mark>economies</mark>, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism</u>. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). <u>Is there an alternative economic model?</u> The preceding description would seem to confirm <u>the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature</u>. <u>The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises</u>, while painful, <u>is doable even by the poorest countries</u>, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. <u>Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category</u>. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. <u><mark>The Chinese model is </mark>in part</u> the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part <u><mark>mercantilism</u></mark>. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart<u>. <mark>That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict</u></mark> with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that<u> adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself</u>. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. <u>The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis.</u> Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. <u><mark>Failure to act</mark> affirmatively to manage the situation, however, <mark>bears</mark> two significant and related <mark>risks: first, that China</mark> and perhaps some other rising economic powers <mark>will</mark> opportunistically <mark>divert countries</mark> in US-oriented integrated <mark>relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise</mark> in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. <mark>Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence,</mark> <mark>make the economic system less resilient</mark> in response to future shocks</u> (to every country's detriment), <u><mark>reduce</mark> economic <mark>growth and</mark> thus <mark>the rate of reduction in global poverty,</mark> <mark>and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change</u></mark> or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
3
| 70,108 | 17 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,971 |
Voter for fairness and education
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><u><strong>Voter for fairness and education</h4></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
5
| 430,893 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,972 |
Without the state, public goods disappear and the population suffers – key to distribute resources
| null |
Rotberg 2 ROBERT I. ROTBERG, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 127-140 Failed States in a World of Terror JSTOR
|
STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of peace and order.
In contrast, failed states generally share the following characteristics a rise in criminal and political violence rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita and basic food shortages, leading to starvation
|
STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods high levels of security from violence political freedom and civil liberties peace and order
failed states characteristics rise in violence rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities use of terror insufficient infrastructure collapsed health system
|
STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to standard indicators such as per capita GDP, the UN'S Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World report. Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of peace and order.
In contrast, failed states are tense, conflicted, and dangerous. They generally share the following characteristics: a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation. Failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves, key interest groups show less and less loyalty to the state. The people's sense of political community vanishes and citizens feel disenfranchised and marginalized. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in. The rise of terrorist groups becomes more likely.
| 1,904 |
<h4><strong>Without the state, public goods disappear and the population suffers – key to distribute resources</h4><p><u></strong>Rotberg 2</u> ROBERT<u> I. ROTBERG, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 127-140 Failed States in a World of Terror JSTOR</p><p><mark>STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods</mark> </u>to their citizens. They perform well according to standard indicators such as per capita GDP, the UN'S Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World report. <u>Strong states offer <mark>high levels of security from</mark> political and criminal <mark>violence</mark>, ensure <mark>political freedom and civil liberties</mark>, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of <mark>peace and order</mark>. </p><p>In contrast, <mark>failed states</u></mark> are tense, conflicted, and dangerous. They <u>generally share the following <mark>characteristics</u></mark>: <u>a <mark>rise</mark> <mark>in</mark> criminal and political <mark>violence</u></mark>; a loss of control over their borders; <u><mark>rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities</u></mark>; civil war; <u>the <mark>use of terror</mark> against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or <mark>insufficient</mark> <mark>infrastructure</mark>; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion</u>; high levels of corruption; <u>a <mark>collapsed health system</mark>; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita</u>; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; <u>and basic food shortages, leading to starvation</u>. Failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves, key interest groups show less and less loyalty to the state. The people's sense of political community vanishes and citizens feel disenfranchised and marginalized. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in. The rise of terrorist groups becomes more likely.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 195,091 | 3 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,973 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About<u> Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,974 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4><strong>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p>Downs 12 <u></strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u><mark>Given this history, the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities<strong></mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,975 |
University students engaging in macro-political discussions are preventing the Right’s ascendancy—The AFF’s retreat from policy implementation chokes off effective solutions ensuring their advocacy is anti-political
|
Gitlin 5
|
Gitlin 5 (Todd formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 200 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 9/25/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_04.pdf)
|
Weak thinking on the left is glaring but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive The reason But my focus here is for the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament. Some of Left and liberal analyses and proposals do emerge from universities but circulation is choked off The right’s apparatus is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat The left’s intellectual stockpile has been badly depleted When the left has thought big, it has been clearer about isms to oppose mainly racism than about policies to further it has preferred the denunciatory mode All this is to say that the left has been imprisoned in the closed world of outside politics the academic left has nourished what has come to be called “theory” The turn” turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions Politically, it is useless. It amounts to secession from the world where people live
|
the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament liberal proposals emerge from universities but circulation is choked off left’s intellectual stockpile has depleted the left has thought big, it has been about isms to oppose than policies the left has been imprisoned outside politics Politically, it is useless
|
Weak thinking on the American left is especially glaring after September 11, 2001, as I’ll argue in part III, but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive at making the world comprehensible. For decades the right has cultivated its own types of blindness and more than that: having risen to political power, it has been in a position to make blindness the law of the land. The neoconservatives’ foreign policy is largely hubris under a veneer of ideals. The antigovernment dogma of deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts exacerbates economic and social troubles. A culture war against modernity—against secularism, feminism, and racial justice—flies in the face of the West’s distinctive contribution to the history of civilization, namely, the rise of individual rights and reason. To elaborate on these claims is the work of other books. The reasons for the right-wing ascendancy are many, among them—as I argued in letter 7 of Letters to a Young Activist (2003)—the organizational discipline that the right cherishes and the left, at least until recently, tends to abhor. The left’s institutions, in particular, unions, are weak. But my focus here is another reason for the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament. Some of the deficiency is institutional. Despite efforts to come from behind after the 2000 election, there remain decades’ worth of shortfall in the left’s cultural apparatus. In action-minded think tanks, talk radio and cable television, didactic newspapers, subsidies for writers, and so on, the right has held most of the high cards.1 Left and liberal analyses and proposals do emerge from universities and research centers, but their circulation is usually choked off for lack of focus, imagination, and steady access to mass media—except in the cheapened forms of punditry and agitprop. The right’s masterful apparatus for purveying its messages and organizing for power is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat after defeat in national politics since the 1960s. The left’s intellectual stockpile has been badly depleted, and new ideas are more heralded than delivered. When the left has thought big, it has been clearer about isms to oppose—mainly imperialism and racism—than about values and policies to further. At that, it has often preferred the denunciatory mode to the analytical, mustering full-throated opposition rather than full-brained exploration. While it is probably true that many more reform ideas are dreamt of than succeed in circulating through the brain-dead media, the liberal-left conveys little sense of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. While the right has rather successfully tarred liberals with the brush of “tax-and-spend,” those thus tarred have often been unsure whether to reply “It’s not so” or “It is so, we’re proud to say.” A fair generalization is that the left’s expertise has been constricted in scope, showing little taste for principle and little capacity to imagine a reconstituted nation. It has been conflicted and unsteady about values. It has tended to disdain any design for foreign policy other than “U.S. out,” which is no substitute for a foreign policy—and inconsistent to boot when you consider that the left wants the United States to intervene, for example, to push Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. All this is to say that the left has been imprisoned in the closed world of outsider politics. Instead of a vigorous quest for testable propositions that could actually culminate in reform, the academic left in particular has nourished what has come to be called “theory”: a body of writing (one can scarcely say its content consists of propositions) that is, in the main, distracting, vague, self-referential, and wrong-headed. “Theory” is chiefly about itself: “thought to the second power,” as Fredric Jameson defined dialectical thinking in an early, dazzling American exemplar of the new theoretical style.2 Even when “theory” tries to reconnect from language and mind to the larger social world, language remains the preoccupation. Michel Foucault became a rock star of theory in the United States precisely because he demoted knowledge to a reflex of power, merely the denominator of the couplet “power/knowledge,” yet his preoccupation was with the knowledge side, not actual social structures. His famous illustration of the power of “theory” was built on Jeremy Bentham’s design of an ideal prison, the Panopticon—a model never built.3 The “linguistic turn” in the social sciences turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. When convenient, “theory” lays claim to objective truth, but in fact the chief criterion by which it ascended in status was aesthetic, not empirical. Flair matters more than explanatory power. At crucial junctures “theory” consists of flourishes, intellectual performance pieces: things are said to be so because the theorist says so, and even if they are not, isn’t it interesting to pretend? But the problem with “theory” goes beyond opaque writing—an often dazzling concoction of jargon, illogic, and preening. If you overcome bedazzlement at the audacity and glamour of theory and penetrate the obscurity, you find circularity and self-justification, often enough (and self-contradictorily) larded with populist sentimentality about “the people” or “forces of resistance.” You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions. Despite the selective use of the still-prestigious rhetoric of science, the world of “theory” makes only tangential contact with the social reality that it disdains. Politically, it is useless. It amounts to secession from the world where most people live.
