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742,605 |
NOTA does not apply to research – only to transplants
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Korobkin 7
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Korobkin 7 Russell Korobkin, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Faculty Fellow, UCLA Center for Society and Genetics; Faculty Associate, UCLA Center for Health Policy Research. Arizona Law Review Spring, 2007 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 45 ARTICLE: Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research
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NOTA's reach is limited to organs "for use in human transplantation." This language indicates that researchers may buy and donors may sell covered organs for research purposes without running afoul of the statute
| null |
The primary federal law relating to the purchase or sale of human tissues is the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"). Enacted in 1984, NOTA specifically prohibits - on pain of fine or imprisonment - the buying or selling of human organs, which it defines to include the kidneys, liver, heart, lungs, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof, and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus). n11 The inclusion in the statute's scope of any "subpart" of any listed organ suggests that even a single skin cell, which conceivably could be used in therapeutic cloning, would fall under the prohibition on sales, however its scope does not encompass renewable tissues, including blood or sperm. n12 More importantly, NOTA's reach is limited, on its face, to organs "for use in human transplantation." n13 This language [*48] indicates that researchers may buy and donors may sell covered organs for research purposes without running afoul of the statute. n14
| 1,030 |
<h4>NOTA does not apply to research – only to transplants</h4><p><strong>Korobkin 7</strong> Russell Korobkin, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Faculty Fellow, UCLA Center for Society and Genetics; Faculty Associate, UCLA Center for Health Policy Research. Arizona Law Review Spring, 2007 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 45 ARTICLE: Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research</p><p> The primary federal law relating to the purchase or sale of human tissues is the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"). Enacted in 1984, NOTA specifically prohibits - on pain of fine or imprisonment - the buying or selling of human organs, which it defines to include the kidneys, liver, heart, lungs, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof, and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus). n11 The inclusion in the statute's scope of any "subpart" of any listed organ suggests that even a single skin cell, which conceivably could be used in therapeutic cloning, would fall under the prohibition on sales, however its scope does not encompass renewable tissues, including blood or sperm. n12 More importantly, <u>NOTA's reach is limited</u>, on its face, <u>to organs "for use in human transplantation."</u> n13 <u>This language</u> [*48] <u>indicates that researchers may buy and donors may sell covered organs for research purposes without running afoul of the statute</u>. n14</p>
|
1ar cards
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,773 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,606 |
Inequality=multiple structural trends towards extinction
|
Szentes ‘8
|
Szentes ‘8
Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf
|
arms race and militarisation have not ended but escalated and continued many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor , manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation , exploitation and oppression, and in the degradation of human environment, ”, Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars peace cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe Nevertheless, . Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. The real choice for the world society is between continuation of visible and “invisible wars” and transformation of the world order
|
arms race and militarisation have not ended but escalated and continued invisible wars are suffered by the poor Behind invisible wars” we find striking international inequities which tend to generate tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars peace cannot be safeguarded in one part when some others suffer no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap are substantially reduced selfish behaviour paves the way for the final catastrophe human society cannot survive unless profound international inequalities are eliminated
|
It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.
| 7,499 |
<h4><strong>Inequality=multiple structural trends towards extinction</h4><p>Szentes ‘8</p><p></strong>Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf</p><p>It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --<u><mark>arms race and militarisation have not ended</u></mark> with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, <u><mark>but escalated and continued</u></mark>, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --<u>many “<mark>invisible wars</mark>” <mark>are suffered by the poor</mark> </u>and oppressed people<u>, manifested in<strong> mass misery, </strong>poverty,<strong> unemployment, homelessness, starvation</strong> </u>and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions<u>, exploitation and oppression, </u>racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc.,<u> <strong>and</strong> </u>last but not least,<u> <strong>in the degradation of human environment</strong>, </u>which means that --the “war against Nature<u>”,</u> i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. <u><mark>Behind<strong></mark> </u></strong>global terrorism and<u> “<mark>invisible wars” we find striking international </mark>and intrasociety <mark>inequities</mark> and distorted development patterns , <mark>which tend to generate</mark> social as well as international <mark>tensions</u></mark>, thus <u><mark>paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars</u></mark>. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, <u><mark>peace<strong></mark> </u></strong>is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and<u> <mark>cannot be safeguarded in one part</mark> of the world <mark>when some others suffer</mark> visible or invisible wars</u>. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However,<u> <mark>no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap</mark> and intra-society inequalities <mark>are substantially reduced</u></mark>. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. <u>The narrow-minded, election-oriented, <mark>selfish behaviour</mark> motivated by thirst for power and wealth,</u> which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, <u><mark>paves the way for</mark> <strong><mark>the final</mark>, last <mark>catastrophe</u></strong></mark>. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. <u>Nevertheless, </u>the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution<u>. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, <mark>human society cannot survive unless</mark> such <mark>profound</mark> intra-society and <mark>international inequalities</mark> prevailing today <mark>are</mark> soon <mark>eliminated</mark>.</u> Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. <u>The real choice for the world society is between</u> negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, <u>continuation of visible and “invisible wars”</u>, as long as this is possible at all, <u>and</u>, on the other, <u><strong>transformation of the world order</u></strong> by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 912 | 269 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,607 |
Gut check - what does it mean to “be a body w/o organs”? You are always already constituted as a subject by power relations – the aff can only result in a rearticulation of white privilege.
|
Kelly 2009
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Kelly 2009 (Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault )
|
Foucault does on one occasion call for the rescindment of the norm of the individual as a means to its concrete abolition Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual e individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization the individual is something different and more recent than subjectivity per se for Foucault This Deleuzian demand for de-individualization follows the logic that individuality is something pernicious imposed on us; such harking after an authentic existence is quite alien to Foucault's thought Foucault lauds recent struggles that are not exactly for or against the 'individual'; rather, they are struggles against the 'government of individualization' That to which Foucault does advocate resistance is identity Foucault is himself ambivalent about the concept of identity, only using the word a couple of times, and then in a perjorative sense, in contrast to “form of subjectivity,” which for Foucault is a perfectly neutral expression
|
Foucault does call for the rescindment of the norm of the individual as a means to its concrete abolition Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual The individual is the product of power What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement the individual is something different and more recent than subjectivity harking after an authentic existence is quite alien to Foucault's thought Foucault lauds recent struggles that are not exactly for or against the 'individual'; rather, they are struggles against the 'government of individualization That to which Foucault does advocate resistance is identity
|
It's true that Foucault does on one occasion call for the rescindment of the norm of the individual as a means to its concrete abolition: Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization. (EW3 109) While, as we have seen, the individual is something different and more recent than subjectivity per se for Foucault, and while it is thus something that is connected to the subjection that Foucault obviously in a sense condemns, Foucault does not in general follow this anti-individual line. The quoted passage comes from the introduction written by Foucault for the English translation of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. Here Foucault is doing an exegesis of their thought, outlining what he thinks is a central principle expounded in the work he is introducing. The fact that Foucault says this here then really does not imply that Foucault himself believes it. This Deleuzian demand for de-individualization follows the logic that individuality is something pernicious imposed on us; such harking after an authentic existence is quite alien to Foucault's thought. By contrast, in "The Subject and Power," Foucault lauds recent struggles that "assert the right to be different and underline everything that makes individuals truly individual" while simultaneously attacking "everything that separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life": "These struggles are not exactly for or against the 'individual'; rather, they are struggles against the 'government of individualization'" (EW3 330). That to which Foucault does advocate resistance is identity. Now, David Weberman (2000, 263), among others, claims that Foucault wants us to develop "new 'identities,'" but Weberman in fact here cites the passage we have already mentioned in which Foucault advocates "new forms of subjectivity" (EW3 336; emphasis added); he does not here mention "identity" as such. Butler (1997, 84) for her part sees individuals as "formulated" through "discursively constituted 'identity,'" which would mean that iden-tity and individuality are coextensive, but Foucault (EW1 166) is himself ambivalent about the concept of identity, only using the word a couple of times, and then in a perjorative sense, in contrast to “form of subjectivity,” which for Foucault is a perfectly neutral expression.
| 2,641 |
<h4>Gut check - what does it mean to “be a body w/o organs”? You are always already constituted as a subject by power relations – the aff can only result in a rearticulation of white privilege.</h4><p><strong>Kelly 2009</strong> (Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault )</p><p>It's true that <u><strong><mark>Foucault</mark> <mark>does</mark> on one occasion <mark>call for the rescindment of the norm of the individual as a means to its concrete abolition</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual</u></strong></mark>, as philosophy has defined them. <mark>Th<u><strong>e individual is the product of power</mark>. <mark>What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement</mark>, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization</u></strong>. (EW3 109) While, as we have seen, <u><strong><mark>the individual is something different and more recent than subjectivity</mark> per se for Foucault</u></strong>, and while it is thus something that is connected to the subjection that Foucault obviously in a sense condemns, Foucault does not in general follow this anti-individual line. The quoted passage comes from the introduction written by Foucault for the English translation of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. Here Foucault is doing an exegesis of their thought, outlining what he thinks is a central principle expounded in the work he is introducing. The fact that Foucault says this here then really does not imply that Foucault himself believes it. <u><strong>This Deleuzian demand for de-individualization follows the logic that individuality is something pernicious imposed on us; such <mark>harking after an authentic existence is quite alien to Foucault's thought</u></strong></mark>. By contrast, in "The Subject and Power," <u><strong><mark>Foucault lauds recent struggles that</u></strong></mark> "assert the right to be different and underline everything that makes individuals truly individual" while simultaneously attacking "everything that separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life": "These struggles <u><strong><mark>are not exactly for or against the 'individual'; rather, they are struggles against the 'government of individualization</mark>'</u></strong>" (EW3 330). <u><strong><mark>That to which Foucault does advocate resistance is identity</u></strong></mark>. Now, David Weberman (2000, 263), among others, claims that Foucault wants us to develop "new 'identities,'" but Weberman in fact here cites the passage we have already mentioned in which Foucault advocates "new forms of subjectivity" (EW3 336; emphasis added); he does not here mention "identity" as such. Butler (1997, 84) for her part sees individuals as "formulated" through "discursively constituted 'identity,'" which would mean that iden-tity and individuality are coextensive, but <u><strong>Foucault</u></strong> (EW1 166) <u><strong>is himself ambivalent about the concept of identity, only using the word a couple of times, and then in a perjorative sense, in contrast to “form of subjectivity,” which for Foucault is a perfectly neutral expression</u></strong>.</p>
| null | null |
1NC K
| 180,749 | 6 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
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5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,608 |
Legalization doesn’t free up resources—just have to expend time and money on regulations
|
Felbab-Brown 12 http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown
|
Felbab-Brown 12 Vanda, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings specializing in nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies; “Organized Criminals Won't Fade Away” Brookings; August, 2012; http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown
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Nor does legalization imply that police would be freed up to focus on other issues The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy
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Nor does legalization imply police would be freed up to focus on other issues The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy
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Nor does legalization imply that police would be freed up to focus on other issues or become less corrupt: The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy.
| 183 |
<h4><strong>Legalization doesn’t free up resources—just have to expend time and money on regulations</h4><p>Felbab-Brown 12 </strong>Vanda, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings specializing in nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies; “Organized Criminals Won't Fade Away” Brookings; August, 2012; <u><strong>http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown</p><p><mark>Nor does legalization imply</mark> that <mark>police would be freed up to focus on other issues</mark> </u></strong>or become less corrupt: <u><strong><mark>The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Cartels
| 430,774 | 5 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
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4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,609 |
Sales for research purposes takes out (not unique or empirically denied)
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Boyer 12
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Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her death
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research institutions pay large sums of money for parts one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth
|
n150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $ 90,000. Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. Further, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof. Cheney, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Also, one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her death. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, Cadaver Calculator, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
| 764 |
<h4>Sales for research purposes takes out (not unique or empirically denied)</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>n150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $ 90,000. Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. Further, <u><mark>research institutions pay large sums of money for</mark> fresh and frozen cadavers or <mark>parts</mark> thereof</u>. Cheney, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Also, <u><mark>one</mark> <mark>website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby,</mark> <mark>after</mark> <mark>answering</mark> a series of <mark>questions</mark> <mark>regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth</mark> in the event of her death</u>. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, Cadaver Calculator, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). </p>
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1ar cards
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,775 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,610 |
Race and sexuality are categories that have been appropriated by power – the response cannot be to reconstitute oneself in the same networks of control – only doing history via the alternative solves
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McWhorter 2005 (
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McWhorter 2005 (here do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies Philosophy Social Criticism 2005 31: 533 Ladelle McWhorter)
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Foucault held that modern racism is intimately bound up with normalization and its deployment of sexuality and criminality he clearly links race and racism to the rise of biopower through the 19th century the preoccupation with blood and the law has for nearly two centuries haunted the administration of sexuality. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race. Modern racism is a product of biopower’s appropriation and adaptation of an older discourse of blood. It makes its appearance in the 19th century as a way of justifying and extending sexual surveillance among other things, and it gains virulence through the 20th. Modern racial identities are fairly recent phenomena What this means is that race – including white sub- jectivity and racism, the primary objects of Whiteness Studies’ attention – can only be fully understood within the context of the history of nor- malization and biopolitical development and in conjunction with the dispositif Trying to understand race apart from that context is like trying to understand a region’s cuisine with no knowledge of its climate, terrain, economy, or agricultural technologies.
|
modern racism is intimately bound up with normalization and its deployment of sexuality and criminality he clearly links race and racism to the rise of biopower thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point Modern racism is a product of biopower’s appropriation and adaptation of an older discourse of blood It makes its appearance as a way of justifying and extending surveillance racial identities are fairly recent phenomena What this means is that race – including white sub- jectivity and racism, the primary objects of Whiteness Studies’ attention – can only be fully understood within the context of the history of nor- malization and biopolitical development and in conjunction with the dispositif Trying to understand race apart from that context is like trying to understand a region’s cuisine with no knowledge of its climate, terrain, economy, or agricultural technologies.
|
Foucault held that modern racism is intimately bound up with normalization and its deployment of sexuality and criminality. At the end of The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, he clearly links race and racism to the rise of biopower through the 19th century. He writes: In different ways, the preoccupation with blood and the law has for nearly two centuries haunted the administration of sexuality. Two of these interferences are noteworthy, the one for its historical importance, the other for the problems it poses. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, ‘biologizing,’ statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement (peuplement), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race. (Foucault, 1978: 149) Modern racism, Foucault here asserts, is a product of biopower’s appropriation and adaptation of an older discourse of blood. It makes its appearance in the 19th century as a way of justifying and extending sexual surveillance among other things, and it gains virulence through the 20th. Modern racism – and the racial identities it constructs and deploys – are fairly recent phenomena then. If we are to understand hem fully, they must be studied in relation to the networks of power that generated them. What this means is that race – including white sub- jectivity and racism, the primary objects of Whiteness Studies’ attention – can only be fully understood within the context of the history of nor- malization and biopolitical development and in conjunction with the dispositif de sexualité. Trying to understand race apart from that context is like trying to understand a region’s cuisine with no knowledge of its climate, terrain, economy, or agricultural technologies.
| 2,238 |
<h4><strong>Race and sexuality are categories that have been appropriated by power – the response cannot be to reconstitute oneself in the same networks of control – only doing history via the alternative solves</h4><p>McWhorter 2005 (</strong>here do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies Philosophy Social Criticism 2005 31: 533 Ladelle McWhorter<u>)</p><p><strong>Foucault held that <mark>modern racism is intimately bound up with normalization and its deployment of</mark> <mark>sexuality and criminality</u></strong></mark>. At the end of The History of Sexuality, Volume 1,<u><strong> <mark>he clearly links race and racism to the rise of biopower</mark> through the 19th century</u></strong>. He writes: In different ways, <u><strong>the preoccupation with blood and the law has for nearly two centuries haunted the administration of sexuality.</u></strong> Two of these interferences are noteworthy, the one for its historical importance, the other for the problems it poses. <u><strong>Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the <mark>thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality.</mark> <mark>Racism took shape at this point</mark> (racism in its modern,</u></strong> ‘biologizing,’ statist <u><strong>form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement</u></strong> (peuplement), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, <u><strong>received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race.</u></strong> (Foucault, 1978: 149) <u><strong><mark>Modern racism</u></strong></mark>, Foucault here asserts, <u><strong><mark>is a product of biopower’s appropriation and adaptation of an older discourse of blood</mark>. <mark>It makes its appearance</mark> in the 19th century <mark>as a way of justifying and extending</mark> sexual <mark>surveillance</mark> among other things, and it gains virulence through the 20th. Modern</u></strong> racism – and the <u><strong><mark>racial identities</u></strong></mark> it constructs and deploys – <u><strong><mark>are fairly recent phenomena</u></strong></mark> then. If we are to understand hem fully, they must be studied in relation to the networks of power that generated them. <u><strong><mark>What this means is that race – including white sub- jectivity and racism, the primary objects of Whiteness Studies’ attention – can only be fully understood within the context of the history of nor- malization and biopolitical development and in conjunction with the dispositif</u></strong></mark> de sexualité. <u><strong><mark>Trying to understand race apart from that context is like trying to understand a region’s cuisine with no knowledge of its climate, terrain, economy, or agricultural technologies.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
1NC K
| 430,776 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,611 |
Marijuana doesn’t bring in much cartel money- their cards are based on total fabrications
|
Bond et al 2010
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Bond et al 2010 (Brittany M., economist at the U.S. Department of Commerce; Jonathan Caulkins, H. Guyford Stever Professorship of Operations Research and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon; Beau Kilmer and Peter Reuter, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf)
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violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization in the United States. Often, big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around with little thought one analysis estimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting marijuana the figures have been repeated in the popular press The figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up. no data support the claim that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds let alone that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico. This is three times the UNODC upper bound for total U.S. consumption
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violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around one analysis estimated that 60 percent of DTO drug revenue comes from marijuana no data support the claim that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds let alone that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico This is three times the UNODC upper bound for total U.S. consumption
|
Not surprisingly, violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization in the United States. Often, big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around in drug policy discussions with little thought and, frankly, little consequence. Some U.S. government reports suggest that Mexican and Colombian DTOs combined earn $18 billion–$39 billion annually in wholesale drug proceeds (NDIC, 2008d), and one analysis even estimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting marijuana (ONDCP, 2006). Legalization advocates seize on such figures to supplement their traditional arguments, and the figures have been repeated in the popular press, with even respectable news sources claiming that “the Mexican cartels could be selling $20 billion worth of marijuana in the U.S. market each year” (Fainaru and Booth, 2009). The $20 billion figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up. However, no data support the claim that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds (~16,000 metric tons [MT]) per year, let alone that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico. (This point is addressed in detail in Chapter Three.) This is three times the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) (2009) upper bound for total U.S. consumption and nearly four times the amount estimated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DASC, 2002).
