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742,705	Even if there were a vote- it wouldn’t pass	CBS News 9/28	CBS News 9/28/2014 (John Boehner "happy" to have Congress vote on anti-ISIS mission, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-happy-to-have-congress-vote-on-anti-isis-mission/)	Congress might vote on the anti-ISIS mission during the lame duck the vote could present a "real problem You're going to have the president's anti-war left, members of Congress who were reluctant to do this anyway, they now will not have the pressure of an election to push them behind the president There could be a very huge and ugly debate that could not go his way	null	The Wall Street Journal's Kimberley Strassel suggested Sunday on "Face the Nation" that Congress might vote on the anti-ISIS mission after November's elections, during the lame duck session before the new Congress takes over in January. But she said the vote could present a "real problem," even then. "You're going to have the president's anti-war left, members of Congress who were reluctant to do this anyway, they now will not have the pressure of an election to sort of push them along behind the president either," she said. "There could be a very huge and ugly debate that could not go his way."	602	<h4>Even if there were a vote- it wouldn’t pass</h4><p><strong>CBS News 9/28</strong>/2014 (John Boehner "happy" to have Congress vote on anti-ISIS mission, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-happy-to-have-congress-vote-on-anti-isis-mission/)</p><p>The Wall Street Journal's Kimberley Strassel suggested Sunday on "Face the Nation" that <u>Congress might vote on the anti-ISIS mission</u> after November's elections, <u>during the lame duck</u> session before the new Congress takes over in January. But she said <u>the vote could present a "real problem</u>," even then. "<u>You're going to have the president's anti-war left, members of Congress who were reluctant to do this anyway, they now will not have the pressure of an election to</u> sort of <u>push them</u> along <u>behind the president</u> either," she said. "<u><strong>There could be a very huge and ugly debate that could not go his way</u></strong>."</p>	null	null	Plan	430,804	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,706	It’s most predictable and key to aff education—they spent 8 minutes and 55 seconds justifying a particular view of the world—they should be prepared to defend it.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>It’s most predictable and key to aff education—they spent 8 minutes and 55 seconds justifying a particular view of the world—they should be prepared to defend it.</h4>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	FBI	430,803	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,707	No vote- nobody ACTUALLY wants to debate it- even if they did it would be next year	Fiscal Times 10/1	Fiscal Times 10/1/2014 (Congress Can’t Duck Voting on ISIS Forever, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/10/01/Congress-Can-t-Duck-Voting-ISIS-Forever)	Congressional leaders have done just about everything they can to avoid taking a direct position on force against ISIS The strategy is obvious: If the administration’s approach fails, they avoid blame; if it succeeds, they claim credit for allowing it to proceed Boehner would prefer to wait until next year but said that he would consider holding a vote only if the president were to call Congress back Boehner later said that he believes the president does have the authority to attack ISIS Left unexplained was why he has chosen not to exercise his authority to recall the House on his own Congressional staffers, speaking on background, have made it clear that lawmakers don’t want to get their fingerprints on anything that could be construed as committing U.S. forces to another long-term engagement. people really don’t want to do this leadership is unwilling to bring a new authorization to a vote because, “There’s no certainty as to how it would turn out	null	Congressional leaders have done just about everything they can to avoid taking a direct position on President Obama’s decision to use U.S. military force against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, committing only to the relatively uncontroversial request to arm and train the moderate Syrian opposition. The strategy is obvious: If the administration’s approach fails, they avoid blame; if it succeeds, they claim credit for allowing it to proceed. Criticism of their reluctance to engage in debate on the issue has been growing, though, both from within Congress’s own ranks, and from outside. It’s not hard to see why. U.S. planes are now bombing targets in Iraq based on a law passed 13 years ago – known as Authorization for Use of Military Force – to approve a war in Afghanistan. They are hitting targets in Syria based partly on a 12-year-old AUMF sanctioning war in Iraq. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) has suggested that Congress might start discussing some sort of new authorization of military action in the lame duck session that begins in November. House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) would prefer to wait until next year, but said that he would consider holding a vote – though only if the president were to call Congress back to Washington. "The president typically in a situation like this would call for an authorization vote and go sell that to the American people and send a resolution to [Congress]," Boehner said in an interview on ABC News Sunday. “The president has not done that. He believes he has authority under existing resolutions to do what he's done.” Boehner later said that he believes the president does have the authority to attack ISIS in Iraq and Syria, but added that he thinks Congress ought to debate the issue anyway. Left unexplained was why he has chosen not to exercise his authority to recall the House on his own and have the debate he acknowledges is necessary. Some members aren’t satisfied with Boehner’s wait-and-see approach, arguing that, having committed the country to a military engagement that he said could last “years,” the President should be forced to make his case to Congress. “Speaker Boehner has said that he can’t bring up a war resolution unless the president asks for one, a dubious irony given that he is suing the President for exercising too great a prerogative when it comes to domestic policy,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff in an email to The Fiscal Times Tuesday. “It is also fundamentally wrong,” Schiff continued. “The constitution gives Congress alone the power to declare war – it doesn’t say, “’but only when asked by the president, and not around midterm elections.’” Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) has been one of the most vocal critics of the administration’s go-it-alone approach on the Senate side, and has been calling for Reid to have the Senate debate the issue since June. He’s been joined, among others, by likely GOP presidential candidate Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), who has accused the president of “illegally” acting on his own against ISIS. Congressional staffers, speaking on background, have made it clear that lawmakers don’t want to get their fingerprints on anything that could be construed as committing U.S. forces to another long-term engagement. “A lot of people up here really don’t want to do this,” said a senior House staffer, adding that leadership is unwilling to bring a new authorization to a vote because, “There’s no certainty as to how it would turn out.”	3,458	<h4>No vote- nobody ACTUALLY wants to debate it- even if they did it would be next year</h4><p><strong>Fiscal Times 10/1</strong>/2014 (Congress Can’t Duck Voting on ISIS Forever, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/10/01/Congress-Can-t-Duck-Voting-ISIS-Forever)</p><p><u><strong>Congressional leaders have done just about everything they can to avoid taking a direct position</u></strong> <u><strong>on</u></strong> President Obama’s decision to use U.S. military <u><strong>force against ISIS</u></strong> in Iraq and Syria, committing only to the relatively uncontroversial request to arm and train the moderate Syrian opposition. <u>The strategy is obvious: If the administration’s approach fails, they avoid blame; if it succeeds, they claim credit for allowing it to proceed</u>. Criticism of their reluctance to engage in debate on the issue has been growing, though, both from within Congress’s own ranks, and from outside. It’s not hard to see why. U.S. planes are now bombing targets in Iraq based on a law passed 13 years ago – known as Authorization for Use of Military Force – to approve a war in Afghanistan. They are hitting targets in Syria based partly on a 12-year-old AUMF sanctioning war in Iraq. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) has suggested that Congress might start discussing some sort of new authorization of military action in the lame duck session that begins in November. House Speaker John <u>Boehner</u> (R-OH) <u>would prefer to wait until next year</u>, <u>but said that he would consider holding a vote </u>– though <u><strong>only if the president were to call Congress back</u></strong> to Washington. "The president typically in a situation like this would call for an authorization vote and go sell that to the American people and send a resolution to [Congress]," Boehner said in an interview on ABC News Sunday. “The president has not done that. He believes he has authority under existing resolutions to do what he's done.” <u>Boehner later said that he believes the president does have the authority to attack ISIS</u> in Iraq and Syria, but added that he thinks Congress ought to debate the issue anyway. <u>Left unexplained was why he has chosen not to exercise his authority to recall the House on his own </u>and have the debate he acknowledges is necessary. Some members aren’t satisfied with Boehner’s wait-and-see approach, arguing that, having committed the country to a military engagement that he said could last “years,” the President should be forced to make his case to Congress. “Speaker Boehner has said that he can’t bring up a war resolution unless the president asks for one, a dubious irony given that he is suing the President for exercising too great a prerogative when it comes to domestic policy,” said California Rep. Adam Schiff in an email to The Fiscal Times Tuesday. “It is also fundamentally wrong,” Schiff continued. “The constitution gives Congress alone the power to declare war – it doesn’t say, “’but only when asked by the president, and not around midterm elections.’” Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) has been one of the most vocal critics of the administration’s go-it-alone approach on the Senate side, and has been calling for Reid to have the Senate debate the issue since June. He’s been joined, among others, by likely GOP presidential candidate Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), who has accused the president of “illegally” acting on his own against ISIS. <u>Congressional staffers, speaking on background, have made it clear that <strong>lawmakers don’t want to get their fingerprints on anything</strong> that could be construed as committing U.S. forces to another long-term engagement. </u>“A lot of <u>people</u> up here <u><strong>really don’t want to do this</u></strong>,” said a senior House staffer, adding that <u>leadership is <strong>unwilling to bring a new authorization to a vote</u></strong> <u>because, “There’s no certainty as to how it would turn out</u>.”</p>	null	null	Plan	430,805	2	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,708	The reasons for doing a policy are key to that policy	Hill, 91	Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, 1991 (“The Message of Affirmative Action,” The Affirmative Action Debate (1995), edited by Steven M. Cahn, Published by Routledge, Reprinted from Social Philosophy & Policy, p. 169-170)	What our actions say to others depends largely upon our avowed reasons for acting "the same act" can have very different consequences, depending upon how we choose to justify it. In a sense, acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar, and so not merely the consequences but also the moral nature of our acts depend in part on our decisions about the reasons for doing them the message of an act or policy is almost always a relevant factor in the moral assessment of the act or policy Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? What is superficially "the same act" can be an offer to buy, an admission of guilt, an expression of gratitude, a contribution to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult. Because all this is so familiar, the extent to which these elementary points are ignored in discussions of the pros and cons of social policies is surprising. The usual presumption is that social policies can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received	What our actions say depends largely on our reasons for acting; the same act" can have different consequences, depending upon how we justify it acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar the moral nature of our acts depend on our reasons for doing them. the message of policy is always relevant What is superficially "the same act" can be an admission of guilt gratitude, a contribution the extent to which these elementary points are ignored in discussions of policies is surprising	Actions, as the saying goes, often speak louder than words. There are times, too, when only actions can effectively communicate the message we want to convey, and times when giving a message is a central part of the purpose of action. What our actions say to others depends largely, though not entirely, upon our avowed reasons for acting; and this is a matter for reflective [end page 169] decision, not something we discover later by looking back at what we did and its effects. The decision is important because "the same act" can have very different consequences, depending upon how we choose to justify it. In a sense, acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar, and so not merely the consequences but also the moral nature of our acts depend in part on our decisions about the reasons for doing them. Unfortunately, the message actually conveyed by our actions does not depend only on our intentions and reasons, for our acts may have a meaning for others quite at odds with what we hoped to express. Others may misunderstand our intentions, doubt our sincerity, or discern a subtext that undermines the primary message. Even if sincere, well-intended, and successfully conveyed, the message of an act or policy does not by itself justify the means by which it is conveyed; it is almost always a relevant factor, however, in the moral assessment of the act or policy. These remarks may strike you as too obvious to be worth mentioning; for, even if we do not usually express the ideas so abstractly, we are all familiar with them in our daily interactions with our friends, families, and colleagues. Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? What is superficially "the same act" can be an offer to buy, an admission of guilt, an expression of gratitude, a contribution to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult. Because all this is so familiar, the extent to which these elementary points are ignored in discussions of the pros and cons of social policies such as affirmative action is surprising. The usual presumption is that social policies can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received.	2,455	<h4>The reasons for doing a policy are key to that policy</h4><p>Thomas E. <strong><mark>Hill</mark>, </strong>Jr., Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, 19<strong><mark>91</strong></mark> (“The Message of Affirmative Action,” The Affirmative Action Debate (1995), edited by Steven M. Cahn, Published by Routledge, Reprinted from Social Philosophy & Policy, p. 169-170)</p><p>Actions, as the saying goes, often speak louder than words. There are times, too, when only actions can effectively communicate the message we want to convey, and times when giving a message is a central part of the purpose of action. <u><mark>What our actions say</mark> to others <mark>depends largely</u></mark>, though not entirely, <u>up<mark>on our</mark> avowed <mark>reasons for acting</u>;</mark> and this is a matter for reflective [end page 169] decision, not something we discover later by looking back at what we did and its effects. The decision is important because <u>"<mark>the same act" can have </mark>very <mark>different consequences, depending upon how we</mark> choose to <mark>justify it</mark>. In a sense, <mark>acts done for different reasons are not "the same act"</mark> <mark>even if otherwise similar</mark>, and so not merely the consequences but also <mark>the moral nature of our acts depend</mark> in part <mark>on our</mark> decisions about the <mark>reasons for doing them</u>.</mark> Unfortunately, the message actually conveyed by our actions does not depend only on our intentions and reasons, for our acts may have a meaning for others quite at odds with what we hoped to express. Others may misunderstand our intentions, doubt our sincerity, or discern a subtext that undermines the primary message. Even if sincere, well-intended, and successfully conveyed, <u><mark>the message of</mark> an act or <mark>policy</u></mark> does not by itself justify the means by which it is conveyed; it <u><mark>is</mark> almost <mark>always</mark> a <mark>relevant</mark> factor</u>, however, <u>in the moral assessment of the act or policy</u>. These remarks may strike you as too obvious to be worth mentioning; for, even if we do not usually express the ideas so abstractly, we are all familiar with them in our daily interactions with our friends, families, and colleagues. <u>Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? <mark>What is superficially "the same act" can be</mark> an offer to buy, <mark>an admission of guilt</mark>, an expression of <mark>gratitude, a contribution</mark> to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult. Because all this is so familiar, <mark>the extent to which these</mark> <mark>elementary points are ignored in discussions of</mark> the pros and cons of social <mark>policies</u></mark> such as affirmative action <u><mark>is surprising</mark>. The usual presumption is that social policies can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received</u>. </p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	FBI	234,324	9	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,709	No leaders will allow a vote- even if they do it will be an uncontroversial short-term extension	Sargent 9/25	Sargent 9/25/2014 (Greg, writer for the Washington Post, the Plum Line, Morning Plum: Congress may not vote on war until…next year, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/09/25/morning-plum-congress-may-not-vote-on-war-until-next-year/)	We may not get any Congressional vote until next year. Boehner thinks lawmakers should take up the issue after January this is a bipartisan leadership failing Democratic Congressional leaders have also dropped the ball claiming Obama has authority if Boehner’s timetable is any indication, one imagines Congress could simply push through a short-term extension of that, putting off the broader debate on war once again.	null	If you are still persuaded that Congress might — just might — vote on President Obama’s escalation against ISIS after the elections, you are probably being too optimistic. We may not get any Congressional vote until next year. In an interview with First Draft’s excellent Carl Hulse, House Speaker John Boehner delivered the news: “I have made it clear that I think the House and the Congress itself should speak,” the speaker said in an exclusive, wide-ranging interview with First Draft. But Mr. Boehner believes a post-election, lame-duck session is the wrong time for such a weighty decision. “Doing this with a whole group of members who are on their way out the door, I don’t think that is the right way to handle this,” he said. Mr. Boehner, who is open to a more expansive military campaign to destroy the Islamic State, thinks lawmakers should take up the issue after the new Congress convenes in January… “I would suggest to you that early next year, assuming that we continue in this effort, there may be that discussion and there may be that request from the president,” he said. The Times is presenting this as a sign that Boehner is really, seriously, going to hold a vote on war, whether or not the President makes a formal authorization request. That’s nice, but the really noteworthy thing here is the lack of urgency. You have to love the idea that this is too “weighty” a decision to make during the lame duck session, but not “weighty” enough to vote on before the escalation actually launched, let alone before an election in which voters deserve to know where lawmakers stand on a matter of such great consequence. To be clear, this is a bipartisan leadership failing. Democratic Congressional leaders have also dropped the ball here, claiming Obama has the authority to escalate without Congressional approval, in order to do the President’s bidding. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has offered no credible rationale for failing to seek authorization. But as some members in both parties have pointed out, despite Obama’s abdication of responsibility to come to Congress, lawmakers could force the issue on their own. Dem Rep. Chris Van Hollen wants Congress to “revise the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force in a way that supports the targeted actions underway, but also prevents the deployment of American ground forces that would drag us into another Iraq War.” Democratic leaders such as Senator Dick Durbin have indicated that Congress will debate and vote on the war in December, because the narrower authorization for arming and training the Syrian rebels against ISIS runs out at that time. Yet if Boehner’s timetable is any indication, one imagines Congress could simply push through a short-term extension of that, putting off the broader debate on war once again. There probably will be a broader debate and vote on war at some point. But how much war-making will have unfolded by then without Congressional authorization?	2,966	<h4>No leaders will allow a vote- even if they do it will be an uncontroversial short-term extension</h4><p><strong>Sargent 9/25</strong>/2014 (Greg, writer for the Washington Post, the Plum Line, Morning Plum: Congress may not vote on war until…next year, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/09/25/morning-plum-congress-may-not-vote-on-war-until-next-year/)</p><p>If you are still persuaded that Congress might — just might — vote on President Obama’s escalation against ISIS after the elections, you are probably being too optimistic. <u>We may not get any Congressional vote until next year. </u>In an interview with First Draft’s excellent Carl Hulse, House Speaker John Boehner delivered the news: “I have made it clear that I think the House and the Congress itself should speak,” the speaker said in an exclusive, wide-ranging interview with First Draft. But Mr. Boehner believes a post-election, lame-duck session is the wrong time for such a weighty decision. “Doing this with a whole group of members who are on their way out the door, I don’t think that is the right way to handle this,” he said. Mr. <u>Boehner</u>, who is open to a more expansive military campaign to destroy the Islamic State, <u>thinks lawmakers should take up the issue after</u> the new Congress convenes in <u>January</u>… “I would suggest to you that early next year, assuming that we continue in this effort, there may be that discussion and there may be that request from the president,” he said. The Times is presenting this as a sign that Boehner is really, seriously, going to hold a vote on war, whether or not the President makes a formal authorization request. That’s nice, but the really noteworthy thing here is the lack of urgency. You have to love the idea that this is too “weighty” a decision to make during the lame duck session, but not “weighty” enough to vote on before the escalation actually launched, let alone before an election in which voters deserve to know where lawmakers stand on a matter of such great consequence. To be clear, <u><strong>this is a bipartisan leadership failing</u></strong>. <u>Democratic Congressional leaders have also dropped the ball</u> here, <u>claiming Obama has</u> the <u>authority</u> to escalate without Congressional approval, in order to do the President’s bidding. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has offered no credible rationale for failing to seek authorization. But as some members in both parties have pointed out, despite Obama’s abdication of responsibility to come to Congress, lawmakers could force the issue on their own. Dem Rep. Chris Van Hollen wants Congress to “revise the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force in a way that supports the targeted actions underway, but also prevents the deployment of American ground forces that would drag us into another Iraq War.” Democratic leaders such as Senator Dick Durbin have indicated that Congress will debate and vote on the war in December, because the narrower authorization for arming and training the Syrian rebels against ISIS runs out at that time. Yet <u>if Boehner’s timetable is any indication, one imagines Congress could simply push through a short-term extension of that, putting off the broader debate on war once again. </u>There probably will be a broader debate and vote on war at some point. But how much war-making will have unfolded by then without Congressional authorization?</p>	null	null	Plan	430,807	4	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,710	Literature proves we are relevant and checks their offense.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Literature proves we are relevant and checks their offense.</h4>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	FBI	430,806	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,711	No vote until next year	Antle 9/29	Antle 9/29/2014 (W. James, editor of the Daily Caller News Foundation and author of Devouring Freedom: Can Big Government Ever Be Stopped?, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/seven-awful-reasons-for-bypassing-congress-on-isis/)	Maybe Congress will vote on the war against Islamic State next year the midterm elections seem to overrule	null	Maybe if we’re lucky, Congress will vote on the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—already underway—sometime next year. While a few brave souls are calling for a vote before then, the midterm elections seem to overrule the Constitution.	249	<h4>No vote until next year</h4><p><strong>Antle 9/29</strong>/2014 (W. James, editor of the Daily Caller News Foundation and author of Devouring Freedom: Can Big Government Ever Be Stopped?, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/seven-awful-reasons-for-bypassing-congress-on-isis/)</p><p><u><strong>Maybe </u></strong>if we’re lucky, <u>Congress will vote on the war against</u> the <u>Islamic State</u> in Iraq and Syria—already underway—sometime <u><strong>next year</u></strong>. While a few brave souls are calling for a vote before then, <u>the midterm elections seem to overrule</u> the Constitution.</p>	null	null	Plan	430,808	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,712	Their divorce of personal and political kills agency and turns the aff	Kappeler 95	Kappeler 95 (Susanne is an associate professor at al-akhawayn university, “the will to violence: the politics of personal behavior”, pg. 10-11)	null	we regard mega action as the only worthwhile ones question of what I would do tends to peter out We are this war’ even if we do not command the troops	Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.	1,890	<h4>Their divorce of personal and political kills agency and turns the <strong>aff</h4><p>Kappeler 95</strong> (Susanne is an associate professor at al-akhawayn university, “the will to violence: the politics of personal behavior”, pg. 10-11)</p><p> </p><p>Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega</mark> spheres of <mark>action as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any <mark>question of what I would do</mark> if I were indeed myself <mark>tends to</mark> <mark>peter out</mark> in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘<mark>We are this war’</mark>, however, <mark>even if we do not command the troops</mark> or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	FBI	11,742	82	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,713	Obama will appoint a new attorney general in the lame duck- causes backlash no matter who it is	The Hill 9/25	The Hill 9/25/2014 (GOP to Obama: Don't replace Holder in lame-duck Congress, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news-other-administration/218945-gop-warns-obama-against-lame-duck-ag-move)	Confirming an attorney general between Nov. 12, when Congress is scheduled to return, and the end of the year would leave scant time for lawmaker vetting White House press secretary said the administration is already evaluating candidates He said the Senate should be prepared to act swiftly There’s no doubt the president will try to ram through another partisan hack Republicans have repeatedly urged Democrats to refrain from pushing through legislation in a lame-duck session arguing lawmakers would have no accountability That holds true for selecting Holder’s replacement Allowing Democratic senators to confirm Holder’s successor would be an abuse of power that should not be countenanced	null	Confirming an attorney general between Nov. 12, when Congress is scheduled to return, and the end of the year would leave scant time for lawmaker vetting of the president’s nominee. At the same time, White House press secretary Josh Earnest said Thursday the administration is already evaluating candidates to replace Holder and that the selection would be a "high priority." He said the Senate should be prepared to act swiftly, adding to speculation from conservative groups that the administration intends to act this year. “There’s no doubt the president will try to ram through a lame-duck Senate another partisan hack for attorney general,” said Jenny Beth Martin, co-founder of Tea Party Patriots. “We cannot allow that to happen." Republicans have repeatedly urged Democrats to refrain from pushing through any non-emergency legislation in a lame-duck session, arguing that lawmakers who have lost their seats would have no accountability. That holds true for selecting Holder’s replacement, said Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), a member of the Judiciary Committee, which will consider the eventual nomination. “Allowing Democratic senators, many of whom will likely have just been defeated at the polls, to confirm Holder’s successor would be an abuse of power that should not be countenanced,” Cruz said.	1,307	<h4>Obama will appoint a new attorney general in the lame duck- causes backlash no matter who it is</h4><p><strong>The Hill 9/25</strong>/2014 (GOP to Obama: Don't replace Holder in lame-duck Congress, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news-other-administration/218945-gop-warns-obama-against-lame-duck-ag-move)</p><p><u>Confirming an attorney general between Nov. 12, when Congress is scheduled to return, and the end of the year would leave scant time for lawmaker vetting</u> of the president’s nominee. At the same time, <u>White House press secretary</u> Josh Earnest <u>said</u> Thursday <u>the administration is already evaluating candidates </u>to replace Holder and that the selection would be a "high priority." <u>He said the Senate should be prepared to act swiftly</u>, adding to speculation from conservative groups that the administration intends to act this year. “<u><strong>There’s no doubt the president will try to ram through</u></strong> a lame-duck Senate <u><strong>another partisan hack </u></strong>for attorney general,” said Jenny Beth Martin, co-founder of Tea Party Patriots. “We cannot allow that to happen." <u>Republicans have repeatedly urged Democrats to refrain from pushing through</u> any non-emergency <u>legislation in a lame-duck session</u>, <u>arguing</u> that <u>lawmakers</u> who have lost their seats <u>would have no accountability</u>. <u>That holds true for</u> <u>selecting Holder’s replacement</u>, said Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), a member of the Judiciary Committee, which will consider the eventual nomination. “<u>Allowing Democratic senators</u>, many of whom will likely have just been defeated at the polls, <u>to confirm Holder’s successor would be an <strong>abuse of power that should not be countenanced</u></strong>,” Cruz said.</p>	null	null	Plan	430,809	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,714	That DOMINATES politics in the lame duck	LA Times 9/25	LA Times 9/25/2014 (Who will replace Holder, and can Obama get a nominee confirmed?, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-pn-holders-replacement-senate-20140925-story.html)	The nominee will face a spirited confirmation battle Democrats will be poised to swiftly approve the new attorney general That will certainly be met with protests by Republicans any nominee could take as long as three weeks before even clearing the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate floor debate could take a week to clear all the procedural hurdles at the Republican minority’s disposal Those issues, along with the post-election political environment in the Senate, are likely to ensure a long conversation about the nation’s next attorney general	null	One point is certain: The eventual nominee will face a potentially spirited confirmation battle. Republicans had long fumed over Holder’s handling of the Justice Department and they will be certain to hold the next top law enforcement official responsible. “The relationship has been pretty scarred over the last six years,” said a Republican aide in the Senate, unauthorized to discuss the situation publicly. "I think they’ll look at it pretty closely.” Complicating the confirmation will be the political dynamics in the post-election lame-duck session of Congress that is scheduled to begin Nov. 12. If Republicans take the majority in the Senate, Democrats will be poised to swiftly approve the new attorney general as well as dozens of Obama’s picks for judges and administrative posts in the final weeks of the year before relinquishing control of the chamber in January. That will certainly be met with protests by Republicans, especially after Democrats changed historic Senate rules this session to allow a simple majority for confirmation of some nominees, taking away the filibuster-stopping power of the minority. Democrats now have a 55-seat majority. With Republican opposition, any nominee could take as long as three weeks before even clearing the Senate Judiciary Committee, because of rules that guarantee them, as the minority party, a chance to delay the vote. Following that, the Senate floor debate could take a week to clear all the procedural hurdles at the Republican minority’s disposal to stall the vote. Holder’s detractors in Congress have long been at odds with his handling of the Justice Department, including the Fast and Furious gun-running probe and the administration’s decision to release five Taliban prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in exchange for a captive Army soldier. Many Republicans also take a harsh view of the Justice Department’s role in enabling Obama’s use of executive authority to enact changes to immigration law. Those issues, along with the post-election political environment in the Senate, are likely to ensure a long conversation about the nation’s next attorney general before the end of the year.	2,161	<h4>That DOMINATES politics in the lame duck</h4><p><strong>LA Times 9/25</strong>/2014 (Who will replace Holder, and can Obama get a nominee confirmed?, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-pn-holders-replacement-senate-20140925-story.html)</p><p>One point is certain: <u>The</u> eventual <u>nominee will face a</u> potentially <u>spirited</u> <u>confirmation</u> <u>battle</u>. Republicans had long fumed over Holder’s handling of the Justice Department and they will be certain to hold the next top law enforcement official responsible. “The relationship has been pretty scarred over the last six years,” said a Republican aide in the Senate, unauthorized to discuss the situation publicly. "I think they’ll look at it pretty closely.” Complicating the confirmation will be the political dynamics in the post-election lame-duck session of Congress that is scheduled to begin Nov. 12. If Republicans take the majority in the Senate, <u>Democrats will be poised to swiftly approve the new attorney general</u> as well as dozens of Obama’s picks for judges and administrative posts in the final weeks of the year before relinquishing control of the chamber in January. <u><strong>That will certainly be met with protests by Republicans</u></strong>, especially after Democrats changed historic Senate rules this session to allow a simple majority for confirmation of some nominees, taking away the filibuster-stopping power of the minority. Democrats now have a 55-seat majority. With Republican opposition, <u>any nominee could take as long as three weeks before even clearing the Senate Judiciary Committee,</u> because of rules that guarantee them, as the minority party, a chance to delay the vote. Following that, <u>the Senate floor debate could take a week to clear all the procedural hurdles at the Republican minority’s disposal</u> to stall the vote. Holder’s detractors in Congress have long been at odds with his handling of the Justice Department, including the Fast and Furious gun-running probe and the administration’s decision to release five Taliban prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in exchange for a captive Army soldier. Many Republicans also take a harsh view of the Justice Department’s role in enabling Obama’s use of executive authority to enact changes to immigration law. <u>Those issues, along with the post-election political environment in the Senate, are likely to ensure a <strong>long conversation about the nation’s next attorney general</u></strong> before the end of the year.