| 5,715 |
<h4><strong>University students <u>engaging</u> in macro-political discussions are preventing the Right’s ascendancy—The AFF’s <u>retreat</u> from policy implementation <u>chokes off</u> effective solutions ensuring their advocacy is <u>anti-political</h4><p></u>Gitlin 5 </strong>(Todd formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 200 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 9/25/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_04.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>Weak thinking on the</u></strong> American<u><strong> left is </u></strong>especially <u><strong>glaring </u></strong>after September 11, 2001, as I’ll argue in part III, <u><strong>but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive</u></strong> at making the world comprehensible. For decades the right has cultivated its own types of blindness and more than that: having risen to political power, it has been in a position to make blindness the law of the land. The neoconservatives’ foreign policy is largely hubris under a veneer of ideals. The antigovernment dogma of deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts exacerbates economic and social troubles. A culture war against modernity—against secularism, feminism, and racial justice—flies in the face of the West’s distinctive contribution to the history of civilization, namely, the rise of individual rights and reason. To elaborate on these claims is the work of other books. <u><strong>The reason</u></strong>s for the right-wing ascendancy are many, among them—as I argued in letter 7 of Letters to a Young Activist (2003)—the organizational discipline that the right cherishes and the left, at least until recently, tends to abhor. The left’s institutions, in particular, unions, are weak. <u><strong>But my focus here is </u></strong>another reason<u><strong> for <mark>the right’s ascendancy: the left’s intellectual disarmament</mark>. Some of </u></strong>the deficiency is institutional. Despite efforts to come from behind after the 2000 election, there remain decades’ worth of shortfall in the left’s cultural apparatus. In action-minded think tanks, talk radio and cable television, didactic newspapers, subsidies for writers, and so on, the right has held most of the high cards.1 <u><strong>Left and <mark>liberal</mark> analyses and <mark>proposals</mark> do <mark>emerge from universities</mark> </u></strong>and research centers, <u><strong><mark>but</mark> </u></strong>their<u><strong> <mark>circulation is</mark> </u></strong>usually<u><strong> <mark>choked off</mark> </u></strong>for lack of focus, imagination, and steady access to mass media—except in the cheapened forms of punditry and agitprop. <u><strong>The right’s</u></strong> masterful <u><strong>apparatus</u></strong> for purveying its messages and organizing for power <u><strong>is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat</u></strong> after defeat in national politics since the 1960s. <u><strong>The <mark>left’s intellectual stockpile has</mark> been badly </strong><mark>depleted</u></mark>, and new ideas are more heralded than delivered. <u><strong>When <mark>the left has thought big, it has been </mark>clearer <mark>about isms to oppose</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>mainly</u></strong> imperialism and <u><strong>racism</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>than</mark> about</u></strong> values and <u><strong><mark>policies</mark> to further</u></strong>. At that, <u><strong>it has</u></strong> often <u><strong>preferred the denunciatory mode </u></strong>to the analytical, mustering full-throated opposition rather than full-brained exploration. While it is probably true that many more reform ideas are dreamt of than succeed in circulating through the brain-dead media, the liberal-left conveys little sense of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. While the right has rather successfully tarred liberals with the brush of “tax-and-spend,” those thus tarred have often been unsure whether to reply “It’s not so” or “It is so, we’re proud to say.” A fair generalization is that the left’s expertise has been constricted in scope, showing little taste for principle and little capacity to imagine a reconstituted nation. It has been conflicted and unsteady about values. It has tended to disdain any design for foreign policy other than “U.S. out,” which is no substitute for a foreign policy—and inconsistent to boot when you consider that the left wants the United States to intervene, for example, to push Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. <u><strong>All this is to say that <mark>the left has been imprisoned</mark> in the closed world of <mark>outside</u></strong></mark>r <u><strong><mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. Instead of a vigorous quest for testable propositions that could actually culminate in reform, <u><strong>the academic left</u></strong> in particular <u><strong>has nourished what has come to be called “theory”</u></strong>: a body of writing (one can scarcely say its content consists of propositions) that is, in the main, distracting, vague, self-referential, and wrong-headed. “Theory” is chiefly about itself: “thought to the second power,” as Fredric Jameson defined dialectical thinking in an early, dazzling American exemplar of the new theoretical style.2 Even when “theory” tries to reconnect from language and mind to the larger social world, language remains the preoccupation. Michel Foucault became a rock star of theory in the United States precisely because he demoted knowledge to a reflex of power, merely the denominator of the couplet “power/knowledge,” yet his preoccupation was with the knowledge side, not actual social structures. His famous illustration of the power of “theory” was built on Jeremy Bentham’s design of an ideal prison, the Panopticon—a model never built.3 <u><strong>The</u></strong> “linguistic <u><strong>turn” </u></strong>in the social sciences<u><strong> turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. </u></strong> When convenient, “theory” lays claim to objective truth, but in fact the chief criterion by which it ascended in status was aesthetic, not empirical. Flair matters more than explanatory power. At crucial junctures “theory” consists of flourishes, intellectual performance pieces: things are said to be so because the theorist says so, and even if they are not, isn’t it interesting to pretend? But the problem with “theory” goes beyond opaque writing—an often dazzling concoction of jargon, illogic, and preening. If you overcome bedazzlement at the audacity and glamour of theory and penetrate the obscurity, you find circularity and self-justification, often enough (and self-contradictorily) larded with populist sentimentality about “the people” or “forces of resistance.” <u><strong>You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions</u></strong>. Despite the selective use of the still-prestigious rhetoric of science, the world of “theory” makes only tangential contact with the social reality that it disdains. <u><strong><mark>Politically, it is useless</mark>. It amounts to secession from the world where </u></strong>most <u><strong>people live</u>. </p></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
4
| 220,476 | 9 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,976 |
Credible solves several existential impacts—also turns their terrorism and hegemony impacts
|
Keck 2014
|
Keck 2014 (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)
|
on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar , much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world there is good reason to fear relative decline compared with China hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority can govern interactions We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East As China grows more powerful, it has sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This has to come at the expense of other powers these have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day All of this highlights the advantages of a unipolar system although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of casualties America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests even if the transitions are managed successfully, there are significant negative effects on international relations it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples include climate change, health pandemics terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and compel others to fall in line the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
|
It’s difficult to imagine China defending open order if it were a unipolar p transition periods have been the most destabilizing eras in history the rise of new powers necessitates revisions to rules This is impossible to do in any organized fashion although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently its wars have been fairly limited preponderance has prevented great power war, and restrained regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Iran-Iraq wars many challenges can only be solved through multilateral coop Examples include climate change, pandemics terrorism financial crises, and prolif A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing global action preponderance lessens the intensity of competition among players
|
Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
| 4,352 |
<h4><strong>Credible solves several existential impacts—also turns their terrorism and hegemony impacts</h4><p>Keck 2014</strong> (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)</p><p>Still, <u>on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world</u>, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, <u>it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly</u> if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. <u><mark>It’s difficult to imagine China defending</mark> a rule-based, <mark>open </mark>international <mark>order if it were a unipolar </u>p</mark>ower<u>, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world</u>. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, <u>there is good reason to fear</u> its <u>relative decline compared with China</u> and other emerging nations. To begin with, <u>hegemonic <mark>transition periods have </mark>historically<mark> been <strong>the most destabilizing eras</strong> in history</u></mark>. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). <u>Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, <mark>the rise of new </mark>global <mark>powers</mark> <mark>necessitates revisions to </mark>the “<mark>rules </mark>of the road.” <mark>This is <strong></mark>nearly <mark>impossible</strong> to do in any organized fashion </mark>given the anarchic nature of the international system, where</u> there is <u>no central authority</u> that <u>can govern interactions</u> between states. <u>We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific</u> (<u>and</u> arguably the <u>Middle East</u>). <u>As China grows more</u> economically and militarily <u>powerful, it has</u> unsurprisingly <u>sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This</u> necessarily <u>has to come at the expense of other powers</u>, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, <u>these</u> powers <u>have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation <strong>grows more tense</strong> with each passing day</u>. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. <u>All of this highlights</u> some of <u>the advantages of a unipolar system</u>. Namely, <u><mark>although the U.S. has asserted military force</u></mark> quite <u><mark>frequently</u></mark> in the post-Cold War era, <u>it has only fought weak powers and thus <mark>its wars have been <strong>fairly limited</strong> </mark>in terms of</u> the number of <u>casualties</u> involved. At the same time, <u>America’s <mark>preponderance</mark> of power <mark>has prevented </mark>a <strong><mark>great power war</strong>, and </mark>even <mark>restrained </mark>major <strong><mark>regional powers from coming to blows.</u></strong></mark> For instance, <u><mark>the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the </mark>Israeli-Arab or <mark>Iran-Iraq wars </mark>of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises <strong>dramatically</strong>. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers</u> like Japan <u>acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests</u> against their newly empowered rivals. But <u>even if the transitions</u> caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises <u>are managed successfully, there are</u> still likely to be <u>significant negative effects on international relations</u>. In today’s “globalized” world, <u>it is commonly asserted that <mark>many </mark>of the defining <mark>challenges </mark>of our era <mark>can only be solved through multilateral coop</mark>eration. <mark>Examples</u> </mark>of this <u><mark>include <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong></mark>health <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>, organized crime and <u><strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, <strong>global <mark>financial crises</strong>, and </mark>the <strong><mark>prolif</mark>eration of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong>, among many others. <u><mark>A unipolar system,</u> </mark>for all its limitations, <u><mark>is <strong>uniquely suited</strong> for organizing </mark>effective <strong><mark>global action</strong></mark> on these transnational issues</u>. This is because <u>there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and</u>, to some degree, <u>compel others to fall in line</u>. In addition, <u>the unipole’s <mark>preponderance </mark>of power <strong><mark>lessens the intensity of competition</strong> among </mark>the global <mark>players </mark>involved</u>. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that <u>global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War<strong>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