| 1,506 |
<h4>Marijuana doesn’t bring in much cartel money- their cards are based on total fabrications</h4><p><strong>Bond et al 2010</strong> (Brittany M., economist at the U.S. Department of Commerce; Jonathan Caulkins, H. Guyford Stever Professorship of Operations Research and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon; Beau Kilmer and Peter Reuter, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf)</p><p>Not surprisingly, <u><strong><mark>violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana</mark> legalization in the United States. Often, <mark>big numbers of dubious origin are tossed around</u></strong></mark> in drug policy discussions <u><strong>with little thought</u></strong> and, frankly, little consequence. Some U.S. government reports suggest that Mexican and Colombian DTOs combined earn $18 billion–$39 billion annually in wholesale drug proceeds (NDIC, 2008d), and <u><strong><mark>one analysis</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>estimated that 60 percent of</mark> all Mexican <mark>DTO drug revenue comes from</mark> exporting <mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark> (ONDCP, 2006). Legalization advocates seize on such figures to supplement their traditional arguments, and <u><strong>the figures have been repeated in the popular press</u></strong>, with even respectable news sources claiming that “the Mexican cartels could be selling $20 billion worth of marijuana in the U.S. market each year” (Fainaru and Booth, 2009). <u><strong>The</u></strong> $20 billion <u><strong>figure appears to come from multiplying a $525-per-pound2 markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up.</u></strong> However, <u><strong><mark>no data support the claim</u></strong> <u><strong>that U.S. users consume 35 million pounds</u></strong></mark> (~16,000 metric tons [MT]) per year, <u><strong><mark>let alone that they consume this much marijuana from Mexico</mark>.</u></strong> (This point is addressed in detail in Chapter Three.) <u><strong><mark>This is three times</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong></mark> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (<u><strong><mark>UNODC</u></strong></mark>) (2009) <u><strong><mark>upper bound for total U.S. consumption</u></strong></mark> and nearly four times the amount estimated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DASC, 2002).</p>
| null | null |
Cartels
| 55,187 | 7 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,612 |
Sale of body parts and medical care commodify as much as organ sales
|
Calandrillo 4
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Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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Morality concerns opposing commodification of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general,
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n176 Morality concerns opposing commodificatio are hypocritical we allow payment for tissues We have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general
|
The objections to human organ sales detailed above all contain some merit, but lose some of their force upon closer analysis and further ignore the reality that markets in human body parts and products are, for all practical purposes, unavoidable. n176 Morality concerns opposing commodification of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when one considers that we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. n177 We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general, without which their health and lives can be expected to suffer. The argument regarding the distributive justice impact of allowing sales (i.e., that the poor would be sellers, and only the rich could be buyers) ignores the fact that organ transplants are still rationed on the basis of ability to pay today. n178 Further, distributive inequity could be partially cured by providing government subsidies to enable the poor to have equal access to available organs. n179 [*106]
| 1,017 |
<h4>Sale of body parts and medical care commodify as much as organ sales</h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> The objections to human organ sales detailed above all contain some merit, but lose some of their force upon closer analysis and further ignore the reality that markets in human body parts and products are, for all practical purposes, unavoidable. <mark>n176 <u>Morality concerns opposing commodificatio</mark>n of the human body <mark>are</mark> somewhat <mark>hypocritical</mark> when </u>one considers that<u> <mark>we</mark> <mark>allow</mark> the explicit <mark>payment</mark> of cash <mark>for</mark> human <mark>tissues</mark>, blood, semen and ova. </u>n177 <u><mark>We</mark> also <mark>have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general</mark>, </u>without which their health and lives can be expected to suffer. The argument regarding the distributive justice impact of allowing sales (i.e., that the poor would be sellers, and only the rich could be buyers) ignores the fact that organ transplants are still rationed on the basis of ability to pay today. n178 Further, distributive inequity could be partially cured by providing government subsidies to enable the poor to have equal access to available organs. n179 [*106] </p>
|
1ar cards
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,777 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,613 |
Your only concern should be creating the conditions for successful criticism. Their rhetorically powerful demands debate to create political change confuse the role of the activist and the critic. Debate is only useful insofar as it allows us to interrogate and reveal the operations of power – if we win that the affirmative makes this network more opaque, vote negative.
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Kelly 2009
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Kelly 2009 ( Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault p 129-131 )
|
the role Foucault prescribes for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions, nor of discovering anything new, but of examining what is already known. "If we are not to settle for the ... empty dream of freedom, ... this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one" the invention of concepts is helpful to criticism. Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths. This, was an essential resistance: it is precisely because the world does have ideas that the world is not passively led by those who direct it or by those who would like to teach everyone what to think. Foucault he charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth. Critique is for Foucault not the function only of the philosophers, Foucault "reclaims" the term "intellectual," charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy. society is today in even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become critique, is essential in respect of any resistance movement, regardless of the configuration of forces. "the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the 'agonism' between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence" the fact that power is inescapable, "makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others" Foucault depicts critique as a specific counterpart to the modern art of government, as counter-art; “the art of not being governed quite so much” Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth; critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not. resistance can be either with or against "domination," but "critical resistance" is essentially against it, because "critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces" : while the technology of government essentially implies the question, how should one govern?, there is a simultaneous counter-art in which the governed ask how they can not be governed in the way that they are being governed
|
the role Foucault prescribes for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions but of examining what is already known Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths This was essential resistance: Foucault charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth Foucault reclaims" the term "intellectual, charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy society is today in even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence the fact that power is inescapable makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others Foucault depicts critique as counter-art the art of not being governed quite so much Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not resistance can be either with or against "domination, but critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces"
|
Clearly, the role Foucault prescribes here for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions, nor of discovering anything new, but of examining what is already known. Now, this purely critical vision of philosophy is somewhat surprising in that I earlier portrayed Foucault as engaging in an exercise of conceptual construction, but these two go hand-in-hand for Foucault: "If we are not to settle for the ... empty dream of freedom, ... this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one" (EW1 316); the invention of concepts is helpful to criticism. Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths. This, for him, was a universal human activity, an essential resistance: It is not ideas that guide the world. But it is precisely because the world does have ideas (and because it continuously produces lots of them) that the world is not passively led by those who direct it or by those who would like to teach everyone what to think.4 Conceptual construction is however not the activity which Foucault assigns to philosophy, unlike for Deleuze and Guattari (1994). Rather, he charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth. Critique is for Foucault not the function only of the philosophers, however. Simultaneously with his redefinition of philosophy, Foucault (FL 461) "reclaims" the term "intellectual," charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy. Indeed, as early as 1971, Foucault (Foucault 1974,171) identifies the critique of the functioning of institutions as "the real political task in a society such as ours."5 This was thirty-seven years ago, but society is today in the relevant respects even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become (cf. EW1 317). Indeed, critique, in a general sense, is in fact essential in respect of any resistance movement, regardless of the configuration of forces. In "The Subject and Power," Foucault makes the even broader claim that "the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the 'agonism' between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence" (EW3 343; emphasis added). This follows for him from the fact that power is inescapable, which "makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others" (EW3 343). Foucault is influenced by Kant's interpretation of the Enlightenment :IS, in Kant's own words, "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another" (PT 7). In this spirit, Foucault depicts critique as a specific counterpart to the modern art of government, as counter-art; in Foucault’s words, “the art of not being governed quite so much” (PT 29): Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth; well! critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of considered indocility.6 This self-conscious resistance Foucault identifies as a hallmark of modernity, qua the Enlightenment, as inaugural to "the attitude of modernity" (EW1 309). Indeed, critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not. This is the defining point of David Couzens Hoy's Critical Resistance: that resistance can be either with or against "domination," but what he calls "critical resistance" is essentially against it, because "critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces" (Hoy 2004, 2). This distinction can be understood, in Foucaultian terms, not as normative, but rather as tactical. In Foucault's study of governmentality qua the problematic of modern political thought, he points to a pair of opposites inaugurated simultaneously at the level of macro-practice: while the technology of government essentially implies the question, how should one govern?, there is a simultaneous counter-art in which the governed ask how they can not be governed in the way that they are being governed (PT 27-28). While Foucault does not condemn the macro-practice of government per se, he does refuse to engage in it qua intellectual, Foucault seeing intellectuals as obligated to resist power
| 4,811 |
<h4>Your only concern should be creating the conditions for successful criticism. Their rhetorically powerful demands debate to create political change confuse the role of the activist and the critic. Debate is only useful insofar as it allows us to interrogate and reveal the operations of power – if we win that the affirmative makes this network more opaque, vote negative.</h4><p><strong>Kelly 2009</strong> ( Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault p 129-131 )</p><p>Clearly, <u><strong><mark>the role Foucault prescribes</u></strong></mark> here <u><strong><mark>for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions</mark>, nor of discovering anything new, <mark>but of examining what is already known</strong></mark>.</u> Now, this purely critical vision of philosophy is somewhat surprising in that I earlier portrayed Foucault as engaging in an exercise of conceptual construction, but these two go hand-in-hand for Foucault: <u>"I<strong>f we are not to settle for the ... empty dream of freedom, ... this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one" </u></strong>(EW1 316); <u><strong>the invention of concepts is helpful to criticism. <mark>Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths</mark>. <mark>This</mark>,</u></strong> for him, <u><strong><mark>was</mark> </u></strong>a universal human activity, <u>an <strong><mark>essential resistance</strong>:</u></mark> It is not ideas that guide the world. But <u><strong>it is precisely because the world does have ideas</u></strong> (and because it continuously produces lots of them) <u><strong>that the world is not passively led by those who direct it or by those who would like to teach everyone what to think.</u></strong>4 Conceptual construction is however not the activity which <u><strong><mark>Foucault</u></strong></mark> assigns to philosophy, unlike for Deleuze and Guattari (1994). Rather, <u><strong>he <mark>charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth</mark>. Critique is for Foucault not the function only of the philosophers</strong>,</u> however. Simultaneously with his redefinition of philosophy, <u><mark>Foucault</u></mark> (FL 461) <u>"<strong><mark>reclaims" the term "intellectual,</mark>" <mark>charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed, as early as 1971, Foucault (Foucault 1974,171) identifies the critique of the functioning of institutions as "the real political task in a society such as ours."5 This was thirty-seven years ago, but <u><strong><mark>society is today in</u></strong></mark> the relevant respects <u><strong><mark>even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become</u></strong></mark> (cf. EW1 317). Indeed, <u><strong>critique,</u></strong> in a general sense, <u>is</u> in fact <u><strong>essential in respect of any resistance movement, regardless of the configuration of forces</strong>.</u> In "The Subject and Power," Foucault makes the even broader claim that <u>"<strong><mark>the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations</mark> and the 'agonism' between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom <mark>is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence</mark>"</u></strong> (EW3 343; emphasis added). This follows for him from <u><strong><mark>the fact that power is inescapable</strong></mark>,</u> which <u>"<strong><mark>makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others</strong></mark>"</u> (EW3 343). Foucault is influenced by Kant's interpretation of the Enlightenment :IS, in Kant's own words, "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another" (PT 7). In this spirit, <u><strong><mark>Foucault depicts critique</mark> as a specific counterpart to the modern art of government, <mark>as counter-art</strong></mark>;</u> in Foucault’s words, <u>“<strong><mark>the art of not being governed quite so much</strong></mark>”</u> (PT 29): <u><strong><mark>Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth</mark>;</strong> </u>well! critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of considered indocility.6 This self-conscious resistance Foucault identifies as a hallmark of modernity, qua the Enlightenment, as inaugural to "the attitude of modernity" (EW1 309). Indeed, <u><strong><mark>critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not</mark>.</u></strong> This is the defining point of David Couzens Hoy's Critical Resistance: that <u><strong><mark>resistance can be either with or against "domination,</mark>" <mark>but</u></strong></mark> what he calls <u><strong>"critical resistance" is essentially against it, because "<mark>critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces"</strong></mark> </u>(Hoy 2004, 2). This distinction can be understood, in Foucaultian terms, not as normative, but rather as tactical. In Foucault's study of governmentality qua the problematic of modern political thought, he points to a pair of opposites inaugurated simultaneously at the level of macro-practice<u><strong>: while the technology of government essentially implies the question, how should one govern?, there is a simultaneous counter-art in which the governed ask how they can not be governed in the way that they are being governed</u></strong> (PT 27-28). While Foucault does not condemn the macro-practice of government per se, he does refuse to engage in it qua intellectual, Foucault seeing intellectuals as obligated to resist power</p>
| null | null |
1NC K
| 430,607 | 2 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,614 |
No ISIS impact – they’re doomed and regional containment is inevitable
|
Joshi 14
|
Shashank Joshi, 6-25-2014; PhD candidate at Harvard Why an Isis caliphate is no more than a pipe dream http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100277636/why-an-isis-caliphate-is-no-more-than-a-pipe-dream/
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the question is whether it has staying power Isis’ caliphate could run out of steam Isis has hostile forces in every direction It will face resistance from anti-Isis Syrian rebels in the west, the hostility of Kurds in the north, and, eventually, a counter-offensive from government forces to the south Iraq’s Shia majority will not accept a permanent jihadist state let alone allow Isis to stroll into Baghdad Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly at the fact that Isis has kidnapped Turkish diplomats Iran is not just aghast at the rise of a radical Sunni force on its western border, but concerned about losing an ally If Isis attempts to conduct attacks against Western countries, as the prime minister warned it will face the near certainty of air strikes. large stretches of its territory are completely devoid of cover. It will suffer grievous losses Isis’ biggest challenge is closer to home. It depends on a coalition of other Sunni militants and local Sunni tribes coalitions like this can fall apart Isis was defeated once before, in its previous incarnation as Al Qaida in Iraq Their campaign of terror was quelled thanks to a surge of US troops and the so-called ‘awakening’
|
Isis has hostile forces in every direction. It will face resistance from Syrian rebels Kurds in the north, and a counter-offensive from forces to the south Iraq’s majority will not accept a jihadist state Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly Iran is concerned about losing an ally It will suffer grievous losses Isis’ depends on a coalition coalitions like this can fall apart Isis was defeated once before
|
But the question is whether it has staying power. There are good reasons to think that Isis’ caliphate could run out of steam long before it matches the great Islamic empires of history. Isis has hostile forces in every direction. It will face resistance from anti-Isis Syrian rebels in the west, the hostility of Kurds in the north, and, eventually, a counter-offensive from government forces to the south. Even if the government collapses – and we are a long way from that – then Iraq’s Shia majority will not accept a permanent jihadist state on their northern flank, let alone allow Isis to stroll into Baghdad. Saddam slaughtered Shias in 1991, and Isis has been slaughtering Shias for over a decade. The Shias have had quite enough, thank you. Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly at the fact that Isis has kidnapped Turkish diplomats in Mosul. Iran is not just aghast at the rise of a radical Sunni force on its western border, but concerned about losing an ally in Baghdad that it views as more important than even Assad. Tehran is reportedly airlifting over a hundred tons of supplies to Baghdad daily, and deployed its special forces there weeks ago. If Isis attempts to conduct attacks against Western countries, as the prime minister warned last week, then it will face the near certainty of air strikes. It can hunker down safely in urban areas like Mosul, but large stretches of its territory are completely devoid of cover. It will suffer grievous losses. But Isis’ biggest challenge is closer to home. It depends on a coalition of other Sunni militants and local Sunni tribes. Without such allies, it could not possibly have walked over Iraqi security forces so easily. But coalitions like this can fall apart. Remember that Isis was defeated once before, in its previous incarnation as Al Qaida in Iraq. Their campaign of terror was quelled by 2008, thanks to a surge of US troops and the so-called ‘awakening’ of local Sunni tribes who grew tired of the group’s brutality.
| 2,021 |
<h4>No ISIS impact – they’re doomed and regional containment is inevitable</h4><p>Shashank <strong>Joshi</strong>, 6-25-20<strong>14</strong>; PhD candidate at Harvard Why an Isis caliphate is no more than a pipe dream http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100277636/why-an-isis-caliphate-is-no-more-than-a-pipe-dream/</p><p>But <u><strong>the question is whether it has staying power</u></strong>. There are good reasons to think that <u><strong>Isis’ caliphate could run out of steam</u></strong> long before it matches the great Islamic empires of history. <u><strong><mark>Isis has hostile forces in every direction</u></strong>. <u><strong>It will face resistance from </mark>anti-Isis <mark>Syrian rebels</mark> in the west, the hostility of <mark>Kurds in the</mark> <mark>north, and</mark>, eventually, <mark>a counter-offensive from </mark>government <mark>forces to the south</u></strong></mark>. Even if the government collapses – and we are a long way from that – then <u><strong><mark>Iraq’s</mark> Shia <mark>majority will not accept a</mark> permanent <mark>jihadist state</mark> </u></strong>on their northern flank, <u><strong>let alone allow Isis to stroll into Baghdad</u></strong>. Saddam slaughtered Shias in 1991, and Isis has been slaughtering Shias for over a decade. The Shias have had quite enough, thank you. <u><strong><mark>Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly</mark> at the fact that Isis has kidnapped Turkish diplomats</u></strong> in Mosul. <u><strong><mark>Iran is</mark> not just aghast at the rise of a radical Sunni force on its western border, but <mark>concerned about losing an ally</u></strong></mark> in Baghdad that it views as more important than even Assad. Tehran is reportedly airlifting over a hundred tons of supplies to Baghdad daily, and deployed its special forces there weeks ago. <u><strong>If Isis attempts to conduct attacks against Western countries, as the prime minister warned</u></strong> last week, then <u><strong>it will face the near certainty of air strikes.</u></strong> It can hunker down safely in urban areas like Mosul, but <u><strong>large stretches of its territory are completely devoid of cover. <mark>It will suffer grievous losses</u></strong></mark>. But <u><strong><mark>Isis’</mark> biggest challenge is closer to home. It <mark>depends on a coalition</mark> of other Sunni militants and local Sunni tribes</u></strong>. Without such allies, it could not possibly have walked over Iraqi security forces so easily. But <u><strong><mark>coalitions like this can fall apart</u></strong></mark>. Remember that <u><strong><mark>Isis was defeated once before</mark>, in its previous incarnation as Al Qaida in Iraq</u></strong>. <u><strong>Their campaign of terror was quelled</u></strong> by 2008, <u><strong>thanks to a surge of US troops and the so-called ‘awakening’</u></strong> of local Sunni tribes who grew tired of the group’s brutality.</p>
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Cartels
| 430,709 | 6 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
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Kentucky
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4
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Bagwell
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1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,615 |
Letting people die is bigger link to dignity
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Satel 1
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Satel 1 Dr. Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute The Wall Street Journal | December 6, 2001 A Lifesaving Legal Ruling on Organ Donation Allowing payment for some bone-marrow transplants is a small but profound first victory. http://www.sallysatelmd.com/html/a-wsj34.html
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some say, but accepting compensation is a sordid affront to human dignity.
How absurd. Dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions in their own best interest, protect their health, and express gratitude for their sacrifice. The true indignity is to stand by while thousands of people die each year.
|
some say, accepting compensation is affront to
How absurd Dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions protect their health, and express gratitude true indignity is to stand by while thousands die
|
The Ninth Circuit decision should also spur a moral dialogue about the idea of "commodification." Giving a body part "free" is noble, some say, but accepting compensation is illegitimate, a sordid affront to human dignity.
How absurd. Dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions in their own best interest, protect their health, and express gratitude for their sacrifice. The true indignity is to stand by while thousands of people die each year.