</p>	null	null	Plan	430,810	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,715	Terrorism discourse is wrong and leads to war	Cortright 8	Cortright 8 [David, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and research fellow for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2008 (“Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.” Pg. 125]	terrorism has replaced communism as the frame of dehumanization. to lump together all considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of circumstances The so-called war on terror” is used to justify all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary to defeat “evil” . Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable Wei 12 The American China threat mentality has become an effective tool that perpetuates American exceptionalist practice China threat mentality evolved from racial nativism McCarthyist extremism and American exceptionalism The climax was the Chinese Exclusion Act With growing interdependence and interweaving economies, America can no longer operate its relations with China by virtue of the American China threat mentality and the dichotomous view of the world , lack of historical perspective and a completely shallow understanding of the roots of Chinese culture will only misguide America and create more problems than solve this threat was a selfcreated and selffulfilling fallacy predicated on the paranoiac aspect of American politics, which will only perpetuate actual conflicts or even wars	The American China threat mentality has become a tool that perpetuates American exceptionalist practice With growing interdependence America can no longer operate its relations with China by virtue of the American China threat mentality lack of historical perspective and shallow understanding of Chinese culture will only misguide America and create more problems than solve this threat was a selfcreated and selffulfilling fallacy predicated on paranoiac politics, which will perpetuate actual wars	In recent years terrorism has replaced communism as the new frame of dehumanization. It has been used to lump together all those who are considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of the specific circumstances involved. The so-called “global war on terror” is used to justify any and all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary by government officials to defeat the “evil” enemy. Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable, just as during the cold war the fight against communism provided the justification for the unthinkable. Chinese threat mentality is racist and causes serial policy failure and war Wei (Master’s at Dartmouth College) 12 (Li Juan, THE AMERICAN CHINA THREAT MENTALITY, Master’s Thesis in Liberal Studies, March 2012, pg. 77-79) The American China threat mentality has become an effective tool that perpetuates American exceptionalist practice in respect to U.S. relations with China and their dichotomous view of the world. It also helps shape the future trajectory of ChinaU.S. relations. The American China threat mentality basically evolved from three major trends including racial nativism in the late nineteen century, McCarthyist extremism in the Cold War and the new American exceptionalism in the postColdWar era. This evolution started in the late nineteenth century when racial nativism was in full swing, cultivating the fear of the Chinese immigrants. The climax of this nativist movement was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. This fear and exclusion of the Chinese immediately morphed into the fear of Communism during the Cold War. McCarthyism definitely culminated in this paranoia of Communism or Chinese communism in particular. This extremist mindset and practice continued after the Cold War and was further reflected in the new American exceptionalism which supplied the American China threat mentality with the friendorfoe binary opposition and the exceptionalist norm that promoted the American political model and legitimized its transgressions of and exemptions from the rule of law. Moreover, as suggested by Galtung's oscillation model, Americans' misunderstanding of the stark realities of Chinese politics and economy from 1949 to 1958 also enhanced Americans' misperceptions of China and further contributed to this China threat mentality. Grounded on the friendorfoe rationale and exceptionalist norm, the American China threat mentality not only was reflected in American public opinion of China as well as U.S.China policy, but also found its way into the discourse of American mainstream media and scholarly works. The scrutiny of the media discourse and scholarly publications concerning the four pivotal incidents in the history of ChinaU.S. relations reveals that mass media reified the American China threat mentality by virtue of using those events as a way to revive Americans' Cold War memory, criticize the Chinese government and therefore accentuate the enemy image of the Chinese government and communism. In a bigger picture, the American China threat mentality followed a zigzag pattern similar to Galtung's oscillation model. This pattern featured alternating periods of the waxing and waning of the China threat mentality, corresponding to the fluctuation of American public opinion on China. To be specific, the waxing of this China threat mentality was parallel to the 9year distribution period and the waning to the 9year growth period. In a similar fashion, ChinaU.S. relations showed a curvy pattern as well. From the confrontation and containment in the 1950s to the moderate improvements in the bilateral ties between the two in the 1960s, ChinaU.S. relations fluctuated widely. From the nascent opening contacts and rapprochement in 1970s to the increasing military and economic cooperation in the 1980s, the fluctuation of ChinaU.S. relations continued. From the strategic engagement in the 1990s to the widespread concerns over China's future economic trajectory and military prowess in the 2000s, ChinaU.S. relations oscillated in the same manner. With a clear sight on the similar zigzag patterns of the American China threat mentality and ChinaU.S. relations, one can predict that ChinaU.S. relations will continue to fluctuate the conceivable future. With growing interdependence and interweaving economies, America can no longer operate its relations with China by virtue of the American China threat mentality and the dichotomous view of the world. It will be in the interest of our nations to seek common ground while reserving our differences. Moreover, lack of historical perspective and a completely shallow understanding of the roots of Chinese culture in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism will only misguide America and create more problems than solve. Additionally, the misperception of Americans in viewing all Communism as the same lacks the understanding that postCultural Revolution communism in China was a system that while flawed in some ways, worked for the Chinese people. Americans did not dare to admit that the communism at that time in China was actually saving a country of over 500 million people'97 from foreign oppression, domestic tyranny, constant warfare and starvation. It was Americans' imperative in post World War II to contain all of communism in the world which led to American policy seeking to ring China with a circle of strategic holdings. Another reason for America perceiving communism in the world and Chinese communism in particular as a threat was that communism was frequently linked to notables such as Stalin, and this threat of communism was a selfcreated and selffulfilling fallacy predicated on the paranoiac aspect of American politics, which will only perpetuate actual conflicts or even wars.	5,917	<h4><u><strong>Terrorism discourse is wrong and leads to war</h4><p>Cortright 8</u></strong> [David, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and research fellow for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2008 (“Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.” Pg. 125]</p><p>In recent years <u>terrorism has replaced communism as the </u>new<u><strong> frame of dehumanization</strong>. </u>It has been used<u> to lump together all </u>those who are <u>considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of</u> the specific<u> circumstances</u> involved. <u>The so-called </u>“global<u> war on terror” is used to justify </u>any and<u> all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary </u>by government officials<u> to defeat </u>the<u> “evil” </u>enemy<u>. Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable</u>, just as during the cold war the fight against communism provided the justification for the unthinkable.</p><p>Chinese threat mentality is racist and causes serial policy failure and war</p><p><u><strong>Wei</u></strong> (Master’s at Dartmouth College) <u><strong>12</p><p></u></strong>(Li Juan, THE AMERICAN CHINA THREAT MENTALITY, Master’s Thesis in Liberal Studies, March 2012, pg. 77-79)</p><p><u><mark>The American China threat mentality has become a</mark>n effective <mark>tool that perpetuates American</mark> <mark>exceptionalist practice</u></mark> in respect to U.S. relations with China and their dichotomous view of the world. It also helps shape the future trajectory of ChinaU.S. relations.</p><p>The American <u>China threat mentality</u> basically <u>evolved from</u> three major trends including <u>racial nativism</u> in the late nineteen century, <u>McCarthyist extremism</u> in the Cold War <u>and</u> the new <u>American exceptionalism</u> in the postColdWar era. This evolution started in the late nineteenth century when racial nativism was in full swing, cultivating the fear of the Chinese immigrants. <u>The climax</u> of this nativist movement <u>was the</u> 1882 <u>Chinese Exclusion Act</u>. This fear and exclusion of the Chinese immediately morphed into the fear of Communism during the Cold War. McCarthyism definitely culminated in this paranoia of Communism or Chinese communism in particular. This extremist mindset and practice continued after the Cold War and was further reflected in the new American exceptionalism which supplied the American China threat mentality with the friendorfoe binary opposition and the exceptionalist norm that promoted the American political model and legitimized its transgressions of and exemptions from the rule of law. Moreover, as suggested by Galtung's oscillation model, Americans' misunderstanding of the stark realities of Chinese politics and economy from 1949 to 1958 also enhanced Americans' misperceptions of China and further contributed to this China threat mentality.</p><p>Grounded on the friendorfoe rationale and exceptionalist norm, the American China threat mentality not only was reflected in American public opinion of China as well as U.S.China policy, but also found its way into the discourse of American mainstream media and scholarly works. The scrutiny of the media discourse and scholarly publications concerning the four pivotal incidents in the history of ChinaU.S. relations reveals that mass media reified the American China threat mentality by virtue of using those events as a way to revive Americans' Cold War memory, criticize the Chinese government and therefore accentuate the enemy image of the Chinese government and communism.</p><p>In a bigger picture, the American China threat mentality followed a zigzag pattern similar to Galtung's oscillation model. This pattern featured alternating periods of the waxing and waning of the China threat mentality, corresponding to the fluctuation of American public opinion on China. To be specific, the waxing of this China threat mentality was parallel to the 9year distribution period and the waning to the 9year growth period.</p><p>In a similar fashion, ChinaU.S. relations showed a curvy pattern as well. From the confrontation and containment in the 1950s to the moderate improvements in the bilateral ties between the two in the 1960s, ChinaU.S. relations fluctuated widely. From the nascent opening contacts and rapprochement in 1970s to the increasing military and economic cooperation in the 1980s, the fluctuation of ChinaU.S. relations continued. From the strategic engagement in the 1990s to the widespread concerns over China's future economic trajectory and military prowess in the 2000s, ChinaU.S. relations oscillated in the same manner. With a clear sight on the similar zigzag patterns of the American China threat mentality and ChinaU.S. relations, one can predict that ChinaU.S. relations will continue to fluctuate the conceivable future.</p><p><u><mark>With growing interdependence</mark> and interweaving economies, <mark>America can no longer operate its relations with China by virtue of the American China threat mentality</mark> and the dichotomous view of the world</u>. It will be in the interest of our nations to seek common ground while reserving our differences. Moreover<u>, <mark>lack of historical perspective and</mark> a completely <mark>shallow understanding of</mark> the roots of <mark>Chinese culture</u></mark> in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism <u><mark>will only misguide America and create more problems than solve</u></mark>.</p><p>Additionally, the misperception of Americans in viewing all Communism as the same lacks the understanding that postCultural Revolution communism in China was a system that while flawed in some ways, worked for the Chinese people. Americans did not dare to admit that the communism at that time in China was actually saving a country of over 500 million people'97 from foreign oppression, domestic tyranny, constant warfare and starvation. It was Americans' imperative in post World War II to contain all of communism in the world which led to American policy seeking to ring China with a circle of strategic holdings. Another reason for America perceiving communism in the world and Chinese communism in particular as a threat was that communism was frequently linked to notables such as Stalin, and <u><mark>this threat</u></mark> of communism <u><mark>was</u> <u>a selfcreated and selffulfilling fallacy predicated on</mark> the <mark>paranoiac</mark> aspect of American <mark>politics, which will</mark> only <mark>perpetuate actual</mark> <strong>conflicts or even <mark>wars</u></strong></mark>.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	2nc Link?	430,519	5	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,716	Owen votes neg interrogating the discursive backdrops they make their truth claims on is key	Owen 2	Owen 2 [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3]	the issue for practitioners is the picturing of international politics and the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline The point is to call critically into question the background picture against which disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted to make this background an object of reflection and evaluation. the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites arrogance is all too visible in the behaviour of dominant political forces The most pressing questions call for a serious rethinking of the ways human beings live together. existing ways of picturing politics emerge from the very practices with which they are engaged these ways may lose their epistemic and ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required.	the issue for practitioners is the picturing of international politics and the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline The point is to call critically into question the background picture against which disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted to make this background an object of reflection and evaluation. the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites arrogance is all too visible in the behaviour of dominant political forces The most pressing questions call for a serious rethinking of the ways human beings live together. existing ways of picturing politics emerge from the very practices with which they are engaged these ways may lose their epistemic and ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required.	The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’, 12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled. 13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory-construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations. 14 The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together. 15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them. 16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.	4,406	<h4>Owen votes neg interrogating the discursive backdrops they make their truth claims on is key</h4><p><u><strong>Owen 2</u></strong> [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3]</p><p>The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’, 12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled. 13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because <u><mark>the issue</u></mark> at stake <u><mark>for</u></mark> the <u><mark>practitioners</u></mark> of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ <u><mark>is <strong>the picturing of international politics</strong> and</u></mark> the implications of this picturing for <u><mark>the <strong>epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline</u></strong></mark>, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory-construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations. 14 <u><mark>The point</u></mark> of these remarks <u><mark>is to call critically into question the background picture</u></mark> (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) <u><mark>against which</u></mark> the <u><mark>disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted</u></mark> in order <u><mark>to make this background</u></mark> itself <u><strong><mark>an object of reflection and evaluation.</u></strong></mark> In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances <u><mark>the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites</u></mark> a degree of <u><mark>arrogance</u></mark> that <u><mark>is all too visible in the behaviour of</u></mark> the <u><mark>dominant political forces</u></mark> of our time. . . . <u><mark>The most pressing questions</u></mark> of the age <u><mark>call</u></mark> not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, <u><mark>for <strong>a serious rethinking</strong> of the ways</u></mark> in which it is possible for <u><mark>human beings</u></mark> to <u><mark>live together.</u></mark> 15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our <u><mark>existing ways of picturing</u></mark> international <u><mark>politics emerge from</u></mark>, and in relation to, <u><mark>the very practices</u></mark> of international politics <u><mark>with which they are engaged</u></mark> and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, <u><mark>these ways</u></mark> of guiding reflection and action <u><mark>may lose their epistemic and</u></mark>/or <u><mark>ethical value such that a <strong>deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required.</u></strong></mark> Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them. 16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	AT: Owen	69,358	17	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,717	Winners win – political capital theory is wrong	Hirsh 13	Hirsh 13 Michael Hirsh February 7, 2013 National Journal There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207	the pundits will talk about how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Ornstein of the A E I “ political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got Civil Rights along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Obama seems to be emerging, If he can get some early wins— that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”	null	On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ . Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls. THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” .	18,095	<h4>Winners win – political capital theory is wrong</h4><p><strong>Hirsh 13</strong> Michael Hirsh February 7, 2013 National Journal There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207 </p><p>On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, <u>the pundits</u> will do what they always do this time of year: They <u>will talk about </u>how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of <u>how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program</u> through.</p><p><u>Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens</u> over the next four years.</p><p>Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.</p><p>What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.”</p><p>As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.</p><p><u><strong>Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.</p><p></strong>The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term</u>. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “<u>It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says</u> Norman <u>Ornstein of the<strong> </strong>A</u>merican <u>E</u>nterprise<u> I</u>nstitute. <u><strong>“</u></strong>You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”</p><p>The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, <u>political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, </u>and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, <u>it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest,</u> just as someone might have real investment capital—<u>that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.</p><p></u>Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.</p><p>But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, <u>the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington</u> that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or<u> as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” </u>In theory, and in <u>practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.</p><p>Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. </u>“It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests.<u> Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”</p><p></u>ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ</p><p><u><strong> </u></strong>. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?”</p><p><u>Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got</u> the <u>Civil Rights</u> Act enacted, <u>along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed</u> in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)</p><p>And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either.</p><p>At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country.</p><p>Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it.</p><p>The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.</p><p>THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER</p><p>Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.</p><p>Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.</p><p>Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington.</p><p>Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories.</p><p><u>In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction.</p><p></u>Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature <u>Obama seems to be emerging, </u>one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. <u>If he can get some early wins—</u>as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—<u>that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”</p><p></u>. </p>	null	null	Plan	23,293	350	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,718	View their Thayer evidence with skepticism – his self-justifying research is a product of the military-industrial complex and ensure continued imperial violence.	Morrissey 11	Morrissey 11 [John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security, 22 FEB 2011, Antipode, Volume 43, Issue 2, pages 435–470, March 2011]	Thayer is just one of literally hundreds of national security “experts” within the “military–strategic studies complex” a powerful, well-funded assemblage of policy institutes, military colleges and university departments with close links to the D o D the complex is intricately informed by the territorial tactics of imperial history, and its close associations with the Pentagon are exposed in a critique of its ultimate countenancing of a state violence all too familiar to those whose “lived experience” it sets itself above	Thayer is just one of literally hundreds of national security “experts” within the “military–strategic studies complex” a powerful, well-funded assemblage of policy institutes, military colleges and university departments with close links to the the complex is intricately informed by the territorial tactics of imperial history, and its close associations with the Pentagon are exposed in a critique of its ultimate countenancing of a state violence all too familiar to those whose “lived experience” it sets itself above	Bradley Thayer is the senior analyst in international and national security at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. For Thayer, the war on terrorism “provides the opportunity to increase significantly American military and economic power in the Middle East”; it was “only by invading Iraq” that the United States could “reach its strategic objectives in the region”; and since the US is “an imperial power”, it should rightfully “exert its influence in the region [NOTE: Middle East] to bring about regional change” (2003:4, 15, 19). Thayer is just one of literally hundreds of national security “experts” within what can be called the “military–strategic studies complex” of the United States today. This complex is a powerful, well-funded assemblage of policy institutes, military colleges and university departments, all with close links to the US Department of Defense and specializing in Strategic Studies research, teaching and policy publications. Like the National Institute for Public Policy, many are located in and around Washington, DC and northern Virginia, and in post-9/11 America their proliferation can be read as an adjunct of the ascendant Pentagon of the Bush administration. The historical connections between Geography, geographical intelligence and military warfare have been well established (Mamadouh 2005; Woodward 2005). Anne Godlewska (1994) and Gerard Toal (Ó Tuathail forthcoming), for example, have illuminated the early military-induced institutionalization of modern Geography in Napoleonic France. Others have highlighted the key role played by prominent geographers through history—such as Isaiah Bowman in the United States and Halford Mackinder in Britain—in the advancement and enactment of imperial ambition (Kearns 2004; Smith 2003a). Yves Lacoste (1973) has illustrated the “geographical warfare” of the US military during the Vietnam War, while Ghazi Falah has shown the ongoing import of the “practice” of geography as a discipline, pointing out that “geography as practiced in Israeli academia today may provide one of the most distinctive cases in the political sociology of knowledge anywhere” (2005:1034). Geography as a university discipline first became established in Europe in the era of high colonialism, and a critical interrogation of its initial development divulges the part played by geographical methods, institutions and academics themselves in imperial practices of exploration and military conquest (Dodds 2009). Although geography was never simply a tool of imperialist expansion, elements of the discipline, including regional surveying and cartography, facilitated what Edward Said called “acts of geographical violence”, in which spaces were “explored, charted, and finally brought under control” (1993:271). The twentieth century's two world wars saw geography play an even more prominent role in both the practices of warfare and post-war statecraft (Barnes 2006; Clout and Gosme 2003; Farish 2005; Heffernan 1996). The import of geographical writing, mapping and surveying for the US military in particular continued through the Cold War (Barnes and Farish 2006; Farish 2006). Technical advances (especially in the USA) in the development of geographical surveying and analysis, including remote sensing, geographic information systems (GIS) and global positioning systems (GPS) saw geography expand its military/defense utility. Jon Cloud and Keith Clarke (1999:1), for example, have shown the “tangled relationships” between “civilian, military and intelligence remote sensing” during the early stages of the US space program. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, geography's service to the US military in the prosecution of the war was variously heralded, and in the initial stages of the Cold War, the existing assemblages of spatial, regional and geopolitical “geographical knowledges” were increasingly expanded (Barnes 2008). Geographical surveying, modelling and cartography became extensively entwined with what Senator J. William Fulbright lamented in 1967 as the “military–industrial–academic complex” (Leslie 1993). That complex had become more and more powerful through the course of the 1960s, rendering prescient what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned of in his farewell address to the American people in 1961; his oft-quoted speech originally including the term “academic” (see Giroux 2007).1 Various geographers have since skilfully unpacked geography's role in the “military–industrial–academic complex” since the Cold War (Barnes 2008; Cloud 2000, 2002; Ó Tuathail forthcoming). However, what I am endeavouring to do in this paper is to illuminate the expansion of specifically strategic studies from the late 1970s and early 1980s, whose resulting “military–strategic studies complex” I am arguing was an important development with continued consequences, and especially so for the Middle East.2 The paper seeks to chart the role played by an assemblage of “strategic studies” knowledges in the support and advancement of US geopolitics overseas, particularly in the Middle East. It begins by outlining the development of strategic studies in the USA before presenting a history of policy–institute connections to the Department of Defense (DoD) that culminated in the formation of dedicated DoD regional centers for strategic studies in the 1990s. The paper then uses the example of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, one of the most connected strategic studies institutes in Washington, to examine the contours of the dominant national security discourse of the military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America. That discourse is revealed as a well-established enunciation from unelected and unaccountable individuals of an enduring US leasehold empire in the Middle East—comprising military bases, access rights and pre-positioned equipment and supplies—and an enthusiastic championing of US global economic ambition and indeed responsibility in securitizing the regional political economy. Through the course of the paper, the military–strategic studies complex is shown to be intricately informed by the territorial tactics of imperial history, and its close associations with the Pentagon are exposed in a critique of its ultimate countenancing of a state violence all too familiar to those whose “lived experience” it sets itself above (Lefebvre 1991). The paper examines too the extent of alternative and resistant military–strategic visions in the USA today, before concluding by considering the responsibility of geography in advancing more grounded, nuanced and humane scriptings of the various worlds that form the backdrop of so much contemporary US geopolitical and geoeconomic calculation.	6,764	<h4>View their Thayer evidence with skepticism – his self-justifying research is a product of the military-industrial complex and ensure continued imperial violence.</h4><p><u><strong>Morrissey 11</u></strong> [John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security, 22 FEB 2011, Antipode, Volume 43, Issue 2, pages 435–470, March 2011]</p><p>Bradley Thayer is the senior analyst in international and national security at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. For Thayer, the war on terrorism “provides the opportunity to increase significantly American military and economic power in the Middle East”; it was “only by invading Iraq” that the United States could “reach its strategic objectives in the region”; and since the US is “an imperial power”, it should rightfully “exert its influence in the region [NOTE: Middle East] to bring about regional change” (2003:4, 15, 19). <u><mark>Thayer is just one of literally hundreds of national security “experts” within</u></mark> what can be called <u><mark>the “military–strategic studies complex”</u></mark> of the United States today. This complex is <u><mark>a powerful, well-funded assemblage of policy institutes, military colleges and university departments</u></mark>, all <u><mark>with close links to the</u></mark> US<u> D</u>epartment <u>o</u>f <u>D</u>efense and specializing in Strategic Studies research, teaching and policy publications. Like the National Institute for Public Policy, many are located in and around Washington, DC and northern Virginia, and in post-9/11 America their proliferation can be read as an adjunct of the ascendant Pentagon of the Bush administration. The historical connections between Geography, geographical intelligence and military warfare have been well established (Mamadouh 2005; Woodward 2005). Anne Godlewska (1994) and Gerard Toal (Ó Tuathail forthcoming), for example, have illuminated the early military-induced institutionalization of modern Geography in Napoleonic France. Others have highlighted the key role played by prominent geographers through history—such as Isaiah Bowman in the United States and Halford Mackinder in Britain—in the advancement and enactment of imperial ambition (Kearns 2004; Smith 2003a). Yves Lacoste (1973) has illustrated the “geographical warfare” of the US military during the Vietnam War, while Ghazi Falah has shown the ongoing import of the “practice” of geography as a discipline, pointing out that “geography as practiced in Israeli academia today may provide one of the most distinctive cases in the political sociology of knowledge anywhere” (2005:1034). Geography as a university discipline first became established in Europe in the era of high colonialism, and a critical interrogation of its initial development divulges the part played by geographical methods, institutions and academics themselves in imperial practices of exploration and military conquest (Dodds 2009). Although geography was never simply a tool of imperialist expansion, elements of the discipline, including regional surveying and cartography, facilitated what Edward Said called “acts of geographical violence”, in which spaces were “explored, charted, and finally brought under control” (1993:271). The twentieth century's two world wars saw geography play an even more prominent role in both the practices of warfare and post-war statecraft (Barnes 2006; Clout and Gosme 2003; Farish 2005; Heffernan 1996). The import of geographical writing, mapping and surveying for the US military in particular continued through the Cold War (Barnes and Farish 2006; Farish 2006). Technical advances (especially in the USA) in the development of geographical surveying and analysis, including remote sensing, geographic information systems (GIS) and global positioning systems (GPS) saw geography expand its military/defense utility. Jon Cloud and Keith Clarke (1999:1), for example, have shown the “tangled relationships” between “civilian, military and intelligence remote sensing” during the early stages of the US space program. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, geography's service to the US military in the prosecution of the war was variously heralded, and in the initial stages of the Cold War, the existing assemblages of spatial, regional and geopolitical “geographical knowledges” were increasingly expanded (Barnes 2008). Geographical surveying, modelling and cartography became extensively entwined with what Senator J. William Fulbright lamented in 1967 as the “military–industrial–academic complex” (Leslie 1993). That complex had become more and more powerful through the course of the 1960s, rendering prescient what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned of in his farewell address to the American people in 1961; his oft-quoted speech originally including the term “academic” (see Giroux 2007).1 Various geographers have since skilfully unpacked geography's role in the “military–industrial–academic complex” since the Cold War (Barnes 2008; Cloud 2000, 2002; Ó Tuathail forthcoming). However, what I am endeavouring to do in this paper is to illuminate the expansion of specifically strategic studies from the late 1970s and early 1980s, whose resulting “military–strategic studies complex” I am arguing was an important development with continued consequences, and especially so for the Middle East.2 The paper seeks to chart the role played by an assemblage of “strategic studies” knowledges in the support and advancement of US geopolitics overseas, particularly in the Middle East. It begins by outlining the development of strategic studies in the USA before presenting a history of policy–institute connections to the Department of Defense (DoD) that culminated in the formation of dedicated DoD regional centers for strategic studies in the 1990s. The paper then uses the example of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, one of the most connected strategic studies institutes in Washington, to examine the contours of the dominant national security discourse of the military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America. That discourse is revealed as a well-established enunciation from unelected and unaccountable individuals of an enduring US leasehold empire in the Middle East—comprising military bases, access rights and pre-positioned equipment and supplies—and an enthusiastic championing of US global economic ambition and indeed responsibility in securitizing the regional political economy. Through the course of the paper, <u><mark>the</u></mark> military–strategic studies <u><mark>complex is</u></mark> shown to be <u><mark>intricately informed by the territorial tactics of imperial history, and its close associations with the Pentagon are exposed in a critique of its ultimate countenancing of a state violence all too familiar to those whose “lived experience” it sets itself above</u></mark> (Lefebvre 1991). The paper examines too the extent of alternative and resistant military–strategic visions in the USA today, before concluding by considering the responsibility of geography in advancing more grounded, nuanced and humane scriptings of the various worlds that form the backdrop of so much contemporary US geopolitical and geoeconomic calculation.