2
| 45,610 | 739 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,977 |
Legalization leads to more arrests and policing
|
Sabet 2012
|
Sabet 2012 (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Advisor to President Obama's Drug Czar, There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-to-deal-with-marijuana-than-legalization)
|
under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcohol as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market
|
, under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcoho as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain.
|
Even the supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically, under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcohol (there are 2.7 million arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit. Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs (marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market.
| 1,126 |
<h4><strong>Legalization leads to more arrests and policing</h4><p>Sabet 2012</strong> (Kevin, Former Senior Policy Advisor to President Obama's Drug Czar, There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-to-deal-with-marijuana-than-legalization)</p><p>Even the supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically<mark>, <u>under legalization, we could see arrest rates for marijuana actually increase, similar to what we see with alcoho</mark>l</u> (there are 2.7 million arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), <u><mark>as more users drive high or violate marijuana growing and using laws</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>there is no guarantee that the underground market would significantly diminish.</u> <u>In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug trade has every incentive to remain.</u></mark> <u>Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave cartels with a handsome profit</u>. <u>Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels' grip on other illegal trades</u> such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs (marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). <u>Producing marijuana en masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol. We can expect a thriving grey market</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 56,579 | 11 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,978 |
Debate on effective implementation is a moral responsibility
|
Taub et al 3
|
Taub et al 3 Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf
|
If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
| null |
A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.
| 617 |
<h4>Debate on effective implementation is a moral responsibility</h4><p><strong>Taub et al 3</strong> Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. <u>https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf</p><p></u>A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). <u>If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,266 | 7 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,979 |
New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction
|
Borger 12/31
|
Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment.
|
no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment
|
There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.
| 3,580 |
<h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 171,429 | 23 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,980 |
PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee
|
Moran 9/28
|
Moran 9/28/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)
|
Any choice Obama makes will be controversial It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. the nomination probably won't come until after the election If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
|
Any choice Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
|
Any choice for AG Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so the nomination probably won't come until after the election anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
| 958 |
<h4><strong>PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee</h4><p>Moran 9/28<u></strong>/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)</p><p><mark>Any choice</u></mark> for AG <u><mark>Obama makes will be controversial</u>.</mark> <u><mark>It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and <strong>if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available.</mark> </u></strong>That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so <u>the nomination probably won't come until after the election</u> anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. <u><strong><mark>If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 430,828 | 6 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,981 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marahuana in the United States .
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marahuana in the United States .</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,894 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,982 |
Link alone turns the case—The AFF’s unconventional cultural pedagogy does not effectively engage politics—It’ll cede politics to the right and reify racism
|
Gitlin 5
|
Gitlin 5 Todd Gitlin formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 2005 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 7/16/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_02.pdf
|
embattlement led to the wishful notion that cultural studies, for all its frailty, amounted to a force combating right-wing power To believe this one had to vulgarize the notion that “the personal is political.” the opposition could find footing and breathing space, rally the powerless, defy the grip of the dominant ideas, isolate the powers that be, and prepare for a “war of position” against its dwindling ramparts. The assumption was that what held the ruling groups in power was their capacity to destroy contrary tendencies scholars gravitated to cultural studies because it was to them incontestable that culture was politics To do cultural studies was the only politics they knew or respected. Throughout the English-speaking world racial misery may have mounted the organized left may have fragmented and its ideas blurred, but never mind. One need not be rigorous about what one opposes and what one proposes in its place. Speaking cavalierly of “opposition” and “resistance” cultivates—a certain sloppiness of thinking You can identify with the left without having to face hard questions of political self-definition.
|
. The assumption was that what held the ruling groups in power was their capacity to destroy contrary tendencies scholars gravitated to cultural studies because it was to them incontestable that culture was politics. To do cultural studies was the only politics they knew or respected. Throughout the English-speaking world racial misery may have mounted the organized left may have fragmented and its ideas blurred, One need not be rigorous about what one opposes and what one proposes in its place. Speaking cavalierly of “opposition” and “resistance” cultivates—a certain sloppiness of thinking. You can identify with the left without having to face hard questions of political self-definition
|
The thirst for consolation explains the rise of academic cultural studies during precisely the years when the right held more political power for a longer stretch than at any other time in generations. Consolation and embattlement led to the wishful notion that cultural studies, for all its frailty, amounted to a force combating right-wing power. To believe this one had to vulgarize the feminist notion that “the personal is political.” In effect, one had to believe that “the cultural is political.” In popular culture the opposition could find footing and breathing space, rally the powerless, defy the grip of the dominant ideas, isolate the powers that be, and prepare for a “war of position” against its dwindling ramparts. To dwell on the centrality of popular culture was good for morale. It certified the people and their projects. The assumption was that what held the ruling groups in power was their capacity to muffle, deform, paralyze, or destroy contrary tendencies. If a significant opposition were to exist, it first had to find a base in popular culture—and first also turned out to be second, third, and home plate as well, since popular culture was so much more accessible, porous, and changeable than the economic and political order. With time, what began as compensation hardened into a tradition. Younger scholars gravitated to cultural studies because it was to them incontestable that culture was politics. To do cultural studies, especially in connection with identity politics, was the only politics they knew or respected. The contrast with the rest of the West is illuminating. In varying degrees left-wing intellectuals in France, Italy, Scandinavia, Germany, Spain, and elsewhere retain energizing attachments to Social Democratic, Green, and other left-wing parties. There, the association of culture with excellence and traditional elites remains strong. But in the Anglo-American world these conditions scarcely obtain. Here, in a discouraging time, popular culture emerges as a consolation prize. Throughout the English-speaking world of Europe, North America, and Australia, class inequality may have soared, ruthless individualism may have intensified, racial misery may have mounted, unions and social democratic parties may have reached an impasse, the organized left may have fragmented and its ideas blurred, but never mind. Attend to popular culture, study it with sympathy for the rewards that minorities find there, and one need not be unduly vexed by electoral defeat. One need not be rigorous about what one opposes and what one proposes in its place. Is capitalism the trouble? Is it the particular form of capitalism practiced by multinational corporations in a deregulatory era? Is it patriarchy (and is that the proper term for a society that has seen many improvements in the status of women)? Racism? Practitioners of cultural studies permit themselves their evasions.Speaking cavalierly of “opposition” and “resistance” permits— rather, cultivates—a certain sloppiness of thinking. You can identify with the left without having to face hard questions of political self-definition. So the situation of cultural studies conforms to the contours of the past political generation. For economic and political ideas it substitutes a cheerleading approach to popular culture, with its cascading choices and technological marvels. Its cultivation of sensibility ratifies the wisdom of the prevailing withdrawal from practical politics. Seeking political energies in audiences who function qua audiences, rather than in citizens who function qua citizens, cultural studies stamps its seal of approval upon what is already a powerful tendency within industrial societies: popular culture as a surrogate for politics.