( next card could be saved to extend abover argument)
| 538 |
<h4>Letting people die is bigger link to dignity</h4><p><strong>Satel 1</strong> Dr. Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute The Wall Street Journal | December 6, 2001 A Lifesaving Legal Ruling on Organ Donation Allowing payment for some bone-marrow transplants is a small but profound first victory. <u>http://www.sallysatelmd.com/html/a-wsj34.html</p><p></u>The Ninth Circuit decision should also spur a moral dialogue about the idea of "commodification." Giving a body part "free" is noble, <u><mark>some say,</mark> but <mark>accepting compensation is</mark> </u>illegitimate,<u> a sordid <mark>affront to</mark> human dignity.</p><p><mark>How absurd</mark>. <mark>Dignity is affirmed when we</mark> <mark>respect the capacity of individuals to make decisions</mark> in their own best interest, <mark>protect their health, and express</mark> <mark>gratitude</mark> for their sacrifice. The <mark>true indignity is to stand by while thousands</mark> of people <mark>die</mark> each year.</p><p></u>( next card could be saved to extend abover argument)</p>
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1ar cards
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,778 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
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3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,616 |
Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage
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Francis 2014 )
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Francis 2014 (David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous)
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Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
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decriminalization would push the price of pot down taking away a key revenue stream for cartels It’s forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests cartels are stealing from energy companies a practice common in West Africa the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May Los Zetas are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from the state oil company
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Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
| 3,143 |
<h4>Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage</h4><p><strong>Francis 2014 </strong>(David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous<u><strong>)</p><p>Wider <mark>decriminalization would push the price of pot down</mark>, <mark>taking away a key revenue stream for cartels</mark> like Los Zetas and La Familia. </u></strong>It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> also <mark>forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa</mark>, <mark>upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests</mark>.</u></strong> A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. <u><strong>Grayson also said that the <mark>cartels are stealing from energy companies</mark>, <mark>a practice</mark> more <mark>common in West Africa</mark> than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, <mark>the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May</mark> in Veracruz alone. “<mark>Los Zetas</mark>, in particular, <mark>are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from</mark> Pemex, <mark>the state oil company</mark>. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.” </p></u></strong>
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1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
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Our alternative is to criticize constructions of identity as a specific intellectual. We solve the case better - their impacts manifest themselves as regimes of truth which cannot be overturned in one sweeping program, only destabilized by ongoing criticism.
| null |
Ransom, 1997
|
Specific intellectuals, in other words, need an Oppenheimer effect: some way that their local struggles can participate in a broader assault on the circumstances that provide the environment for the disciplines in which they are active. Foucault suggests that the work of specific intellectuals can have such a cumulative effect by posing a changed to the general “regime of truth” that governs the production of truthful and hence socially acceptable statements and acts. , it is in the local arena that new forms of power are invented, applied, and revised. “Power’s conditions of possibility…must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point.” In this content, “one must,” as Foucault puts it, “conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting…from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history . If, then, “power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere,” a straightforward consequence is that the multiple local, relatively autonomous sites contributing to “power’s condition of possibility” are plausible targets for effective resistance. Second, the plurality of power refers not only to the existence of diverse centers of power that are pulled together to make up larger systems. A picture of power as a fractured entity, very much subject to change because it is so fragile, turns out to be Foucault’s final assessment of power local resistance is preferred because locally produced knowledge and techniques are the building blocks of larger constructs power formations, once constructed, are patched together from blocks that retain their autonomy and thus their hard edges. The fit among the different parts is always far from exact. This inexact fit has to do with the resistance that components of a strategy will offer to full incorporation. It is, in addition, not always in the interests of the broader power structures that all elements of a strategy be subsumed under one “rationality.” Finally, we must, Foucault says, “turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.” In the name of resolving a more fundamental contradiction, global and revolutionary projects for change miss the true sources of modern power, often reinstituting them under another banner. A small example would be Lenin’s respect for the Taylor system of time management that forced workers in factories to economize their movements so as to keep up with an even faster assembly line Thus, the value of the goal acts as a legitimating cover for the reinscription of oppressive practices. Foucault did not believe he was advocating an unfortunate but unavoidable retreat from “real” solutions into an inefficacious localism. Rather, as we just saw, he disdains projects of transformation of “society” for their impotence.
. The sacrificial rhetoric the race traitors often use plays right into that desire. They imply that white people can just put down their knapsacks and stop being white and that will bring racism to an end. In fact, they suggest that white people can become black.
whiteness is the willingness to seek a comfortable place within the system of race privilege. Blackness means total, implacable, and relent- less opposition to that system.
Whiteness Studies covertly seeks not so much to destabilize race and end white supremacy as to find ways of being white or of ceasing to be white) that purify individuals of racial complicity or guilt, that the movement is more about innocence than about justice or transformation. But I do not want to be that dismissive, both because it is always risky to guess at scholars’ motives I think it is just inevitable that unless we place the juridi- cal conception of power in question as Foucault did and look at racism as part of a vast system of non-subjective, non-intentional networks of biopower, we will be pushed toward the untenable intellectual and political positions that Whiteness theorists find themselves in, calling for voluntary divestiture of ‘privileges’ or ‘unearned assets’ We will not be able to understand how white subjectivity is constituted, much less see how we might disrupt it. We have to make historical transformations of power primary over both conscious and unconscious subjectivity . I would argue that what we need instead of avowals and exposés of whiteness as a racial identity is a genealogy of race and a network of counter-memories to begin to build alternative accounts of raced exist- ence and possibilities of living race differently.
|
Specific intellectuals need some way that their local struggles can participate in a broader assault on the circumstances that provide the environment for the disciplines in which they are active he work of specific intellectuals can have such a cumulative effect by posing a change to the general “regime of truth that governs acts it is in the local arena that new forms of power are invented Power’s conditions of possibility must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point.” one must conduct an ascending analysis of power the multiple local autonomous sites are plausible targets for effective resistance A picture of power as a fractured entity, very much subject to change because it is so fragile, turns out to be Foucault’s final assessment of power power formations are patched together from blocks that retain their autonomy and thus their hard edges. The fit among the different parts is always far from exact . It is not always in the interests of the broader power structures that all elements of a strategy be subsumed under one “rationality.” we must, Foucault says, “turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.” In the name of resolving a more fundamental contradiction, global and revolutionary projects for change miss the true sources of modern power, often reinstituting them under another banner. Lenin called for the “study and teaching of the Taylor system the value of the goal acts as a legitimating cover for the reinscription of oppressive practices. Foucault did not believe he was advocating an unfortunate but unavoidable retreat from “real” solutions
acrificial rhetoric the race traitors often use plays right into that desire. They imply that white people can just put down their knapsacks and stop being white and that will bring racism to an end. In fact, they suggest that white people can become black
whiteness is the willingness to seek a comfortable place within the system of race privilege
Whiteness Studies seeks to find ways of being white that purify individuals of racial complicity the movement is more about innocence than about justice or transformation unless we place the juridi- cal conception of power in question as Foucault did and look at racism as part of a vast system of non-subjective, non-intentional networks of biopower, we will be pushed toward the untenable intellectual positions calling for voluntary divestiture e will not be able to understand how white subjectivity is constituted, much less see how we might disrupt it we need instead of avowals and exposés of whiteness as a racial identity is a genealogy of race and a network of counter-memories to begin to build alternative accounts of raced exist- ence and possibilities of living race differently
|
(John S., Associate Professor of Political Science @ Dickinson College, Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity, Duke University Press, Pg. 148-150)
Specific intellectuals, in other words, need an Oppenheimer effect: some way that their local struggles can participate in a broader assault on the circumstances that provide the environment for the disciplines in which they are active. Foucault suggests that the work of specific intellectuals can have such a cumulative effect by posing a changed to the general “regime of truth” that governs the production of truthful and hence socially acceptable statements and acts. The “generality” to which local action can be related should not, however, be understood as a reintroduction of the totality through the back door. It is, instead, restricted to “the level of the Western societies from which we derive.” Issues of “sickness and health…crime and the law; the…role of sexual relations, and so on” contribute to a “historically unique” set of questions that recur in a variety of forms. Understanding the background sources of these forms can both inform the conduct of local struggles and provide a basis for coalitions and wider self-understandings. Foucault admits, then, that local action can and should make reference to the broader circumstances in which it occurs. But as we have seen in Foucault’s treatment of the specific intellectual, the emphasis is on the value of local, site-specific oppositional activity. Foucault gives three reasons for preferring a local over a global approach to change. First, it is in the local arena that new forms of power are invented, applied, and revised. “Power’s conditions of possibility…must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point.” In this content, “one must,” as Foucault puts it, “conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting…from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history,…their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been—and continue to be—invested, colonized,…transformed,…extended, etc. by ever more general mechanisms.” Large interests “engage with…technologies that are at once both relatively autonomous of power and act as its infinitesimal elements.” This is, for Foucault, the fundamental feature of the construction of power in the modern era. If, then, “power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere,” a straightforward consequence is that the multiple local, relatively autonomous sites contributing to “power’s condition of possibility” are plausible targets for effective resistance. Second, the plurality of power refers not only to the existence of diverse centers of power that are pulled together to make up larger systems. A picture of power as a fractured entity, very much subject to change because it is so fragile, turns out to be Foucault’s final assessment of power. In the previous paragraph, local resistance is preferred because locally produced knowledge and techniques are the building blocks of larger constructs. Here the consideration is that power formations, once constructed, are patched together from blocks that retain their autonomy and thus their hard edges. The fit among the different parts is always far from exact. This inexact fit has to do with the resistance that components of a strategy will offer to full incorporation. It is, in addition, not always in the interests of the broader power structures that all elements of a strategy be subsumed under one “rationality.” This fractured depiction of power once again points to a preference for local forms of resistance. Finally, we must, Foucault says, “turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical.” The reasoning behind this conclusion is based on the primary events of the twentieth century—fascism and its horrors and the failed revolutions in the East: “In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.” In the name of resolving a more fundamental contradiction, global and revolutionary projects for change miss the true sources of modern power, often reinstituting them under another banner. A small example would be Lenin’s respect for the Taylor system of time management that forced workers in factories to economize their movements so as to keep up with an even faster assembly line. Soon after taking power, Lenin called the Taylor system “a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and [one] of the greatest scientific achievements in the field of analyzing mechanical motions during work.” He called for the “study and teaching of the Taylor system” so as to “adapt it to our own ends.” Thus, the value of the goal acts as a legitimating cover for the reinscription of oppressive practices. Foucault did not believe he was advocating an unfortunate but unavoidable retreat from “real” solutions into an inefficacious localism. Rather, as we just saw, he disdains projects of transformation of “society” for their impotence. He was convinced that local actions were the best way to introduce changes into the larger structures of power: “I prefer the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a certain number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, between the sexes,…I prefer even these partial transformations…to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century.” The fact that actions are local does not mean that they are forever disconnected from one another in their effects. There is room for cross-fertilization as well as alliances. What does have to be given up, however, is the “hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits.” In other words, there is no version of the “totality” in Foucault’s understanding of Western societies.
Our method is specifically key to resolve any level of racial oppression
McWhorter 2005 (here do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies Philosophy Social Criticism 2005 31: 533 Ladelle McWhorter)
I do believe the race traitors are adding something to the mix that neither McIntosh’s analysis nor Frankenberg’s afford, however. They are trying to get rid of not only racism or whiteness but, ultimately, race itself. In an editorial reply to a reader’s letter, Ignatiev and Garvey write: ‘[M]ake no mistake about it: we intend to keep bashing the dead white males, and the live ones, and the females, too, until the social construct known as “race” is destroyed – not “deconstructed” but destroyed’ (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996: 279). It is this goal that sets them apart from McIntosh’s quest for equality and from Frankenberg’s push for racial renovation. White race treason is their suggested means to that end.
The means, though, are easily subverted to different ends if what white people really want is not a more just society but only divestiture, only innocence. The sacrificial rhetoric the race traitors often use plays right into that desire. They imply that white people can just put down their knapsacks and stop being white and that will bring racism to an end. In fact, they suggest that white people can become black. Ignatiev goes so far as to say this:
Politically, whiteness is the willingness to seek a comfortable place within the system of race privilege. Blackness means total, implacable, and relent- less opposition to that system. To the extent so-called whites oppose the race line, repudiating their own race privileges and jeopardizing their own standing in the white race, they can be said to have washed away their whiteness and taken in some blackness. (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996: 289)
If I felt especially cynical I might suggest that Whiteness Studies covertly seeks not so much to destabilize race and end white supremacy as to find ways of being white (or of ceasing to be white) that purify individuals of racial complicity or guilt, that the movement is more about innocence than about justice or transformation. But I do not want to be that dismissive, both because it is always risky to guess at scholars’ motives and because regardless of their motives much of the work that Whiteness Studies theorists are doing is extremely valuable and import- ant. Rather, I think it is just inevitable that unless we place the juridi- cal conception of power in question as Foucault did and look at racism as part of a vast system of non-subjective, non-intentional networks of biopower, we will be pushed toward the untenable intellectual and political positions that Whiteness theorists find themselves in, calling for voluntary divestiture of ‘privileges’ or ‘unearned assets’. We will not be able to understand how white subjectivity is constituted, much less see how we might disrupt it. We have to make historical transformations of power primary over both conscious and unconscious subjectivity in order to create an account of how racism functions in modern society. I would argue that what we need instead of avowals and exposés of whiteness as a racial identity is a genealogy of race and a network of counter-memories to begin to build alternative accounts of raced exist- ence and possibilities of living race differently. That will require a thorough critique of traditional conceptions of power, an undertaking in which knowledge of Foucault’s work is essential
| 9,764 |
<h4>Our alternative is to criticize constructions of identity as a specific intellectual. We solve the case better - their impacts manifest themselves as regimes of truth which cannot be overturned in one sweeping program, only destabilized by ongoing criticism.</h4><p><u>Ransom, 1997</p><p></u>(John S., Associate Professor of Political Science @ Dickinson College, Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity, Duke University Press, Pg. 148-150)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Specific intellectuals</mark>, in other words, <mark>need</mark> an Oppenheimer effect: <mark>some way that their local struggles</mark> <mark>can participate in a broader assault on the circumstances that provide the environment for the disciplines in which they are active</mark>. Foucault suggests that t<mark>he work of specific intellectuals can have such a cumulative effect by posing a change</mark>d <mark>to the general “regime of truth</mark>” <mark>that</mark> <mark>governs</mark> the production of truthful and hence socially acceptable statements and <mark>acts</mark>.</u></strong> The “generality” to which local action can be related should not, however, be understood as a reintroduction of the totality through the back door. It is, instead, restricted to “the level of the Western societies from which we derive.” Issues of “sickness and health…crime and the law; the…role of sexual relations, and so on” contribute to a “historically unique” set of questions that recur in a variety of forms. Understanding the background sources of these forms can both inform the conduct of local struggles and provide a basis for coalitions and wider self-understandings. Foucault admits, then, that local action can and should make reference to the broader circumstances in which it occurs. But as we have seen in Foucault’s treatment of the specific intellectual, the emphasis is on the value of local, site-specific oppositional activity. Foucault gives three reasons for preferring a local over a global approach to change. First<u><strong>, <mark>it is in the local arena that new forms of power are invented</mark>, applied, and revised. “<mark>Power’s conditions of possibility</mark>…<mark>must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point.”</mark> In this content, “<mark>one must</mark>,” as Foucault puts it, “<mark>conduct an ascending analysis of power</mark>, starting…from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history</u></strong>,…their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been—and continue to be—invested, colonized,…transformed,…extended, etc. by ever more general mechanisms.” Large interests “engage with…technologies that are at once both relatively autonomous of power and act as its infinitesimal elements.” This is, for Foucault, the fundamental feature of the construction of power in the modern era<u><strong>. If, then, “power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere,” a straightforward consequence is that <mark>the multiple local</mark>, relatively <mark>autonomous sites</mark> contributing to “power’s condition of possibility” <mark>are plausible targets for effective resistance</mark>. Second, the plurality of power refers not only to the existence of diverse centers of power that are pulled together to make up larger systems. <mark>A picture of power as a fractured entity, very much subject to change because it is so fragile, turns out to be Foucault’s final assessment of power</u></strong></mark>. In the previous paragraph, <u><strong>local resistance is preferred because locally produced knowledge and techniques are the building blocks of larger constructs</u></strong>. Here the consideration is that<u><strong> <mark>power formations</mark>, once constructed, <mark>are patched together from blocks that retain their autonomy and thus their hard edges.</mark> <mark>The fit among the different parts is always far from exact</mark>. This inexact fit has to do with the resistance that components of a strategy will offer to full incorporation<mark>. It is</mark>, in addition, <mark>not always in the interests of the broader power structures that all elements of a strategy be subsumed under one “rationality.”</u></strong></mark> This fractured depiction of power once again points to a preference for local forms of resistance. <u><strong>Finally, <mark>we must, Foucault says, “turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical</mark>.</u></strong>” The reasoning behind this conclusion is based on the primary events of the twentieth century—fascism and its horrors and the failed revolutions in the East: “In fact we know from experience <u><strong>that <mark>the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.”</mark> <mark>In the name of resolving a more fundamental contradiction, global and revolutionary projects for change miss the true sources of modern power, often reinstituting them under another banner.</mark> A small example would be Lenin’s respect for the Taylor system of time management that forced workers in factories to economize their movements so as to keep up with an even faster assembly line</u></strong>. Soon after taking power, <mark>Lenin</mark> called the Taylor system “a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and [one] of the greatest scientific achievements in the field of analyzing mechanical motions during work.” He <mark>called for the “study and teaching of the Taylor system</mark>” so as to “adapt it to our own ends.” <u><strong>Thus, <mark>the value of the goal acts as a legitimating cover for the reinscription of oppressive practices.</mark> <mark>Foucault</mark> <mark>did not believe he was advocating an unfortunate but unavoidable retreat from “real” solutions</mark> into an inefficacious localism. Rather, as we just saw, he disdains projects of transformation of “society” for their impotence. </u>He was convinced that local actions were the best way to introduce changes into the larger structures of power: “I prefer the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a certain number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, between the sexes,…I prefer even these partial transformations…to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century.” The fact that actions are local does not mean that they are forever disconnected from one another in their effects. There is room for cross-fertilization as well as alliances. What does have to be given up, however, is the “hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits.” In other words, there is no version of the “totality” in Foucault’s understanding of Western societies. </p><p>Our method is specifically key to resolve any level of racial oppression</p><p>McWhorter 2005 (</strong>here do white people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies Philosophy Social Criticism 2005 31: 533 Ladelle McWhorter<strong>)</p><p></strong>I do believe the race traitors are adding something to the mix that neither McIntosh’s analysis nor Frankenberg’s afford, however. They are trying to get rid of not only racism or whiteness but, ultimately, race itself. In an editorial reply to a reader’s letter, Ignatiev and Garvey write: ‘[M]ake no mistake about it: we intend to keep bashing the dead white males, and the live ones, and the females, too, until the social construct known as “race” is destroyed – not “deconstructed” but destroyed’ (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996: 279). It is this goal that sets them apart from McIntosh’s quest for equality and from Frankenberg’s push for racial renovation. White race treason is their suggested means to that end.</p><p>The means, though, are easily subverted to different ends if what white people really want is not a more just society but only divestiture, only innocence<u><strong>. The s<mark>acrificial rhetoric the race traitors often use plays right into that desire.</strong> They imply that white people can just put down their knapsacks and stop being white and that will bring racism to an end<strong>. In fact, they suggest that white people can become black</mark>.</u></strong> Ignatiev goes so far as to say this:</p><p>Politically, <u><mark>whiteness is the willingness to seek a comfortable place within the system of race privilege</mark>. Blackness means total, implacable, and relent- less opposition to that system. </u>To the extent so-called whites oppose the race line, repudiating their own race privileges and jeopardizing their own standing in the white race, they can be said to have washed away their whiteness and taken in some blackness. (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996: 289)</p><p>If I felt especially cynical I might suggest that <u><mark>Whiteness Studies</mark> covertly <mark>seeks</mark> not so much to destabilize race and end white supremacy as <mark>to find ways of being white</u></mark> (<u>or of ceasing to be white) <mark>that purify individuals of racial complicity</mark> or guilt,</u> <u><strong>that <mark>the movement is more about innocence than about justice or transformation</mark>. </strong>But I do not want to be that dismissive, both because it is always risky to guess at scholars’ motives</u> and because regardless of their motives much of the work that Whiteness Studies theorists are doing is extremely valuable and import- ant. Rather, <u>I think it is just inevitable that <mark>unless we place the juridi- cal conception of power in question as Foucault did and look at racism as part of a vast system of non-subjective, non-intentional networks of biopower, we will be pushed toward the untenable intellectual</mark> and political <mark>positions</mark> that Whiteness theorists find themselves in,<strong> <mark>calling for voluntary divestiture</mark> of ‘privileges’ or ‘unearned assets’</u></strong>. <u><strong>W<mark>e will not be able to understand how white subjectivity is constituted, much less see how we might disrupt it</strong></mark>. We have to make historical transformations of power primary over both conscious and unconscious subjectivity</u> in order to create an account of how racism functions in modern society<u><strong>. I would argue that what <mark>we need instead of avowals and exposés of whiteness as a racial identity is a genealogy of race and a network of counter-memories to begin to build alternative accounts of raced exist- ence and possibilities of living race differently</mark>.</u></strong> That will require a thorough critique of traditional conceptions of power, an undertaking in which knowledge of Foucault’s work is essential</p>
| null | null |
1NC K
| 430,779 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
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Kentucky
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5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
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Najor
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1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,618 |
Organs are paid for by others in the transplant process
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Boyer 12
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Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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Commoditization Has Already Happened
the current system, , in fact quantifies the value of the human body.
to say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality.
organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ. Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient
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Commoditization Has Already Happened
the current system quantifies the value of the body
to say the law prohibits attaching a price tag is to ignore reality.
organs are often subject to a string of transactions At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged
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B. Commoditization Has Already Happened
The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad. n137 However, the current system, to which no ethical qualms are raised, in fact quantifies the value of the human body. n138 As such, an analysis of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation.