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	AT: Owen	93,767	6	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,719	Alt solves—Lal cites multiple historical examples of grassroots movements movements like the alternative that have forced states to move beyond a competitive framework—the end of the cold war, withdrawal from Vietnam, the end of historical rivalries in Europe.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Alt solves—Lal cites multiple historical examples of grassroots movements movements like the alternative that have <u>forced</u> states to move beyond a competitive framework—the end of the cold war, withdrawal from Vietnam, the end of historical rivalries in Europe.</h4>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	AT: Inevitable	430,811	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,720	Prefer our evidence-- Central purchasing avoids politics - government purchase avoids the objections	Rothman, 6	Rothman, 6 David J. Rothman, Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine and Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and Professor of History at Columbia University; and Sheila M. Rothman, Professor of Public Health in the Division of Sociomedical Sciences at the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, also Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons. The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales American Journal of Transplantation, 6(7); 1524-1529, 13 February 2006	Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central, UNOS-like organization, permitting individuals to sell but not to purchase an organ	Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central organization, permitting individuals to sell but not to purchase an organ	http://www.societyandmedicine.columbia.edu/organs_challenge.shtml The Myth of the Regulated Market Proponents offer very different models for a market in organs, making it difficult to know precisely what is being advocated. Some would restrict compensation to cadaveric organs and give credits to families who agree to the removal. Others, including a committee of the American Medical Association, endorse a futures market in organs: American Journal of Transplantation they would compensate would-be donors for agreeing to organ removal upon death (24–29). Still others urge a regulated market among living vendors but provide almost no details (1,6,20). Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central, UNOS-like organization, permitting individuals to sell but not to purchase an organ (30–32). Such compromises, it should be noted, are inconsistent with proponents’ attachment to the market. After all, people are even more likely to do something if they are very well paid for it—so why not permit auctions?	1,100	<h4><strong>Prefer our evidence-- Central purchasing avoids politics - government purchase avoids the objections</h4><p>Rothman, 6 </strong>David J. Rothman, Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine and Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and Professor of History at Columbia University; and Sheila M. Rothman, Professor of Public Health in the Division of Sociomedical Sciences at the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, also Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons.<strong> </strong>The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales<strong> </strong>American Journal of Transplantation, 6(7); 1524-1529, 13 February 2006</p><p>http://www.societyandmedicine.columbia.edu/organs_challenge.shtml</p><p>The Myth of the Regulated Market</p><p>Proponents offer very different models for a market in organs, making it difficult to know precisely what is being advocated. Some would restrict compensation to cadaveric organs and give credits to families who agree to the removal. Others, including a committee of the American Medical Association, endorse a futures market in organs: American Journal of Transplantation they would compensate would-be donors for agreeing to organ removal upon death (24–29). Still others urge a regulated market among living vendors but provide almost no details (1,6,20). <u><mark>Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central</mark>, UNOS-like <mark>organization, permitting individuals <strong>to sell but not to purchase</strong> an organ</u><strong></mark> (30–32). Such compromises, it should be noted, are inconsistent with proponents’ attachment to the market. After all, people are even more likely to do something if they are very well paid for it—so why not permit auctions?</p></strong>	null	null	Plan	430,212	17	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,721	Turns out both dems and republicans	Gregory ’11	Gregory, ’11 [Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR]	The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal . The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. studies show that this has become a matter of life and death	organ sales, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice, conservatives claim to favor free markets but self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts studies show that this has become a matter of life and death	The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that this has become a matter of life and death.	3,584	<h4><strong>Turns out both dems and republicans</h4><p>Gregory</strong>, <strong>’11</strong> [Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR]</p><p><u>The very idea of legalization <strong>might sound gruesome</strong> to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list</u>. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. <u><strong>Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's</u></strong>. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. <u>Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful</u>. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. <u>Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that <mark>organ sales,</mark> in and of themselves, <mark>are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal</u>.</mark> Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law<u>. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven <strong>highly controversial</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice</strong>,</mark>" and <mark>conservatives claim to favor free markets</mark>, <mark>but</mark> true <mark>self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts</mark>, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs.</u> In any event, <u><strong><mark>studies show that this has become a matter of life and death</u></strong></mark>.</p>	null	null	Plan	109,344	24	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,722	Claimed inevitability is the worst act of closure – alternative discourse is key and empirically solves	null	Kraig 02 – Robert Alexander is Wisconsin state political director for Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is also an instructor in the Communication Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 1-30	Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance realist/idealist dichotomy dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established The science This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved , is fate Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. . Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. matter of first principles denies all others alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences amateurs. no standing in debate those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement beyond the power of humans to mediate ] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism symbolic ammunition What is needed is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. History is replete with ideals that, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so.	Given claimed inevitability of realism one might think nations need not look to expert guidance realist dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who consider transcending established patterns Tremendous suffering can be rationalized away as the product of the impersonal system of power leaders are encouraged to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of politics realists deny these questions can be debated determinism of realism is antihumanist democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity i self-determining. Society as social contract which is subject to dialectical improvement What is needed is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. that realism engenders cynicism and fatalism in those who would engage moral questions History is replete with ideals that matured into social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance and socially active government were impossibilities. they suggest possibility of human social transformation surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so.	Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.	11,554	<h4>Claimed inevitability is the worst act of closure – alternative discourse is key and empirically solves </h4><p>Kraig 02 – Robert Alexander is Wisconsin state political director for Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is also an instructor in the Communication Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 1<u>-30</p><p><mark>Given</mark> the <mark>claimed inevitability of realism</mark>'s description</u> of international politics, <u><mark>one might think </mark>that <mark>nations need not look to expert guidance</mark> </u>because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the<u> <mark>realist</mark>/idealist dichotomy</u>. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this <u><mark>dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who</mark> dare to <mark>consider transcending</mark> or transforming <mark>established patterns</u></mark> of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in.<u> It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be <strong>rationally and objectively established</u></strong>. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." <u><strong>The science</u> </strong>of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy<strong>. <u>This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics</u>.</strong> Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political <u>realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved </u>upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words<u><strong>, is fate</u></strong>. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. <u><strong><mark>Tremendous</mark> human <mark>suffering can be rationalized away as the</mark> inevitable <mark>product of the impersonal</mark> international <mark>system of power</mark> relations. </strong>World <mark>leaders are</mark> actively <mark>encouraged</u></mark> by the realists <u><mark>to put aside moral pangs of doubt and <strong>play the game</strong> of</mark> international <mark>politics</mark> according to the established rules of political engagement. </u>This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation<u>. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true</u>.<u> The greatest barrier to engaging the <mark>realists </mark>in serious dialogue about their premises is that they <strong><mark>deny</mark> that <mark>these questions can be</mark> seriously <mark>debated</u></strong></mark>. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is <u><strong>imparted through the back door.</u> <u>It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description.</u></strong> The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a <u><strong>matter of first principles denies all others</u></strong>. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, <u><strong>alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences</u></strong>. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or <u><strong>amateurs.</u></strong> Such people have <u><strong>no standing in debate</u></strong> because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but <u><strong>those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate</u>.</strong> Third, the environmental<u> <mark>determinism of</mark> political <mark>realism</mark>, even though it is grounded in human social nature, <mark>is antihumanist</u></mark>. Much of the <u><mark>democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity i</mark>s</u> in some sense socially <u><mark>self-determining. Society as social contract</mark> is a joint project <mark>which</mark>, over time, <mark>is subject to dialectical improvement</u></mark>. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is <u><strong>beyond the power of humans to mediate</u>.</strong> 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22<u><strong>] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism</u>.</strong> Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable <u><strong>symbolic ammunition</u></strong>. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. <u><mark>What is needed</u></mark>, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, <u><strong><mark>is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric</strong>.</mark> It must be said, in the <strong>strongest possible terms,</strong> <mark>that realism engenders</mark> an attitude of <mark>cynicism and fatalism in those who</mark> <mark>would</mark> otherwise <mark>engage</mark> the great <mark>moral</mark> and political <mark>questions</mark> of our age.</u> 74 <u><mark>History is replete with ideals that</mark>,</u> after much time and effort, <u><mark>matured into</mark> new <mark>social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance</mark> on a mass scale <mark>and socially active government were</mark> empirical <mark>impossibilities.</u> <u></mark>However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, <mark>they suggest</mark> the power of ideals and the <mark>possibility of human social transformation</mark>. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. <strong>The <mark>surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so</strong>. </u></mark>This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	AT: Inevitable	877	18	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,723	Heres a bunch of counterexamples	Wright 5	Wright 5 Logan doctoral candidate in Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations at George Washington University in Washington, DC. http://survivedsars.typepad.com/survivedsars/2005/11/offensive_reali_1.html 11-18-05	Mearsheimer, the godfather of offensive realist theory provided a rejection of the idea of China's peaceful rise This article could have been written in 1985, 1995, or 2005. Mearsheimer was well-known for predicting the collapse of NATO and breakup of Europe Why would China have so few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia agree to sell China significant quantities of military hardware, if they were concerned about great power competition? Why would China's military modernization efforts be focused intensely on the Taiwan question, rather than larger issues of great-power competition Why would China attempt to join international institutions, Why would China have negotiated border settlements with India, Russia, and Kazakhstan on terms that were generally unfavorable to China How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer, before your predictions begin to make sense? how do you explain the collapse of the Soviet Union again	offensive realist theory was well-known for predicting collapse of NATO and breakup of Europe Why would China have few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia sell China military hardware, Why would military modernization be focused on Taiwan rather than larger issues Why would China join international institutions Why would China negotiate settlements with India on terms that were unfavorable to China How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer, before predictions make sense how do you explain collapse of the Soviet Union	It would take something like this to bring me out of my blogging slumber, which resulted from a trip to England and a general feeling that I'm behind on other work, so that I should stay away from blogging for a while. John Mearsheimer, the godfather of offensive realist theory, has provided a completely deductive, completely theoretical rejection of the idea of China's peaceful rise into the international system. When I read this article, I didn't even know where to start, and how to concisely summarize my criticism. I'm sure I'll fail to be brief, but I'll start this way: This article could have been written in 1985, 1995, or 2005. Mearsheimer was well-known for predicting the collapse of NATO at the end of the Cold War (he still claims he's right, given US-European tension) and the breakup of European integration into hypernationalist or ethnic conflict (again, Mearsheimer claims violence in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s provides support for his argument). There is a significant debate over whether theories should attempt to explain, predict, or contribute to understanding of international phenomena, but offensive realism is definitely in the "predictive" category, if only because its prescriptions are so unidirectional. In contrast to defensive realists like Robert Jervis, offensive realists argue that security, ultimately, is scarce, and states, in order to preserve their own security, must actually maximize their power. Note: not maintain, but maximize. This is what is so frustrating about this article. Mearsheimer lays out the case for great power competition between the United States and China. China - whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic - is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries, much the way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the US out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s. These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. Note what Mearsheimer said. "China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia." Maximize? Really? Keep in mind, this is the essential prediction of this theory, which is parsimonious, to Mearsheimer's credit. In light of this, I have a number of questions for Dr. Mearsheimer. If your theory is correct... Why would China have so few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia agree to sell China significant quantities of military hardware, if they were concerned about great power competition? Why would China's military modernization efforts be focused intensely on the Taiwan question, rather than larger issues of great-power competition (a blue-water navy, more ICBMs, etc.)? Why would China attempt to join international institutions, if they are concerned that these institutions are part of the global economic and political order dominated by the United States? Why would Chinese officials openly claim that they are not interested in pushing the United States out of Asia, as the US presence provides a level of security essential for China's economic growth? Why would China have negotiated border settlements with India, Russia, and Kazakhstan on terms that were generally unfavorable to China, given their past historical positions? Why would China attempt to work within existing international institutions, and campaign actively to join them, rather than attempting to create their own? Why would a democratic China still be interested in a military solution to the Taiwan issue? Why would Taiwan be opposed to reunification in such a scenario? Keep in mind, in offensive realism, the character of the state involved is not relevant to the analysis. How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer, before your predictions begin to make sense? How would this article have been different in 1985 or 1995, rather than 2005? Are we all just engaging in the Popperian "inductivist illusion" by having the audacity to look at empirical evidence, rather than living in our deductive theoretical cocoons? Or is the theory simply a cut too thin, designed to maximize parsimony at the expense of explaining independent observations? And by the way, how do you explain the collapse of the Soviet Union again?	5,289	<h4>Heres a bunch of counterexamples</h4><p><strong>Wright 5</strong> Logan doctoral candidate in Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations at George Washington University in Washington, DC. http://survivedsars.typepad.com/survivedsars/2005/11/offensive_reali_1.html 11-18-05</p><p>It would take something like this to bring me out of my blogging slumber, which resulted from a trip to England and a general feeling that I'm behind on other work, so that I should stay away from blogging for a while. John <u>Mearsheimer, the godfather of <mark>offensive realist theory</u></mark>, has <u>provided a </u>completely deductive, completely theoretical <u>rejection of the idea of China's peaceful rise </u>into the international system. When I read this article, I didn't even know where to start, and how to concisely summarize my criticism. I'm sure I'll fail to be brief, but I'll start this way: <u>This article could have been written in 1985, 1995, or 2005. Mearsheimer <mark>was well-known for predicting </mark>the <mark>collapse of NATO </u></mark>at the end of the Cold War (he still claims he's right, given US-European tension) <u><mark>and</u> </mark>the <u><mark>breakup of Europe</u></mark>an integration into hypernationalist or ethnic conflict (again, Mearsheimer claims violence in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s provides support for his argument). There is a significant debate over whether theories should attempt to explain, predict, or contribute to understanding of international phenomena, but offensive realism is definitely in the "predictive" category, if only because its prescriptions are so unidirectional. In contrast to defensive realists like Robert Jervis, offensive realists argue that security, ultimately, is scarce, and states, in order to preserve their own security, must actually maximize their power. Note: not maintain, but maximize. This is what is so frustrating about this article. Mearsheimer lays out the case for great power competition between the United States and China. China - whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic - is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries, much the way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the US out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s. These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. Note what Mearsheimer said. "China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia." Maximize? Really? Keep in mind, this is the essential prediction of this theory, which is parsimonious, to Mearsheimer's credit. In light of this, I have a number of questions for Dr. Mearsheimer. If your theory is correct... <u><mark>Why would China have </mark>so <mark>few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia</mark> agree to <mark>sell China </mark>significant quantities of <mark>military hardware, </mark>if they were concerned </p><p>about great power competition? <mark>Why would</mark> China's <mark>military modernization</mark> efforts <mark>be focused</mark> intensely <mark>on</mark> the <mark>Taiwan</mark> question, <mark>rather than</mark> <mark>larger issues</mark> of great-power competition </u>(a blue-water navy, more ICBMs, etc.)? <u><mark>Why would China </mark>attempt to <mark>join international institutions</mark>, </u>if they are concerned that these institutions are part of the global economic and political order dominated by the United States? Why would Chinese officials openly claim that they are not interested in pushing the United States out of Asia, as the US presence provides a level of security essential for China's economic growth? <u><mark>Why would China </mark>have <mark>negotiate</mark>d border <mark>settlements with India</mark>, Russia, and Kazakhstan <mark>on terms that were </mark>generally <mark>unfavorable to China</u></mark>, given their past historical positions? Why would China attempt to work within existing international institutions, and campaign actively to join them, rather than attempting to create their own? Why would a democratic China still be interested in a military solution to the Taiwan issue? Why would Taiwan be opposed to reunification in such a scenario? Keep in mind, in offensive realism, the character of the state involved is not relevant to the analysis.<u> <mark>How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer,</mark> <mark>before</mark> your <mark>predictions</mark> begin to <mark>make sense</mark>? </u>How would this article have been different in 1985 or 1995, rather than 2005? Are we all just engaging in the Popperian "inductivist illusion" by having the audacity to look at empirical evidence, rather than living in our deductive theoretical cocoons? Or is the theory simply a cut too thin, designed to maximize parsimony at the expense of explaining independent observations? And by the way,<u> <mark>how do you explain </mark>the <mark>collapse of the Soviet Union </mark>again</u>?</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	AT: Framework	AT: Inevitable	430,552	6	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,724	Doctors support	Erin and Harris 3	Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full	the American Medical Association voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.	, the A M A voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.	At its annual meeting in 1999, the British Medical Association voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK moving to a system of presumed consent for organ donation,3 a proposed change in policy that the UK government immediately rejected.4 What else might we do to increase the supply of donor organs? At its annual meeting in 2002, the American Medical Association voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers.5 In 1998, the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.6 In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme.7 Now may be an appropriate time to revisit the idea of a market in donor organs.8 Our focus then, as now, is organs obtained from the living since creating a market in cadaver organs is uneconomic and is more likely to reduce supply than increase it and the chief reason for considering sale of organs is to improve availability.	1,159	<h4>Doctors support</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>At its annual meeting in 1999, the British Medical Association voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK moving to a system of presumed consent for organ donation,3 a proposed change in policy that the UK government immediately rejected.4 What else might we do to increase the supply of donor organs? At its annual meeting in 2002<mark>, <u>the A</mark>merican <mark>M</mark>edical <mark>A</mark>ssociation <mark>voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers</u></mark>.5 In 1998, <u><mark>the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.</u></mark>6 In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme.7 Now may be an appropriate time to revisit the idea of a market in donor organs.8 Our focus then, as now, is organs obtained from the living since creating a market in cadaver organs is uneconomic and is more likely to reduce supply than increase it and the chief reason for considering sale of organs is to improve availability.</p>	null	null	Plan	430,752	3	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,725	That influences the election	Stone 12	Stone 12 Melissa, MD Candidate, Miami University Medical School; “THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION IN THE 1950S AND THE 2000S: FEAR VS. COMPASSION” University of Miami Humanities in Medicine; March 14, 2012; http://umhm.mededu.miami.edu/?p=394	As the largest association of physicians and medical students in the United States the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation and how it will influence physicians Over the years, the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation, and this coverage has been given much clout.	As the largest association of physicians and medical students the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation this coverage has much clout.	The American Medical Association (AMA) has been on both sides of the national health reform campaign since the beginning of the twentieth century when the American Association for Labor Legislation first proposed a national health insurance plan. As the largest association of physicians and medical students in the United States, the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation and how it will influence physicians, specifically with regards to their incomes. Over the years, the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation, and this coverage has been given much clout. In the 1950s, the AMA was vehemently opposed to any changes to the current health care system, whereas in the 2000s, the AMA had a more nuanced view on health care since the organization fought for more health insurance for the less fortunate but disagreed with how the government proposed to do this. In both instances, the AMA enacted a large-scale media campaign opposing the reform, claiming health insurance controlled by the government would limit patients’ choices and freedoms. However, to invoke an anti-health care legislation sentiment in the 1950s, the AMA appealed to the public’s panic of a Socialist agenda while in the 2000s, the AMA appealed to the public’s sympathy for the less fortunate. Ultimately, through these campaigns, the American people have responded more strongly to fear than to compassion.	1,457	<h4>That influences the election</h4><p><strong>Stone 12 </strong>Melissa, MD Candidate, Miami University Medical School; “THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION IN THE 1950S AND THE 2000S: FEAR VS. COMPASSION” University of Miami Humanities in Medicine; March 14, 2012; http://umhm.mededu.miami.edu/?p=394</p><p>The American Medical Association (AMA) has been on both sides of the national health reform campaign since the beginning of the twentieth century when the American Association for Labor Legislation first proposed a national health insurance plan. <u><mark>As the largest association of physicians and medical students</mark> in the United States</u>,<u> <mark>the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation</mark> and how it will influence physicians</u>, specifically with regards to their incomes. <u>Over the years, <mark>the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation</mark>, and <mark>this coverage has</mark> been given <mark>much clout.</u></mark> In the 1950s, the AMA was vehemently opposed to any changes to the current health care system, whereas in the 2000s, the AMA had a more nuanced view on health care since the organization fought for more health insurance for the less fortunate but disagreed with how the government proposed to do this. In both instances, the AMA enacted a large-scale media campaign opposing the reform, claiming health insurance controlled by the government would limit patients’ choices and freedoms. However, to invoke an anti-health care legislation sentiment in the 1950s, the AMA appealed to the public’s panic of a Socialist agenda while in the 2000s, the AMA appealed to the public’s sympathy for the less fortunate. Ultimately, through these campaigns, the American people have responded more strongly to fear than to compassion. </p>	null	null	Plan	430,753	2	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,726	De facto federalism limits instability.	Cordesman and Mann 6/26	Cordesman and Mann 6/26 [Anthony H. Cordesman and Sean T. Mann, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, AFGHANISTAN: THE FAILING ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION Third Working Draft: June 26, 2012 http://csis.org/files/publication/120626_Afghan_Uncert_Econ_Trans.pdf]	insurgent groups represent small, unpopular movements with ethnic and sectarian ties that limit their influence Even if the US and allies cannot achieve the level of stability they desire, this does not mean Afghanistan cannot achieve relative stability based on some form of de facto federalism between the government and given factions. This may limit insurgent gains and control as well as mitigate the risk Afghanistan will become a center of terrorism.	insurgent groups represent small, unpopular movements with ethnic and sectarian ties that limit their influence Even if the US and allies cannot achieve the level of stability they desire, this does not mean Afghanistan cannot achieve based on some form of de facto federalism between the government and given factions. This may limit insurgent gains and control as well as mitigate the risk Afghanistan will become a center of terrorism.	It is still clear, however, that the economics of Transition – and the level of future US and other donor military and civilian aid efforts – are critical if Afghanistan is to have a chance of creating a reasonable level of post-2014 security and stability. It is also important to remember – for all the problems involved in creating any form of successful ransition – that the various insurgent groups still represent relatively small, unpopular movements with ethnic and sectarian ties that limit their influence in many parts of the country. Even if the US and its allies cannot achieve the level of post-2014 stability and security they desire, this does not mean that Afghanistan cannot achieve relative stability based on some form of de facto federalism or sharing of power between the central government and given factions. This may limit insurgent gains and control as well as mitigate the risk that Afghanistan will become a center of terrorism.	971	<h4>De facto federalism limits instability.</h4><p><u><strong>Cordesman and Mann 6/26</u></strong> [Anthony H. Cordesman and Sean T. Mann, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, AFGHANISTAN: THE FAILING ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION Third Working Draft: June 26, 2012 http://csis.org/files/publication/120626_Afghan_Uncert_Econ_Trans.pdf<u><mark>]</p><p></u></mark>It is still clear, however, that the economics of Transition – and the level of future US and other donor military and civilian aid efforts – are critical if Afghanistan is to have a chance of creating a reasonable level of post-2014 security and stability. It is also important to remember – for all the problems involved in creating any form of successful ransition – that the various <u><mark>insurgent groups</u></mark> still <u><mark>represent</u></mark> relatively <u><mark>small, unpopular movements with ethnic and sectarian ties that <strong>limit their influence</u></strong></mark> in many parts of the country. <u><mark>Even if the US and</u></mark> its <u><mark>allies cannot achieve the level of </u></mark>post-2014 <u><mark>stability</u></mark> and security <u><mark>they desire, this does not mean</u></mark> that <u><mark>Afghanistan cannot achieve <strong></mark>relative stability</strong><mark> based on some form of <strong>de facto federalism</u></strong></mark> or sharing of power <u><mark>between the</u></mark> central <u><mark>government and given factions. This may <strong>limit insurgent gains</strong> and control as well as <strong>mitigate the risk</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>Afghanistan will become a center of terrorism.</p></u></mark>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,813	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,727	No civil war – compromise is likely.	Dreyfuss 7/18	Dreyfuss 7/18 [Robert, independent, investigative journalist in the Washington, D.C, area, who writes frequently for The Nation, Rolling Stone, and other publications. His blog, The Dreyfuss Report, appears at TheNation.com. He is the author of ‘Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam’. Predictions for Afghan Civil War Are Foolhardy July 18, 2012 http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/18/predictions-for-afghan-civil-war-are-foolhardy/]	Far more likely, Afghanistan will muddle through – what commanders call “Afghan good enough” – and both Afghanistan’s factions and its neighbors will look over the cliff and then decide it’s time to compromise. former Afghan Ambassador says the various actors in the Afghan drama are likely to strike a deal, and points to Track II diplomatic encounters to back this up.	