| 3,763 |
<h4><strong>Link alone turns the case—The AFF’s <u>unconventional</u> cultural pedagogy does <u>not</u> effectively engage politics—It’ll cede politics to the right and <u>reify</u> racism </h4><p>Gitlin 5</strong> Todd Gitlin formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 2005 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 7/16/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_02.pdf </p><p>The thirst for consolation explains the rise of academic cultural studies during precisely the years when the right held more political power for a longer stretch than at any other time in generations. Consolation and <u><strong>embattlement led to the wishful notion that cultural studies, for all its frailty, amounted to a force combating right-wing power</u></strong>. <u><strong>To believe this one had to vulgarize the</u></strong> feminist <u><strong>notion that “the personal is political.”</u></strong> In effect, one had to believe that “the cultural is political.” In popular culture <u><strong>the opposition could find footing and breathing space, rally the powerless, defy the grip of the dominant ideas, isolate the powers that be, and prepare for a “war of position” against its dwindling ramparts. </u></strong>To dwell on the centrality of popular culture was good for morale. It certified the people and their projects<mark>. <u><strong>The assumption was that what held the ruling groups in power was their capacity to</u></strong></mark> muffle, deform, paralyze, or <u><strong><mark>destroy contrary tendencies</u></strong></mark>. If a significant opposition were to exist, it first had to find a base in popular culture—and first also turned out to be second, third, and home plate as well, since popular culture was so much more accessible, porous, and changeable than the economic and political order. With time, what began as compensation hardened into a tradition. Younger <u><strong><mark>scholars gravitated to cultural studies because it was to them incontestable that culture was politics</u></strong>. <u><strong>To do cultural studies</u></strong></mark>, especially in connection with identity politics, <u><strong><mark>was the only politics they knew or respected.</mark> </u></strong>The contrast with the rest of the West is illuminating. In varying degrees left-wing intellectuals in France, Italy, Scandinavia, Germany, Spain, and elsewhere retain energizing attachments to Social Democratic, Green, and other left-wing parties. There, the association of culture with excellence and traditional elites remains strong. But in the Anglo-American world these conditions scarcely obtain. Here, in a discouraging time, popular culture emerges as a consolation prize. <u><strong><mark>Throughout the English-speaking world</u></strong></mark> of Europe, North America, and Australia, class inequality may have soared, ruthless individualism may have intensified, <u><strong><mark>racial misery may have mounted</u></strong></mark>, unions and social democratic parties may have reached an impasse, <u><strong><mark>the organized left may have fragmented and its ideas blurred,</mark> but never mind. </u></strong>Attend to popular culture, study it with sympathy for the rewards that minorities find there, and one need not be unduly vexed by electoral defeat. <u><strong><mark>One need not be rigorous about what one opposes and what one proposes in its place.</u></strong></mark> Is capitalism the trouble? Is it the particular form of capitalism practiced by multinational corporations in a deregulatory era? Is it patriarchy (and is that the proper term for a society that has seen many improvements in the status of women)? Racism? Practitioners of cultural studies permit themselves their evasions.<u><strong><mark>Speaking cavalierly of “opposition” and “resistance”</u></strong></mark> permits— rather, <u><strong><mark>cultivates—a certain sloppiness of thinking</u></strong>. <u><strong>You can identify with the left without having to face hard questions of political self-definition</mark>. </u></strong> So the situation of cultural studies conforms to the contours of the past political generation. For economic and political ideas it substitutes a cheerleading approach to popular culture, with its cascading choices and technological marvels. Its cultivation of sensibility ratifies the wisdom of the prevailing withdrawal from practical politics. Seeking political energies in audiences who function qua audiences, rather than in citizens who function qua citizens, cultural studies stamps its seal of approval upon what is already a powerful tendency within industrial societies: popular culture as a surrogate for politics. <strong> </p></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
4
| 430,896 | 1 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,983 |
Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities
|
Moran 2011
|
Moran 2011 (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)
|
legalization for minority groups might represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound. marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billions of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing and selling of marijuana To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess cultivating marijuana would require a license fee all applicants to submit to a criminal history background check appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security and compliance with other employment inspection and recordkeeping measures These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[
|
for minority group represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billion of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drai marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate
|
C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, legalization makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, for minority groups it might truthfully represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound.137 As noted earlier, marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually.138 As also noted, the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling.139 These figures tend to reflect that billions, and at the very least hundreds of millions, of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing140 and the selling141 of marijuana. To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess: cultivating or growing marijuana would require 1) a maximum license fee of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) all license applicants to submit to a criminal history background check;143 3) appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security";144 and 4) compliance with other employment,145 inspection,146 and recordkeeping147 measures. These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital. Therefore, marijuana, if legalized in the California fashion, while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. Worsening this dilemma, most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[man]."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149
| 3,078 |
<h4><strong>Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities</h4><p>Moran 2011</strong> (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)</p><p>C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, <u>legalization</u> makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, <u><mark>for minority group</mark>s</u> it <u>might</u> truthfully <u><mark>represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities</u>. <u>In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound</mark>.</u>137 As noted earlier, <u>marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually</u>.138 As also noted, <u><mark>the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling</u></mark>.139 These figures tend to reflect that <u><mark>billion</mark>s</u>, and at the very least hundreds of millions, <u><mark>of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year</u>. <u>With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drai</mark>n</u>. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? <u>The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing</u>140 <u>and</u> the <u>selling</u>141 <u>of marijuana</u>. <u>To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess</u>: <u>cultivating</u> or growing <u>marijuana</u> <u>would require</u> 1) <u>a </u>maximum <u>license fee</u> of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) <u>all</u> license <u>applicants to submit to a criminal history background check</u>;143 3) <u>appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security</u>";144 <u>and</u> 4) <u>compliance with other employment</u>,145 <u>inspection</u>,146 <u>and recordkeeping</u>147 <u>measures</u>. <u>These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital</u>. Therefore, <u><mark>marijuana, if legalized</u></mark> in the California fashion, <u><mark>while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate</mark> such production.</u> Worsening this dilemma, <u>most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[</u>man]<strong>."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 299,332 | 8 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,984 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana within the United States and license non-profit organizations to produce and distribute marihuana
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana within the United States and license non-profit organizations to produce and distribute marihuana</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,895 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,985 |
Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights
|
Sharpton 9/29
|
Sharpton 9/29/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas Holder lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements from being dismissed, or altered The principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. combatted efforts towards voter suppression the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously he principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued
|
Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG, whoever he or she may be. We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas. Throughout his tenure, Holder has consistently lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements in the areas of civil rights and voting rights from being dismissed, or altered somehow. The governing principle that this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder.