On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human corpse now has a substantial economic value. n139 And while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ. n140 Simply put, to say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality. n141
The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs for large profits. n142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are [*334] so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative methods of procurement. n143
Further, organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." n144 At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ. n145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in each transaction - again with the exception of the first - and has validated sales contracts for human tissue. n146 Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient.
| 2,131 |
<h4>Organs are paid for by others in the transplant process</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the<u> Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p></u>B. <u><mark>Commoditization Has Already Happened</p><p></u></mark>The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad. n137 However,<u> <mark>the current system</mark>, </u>to which no ethical qualms are raised<u>, in fact <mark>quantifies the value of the</mark> human <mark>body</mark>. </u>n138 As such, an analysis of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation.</p><p>On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human corpse now has a substantial economic value. n139 And while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ. n140 Simply put,<u> <mark>to say</mark> that <mark>the law prohibits attaching a price tag</mark> to a donated organ <mark>is to ignore reality.</u></mark> n141</p><p>The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs for large profits. n142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are [*334] so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative methods of procurement. n143</p><p>Further,<u> <mark>organs are often subject to a string of transactions</mark> in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." </u>n144 <u><mark>At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged</mark> for the organ. </u>n145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in each transaction - again with the exception of the first - and has validated sales contracts for human tissue. n146 <u>Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient</u>.</p>
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1ar cards
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Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,691 | 6 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
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Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,619 |
Legalization destabilizes Mexico- rapid drops in cartel funding force them to turn to violence
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Jackson et al 2011
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Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
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Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime. the most obvious short-term effect of marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue. The short-term effects of legalization could very well create chaos for Mexico The cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities--kidnapping, murder-for-hire extortion, theft of oil and other items they are not going to return to the licit world If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion it could lead to a spike in violence that would prove to be destabilizing employees will likely be shed to maintain profitability former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico
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Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime marijuana legalization would rob Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of half their revenue short-term effects could create chaos for Mexico cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into kidnapping, murder-for-hire theft of oil and other items could lead to a spike in violence that would prove destabilizing legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories to become more violent than they are today
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Short-term Effects on Mexican DTOs and Security Implications Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime. Perhaps the most obvious short-term effect of marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue.117 The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the short term. The short-term effects of legalization could very well create chaos for Mexico. “The cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities--kidnapping, murder-for-hire, contraband, illegal 29 immigrant smuggling, extortion, theft of oil and other items, loan-sharking, prostitution, selling protection, etc.”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the same then “they are not going to return to the licit world.”119 If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion, it could lead to a spike in violence that would prove to be destabilizing in those organizations‟ areas of operation. The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel might splinter into smaller groups. In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue would probably force them to downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, employees will likely be shed first in order to maintain profitability.120 These former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers. Therefore it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico.121
| 1,967 |
<h4>Legalization destabilizes Mexico- rapid drops in cartel funding force them to turn to violence</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Short-term Effects on Mexican DTOs and Security Implications <u><strong><mark>Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime</mark>.</u></strong> Perhaps <u><strong>the most obvious short-term effect of <mark>marijuana legalization</mark> is that this <mark>would rob</mark> the <mark>Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of</mark> up to <mark>half</mark> of <mark>their</mark> total <mark>revenue</mark>.</u></strong>117 The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the short term. <u><strong>The <mark>short-term effects</mark> of legalization <mark>could</mark> very well <mark>create chaos for Mexico</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong>The <mark>cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into </mark>other criminal activities--<mark>kidnapping, murder-for-hire</u></strong></mark>, contraband, illegal 29 immigrant smuggling, <u><strong>extortion, <mark>theft of oil and other items</u></strong></mark>, loan-sharking, prostitution, selling protection, etc.”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the same then “<u><strong>they are not going to return to the licit world</u></strong>.”119 <u><strong>If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion</u></strong>, <u><strong>it <mark>could lead to a spike in violence that would prove </mark>to be <mark>destabilizing</u></strong></mark> in those organizations‟ areas of operation. The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel might splinter into smaller groups. In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue would probably force them to downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, <u><strong>employees will likely be shed</u></strong> first in order <u><strong>to maintain profitability</u></strong>.120 These <u><strong>former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers</u></strong>. Therefore <u><strong>it is possible that the <mark>legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause</mark> <mark>territories</mark> currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel <mark>to become more violent than they are today</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico</u></strong>.121</p>
| null | null |
Cartels
| 56,591 | 113 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
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4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Bagwell
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1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,620 |
Failure to conduct an analysis of power means you aren’t critique, or at least not a kind valuable to revolutionary politics
|
Kelly 2009
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Kelly 2009 (Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault )
|
I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based
Foucault's approach here answers two possible errors one to think that practice occurs without significant influence from theory the other to impose our theory without heeding the practical realities practice without strategic analysis is no good
Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice, albeit a highly specific one which relates to other practices in specific ways
Thought is not discourse, not a violence we do to things per se It's rather in the order of a preparation for such a violence, a step further away from things than language s relation is in a sense the opposite of that of language, in that where language is an irruptive intervention into the world, thought is a kind of withdrawal from it
Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which, between the codes which establish how a given culture divides up the world and the highest level philosophies which sanctify the bases of the culture is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question
| null |
Regarding the role of critique apropos of political practice, reflecting on the efficacy of his work in the light of the victory of the Left in the 1981 French national elections, Foucault said:
I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation.
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based.
We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social and stop regarding that essential element in human life and social relations—I mean thought—as so much wind. (EW3 456)
Foucault's approach here answers two possible errors: one to think that practice occurs without significant influence from theory (call this spontaneism), the other to impose our theory without heeding the practical realities. Deleuze refers to both these meta-theoretical errors in passing in conversation with Foucault in 1972, when he says that previous models were either of theory having to be created by practice or that theory was what had to be put into practice (FL 74; DEI 1175). Foucault avoids the first error by insisting on the necessity of critique, that practice without strategic analysis is no good, and the second by refusing to prescribe what should be done.
Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice, albeit a highly specific one which relates to other practices in specific ways. Utopias, plans, critique, all involve thought, but in different modalities with different relations to other practices.
Here we see Foucault's materialism of the incorporeal at work, seeing thought itself as material qua practice (OT 328). Thought is not discourse, not a violence we do to things per se (see Chapter 1). It's rather in the order of a preparation for such a violence, a step further away from things than language. Like language, it still has a fundamental connection to non-linguistic reality, but its relation is in a sense the opposite of that of language, in that where language is an irruptive intervention into the world, thought is a kind of withdrawal from it:
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (EW1 117)"
How is it possible to step back from things and reconsider them? On what basis can we proceed? We have already had Foucault's answer in our examination in Chapter 1 of Foucault's notion of a pure experience of things to be ordered as the basis for discursive mutation. As we saw there, albeit from a different angle, in the preface to The Order of Things, Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which, between the codes which establish how a given culture divides up the world and the highest level philosophies which sanctify the bases of the culture, is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question. At that point, as we have seen,
this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists. As though emancipating itself to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture superimposed on them another kind of grid which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state. It is on the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, taken as a firm foundation, that general theories as to the ordering of things, and the interpretation that such an ordering involves, will be constructed. Thus, between the already "encoded" eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself. . . . This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more 'true' than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being. (OT xx-xxi)
| 5,269 |
<h4>Failure to conduct an analysis of power means you aren’t critique, or at least not a kind valuable to revolutionary politics</h4><p><strong>Kelly 2009</strong> (Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault )</p><p>Regarding the role of critique apropos of political practice, reflecting on the efficacy of his work in the light of the victory of the Left in the 1981 French national elections, Foucault said:</p><p><u><strong>I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based</u></strong>.</p><p>We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social and stop regarding that essential element in human life and social relations—I mean thought—as so much wind. (EW3 456)</p><p><u><strong>Foucault's approach here answers two possible errors</u></strong>: <u><strong>one to think that practice occurs without significant influence from theory</u></strong> (call this spontaneism), <u><strong>the other to impose our theory without heeding the practical realities</u></strong>. Deleuze refers to both these meta-theoretical errors in passing in conversation with Foucault in 1972, when he says that previous models were either of theory having to be created by practice or that theory was what had to be put into practice (FL 74; DEI 1175). Foucault avoids the first error by insisting on the necessity of critique, that <u><strong>practice without strategic analysis is no good</u></strong>, and the second by refusing to prescribe what should be done.</p><p><u><strong>Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice, albeit a highly specific one which relates to other practices in specific ways</u></strong>. Utopias, plans, critique, all involve thought, but in different modalities with different relations to other practices.</p><p>Here we see Foucault's materialism of the incorporeal at work, seeing thought itself as material qua practice (OT 328). <u><strong>Thought is not discourse, not a violence we do to things per se</u></strong> (see Chapter 1). <u><strong>It's rather in the order of a preparation for such a violence, a step further away from things than language</u></strong>. Like language, it still has a fundamental connection to non-linguistic reality, but it<u><strong>s relation is in a sense the opposite of that of language, in that where language is an irruptive intervention into the world, thought is a kind of withdrawal from it</u></strong>:</p><p>Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (EW1 117)"</p><p>How is it possible to step back from things and reconsider them? On what basis can we proceed? We have already had Foucault's answer in our examination in Chapter 1 of Foucault's notion of a pure experience of things to be ordered as the basis for discursive mutation. As we saw there, albeit from a different angle, in the preface to The Order of Things, <u><strong>Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which, between the codes which establish how a given culture divides up the world and the highest level philosophies which sanctify the bases of the culture</u></strong>, <u><strong>is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question</u></strong>. At that point, as we have seen,</p><p><strong>this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists. As though emancipating itself to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture superimposed on them another kind of grid which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state. It is on the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, taken as a firm foundation, that general theories as to the ordering of things, and the interpretation that such an ordering involves, will be constructed. Thus, between the already "encoded" eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself. . . . This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more 'true' than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being. (OT xx-xxi)</p></strong>
| null | null |
2NC K
| 430,650 | 2 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,621 |
Economic collapse doesn’t cause war
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Drezner 12
|
Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
|
During initial stages analysts asserted financial crisis would lead to diversionary wars or great power conflict
aggregate data suggests otherwise, 2012 is the same as 07 studies confirm the Recession has not triggered conflict; protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion
Given the depth of the 08 crisis, the proper comparison is Depression by that the outcome variables look impressive concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42
|
During initial stages analysts asserted financial crisis would lead to diversionary wars or great power conflict
aggregate data suggests otherwise, 2012 is the same as 07 studies confirm the Recession has not triggered conflict; protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion
Given the depth of the 08 crisis, the proper comparison is Depression by that the outcome variables look impressive
|
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.
The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that theGreat Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusionthat might have been expected.”40
None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. Andby that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42
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<h4>Economic collapse doesn’t cause war</h4><p>Daniel W. <u><strong>Drezner 12</u></strong>, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf</p><p> The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. <u><strong><mark>During</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>initial stages</u></strong></mark> of the crisis, multiple <u><strong><mark>analysts asserted</u></strong></mark> that the <u><strong><mark>financial crisis would lead</u></strong></mark> states <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, <u><strong><mark>diversionary wars</u></strong></mark>, arms races, <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> a ratcheting up of <u><strong><mark>great power conflict</u></strong></mark>, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>aggregate data</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>suggests otherwise,</u></strong></mark> however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in <u><strong><mark>2012 is</u></strong></mark> approximately <u><strong><mark>the same as</u></strong></mark> it was in 20<u><strong><mark>07</u></strong></mark>.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other <u><strong><mark>studies confirm</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark>Great <u><strong><mark>Recession has not triggered</u></strong></mark> any increase in violent <u><strong><mark>conflict;</u></strong></mark> the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in <u><strong><mark>protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion</u></strong></mark>that might have been expected.”40</p><p>None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. <u><strong><mark>Given the</u></strong></mark> severity, reach and <u><strong><mark>depth of the</u></strong></mark> 20<u><strong><mark>08</u></strong></mark> financial <u><strong><mark>crisis,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the proper comparison</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> with Great <u><strong><mark>Depression</u></strong></mark>. And<u><strong><mark>by that</u></strong></mark> standard, <u><strong><mark>the outcome variables look impressive</u></strong></mark>. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff<u><strong> concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42</p></u></strong>
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Their focus on the question “how can I survive?” is precisely what we critique – they assume the existence of a coherent and isolated subject without asking what power relations constitute them as such. Only a rejection of subjectivation by one’s own experiences avoids rearticulating ______.
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McLaren 2
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McLaren 2 Margaret McLaren, George D. and Harriet W. Cornell Chair, Professor of Philosophy, Rollins College, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, p. 58, pp. 61-62
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Foucault had to reject a certain a priori theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power and so forth His denial is a hesitation to begin from a particular theory of the subject Foucault refuses conceptions of subjectivity that assume an a priori notion of the subject either as the condition for the possibility of experience (which he ascribes to phenomenology and existentialism) or as transcendental consciousness For Foucault subjectivity is a historically and culturally specific way of conceptualizing the self. He associates the emergence of the desiring subject with Christianity because of its concern with deciphering, controlling, and confessing sexual desire. Foucault is especially critical of the tie among subjectivity, sexuality, and truth, This particular form of subjectivity was constituted through the practices of Christianity, notably confession, but continues to influence current Western conceptions of morality Foucault believes that a subject-centered morality has run its course.
(Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS
A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others Both features need to be addressed switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems the "confusion of pluralism with relativism is the most serious ideological barrier to moral education The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable: All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views are equally right Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. debaters are exposed to a multivalued world Yet this exposure hardly commits them to mistaken" values the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.
No. 12, pp. 9-35
. It is surprising that Foucault is not widely cited and discussed in the epistemologies of ignorance developed in Feminist Standpoint Theory and Critical Race Theory. Perhaps this is a residual effect of the old-fashioned opposition between any theory that privileges standpoints and social constructivist views that interrogate those standpoints as cultural artifacts. This Foucaultian perspective that Code echoes contains two crucial insights for the epistemology of ignorance. The first crucial insight is the idea that a discursive framework produces spaces of knowability and unknowability simultaneously In other words, the epistemic agency that subjects have within a discursive practice is such that their knowledge and ignorance are co-constituted: their epistemic lucidity and their epistemic blindness go hand in hand, mutually supporting each other rather than oppose knowledge, ignorance often is formed by it, and vice versa. Sullivan suggests that we talk about "ignorance/knowledge," instead of talking about ignorance and knowledge separately, so that we undo certain epistemic illusions there is no such thing as epistemic innocence, for we always operate from a space of knowability and unknowability simultaneously,
from a knowledge/ignorance framework. And this problematizes the notion of culpable ignorance in dealing with the epistemic aspects of particular forms of oppression, we should be very careful not to indulge in the naive charge of epistemic culpability "they should have known better," for very often subjects could not have known otherwise and, therefore, the charge of culpability is vacuous On the other hand, however, interstices within discursive practices as well as alternative practices are often available; and they present opportunities for epistemic resistance Genealogical investigations can be used to point out how these subjugated knowledges could have been used, how people could have known otherwise by drawing on them, how they could have become able to undo epistemic exclusions and stigmatizations. Hence the insurrectionary power of subjugated knowledges The creation of ignorance/knowledge through relations of force often is unbalanced and unequal, as is the case in colonized lands. But as a dynamic, relational process, it involves the active participation of all 'sides' and includes the possibility of resistance to and transformation of the forms of ignorance/knowledge produced ¶ A Foucaultian guerrilla pluralism enables us to see how different possibilities of resistance appear for differently constituted and situated subjects as they develop different forms of agency with respect to power/knowledge . What a Foucaultian racial epistemology of power/knowledge-ignorance underscores is the constant epistemic struggles that take place in racialized social fields, calling attention to possibilities of resistance and contestation
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Foucault had to reject a certain a priori theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the constitution of the subject and power His denial is a hesitation to begin from the subject subjectivity is a historically and culturally specific way of conceptualizing the self He associates the emergence of the desiring subject with Christianity because of its concern with deciphering, controlling, and confessing desire subjectivity was constituted through the practices of confession but continues to influence current Western conceptions of morality Foucault believes that a subject-centered morality has run its course
switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses on the validity of opposing belief systems the "confusion of pluralism with relativism s the most serious ideological barrier to moral education Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs switch-side debate foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. the divorce of the game from the "real world can be a means gaining perspective without obligating students to immoral actions
It is surprising that Foucault is not widely cited and discussed in the epistemologies of ignorance in Critical Race Theory Perhaps this is a residual effect of the old-fashioned opposition between any theory that privileges standpoints and social constructivist views that interrogate those standpoints as cultural artifacts epistemic agency that subjects have within a discursive practice is such that their knowledge and ignorance are co-constituted lucidity and blindness go hand in hand, mutually supporting each other there is no such thing as epistemic innocence we always operate from a space of knowability and unknowability simultaneously
from a knowledge/ignorance framework we should be very careful not to indulge in the naive charge of epistemic culpability "they should have known better interstices within discursive practices as well as alternative practices are often available; and they present opportunities for epistemic resistance Genealogical investigations can be used to point out how these subjugated knowledges could have been used how they could have become able to undo epistemic exclusions Foucaultian guerrilla pluralism enables us to see how different possibilities of resistance appear for differently constituted and situated subjects as they develop different forms of agency with respect to power/knowledge
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But what is Foucault refusing when he refuses the subject? Foucault's opposition to the Cartesian cogito is well documented.25 But surely his wariness of accepting a Cartesian notion of subjectivity is not what feminists object to, because many feminists also reject a Cartesian notion of subjectivity. In an interview shortly before his death Foucault responds to the question, "But you have always 'refused* that we speak to you about the subject in general?" by saying, "What I refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory of the subject. . . What I wanted to know was how the subject constituted himself, in such and such a determined form.... I had to reject a certain a priori theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power and so forth."26 His denial of the subject here is not a denial of the subject tout court, but a hesitation to begin from a particular theory of the subject. Foucault refuses the subject as the condition for the possibility of experience, claiming instead that it is experience that results in a subject or subjects.2' When asked whether his books prior to The History of Sexuality "ruin the sovereignty of the subject," Foucault replies that he wanted to return to the problem of the subject and follow its developments through history to analyze "the combination of processes by which the subject exists with its different problems and obstacles and through forms which are far from being completed." Foucault does not reject the subject altogether, but refuses a particular formulation of it. Foucault refuses conceptions of subjectivity that assume an a priori notion of the subject either as the condition for the possibility of experience (which he ascribes to phenomenology and existentialism) or as transcendental consciousness (which he attributes to Descartes and Kant). But these conceptions of subjectivity hardly exhaust the possibilities for conceiving of the self. As he says, "subjectivity... is of course only one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness."2'' For Foucault, subjectivity is a historically and culturally specific way of conceptualizing the self. He associates the emergence of the desiring subject with Christianity because of its concern with deciphering, controlling, and confessing sexual desire. He points out that Greek thought did not have a theory of subjectivity or a conception of the subject. Foucault does not deny that the Greeks were interested in issues of the self such as self-mastery and self-knowledge. The Greeks, like later philosophers, were interested in defining the conditions for experience, or as Foucault puts it, problematizing experience. Different historical epochs problematize experience differently and for the Greeks the result of the problematization of experience was not the subject, but the individual. Foucault claims that there is no theory of the subject in Greek philosophy and hence no subject.1" As he says, "What was missing in classical antiquity was the problematization of the constitution of the self as subject."51 For Foucault, the notion of subjectivity is fraught with problems. He is especially critical of the tie among subjectivity, sexuality, and truth, which he traces in The History of Sexuality Volume One. This particular form of subjectivity was constituted through the practices of Christianity, notably confession, but continues to influence current Western conceptions of morality. Foucault believes that a subject-centered morality has run its course. His objections to anthropological universal discussed in chapter 2 carry over to conceptions of subjectivity and morality. However, his rejection of universals should not be seen as a disinterest in moral and ethical questions. His studies of Antiquity are an exploration of an ethics that does not rely on a universal moral code, and an elaboration of a process of subjectivization that does not result in a (Modern, or in his terms, Classical) subject.'2 Foucault's attack on the subject can be seen as specific to the subjectivity of what he calls the Classical Age. His genealogies reveal the normalizing character of the disciplines that constitute subjectivity; this should prompt us to investigate nonnormalizing ways of existence. In Foucault's view, refusing what we are would enable us to liberate ourselves from the type of individuality (subjectivity) that has imposed itself on us through disciplines and practices for the last several centuries. The refusal to be what we are, to be a subject and hence subjected, opens up new possibilities for being.