Far more likely, Afghanistan will muddle through – what commanders call – and both Afghanistan’s factions and its neighbors will look over the cliff and then decide it’s time to compromise. former Afghan Ambassador says the various actors in the Afghan drama are likely to strike a deal, and points to Track II diplomatic encounters to back this up.	Far more likely, Afghanistan will muddle through – what some U.S. commanders call “Afghan good enough” – and both Afghanistan’s rambunctious factions and its trouble-making neighbors will look over the cliff and then decide that it’s time to compromise. Omar Samad thinks that’s probably what’s going to happen. Samad, former Afghan Ambassador to France and Canada, says that as long as a number of pieces fall into place between now and 2014, the various actors in the Afghan drama are likely to strike a deal, and he points to a series of Track II diplomatic encounters, most recently in Paris and Kyoto, to back this up. “Those who are concerned about a Taliban takeover and about an unjust power grab by the Taliban would be satisfied [with] a requirement that the Taliban accept to be a political force, and not an armed force,” says Samad, in an interview with The Diplomat. And, he says, if the Pakistani strategists who handle “the Taliban file” in Islamabad can be persuaded to cooperate, then an arrangement might be worked out. “The Taliban’s choice will be made easier if Pakistan plays a more constructive and helpful role,” he says.	1,148	<h4>No civil war – compromise is likely.</h4><p><u><strong>Dreyfuss 7/18</u></strong> [Robert, independent, investigative journalist in the Washington, D.C, area, who writes frequently for The Nation, Rolling Stone, and other publications. His blog, The Dreyfuss Report, appears at TheNation.com. He is the author of ‘Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam’. Predictions for Afghan Civil War Are Foolhardy July 18, 2012 http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/18/predictions-for-afghan-civil-war-are-foolhardy/]</p><p><u><strong><mark>Far more likely</strong>, Afghanistan will muddle through – what</u></mark> some U.S. <u><mark>commanders call <strong></mark>“Afghan good enough”</strong><mark> – and both Afghanistan’s</u></mark> rambunctious <u><mark>factions and its</u></mark> trouble-making <u><mark>neighbors will look over the cliff and then decide</u></mark> that <u><mark>it’s time to compromise.</u></mark> Omar Samad thinks that’s probably what’s going to happen. Samad, <u><mark>former Afghan Ambassador</u></mark> to France and Canada, <u><mark>says</u></mark> that as long as a number of pieces fall into place between now and 2014, <u><mark>the various actors in the Afghan drama are <strong>likely to strike a deal</strong>, and</u></mark> he <u><mark>points to</u></mark> a series of <u><mark>Track II diplomatic encounters</u></mark>, most recently in Paris and Kyoto, <u><mark>to back this up.</u></mark> “Those who are concerned about a Taliban takeover and about an unjust power grab by the Taliban would be satisfied [with] a requirement that the Taliban accept to be a political force, and not an armed force,” says Samad, in an interview with The Diplomat. And, he says, if the Pakistani strategists who handle “the Taliban file” in Islamabad can be persuaded to cooperate, then an arrangement might be worked out. “The Taliban’s choice will be made easier if Pakistan plays a more constructive and helpful role,” he says.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,814	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,728	No escalation in the Middle East	Maloney, Brookings, 7 ]	Maloney, Brookings, 7 [Suzanne, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, International Herald Tribune Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World, Civil War Ray Takeyh, Fellow Steven A. Cook, Fellow June 28, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm]	Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war Middle Eastern leaders are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has developed an intuitive ability to contain civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.	Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are to go to war Middle Eastern leaders are primarily interested in one thing: most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power there is for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has developed an intuitive ability to contain civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.	Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.	2,831	<h4>No escalation in the Middle East</h4><p><u><strong>Maloney, Brookings, 7</u></strong> [Suzanne, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, International Herald Tribune Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World, Civil War Ray Takeyh, Fellow Steven A. Cook, Fellow June 28, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm<strong>]</p><p></strong>Yet, the <u><mark>Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are <strong></mark>very unlikely</strong><mark> to go to war</u></mark> either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, <u><mark>Middle Eastern leaders</u></mark>, like politicians everywhere, <u><mark>are primarily interested in one thing: <strong></mark>self-preservation</u></strong>. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, <u><mark>most Arab armies are <strong>geared toward regime protection </strong>rather than projecting power</u></mark> and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, <u><mark>there is <strong></mark>no precedent</strong><mark> for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved</u></mark>. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But <u><mark>given its <strong>experifence with ambiguous conflicts</strong>, the region has</u></mark> also <u><mark>developed an intuitive ability to <strong>contain</u></strong></mark> its <u><strong><mark>civil strife</strong> and <strong>prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.</p></u></strong></mark>	null	null	Plan	66,157	251	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,729	Marijuana doesn’t bring in much cartel money- their cards are based on total fabrications	Bond et al 2010	Bond et al 2010 (Brittany M., economist at the U.S. Department of Commerce; Jonathan Caulkins, H. Guyford Stever Professorship of Operations Research and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon; Beau Kilmer and Peter Reuter, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf)	violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization in the United States. Often, big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around with little thought one analysis estimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting marijuana the figures have been repeated in the popular press The figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up. no data support the claim that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds let alone that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico. This is three times the UNODC upper bound for total U.S. consumption	violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around with little thought one analysis stimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting marijuana The figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up. no data support the claim that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds let a one that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico. This is three times the UNODC upper bound for total U.S. consumption	Not surprisingly, violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization in the United States. Often, big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around in drug policy discussions with little thought and, frankly, little consequence. Some U.S. government reports suggest that Mexican and Colombian DTOs combined earn $18 billion–$39 billion annually in wholesale drug proceeds (NDIC, 2008d), and one analysis even estimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting marijuana (ONDCP, 2006). Legalization advocates seize on such figures to supplement their traditional arguments, and the figures have been repeated in the popular press, with even respectable news sources claiming that “the Mexican cartels could be selling $20 billion worth of marijuana in the U.S. market each year” (Fainaru and Booth, 2009). The $20 billion figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up. However, no data support the claim that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds (~16,000 metric tons [MT]) per year, let alone that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico. (This point is addressed in detail in Chapter Three.) This is three times the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) (2009) upper bound for total U.S. consumption and nearly four times the amount estimated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DASC, 2002).	1,506	<h4>Marijuana doesn’t bring in much cartel money- their cards are based on total fabrications</h4><p><strong>Bond et al 2010</strong> (Brittany M., economist at the U.S. Department of Commerce; Jonathan Caulkins, H. Guyford Stever Professorship of Operations Research and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon; Beau Kilmer and Peter Reuter, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf)</p><p>Not surprisingly, <u><strong><mark>violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization</mark> in the United States. Often, <mark>big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around</u></strong></mark> in drug policy discussions <u><strong><mark>with little thought</u></strong></mark> and, frankly, little consequence. Some U.S. government reports suggest that Mexican and Colombian DTOs combined earn $18 billion–$39 billion annually in wholesale drug proceeds (NDIC, 2008d), and <u><strong><mark>one analysis</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong>e<mark>stimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting marijuana</u></strong></mark> (ONDCP, 2006). Legalization advocates seize on such figures to supplement their traditional arguments, and <u><strong>the figures have been repeated in the popular press</u></strong>, with even respectable news sources claiming that “the Mexican cartels could be selling $20 billion worth of marijuana in the U.S. market each year” (Fainaru and Booth, 2009). <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> $20 billion <u><strong><mark>figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the</mark> <mark>Mexican government</mark> <mark>that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up.</u></strong></mark> However, <u><strong><mark>no data support the claim</u></strong> <u><strong>that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds</u></strong></mark> (~16,000 metric tons [MT]) per year, <u><strong><mark>let a</mark>l<mark>one that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico.</u></strong></mark> (This point is addressed in detail in Chapter Three.) <u><strong><mark>This is three times</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong></mark> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (<u><strong><mark>UNODC</u></strong></mark>) (2009) <u><strong><mark>upper bound for total U.S. consumption</u></strong></mark> and nearly four times the amount estimated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DASC, 2002).</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	55,187	7	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,730	No Middle East war – leaders across the region are committed to self-preservation and domestic political stability. Most Arab armies are designed for regime protection, not power projection. Empirics prove no drag-in. Local conflicts will remain contained. That’s Maloney.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>No Middle East war – leaders across the region are committed to self-preservation and domestic political stability. Most Arab armies are designed for regime protection, not power projection. Empirics prove no drag-in. Local conflicts will remain contained. That’s Maloney.</h4>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,815	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,731	No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—</h4>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,816	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,732	Empirics prove.	Drum 7 [Kevin, staff writer for Washington Monthly, 9/9/07, Political Animal,http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012029.php]	Drum 7 [Kevin, staff writer for Washington Monthly, 9/9/07, Political Animal,http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012029.php]	Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Iran and Iraq fought Soviets fought in Afghanistan U.S. fought the Gulf War Algeria fought for a decade. No regional conflagration.	Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East Iran and Iraq fought Soviets fought in Afghanistan U.S. fought the Gulf War Algeria fought for a decade.	Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.	946	<h4>Empirics prove.</h4><p><u><strong>Drum 7<mark> [Kevin, staff writer for Washington Monthly, 9/9/07, Political Animal,http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012029.php]</p><p></u></strong></mark>Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. <u><mark>Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East</mark>.</u> Result: no regional conflagration. <u><mark>Iran and Iraq fought</mark> </u>one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The <u><mark>Soviets fought in Afghanistan</u></mark> and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The <u><mark>U.S. fought the Gulf War</u></mark> and then left. No regional conflagration. <u><mark>Algeria fought</u></mark> an internal civil war <u><mark>for a decade. <strong></mark>No regional conflagration.</p></u></strong>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	102,365	32	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,733	Their impact ev is all political hype	Stewart 2014	Stewart 2014 (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)	Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004 the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010 This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism other analysts believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded	Lost in the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that 2013 immigration was down significantly from historical levels This hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at intervals for years along with the boogeyman of terrorism an analysis of the history of plots and the changes in transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded	Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis” is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010.¶ This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border is not new. It is something that has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now, along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While other border security analysts have told reporters that they believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded.	2,127	<h4>Their impact ev is all political hype</h4><p><strong>Stewart 2014</strong> (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Lost in</mark> all <mark>the</mark> <mark>media hype over this “border crisis</u></strong></mark>” <u><strong><mark>is the fact that</mark> in <mark>2013</mark> overall <mark>immigration was down significantly from historical</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>levels</u></strong></mark>. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, <u><strong>there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004</u></strong>. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, <u><strong>the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>This</mark> type of <mark>hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border</u></strong></mark> is not new. It is something that <u><strong><mark>has surfaced at</mark> irregular <mark>intervals</mark> <mark>for years</mark> now</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>along with</mark> scaremongering using <mark>the boogeyman of terrorism</u></strong></mark>, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While <u><strong>other</u></strong> border security <u><strong>analysts</u></strong> have told reporters that they <u><strong>believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis</u></strong> and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that <u><strong><mark>an analysis of the history of</mark> <mark>plots</mark> directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas <mark>and</mark> an examination of <mark>the changes in</mark> the dynamics of <mark>transnational terrorism</mark> <mark>show such claims to be unfounded</u></strong></mark>.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	220,701	15	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,734	Regional multipolarity checks escalation.	Gause 11	Gause 11 [F. Gregory Gause III, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont and Director of its Middle East Studies Program Misdiagnosing the Middle East \| May 26, 2011 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/misdiagnosing-the-middle-east-5368?page=show]	Our core interest is not at risk now. There is a natural multipolarity in the region—Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia will balance each other aggressively in their own interests. no matter what their domestic political arrangements are.	Our core interest is not at risk now. There is a in the region—Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia will balance each other aggressively in their own interests. no matter what their domestic political arrangements are.	Our core interest in the region is preventing any hostile power from dominating it politically and militarily, and thus being able to affect the production and flow of oil there. That interest is not particularly at risk now. There is a natural multipolarity in the region—Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. They will balance each other aggressively in their own interests. They will do that no matter what their domestic political arrangements are. We can assist in that process, shoring up the weak against the strong and standing ready to intervene against any effort to establish military control over the Persian Gulf. We can do that from offshore. Preventing Arab-Israeli conflict is an important part of avoiding regional upheaval. We should continue in that diplomatic effort, recognizing that the conditions on the ground are not particularly propitious for progress right now. We can acknowledge that military bases in unstable countries are more trouble than they are worth, and thus reconsider our basing arrangements in Bahrain. We can recognize that the day of the stable Arab authoritarian is over, and wish the forces of democracy and freedom in the region well, being the friends of liberty for all but the champion only of our own.	1,257	<h4>Regional multipolarity checks escalation.</h4><p><u><strong>Gause 11</u></strong> [F. Gregory Gause III, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont and Director of its Middle East Studies Program Misdiagnosing the Middle East \| May 26, 2011 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/misdiagnosing-the-middle-east-5368?page=show]</p><p><u><mark>Our core interest</u></mark> in the region is preventing any hostile power from dominating it politically and militarily, and thus being able to affect the production and flow of oil there. That interest <u><mark>is not</u></mark> particularly<u><mark> at risk now. There is a <strong></mark>natural multipolarity</strong><mark> in the region—Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia</u></mark>. They <u><mark>will <strong>balance each other aggressively in their own interests.</u></strong></mark> They will do that <u><mark>no matter what their domestic political arrangements are.</u></mark> We can assist in that process, shoring up the weak against the strong and standing ready to intervene against any effort to establish military control over the Persian Gulf. We can do that from offshore. Preventing Arab-Israeli conflict is an important part of avoiding regional upheaval. We should continue in that diplomatic effort, recognizing that the conditions on the ground are not particularly propitious for progress right now. We can acknowledge that military bases in unstable countries are more trouble than they are worth, and thus reconsider our basing arrangements in Bahrain. We can recognize that the day of the stable Arab authoritarian is over, and wish the forces of democracy and freedom in the region well, being the friends of liberty for all but the champion only of our own.</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,817	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,735	No plots have EVER come from the US-Mexico border	Stewart 2014	Stewart 2014 (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)	an examination of all jihadist plots since the first such attack in the United States shows that none had any U.S.-Mexico border link. there have been more plots against the U.S. homeland that have involved the U.S.-Canada border most terrorists have entered the U S by flying There is not one jihadist attack or thwarted plot in which Mexican criminal organizations smuggled the operative into the U S There was one bumbling plot by Iran in which a U.S. citizen traveled to Mexico to contract a team of Mexican cartel hit men Instead he encountered a U.S. D E A informant a sting	an examination of all plots since the first attack in the U S shows that none had any Mexico border link more have involved the U.S.-Canada border most terrorists entered the U S by flying There was one bumbling plot by Iran in which a U.S. citizen traveled to Mexico to contract hit men Instead he encountered a sting	However, an examination of all jihadist plots since the first such attack in the United States — the November 1990 assassination of the radical founder of the Jewish Defense League, Meir Kahane — shows that none had any U.S.-Mexico border link. Indeed, as we’ve noted elsewhere, there have been more plots against the U.S. homeland that have involved the U.S.-Canada border, including the 1997 plot to bomb the New York Subway and the Millennium Bomb Plot. But by and large, most terrorists, including those behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 attacks, have entered the United States by flying directly to the country. There is not one jihadist attack or thwarted plot in which Mexican criminal organizations smuggled the operative into the United States.¶ There was one bumbling plot by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in which Manssor Arbabsiar, a U.S. citizen born in Iran and residing in Texas, traveled to Mexico in an attempt to contract a team of Mexican cartel hit men to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. Instead of Los Zetas, he encountered a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration informant and was set up for a sting. There is no evidence that an actual Mexican cartel leader would have accepted the money Arbabsiar offered for the assassination.	1,306	<h4>No plots have EVER come from the US-Mexico border</h4><p><strong>Stewart 2014</strong> (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)</p><p>However, <u><strong><mark>an examination of all</mark> jihadist <mark>plots since the first</mark> such <mark>attack in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates </u></strong>— the November 1990 assassination of the radical founder of the Jewish Defense League, Meir Kahane — <u><strong><mark>shows that none had any</mark> U.S.-<mark>Mexico</mark> <mark>border link</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed, as we’ve noted elsewhere, <u><strong>there have been <mark>more</mark> plots against the U.S. homeland that <mark>have involved the U.S.-Canada border</u></strong></mark>, including the 1997 plot to bomb the New York Subway and the Millennium Bomb Plot. But by and large, <u><strong><mark>most terrorists</u></strong></mark>, including those behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 attacks, <u><strong>have <mark>entered the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>by flying</u></strong></mark> directly to the country. <u><strong>There is not one jihadist attack or thwarted plot in which Mexican criminal organizations smuggled the operative into the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates.¶ <u><strong><mark>There was one bumbling plot</u></strong> <u><strong>by Iran</u></strong></mark>’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps <u><strong><mark>in which</u></strong></mark> Manssor Arbabsiar, <u><strong><mark>a U.S. citizen</u></strong></mark> born in Iran and residing in Texas, <u><strong><mark>traveled to Mexico </u></strong></mark>in an attempt <u><strong><mark>to contract</mark> a team of Mexican cartel <mark>hit men</u></strong></mark> to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. <u><strong><mark>Instead</u></strong></mark> of Los Zetas, <u><strong><mark>he encountered</mark> a U.S. D</u></strong>rug <u><strong>E</u></strong>nforcement <u><strong>A</u></strong>dministration <u><strong>informant</u></strong> and was set up for <u><strong><mark>a sting</u></strong></mark>. There is no evidence that an actual Mexican cartel leader would have accepted the money Arbabsiar offered for the assassination.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	431,061	8	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,736	No war – China won’t risk it all and no flashpoints.	Bremmer 10	Bremmer 10 [Ian, president of Eurasia Group and the author, most recently, of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?, Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020 July/August 2010 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html]	Beijing has no incentive to challenge U.S. power. its economy has grown so quickly and living standards improved so dramatically, It has no incentive to sever its expanding commercial ties all over the world—and the U S familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is aware no U.S. government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island it has co-opted via privileged access to investment opportunities	Beijing has no incentive to challenge U.S. power. its economy has grown so quickly and living standards improved so dramatically It has no incentive to sever its expanding commercial ties all over the world—and the U S familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is aware no U.S. government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island it has co-opted via privileged access to investment opportunities	In addition, Beijing has no incentive to mount a global military challenge to U.S. power. China will one day possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but its economy has grown so quickly over the past two decades, and its living standards improved so dramatically, that it is difficult to imagine the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all by posing the West a large-scale military challenge. It has no incentive to allow anything less than the most serious threat to its sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might sever its expanding network of commercial ties with countries all over the world—and with the United States, the European Union, and Japan, in particular. The more familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is well aware that no U.S. government will support a Taiwanese bid for independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already, via an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of privileged access to investment opportunities on the mainland.	1,106	<h4>No war – China won’t risk it all and no flashpoints.</h4><p><u><strong>Bremmer 10</u></strong> [Ian, president of Eurasia Group and the author, most recently, of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?, Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020 July/August 2010 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html] </p><p>In addition, <u><strong><mark>Beijing has no incentive to</u></strong></mark> mount a global military <u><strong><mark>challenge</u></strong></mark> to <u><strong><mark>U.S. power</strong>.</u></mark> China will one day possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but <u><mark>its economy has <strong>grown so quickly</u></strong></mark> over the past two decades, <u><mark>and</mark> </u>its <u><mark>living standards improved so dramatically</mark>, </u>that it is difficult to imagine the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all by posing the West a large-scale military challenge. <u><mark>It has <strong>no incentive</strong> to</u></mark> allow anything less than the most serious threat to its sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might <u><mark>sever its expanding</u></mark> network of <u><mark>commercial ties</u></mark> with countries <u><mark>all over the world—and</u></mark> with <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, the European Union, and Japan, in particular. The more <u><mark>familiar flash points are <strong>especially unlikely</strong> to spark a hot war: Beijing is</u></mark> well <u><mark>aware</u></mark> that <u><mark>no U.S. government will support</u></mark> a <u><mark>Taiwanese</u></mark> bid for <u><mark>independence, and China need not invade an island</u></mark> that <u><mark>it has</u></mark> largely <u><mark>co-opted</u></mark> already, <u><mark>via</u></mark> an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of <u><mark>privileged access to investment opportunities</u></mark> on the mainland.</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	403,387	3	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,737	No nuclear terror.	Chapman 12	Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]	Given their inability to do something simple Ohio State University professor John Mueller “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” Russia’s devices are no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.	Given their inability to do something simple “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.	Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.	2,150	<h4>No nuclear terror.</h4><p><u><strong>Chapman 12</u></strong> [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html<u><mark>]</p><p>Given their inability to do something simple</u></mark> — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued <u><strong>Ohio State University professor John Mueller</u></strong> in a presentation at the University of Chicago, <u><mark>“the likelihood</u></mark> that <u><mark>a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems</u></mark> to be <u><strong><mark>vanishingly small.”</u></strong></mark> The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from <u><strong>Russia’s</u></strong> inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those <u><strong>devices are</u></strong> probably <u><strong>no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards</u></strong> designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of <u><mark>building a bomb</u></mark>. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It <u><mark>requires millions </u></mark>of dollars, <u><mark>a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus</u></mark> people with <u><mark>specialized skills</u></mark>, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. <u><mark>Assuming</u></mark> the <u><mark>jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.</u></mark> Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like <u><mark>every</u></mark> other <u><mark>step</u></mark> in the entire process, <u><mark>means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.</u></mark> That has heartening implications. If <u><mark>al-Qaida </u></mark>embarks on the project, it <u><mark>has <strong>only a minuscule chance</u></strong></mark> of seeing it bear fruit. <u><mark>Given the formidable odds, <strong>it</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>won’t bother.</p></u></strong></mark>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	18,931	81	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,738	No War – economic interdependence	Bunn et al. 13	Bunn et al. 13 [Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship September 2013 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MAD%20English.pdf]	Common interests in a healthy and growing world economy supersede differences in economic systems. Economic ties between Russia and the E U are evolving in a positive direction. That economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia virtually unthinkable.	null	In the era of globalization, the role of economic relations has changed. Common interests in a healthy and growing world economy supersede differences in economic systems. Transnational corporations in the manufacturing and financial sectors have linked most of the countries in the world with economic ties. Any military conflict disrupts these links and causes significant economic damage. In fact, maintaining the stability of the world economy has become a constraining factor in military conflicts. Economic ties between Russia and the European Union are also evolving in a positive direction. That economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia virtually unthinkable.	696	<h4>No War – economic interdependence</h4><p><u><strong>Bunn et al. 13</u></strong> [Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship September 2013<u> http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MAD%20English.pdf] </p><p></u>In the era of globalization, the role of economic relations has changed. <u>Common interests in a healthy and growing world economy supersede differences in economic systems.</u> Transnational corporations in the manufacturing and financial sectors have linked most of the countries in the world with economic ties. Any military conflict disrupts these links and causes significant economic damage. In fact, maintaining the stability of the world economy has become a constraining factor in military conflicts. <u>Economic ties between Russia and the E</u>uropean <u>U</u>nion <u>are</u> also <u>evolving in a positive direction. That economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia <strong>virtually unthinkable.</p></u></strong>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,818	2	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,739	No Israel/Iran war	Walt, 12 )	Walt, 12 (Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Top ten media failures in the Iran war debate,” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/11/top_ten_media_failures_in_the_iran_war_debate)	Exaggerating Israel's capabilities. this war scare has been driven by the possibility that Israel might feel so endangered that they would launch a preventive war on their own the IDF doesn't have the capacity to take out Iran's new facility because they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock that protect the facilities. if they can't take out Fordow, then they can't do much to delay Iran's program recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike on its own-may be based on a mirage.	this scare has been driven by the possibility Israel might launch war the IDF doesn't have the capacity to take out Iran's facility because they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike may be based on a mirage.	#7: Exaggerating Israel's capabilities. In a very real sense, this whole war scare has been driven by the possibility that Israel might feel so endangered that they would launch a preventive war on their own, even if U.S. leaders warned them not to. But the IDF doesn't have the capacity to take out Iran's new facility at Fordow, because they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock that protect the facilities. And if they can't take out Fordow, then they can't do much to delay Iran's program at all and the only reason they might strike is to try to get the United States dragged in. In short, the recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike on its own-may be based on a mirage.	757	<h4>No Israel/Iran war</h4><p><strong>Walt, 12 </strong>(Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Top ten media failures in the Iran war debate,” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/11/top_ten_media_failures_in_the_iran_war_debate<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>#7: <u><strong>Exaggerating Israel's capabilities. </u></strong>In a very real sense, <u><mark>this</u></mark> whole <u>war <mark>scare</mark> <mark>has been driven by the</mark> <mark>possibility</mark> that <mark>Israel might</mark> feel so endangered that they would <mark>launch</mark> a preventive <mark>war</mark> on their own</u>, even if U.S. leaders warned them not to. But <u><strong><mark>the IDF doesn't have the capacity</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>to take out Iran's</mark> new <mark>facility</u></mark> at Fordow, <u><mark>because</mark> <mark>they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock</mark> that protect the facilities.</u> And <u>if they can't take out Fordow, then they can't do much to delay Iran's program </u>at all and the only reason they might strike is to try to get the United States dragged in. In short, the <u><mark>recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike</mark> on its own-<mark>may be <strong>based on a mirage.</p></u></strong></mark>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,819	5	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,740	Prefer conventional weapons.	