| 3,812 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights</h4><p>Sharpton 9/29</strong>/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)</p><p>Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric <u><mark>Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights.</u></mark> I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. <u><mark>Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG</u></mark>, whoever he or she may be. <u>We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas</u>. Throughout his tenure, <u>Holder</u> has consistently <u>lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights</u> in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. <u><mark>No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing <strong>sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies</strong>.</u></mark> <u>No other AG <mark>combatted efforts towards <strong>voter suppression</mark> with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting</u></strong>. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. <u>The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is <mark>the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously</mark> throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements </u>in the areas of civil rights and voting rights <u>from being dismissed, or altered</u> somehow. <u><strong>T<mark>he</u></strong></mark> governing <u><strong><mark>principle</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued</u></strong></mark>. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They <u>just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 430,830 | 6 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,986 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,897 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,987 |
Anti-politics causes extinction, turns the case, and destroys solvency
|
Boggs 97
|
Boggs 97 (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)
|
urgent problems will go unsolved ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, retreat from politics comes when agendas that side-step these realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the U S political power will continue to decide the fate of human societies. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that state structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian elites the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it help rationalize existing power In either case
|
urgent problems will go unsolved ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious retreat from politics comes when agendas side-step realities the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The shrinkage of politics hardly means state structures will lose their hold over people's lives citizenry ready to participate can be filled by authoritarian elites
|
The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75
| 2,695 |
<h4><strong>Anti-politics causes extinction, turns the case, and destroys solvency</h4><p>Boggs 97</strong> (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)</p><p>The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, <u><strong><mark>urgent problems</u></strong></mark> that are destroying the fabric of American society <u><strong><mark>will go unsolved</u></strong></mark> -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously<u> </u>into the future. And such problems (<u><strong><mark>ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious </mark>cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context</strong> <strong>diseases</strong>, </u>technological displacement of<u> </u>workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread<u><strong> <mark>retreat from politics</u></strong></mark>, often inspired by localist sentiment, <u><strong><mark>comes</mark> </u></strong>at a time<u><strong> <mark>when agendas</mark> that </u></strong>ignore or <u><strong><mark>side-step</mark> these</u></strong> global<u><strong> <mark>realities</mark> will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.</u></strong> In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime,<u><strong> <mark>the fate of the world hangs in the balance.</mark> The unyielding truth is that, even as </u></strong>the ethos of<u><strong> anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the U</u></strong>nited<u> <strong>S</u></strong>tates, it is the vagaries of<u><strong> political power</u></strong> that<u><strong> will continue to decide the fate of human societies.</strong> </u>This last point demands further elaboration. <u><strong><mark>The shrinkage of politics hardly means</mark> that </u></strong>corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic <u><strong><mark>state</mark> </u></strong>and military<u><strong> <mark>structures will lose their hold over people's lives</mark>. Far from it: the space </strong>abdicated by a broad <mark>citizenry</mark>, well-informed and <mark>ready to participate</mark> at many levels, <strong><mark>can</strong></mark> in fact <strong><mark>be filled by authoritarian</mark> </u></strong>and reactionary<u><strong> <mark>elites</strong></mark> </u> -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way <u><strong>the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it </u></strong>might <u><strong>help </u></strong>further <u><strong>rationalize</u></strong> the<u><strong> existing power </u></strong>structure.<u><strong> In either case</u></strong>, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75<strong> </p></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
4
| 35,468 | 182 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,988 |
Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
|
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
|
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
|
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
|
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment
|
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
| 1,802 |
<h4><strong>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</h4><p>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p><u>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment<strong></mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 26,721 | 1,533 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,989 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,898 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,990 |
Sentencing reform key to US credibility
|
CGS 2013
|
CGS 2013 (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare.
| 569 |
<h4><strong>Sentencing reform key to US credibility</h4><p>CGS 2013</strong> (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)</p><p><u>The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates</u>. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. <u><mark>The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform</u>,</mark> and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit <u><mark>prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society</u>. <u><strong>As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 430,865 | 7 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,991 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,899 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,992 |
Only State-based, macro-political approaches solve—The AFF is comparatively worse
|
Bronner 4
|
Bronner 4 Stephen Eric Bronner, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature and German Studies at Rutgers University, 2004 (Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, Published by Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231126090, p. 151-153)
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Seeking to constrain use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect free exercise of subjectivity The state was the best institution for social justice. That remains the case The left must overcome its more naïve populist inclinations This means looking beyond the town meeting, and the workers' council Neither seems willing to confront practical questions Bureaucracy is despised for the hierarchy it generates Arguments of this sort retreat from engaging the actual conflicts that continue to shape our world They are instead content to rest on anti-political politics
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The state was the best institution for social justice. That remains the case The left must overcome town meeting, and workers' council Bureaucracy is despised for hierarchy it generates this retreat from engaging actual conflicts that continue to shape our world. They are instead content to rest on anti politics
|
Enlightenment thinkers wished neither to abolish the state nor to bring about some utopian alternative. Seeking to constrain the institutional use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect the free exercise of subjectivity and promote the free pursuit of scientific knowledge. The state became the anchor for that enterprise; it was seen as the best institution for securing civil [end page 151] liberties and for furthering social justice. That remains the case. Transnational organizations are, to be sure, required in order to contest emerging transnational economic structures. New ways of establishing and expressing the common interest and a m ore cosmopolitan outlook will also prove necessary not just in the United States or Europe but also in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Solidarity must surely be reconceived to meet new conditions. But this still does not justify simply dismissing the state or fantasizing about its future disappearance. Confronting an increasingly global society is impossible when indulging in a misplaced romantic nostalgia for the traditional, the organic, and the parochial. The left must overcome its more naïve populist inclinations. This means looking beyond the polis, the town meeting, and even the workers' council.1 Their partisans actually share much in common with the religious and traditional advocates of the organic community. Both seem blind to the dangers involved in dismissing "mechanical" notions of representative democracy with its mass parties, interest group pluralism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. Neither seems willing to confront practical questions of economic coordination, the disappearance of a homogenous citizenry or proletariat, and the implications of an increasingly complex division of labor. Rarely does either consider how local politics fosters patronage, provincialism, and corruption. Bureaucracy is despised for the routine and hierarchy it generates; the importance of an independent judiciary for the preservation of civil liberties is ignored, and little time is wasted on how to maintain acceptable investment or reproduce the conditions for participation in the modern world. Much easier then to condemn the Enlightenment for "severing the organic links that bind humans to their social nature," maintain that all communities should be "left alone," and insist that freedom is not the insight into but rather "the rejection of necessity."2 Arguments of this sort, of course, retreat from engaging the actual conflicts between real movements that continue to shape our world. They are instead content to rest on the belief that "the whole is false," and that the true pursuit of freedom requires an [end page 152] anti-political politics. It is the same with even with more serious radicals who insist that socialism can be conceived only as a utopian "other" in which alienation has been abolished and a world of direct democracy has been achieved.