Muir 93
(Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS
A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism, Stewart, for example, sees value clarification as individualistic, personal, and situational.^' He also characterizes values clarification as possessing a hidden set of values (an "absolute relativism") that includes purposefulness, strong beliefs, and thoughtfulness, among others. This "hidden curriculum" of values clarification formulates responses to situations while decrying such pre-judgment. In obvious ways, switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others as a matter of procedure. Both features need to be explicitly addressed since both reflect directly on debate as a tool of moral pedagogy. The first response to the charge of relativism is that switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems. Scriven argues that the "confusion of pluralism, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, with relativism—the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion—is perhaps the most serious ideological barrier to the implementation of moral education today. "^ The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not. Here is where cognitive-development diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable: It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.
Medina 11 José Medina is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University and Distinguished Chair in the Humanities at the Carlos III University (Madrid, Spain). He works primarily in Philosophy of Language, Social Epistemology, and Political Philosophy, with a special focus on gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” Foucault Studies No. 12, pp. 9-35
In this brief concluding section I want to connect the critical and transformative possibilities underscored by a Foucaultian guerrilla pluralism with ongoing discussions in epistemologies of ignorance. It is surprising that Foucault is not widely cited and discussed in the epistemologies of ignorance developed in Feminist Standpoint Theory and Critical Race Theory. Perhaps this is a residual effect of the old-fashioned opposition between any theory that privileges standpoints and social constructivist views that interrogate those standpoints as cultural artifacts. But recent accounts in feminist standpoint theory and critical race theory are highly performative and constructivist, with the focus shifting from fixed notions of gender and race to dynamic and situated social processes of genderization and racialization that are deeply interrogated. Surprisingly, though, Foucault is still used only sporadically by this new generation of standpoint and race theorists. Lorraine Code is a notable exception here. In "The Power of Ignorance" she acknowledges and makes explicit use of the Foucaultian approach:¶ I follow Michel Foucault in recognizing the impediments to knowing what is not 'within the true' (1972, 224), thus within the knowable, within the conceptual framework held in place by an intransigent hegemonic discourse, an instituted¶ social imaginary.61¶ This Foucaultian perspective that Code echoes contains two crucial insights for the epistemology of ignorance. The first crucial insight is the idea that a discursive framework produces spaces of knowability and unknowability simultaneously, so that there will be things that lie within the true ("dans le vrai") as well as things outside it for agents who operate within that framework. In other words, the epistemic agency that subjects have within a discursive practice is such that their knowledge and ignorance are co-constituted: their epistemic lucidity and their epistemic blindness go hand in hand, mutually supporting each other. As another epistemologist of ignorance, Shannon Sullivan, puts it, "rather than oppose knowledge, ignorance often is formed by it, and vice versa."63 For this reason, Sullivan suggests that we talk about "ignorance/knowledge," instead of talking about ignorance and knowledge separately, so that we undo certain epistemic illusions—in particular, "the purported self-mastery and self-transparency of knowledge, as if nothing properly escaped its grasp."6*¶ The second crucial idea that derives from the Foucaultian approach is that there is no such thing as epistemic innocence, for we always operate from a space of knowability and unknowability simultaneously,
from a knowledge/ignorance framework. And this problematizes the notion of culpable ignorance. On the one hand, as Code remarks, there is no such thing as "an innocent position from which 'we' could level charges of culpability."65 Therefore, as Code insists, in dealing with the epistemic aspects of particular forms of oppression, we should be very careful not to indulge in the naive charge of epistemic culpability "they should have known better," for very often subjects could not have known otherwise and, therefore, the charge of culpability is vacuous. On the other hand, however, interstices within discursive practices as well as alternative practices are often available; and they present opportunities for epistemic resistance, for challenging knowledge/ignorance structures. Genealogical investigations can be used to point out how these subjugated knowledges could have been used, how people could have known otherwise by drawing on them, how they could have become able to undo epistemic exclusions and stigmatizations. Hence the insurrectionary power of subjugated knowledges, which genealogical investigations try to mobilize. As Sullivan puts it, echoing Foucault:¶ The creation of ignorance/knowledge through relations of force often is unbalanced and unequal, as is the case in colonized lands. But as a dynamic, relational process, it involves the active participation of all 'sides' and includes the possibility of resistance to and transformation of the forms of ignorance/knowledge produced.66¶ A Foucaultian guerrilla pluralism enables us to see how different possibilities of resistance appear for differently constituted and situated subjects as they develop different forms of agency with respect to power/knowledge, or rather, power/knowledge-ignorance. Let me briefly sketch, by way of a conclusion, how this insurrectionary genealogical pluralism can be put to use against ideologies of racial oppression and the forms of white ignorance that they produce. In my application of the Foucaultian approach to white ignorance, we can appreciate the two points highlighted by Code's Foucaultian standpoint theory in the context of the epistemology of race: the co-constitutive relations between racial knowledge and racial ignorance, and the unavailability of innocent racialized standpoints. What a Foucaultian racial epistemology of power/knowledge-ignorance underscores is the constant epistemic struggles that take place in racialized social fields, calling attention to possibilities of resistance and contestation. In what follows I will compare and contrast Foucault's guerrilla pluralism applied to racial knowledge/ignorance with one of the most influential accounts in race theory: namely, Charles Mills's racial epistemology of ignorance.
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<h4>Their focus on the question “how can I survive?” is precisely what we critique – they assume the existence of a coherent and isolated subject without asking what power relations constitute them as such. Only a rejection of subjectivation by one’s own experiences avoids rearticulating ______.</h4><p><strong>McLaren 2</strong> Margaret McLaren, George D. and Harriet W. Cornell Chair, Professor of Philosophy, Rollins College, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, p. 58, pp. 61-62</p><p>But what is Foucault refusing when he refuses the subject? Foucault's opposition to the Cartesian cogito is well documented.25 But surely his wariness of accepting a Cartesian notion of subjectivity is not what feminists object to, because many feminists also reject a Cartesian notion of subjectivity. In an interview shortly before his death <u><strong><mark>Foucault</u></strong></mark> responds to the question, "But you have always 'refused* that we speak to you about the subject in general?" by saying, "What I refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory of the subject. . . What I wanted to know was how the subject constituted himself, in such and such a determined form.... I <u><strong><mark>had to reject a certain a priori theory of the subject</mark> <mark>in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the constitution of the subject</mark> or different forms of the subject <mark>and</mark> games of truth, practices of <mark>power</mark> and so forth</u></strong>."26 <u><strong><mark>His denial</u></strong></mark> of the subject here <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> not a denial of the subject tout court, but <u><strong><mark>a hesitation to begin from</mark> a particular theory of <mark>the subject</u></strong></mark>. Foucault refuses the subject as the condition for the possibility of experience, claiming instead that it is experience that results in a subject or subjects.2' When asked whether his books prior to The History of Sexuality "ruin the sovereignty of the subject," Foucault replies that he wanted to return to the problem of the subject and follow its developments through history to analyze "the combination of processes by which the subject exists with its different problems and obstacles and through forms which are far from being completed." Foucault does not reject the subject altogether, but refuses a particular formulation of it. <u><strong>Foucault refuses conceptions of subjectivity that assume an a priori notion of the subject either as the condition for the possibility of experience (which he ascribes to phenomenology and existentialism) or as transcendental consciousness</u></strong> (which he attributes to Descartes and Kant). But these conceptions of subjectivity hardly exhaust the possibilities for conceiving of the self. As he says, "subjectivity... is of course only one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness."2'' <u><strong>For Foucault</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>subjectivity is a historically and culturally specific way of conceptualizing the self</mark>. <mark>He associates the emergence of the desiring subject with Christianity because of its concern with deciphering, controlling, and confessing</mark> sexual <mark>desire</mark>.</u></strong> He points out that Greek thought did not have a theory of subjectivity or a conception of the subject. Foucault does not deny that the Greeks were interested in issues of the self such as self-mastery and self-knowledge. The Greeks, like later philosophers, were interested in defining the conditions for experience, or as Foucault puts it, problematizing experience. Different historical epochs problematize experience differently and for the Greeks the result of the problematization of experience was not the subject, but the individual. Foucault claims that there is no theory of the subject in Greek philosophy and hence no subject.1" As he says, "What was missing in classical antiquity was the problematization of the constitution of the self as subject."51 For <u><strong>Foucault</u></strong>, the notion of subjectivity is fraught with problems. He <u><strong>is especially critical of the tie among subjectivity, sexuality, and truth,</u></strong> which he traces in The History of Sexuality Volume One. <u><strong>This particular form of <mark>subjectivity was constituted through the practices of</mark> Christianity, notably <mark>confession</mark>, <mark>but continues to influence current Western conceptions of morality</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Foucault believes that a subject-centered morality has run its course</mark>.</u></strong> His objections to anthropological universal discussed in chapter 2 carry over to conceptions of subjectivity and morality. However, his rejection of universals should not be seen as a disinterest in moral and ethical questions. His studies of Antiquity are an exploration of an ethics that does not rely on a universal moral code, and an elaboration of a process of subjectivization that does not result in a (Modern, or in his terms, Classical) subject.'2 Foucault's attack on the subject can be seen as specific to the subjectivity of what he calls the Classical Age. His genealogies reveal the normalizing character of the disciplines that constitute subjectivity; this should prompt us to investigate nonnormalizing ways of existence. In Foucault's view, refusing what we are would enable us to liberate ourselves from the type of individuality (subjectivity) that has imposed itself on us through disciplines and practices for the last several centuries. The refusal to be what we are, to be a subject and hence subjected, opens up new possibilities for being.</p><p><strong>Muir 93</p><p> <u>(Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS </p><p>A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism</u></strong>, Stewart, for example, sees value clarification as individualistic, personal, and situational.^' He also characterizes values clarification as possessing a hidden set of values (an "absolute relativism") that includes purposefulness, strong beliefs, and thoughtfulness, among others. This "hidden curriculum" of values clarification formulates responses to situations while decrying such pre-judgment. In obvious ways, <u><strong>switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others</u></strong> as a matter of procedure. <u><strong>Both features need to be</u></strong> explicitly <u><strong>addressed</u></strong> since both reflect directly on debate as a tool of moral pedagogy. The first response to the charge of relativism is that <u><strong><mark>switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses </mark>attention<mark> on </mark>assessing <mark>the validity of opposing belief systems</u></strong></mark>. Scriven argues that <u><strong><mark>the "confusion of pluralism</u></strong></mark>, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, <u><strong><mark>with relativism</u></strong></mark>—the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion—<u><strong>i<mark>s</u></strong></mark> perhaps <u><strong><mark>the most serious ideological barrier to</u></strong></mark> the implementation of <u><strong><mark>moral education</u></strong></mark> today. "^ <u><strong>The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not</u></strong>. Here is where cognitive-development diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. <u><strong>A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable:</u></strong> It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. <u><strong>All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views</u></strong> about abortion or pornography or war <u><strong>are</u></strong> <u><strong>equally right</u></strong>, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. <u><strong><mark>Pluralism</u></strong> <u><strong>requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs</u></strong></mark>; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. <u><strong>The role of <mark>switch-side debate</mark> is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that <mark>foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs.</u></strong></mark> The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, <u><strong>debaters are</u></strong> indeed <u><strong>exposed to a multivalued world</u></strong>, both within and between the sides of a given topic. <u><strong>Yet this exposure hardly commits them to</u></strong> such "<u><strong>mistaken" values</u></strong>. In this view, <u><strong><mark>the divorce of the game from the "real world</mark>" <mark>can be</mark> seen as <mark>a</mark> <mark>means </mark>of <mark>gaining perspective without obligating students to </mark>validate their hypothetical value structure through <mark>immoral actions</mark>.</p><p></u>Medina 11</strong> José Medina is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University and Distinguished Chair in the Humanities at the Carlos III University (Madrid, Spain). He works primarily in Philosophy of Language, Social Epistemology, and Political Philosophy, with a special focus on gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” Foucault Studies <u><strong>No. 12, pp. 9-35</p><p></u></strong>In this brief concluding section I want to connect the critical and transformative possibilities underscored by a Foucaultian guerrilla pluralism with ongoing discussions in epistemologies of ignorance<u><strong>. <mark>It is surprising that Foucault is not widely cited and discussed in the epistemologies of ignorance</mark> developed <mark>in</mark> Feminist Standpoint Theory and <mark>Critical Race Theory</mark>. <mark>Perhaps this is a residual effect of the old-fashioned opposition between any theory that privileges standpoints and social constructivist views that interrogate those standpoints as cultural artifacts</mark>.</u></strong> But recent accounts in feminist standpoint theory and critical race theory are highly performative and constructivist, with the focus shifting from fixed notions of gender and race to dynamic and situated social processes of genderization and racialization that are deeply interrogated. Surprisingly, though, Foucault is still used only sporadically by this new generation of standpoint and race theorists. Lorraine Code is a notable exception here. In "The Power of Ignorance" she acknowledges and makes explicit use of the Foucaultian approach:¶ I follow Michel Foucault in recognizing the impediments to knowing what is not 'within the true' (1972, 224), thus within the knowable, within the conceptual framework held in place by an intransigent hegemonic discourse, an instituted¶ social imaginary.61¶ <u><strong>This Foucaultian perspective that Code echoes contains two crucial insights for the epistemology of ignorance. The first crucial insight is the idea that a discursive framework produces spaces of knowability and unknowability simultaneously</u></strong>, so that there will be things that lie within the true ("dans le vrai") as well as things outside it for agents who operate within that framework. <u><strong>In other words, the <mark>epistemic agency that subjects have within a discursive practice is such that their knowledge and ignorance are co-constituted</mark>: their epistemic <mark>lucidity and</mark> their epistemic <mark>blindness go hand in hand, mutually supporting each other</u></strong></mark>. As another epistemologist of ignorance, Shannon Sullivan, puts it, "<u><strong>rather than oppose knowledge, ignorance often is formed by it, and vice versa.</u></strong>"63 For this reason, <u><strong>Sullivan suggests that we talk about "ignorance/knowledge," instead of talking about ignorance and knowledge separately, so that we undo certain epistemic illusions</u></strong>—in particular, "the purported self-mastery and self-transparency of knowledge, as if nothing properly escaped its grasp."6*¶ The second crucial idea that derives from the Foucaultian approach is that <u><strong><mark>there is no such thing as epistemic innocence</mark>, for <mark>we always operate from a space of knowability and unknowability simultaneously</mark>, </p><p><mark>from a knowledge/ignorance framework</mark>. And this problematizes the notion of culpable ignorance</u></strong>. On the one hand, as Code remarks, there is no such thing as "an innocent position from which 'we' could level charges of culpability."65 Therefore, as Code insists, <u><strong>in dealing with the epistemic aspects of particular forms of oppression, <mark>we should be very careful not to indulge in the naive charge of epistemic culpability "they should have known better</mark>," for very often subjects could not have known otherwise and, therefore, the charge of culpability is vacuous</u></strong>. <u><strong>On the other hand, however, <mark>interstices within discursive practices as well as alternative practices are often available; and they present opportunities for epistemic resistance</u></strong></mark>, for challenging knowledge/ignorance structures. <u><strong><mark>Genealogical investigations can be used to point out how these subjugated knowledges could have been used</mark>, how people could have known otherwise by drawing on them, <mark>how they could have become able to undo epistemic exclusions</mark> and stigmatizations. Hence the insurrectionary power of subjugated knowledges</u></strong>, which genealogical investigations try to mobilize. As Sullivan puts it, echoing Foucault:¶ <u><strong>The creation of ignorance/knowledge through relations of force often is unbalanced and unequal, as is the case in colonized lands. But as a dynamic, relational process, it involves the active participation of all 'sides' and includes the possibility of resistance to and transformation of the forms of ignorance/knowledge produced</u></strong>.66<u><strong>¶ A <mark>Foucaultian guerrilla pluralism enables us to see how different possibilities of resistance appear for differently constituted and situated subjects as they develop different forms of agency with respect to power/knowledge</u></strong></mark>, or rather, power/knowledge-ignorance. Let me briefly sketch, by way of a conclusion, how this insurrectionary genealogical pluralism can be put to use against ideologies of racial oppression and the forms of white ignorance that they produce. In my application of the Foucaultian approach to white ignorance, we can appreciate the two points highlighted by Code's Foucaultian standpoint theory in the context of the epistemology of race: the co-constitutive relations between racial knowledge and racial ignorance, and the unavailability of innocent racialized standpoints<u><strong>. What a Foucaultian racial epistemology of power/knowledge-ignorance underscores is the constant epistemic struggles that take place in racialized social fields, calling attention to possibilities of resistance and contestation</u></strong>. In what follows I will compare and contrast Foucault's guerrilla pluralism applied to racial knowledge/ignorance with one of the most influential accounts in race theory: namely, Charles Mills's racial epistemology of ignorance.</p>
| null | null |
2NC K
| 273,101 | 4 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,623 |
No grid attacks – no incentive, no capabilities, and deterrence
|
Birch 10/1
|
Birch 10/1 [Douglas Birch is a former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy. Forget Revolution, OCTOBER 1, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution?page=full]
|
in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system -- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of the network's machines "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like Windows used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive for them to do so. There is also the threat of retaliation. "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks."
|
to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling the U.S. electric grid hackers would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of network's machines Every control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different protocols Professional hackers are in it for the money like Windows banks and other affluent targets, than systems linked to generators only industrial nations have the means But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive There is also the threat of retaliation If you shut down power maybe we will put a missile down your smokestack
|
Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system -- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks."