Craig 11	Craig 11 [Campbell, professor of international relations at the University of Southampton Special Issue: Bringing Critical Realism and Historical Materialism into Critical Terrorism Studies Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 4, Issue 1, 2011, April, pages 115-124]	the risk of nuclear terrorism is exceptionally small, along the lines of an asteroid hitting earth. terrorist groups are widely scattered and disorganized – precisely the wrong arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project.	the risk of nuclear terrorism is , along the lines of an asteroid hitting earth. terrorist groups are – precisely the wrong arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project.	Let us address each of his claims, in reverse order. Mueller suggests that the risk of an act of major nuclear terrorism is exceptionally small, along the lines of an asteroid hitting the earth. Drawing upon his powerful book against terrorism alarmism, Overblown (2006), he shows that serious anti-Western terrorist groups are today widely scattered and disorganized – precisely the wrong kind of arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project. He points out, as have other authors, that so-called ‘rogue’ nations, even if they obtain a bomb, are never going to hand it over to terrorists: to do so would utterly negate everything they had worked so hard for. A nation such as Iran that somehow decided to give its bomb to al-Qaeda (leaving aide their completely different objectives) would not only be handing over a weapon that it had spent years and billions to build, and giving up the prestige and deterrence the bomb supposedly confers, it would also be putting itself at acute risk of being on the receiving end of a retaliatory strike once the terrorists did their work. By what rationale would any leader make such a move? The potential costs would be astronomical, the benefits non-existent.	1,389	<h4>Prefer conventional weapons.</h4><p><u><strong>Craig 11</u></strong> [Campbell, professor of international relations at the University of Southampton Special Issue: Bringing Critical Realism and Historical Materialism into Critical Terrorism Studies Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 4, Issue 1, 2011, April, pages 115-124]</p><p>Let us address each of his claims, in reverse order. Mueller suggests that <u><mark>the risk of</u></mark> an act of major <u><mark>nuclear terrorism is <strong></mark>exceptionally small</strong><mark>, along the lines of an asteroid hitting</u></mark> the <u><mark>earth.</u></mark> Drawing upon his powerful book against terrorism alarmism, Overblown (2006), he shows that serious anti-Western<u><mark> terrorist groups are</u></mark> today <u><strong>widely scattered and disorganized</strong><mark> – precisely the wrong</u></mark> kind of <u><mark>arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project.</u></mark> He points out, as have other authors, that so-called ‘rogue’ nations, even if they obtain a bomb, are never going to hand it over to terrorists: to do so would utterly negate everything they had worked so hard for. A nation such as Iran that somehow decided to give its bomb to al-Qaeda (leaving aide their completely different objectives) would not only be handing over a weapon that it had spent years and billions to build, and giving up the prestige and deterrence the bomb supposedly confers, it would also be putting itself at acute risk of being on the receiving end of a retaliatory strike once the terrorists did their work. By what rationale would any leader make such a move? The potential costs would be astronomical, the benefits non-existent.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	267,753	5	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,741	Public won’t demand retaliation	Smith and Herron 5	Smith and Herron 5, Professor, University of Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Norman Campus, (Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., and Kerry G., "United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?" Review of Policy Research 22.5 (2005): 599-623, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hjsmith)	our data show that support for using military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action panelists preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year. those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs while United States public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.	support for using military force to retaliate against terrorists did not reach a high level of demand for military action panelists preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability be established before action results are inconsistent with the contention will result in volatile responses even in a serious attack the overall public response was quite measured while public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.	Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that support for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year. Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents— hardly the expected source of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11 change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information (the richest, best educated), and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that while United States public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.	2,610	<h4>Public won’t demand retaliation</h4><p><strong>Smith and Herron 5</strong>, Professor, University of Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Norman Campus, (Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., and Kerry G., "United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?" Review of Policy Research 22.5 (2005): 599-623, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hjsmith) </p><p>Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here <u><strong>our data show that <mark>support for using</u></strong></mark> conventional United States <u><strong><mark>military force to retaliate against terrorists</mark> initially averaged above midscale, but <mark>did not reach a high level of demand for military action</u></strong></mark>. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>panelists</u></strong></mark> both in 2001 and 2002 <u><strong><mark>preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability</u></strong></mark> (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) <u><strong><mark>be established before </mark>taking military <mark>action</mark>. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion</u></strong>.</p><p>Overall, <u><strong>these <mark>results are inconsistent with the contention </mark>that highly charged events <mark>will result in volatile</mark> and unstructured <mark>responses</mark> among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes.</u></strong> The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But <u><strong><mark>even in</mark> the highly charged context of such <mark>a serious attack</mark> on the American homeland, <mark>the overall public response was quite measured</mark>. </u></strong>On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial<u><strong> willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.</p><p></u></strong>Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents— hardly the expected source of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11 change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, <u><strong>those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information</u></strong> (the richest, best educated), <u><strong>and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs</u></strong>. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that <u><strong><mark>while</mark> United States <mark>public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.</p></u></strong></mark>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	142,393	41	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,742	Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.	Layne 12	Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]	the U S will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. The best indicators of decline are GDP and manufacturing China’s manufacturing output has edged past the U S virtually all leading economic forecasters agree China’s GDP will exceed the U S by the end of the decade. concerns about inflation and debts could imperil the dollar’s reserve-currency status. That allows the U S to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means regional powers will assume more prominent roles in international politics. the “unipolar moment,” will be replaced by a multipolar system.	the U S will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. The best indicators of decline are GDP and manufacturing China’s manufacturing output has edged past the U S virtually all leading economic forecasters agree China’s GDP will exceed the U S by the end of the decade. concerns about inflation and debts could imperil the dollar’s reserve-currency status. That allows the U S to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means regional powers will assume more prominent roles in international politics. the “unipolar moment,” will be replaced by a multipolar system.	The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.	2,791	<h4>Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.</h4><p><u><strong>Layne 12</u></strong> [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]</p><p>The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates is in economic decline and <u><mark>will face a <strong>serious fiscal crisis</strong> <strong>by the end of this decade.</u></strong></mark> As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” <u><mark>The <strong>best indicators</strong> of</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>decline are</u></mark> its <u><mark>GDP</u></mark> relative to potential competitors <u><mark>and</u></mark> its share of world <u><mark>manufacturing</u></mark> output. <u><mark>China’s manufacturing output has</u></mark> now <u><mark>edged past</u></mark> that of <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, <u><mark>virtually all leading economic forecasters agree</u></mark> that, measured by market-exchange rates, <u><mark>China’s</u></mark> aggregate <u><mark>GDP will exceed</u></mark> that of <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>by the end of the</u></mark> current <u><mark>decade.</u></mark> Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, <u><mark>concerns about</u></mark> future <u><mark>inflation and</u></mark> America’s ability to repay its <u><mark>debts could imperil the</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>dollar’s reserve-currency status. That</u></mark> currency status <u><mark>allows the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means</u></mark> while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important <u><mark>regional powers</u></mark> such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil <u><mark>will assume more prominent roles in international politics.</u></mark> Thus, <u><mark>the</u></mark> post-Cold War <u><mark>“unipolar moment,”</u></mark> when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” <u><mark>will be <strong>replaced by a multipolar</u></strong></mark> international <u><strong><mark>system.</u></strong></mark> The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	143,025	15	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,743	Volatility’s inevitable and has no impact.	Kaplan 9/4	Kaplan 9/4 [Marshall Kaplan was former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at University of Colorado and directed the Wirth Chair in Energy, Climate Change and Community Development related issues and policies. Before that, he served in the Carter, and Kennedy Administrations and was the principal in the policy advisory firm of Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn. Mr. Kaplan has advised numerous federal, state, and local governments as well as non-profit groups and businesses on diverse public policy alternatives. He also facilitated consensus of international leaders at Aspen Global Forums focused on issues of economic development, privatization of energy, and financing infrastructure. Mr. Kaplan came to Orange County in Feb 2004 to lead the Merage Foundations, and recently established the non-profit Pathways to Opportunities with Merage Foundation support. He has written numerous articles as well as several books on urban, economic and social welfare policy. A winner of the ADL Proclaim Liberty Award in Denver, he is a graduate of both MIT and Boston University. The Ups And Downs Of The Oil Market And A Sane Natural Gas Policy, 9/4/12, http://www.fuelfreedom.org/blog/the-ups-and-downs-of-the-oil-market-and-a-sane-natural-gas-policy/]	Hamilton, a certified time-tested expert on oil markets, now a professor at U C S D provided historical evidence that oil markets “have always been volatile. If you look at 12-month logarithmic changes 25 percent moves up or down within a year are fairly common, and 50 percent moves or greater have been seen on a number of occasions.” dramatic changes in the current market are not likely in the near future and aren’t likely, if they occur, to be sustainable.	Hamilton, a certified time-tested expert on oil markets, now a professor at U C S D provided historical evidence that oil markets “have always been volatile. If you look at 12-month logarithmic changes 25 percent moves up or down within a year are fairly common, and 50 percent moves or greater have been seen on a number of occasions.” dramatic changes in the current market are not likely in the near future and aren’t likely, if they occur, to be sustainable.	Regrettably, reacting to the frequent and relatively brief ups and downs of the oil market is no way to set a natural gas policy that generates from the public interest. Over the weekend I noticed an interview conducted by James Stafford with James Hamilton, a certified time-tested expert on oil markets, now a professor at the University of California, San Diego. Hamilton provided historical evidence that oil markets “have always been volatile. If you look at 12-month logarithmic changes in WTI going back to 1947, you come up with a standard deviation for 0.27. In other words, 25 percent moves up or down within a year are fairly common, and 50 percent moves or greater have also been seen on a number of occasions.” Hamilton noted the same degree of uncertainty in option prices. What does this all mean? While dramatic changes in the current market for oil are possible, they are not likely in the near future according to Hamilton and aren’t likely, if they occur, to be sustainable. Certainly, a serious economic decline in China, a deep recession in the U.S. and or war in the Middle East could lead oil prices to reflect big swings. But demand for oil is mostly “insensitive” to prices in the short run. According to Hamilton, “The next decade will look something like the last with oil prices volatile but exhibiting an upward trend.”	1,349	<h4>Volatility’s inevitable and has no impact.</h4><p><u><strong>Kaplan 9/4</u></strong> [Marshall Kaplan was former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at University of Colorado and directed the Wirth Chair in Energy, Climate Change and Community Development related issues and policies. Before that, he served in the Carter, and Kennedy Administrations and was the principal in the policy advisory firm of Marshall Kaplan, Gans and Kahn. Mr. Kaplan has advised numerous federal, state, and local governments as well as non-profit groups and businesses on diverse public policy alternatives. He also facilitated consensus of international leaders at Aspen Global Forums focused on issues of economic development, privatization of energy, and financing infrastructure. Mr. Kaplan came to Orange County in Feb 2004 to lead the Merage Foundations, and recently established the non-profit Pathways to Opportunities with Merage Foundation support. He has written numerous articles as well as several books on urban, economic and social welfare policy. A winner of the ADL Proclaim Liberty Award in Denver, he is a graduate of both MIT and Boston University. The Ups And Downs Of The Oil Market And A Sane Natural Gas Policy, 9/4/12, http://www.fuelfreedom.org/blog/the-ups-and-downs-of-the-oil-market-and-a-sane-natural-gas-policy/]</p><p>Regrettably, reacting to the frequent and relatively brief ups and downs of the oil market is no way to set a natural gas policy that generates from the public interest. Over the weekend I noticed an interview conducted by James Stafford with James <u><mark>Hamilton, a certified time-tested expert on oil markets, now a professor at</u></mark> the <u><mark>U</u></mark>niversity of <u><mark>C</u></mark>alifornia, <u><mark>S</u></mark>an <u><mark>D</u></mark>iego. Hamilton <u><mark>provided historical evidence that oil markets “<strong>have always been volatile.</strong> If you look at 12-month logarithmic changes</u></mark> in WTI going back to 1947, you come up with a standard deviation for 0.27. In other words, <u><mark>25 percent moves up or down within a year are fairly common, and 50 percent moves or greater have</u></mark> also <u><mark>been seen on a number of occasions.”</u></mark> Hamilton noted the same degree of uncertainty in option prices. What does this all mean? While <u><mark>dramatic changes in the current market</u></mark> for oil are possible, they <u><mark>are not likely in the near future</u></mark> according to Hamilton <u><mark>and aren’t likely, if they occur, to be sustainable.</u></mark> Certainly, a serious economic decline in China, a deep recession in the U.S. and or war in the Middle East could lead oil prices to reflect big swings. But demand for oil is mostly “insensitive” to prices in the short run. According to Hamilton, “The next decade will look something like the last with oil prices volatile but exhibiting an upward trend.”</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,820	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,744	Heg doesn’t solve conflict.	Fettweis 11	Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]	hegemony is not the cause of stability the U S may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Since most of the world is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. empirical evidence suggests there is little connection between U.S. activism and international stability. During the 90s The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe its security was endangered No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred once the presence of the military was diminished. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America globalization would continue, deepening economic interdependence democracy would not shrivel the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.	hegemony is not the cause of stability the U S may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Since most of the world is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. empirical evidence suggests there is little connection between U.S. activism and international stability. During the 90s The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe its security was endangered No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred once the presence of the military was diminished. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America globalization would continue, deepening economic interdependence democracy would not shrivel	The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-coe more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-7 exis*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.	11,216	<h4>Heg doesn’t solve conflict.</h4><p><u><strong>Fettweis 11</u></strong> [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page<u> 73-6]</p><p></u>The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US <u><strong><mark>hegemony is not the</u></strong></mark> primary <u><strong><mark>cause of</u></strong></mark> the current era of <u><mark>s<strong>tability</u></strong></mark>. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>may be patrolling a neighborhood that has <strong>already rid itself of crime.</u></strong></mark> Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. <u><mark>Since most of the world</u></mark> today <u><mark>is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work.</u></mark> Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited <u><strong><mark>empirical evidence</u></strong></mark> we have <u><mark>suggests</u></mark> that <u><mark>there is <strong>little connection</strong> between</u></mark> the relative level of <u><mark>U.S. activism and international stability. During the</u></mark> 19<u><mark>90s</u></mark> the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: <u><mark>The world grew more peaceful while the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>cut its forces. No state seemed to believe</u></mark> that <u><mark>its security was endangered</u></mark> by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. <u><strong><mark>No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred</strong> once the</u></mark> stabilizing <u><mark>presence of the</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>military was diminished.</u></mark> The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. <u><mark>The incidence and magnitude of global conflict <strong>declined</u></strong></mark> while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that <u><mark>none of the other explanations for the decline of War—<strong>nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms</strong> necessitate an activist America</u></mark> to maintain their validity. Were America to be-coe more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of <u><mark>globalization would continue, deepening</u></mark> the complexity of <u><mark>economic interdependence</u></mark>; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and <u><mark>democracy would not shrivel</u></mark> where it cur-7 exis*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, <u>the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.</p></u>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	42,650	583	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,745	Latin America stable – positive trends.	Valenzuela 11	Valenzuela 11 [ Testimony of Arturo A. Valenzuela Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Department of State Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations February 17, 2011]	we are optimistic about the hemisphere’s course. Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis, but current growth rates are projected to exceed 4 percent this year. politically speaking, we welcome the reduction in tensions among the nations of the Andean region and note the smooth transfer of power that has occurred in many countries throughout the Americas. we are seeing the convergence of two powerful and positive trends: the consolidation of successful market democracies that are making big strides in meeting their peoples’ needs; and growing global integration. The greatest regional challenges—including inequality, lack of transparency and accountability, insufficient respect for human rights, ineffective institutions, and lack of opportunity—are receding in most countries in the Americas. Nations of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in new global challenges	we are optimistic about the hemisphere’s course. Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis, but current growth rates are projected to exceed 4 percent we welcome the reduction in tensions among the nations of the Andean region and note the smooth transfer of power that has occurred in many countries throughout the Americas. we are seeing the convergence of two powerful positive trends: the consolidation of successful market democracies and growing global integration. The greatest regional challenges are receding in most countries Nations of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in new global challenges	Today, we are optimistic about the hemisphere’s course. Indeed, the Western Hemisphere is experiencing a period of economic progress that is a far cry from the troubles of the past. Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis, but current growth rates are projected to exceed 4 percent this year. And politically speaking, we welcome the reduction in tensions among the nations of the Andean region and note the smooth transfer of power that has occurred in many countries throughout the Americas. Indeed, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are undeniably promising partners in confronting crucial regional and global challenges. In much of the region, we are seeing the convergence of two powerful and positive trends: the consolidation of successful market democracies that are making big strides in meeting their peoples’ needs; and growing global integration. The greatest regional challenges—including inequality, lack of transparency and accountability, insufficient respect for human rights, ineffective institutions, and lack of opportunity—are receding in most countries in the Americas. Nations of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in new global challenges, like food security, climate change, transnational crime, and economic competitiveness.	1,323	<h4>Latin America stable – positive trends.</h4><p><u><strong>Valenzuela 11</u></strong> [ Testimony of Arturo A. Valenzuela Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Department of State Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations February 17, 2011]</p><p>Today, <u><mark>we are optimistic about the hemisphere’s course.</u></mark> Indeed, the Western Hemisphere is experiencing a period of economic progress that is a far cry from the troubles of the past. <u><mark>Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis, but current growth rates are projected to exceed 4 percent</mark> this year.</u> And <u>politically speaking, <mark>we welcome the reduction in tensions among the nations of the Andean region and note the smooth transfer of power that has occurred in many countries throughout the Americas.</u></mark> Indeed, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are undeniably promising partners in confronting crucial regional and global challenges. In much of the region, <u><mark>we are seeing the convergence of two powerful </mark>and <mark>positive trends: the consolidation of successful market democracies</mark> that are making big strides in meeting their peoples’ needs; <mark>and growing global integration. The greatest regional challenges</mark>—including inequality, lack of transparency and accountability, insufficient respect for human rights, ineffective institutions, and lack of opportunity—<mark>are receding in most</mark> <mark>countries</mark> in the Americas. <mark>Nations of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in new global challenges</u></mark>, like food security, climate change, transnational crime, and economic competitiveness.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,821	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,746	Crowd out would not be a net reduction	Erin and Harris 94	Erin and Harris 94 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson	policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield	null	Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).	1,276	<h4>Crowd out would not be a net reduction</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 94</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson </p><p>Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such <u>policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem,</u> Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). <u>It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an <strong>overall increase</strong> in organ yield</u> (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,451	5	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,747	Sequencing matters – unilateral legalization wrecks the entire UN treaty system	Rolles 2009 )	Rolles 2009 (senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg)	Parties could simply ignore the treaties An individual country disregarding the treaties could institute the legalisation of cannabis Such a move however raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control if taken unilaterally unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production. would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.	Parties could simply ignore treaties A country disregarding the treaties could institute legalisation of cannabis Such a move however raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control if taken unilaterally unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten stability of the entire treaty system would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.	Parties could simply ignore all or part of the treaties. If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. An individual country disregarding the treaties, or applying them only partially, could in this way institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including arguably the most likely example: the actual legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states). Such a move however, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control—particularly if taken unilaterally. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten, or be perceived to threaten, the stability of the entire treaty system. The cost of such a threat and the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production. would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.	1,289	<h4>Sequencing matters – <u>unilateral</u> legalization wrecks the <u>entire</u> UN treaty system</h4><p><strong>Rolles 2009 </strong>(senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>Parties could simply ignore</u></strong></mark> all or part of <u><strong>the <mark>treaties</u></strong></mark>. If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. <u><strong><mark>A</mark>n individual <mark>country disregarding the treaties</u></strong></mark>, or applying them only partially, <u><strong><mark>could</u></strong></mark> in this way <u><strong><mark>institute</u></strong></mark> any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including arguably the most likely example: <u><strong>the</u></strong> actual <u><strong><mark>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong></mark> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states). <u><strong><mark>Such a move however</u></strong></mark>, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> that go <mark>beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong></mark>—particularly <u><strong><mark>if taken unilaterally</u></strong></mark>. The possibility of nations <u><strong><mark>unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten</u></strong></mark>, or be perceived to threaten, <u><strong>the <mark>stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. The cost of such a threat and <u><strong>the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.</p><p><mark>would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.</p></u></strong></mark>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,468	48	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,748	Destroys PC- outweighs the link	NYT 9/26	NYT 9/26/2014 (New York Times, Holder Resigns, Setting Up Fight Over Successor, lexis)	Obama's announcement that Holder would leave sets up an election-season scramble for a replacement Holder emerged as the primary political antagonist That anger among Republicans could be a political nightmare for Obama If Republicans take control of the Senate the president's pick to replace Holder will face enormous scrutiny without support from a friendly leadership McConnell will be scrutinizing the president's replacement nominee	Obama's announcement that would leave sets up an election-season scramble for a replacement Holder emerged as the primary political antagonist f That anger could be a political nightmare for Obama the president's pick will face enormous scrutiny without support from a friendly leadership	President Obama's announcement on Thursday that Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. would leave the administration sets up an election-season scramble for a replacement to carry on Mr. Holder's civil rights crusade, wage rhetorical combat with Congress and manage the legal complexities of a presidency increasingly drawn into war with terrorists. One of the earliest members of Mr. Obama's cabinet, Mr. Holder, 63, became the nation's first African-American attorney general and the president's chief liberal warrior, especially on efforts to protect voter rights and end racial discrimination in the justice system. He also emerged as the primary political antagonist for a Republican opposition in Congress that viewed him as dismissive of existing laws and contemptuous of its oversight of his department. That still-simmering anger among Republicans, who once voted to hold Mr. Holder in contempt of Congress, could be a political nightmare for Mr. Obama as he searches for a replacement who can win confirmation in the Senate. Democrats on Capitol Hill are bracing for attacks on any nominee involved in what Republicans consider scandals: political targeting by the Internal Revenue Service, the terrorist attacks on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi or the numerous executive actions by Mr. Obama circumventing Congress. Frequently mentioned candidates to replace Mr. Holder include Kathryn Ruemmler, the former White House counsel who remains close to Mr. Obama; Gov. Deval Patrick of Massachusetts; Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.; former Gov. Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan; Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Democrat of Rhode Island, a former prosecutor; Preet Bharara, the United States attorney for the Southern District of New York; and Loretta E. Lynch, the United States attorney in Brooklyn. Mr. Patrick on Thursday said that it was not the right time for him to take such a job. White House officials said that Mr. Obama had not yet decided on a successor, with one official saying the president was ''a long way'' from an announcement. In a ceremony in the State Dining Room on Thursday, Mr. Obama said Mr. Holder had promised to stay in his job until a successor was confirmed. ''I chose him to serve as attorney general because he believes, as I do, that justice is not just an abstract theory -- it's a living and breathing principle,'' Mr. Obama said, adding that Mr. Holder used the law to improve people's lives. ''That's why I made him America's lawyer, the people's lawyer.'' Mr. Holder's resignation was not a surprise; he had said previously that he planned to leave office by the end of 2014 after six years in the job. Selecting the next attorney general is likely to be complicated by the uncertainty of the future political landscape in Washington. If Republicans take control of the Senate in the midterm elections this November, the president's pick to replace Mr. Holder will face enormous scrutiny without support from a friendly leadership in control of the legislative agenda. Senator Mitch McConnell, the Kentucky Republican who would most likely take over as the majority leader if his party wins control in November, accused Mr. Holder on Thursday of placing ideology above the rule of law during his tenure. Mr. McConnell urged Mr. Obama to name a replacement who, he said, would have more respect for the law. ''I will be scrutinizing the president's replacement nominee to ensure the Justice Department finally returns to prioritizing law enforcement over partisan concerns,'' Mr. McConnell said. Conservatives spent years attacking Mr. Holder's integrity, especially over the Justice Department's botched gun-trafficking operation called Fast and Furious. Jenny Beth Martin, the co-founder of the Tea Party Patriots, issued a statement calling Mr. Holder ''the nation's most corrupt attorney general'' and vowed not to let Mr. Obama push through ''another partisan hack for attorney general.''	3,955	<h4>Destroys PC- outweighs the link</h4><p><strong>NYT 9/26</strong>/2014 (New York Times, Holder Resigns, Setting Up Fight Over Successor, lexis)</p><p>President <u><mark>Obama's announcement</u></mark> on Thursday <u><mark>that</u></mark> Attorney General Eric H. <u>Holder</u> Jr. <u><mark>would</u> <u>leave</u></mark> the administration <u><mark>sets up an election-season scramble for a replacement</u></mark> to carry on Mr. Holder's civil rights crusade, wage rhetorical combat with Congress and manage the legal complexities of a presidency increasingly drawn into war with terrorists. One of the earliest members of Mr. Obama's cabinet, Mr. <u><mark>Holder</u></mark>, 63, became the nation's first African-American attorney general and the president's chief liberal warrior, especially on efforts to protect voter rights and end racial discrimination in the justice system. He also <u><mark>emerged as the primary political antagonist</u> f</mark>or a Republican opposition in Congress that viewed him as dismissive of existing laws and contemptuous of its oversight of his department. <u><mark>That</u></mark> still-simmering <u><mark>anger</u></mark> <u>among Republicans</u>, who once voted to hold Mr. Holder in contempt of Congress, <u><strong><mark>could be a political nightmare for</u></strong></mark> Mr. <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> as he searches for a replacement who can win confirmation in the Senate. Democrats on Capitol Hill are bracing for attacks on any nominee involved in what Republicans consider scandals: political targeting by the Internal Revenue Service, the terrorist attacks on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi or the numerous executive actions by Mr. Obama circumventing Congress. Frequently mentioned candidates to replace Mr. Holder include Kathryn Ruemmler, the former White House counsel who remains close to Mr. Obama; Gov. Deval Patrick of Massachusetts; Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.; former Gov. Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan; Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Democrat of Rhode Island, a former prosecutor; Preet Bharara, the United States attorney for the Southern District of New York; and Loretta E. Lynch, the United States attorney in Brooklyn. Mr. Patrick on Thursday said that it was not the right time for him to take such a job. White House officials said that Mr. Obama had not yet decided on a successor, with one official saying the president was ''a long way'' from an announcement. In a ceremony in the State Dining Room on Thursday, Mr. Obama said Mr. Holder had promised to stay in his job until a successor was confirmed. ''I chose him to serve as attorney general because he believes, as I do, that justice is not just an abstract theory -- it's a living and breathing principle,'' Mr. Obama said, adding that Mr. Holder used the law to improve people's lives. ''That's why I made him America's lawyer, the people's lawyer.'' Mr. Holder's resignation was not a surprise; he had said previously that he planned to leave office by the end of 2014 after six years in the job. Selecting the next attorney general is likely to be complicated by the uncertainty of the future political landscape in Washington. <u>If Republicans take control of the Senate</u> in the midterm elections this November, <u><mark>the president's pick</mark> to replace </u>Mr. <u>Holder <mark>will face enormous scrutiny</u> <u>without support from a friendly leadership</u></mark> in control of the legislative agenda. Senator Mitch McConnell, the Kentucky Republican who would most likely take over as the majority leader if his party wins control in November, accused Mr. Holder on Thursday of placing ideology above the rule of law during his tenure. Mr. <u>McConnell</u> urged Mr. Obama to name a replacement who, he said, would have more respect for the law. ''I <u>will be scrutinizing the president's replacement nominee</u> to ensure the Justice Department finally returns to prioritizing law enforcement over partisan concerns,'' Mr. McConnell said. Conservatives spent years attacking Mr. Holder's integrity, especially over the Justice Department's botched gun-trafficking operation called Fast and Furious. Jenny Beth Martin, the co-founder of the Tea Party Patriots, issued a statement calling Mr. Holder ''the nation's most corrupt attorney general'' and vowed not to let Mr. Obama push through ''another partisan hack for attorney general.''</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,822	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,749	It will be a huge fight Charleston Gazette 9/26/2014 (Holder quitting A.G. post; Resignation sets up potentially nasty battle in Senate over his replacement, lexis)	Charleston Gazette 9/26	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>It will be a huge fight</h4><p><strong>Charleston Gazette 9/26</strong>/2014 (Holder quitting A.G. post; Resignation sets up potentially nasty battle in Senate over his replacement, lexis)</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,823	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,750	Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)	Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger strong condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions would be unavoidable Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in agreements countries want to keep parts of the international drug-control regime not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems the Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences	Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger strong condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussion For countries receiving aid sanctions would be unavoidable Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in agreements, Eu countries want to keep the drug-control regime intact not least its control system for drugs for medicinal purposes countries are already suffering inadequate tial medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problem . Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose remedial measures” banning trade in medicines if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences	Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations than seen in the case of Bolivia, and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions.37 For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union would probably be unavoidable. Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in several other agreements, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most countries now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change want to keep significant parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems. Moreover, the 1961 and 1971 Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.	2,352	<h4>Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>strong</u></strong></mark>er <u><strong><mark>condemnations</u></strong></mark> than seen in the case of Bolivia, <u><strong><mark>and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussion</mark>s</u></strong>.37 <u><strong><mark>For countries receiving</mark> development <mark>aid</mark> or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, <mark>sanctions</u></strong></mark> from the U.S. and the European Union <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>be</u></strong> <u><strong>unavoidable</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in</u></strong></mark> several other <u><strong><mark>agreements</u></strong>,</mark> not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the<mark> Eu</mark>ropean Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most <u><strong><mark>countries</u></strong></mark> now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change <u><strong><mark>want to keep</u></strong></mark> significant <u><strong>parts of <mark>the</mark> international <mark>drug-control regime </u>intact</strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>not least its control system for</mark> production, trade and availability of <mark>drugs for medicinal purposes</u></strong></mark>. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. <u><strong>Many <mark>countries</mark>, however, <mark>are already suffering</mark> <mark>inadequate</mark> availability of essen<mark>tial medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problem</mark>s</u></strong><mark>.</mark> Moreover, <u><strong>the</u></strong> 1961 and 1971 <u><strong><mark>Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose</mark> “<mark>remedial measures”</mark> in terms of restricting or <mark>banning trade in medicines </mark>controlled under those treaties to countries <mark>if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered</mark> </u></strong>by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as <u><strong><mark>such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences</u></strong></mark> and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,464	8	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,751	Infectious disease risks extinction Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.	Franca et al. 13 , infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic plague, and the present pandemic of (HIV), in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Infectious disease risks extinction </h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13</strong> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress<u><strong>, <mark>infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival</u></strong>.</mark> Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. <u><strong>Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. <mark>An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such</mark> as the bubonic</u></strong>–pneumonic <u><strong>plague,</u></strong> Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), <u><strong>and the present pandemic of</u></strong> human immunodeficiency virus <u><strong>(<mark>HIV)</mark>,</u></strong> in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, <u><strong><mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</mark> like dengue fever, <mark>the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded</mark> </u></strong>[5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.</p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	1NR	AT: Inevitable	430,824	1	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,752	Attorney General Eric Holder announced his resignation Thursday, signaling an end to his six turbulent years in office and setting the stage for a potentially bruising confirmation battle in the Senate over his eventual replacement. "We could not be more grateful for everything that you've done, not just for me and the administration but for our country, President Obama said at the White House, with Holder at his side. Obama cited Holder's record on corruption, terrorism and revising unfair sentencing guidelines. He suggested Holder's biggest accomplishment may have been "reinvigorating and restoring what Holder has called the Justice Department's "conscience, the Civil Rights Division. Holder called the job the "greatest honor of my professional life and thanked Obama for sticking with him, despite repeated Republican calls for him to step down. "In good times and in bad, in things personal and in things professional, you have been there for me, Holder said. Holder has served as one of the biggest lightning rods in the administration for conservatives, and his departure sparked a quick round of speculation about potential successors, including Preet Bharara, the high-profile U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, California Attorney General Kamala Harris and Jenny Durkan, a former U.S. attorney in Washington state. Holder faced criticism for failing to aggressively prosecute Wall Street, but Bharara has led the charge in recent years against Swiss banks that were helping American citizens skirt U.S. tax laws, prosecuting Swiss bankers and forcing the banks to turn over lists of account holders. Verrilli, who is the administration's leading advocate before the United States Supreme Court, has been panned for weak oratory skills. But he delivered one of the administration's biggest wins, defending Obama's signature Affordable Care Act before the Supreme Court. Harris, a politically ambitious 49-year-old, has periodically seen her name floated for an Obama administration appointment. The Human Rights Campaign is championing Durkan, the first openly gay U.S. attorney to be appointed by a president and confirmed by the Senate. Two potential contenders took themselves out of the running. Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick told reporters at a campaign event that Holder's job was "not one for me right now. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., said in a statement that he had "no interest in other positions. Holder agreed to remain in his post until a successor is confirmed, a process that could prove exceedingly divisive, particularly if Democrats lose control of the Senate in the November elections.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>Attorney General Eric <u><mark>Holder announced his resignation</u></mark> Thursday, signaling an end to his six turbulent years in office and <u><mark>setting the stage for a</u></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>bruising confirmation battle</u></strong></mark> in the Senate over his eventual replacement. "We could not be more grateful for everything that you've done, not just for me and the administration but for our country, President Obama said at the White House, with Holder at his side. Obama cited Holder's record on corruption, terrorism and revising unfair sentencing guidelines. He suggested Holder's biggest accomplishment may have been "reinvigorating and restoring what Holder has called the Justice Department's "conscience, the Civil Rights Division. Holder called the job the "greatest honor of my professional life and thanked Obama for sticking with him, despite repeated Republican calls for him to step down. "In good times and in bad, in things personal and in things professional, you have been there for me, Holder said. Holder has served as one of the biggest lightning rods in the administration for conservatives, and his departure sparked a quick round of speculation about potential successors, including Preet Bharara, the high-profile U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, California Attorney General Kamala Harris and Jenny Durkan, a former U.S. attorney in Washington state. Holder faced criticism for failing to aggressively prosecute Wall Street, but Bharara has led the charge in recent years against Swiss banks that were helping American citizens skirt U.S. tax laws, prosecuting Swiss bankers and forcing the banks to turn over lists of account holders. Verrilli, who is the administration's leading advocate before the United States Supreme Court, has been panned for weak oratory skills. But he delivered one of the administration's biggest wins, defending Obama's signature Affordable Care Act before the Supreme Court. Harris, a politically ambitious 49-year-old, has periodically seen her name floated for an Obama administration appointment. The Human Rights Campaign is championing Durkan, the first openly gay U.S. attorney to be appointed by a president and confirmed by the Senate. Two potential contenders took themselves out of the running. Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick told reporters at a campaign event that Holder's job was "not one for me right now. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., said in a statement that he had "no interest in other positions. <u><mark>Holder agreed to remain in his post until a successor is confirmed, a process that could prove <strong>exceedingly divisive</u></strong></mark>, particularly if Democrats lose control of the Senate in the November elections.</h4>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,825	1	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,753	No nuclear terror.	Chapman 12	Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]	Given their inability to do something simple Ohio State University professor John Mueller “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” Russia’s devices are no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.	Given their inability to do something simple “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.	Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.	2,150	<h4>No nuclear terror.</h4><p><u><strong>Chapman 12</u></strong> [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html<u><mark>]</p><p>Given their inability to do something simple</u></mark> — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued <u>Ohio State University professor John Mueller</u> in a presentation at the University of Chicago, <u><mark>“the likelihood</u></mark> that <u><mark>a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems</u></mark> to be <u><mark>vanishingly small.”</u></mark> The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from <u>Russia’s</u> inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those <u>devices are</u> probably <u>no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards</u> designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of <u><mark>building a bomb</u></mark>. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It <u><mark>requires millions </u></mark>of dollars, <u><mark>a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus</u></mark> people with <u><mark>specialized skills</u></mark>, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. <u><mark>Assuming</u></mark> the <u><mark>jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.</u></mark> Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like <u><mark>every</u></mark> other <u><mark>step</u></mark> in the entire process, <u><mark>means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.</u></mark> That has heartening implications. If <u><mark>al-Qaida </u></mark>embarks on the project, it <u><mark>has only a minuscule chance</u></mark> of seeing it bear fruit. <u><mark>Given the formidable odds, it</u></mark> probably <u><mark>won’t bother.</p></u></mark>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	18,931	81	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,754	The reasons for doing a policy are key to that policy	Hill, 91	Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, 1991 (“The Message of Affirmative Action,” The Affirmative Action Debate (1995), edited by Steven M. Cahn, Published by Routledge, Reprinted from Social Philosophy & Policy, p. 169-170)	What our actions say to others depends largely upon our avowed reasons for acting "the same act" can have very different consequences, depending upon how we choose to justify it. In a sense, acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar, and so not merely the consequences but also the moral nature of our acts depend in part on our decisions about the reasons for doing them the message of an act or policy is almost always a relevant factor in the moral assessment of the act or policy Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? What is superficially "the same act" can be an offer to buy, an admission of guilt, an expression of gratitude, a contribution to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult. Because all this is so familiar, the extent to which these elementary points are ignored in discussions of the pros and cons of social policies is surprising. The usual presumption is that social policies can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received	What our actions say depends largely on our reasons for acting; the same act" can have different consequences, depending upon how we justify it acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar the moral nature of our acts depend on our reasons for doing them. the message of policy is always relevant What is superficially "the same act" can be an admission of guilt gratitude, a contribution the extent to which these elementary points are ignored in discussions of policies is surprising	Actions, as the saying goes, often speak louder than words. There are times, too, when only actions can effectively communicate the message we want to convey, and times when giving a message is a central part of the purpose of action. What our actions say to others depends largely, though not entirely, upon our avowed reasons for acting; and this is a matter for reflective [end page 169] decision, not something we discover later by looking back at what we did and its effects. The decision is important because "the same act" can have very different consequences, depending upon how we choose to justify it. In a sense, acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar, and so not merely the consequences but also the moral nature of our acts depend in part on our decisions about the reasons for doing them. Unfortunately, the message actually conveyed by our actions does not depend only on our intentions and reasons, for our acts may have a meaning for others quite at odds with what we hoped to express. Others may misunderstand our intentions, doubt our sincerity, or discern a subtext that undermines the primary message. Even if sincere, well-intended, and successfully conveyed, the message of an act or policy does not by itself justify the means by which it is conveyed; it is almost always a relevant factor, however, in the moral assessment of the act or policy. These remarks may strike you as too obvious to be worth mentioning; for, even if we do not usually express the ideas so abstractly, we are all familiar with them in our daily interactions with our friends, families, and colleagues. Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? What is superficially "the same act" can be an offer to buy, an admission of guilt, an expression of gratitude, a contribution to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult. Because all this is so familiar, the extent to which these elementary points are ignored in discussions of the pros and cons of social policies such as affirmative action is surprising. The usual presumption is that social policies can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received.	2,455	<h4>The reasons for doing a policy are key to that policy</h4><p>Thomas E. <strong><mark>Hill</mark>, </strong>Jr., Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, 19<strong><mark>91</strong></mark> (“The Message of Affirmative Action,” The Affirmative Action Debate (1995), edited by Steven M. Cahn, Published by Routledge, Reprinted from Social Philosophy & Policy, p. 169-170)</p><p>Actions, as the saying goes, often speak louder than words. There are times, too, when only actions can effectively communicate the message we want to convey, and times when giving a message is a central part of the purpose of action. <u><mark>What our actions say</mark> to others <mark>depends largely</u></mark>, though not entirely, <u>up<mark>on our</mark> avowed <mark>reasons for acting</u>;</mark> and this is a matter for reflective [end page 169] decision, not something we discover later by looking back at what we did and its effects. The decision is important because <u>"<mark>the same act" can have </mark>very <mark>different consequences, depending upon how we</mark> choose to <mark>justify it</mark>. In a sense, <mark>acts done for different reasons are not "the same act"</mark> <mark>even if otherwise similar</mark>, and so not merely the consequences but also <mark>the moral nature of our acts depend</mark> in part <mark>on our</mark> decisions about the <mark>reasons for doing them</u>.</mark> Unfortunately, the message actually conveyed by our actions does not depend only on our intentions and reasons, for our acts may have a meaning for others quite at odds with what we hoped to express. Others may misunderstand our intentions, doubt our sincerity, or discern a subtext that undermines the primary message. Even if sincere, well-intended, and successfully conveyed, <u><mark>the message of</mark> an act or <mark>policy</u></mark> does not by itself justify the means by which it is conveyed; it <u><mark>is</mark> almost <mark>always</mark> a <mark>relevant</mark> factor</u>, however, <u>in the moral assessment of the act or policy</u>. These remarks may strike you as too obvious to be worth mentioning; for, even if we do not usually express the ideas so abstractly, we are all familiar with them in our daily interactions with our friends, families, and colleagues. <u>Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? <mark>What is superficially "the same act" can be</mark> an offer to buy, <mark>an admission of guilt</mark>, an expression of <mark>gratitude, a contribution</mark> to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult. Because all this is so familiar, <mark>the extent to which these</mark> <mark>elementary points are ignored in discussions of</mark> the pros and cons of social <mark>policies</u></mark> such as affirmative action <u><mark>is surprising</mark>. The usual presumption is that social policies can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received</u>. </p>	Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL	2NR	AT: Inevitable	234,324	9	17,088	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	565,244	N	Kentucky	2	George Mason KL	Ryan Galloway	1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI) 1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K 2NC K Case 1NR Case Treaties 2NR K Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,755	No escalation in the Middle East	Maloney, Brookings, 7 ]	Maloney, Brookings, 7 [Suzanne, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, International Herald Tribune Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World, Civil War Ray Takeyh, Fellow Steven A. Cook, Fellow June 28, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm]	Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war Middle Eastern leaders are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has developed an intuitive ability to contain civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.	Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are to go to war Middle Eastern leaders are primarily interested in one thing: most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power there is for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has developed an intuitive ability to contain civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.	Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.	2,831	<h4> No escalation in the Middle East</h4><p><u><strong>Maloney, Brookings, 7</u></strong> [Suzanne, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, International Herald Tribune Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World, Civil War Ray Takeyh, Fellow Steven A. Cook, Fellow June 28, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/maloney20070629.htm<strong>]</p><p></strong>Yet, the <u><mark>Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are </mark>very unlikely<mark> to go to war</u></mark> either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, <u><mark>Middle Eastern leaders</u></mark>, like politicians everywhere, <u><mark>are primarily interested in one thing: </mark>self-preservation</u>. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, <u><mark>most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power</u></mark> and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, <u><mark>there is </mark>no precedent<mark> for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved</u></mark>. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But <u><mark>given its experifence with ambiguous conflicts, the region has</u></mark> also <u><mark>developed an intuitive ability to contain</u></mark> its <u><mark>civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.</p></u></mark>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	66,157	251	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,756	No China war – China won’t risk it all and no flashpoints.	Bremmer 10	Bremmer 10 [Ian, president of Eurasia Group and the author, most recently, of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?, Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020 July/August 2010 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html]	Beijing has no incentive to challenge U.S. power. its economy has grown so quickly and living standards improved so dramatically, It has no incentive to sever its expanding commercial ties all over the world—and the U S familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is aware no U.S. government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island it has co-opted via privileged access to investment opportunities	Beijing has no incentive to challenge U.S. power. its economy has grown so quickly and living standards improved so dramatically It has no incentive to sever its expanding commercial ties all over the world—and the U S familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is aware no U.S. government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island it has co-opted via privileged access to investment opportunities	In addition, Beijing has no incentive to mount a global military challenge to U.S. power. China will one day possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but its economy has grown so quickly over the past two decades, and its living standards improved so dramatically, that it is difficult to imagine the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all by posing the West a large-scale military challenge. It has no incentive to allow anything less than the most serious threat to its sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might sever its expanding network of commercial ties with countries all over the world—and with the United States, the European Union, and Japan, in particular. The more familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is well aware that no U.S. government will support a Taiwanese bid for independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already, via an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of privileged access to investment opportunities on the mainland.	1,106	<h4>No China war – China won’t risk it all and no flashpoints.</h4><p><u><strong>Bremmer 10</u></strong> [Ian, president of Eurasia Group and the author, most recently, of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?, Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020 July/August 2010 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html] </p><p>In addition, <u><mark>Beijing has no incentive to</u></mark> mount a global military <u><mark>challenge</u></mark> to <u><mark>U.S. power.</u></mark> China will one day possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but <u><mark>its economy has grown so quickly</u></mark> over the past two decades, <u><mark>and</mark> </u>its <u><mark>living standards improved so dramatically</mark>, </u>that it is difficult to imagine the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all by posing the West a large-scale military challenge. <u><mark>It has no incentive to</u></mark> allow anything less than the most serious threat to its sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might <u><mark>sever its expanding</u></mark> network of <u><mark>commercial ties</u></mark> with countries <u><mark>all over the world—and</u></mark> with <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, the European Union, and Japan, in particular. The more <u><mark>familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is</u></mark> well <u><mark>aware</u></mark> that <u><mark>no U.S. government will support</u></mark> a <u><mark>Taiwanese</u></mark> bid for <u><mark>independence, and China need not invade an island</u></mark> that <u><mark>it has</u></mark> largely <u><mark>co-opted</u></mark> already, <u><mark>via</u></mark> an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of <u><mark>privileged access to investment opportunities</u></mark> on the mainland.</p>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	403,387	3	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,757	No Russia War – economic interdependence	Bunn et al. 13	Bunn et al. 13 [Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship September 2013 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MAD%20English.pdf]	Common interests in a healthy and growing world economy supersede differences in economic systems. Economic ties between Russia and the E U are evolving in a positive direction. That economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia virtually unthinkable.	Common interests in a growing world economy supersede differences in economic systems. Economic ties between Russia and the E U are positive economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia virtually unthinkable.	In the era of globalization, the role of economic relations has changed. Common interests in a healthy and growing world economy supersede differences in economic systems. Transnational corporations in the manufacturing and financial sectors have linked most of the countries in the world with economic ties. Any military conflict disrupts these links and causes significant economic damage. In fact, maintaining the stability of the world economy has become a constraining factor in military conflicts. Economic ties between Russia and the European Union are also evolving in a positive direction. That economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia virtually unthinkable.	696	<h4>No Russia War – economic interdependence</h4><p><u><strong>Bunn et al. 13</u></strong> [Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship September 2013<u> http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MAD%20English.pdf] </p><p></u>In the era of globalization, the role of economic relations has changed. <u><mark>Common interests in a</mark> healthy and <mark>growing</mark> <mark>world</mark> <mark>economy</mark> <mark>supersede differences in economic systems.</u></mark> Transnational corporations in the manufacturing and financial sectors have linked most of the countries in the world with economic ties. Any military conflict disrupts these links and causes significant economic damage. In fact, maintaining the stability of the world economy has become a constraining factor in military conflicts. <u><mark>Economic ties between Russia and the E</u></mark>uropean <u><mark>U</u></mark>nion <u><mark>are</u></mark> also <u>evolving in a <mark>positive</mark> direction. That <mark>economic foundation makes a military conflict between NATO and Russia virtually unthinkable.</p></u></mark>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,818	2	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,758	No Israel/Iran war	Walt, 12 )	Walt, 12 (Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Top ten media failures in the Iran war debate,” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/11/top_ten_media_failures_in_the_iran_war_debate)	Exaggerating Israel's capabilities. this war scare has been driven by the possibility that Israel might feel so endangered that they would launch a preventive war on their own the IDF doesn't have the capacity to take out Iran's new facility because they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock that protect the facilities. if they can't take out Fordow, then they can't do much to delay Iran's program recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike on its own-may be based on a mirage.	this scare has been driven by the possibility Israel might launch war the IDF doesn't have the capacity to take out Iran's facility because they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike may be based on a mirage.	#7: Exaggerating Israel's capabilities. In a very real sense, this whole war scare has been driven by the possibility that Israel might feel so endangered that they would launch a preventive war on their own, even if U.S. leaders warned them not to. But the IDF doesn't have the capacity to take out Iran's new facility at Fordow, because they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock that protect the facilities. And if they can't take out Fordow, then they can't do much to delay Iran's program at all and the only reason they might strike is to try to get the United States dragged in. In short, the recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike on its own-may be based on a mirage.	757	<h4>No Israel/Iran war</h4><p><strong>Walt, 12 </strong>(Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Top ten media failures in the Iran war debate,” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/11/top_ten_media_failures_in_the_iran_war_debate<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>#7: <u><strong>Exaggerating Israel's capabilities. </u></strong>In a very real sense, <u><mark>this</u></mark> whole <u>war <mark>scare</mark> <mark>has been driven by the</mark> <mark>possibility</mark> that <mark>Israel might</mark> feel so endangered that they would <mark>launch</mark> a preventive <mark>war</mark> on their own</u>, even if U.S. leaders warned them not to. But <u><strong><mark>the IDF doesn't have the capacity</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>to take out Iran's</mark> new <mark>facility</u></mark> at Fordow, <u><mark>because</mark> <mark>they don't have any aircraft that can carry a bomb big enough to penetrate the layers of rock</mark> that protect the facilities.</u> And <u>if they can't take out Fordow, then they can't do much to delay Iran's program </u>at all and the only reason they might strike is to try to get the United States dragged in. In short, the <u><mark>recent war scare-whose taproot is the belief that Israel might strike</mark> on its own-<mark>may be <strong>based on a mirage.</p></u></strong></mark>	null	null	2NC Middle East War	430,819	5	17,089	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	565,242	A	Kentucky	1	UGA DH	Katsula	aff Organ Sales 1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC 2nc Politics 1nr Case 2nr Politics Case	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx	null	48,453	MaCr	Dartmouth MaCr	null	Jo.....	Ma.....	No.....	Cr.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,759	Ghetto	null	Why should I confine myself	null	null	To the image they would fix me in? For pity’s sake, I’d suffocate segregated as exotic I’m no idol made of ebony Breathing phony incense In museums of the primitive I’m no sideshow cannibal Rolling ivory eyeballs To make the kiddies shiver If I shout a shout That burns my throat, it’s when my belly feels my brothers’ hunger; and if sometimes I howl with pain it’s when my toe is stuck beneath somebody’s boot. The nightingale sings many notes, my monotone laments are done. I’m no perspiring actor, arms lifted to the sky, sobbing out his pain before the camera’s eye. I’m frozen in no pose of militance or of damnation either. I’m a living creature, beast of prey every poised to leap to seize life which mocks at death; to pounce on joy which needs passport; to spring at love when it happens by my door. By Guy Tirolien	824	<h4><u>Ghetto</h4><p></u>Why should I confine myself</p><p>To the image</p><p>they would fix me in?</p><p>For pity’s sake,</p><p>I’d suffocate</p><p>segregated as exotic</p><p>I’m no idol made of ebony</p><p>Breathing phony incense</p><p>In museums of the primitive</p><p>I’m no sideshow cannibal</p><p>Rolling ivory eyeballs</p><p>To make the kiddies shiver</p><p>If I shout a shout</p><p>That burns my throat,</p><p>it’s when my belly</p><p>feels my brothers’ hunger;</p><p>and if sometimes</p><p>I howl with pain</p><p>it’s when my toe</p><p>is stuck beneath somebody’s boot.