| 2,954 |
<h4><strong>Only <u>State-based</u>, macro-political approaches <u>solve</u>—The AFF is <u>comparatively</u> worse</h4><p>Bronner 4 </strong>Stephen Eric Bronner, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature and German Studies at Rutgers University, 2004 (Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, Published by Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231126090, p. 151-153)</p><p>Enlightenment thinkers wished neither to abolish the state nor to bring about some utopian alternative. <u><strong>Seeking to constrain</u></strong> the institutional <u><strong>use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect</u></strong> the <u><strong>free exercise of subjectivity</u></strong> and promote the free pursuit of scientific knowledge. <u><strong><mark>The state</u></strong></mark> became the anchor for that enterprise; it <u><strong><mark>was</u></strong></mark> seen as <u><strong><mark>the best institution for</mark> </u></strong>securing civil [end page 151] liberties and for furthering <u><strong><mark>social justice. That remains the case</u></strong></mark>. Transnational organizations are, to be sure, required in order to contest emerging transnational economic structures. New ways of establishing and expressing the common interest and a m ore cosmopolitan outlook will also prove necessary not just in the United States or Europe but also in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Solidarity must surely be reconceived to meet new conditions. But this still does not justify simply dismissing the state or fantasizing about its future disappearance. Confronting an increasingly global society is impossible when indulging in a misplaced romantic nostalgia for the traditional, the organic, and the parochial. <u><strong><mark>The left must overcome</mark> its more naïve populist inclinations</u></strong>. <u><strong>This means looking beyond the </u></strong>polis, the <u><strong><mark>town</mark> <mark>meeting, and</mark> </u></strong>even <u><strong>the <mark>workers' council</u></strong></mark>.1 Their partisans actually share much in common with the religious and traditional advocates of the organic community. Both seem blind to the dangers involved in dismissing "mechanical" notions of representative democracy with its mass parties, interest group pluralism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. <u><strong>Neither seems willing to confront practical questions </u></strong>of economic coordination, the disappearance of a homogenous citizenry or proletariat, and the implications of an increasingly complex division of labor. Rarely does either consider how local politics fosters patronage, provincialism, and corruption. <u><strong><mark>Bureaucracy is despised for </mark>the</u></strong> routine and <u><strong><mark>hierarchy it generates</u></strong></mark>; the importance of an independent judiciary for the preservation of civil liberties is ignored, and little time is wasted on how to maintain acceptable investment or reproduce the conditions for participation in the modern world. Much easier then to condemn the Enlightenment for "severing the organic links that bind humans to their social nature," maintain that all communities should be "left alone," and insist that freedom is not the insight into but rather "the rejection of necessity."2 <u><strong>Arguments of <mark>this</mark> sort</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong><mark>retreat from engaging</mark> the <mark>actual conflicts</u></strong></mark> between real movements <u><strong><mark>that continue to shape our world</u></strong>. <u><strong>They are instead content</u></strong> <u><strong>to rest on</u></strong></mark> the belief that "the whole is false," and that the true pursuit of freedom requires an [end page 152] <u><strong><mark>anti</mark>-political <mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. It is the same with even with more serious radicals who insist that socialism can be conceived only as a utopian "other" in which alienation has been abolished and a world of direct democracy has been achieved.</p>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
4
| 412,963 | 12 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,993 |
B. This disables progressive politics and allows totalitarianism, turning the affirmative – engaging in policy calculations can capture affirmative impacts while avoiding bad outcomes –
|
Campbell 1998
|
Campbell, Professor of Int’l Politics @ Newcastle, 1998
|
for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination. that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable, cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state incalculable justice requires us to calculate.” left to itself, the incalculable idea of justice is always very close to the bad, for it can always be reappropriated The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” This is the “at least necessary condition,” for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”
|
for progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination. that justice exceeds calculation, cannot serve for staying out of political battles, within an institution left to itself, the incalculable justice is always bad, for it can be reappropriated calculating the incalculable responds to a duty, and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” This is necessary for organization of resistance to totalitarianism
|
(David, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 186-187)
Derrida’s argument addresses more directly—more directly, I would argue, than is acknowledged by Critchley—the concern that for politics (at least for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination. That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, “that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable, cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others.” Indeed, “incalculable justice requires us to calculate.” From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronimic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that “left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.” The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” the “perverse calculation,” even “the worst.” This is the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, the “at least necessary condition,” for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences “we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”
| 1,903 |
<h4><strong>B. This disables progressive politics and allows totalitarianism, turning the affirmative – engaging in policy calculations can capture affirmative impacts while avoiding bad outcomes – </h4><p>Campbell</strong>, Professor of Int’l Politics @ Newcastle, <strong>1998</p><p></strong>(David, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 186-187)</p><p>Derrida’s argument addresses more directly—more directly, I would argue, than is acknowledged by Critchley—the concern that for politics (at least <u><mark>for </mark>a <mark>progressive politics) one must provide an account of</mark> <mark>the decision to combat domination.</mark> </u>That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, “<u><mark>that justice exceeds </mark>law and <mark>calculation, </mark>that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable, <mark>cannot </mark>and should not<mark> serve </mark>as alibi <mark>for</mark> <mark>staying out of </mark>juridico-<mark>political battles, within an institution </mark>or a state</u>, or between institutions or states and others.” Indeed, “<u>incalculable justice requires us to calculate.”</u> From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronimic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that “<u><mark>left to itself, the incalculable</u></mark> and giving (donatrice) <u>idea of <mark>justice is always </mark>very close to the <mark>bad,</u></mark> even to the worst, <u><mark>for it can </mark>always <mark>be reappropriated</u></mark> by the most perverse calculation.” <u>The necessity of <mark>calculating the incalculable </mark>thus <mark>responds to a duty,</mark> </u>a duty that inhabits the instant of madness <u><mark>and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,”</mark> </u>the “perverse calculation,” even “the worst.” <u><mark>This is</u></mark> the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, <u>the “at least <mark>necessary </mark>condition,”<mark> for </mark>the <mark>organization of</mark> <mark>resistance to totalitarianism </mark>in all its forms.</u> And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences “we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, <u><strong>the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 430,840 | 3 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,994 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,900 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,995 |
Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, anti- Americanism is becoming entrenched America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is a core challenge for the global rule of law
|
America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power U S must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, , a core challenge for global rule of law
|
The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, and that anti- Americanism increasingly is becoming entrenched in the twenty-first century. 3 4 America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, and must remain, a core challenge for all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are the guardians of tomorrow's global rule of law
| 2,254 |
<h4><strong>Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions</h4><p>Koh 2007</strong> <u><strong>(Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)</p><p></u></strong>The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that <u>the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11,</u> and that <u>anti- Americanism</u> increasingly <u>is becoming entrenched</u> in the twenty-first century. 3 4 <u><strong><mark>America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power</u></strong></mark>. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, <strong>holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others</u></strong></mark> .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, <u><mark>America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation</u></mark> and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. <u><mark>Protecting our human rights system and reputation is</u>, </mark>and must remain<mark>, <u><strong>a core challenge</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are <u>the</u> guardians of tomorrow's <u><strong><mark>global rule of law</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 430,866 | 7 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,996 |
Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands
| null |
A – moral absolutism means you don’t take action because you are afraid of the purity of your intention
|
)
an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
|
n unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement Abjuring violence may seem like the right thing; but it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters it fails to see violence moral purity is often a form of complicity in injustice , it is the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. absolutism inhibits judgment it undermines political effectiveness
|
B – moral purity is a form of complicity with violence and injustice because you didn’t lead to that so your hands are clean
C – it kills political effectivness
Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
| 2,183 |
<h4>Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands</h4><p>A – moral absolutism means you don’t take action because you are afraid of the purity of your intention</p><p>B – moral purity is a form of complicity with violence and injustice because you didn’t lead to that so your hands are clean</p><p>C – it kills political effectivness</p><p><strong>Isaac, 02</strong> - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, <u><strong>a<mark>n unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</u></strong></mark>. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) <u><strong>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. <mark>Abjuring violence</u></strong></mark> or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties <u><strong><mark>may seem like the right thing; but</mark> if such tactics entail impotence, then <mark>it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters</mark>; (2) <mark>it fails to see</mark> that in a world of real <mark>violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity</mark> is not simply a form of powerlessness; it <mark>is often a form of complicity in injustice</u></strong></mark>. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) <u><strong>it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant.</u></strong> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence<mark>, <u><strong>it is</mark> often <mark>the pursuit of “good” that generates evil.</u></strong></mark> This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <u><strong>Moral <mark>absolutism inhibits</mark> this <mark>judgment</mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And <mark>it undermines political effectiveness</mark>. </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