| 2,600 |
<h4>No grid attacks – no <u>incentive</u>, no <u>capabilities</u>, and <u>deterrence</h4><p></u><strong>Birch 10/1</strong> [Douglas Birch is a former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy. Forget Revolution, OCTOBER 1, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution?page=full<u>]</p><p></u>Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that <u>in order <mark>to create a cyber weapon capable of</mark> <mark>crippling</mark> a specific control system -- like the ones operating <mark>the U.S. electric grid</mark> -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then</u>, the report says, <u><mark>hackers</mark> likely <mark>would need the help of someone with inside</mark> <mark>knowledge of</u></mark> how <u>the <mark>network's machines</u></mark> were wired together to plan an effective attack. <u>"<mark>Every</mark> SCADA <mark>control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different</mark> software/<mark>protocols</mark>,"</u> wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. <u><mark>Professional hackers are in it for the money</mark> -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs <mark>like</u></mark> the <u><mark>Windows</u></mark> operating system, <u>used by <mark>banks</mark> <mark>and other affluent targets, than</mark> in one-of-a-kind SCADA <mark>systems linked to generators</mark> and switches.</u> According to Pollard, <u><mark>only</mark> the world's <mark>industrial nations have the means</mark> to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. <mark>But given the</mark> <mark>integrated global economy, there is little incentive</u></mark>, short of armed conflict, <u>for them to do so. </u>"If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." <u><mark>There is also the threat of retaliation</mark>.</u> Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: <u>"<mark>If you shut</mark> <mark>down</mark> our <mark>power</mark> grid, <mark>maybe we will put a missile down</mark> one of <mark>your smokestack</mark>s."</p></u>
| null | null |
Cartels
| 173,922 | 38 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,624 |
No nuclear terror.
|
Chapman 12
|
Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]
|
Given their inability to do something simple Ohio State University professor John Mueller “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” Russia’s devices are no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.
|
Given their inability to do something simple “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.
|
Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.
| 2,150 |
<h4>No nuclear terror.</h4><p><strong>Chapman 12</strong> [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html<u><mark>]</p><p>Given their inability to do something simple</u></mark> — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued <u><strong>Ohio State University professor John Mueller</u></strong> in a presentation at the University of Chicago, <u><mark>“the likelihood</u></mark> that <u><mark>a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems</u></mark> to be <u><strong><mark>vanishingly small.”</u></strong></mark> The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from <u><strong>Russia’s</u></strong> inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those <u><strong>devices are</u></strong> probably <u><strong>no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards</u></strong> designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of <u><mark>building a bomb</u></mark>. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It <u><mark>requires millions </u></mark>of dollars, <u><mark>a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus</u></mark> people with <u><mark>specialized skills</u></mark>, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. <u><mark>Assuming</u></mark> the <u><mark>jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.</u></mark> Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like <u><mark>every</u></mark> other <u><mark>step</u></mark> in the entire process, <u><mark>means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.</u></mark> That has heartening implications. If <u><mark>al-Qaida </u></mark>embarks on the project, it <u><mark>has <strong>only a minuscule chance</u></strong></mark> of seeing it bear fruit. <u><mark>Given the formidable odds, <strong>it</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>won’t bother.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Cartels
| 18,931 | 81 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,625 |
Don’t solve anything other than marijuana
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Don’t solve anything other than marijuana</h4>
| null | null |
Farms
| 430,781 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,626 |
Industrial model is good and sustainable – AFF causes widespread environmental damage and crushes GMO’s
| null |
-lower yields: 20-50%
|
Worldwatch goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security while reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity evidence argues otherwise organic ag resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit of land and water than conventional ones The low yields of organic ag typically 20%-50% less than conventional ag ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and tech If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, serious environmental issues Another limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality namely minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with cover crops Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides Organic growers in the absence of effective herbicides rely on tillage for weed control prevalent myth is organic ag does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to animals, and rotenone, so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of fish populations the least sustainable aspect of organic farming is the exclusion of "g m o s but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing virtually all fruits, vegetables and grains have been genetically improved by one technique or another, the exclusion from organic ag of organisms makes no sense In recent decades, we have seen advances in ag that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever they have resulted from science-based research and tech ingenuity by agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern industrial agriculture
|
Organic might work for local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food than conventional ones typically 20%-50% less ammonia nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions were higher than conventional farming as were "land use and acidification Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic 's systematic rejection of advanced methods and tech organic production significantly increased would increase the pressure for conversion of land and more water serious environmental issues organic production disfavors the best approach to soil quality namely tilling combined with cover crops Organic farming use rotenone widely used for mass poisoning of fish populations the least sustainable aspect is exclusion of "g m o s modified with precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing advances in ag that have been more sustainable have resulted from science-based research and tech ingenuity b agribusiness companies, not from elites opposed to modern industrial agriculture
|
-land use
-acidification
-soil erosion/tillage
-rotenone x fish
-zero-sum: aff model T/O
Miller 14 (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)
You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The Worldwatch Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, while simultaneously reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity." The evidence argues otherwise. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive organic agriculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit of land and water than conventional ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than conventional agriculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and technologies. If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for the conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, both of which are serious environmental issues. Another limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality—namely, the minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with the use of cover crops. Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides. Organic growers do frequently plant cover crops, but in the absence of effective herbicides, often they rely on tillage (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) for weed control. One prevalent myth is that organic agriculture does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals (mostly containing copper and sulfur) are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to warm-blooded animals, and rotenone, which is moderately toxic to most mammals but so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of unwanted fish populations during restocking projects. Perhaps the most illogical and least sustainable aspect of organic farming in the long term is the exclusion of "genetically modified organisms," but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, virtually all the fruits, vegetables and grains in our diet have been genetically improved by one technique or another, often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, the exclusion from organic agriculture of organisms simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques makes no sense. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. In recent decades, we have seen advances in agriculture that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever before. But they have resulted from science-based research and technological ingenuity by farmers, plant breeders and agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "industrial agriculture."
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<h4>Industrial model is good and sustainable – AFF causes <u>widespread environmental damage </u>and <u>crushes GMO’s</u> </h4><p>-lower yields: 20-50%</p><p>-land use</p><p>-acidification </p><p>-soil erosion/tillage </p><p>-rotenone x fish</p><p>-zero-sum: aff model T/O </p><p><strong>Miller 14</strong> (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)</p><p>You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The <u><strong>Worldwatch </u></strong>Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, <u><strong>goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security </u></strong>by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, <u><strong>while </u></strong>simultaneously <u><strong>reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity</u></strong>." The <u><strong>evidence argues otherwise</u></strong>. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, <u><strong>resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater</u></strong>. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. <u><strong><mark>Organic</mark> farming <mark>might work</mark> well <mark>for</mark> certain <mark>local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food</mark> per unit of land and water <mark>than conventional ones</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The low yields of organic ag</u></strong>riculture—<u><strong><mark>typically 20%-50% less</mark> than conventional ag</u></strong>riculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "<u><strong><mark>ammonia </mark>emissions, <mark>nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions </mark>per product unit <mark>were higher </mark>from organic systems" <mark>than conventional farming </mark>systems, <mark>as were "land use</mark>, eutrophication potential <mark>and acidification</u></strong> </mark>potential per product unit." <u><strong><mark>Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic</mark> farming<mark>'s</mark> <mark>systematic rejection of </mark>many <mark>advanced methods and tech</u></strong></mark>nologies. <u><strong>If the scale of <mark>organic production </mark>were <mark>significantly increased</mark>, the lower yields <mark>would increase the pressure for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>conversion of </mark>more <mark>land </mark>to farming <mark>and more water </mark>for irrigation,</u></strong> both of which are <u><strong><mark>serious environmental issues</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Another limitation of <mark>organic production </mark>is that it <mark>disfavors the best approach to </mark>enhancing <mark>soil quality</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>namely</u></strong></mark>, the <u><strong>minimization of soil disturbances such as <mark>tilling</mark>, <mark>combined with</u></strong> </mark>the use of <u><strong><mark>cover crops</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides</u></strong>. <u><strong>Organic growers</u></strong> do frequently plant cover crops, but <u><strong>in the absence of effective herbicides</u></strong>, often they <u><strong>rely on tillage</u></strong> (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) <u><strong>for weed control</u></strong>. One <u><strong>prevalent myth is</u></strong> that <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>does not employ pesticides. <mark>Organic farming </mark>does <mark>use </mark>insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals</u></strong> (mostly containing copper and sulfur) <u><strong>are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to</u></strong> warm-blooded <u><strong>animals, and <mark>rotenone</mark>,</u></strong> which is moderately toxic to most mammals but <u><strong>so toxic to fish that it's <mark>widely used for </mark>the <mark>mass poisoning of </u></strong></mark>unwanted<u><strong><mark> fish populations</u></strong> </mark>during restocking projects. Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the </u></strong></mark>most illogical and <u><strong><mark>least sustainable aspect </mark>of organic farming</u></strong> in the long term <u><strong><mark>is </mark>the <mark>exclusion of "g</u></strong></mark>enetically <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>odified <u><strong><mark>o</u></strong></mark>rganism<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>but only those that were <mark>modified with </mark>the most <mark>precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing</u></strong></mark>. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, <u><strong>virtually all</u></strong> the <u><strong>fruits, vegetables and grains</u></strong> in our diet <u><strong>have been genetically improved by one technique or another,</u></strong> often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, <u><strong>the exclusion from organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>of organisms</u></strong> simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques <u><strong>makes no sense</u></strong>. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. <u><strong>In recent decades, we have seen <mark>advances in ag</u></strong></mark>riculture <u><strong><mark>that have been more </mark>environmentally friendly and <mark>sustainable </mark>than ever</u></strong> before. But <u><strong>they <mark>have resulted from science-based research and tech</u></strong></mark>nological <u><strong><mark>ingenuity b</mark>y </u></strong>farmers, plant breeders and<u><strong> <mark>agribusiness companies, not from </mark>social <mark>elites opposed to modern</u></strong> </mark>insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "<u><strong><mark>industrial agriculture</u></strong></mark>." </p>
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Contracts plank remedies any possible solvency deficit
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Zeese 2013
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Zeese 2013 (Kevin, attorney, Zeese began his advocacy career while in law school where he worked at the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. He went on to serve as their chief counsel in 1980 and national director in 1983. In 1986 he left to practice criminal law and, with Arnold Trebach, began the Drug Policy Foundation which went on to become the largest drug policy reform organization in history and is now known as the Drug Policy Alliance after merging with the Lindesmith Center. Zeese continues to serve as president of Common Sense for Drug Policy, “The Voters of Colorado and Washington Provide A Path to End the War-on-Marijuana Quagmire” http://greenshadowcabinet.us/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Federal%20Response%20to%20State%20Marijuana%20Laws%204-2013%20FINAL.pdf)
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The federal government has sufficient flexibility under the law to respect the laws of the states that have reformed their laws and still be true to current federal law the federal government should seek to respect local democracy and allow states to implement their laws The state and federal governments should enter into contractual agreements, under Section 873 of the Controlled Substances Act, to accomplish shared goals and ensure each others laws will be effective. Obama can act positively on these issues without any congressional action Congress long ago directed in the CSA that the Attorney General ‘shall cooperate’ with the states and authorized contractual agreements . . . to provide for cooperative enforcemen Cooperation between state and federal government is the only practical path to controlling the market Brandeis phrase about state’s serving as “laboratories of democracy” is appropriate The regulation and licensing of marijuana could be characterized consistent with the purposes of the CSA to control drug abuse and thus are not subject to conflict preemption the Department of Justice is not required to zealously enforce every violation of the CSA federal law enforcement officials have “broad discretion” as to when, whom, and whether to prosecute for violations of the CSA Through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion Obama is free to develop a policy that cooperates with the states to achieve their common objectives and continue to allow federal law to operate the DOJ could simply defer to the state policy and stop prosecutions for violations of the CSA in Washington and Colorado, so long as the individuals are in compliance with state law. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General ‘shall cooperate’ with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements failure to work together is likely to create a chaotic situation the federal government can limit its enforcement in legal states to preventing diversion A focused, co-operative effort has better chance of success than state and federal enforcement working against each other. the federal government should state in an ‘873 Contract’ that it will not enforce federal laws so long as the activity is consistent with state laws This should be part of a contractual agreement between Colorado, Washington and the federal government; similar agreements should be reached with states and District of Columbia
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The government has flexibility to respect states that have reformed and still be true to current federal law state and federal governments should enter into contractual agreements, under Section 873 to ensure each others laws will be effective. Obama can act on these issues without any congressional action Congress directed in the CSA that the A G shall cooperate’ with the states and authorized contractual agreements Brandeis phrase about laboratories of democracy” is appropriate regulation and licensing of marijuana could be characterized consistent with the purposes of the CSA to control abuse D o J is not required to zealously enforce officials have “broad discretion” Through prosecutorial discretion Obama is free to develop a policy that cooperates with the states to achieve their objectives and continue to allow federal law to operate. The CSA not only directs that the A G ‘shall cooperate’ but also gives broad discretion through means including legally binding contractual agreements failure to work together is likely to create a chaotic situation the federal government should state in an ‘873 Contract’ that it will not enforce so long as the activity is consistent with state laws
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The federal government has sufficient flexibility under the law to respect the laws of the states that have reformed their laws and still be true to current federal law. Rather than seeking conflict between federal and state law, the federal government should seek to respect local democracy and allow states to implement their laws. The state and federal governments should enter into contractual agreements, under Section 873 of the Controlled Substances Act, to accomplish shared goals and ensure each others laws will be effective. Federal, state and local governments seek to control the marijuana market as well as protect public health and safety. These shared common goals are a foundation on which to build policies that respect state-level democracy. The Obama administration can act positively on these issues without any congressional action. As Stuart Taylor points out in a report for the Brookings Institution “Congress long ago directed in the CSA that the Attorney General ‘shall cooperate’ with the states on controlled substances and authorized him ‘to enter into contractual agreements . . . to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities.’”64 The alternative, seeking conflict with state governments, will lead to a battle the federal government will ultimately lose; and that will undermine control of the marijuana market as well as public health and safety. The federal government has a lot of power to sue civilly and prosecute criminally; but what it does not have is the people-power to combat the widespread use of marijuana. There is no question that supremacy laws will allow states to decriminalize possession, personal cultivation or repeal all of their marijuana laws and leave it to the federal government to be solely responsible for enforcement. The Colorado law already allows cultivation of up to six plants and sharing up to one ounce without criminal penalties. Stopping a weed that can grow in people’s closets, possession that can be hidden in pockets and sales that occur behind closed doors has proven impossible with state and local law enforcement working with the federal government. Currently the vast majority of marijuana arrests, 99 percent, are made by state and local police. The limited person-power of the federal government will obviously fail without the help of state and local police. Cooperation between state and federal government is the only practical path to controlling the market and protecting the public health and safety of the population. Justice Lewis Brandeis famous phrase about state’s serving as “laboratories of democracy” is appropriate to this issue. Brandeis wrote: “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”65 To block the voters’ clear democratically expressed desire to end the long-failed policy of marijuana prohibition would be a tremendous denial of democracy but also foolish leadership. The United States has been stuck in a quagmire of mass marijuana arrests, mass incarceration, destruction of civil liberties and escalating enforcement expenditures since 1937. It has not worked. Washington and Colorado have given the country a path out of the marijuana war. These state’s are taking their responsibility seriously and fashioning laws that protect public health and safety as well as raise revenue and use taxes to discourage use. Both the House and Senate in Colorado passed a law to tax marijuana as this report went to press. House Bill 1318 would impose a 15 percent excise tax and a sales tax initially set at 10 percent on recreational marijuana sales. Voters this November will have to give their approval of the tax rates before they could take effect. The money would be used for school construction and for regulation of marijuana stores. A companion bill, House Bill 1317 has been passed by the Senate. It regulates the marijuana market. Its provisions include marijuana stores being licensed by the state, only allows Colorado residents to own stores, for the first nine months only existing medical dispensaries can apply for a license, stores would initially have to grow what they sell, in October 2014 growers separate from the store would be allowed. The Senate bill also bars cities from operating the marijuana stores.66 While the “Supremacy Clause” of the US Constitution67 makes it clear that if state marijuana laws conflict with federal law they are preempted by federal law and can be voided by the courts, the Tenth Amendment recognizes the power of the states and does not allow the federal government to coerce states to enforce federal laws or to keep or adopt state laws that they do not want.68 Indeed, there have always been differences between federal and state law on marijuana as well as between the various states on their marijuana laws. There is no question that if states decide to repeal all marijuana laws, laws against cultivation, distribution or possession, the federal government cannot force them to keep those laws.69 The Controlled Substances Act makes it clear that the federal government did not intend to pre-empt the field of marijuana laws:70 “No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together” Courts have adopted a narrow definition of the conflict, “unless state law requires what federal law prohibits, or state law prohibits what federal law requires, it is not ‘impossible’ to comply with both laws.”71 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) in analyzing the preemption issue summarizes the law which begins with the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act: “The Supreme Court has previously identified the ‘main objectives’ of the CSA as ‘conquer[ing] drug abuse’ and ‘control[ing] the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.’ Second, ‘[i]n all pre-emption cases ... we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ State drug laws, including those connected to marijuana cultivation, distribution, or possession have generally been considered to be within ‘the historic police powers of the States.’ Consequently, the Washington and Colorado laws would likely be accorded a presumption of validity.”72 The states and the federal government operate as two distinct sovereigns, enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other.73 As the CRS points out: “If prohibiting certain conduct under federal law had the effect of barring any state attempt to permit that same conduct, the result would be a legal environment in which states were compelled to adopt criminal measures that mirrored federal law. The Tenth Amendment prohibits such a requirement.”74 Federal and state courts have previously held that a state’s decision to simply permit what the federal government prohibits does not create a “positive conflict” with federal law:75 “Nor have courts generally found that simply permitting conduct that the federal government prohibits stands as an ‘obstacle to the execution of Congress’s objectives.’ The Supreme Court has interpreted this relatively narrowly, holding that a state law is preempted where the obstacle is of such a degree that ‘the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished.’”76 The regulation and licensing of marijuana could be characterized consistent with the purposes of the CSA to control drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate distribution of drugs; and thus are not subject to conflict preemption.77 The CRS points out that: “it can be argued that the state regulatory and licensing laws have no impact on the enforcement of federal law; are necessary to implement the state’s decision to remove penalties for certain marijuana-related activities; do not immunize or shield the holder from federal prosecution; and, therefore, are not preempted. Moreover, it could be argued that a state license acts only as a means by which the state can impose controls on the production and distribution of marijuana under state law and to identify which individuals have been preapproved to engage in marijuana-related activities.”78 There has only been one case where a federal court has made any statement about preemption in relation to the Colorado medical marijuana and legalization initiative. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado dealing with a debtor, who leased space for the purposes of growing medicinal marijuana in compliance with state law; the court wrote that “conflict preemption is not an issue here. Colorado constitutional amendments for both medical marijuana, and the more recent amendment legalizing marijuana possession and usage generally, both make it clear that their provisions apply to state law only. Absent from either enactment is any effort to impede the enforcement of federal law.”79 By limiting marijuana production and distribution, it could be argued that the envisioned Colorado and Washington regulatory and licensing provisions “further, rather than obstruct, the purposes of the CSA.” Under this reasoning, the Washington and Colorado regulatory and licensing aspects could be seen as supporting the federal government’s objectives of “control[ing] the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances,” as opposed to creating an obstacle to that goal.80 With regard to taxation in Colorado, the tax (which may not exceed 15% prior to January 1, 2017) is to be levied on sales of marijuana by cultivation facilities, product manufacturing facilities, or retail stores.81 In Washington, a 25% tax is to be imposed at each transaction within the distribution chain, including sales from: producer to processor; processor to retailer; and from retailer to consumer.82 Although little precedent exists relating to state-imposed taxes on medical marijuana, there is evidence to suggest that these taxes would likely be considered permissible.83 The Supreme Court has held that a state may “legitimately tax criminal activities.”84 As the CRS explains, taxes are imposed to either raise revenue, deter conduct, or both. The excise taxes envisioned by Colorado and Washington appear to be motivated by a desire to raise revenue to both pay for the regulatory and licensing controls on marijuana and to contribute to other budgetary needs, most notably health services and education. In addition, the Washington law states that the Liquor Control Board is authorized to make recommendations to adjust the tax levels “that would further the goal of discouraging use while undercutting illegal market prices.”85 The Colorado law does not explicitly reference any goal of deterring marijuana use, but it would appear that the envisioned tax may also have that effect. In addition, taxes are already collected from medical marijuana dispensaries without any conflict with federal law. Thus, the state tax may more accurately be characterized as “interposing an economic impediment to the activity” as opposed to authorizing the activity.86 Taxes, like regulations, are an alternative way to control the market and limit abuse. Thus, under the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemption, the federal government can view the regulatory, licensing and tax laws of Colorado and Washington as consistent with the purpose of the CSA; the same is true for the 18 states that allow the medical use of marijuana. Under the law the Department of Justice is not required to zealously enforce every violation of the CSA. Indeed, as we have noted earlier it would be impossible for them to do so and they already cede enforcement of possession, cultivation and small sales to states. Under the doctrine of “prosecutorial discretion,” federal law enforcement officials have “broad discretion” as to when, whom, and whether to prosecute for violations of the CSA.87 Courts have recognized that the “decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review,” as it involves the consideration of factors, such as the strength of evidence, deterrence value, and existing enforcement priorities “not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”88 Through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Obama administration through Attorney General Holder is free to develop a policy that cooperates with the states to achieve their common objectives and continue to allow federal law to operate. What are the choices the federal government could make? At one extreme they could decide to aggressively enforce the federal marijuana laws in Washington and Colorado. As a practical matter, the federal government simply does not have the resources to enforce federal drug laws without the assistance of state and local police. Approximately 99% of drug offenses are prosecuted under state law by state authorities. Therefore, if the Obama administration decided to increase the frequency of federal prosecutions in order to enforce federal law, vast new resources would be needed by the FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Attorneys. During this time of budget deficits, austerity and sequester including cuts to essential programs like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other programs, it is simply unrealistic to increase federal enforcement spending enough to meet this goal. On the other end of the spectrum, the DOJ could simply defer to the state policy and stop prosecutions for violations of the CSA in Washington and Colorado, so long as the individuals are in compliance with state law. These and all options in between are available to President Obama and Attorney General Holder. How can we make cooperation work? Stuart Taylor89 explains: “The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General ‘shall cooperate’ with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements.” He also notes “U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has already been personally urged by John Hickenlooper, Colorado’s veteran Democratic governor, and Jay Inslee, Washington’s new Democratic governor, to work cooperatively with them.” 90 All parties want to protect the health and safety of the public as well as control the market, by working together they can do so; failure to work together is likely to create a chaotic situation more likely to undermine health and safety as well as create a large illegal marijuana market. The federal interest of preventing marijuana from medical or legal states from crossing borders to non-legal, non-medical states is a legitimate federal concern under existing laws. States can certainly agree to focus resources on preventing diversion to other states, and the federal government can limit its enforcement in legal and medical states to preventing diversion. A focused, co-operative effort has better chance of success than state and federal enforcement working against each other. To make implementation of state laws possible the federal government should state in an ‘873 Contract’ that it will not enforce federal laws so long as the activity is consistent with state laws and diversion to other states is prevented. This should be part of a contractual agreement between Colorado, Washington and the federal government; similar agreements should be reached with the 18 states and District of Columbia that have passed medical marijuana laws.