</p><p>The nightingale sings many notes,</p><p>my monotone laments are done.</p><p>I’m no perspiring actor,</p><p>arms lifted to the sky,</p><p>sobbing out his pain</p><p>before the camera’s eye.</p><p>I’m frozen in no pose of militance</p><p>or of damnation either.</p><p>I’m a living creature,</p><p>beast of prey</p><p>every poised to leap</p><p>to seize life</p><p>which mocks at death;</p><p>to pounce on joy</p><p>which needs passport;</p><p>to spring at love</p><p>when it happens by my door.</p><p>By Guy Tirolien</p>	null	null	null	430,274	2	17,090	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	565,277	A	Hurricanedebates2015	9	Kentucky Grasse-Noparstak	Deming	2NR Framework	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	null	48,455	SiAn	Dartmouth SiAn	null	De.....	Si.....	Ty.....	An.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,760	Legality and Marijuana	But cops be like…“I see you…walking down the street, standing on the corner lookin suspicious, you got a lot a of clothes on, why you got a lot of clothes on, it’s only 60 degrees, you got a hoodie on, you not following the rules, no loitering, cut it out…you a criminal…take that hood off...pull ya paints up…higher…higher…say yes sir”…	But cops be like…“I see you…walking down the street, standing on the corner lookin suspicious, you got a lot a of clothes on, why you got a lot of clothes on, it’s only 60 degrees, you got a hoodie on, you not following the rules, no loitering, cut it out…you a criminal…take that hood off...pull ya paints up…higher…higher…say yes sir”… This white cop…this white cop sees you shaking the hands of other folk…“A black person shaking a black person’s hand? There aint no solidarity around these parts…that’s…that’s suspicious, there aint no love in these streets…but there ain’t no love for you”…we aint got no love so we never move together…	null	null	no one ever taught us to love ourselves so we can’t even move alone…where you gone go, you don’t know where you been…how you gone live if you don’t know what life is…how you gone die if you exist as death… But shaking that hand…the cops say its weed…caught between the palms of death and death but life in death…that dime…that nick…are you hated for the weed? Are you hated for breaking the law?...did you break it or did the law break you…causality of duality, this pragmatism is dancing with death…if you didn’t shake that hand would the cop have looked any different…would prison not be in your periphery…would guns not magically appear in ya hands, holes in ya body, 22 caliber like dartboards switched with you like…but I can’t change that…you can’t change that… Are you a pessimist or are you a realist?…the product of natal alienation, general dishonor…dishonor…dishonor…who did you dishonor…why are you the victim of violence…why? There is no why…gratuitous violence… you exist as suffering but they affirm it…whiteness affirms it…it doesn’t want you to speak…don’t talk back to the cops… definitely not in this space…the debate space…this jail cell, policin people of color “you’re not predictable enough, what are your limits”…it seems we…we must always accommodate you, but when are you going to accommodate us…I should make your life easier…but when does mine get easy…why is everyone else prepared to have this discussion…except you…but you won’t win against what broke you…don’t break the rules…the cops might hurt you…debaters might hurt you…you have nothing to offer the world…that’s what bookings said…that’s what the community says…but you know better…you learned better… the world don’t love you, so don’t love the world…but love yourself affirm it in words…there’s death…there’s life…there’s life in death…they know you dead…but you know you’re alive…social life in social death…your good you young’n, look deep inside, your good young’n your good…love yourself…don’t love your suffering but love yourself…don’t love your death but find your life…find it in the music between the beats, find it in the bed between the sheets, find it in the smiles, find it in your friends, find it in your family, find it in your cannabis, find it in between the lines of your artistic words…find it in your life… life in death… affirm your life as a negation of the world, f it when the world defines you, define yourself,	2,427	<h4><strong>Legality and Marijuana</h4><p>But cops be like…“I see you…walking down the street, standing on the corner lookin suspicious, you got a lot a of clothes on, why you got a lot of clothes on, it’s only 60 degrees, you got a hoodie on, you not following the rules, no loitering, cut it out…you a criminal…take that hood off...pull ya paints up…higher…higher…say yes sir”…</p><p>This white cop…this white cop sees you shaking the hands of other folk…“A black person shaking a black person’s hand? There aint no solidarity around these parts…that’s…that’s suspicious, there aint no love in these streets…but there ain’t no love for you”…we aint got no love so we never move together…</p><p>no one ever taught us to love ourselves so we can’t even move alone…where you gone go, you don’t know where you been…how you gone live if you don’t know what life is…how you gone die if you exist as death…</p><p>But shaking that hand…the cops say its weed…caught between the palms of death and death but life in death…that dime…that nick…are you hated for the weed? Are you hated for breaking the law?...did you break it or did the law break you…causality of duality, this pragmatism is dancing with death…if you didn’t shake that hand would the cop have looked any different…would prison not be in your periphery…would guns not magically appear in ya hands, holes in ya body, 22 caliber like dartboards switched with you like…but I can’t change that…you can’t change that…</p><p>Are you a pessimist or are you a realist?…the product of natal alienation, general dishonor…dishonor…dishonor…who did you dishonor…why are you the victim of violence…why? There is no why…gratuitous violence…</p><p>you exist as suffering but they affirm it…whiteness affirms it…it doesn’t want you to speak…don’t talk back to the cops… definitely not in this space…the debate space…this jail cell, policin people of color “you’re not predictable enough, what are your limits”…it seems we…we must always accommodate you, but when are you going to accommodate us…I should make your life easier…but when does mine get easy…why is everyone else prepared to have this discussion…except you…but you won’t win against what broke you…don’t break the rules…the cops might hurt you…debaters might hurt you…you have nothing to offer the world…that’s what bookings said…that’s what the community says…but you know better…you learned better…</p><p>the world don’t love you, so don’t love the world…but love yourself affirm it in words…there’s death…there’s life…there’s life in death…they know you dead…but you know you’re alive…social life in social death…your good you young’n, look deep inside, your good young’n your good…love yourself…don’t love your suffering but love yourself…don’t love your death but find your life…find it in the music between the beats, find it in the bed between the sheets, find it in the smiles, find it in your friends, find it in your family, find it in your cannabis, find it in between the lines of your artistic words…find it in your life… life in death…</p><p>affirm your life as a negation of the world, f it when the world defines you, define yourself,</p></strong>	null	null	null	430,275	2	17,090	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	565,277	A	Hurricanedebates2015	9	Kentucky Grasse-Noparstak	Deming	2NR Framework	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	null	48,455	SiAn	Dartmouth SiAn	null	De.....	Si.....	Ty.....	An.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,761	Black death has black life which exists outside of your world	Sexton 10	Sexton 10 (Jared Sexton, Director, African American Studies School of Humanities , Associate Professor, African American StudiesSchool of Humanities, Associate Professor, Film & Media Studies School of Humanities at University of California Irvine, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” )	speak of black social life and black social death, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed , one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed- upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.	null	To speak of black social life and black social death, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afropessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed- upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.	1,601	<h4>Black death<strong> has black life which exists outside of your world </h4><p>Sexton 10 </strong>(Jared Sexton, Director, African American Studies School of Humanities , Associate Professor, African American StudiesSchool of Humanities, Associate Professor, Film & Media Studies School of Humanities at University of California Irvine, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” <u>)</p><p></u>To<u> speak of black social life and black social death, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it.</u> A living death is as much a death as it is a living. <u>Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed</u>. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afropessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact<u>, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed- upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed. </p></u>	null	null	null	40,272	236	17,090	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	565,277	A	Hurricanedebates2015	9	Kentucky Grasse-Noparstak	Deming	2NR Framework	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	null	48,455	SiAn	Dartmouth SiAn	null	De.....	Si.....	Ty.....	An.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,762	What’s going to keep blackness alive…Our poetry is fire to the mind, burning away at civil society while warming new conceptions of blackness, F yo faith in the system, white artists, black artists, it’s time to burst free Major ’69 Clarence Major, The New Black Poetry (1969) He has lectured and read his work in dozens of U. S. universities as well as in England, France, Liberia, West Germany, Ghana, and Italy. Clarence Major is also currently a professor of twentieth century American literature at the University of California at Davis.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>What’s going to keep blackness alive…Our poetry is fire to the mind, burning away at civil society while warming new conceptions of blackness, F yo faith in the system, white artists, black artists, it’s time to burst free</h4><p>Major ’69 Clarence Major, The New Black Poetry (1969) He has lectured and read his work in dozens of U. S. universities as well as in England, France, Liberia, West Germany, Ghana, and Italy. Clarence Major is also currently a professor of twentieth century American literature at the University of California at Davis.</p>	null	null	null	430,826	1	17,090	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	565,277	A	Hurricanedebates2015	9	Kentucky Grasse-Noparstak	Deming	2NR Framework	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/SiAn/Dartmouth-Singh-Anderson-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx	null	48,455	SiAn	Dartmouth SiAn	null	De.....	Si.....	Ty.....	An.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,763	Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight	Mataconis 9/27	Mataconis 9/27/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)	Holder’s resignation places the administration in a quandary If Republicans gain control of the Senate the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly the president would have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority it would pose problems for the administration the confirmation process would be brutal the president would get a new attorney general, but not someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the lame-duck It won’t be easy the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Republicans could try to run out the clock through procedural motions and holds there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year	most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will bring the nomination during the - lame-duck It won’t be easy. we’re talking about maybe four weeks the Senate will be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote , and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done Republicans could try to run out the clock there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination before the end of this year	As I noted yesterday, Holder’s resignation at this late date places the administration in something of a quandary. If Republicans gain control of the Senate in November, then the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly. At the very least, the president would likely have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, it would still pose political problems for the administration. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, the confirmation process would likely be brutal. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, the president would likely get a new attorney general, but it would most assuredly not be someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will attempt bring the nomination before the Senate during the upcoming post-election lame-duck session. It won’t be easy. Right now, the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas. In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most we’re talking about maybe four weeks in which the Senate will actually be in session. That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and send the nomination to the floor, but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done. Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate Republicans could do to stop the nomination, although they could try to to delay it or even run out the clock on the Senate’s session through procedural motions and the use of holds, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination through the Senate before the end of this year, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.	2,670	<h4>Obama will get a liberal Attorney General in the lame-duck now but it will be a fight</h4><p><strong>Mataconis 9/27</strong>/2014 (Doug, contributor to DC Decoder, part of the Christian Science Monitor’s politics division, Should the next attorney general be confirmed in a lame-duck session?, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Voices/2014/0927/Should-the-next-attorney-general-be-confirmed-in-a-lame-duck-session)</p><p>As I noted yesterday, <u>Holder’s resignation</u> at this late date <u>places the administration in</u> something of <u>a quandary</u>. <u>If Republicans gain control of the Senate</u> in November, then <u>the odds of getting a nominee confirmed will decrease significantly</u>. At the very least, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>have to choose someone who could garner enough Republicans to get a majority</u>, and while that may end up only being a matter of getting one or two senators, <u>it would</u> still <u>pose</u> political <u>problems for the administration</u>. Even if a nominee is confirmed in a Republican Senate, which I expect one ultimately would, <u>the confirmation process would </u>likely <u>be brutal</u>. Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, who would chair the Judiciary Committee in a Republican Senate, would likely do his best to keep the confirmation hearings as reasonable as possible but they would inevitably become a stage for more conservative members of the GOP caucus to score points against the administration. In the end, <u>the president would</u> likely <u>get a new attorney general, but</u> it would most assuredly <u><strong>not</u></strong> be <u><strong>someone like the type of nominee he could get confirmed in a Senate controlled by Democrats. </u></strong>It’s because of the risk that the GOP might gain control of the Senate that <u><mark>most analysts are expecting that the White House and Senate Democrats will</u></mark> attempt <u><mark>bring the nomination</u></mark> before the Senate <u><mark>during the</u></mark> upcoming post<mark>-</mark>election<mark> <u>lame-duck</u></mark> session. <u><strong><mark>It won’t be easy</u></strong>.</mark> Right now, <u>the Senate is expected to return on Nov. 12 and would likely remain in session until some time before Christmas.</u> In between, there will be a week long break for Thanksgiving, though, so at most <u><mark>we’re talking about maybe four weeks </mark>in which <mark>the Senate will </mark>actually <mark>be in session</u>. <u>That won’t be a lot of time to get a candidate vetted, conduct hearings, hold a vote </mark>in the Judiciary Committee<mark>, and send the nomination to the floor</u>, <u><strong>but it could be done if the Democrats want to get it done</mark>.</u></strong> Thanks to last year’s changes to the filibuster rules, there will be little that Senate Republicans as a group or individual Senate <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> could do to stop the nomination, although they <u><mark>could try to</u></mark> to delay it or even <u><strong><mark>run out the clock</u></strong></mark> on the Senate’s session <u>through procedural motions and</u> the use of <u>holds</u>, which were not affected by the changes to the filibuster rules. That’s one reason why the president might select someone like Solicitor General Donald Verilli, who has already been through the Senate confirmation process, twice in his case. In any case, <u><mark>there are obvious incentives for the administration to try to push the nomination </mark>through the Senate <mark>before the end of this year</u></mark>, and that’s what I expect they’ll do.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	1	430,827	4	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,764	Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities	Downs 12	Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/	As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.	As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities	Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.	563	<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, <u>freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u><mark>Given this history, the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	1	305,170	62	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,765	PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee	Moran 9/28	Moran 9/28/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)	Any choice Obama makes will be controversial It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. the nomination probably won't come until after the election If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.	Any choice Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.	Any choice for AG Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so the nomination probably won't come until after the election anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.	958	<h4>PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee</h4><p><strong>Moran 9/28<u></strong>/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)</p><p><mark>Any choice</u></mark> for AG <u><mark>Obama makes will be controversial</u>.</mark> <u><mark>It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and <strong>if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available.</mark> </u></strong>That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so <u>the nomination probably won't come until after the election</u> anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. <u><mark>If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck</mark> session, <mark>it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.</p></u></mark>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	1	430,828	6	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,766	Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights	Sharpton 9/29	Sharpton 9/29/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)	Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas Holder lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements from being dismissed, or altered The principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder	Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has had in civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue with the next AG No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. combatted efforts towards voter suppression he principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued	Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG, whoever he or she may be. We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas. Throughout his tenure, Holder has consistently lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements in the areas of civil rights and voting rights from being dismissed, or altered somehow. The governing principle that this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder.	3,812	<h4>Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights</h4><p><strong>Sharpton 9/29</strong>/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)</p><p>Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric <u><mark>Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has</mark> ever <mark>had in </mark>the area of <mark>civil rights and voting rights.</u></mark> I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. <u><mark>Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue </mark>on<mark> with the next AG</u></mark>, whoever he or she may be. <u>We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas</u>. Throughout his tenure, <u>Holder</u> has consistently <u>lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights</u> in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. <u><mark>No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing <strong>sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies</strong>.</u></mark> <u>No other AG <mark>combatted efforts towards <strong>voter suppression</mark> with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting</u></strong>. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. <u>The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements </u>in the areas of civil rights and voting rights <u>from being dismissed, or altered</u> somehow. <u><strong>T<mark>he</u></strong></mark> governing <u><strong><mark>principle</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued</u></strong></mark>. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They <u>just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder</u>.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	1	430,830	6	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,767	The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage	Williams 14	Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver	Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains	many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains	Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514 Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.	1,611	<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,245	16	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,768	Collapses the economy	Bowling 2013	Bowling 2013 (Julia, Research Associate in the Brennan Center’s Justice Program, Mass Incarceration Gets Attention as an Economic Issue (Finally), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/mass-incarceration-gets-attention-economic-issue-finally)	mass incarceration has come to be recognized as a fiscal concern the United States government spends an unsustainable $79 billion a year on corrections. Mass incarceration greatly disrupts the American job market Removing people from the labor market lowers the quality of our work force and permanently damages their employment and educational opportunities In addition to gaps in employment and lack of work experience many return to neighborhoods suffering from economic divestment High unemployment among ex-prisoners leads to higher state and federal government assistance payouts, loss of income tax revenue, and drains on spending for other essential programs. The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty. ] Then there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. . Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise give cause for concern there are shades of the 1930s, when global finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices China is perhaps even more fragile its economic growth depend on foreign investment Both will be constricted in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.	come to be recognized as a fiscal concern U St spends an unsustainable $79 billion a year Mass incarceration greatly disrupts the American job market country.” The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty. there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. Russia and China's rise give cause for concern. there are shades of the 30s, when global finance ground to a halt peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers rose up rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys Russian stock market has demonstrated fragility China is even more fragile, None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.	This week, in a move surprising to many, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution stating their intent to end mass incarceration. The country’s largest federation of unions now officially opposes long mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent crimes, and supports reforms to help former prisoners reintegrate into society. This announcement will be well received among economists working on criminal justice reform. Long seen as a racial justice issue in the American political arena, mass incarceration has recently, although belatedly, come to be recognized as a fiscal concern. With the world’s largest incarcerated population, the United States government spends an unsustainable $79 billion a year on corrections. But, until now, the understanding of incarceration’s broader economic impact has largely been confined to academia. In the AFL-CIO press release, University of California at Berkeley Economist Steven Pitts put it best: “We cannot organize an economy that provides shared prosperity if we don’t also end mass incarceration.” Mass incarceration greatly disrupts the American job market. Sixty-one percent of people in prison are between 18-39 years old -- in the prime of their working life. Removing able-bodied working-age people from the labor market lowers the quality of our work force and permanently damages their employment and educational opportunities. The formerly incarcerated face a daunting uphill battle with unemployment. In addition to gaps in employment and lack of work experience, the AFL-CIO resolution notes that many re-entering civil society return to neighborhoods, “long suffering from economic divestment, high unemployment, poor infrastructure and isolation.” Most importantly, the formerly incarcerated face stigma and discrimination. Efforts to “ban the box” on employment forms asking about criminal records may have worked in earlier eras, but today a former convict’s past is only a quick Google search away. Given this reality, it is no surprise that 60 percent of formerly incarcerated people are unemployed, compared to 7.3 percent of the general population. High unemployment among ex-prisoners leads to higher state and federal government assistance payouts, loss of income tax revenue, and drains on spending for other essential programs. The diminished employment prospects of formerly incarcerated individuals also have an enormous effect on their partners and children. Currently, 1 in 28 children has a parent in prison. Having an incarcerated parent doubles a child’s chances of experiencing homelessness, and increases the likelihood that they’ll exhibit social problems, academic problems, and be incarcerated themselves. Nobel Prize Winning Economist Joseph Stiglitz noted in the New York Times, “a young American’s life prospects are more dependent on the income and education of his parents than in almost any other advanced country.” The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty. The AFL-CIO’s resolution is an important sign that the biggest players in America’s economy are beginning to wake up to the reality that mass incarceration is as much an economic issue as a criminal justice one. Let’s hope more of those in the political and business arenas make ending mass incarceration a priority. U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008 [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html] Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.	6,118	<h4>Collapses the economy</h4><p><strong>Bowling 2013</strong> (Julia, Research Associate in the Brennan Center’s Justice Program, Mass Incarceration Gets Attention as an Economic Issue (Finally), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/mass-incarceration-gets-attention-economic-issue-finally)</p><p>This week, in a move surprising to many, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution stating their intent to end mass incarceration. The country’s largest federation of unions now officially opposes long mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent crimes, and supports reforms to help former prisoners reintegrate into society. This announcement will be well received among economists working on criminal justice reform. Long seen as a racial justice issue in the American political arena, <u>mass incarceration has</u> recently, although belatedly, <u><mark>come to be recognized as a fiscal concern</u></mark>. With the world’s largest incarcerated population, <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates government <mark>spends an <strong>unsustainable $79 billion</strong> a year</mark> on corrections. </u>But, until now, the understanding of incarceration’s broader economic impact has largely been confined to academia. In the AFL-CIO press release, University of California at Berkeley Economist Steven Pitts put it best: “We cannot organize an economy that provides shared prosperity if we don’t also end mass incarceration.” <u><mark>Mass incarceration <strong>greatly disrupts the American job market</u></strong></mark>. Sixty-one percent of people in prison are between 18-39 years old -- in the prime of their working life. <u>Removing</u> able-bodied working-age <u>people from the labor market lowers the quality of our work force and permanently damages their employment and educational opportunities</u>. The formerly incarcerated face a daunting uphill battle with unemployment. <u>In addition to gaps in employment and lack of work experience</u>, the AFL-CIO resolution notes that <u>many</u> re-entering civil society <u>return to neighborhoods</u>, “long <u>suffering from economic divestment</u>, high unemployment, poor infrastructure and isolation.” Most importantly, the formerly incarcerated face stigma and discrimination. Efforts to “ban the box” on employment forms asking about criminal records may have worked in earlier eras, but today a former convict’s past is only a quick Google search away. Given this reality, it is no surprise that 60 percent of formerly incarcerated people are unemployed, compared to 7.3 percent of the general population. <u>High unemployment among ex-prisoners leads to higher state and federal government assistance payouts, loss of income tax revenue, and drains on spending for other essential programs. </u>The diminished employment prospects of formerly incarcerated individuals also have an enormous effect on their partners and children. Currently, 1 in 28 children has a parent in prison. Having an incarcerated parent doubles a child’s chances of experiencing homelessness, and increases the likelihood that they’ll exhibit social problems, academic problems, and be incarcerated themselves. Nobel Prize Winning Economist Joseph Stiglitz noted in the New York Times, “a young American’s life prospects are more dependent on the income and education of his parents than in almost any other advanced <mark>country.” <u>The economic impact of incarceration pushes families through the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, and fuels a multi-generational cycle of poverty.</mark> </u><strong>The AFL-CIO’s resolution is an important sign that the biggest players in America’s economy are beginning to wake up to the reality that mass incarceration is as much an economic issue as a criminal justice one. Let’s hope more of those in the political and business arenas make ending mass incarceration a priority.</p><p>U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war</p><p>Friedberg and Schoenfeld</strong>, 20<strong>08 </strong> [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html<u>]</p><p>Then <mark>there are</u></mark> the dolorous <u><mark>consequences of a</u></mark> potential <u><mark>collapse of the world's financial architecture.</mark> </u>For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos<u>.<mark> Russia</mark>'s new militancy <mark>and China's</mark> seemingly relentless <mark>rise </u></mark>also <u><mark>give cause for concern</u>.</mark> If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario <u><mark>there are shades of the</mark> 19<mark>30s,</mark> <mark>when global</u></mark> trade and <u><mark>finance ground</mark> nearly <mark>to a halt</mark>, the <mark>peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers</mark> led by the remorseless fanatics who <mark>rose up</mark> on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that <mark>rogue states may choose to become</u></mark> ever more <u><mark>reckless with their nuclear toys</mark>, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors</u> even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the <u><mark>Russian stock market has demonstrated</mark> the <mark>fragility</mark> of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices</u>, now driven down by the global slowdown. <u><mark>China is</mark> perhaps <mark>even more fragile</u>,</mark> <u>its economic growth depend</u>ing heavily <u>on foreign investment</u> and access to foreign markets. <u>Both will</u> now <u>be constricted</u>, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest <u>in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. <mark>None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders</mark> of these countrie<mark>s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.</p></u></mark>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	1	859,894	14	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,769	The fifty United States and relevant territories should remove criminal and civil penalties for marihuana on the grounds that it violates the disparate impact standard.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should remove criminal and civil penalties for marihuana on the grounds that it violates the disparate impact standard.</h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,829	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,770	Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination	Beard 8	Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy	the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES ORGAN DONOR CARDS incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. REQUIRED REQUEST Some federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation REQUIRED REFERRAL additional legislation to refer potential organ donors COLLABORATION the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage	transplant industry adopted policy options designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, maintain the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo seven actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES ORGAN DONOR CARDS REQUIRED REQUEST REQUIRED REFERRAL OLLABORATION Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative KIDNEY EXCHANGES REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS none of the policies resolve the transplant shortage it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.	http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.	9,339	<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p> Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the <mark>transplant industry</mark> has examined and <mark>adopted</mark> a series of <mark>policy options</mark> ostensibly <mark>designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these,</mark> however, continue to <mark>maintain the</mark> basic zero-price property of the <mark>altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo</mark>te</u>. <u>At least <mark>seven</mark> such <mark>actions have been</mark> <mark>implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u><mark>INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ <u><mark>ORGAN DONOR CARDS</u></mark> A related activity has been the process of <u>incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ <u><mark>REQUIRED REQUEST</mark> Some</u> survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u>requiring all hospitals</u> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u>to request organ donation</u> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ <u><mark>REQUIRED REFERRAL</u></mark> While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ <u>C<mark>OLLABORATION</mark> </u>A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u>the </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ <mark>KIDNEY</mark> <mark>EXCHANGES</u></mark> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ <u><mark>REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS</u></mark> <u>Finally, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct </u>(explicit) <u>costs incurred by</u> such d<u>onors </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u>We must conclude that <mark>none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies</mark> should be expected to <mark>resolve the transplant</mark> organ <mark>shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, <mark>it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u>.