Case
| 26,721 | 1,533 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,997 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,901 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,998 |
Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact
|
BOSTROM 2011
|
BOSTROM 2011 (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)
|
a basis for ethical theory can be found in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this projec Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time We owe some loyalty to this project of the human future Since an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity we would have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus
|
basis for ethical theory can be found in commitment to the future of humanity The aspiration for a better society is a part of this project Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity public policy should favor existential-risk mitigation We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations
|
We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]
| 3,812 |
<h4><strong>Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact</h4><p>BOSTROM 2011 </strong>(Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)</p><p>We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe <u>a</u> better <u><mark>basis for ethical theory</u></mark> in this area <u><mark>can be found in</u></mark> quite a different direction—in <u>a <mark>commitment to the future of humanity</mark> as a vast project</u>, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>aspiration for a better society</mark>—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—<mark>is a part of this projec</u>t</mark>. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … <u><mark>Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project</mark> <mark>of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the</mark> <mark>projects</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>our own personal futures</mark>. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time</u>, considered in isolation from how it got that way. <u>We owe</u>, I think, <u>some loyalty to this project of the human future</u>. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) <u>Since <mark>an existential</mark> <mark>catastrophe would</u></mark> either <u><mark>put an end to the project of the future of humanity</u></mark> or drastically curtail its scope for development, <u>we would</u> seem to <u>have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it</u>, in Adams’ view. We also note that <u>an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences</u>, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, <u>an ethical view emphasizing that <mark>public</mark> <mark>policy should</mark> be determined through informed democratic deliberation</u> by all stakeholders <u>would <mark>favor existential-risk mitigation</mark> if we suppose</u>, as is plausible, <u>that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies</u> upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). <u>We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants</u>.[24] <u><mark>We do not want</mark> <mark>to be the failing link in the chain of generations</mark>, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus</u><strong>. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 93,995 | 284 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,999 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,902 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,000 |
AND - Borders check wars of liberal universalism – the alternative is the 30 Years War happening all the time
|
Prozorov 8 [Sergei, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 34-6]
|
Prozorov 8 [Sergei, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 34-6]
|
the immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement of sovereign transcendence, inevitably renders it anti-political by virtue of its negation of any outside to the immanent order of being the outside of order, disavowed in immanentist thought, is that marginal excess that constitutes the form of order by escaping from it, that supple- ment which simultaneously sustains and undermines the existence of order, the sovereign decision that institutes order, while remaining unsubsumed under its principles Derridean argument, prevents its closure and consolidation into a “self- propelling machine.” On the ontic level, the negation of the outside takes place through the effacement of the fundamental spatio-temporal pluralism of political orders in the project of world unity, for which there are no longer “friends” and “enemies,” both of whom are legitimate equals to the self in the pluralistic domain of the international. What remains is only the self-immanent self that is to be elevated to the universal status and the obscene excess of the “foe,” whose resistance to forcible incorporation into world unity serves as a justification for its annihilation. The logic of world unity is marked by a persistent attempt at the erasure of all dividing lines between individuals and political communities and, thus, the merger of the self and the other in the final reign of benign universality. There is no longer a place for the exclusion of the other, simply because there is no longer any “otherness” in the system which operates with the all-inclu- sive category of humanity the horrifying consequence of world unity would be the elimination of all pluralism the impossibility of difference, “otherness,” and, in concretely spatial terms, the outside. “Freedom is freedom of movement, nothing else. What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer space for measuring and test- ing one’s strength freely? The world, “in which there is only a homeland,” is, a dystopic “world police power,” to which the romantic connotations of “homeland” barely apply: “The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be trans- formed in a world police power pluralistic antagonism between states in an international society is infinitely preferable to the technological nihilism of world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes: after all, “the Kingdom of Satan is also a unity” a piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty generalizations of a false totality. it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary abstraction . . . It would be a false pluralism, which played world-comprehending totalities off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders” domination by what remains merely one political force in the world. The borderless world, is a world of infinite self-certitude and arrogance, unbounded violence of the subjection of particular political entities to the pseudo-universal ideal and unlimited “world police power” over a world that remains ontologically pluralistic and, thus, will inevitably resist its subjection.
|
in the project of world unity What remains is the self to be elevated and the “foe,” whose resistance to forcible incorporation serves as a justification for its annihilation marked by a attempt at the erasure of all dividing lines the horrifying consequence would be the elimination of all pluralism The world, “in which there is only a homeland,” is a dystopic “world police power pluralistic antagonism is infinitely preferable to world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes The borderless world is a world of infinite self-certitude unbounded violence and unlimited “world police power
|
For Schmitt, the immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement of sovereign transcendence, inevitably renders it anti-political by virtue of its negation of any outside to the immanent order of being (cf. Ewald 1992; Ojakangas 2004). This negation of the out- side may be conceptualized at two levels. In terms of political ontology, immanentism necessarily disavows its own origins, which must logically be decisionist and exceptional, i.e., exterior to the plane of immanence of the internal organization of order. Every order is constituted by a founding rupture that dispenses with the previously existing order and inaugurates the new order, without itself being part of either. In the ontological sense, the outside of order, disavowed in immanentist thought, is that marginal excess that constitutes the form of order by escaping from it, that supple- ment which simultaneously sustains and undermines the existence of order, the sovereign decision that institutes order, while remaining unsubsumed under its principles (see Schmitt 1985; Derrida 1992). The dis- avowal of the sovereign foundation is thus the negation of the boundary that ultimately separates order from itself, and thus, in the well-known Derridean argument, prevents its closure and consolidation into a “self- propelling machine.” On the ontic level, the negation of the outside takes place through the effacement of the fundamental spatio-temporal pluralism of political orders in the project of world unity, for which there are no longer “friends” and “enemies,” both of whom are legitimate equals to the self in the pluralistic domain of the international. What remains is only the self-immanent self that is to be elevated to the universal status and the obscene excess of the “foe,” whose resistance to forcible incorporation into world unity serves as a justification for its annihilation. The logic of world unity is marked by a persistent attempt at the erasure of all dividing lines between individuals and political communities and, thus, the merger of the self and the other in the final reign of benign universality. There is no longer a place (literally as well as figuratively) for the exclusion of the other, simply because there is no longer any “otherness” in the system which operates with the all-inclu- sive category of humanity (Schmitt 1976; Kervegan 1999). For Schmitt, the horrifying consequence of world unity would be the elimination of all pluralism and, hence, the impossibility of difference, “otherness,” and, in concretely spatial terms, the outside. A unified world is a world, which is impossible to leave in any other manner than by discon- tinuing one’s own existence. “Freedom is freedom of movement, nothing else. What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer space for measuring and test- ing one’s strength freely?” (Schmitt 1988, 243). The problem with world unity, however, is more than the sacrifice of pluralism. The world, “in which there is only a homeland,” is, in Schmitt’s diagnosis, a dystopic “world police power,” to which the romantic connotations of “homeland” barely apply: “The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be trans- formed in a world police power” (Schmitt, cited in Petito 2004, 6). For Schmitt, pluralistic antagonism between states in an international society is infinitely preferable to the technological nihilism of world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes: after all, “the Kingdom of Satan is also a unity” (Schmitt, cited in Ojakangas 2004, 80). “In a spiritual world ruled by the law of pluralism, a piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty generalizations of a false totality. For it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary abstraction . . . It would be a false pluralism, which played world-comprehending totalities off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders” (Schmitt 1999, 206). The effacement of the outside only serves to endow a necessarily par- ticularistic unity with a universality that elevates it above its numerous equals in the pluralistic ontology of the international, and consequently opens a path for global police domination by what, by logical necessity, remains merely one political force in the world. The borderless world, tele- ologically presupposed in much contemporary political discourse, is, in a Schmittian analysis, a world of infinite self-certitude and arrogance, unbounded violence of the subjection of particular political entities to the pseudo-universal ideal and unlimited “world police power” over a world that remains ontologically pluralistic and, thus, will inevitably resist its subjection.