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<h4>Contracts plank remedies any possible solvency deficit</h4><p><strong>Zeese 2013 </strong>(Kevin, attorney, Zeese began his advocacy career while in law school where he worked at the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. He went on to serve as their chief counsel in 1980 and national director in 1983. In 1986 he left to practice criminal law and, with Arnold Trebach, began the Drug Policy Foundation which went on to become the largest drug policy reform organization in history and is now known as the Drug Policy Alliance after merging with the Lindesmith Center. Zeese continues to serve as president of Common Sense for Drug Policy, “The Voters of Colorado and Washington Provide A Path to End the War-on-Marijuana Quagmire” http://greenshadowcabinet.us/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Federal%20Response%20to%20State%20Marijuana%20Laws%204-2013%20FINAL.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> federal <mark>government has </mark>sufficient <mark>flexibility </mark>under the law <mark>to respect</mark> the laws of the <mark>states that have reformed</mark> their laws <mark>and still be true to current federal law</u></strong></mark>. Rather than seeking conflict between federal and state law, <u><strong>the federal government should seek to respect local democracy and allow states to implement their laws</u></strong>. <u><strong>The <mark>state and federal governments should enter into contractual agreements, under Section 873</mark> of the Controlled Substances Act, <mark>to</mark> accomplish shared goals</u></strong> <u><strong>and <mark>ensure each others laws will be effective.</mark> </u></strong>Federal, state and local governments seek to control the marijuana market as well as protect public health and safety. These shared common goals are a foundation on which to build policies that respect state-level democracy. The <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration <u><strong><mark>can act</mark> positively <mark>on these issues without any congressional action</u></strong></mark>. As Stuart Taylor points out in a report for the Brookings Institution “<u><strong><mark>Congress</mark> long ago <mark>directed in the CSA that the A</mark>ttorney <mark>G</mark>eneral ‘<mark>shall cooperate’ with the states</u></strong></mark> on controlled substances <u><strong><mark>and authorized</u></strong></mark> him ‘to enter into <u><strong><mark>contractual agreements</mark> . . . to provide for cooperative enforcemen</u></strong>t and regulatory activities.’”64 The alternative, seeking conflict with state governments, will lead to a battle the federal government will ultimately lose; and that will undermine control of the marijuana market as well as public health and safety. The federal government has a lot of power to sue civilly and prosecute criminally; but what it does not have is the people-power to combat the widespread use of marijuana. There is no question that supremacy laws will allow states to decriminalize possession, personal cultivation or repeal all of their marijuana laws and leave it to the federal government to be solely responsible for enforcement. The Colorado law already allows cultivation of up to six plants and sharing up to one ounce without criminal penalties. Stopping a weed that can grow in people’s closets, possession that can be hidden in pockets and sales that occur behind closed doors has proven impossible with state and local law enforcement working with the federal government. Currently the vast majority of marijuana arrests, 99 percent, are made by state and local police. The limited person-power of the federal government will obviously fail without the help of state and local police. <u><strong>Cooperation between state and federal government is the only practical path to controlling the market</u></strong> and protecting the public health and safety of the population. Justice Lewis <u><strong><mark>Brandeis</u></strong></mark> famous <u><strong><mark>phrase about</mark> state’s serving as “<mark>laboratories of democracy” is appropriate</u></strong></mark> to this issue. Brandeis wrote: “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”65 To block the voters’ clear democratically expressed desire to end the long-failed policy of marijuana prohibition would be a tremendous denial of democracy but also foolish leadership. The United States has been stuck in a quagmire of mass marijuana arrests, mass incarceration, destruction of civil liberties and escalating enforcement expenditures since 1937. It has not worked. Washington and Colorado have given the country a path out of the marijuana war. These state’s are taking their responsibility seriously and fashioning laws that protect public health and safety as well as raise revenue and use taxes to discourage use. Both the House and Senate in Colorado passed a law to tax marijuana as this report went to press. House Bill 1318 would impose a 15 percent excise tax and a sales tax initially set at 10 percent on recreational marijuana sales. Voters this November will have to give their approval of the tax rates before they could take effect. The money would be used for school construction and for regulation of marijuana stores. A companion bill, House Bill 1317 has been passed by the Senate. It regulates the marijuana market. Its provisions include marijuana stores being licensed by the state, only allows Colorado residents to own stores, for the first nine months only existing medical dispensaries can apply for a license, stores would initially have to grow what they sell, in October 2014 growers separate from the store would be allowed. The Senate bill also bars cities from operating the marijuana stores.66 While the “Supremacy Clause” of the US Constitution67 makes it clear that if state marijuana laws conflict with federal law they are preempted by federal law and can be voided by the courts, the Tenth Amendment recognizes the power of the states and does not allow the federal government to coerce states to enforce federal laws or to keep or adopt state laws that they do not want.68 Indeed, there have always been differences between federal and state law on marijuana as well as between the various states on their marijuana laws. There is no question that if states decide to repeal all marijuana laws, laws against cultivation, distribution or possession, the federal government cannot force them to keep those laws.69 The Controlled Substances Act makes it clear that the federal government did not intend to pre-empt the field of marijuana laws:70 “No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together” Courts have adopted a narrow definition of the conflict, “unless state law requires what federal law prohibits, or state law prohibits what federal law requires, it is not ‘impossible’ to comply with both laws.”71 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) in analyzing the preemption issue summarizes the law which begins with the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act: “The Supreme Court has previously identified the ‘main objectives’ of the CSA as ‘conquer[ing] drug abuse’ and ‘control[ing] the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.’ Second, ‘[i]n all pre-emption cases ... we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ State drug laws, including those connected to marijuana cultivation, distribution, or possession have generally been considered to be within ‘the historic police powers of the States.’ Consequently, the Washington and Colorado laws would likely be accorded a presumption of validity.”72 The states and the federal government operate as two distinct sovereigns, enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other.73 As the CRS points out: “If prohibiting certain conduct under federal law had the effect of barring any state attempt to permit that same conduct, the result would be a legal environment in which states were compelled to adopt criminal measures that mirrored federal law. The Tenth Amendment prohibits such a requirement.”74 Federal and state courts have previously held that a state’s decision to simply permit what the federal government prohibits does not create a “positive conflict” with federal law:75 “Nor have courts generally found that simply permitting conduct that the federal government prohibits stands as an ‘obstacle to the execution of Congress’s objectives.’ The Supreme Court has interpreted this relatively narrowly, holding that a state law is preempted where the obstacle is of such a degree that ‘the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished.’”76 <u><strong>The <mark>regulation and licensing of marijuana could be characterized consistent with the purposes of the CSA to control </mark>drug <mark>abuse</u></strong></mark> and to control the legitimate and illegitimate distribution of drugs; <u><strong>and thus are not subject to conflict preemption</u></strong>.77 The CRS points out that: “it can be argued that the state regulatory and licensing laws have no impact on the enforcement of federal law; are necessary to implement the state’s decision to remove penalties for certain marijuana-related activities; do not immunize or shield the holder from federal prosecution; and, therefore, are not preempted. Moreover, it could be argued that a state license acts only as a means by which the state can impose controls on the production and distribution of marijuana under state law and to identify which individuals have been preapproved to engage in marijuana-related activities.”78 There has only been one case where a federal court has made any statement about preemption in relation to the Colorado medical marijuana and legalization initiative. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado dealing with a debtor, who leased space for the purposes of growing medicinal marijuana in compliance with state law; the court wrote that “conflict preemption is not an issue here. Colorado constitutional amendments for both medical marijuana, and the more recent amendment legalizing marijuana possession and usage generally, both make it clear that their provisions apply to state law only. Absent from either enactment is any effort to impede the enforcement of federal law.”79 By limiting marijuana production and distribution, it could be argued that the envisioned Colorado and Washington regulatory and licensing provisions “further, rather than obstruct, the purposes of the CSA.” Under this reasoning, the Washington and Colorado regulatory and licensing aspects could be seen as supporting the federal government’s objectives of “control[ing] the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances,” as opposed to creating an obstacle to that goal.80 With regard to taxation in Colorado, the tax (which may not exceed 15% prior to January 1, 2017) is to be levied on sales of marijuana by cultivation facilities, product manufacturing facilities, or retail stores.81 In Washington, a 25% tax is to be imposed at each transaction within the distribution chain, including sales from: producer to processor; processor to retailer; and from retailer to consumer.82 Although little precedent exists relating to state-imposed taxes on medical marijuana, there is evidence to suggest that these taxes would likely be considered permissible.83 The Supreme Court has held that a state may “legitimately tax criminal activities.”84 As the CRS explains, taxes are imposed to either raise revenue, deter conduct, or both. The excise taxes envisioned by Colorado and Washington appear to be motivated by a desire to raise revenue to both pay for the regulatory and licensing controls on marijuana and to contribute to other budgetary needs, most notably health services and education. In addition, the Washington law states that the Liquor Control Board is authorized to make recommendations to adjust the tax levels “that would further the goal of discouraging use while undercutting illegal market prices.”85 The Colorado law does not explicitly reference any goal of deterring marijuana use, but it would appear that the envisioned tax may also have that effect. In addition, taxes are already collected from medical marijuana dispensaries without any conflict with federal law. Thus, the state tax may more accurately be characterized as “interposing an economic impediment to the activity” as opposed to authorizing the activity.86 Taxes, like regulations, are an alternative way to control the market and limit abuse. Thus, under the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemption, the federal government can view the regulatory, licensing and tax laws of Colorado and Washington as consistent with the purpose of the CSA; the same is true for the 18 states that allow the medical use of marijuana. Under the law <u><strong>the <mark>D</mark>epartment <mark>o</mark>f <mark>J</mark>ustice <mark>is not required to zealously enforce</mark> every violation of the CSA</u></strong>. Indeed, as we have noted earlier it would be impossible for them to do so and they already cede enforcement of possession, cultivation and small sales to states. Under the doctrine of “prosecutorial discretion,” <u><strong>federal law enforcement <mark>officials have “broad discretion”</mark> as to when, whom, and whether to prosecute for violations of the CSA</u></strong>.87 Courts have recognized that the “decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review,” as it involves the consideration of factors, such as the strength of evidence, deterrence value, and existing enforcement priorities “not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”88 <u><strong><mark>Through</mark> the exercise of <mark>prosecutorial discretion</u></strong></mark>, the <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration through Attorney General Holder <u><strong><mark>is free to develop a policy that cooperates with the states to achieve their</mark> common <mark>objectives and continue to allow federal law to operate</u></strong>.</mark> What are the choices the federal government could make? At one extreme they could decide to aggressively enforce the federal marijuana laws in Washington and Colorado. As a practical matter, the federal government simply does not have the resources to enforce federal drug laws without the assistance of state and local police. Approximately 99% of drug offenses are prosecuted under state law by state authorities. Therefore, if the Obama administration decided to increase the frequency of federal prosecutions in order to enforce federal law, vast new resources would be needed by the FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Attorneys. During this time of budget deficits, austerity and sequester including cuts to essential programs like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other programs, it is simply unrealistic to increase federal enforcement spending enough to meet this goal. On the other end of the spectrum, <u><strong>the DOJ could simply defer to the state policy and stop prosecutions for violations of the CSA in Washington and Colorado, so long as the individuals are in compliance with state law.</u></strong> These and all options in between are available to President Obama and Attorney General Holder. How can we make cooperation work? Stuart Taylor89 explains: “<u><strong><mark>The CSA not only directs that the A</mark>ttorney <mark>G</mark>eneral <mark>‘shall cooperate’</mark> with the state and local governments on drugs <mark>but also gives</mark> him <mark>broad discretion</mark> to do so, <mark>through means including legally binding contractual agreements</u></strong></mark>.” He also notes “U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has already been personally urged by John Hickenlooper, Colorado’s veteran Democratic governor, and Jay Inslee, Washington’s new Democratic governor, to work cooperatively with them.” 90 All parties want to protect the health and safety of the public as well as control the market, by working together they can do so; <u><strong><mark>failure to work together is likely to create a chaotic situation</u></strong></mark> more likely to undermine health and safety as well as create a large illegal marijuana market. The federal interest of preventing marijuana from medical or legal states from crossing borders to non-legal, non-medical states is a legitimate federal concern under existing laws. States can certainly agree to focus resources on preventing diversion to other states, and <u><strong>the federal government can limit its enforcement in legal</u></strong> and medical <u><strong>states to preventing diversion</u></strong>. <u><strong>A focused, co-operative effort has better chance of success than state and federal enforcement working against each other. </u></strong>To make implementation of state laws possible <u><strong><mark>the federal government should state in an ‘873 Contract’ that it will not enforce</mark> federal laws <mark>so long as the activity is consistent with state laws</u></strong></mark> and diversion to other states is prevented. <u><strong>This should be part of a contractual agreement between Colorado, Washington and the federal government; similar agreements should be reached with</u></strong> the 18 <u><strong>states and District of Columbia</u></strong> that have passed medical marijuana laws.</p>
| null |
2NC
|
Solvency
| 56,714 | 32 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,628 |
“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts
|
a clear statement rule against commandeering forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced they promote the political safeguards and deter political process failure. difficulties in enacting legislation and drafting mean that Congress will not amend the law to make the clear statement. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer , there is no way for the Court to "defer" the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice Commandeering absence from the CSA means that a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute promote a major failure of federalism . Imposing a clear statement rule it checks the power of the court
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Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance. By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. Thus, they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political [*634] process failure. Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules. The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. Here, the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials, a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.
| 6,405 |
<h4>“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, <u><strong>political safeguards proponents should insist on <mark>a clear statement rule against commandeering</u></strong></mark>. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 <u><strong>By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance</u></strong>. <u><strong>By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement <mark>forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced</mark>.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>they promote </mark>the working of <mark>the political safeguards and deter political</u></strong></mark> [*634] <u><strong><mark>process failure</u></strong>.</mark> Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, <u><strong>they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules</u></strong>. <u><strong>The <mark>difficulties in enacting legislation and </mark>the increased <mark>drafting </mark>costs in following the clear statement rule may <mark>mean that Congress will not </mark>ultimately <mark>amend the law to make the clear statement</u></strong>.</mark> n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. <u><strong><mark>Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer </mark>state officials<mark>, there is no way for the Court to "defer"</mark> to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice.</u></strong> Here, <u><strong><mark>the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice</mark> of legislative means</u></strong>. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. <u><strong><mark>Commandeering</mark> hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its <mark>absence from the CSA means that </mark>the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process</u></strong>. <u><strong>Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute </mark>would actively <mark>promote a major failure of </mark>the political safeguards of <mark>federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. <u><strong>Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution</u></strong>. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. <u><strong>Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies<mark>. Imposing a clear statement rule</mark> against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as <mark>it checks the power of the court</mark>s</u></strong>. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.</p>
| null |
2NC
|
Solvency
| 430,571 | 9 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,629 |
Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger strong condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions would be unavoidable Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in agreements countries want to keep parts of the international drug-control regime not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems the Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences
|
Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger strong condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussion For countries receiving aid sanctions would be unavoidable Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in agreements, Eu countries want to keep the drug-control regime intact not least its control system for drugs for medicinal purposes countries are already suffering inadequate tial medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problem . Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose remedial measures” banning trade in medicines if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences
|
Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations than seen in the case of Bolivia, and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions.37 For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union would probably be unavoidable. Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in several other agreements, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most countries now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change want to keep significant parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems. Moreover, the 1961 and 1971 Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.
| 2,352 |
<h4>Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>strong</u></strong></mark>er <u><strong><mark>condemnations</u></strong></mark> than seen in the case of Bolivia, <u><strong><mark>and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussion</mark>s</u></strong>.37 <u><strong><mark>For countries receiving</mark> development <mark>aid</mark> or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, <mark>sanctions</u></strong></mark> from the U.S. and the European Union <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>be</u></strong> <u><strong>unavoidable</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in</u></strong></mark> several other <u><strong><mark>agreements</u></strong>,</mark> not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the<mark> Eu</mark>ropean Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most <u><strong><mark>countries</u></strong></mark> now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change <u><strong><mark>want to keep</u></strong></mark> significant <u><strong>parts of <mark>the</mark> international <mark>drug-control regime </u>intact</strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>not least its control system for</mark> production, trade and availability of <mark>drugs for medicinal purposes</u></strong></mark>. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. <u><strong>Many <mark>countries</mark>, however, <mark>are already suffering</mark> <mark>inadequate</mark> availability of essen<mark>tial medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problem</mark>s</u></strong><mark>.</mark> Moreover, <u><strong>the</u></strong> 1961 and 1971 <u><strong><mark>Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose</mark> “<mark>remedial measures”</mark> in terms of restricting or <mark>banning trade in medicines </mark>controlled under those treaties to countries <mark>if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered</mark> </u></strong>by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as <u><strong><mark>such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences</u></strong></mark> and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.</p>
| null |
1NR
|
Disease !