</p></mark>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,246	21	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,771	The United States should enforce environmental standards for violations of disparate impact so as to avoid violations of environmental justice	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The United States should enforce environmental standards for violations of disparate impact so as to avoid violations of environmental justice</h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,831	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,772	One problem is that most voluntary solutions rely exclusively on organs from cadavers, which alone can never solve the shortage	Fry-Revere 14	Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014	The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6 Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualiﬁed donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.	number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualiﬁed donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand	The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6 At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could beneﬁt from a kidney transplant. Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualiﬁed donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now, no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.	1,179	<h4>One problem is that most voluntary solutions rely exclusively on organs from cadavers, which alone can never solve the shortage </h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p><u>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6</p><p></u>At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could beneﬁt from a kidney transplant. <u>Today the <mark>number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualiﬁed donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital</mark>.</u> Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs<u> </u>for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now,<u> no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, <mark>there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand</mark>.</p></u>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,248	7	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,773	The federal government should retain legal prohibitions of Marihuana and enforce them in ways that don’t violate the disparate impact.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The federal government should retain legal prohibitions of Marihuana and enforce them in ways that don’t violate the disparate impact.</h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,832	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,774	The possibility of complex artificial organs that actually function is at best decades away.	Adhikari 14	Adhikari 14 Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s	http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html According to Jordan Miller at Rice "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," . "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," . "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."	According t Jordan Miller, at Rice Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs there are dozens of cell types in these organs We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure	03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html [According to Jordan Miller, assistant professor of bioengineering at Rice University]. "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," Miller said. "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," Miller pointed out. "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure." NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD	861	<h4>The possibility of complex artificial organs that actually function is at best decades away.</h4><p><strong>Adhikari 14</strong> Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s </p><p>03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls <u>http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html</p><p></u>[<u><mark>According t</mark>o <mark>Jordan Miller</u>,</mark> assistant professor of bioengineering <u><mark>at Rice</u></mark> University]. <u>"<mark>Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients</mark>," </u>Miller said<u>. "<mark>We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs</mark>." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "<mark>there are dozens of cell types in these organs</mark>," </u>Miller pointed out<u>. "<mark>We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure</mark>."</p><p></u>NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD</p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,249	7	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,775	The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,833	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,776	The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,834	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,777	The shortage means many die	Beard 8	Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy	our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.	failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.	http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.	5,967	<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u><strong></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p></strong>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,247	16	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,778	The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,835	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,779	All economic studies agree that sales would solve	Kaserman, 7	Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.	Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives have surfaced repeatedly over the years Importantly, every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that policy.	over the years every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that polic	Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis Financial Incentives Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives (or, similarly, through the formation of cadaveric organ procurement markets) have surfaced repeatedly over the years. n56 Importantly, every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that policy. Other, non-economist commentators have reached that same conclusion as well.	688	<h4>All economic studies agree that sales would solve</h4><p><strong>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p>Financial Incentives <u>Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives</u> (or, similarly, through the formation of cadaveric organ procurement markets) <u>have surfaced repeatedly <mark>over the years</u></mark>. n56 <u>Importantly, <mark>every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that polic</mark>y. </u>Other, non-economist commentators have reached that same conclusion as well.</p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,250	3	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,780	CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement	Schwartz 2013	Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)	forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly	only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly	Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.	2,875	<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,416	19	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,781	Some have suggested that a market for organs would discourage altruistic donations, but the core study on which these claims are based has proven untrue	Economist 11	Economist 11 The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering	In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited	In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited	Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Richard Titmuss compared the voluntary British system favourably with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.	1,117	<h4>Some have suggested that a market for organs would discourage altruistic donations, but the core study on which these claims are based has proven untrue</h4><p><strong>Economist 11</strong> The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money</p><p>http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering</p><p>Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. <u><mark>In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift</mark> Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy"</u> Richard <u><mark>Titmuss compared the voluntary British</u> <u>system</u></mark> favourably <u><mark>with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses,</u></mark> and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although <u><mark>he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited</u></mark>, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.</p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,253	7	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,782	Other sales empirically deny crowd out of voluntary donations	Boyer 12	Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis	allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating . Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation	allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation. n157 In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation	It should also be noted that allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating without compensation. n156 Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation. n157 In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation by providing donors with more power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by middlemen.	550	<h4>Other sales empirically deny crowd out of voluntary donations</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>It should also be noted that<u> <mark>allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating</mark> </u>without compensation<u>.</u> n156 <u><mark>Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation</u>. n157 <u>In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation</mark> </u>by providing donors with more power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by middlemen.</p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,620	4	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,783	The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism	Schwartz 2013	Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)	The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is	The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.	B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.	8,598	<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,417	18	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,784	With organs, altruism is even less likely to be affected since the donations are primarily for friends and relatives	Gill 2	Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45	In the early 1970s, Titmuss and Singer argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, first the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U S secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.	first o the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U St secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.	Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html 3. In the early 1970s, Titmuss (1971) and Singer (1973) argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, first of all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the United States. And we believe, secondly, that because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate. We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119).	1,554	<h4>With organs, altruism is even less likely to be affected since the donations are primarily for friends and relatives</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>3. <u>In the early 1970s, Titmuss</u> (1971) <u>and Singer</u> (1973) <u>argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys,</u> leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, <u><mark>first </u>o</mark>f all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that <u><mark>the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u>t</mark>ates. And we believe, <u><mark>secondly,</mark> </u>that<u> <mark>because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.</u></mark> We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119). </p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,252	7	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,785	Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations	Taylor 2013	Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)	without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos	Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,	The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.	5,417	<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	56,721	34	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,786	Even if some crowd out occurred, sales would still provide an adequate supply of organs. Study by Becker and Elias 14	null	Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs	http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.	Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use.	http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.	10,811	<h4><strong>Even if some crowd out occurred, sales would still provide an adequate supply of organs. Study by Becker and Elias 14 </h4><p></strong> Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u>Paying for organs </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><strong>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u></strong>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,254	24	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,787	Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics	American Banker 2014	American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)	The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system	The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"	The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.	1,984	<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,418	16	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,788	The difference between plan and cp is the CP retains federal violations – basis for competition	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4>The difference between plan and cp is the CP retains federal violations – basis for competition</h4>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	2 – keep fed enforcement cp	430,836	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,789	Sales in Iran have resulted in a surplus of donors – there is a waiting list to donate	Minton 14	Minton 14 Michelle Minton • March 27, 2014 Human Achievement of the Day from HumanProgress.org: Organ Replacement Technology	There are 120,000 people waiting for organ transplants in the U S alone. Compare this shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the U S , there is a donor waiting list in Iran.	shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the U S there is a donor waiting list in Iran	https://cei.org/blog/human-achievement-day-humanprogressorg-organ-replacement-technology Medical breakthroughs are giving hope to hundreds of thousands of people waiting for organ transplants. There are 120,000 people waiting for organ transplants in the United States alone. By this time tomorrow, twenty to thirty Americans will die because they cannot get a new kidney—not to mention other organs. Compare this man-made shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the United States, there is a donor waiting list in Iran. As long as the industrialized world rejects the Iranian model, we must turn to innovation to resolve the organ shortage crisis.	689	<h4>Sales in Iran have resulted in a surplus of donors – there is a waiting list to donate </h4><p><strong>Minton 14 </strong>Michelle Minton • March 27, 2014 Human Achievement of the Day from HumanProgress.org: Organ Replacement Technology</p><p>https://cei.org/blog/human-achievement-day-humanprogressorg-organ-replacement-technology</p><p> Medical breakthroughs are giving hope to hundreds of thousands of people waiting for organ transplants. <u>There are 120,000 people waiting for organ transplants in the U</u>nited<u> S</u>tates<u> alone. </u>By this time tomorrow, twenty to thirty Americans will die because they cannot get a new kidney—not to mention other organs. <u>Compare this</u> man-made <u><mark>shortage to Iran where organ donors may be compensated with cash. In contrast to the U</u></mark>nited<u><mark> S</u></mark>tates<u>, <mark>there is a donor waiting list in Iran</mark>.</u> As long as the industrialized world rejects the Iranian model, we must turn to innovation to resolve the organ shortage crisis. </p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,837	2	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,790	Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)	All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection	The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection	All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.	1,067	<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	3	430,419	39	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,791	Setting the price at a market clearing level guarantees a sufficient number of organs.	Watkins 5	Watkins 5 Christy M. Watkins, University of Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law Spring, 2005 5 JICL 1 ARTICLE: A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives n1 lexis	the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand. Price flexibility would eliminate surpluses or shortages automatically.	the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand Price flexibility would eliminate shortages automatically. n	2. The Market Process A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3) hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement [*27] organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care. n214 First, the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand. n215 Price flexibility would eliminate surpluses or shortages automatically. n216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order. n217 In turn, the centers would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price paid to the donor plus the firm's collection and distribution cost. n218 From here, the center could allocate the organs in "precisely the same fashion they are allocated today" under the guidelines of the UNOS. n219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate. n220 Procurement agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms. n221	1,638	<h4>Setting the price at a market clearing level guarantees a sufficient number of organs.</h4><p><strong>Watkins 5</strong> Christy M. Watkins, University of Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law Spring, 2005 5 JICL 1 ARTICLE: A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives n1 lexis</p><p>2. The Market Process</p><p>A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3) hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement [*27] organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care. n214 First, <u><mark>the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand</mark>. </u> n215 <u><mark>Price flexibility would eliminate</mark> surpluses or <mark>shortages automatically. </u> n</mark>216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order. n217 In turn, the centers would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price paid to the donor plus the firm's collection and distribution cost. n218 From here, the center could allocate the organs in "precisely the same fashion they are allocated today" under the guidelines of the UNOS. n219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate. n220 Procurement agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms. n221</p>	null	null	Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives	430,257	4	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,792	Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention	Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)	Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)	marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.	marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs	It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.	936	<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	3	430,420	24	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,793	The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market	Hughes 9	Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.	U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid	A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences	Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351 Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92	2,620	<h4><strong>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u><strong>. n92</p></strong>	null	null	Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market	430,256	14	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,794	Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014	Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)	The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops	If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities still criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation	The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.	4,540	<h4>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><mark>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong><mark>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u> for considerable <u>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><mark>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u></mark> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><mark>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></mark> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	3	430,422	43	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,795	Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.	Jaycox 12	Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College, Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION	Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:	Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.	2,479	<h4><strong>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin<strong> Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p></strong>	null	null	Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market	430,255	14	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,796	Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law	Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)	Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)	Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.	Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.	Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.	1,236	<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u><strong>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	3	193,806	47	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,797	For many, the coercion is more violent	Bowden 13	Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis	Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.	Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking	[452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10	1,529	<h4><strong>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p><strong> </p></strong>	null	null	Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market	430,258	14	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,798	International treaty system solves great power war	Muller 2000	Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)	As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance	as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance	In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.	3,802	<h4>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p><strong>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	3	65,123	59	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,799	And that market is widespread and expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation	Samadi 2012	Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)	the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable	WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower	Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable	2,662	<h4> <strong>And that market is widespread and <u>expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u><strong> </p></strong>	null	null	Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market	267,351	8	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,800	Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize	Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2	Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2 (Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)	unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.	moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment	As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.	1,802	<h4>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</h4><p><strong>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p><u>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment</mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p></u>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	Adv	26,721	1,533	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,801	The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery	Delmonico 3	Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts	the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. The most disturbing issue of organ sales is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world	exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery pressures put by organ brokers provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers	General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003) WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. The most disturbing issue of organ sales to both Christian and secular ethicists is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002).	1,963	<h4><strong>The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance <u>the <mark>exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery</u></mark>, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). <u>The <mark>pressures put by organ brokers</mark> upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to <mark>provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy.</mark> </u>Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, <u>the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor <mark>makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice</mark>. </u>These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. <u>The most disturbing issue of organ sales </u>to both Christian and secular ethicists <u>is the <mark>formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy</mark>.</u> This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that <u><mark>they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce</mark>, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery <mark>medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers</mark> in many parts of the world</u> (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper<strong>-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002). </p></strong>	null	null	Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market	430,260	15	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,802	Turn – Rational Policymaking	null	null	null	null	null	null	<h4><strong>Turn – Rational Policymaking </h4></strong>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	Adv	430,838	1	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,803	The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads anti-biotic resistant bacteria	Kelly 13	Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis	Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries	governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies transplant tourism facilitate spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across border	[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77	1,754	<h4><strong>The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads <u>anti-biotic resistant </u>bacteria</h4><p>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u>Because <mark>governmental disease control agencies do</mark> <mark>not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases</mark> <mark>like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms</mark> <mark>global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism</mark> and broader medical tourism <mark>facilitate</mark> the <mark>spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u>Because such <mark>bacteria are</mark> <mark>frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique</mark> <mark>strains across border</mark>s upon returning to their home countries</u>. n76<strong> As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p></strong>	null	null	Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market	430,429	9	17,092	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	565,249	A	Navy	1	Florida Cone-Marchini	Crane	null	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2
742,804	A. Abandoning calculability leaves no way to measure between competing policy options	Jarvis 2K	Jarvis, senior lecturer @ University of Australia, 2K	Postmodernism ) Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war, famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the subversive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations, question our faith in science, reason, and logic, or reinscribe questions in new contexts, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of theory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privileges no one narrative or understanding over another, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another? for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination. that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable, cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state incalculable justice requires us to calculate.” left to itself, the incalculable idea of justice is always very close to the bad, for it can always be reappropriated The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” This is the “at least necessary condition,” for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. , religious or nationalist fanaticism.”	world experiences , war, famine, problems emerge and solutions will be sought. we might problematize current knowledge question our faith in science, reason, logic, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the search for understanding seems absurd. If we abandon logic and reason, dump objectivity , and succumb to blind relativism how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another? for progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination. that justice exceeds calculation, cannot serve for staying out of political battles, within an institution left to itself, the incalculable justice is always bad, for it can be reappropriated calculating the incalculable responds to a duty, and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” This is necessary for organization of resistance to totalitarianism	(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism ) To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding, the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war, famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the subversive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations, question our faith in science, reason, and logic, or reinscribe questions in new contexts, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of theory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privileges no one narrative or understanding over another, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another? B. This disables progressive politics and allows totalitarianism, turning the affirmative – engaging in policy calculations can capture affirmative impacts while avoiding bad outcomes – Campbell, Professor of Int’l Politics @ Newcastle, 1998 (David, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 186-187) Derrida’s argument addresses more directly—more directly, I would argue, than is acknowledged by Critchley—the concern that for politics (at least for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination. That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, “that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable, cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others.” Indeed, “incalculable justice requires us to calculate.” From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronimic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that “left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.” The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” the “perverse calculation,” even “the worst.” This is the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, the “at least necessary condition,” for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences “we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”	3,570	<h4><strong>A. Abandoning calculability leaves no way to measure between competing policy options </h4><p>Jarvis</strong>, senior lecturer @ University of Australia, <strong>2K</p><p></strong>(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of <u>Postmodernism )</p><p></u>To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding, the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. <u>Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a<mark> world</mark> much the same as today, one that <mark>experiences</mark> the recurring problems of inequality, injustice<mark>, war, famine, </mark>violence, and conflict. Various <mark>problems </mark>will <mark>emerge and solutions </mark>to them <mark>will be sought.</mark> These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the subversive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while <mark>we might problematize current knowledge </mark>and interpretations, <mark>question our faith in science, reason, </mark>and <mark>logic,</mark> or reinscribe questions in new contexts, <mark>to suppose these endeavors contrary to </mark>the activity of theory and <mark>the search for </mark>meaning and <mark>understanding seems </mark>plainly <mark>absurd. If we abandon </mark>the principles of <mark>logic and reason, dump </mark>the yardsticks of <mark>objectivity </mark>and assessment<mark>, and succumb to </mark>a <mark>blind relativism</mark> that privileges no one narrative or understanding over another, <mark>how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another?<strong></mark> </p><p></u>B. This disables progressive politics and allows totalitarianism, turning the affirmative – engaging in policy calculations can capture affirmative impacts while avoiding bad outcomes – </p><p>Campbell</strong>, Professor of Int’l Politics @ Newcastle, <strong>1998</p><p></strong>(David, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 186-187)</p><p>Derrida’s argument addresses more directly—more directly, I would argue, than is acknowledged by Critchley—the concern that for politics (at least <u><mark>for </mark>a <mark>progressive politics) one must provide an account of</mark> <mark>the decision to combat domination.</mark> </u>That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, “<u><mark>that justice exceeds </mark>law and <mark>calculation, </mark>that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable, <mark>cannot </mark>and should not<mark> serve </mark>as alibi <mark>for</mark> <mark>staying out of </mark>juridico-<mark>political battles, within an institution </mark>or a state</u>, or between institutions or states and others.” Indeed, “<u>incalculable justice requires us to calculate.”</u> From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronimic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that “<u><mark>left to itself, the incalculable</u></mark> and giving (donatrice) <u>idea of <mark>justice is always </mark>very close to the <mark>bad,</u></mark> even to the worst, <u><mark>for it can </mark>always <mark>be reappropriated</u></mark> by the most perverse calculation.” <u>The necessity of <mark>calculating the incalculable </mark>thus <mark>responds to a duty,</mark> </u>a duty that inhabits the instant of madness <u><mark>and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,”</mark> </u>the “perverse calculation,” even “the worst.” <u><mark>This is</u></mark> the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, <u>the “at least <mark>necessary </mark>condition,”<mark> for </mark>the <mark>organization of</mark> <mark>resistance to totalitarianism </mark>in all its forms.</u> And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences “we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism<u><strong>, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”</p></u></strong>	Neg vs Harvard ad	1NC	Adv	430,840	3	17,091	./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	565,256	N	Kentucky	7	Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman	Evans	Fed CP (2NR) Treaties DA (2NR) AG Politics	ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx	null	48,454	YaAh	Dartmouth YaAh	null	Ka.....	Ya.....	Pi.....	Ah.....	18,764	Dartmouth	Dartmouth	null	null	1,004	ndtceda14	NDT/CEDA 2014-15	2,014	cx	college	2

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