| 4,840 |
<h4>AND - Borders check wars of liberal universalism – the alternative is the 30 Years War happening all the time</h4><p><strong>Prozorov 8 [Sergei, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 34-6]</p><p></strong>For Schmitt, <u>the immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement of sovereign transcendence, inevitably renders it anti-political by virtue of its negation of any outside to the immanent order of being</u> (cf. Ewald 1992; Ojakangas 2004). This negation of the out- side may be conceptualized at two levels. In terms of political ontology, immanentism necessarily disavows its own origins, which must logically be decisionist and exceptional, i.e., exterior to the plane of immanence of the internal organization of order. Every order is constituted by a founding rupture that dispenses with the previously existing order and inaugurates the new order, without itself being part of either. In the ontological sense, <u>the outside of order, disavowed in immanentist thought, is that marginal excess that constitutes the form of order by escaping from it, that supple- ment which simultaneously sustains and undermines the existence of order, the sovereign decision that institutes order, while remaining unsubsumed under its principles </u>(see Schmitt 1985; Derrida 1992). The dis- avowal of the sovereign foundation is thus the negation of the boundary that ultimately separates order from itself, and thus, in the well-known<u> Derridean argument, prevents its closure and consolidation into a “self- propelling machine.” On the ontic level, the negation of the outside takes place through the effacement of the fundamental spatio-temporal pluralism of political orders <mark>in the project of world unity</mark>, for which there are no longer “friends” and “enemies,” both of whom are legitimate equals to the self in the pluralistic domain of the international. <mark>What remains is </mark>only <mark>the</mark> self-immanent <mark>self </mark>that is <mark>to be elevated</mark> to the universal status <mark>and the</mark> obscene excess of the <mark>“foe,” whose resistance to forcible incorporation </mark>into world unity <mark>serves as a justification for its annihilation</mark>. The logic of world unity is <mark>marked by a</mark> persistent <mark>attempt at the erasure of all dividing lines</mark> between individuals and political communities and, thus, the merger of the self and the other in the final reign of benign universality. There is no longer a place</u> (literally as well as figuratively) <u>for the exclusion of the other, simply because there is no longer any “otherness” in the system which operates with the all-inclu- sive category of humanity</u> (Schmitt 1976; Kervegan 1999). For Schmitt, <u><mark>the horrifying consequence</mark> of world unity <mark>would be the elimination of all pluralism</u></mark> and, hence, <u>the impossibility of difference, “otherness,” and, in concretely spatial terms, the outside. </u>A unified world is a world, which is impossible to leave in any other manner than by discon- tinuing one’s own existence.<u> “Freedom is freedom of movement, nothing else. What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer space for measuring and test- ing one’s strength freely?</u>” (Schmitt 1988, 243). The problem with world unity, however, is more than the sacrifice of pluralism. <u><mark>The world, “in which there is only a homeland,” is</mark>,</u> in Schmitt’s diagnosis, <u><mark>a dystopic “world police power</mark>,” to which the romantic connotations of “homeland” barely apply: “The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be trans- formed in a world police power</u>” (Schmitt, cited in Petito 2004, 6). For Schmitt, <u><mark>pluralistic antagonism</mark> between states in an international society <mark>is infinitely preferable to</mark> the technological nihilism of <mark>world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes</mark>: after all, “the Kingdom of Satan is also a unity” </u>(Schmitt, cited in Ojakangas 2004, 80). “In a spiritual world ruled by the law of pluralism, <u>a piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty generalizations of a false totality.</u> For <u>it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary abstraction . . . It would be a false pluralism, which played world-comprehending totalities off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders” </u>(Schmitt 1999, 206). The effacement of the outside only serves to endow a necessarily par- ticularistic unity with a universality that elevates it above its numerous equals in the pluralistic ontology of the international, and consequently opens a path for global police <u>domination by what</u>, by logical necessity, <u>remains merely one political force in the world. <mark>The borderless world</mark>,</u> tele- ologically presupposed in much contemporary political discourse, <u><mark>is</u></mark>, in a Schmittian analysis, <u><mark>a world of infinite self-certitude</mark> and arrogance, <mark>unbounded violence</mark> of the subjection of particular political entities to the pseudo-universal ideal <mark>and unlimited “world police power</mark>” over a world that remains ontologically pluralistic and, thus, will inevitably resist its subjection.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
1nc
|
Case
| 124,253 | 4 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,001 |
Credible heg solves several existential impacts
|
Keck 2014
|
Keck 2014 (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)
|
on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar , much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world there is good reason to fear relative decline compared with China hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority can govern interactions We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East As China grows more powerful, it has sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This has to come at the expense of other powers these have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day All of this highlights the advantages of a unipolar system although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of casualties America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests even if the transitions are managed successfully, there are significant negative effects on international relations it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples include climate change, health pandemics terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and compel others to fall in line the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
|
It’s difficult to imagine China defending open order if it were a power transition periods have been the most destabilizing eras in history the rise of new powers necessitates revisions to rules This is impossible to do in any organized fashion although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently its wars have been fairly limited preponderance has prevented great power war, and restrained regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Iran-Iraq wars many challenges can only be solved through multilateral coop Examples include climate change, pandemics terrorism financial crises, and prolif A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing global action preponderance lessens the intensity of competition among players
|
Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
| 4,352 |
<h4><strong>Credible heg solves several existential impacts</h4><p>Keck 2014</strong> (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)</p><p>Still, <u>on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world</u>, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, <u>it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly</u> if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. <u><mark>It’s difficult to imagine China defending</mark> a rule-based, <mark>open </mark>international <mark>order if it were a</mark> unipolar </u><mark>power<u></mark>, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world</u>. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, <u>there is good reason to fear</u> its <u>relative decline compared with China</u> and other emerging nations. To begin with, <u>hegemonic <mark>transition periods have </mark>historically<mark> been <strong>the most destabilizing eras</strong> in history</u></mark>. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). <u>Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, <mark>the rise of new </mark>global <mark>powers</mark> <mark>necessitates revisions to </mark>the “<mark>rules </mark>of the road.” <mark>This is <strong></mark>nearly <mark>impossible</strong> to do in any organized fashion </mark>given the anarchic nature of the international system, where</u> there is <u>no central authority</u> that <u>can govern interactions</u> between states. <u>We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific</u> (<u>and</u> arguably the <u>Middle East</u>). <u>As China grows more</u> economically and militarily <u>powerful, it has</u> unsurprisingly <u>sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This</u> necessarily <u>has to come at the expense of other powers</u>, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, <u>these</u> powers <u>have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation <strong>grows more tense</strong> with each passing day</u>. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. <u>All of this highlights</u> some of <u>the advantages of a unipolar system</u>. Namely, <u><mark>although the U.S. has asserted military force</u></mark> quite <u><mark>frequently</u></mark> in the post-Cold War era, <u>it has only fought weak powers and thus <mark>its wars have been <strong>fairly limited</strong> </mark>in terms of</u> the number of <u>casualties</u> involved. At the same time, <u>America’s <mark>preponderance</mark> of power <mark>has prevented </mark>a <strong><mark>great power war</strong>, and </mark>even <mark>restrained </mark>major <strong><mark>regional powers from coming to blows.</u></strong></mark> For instance, <u><mark>the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the </mark>Israeli-Arab or <mark>Iran-Iraq wars </mark>of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises <strong>dramatically</strong>. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers</u> like Japan <u>acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests</u> against their newly empowered rivals. But <u>even if the transitions</u> caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises <u>are managed successfully, there are</u> still likely to be <u>significant negative effects on international relations</u>. In today’s “globalized” world, <u>it is commonly asserted that <mark>many </mark>of the defining <mark>challenges </mark>of our era <mark>can only be solved through multilateral coop</mark>eration. <mark>Examples</u> </mark>of this <u><mark>include <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong></mark>health <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>, organized crime and <u><strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, <strong>global <mark>financial crises</strong>, and </mark>the <strong><mark>prolif</mark>eration of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong>, among many others. <u><mark>A unipolar system,</u> </mark>for all its limitations, <u><mark>is <strong>uniquely suited</strong> for organizing </mark>effective <strong><mark>global action</strong></mark> on these transnational issues</u>. This is because <u>there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and</u>, to some degree, <u>compel others to fall in line</u>. In addition, <u>the unipole’s <mark>preponderance </mark>of power <strong><mark>lessens the intensity of competition</strong> among </mark>the global <mark>players </mark>involved</u>. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that <u>global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War<strong>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Politics
| 45,610 | 739 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,002 |
1. Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
|
Allison 90
|
Allison 90, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”)
|
there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing . The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. we are likely to to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
| 1,156 |
<h4><strong>1. Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought</h4><p>Allison 90</strong>, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19<u>90</u> (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) </p><p>And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, <u>there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism.</u> As Raymond Frey puts it, <u><mark>utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing</mark> .</u>.. [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. <u><mark>The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people.</u></mark> <u>Without</u> a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) <u>or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason,</u> <u><mark>we are likely to</mark> </u>turn towards Bentham and <mark>to<u> judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being<strong>.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
prisons
| 419,694 | 10 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,003 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4><strong>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,004 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should ___________________.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>The fifty United States and relevant territories should ___________________.</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
CP
| 430,903 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
Subsets and Splits
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