| 430,464 | 8 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,630 |
Infectious disease risks extinction
Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.
|
Franca et al. 13 , infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic plague, and the present pandemic of (HIV), in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Infectious disease risks extinction </h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13</strong> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress<u><strong>, <mark>infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival</u></strong>.</mark> Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. <u><strong>Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. <mark>An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such</mark> as the bubonic</u></strong>–pneumonic <u><strong>plague,</u></strong> Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), <u><strong>and the present pandemic of</u></strong> human immunodeficiency virus <u><strong>(<mark>HIV)</mark>,</u></strong> in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, <u><strong><mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</mark> like dengue fever, <mark>the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded</mark> </u></strong>[5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.</p>
| null |
1NR
|
Disease !
| 430,782 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,631 |
There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay
|
Youngers 2014
|
Youngers 2014 (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)
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SINCE NIXON DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs the U.S. used its muscle to dictate policies throughout the region the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this The surge in left-leaning governments The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies Washington is suffering from a credibility problem Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws The irony is not lost on Latin American officials the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path
|
the U.S used its muscle to dictate policies throughout the region the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force. Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds Washington is suffering from a credibility problem Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countrie ), underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
|
SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON FIRST DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs over 40 years ago, the U.S. government has used its political and economic muscle to dictate policies throughout the region. Now the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force. Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this and other policies. The surge in left-leaning governments in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend. Interestingly, the reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds, with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team, Luis Videgaray, said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status." Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. Perhaps the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. Despite arduous negotiations-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to overcome the 'war on drugs' approach." The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada. Interestingly, Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them. This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
| 8,683 |
<h4>There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay</h4><p><strong>Youngers 2014</strong> (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)</p><p><u><strong>SINCE</u></strong> PRESIDENT <u><strong>NIXON</u></strong> FIRST <u><strong>DECLARED</u></strong> <u><strong>THE WAR on Drugs</u></strong> over 40 years ago, <u><strong><mark>the U.S</mark>.</u></strong> government has <u><strong><mark>used its</u></strong></mark> political and economic <u><strong><mark>muscle to dictate policies throughout the region</u></strong></mark>. Now <u><strong><mark>the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this</u></strong></mark> and other policies. <u><strong>The surge in left-leaning governments</u></strong> in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. <u><strong>The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend</u></strong>. Interestingly, the <u><strong><mark>reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador</u></strong> <u><strong>to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies</u></strong>, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. <u><strong><mark>Washington is suffering from a credibility problem</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws</u></strong></mark>. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets. <u><strong>The irony is not lost on Latin American officials</u></strong>; for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), <u><strong>the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team</u></strong>, Luis Videgaray, <u><strong>said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status</u></strong>." <u><strong>Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. </u></strong>Perhaps <u><strong>the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States</u></strong>, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." <u><strong><mark>THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point</u></strong>. <u><strong>For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy</mark> and the exploration of alternatives</u></strong>. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). <u><strong><mark>In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington</u></strong>, <u><strong>the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality</u></strong></mark>. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. <u><strong>Despite arduous negotiations</u></strong>-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-<u><strong>the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. </u></strong>Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that <u><strong><mark>the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered</u></strong></mark>, leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: <u><strong><mark>for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda</u></strong></mark>. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, <u><strong>the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS</u></strong>. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, <u><strong>what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to</u></strong> overcome <u><strong>the 'war on drugs'</u></strong> approach." <u><strong>The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada</u></strong>. Interestingly, <u><strong>Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution</u></strong> (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). <u><strong>And <mark>the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countrie</mark>s</u></strong> (GRULAC<mark>), <u><strong>underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path</u></strong>.</p></mark>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Non-U
| 430,470 | 17 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,632 |
That push will be accepted
|
Oakford 2014
|
Oakford 2014 (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)
|
Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Uruguay's Ambassador told We have an interpretation to the side of liberty and rights
|
Russia's meddling in Ukraine forced them to set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions, Uruguay's that
|
But Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Milton Romani Gerner, Uruguay's Ambassador to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, told VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. We have an interpretation to the other side, to the side of liberty and rights."
| 892 |
<h4>That push will be accepted</h4><p><strong>Oakford 2014</strong> (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)</p><p>But <u><strong><mark>Russia's meddling in Ukraine</mark> has <mark>forced them to</mark> temporarily <mark>set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding,</mark> <mark>and could open</mark> <mark>a window </mark>as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. </u></strong>There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But <u><strong>as <mark>more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. </u></strong>"<u><strong>We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions,</mark>"</u></strong> Milton Romani Gerner, <u><strong><mark>Uruguay's</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Ambassador</u></strong> to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, <u><strong>told</u></strong> VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna <mark>that</mark> defend its use on minors involved with drugs. <u><strong>We have an interpretation</u></strong> to the other side, <u><strong>to the side of liberty and rights</u></strong>."</p>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Non-U
| 430,783 | 8 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,633 |
The flexibility model is taking hold now
|
Youngers 2014
|
Youngers 2014 (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)
|
MORE BLOOD HAS BEEN SHED AS A RESULT OF the "war on drugs" in Colombia and Mexico than anywhere else in Latin America, giving the two countries pretty solid credentials to critique the prevailing international drug control paradigm both of them did just that at the highlevel segment of the 2014 meeting of the CND This puts Latin America at the vanguard of international efforts to promote drug policy reform The calls for frank discussion have had major repercussions the United Nations, at the request of the governments of Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala will host a UNGASS on drugs in 2016 This will be the first opportunity for an international governmental forum of the world's leaders to discuss drug policies. two Latin American countries have directly challenged the prevailing international conventions Reform-oriented countries in other parts of the world are looking to Latin America to take the lead in pushing for meaningful reform at the 2016 UNGASS. reform-oriented countries are getting a significant boost from civil society A drug policy reform movement has taken root across the region including NGOs treatment providers student groups and drug user groups massive marches took place in numerous Latin American countries in support of creating legal, regulated cannabis markets. Regional dynamics around drug policy issues have undergone a profound shift.
|
This puts Latin America at the vanguard of international efforts to promote drug policy reform. the U N will host a UNGASS) on drugs in 2016. This will be the first opportunity for an international governmental forum of the world's leaders to discuss drug policies Reform-oriented countries in other parts of the world are looking to Latin America to take the lead in pushing for reform reform-oriented countries are getting a significant boost from civil society A drug policy reform movement has taken root across the region, including NGOs treatment providers, student groups and drug user groups
|
MORE BLOOD HAS BEEN SHED AS A RESULT OF the "war on drugs" in Colombia and Mexico than anywhere else in Latin America, giving the two countries pretty solid credentials to critique the prevailing international drug control paradigm. And both of them did just that at the highlevel segment of the 2014 annual meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which brings hundreds of policy officials from around the world to Vienna every March. "Colombia has adopted all of the recommendations received from the international community...even at the risk of exacting a painful quota of blood in the fight against this world scourge," declared the country's Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Alfonso Gómez Méndez. "[W]e have learned that... winning battles does not achieve victory. Despite using all of these measures, we have not, as is the case in the rest of the world, achieved the desired results." The Mexican representative asserted that, "strategies to reduce demand and supply...should not cause more harmful effects than the damage.. .generated by the demand and supply of drugs." Such statements would have been unthinkable even two or three years ago. But now, such concerns are routinely expressed by sitting presidents and officials from key Latin American countries. This puts Latin America at the vanguard of international efforts to promote drug policy reform. The calls for frank discussion have had major repercussions within the Organization of American States (OAS), which issued a ground-breaking report on drug policy in May 2013, and the United Nations, which at the request of the governments of Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala will host a UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 2016. This will be the first opportunity since 1998 for an international governmental forum of the world's leaders to discuss drug policies. Moreover, two Latin American countries have directly challenged the prevailing international conventions. Bolivia is the first country to denounce and return to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs with a reservation on the coca leaf, over the objections of powerful actors including the United States and Russia. The 1961 Convention-the cornerstone of the international drug control regime-erroneously lists the coca plant as a dangerous narcotic and called for the elimination of all coca use within 25 years, a period that has long come and gone. Bolivia's new constitution recognizes the right to use coca for traditional and legal purposes. In order to reconcile its new constitution with its international obligations, in June 2011 the Bolivian government denounced the 1961 Convention (as amended by the 1972 Protocol) and then re-acceded with a reservation allowing for the traditional use of coca within its territory. The other country that has taken center stage in the drug policy debate is Uruguay, which is forging a new path as the first country in the world to adopt a legal, regulated cannabis market. Reform-oriented countries in other parts of the world are looking to Latin America to take the lead in pushing for debate and, above all, the beginning of meaningful reform at the 2016 UNGASS. Whether or not the region will be able to play that role, however, is far from clear given the formidable opposition by some countries and indifference on the part of others. Fortunately, reform-oriented countries are getting a significant boost from civil society. A drug policy reform movement has taken root across the region, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), treatment providers, student groups (primarily organized around cannabis regulation) and drug user groups. Many of the NGOs work together within the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), a coalition of more than 100 organizations and networks worldwide advocating for more effective and humane drug policies. This May, massive marches took place in numerous Latin American countries in support of creating legal, regulated cannabis markets. Regional dynamics around drug policy issues have undergone a profound shift.
| 4,106 |
<h4>The flexibility model is taking hold now</h4><p><strong>Youngers 2014</strong> (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest<u>)</p><p><strong>MORE BLOOD HAS BEEN SHED AS A RESULT OF the "war on drugs" in Colombia and Mexico than anywhere else in Latin America, giving the two countries pretty solid credentials to critique the prevailing international drug control paradigm</u></strong>. And <u><strong>both of them did just that at the highlevel segment of the 2014</u></strong> annual <u><strong>meeting</u></strong> <u><strong>of the</u></strong> United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (<u><strong>CND</u></strong>), which brings hundreds of policy officials from around the world to Vienna every March. "Colombia has adopted all of the recommendations received from the international community...even at the risk of exacting a painful quota of blood in the fight against this world scourge," declared the country's Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Alfonso Gómez Méndez. "[W]e have learned that... winning battles does not achieve victory. Despite using all of these measures, we have not, as is the case in the rest of the world, achieved the desired results." The Mexican representative asserted that, "strategies to reduce demand and supply...should not cause more harmful effects than the damage.. .generated by the demand and supply of drugs." Such statements would have been unthinkable even two or three years ago. But now, such concerns are routinely expressed by sitting presidents and officials from key Latin American countries. <u><strong><mark>This puts Latin America at the vanguard of international efforts to promote drug policy reform</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>The calls for frank discussion have had major repercussions</u></strong> within the Organization of American States (OAS), which issued a ground-breaking report on drug policy in May 2013, and <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>N</mark>ations,</u></strong> which <u><strong>at the request of the governments of Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala <mark>will host a</u></strong></mark> UN General Assembly Special Session (<u><strong><mark>UNGASS</u></strong>) <u><strong>on drugs in 2016</u></strong>. <u><strong>This will be the first opportunity</u></strong></mark> since 1998 <u><strong><mark>for an international governmental forum of the world's leaders to discuss drug policies</mark>. </u></strong>Moreover, <u><strong>two Latin American countries have directly challenged the prevailing international conventions</u></strong>. Bolivia is the first country to denounce and return to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs with a reservation on the coca leaf, over the objections of powerful actors including the United States and Russia. The 1961 Convention-the cornerstone of the international drug control regime-erroneously lists the coca plant as a dangerous narcotic and called for the elimination of all coca use within 25 years, a period that has long come and gone. Bolivia's new constitution recognizes the right to use coca for traditional and legal purposes. In order to reconcile its new constitution with its international obligations, in June 2011 the Bolivian government denounced the 1961 Convention (as amended by the 1972 Protocol) and then re-acceded with a reservation allowing for the traditional use of coca within its territory. The other country that has taken center stage in the drug policy debate is Uruguay, which is forging a new path as the first country in the world to adopt a legal, regulated cannabis market. <u><strong><mark>Reform-oriented countries in other parts of the world are looking to Latin America to take the lead</u></strong> <u><strong>in pushing for</u></strong></mark> debate and, above all, the beginning of <u><strong>meaningful <mark>reform</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>at the 2016 UNGASS.</u></strong> Whether or not the region will be able to play that role, however, is far from clear given the formidable opposition by some countries and indifference on the part of others. Fortunately, <u><strong><mark>reform-oriented countries are getting a significant boost from civil society</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>A drug policy reform movement has taken root across the region</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong></mark> non-governmental organizations (<u><strong><mark>NGOs</u></strong></mark>), <u><strong><mark>treatment providers</u></strong>, <u><strong>student groups</u></strong></mark> (primarily organized around cannabis regulation) <u><strong><mark>and drug user groups</u></strong></mark>. Many of the NGOs work together within the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), a coalition of more than 100 organizations and networks worldwide advocating for more effective and humane drug policies. This May, <u><strong>massive marches took place in numerous Latin American countries in support of creating legal, regulated cannabis markets. Regional dynamics around drug policy issues have undergone a profound shift.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Non-U
| 430,470 | 17 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,634 |
US federal legalization is modeled- causes mass treaty abrogation
|
Jenner 2011 )
|
Jenner 2011 (Matthew, Articles Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D., 2011, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. cum laude, 2008, University of Notre Dame, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies18.2 (Summer 2011): 901-927, proquest)
|
A candidate to take the first step toward universal legalization is the United States the United States is one of the leading consumers of illicit drugs worldwide. If the United States legalized drugs, it would have a profound effect on the market other nations tend to follow its drug policies Because the United States is the leader of the war on drugs, its drug policies have dominated the United Nations and other global organizations With the United States at the helm of legalization, other countries would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.
|
A candidate to take the first step toward universal legalization is the U S the U S is one of the leading consumers of illicit drugs . If the United States legalized drugs, it would have a profound effect on the market. other nations tend to follow its drug policies Because the U S is the leader of the war on drugs, its drug policies have dominated global organizations With the U S at the helm other countries would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.
|
A better candidate to take the first step toward universal legalization is the United States. In the words of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, speaking on behalf of the United States, "Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade."135 About 3% of U.S. citizens aged fifteen to sixty-four use cocaine (more than six times the global average) and 12.3% use marijuana (more than three times the global average).136 Those numbers equate to about 30% of all cocaine users globally and 14% of all marijuana users. In addition, the United States-which comprises only 5% of the world's population-consumed 60% of the world's drugs in 1996.137 That number could be different now, but it puts this analysis in perspective. Either way, the United States is one of the leading consumers of illicit drugs worldwide. If the United States legalized drugs, it would have a profound effect on the market. Mexican President Felipe Calderon said it best: "If there isn't a generalized, universal legalization policy across the world, and mainly in the main drug consumer, the United States, there won't even be any economic benefits, because the price is determined by the American market."138 The United States is also a good candidate because other nations tend to follow its drug policies. Because the United States is the leader of the war on drugs, its drug policies have dominated the United Nations and other global organizations.139 With the United States at the helm of legalization, other countries would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.
| 1,580 |
<h4>US federal legalization is modeled- causes mass treaty abrogation</h4><p><strong>Jenner 2011</strong> (Matthew, Articles Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D., 2011, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. cum laude, 2008, University of Notre Dame, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies18.2 (Summer 2011): 901-927, proquest<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>A</u></strong></mark> better <u><strong><mark>candidate to take the first step toward universal legalization is the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. In the words of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, speaking on behalf of the United States, "Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade."135 About 3% of U.S. citizens aged fifteen to sixty-four use cocaine (more than six times the global average) and 12.3% use marijuana (more than three times the global average).136 Those numbers equate to about 30% of all cocaine users globally and 14% of all marijuana users. In addition, the United States-which comprises only 5% of the world's population-consumed 60% of the world's drugs in 1996.137 That number could be different now, but it puts this analysis in perspective. Either way, <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is one of the leading consumers of illicit drugs</mark> worldwide<mark>. If the United States legalized drugs, it would have a profound effect on the market</u></strong>.</mark> Mexican President Felipe Calderon said it best: "If there isn't a generalized, universal legalization policy across the world, and mainly in the main drug consumer, the United States, there won't even be any economic benefits, because the price is determined by the American market."138 The United States is also a good candidate because <u><strong><mark>other nations tend to follow its drug policies</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Because the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is the leader of the war on drugs, its drug policies have dominated </mark>the United Nations and other <mark>global organizations</u></strong></mark>.139 <u><strong><mark>With the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>at the helm</mark> of legalization, <mark>other countries would quickly follow, and universal legalization could become a reality.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Uruguay
| 57,730 | 8 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,635 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP maintains compliance</h4><p><strong>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u><strong>Another complication for legalization is international law</u></strong>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> United Nations <u><strong><mark>Single Convention</u></strong></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><strong><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></strong></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><strong><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></strong></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><strong><mark>reforms</mark> working <mark>within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require</mark> either a country’s <mark>withdrawal</mark> </u></strong>from the treaty<u><strong> or revision </u></strong>thereof. Perhaps partly <u><strong>due to the Single Convention </u></strong>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><strong><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></strong></mark> than the United States <u><strong><mark>lack full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><strong><mark>in the Netherlands</u></strong></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u><strong>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <mark>remains illegal</u></strong></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Other Drugs
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,636 |
Sequencing matters – unilateral legalization wrecks the entire UN treaty system
|
Rolles 2009 )
|
Rolles 2009 (senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg)
|
Parties could simply ignore the treaties An individual country disregarding the treaties could institute the legalisation of cannabis Such a move however raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control if taken unilaterally unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.
|
Parties could simply ignore treaties A country disregarding the treaties could institute legalisation of cannabis Such a move however raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control if taken unilaterally unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten stability of the entire treaty system
|
Parties could simply ignore all or part of the treaties. If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. An individual country disregarding the treaties, or applying them only partially, could in this way institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including arguably the most likely example: the actual legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states). Such a move however, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control—particularly if taken unilaterally. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten, or be perceived to threaten, the stability of the entire treaty system. The cost of such a threat and the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.
| 1,216 |
<h4>Sequencing matters – <u>unilateral</u> legalization wrecks the <u>entire</u> UN treaty system</h4><p><strong>Rolles 2009 </strong>(senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>Parties could simply ignore</u></strong></mark> all or part of <u><strong>the <mark>treaties</u></strong></mark>. If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. <u><strong><mark>A</mark>n individual <mark>country disregarding the treaties</u></strong></mark>, or applying them only partially, <u><strong><mark>could</u></strong></mark> in this way <u><strong><mark>institute</u></strong></mark> any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including arguably the most likely example: <u><strong>the</u></strong> actual <u><strong><mark>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong></mark> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states). <u><strong><mark>Such a move however</u></strong></mark>, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> that go <mark>beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong></mark>—particularly <u><strong><mark>if taken unilaterally</u></strong></mark>. The possibility of nations <u><strong><mark>unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten</u></strong></mark>, or be perceived to threaten, <u><strong>the <mark>stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. The cost of such a threat and <u><strong>the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Other Drugs
| 430,468 | 48 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,637 |
Monoculture doesn’t cause crop extinctions – no impact.
|
Wood 3
|
Wood 3 [1/08/2003, AgBioView, http://www.agbioworld.org]
|
analogy that crop varieties are like wild species, once lost they are gone forever is entirely spurious. Any competent farmer can generate new varieties at will, by selecting from apparent 'off-types' in the crop , extinction is not forever: there is a continual varietal evolution and turnover that collecting and seed stores fail to capture.
|
analogy crop varieties are like wild species, once lost they are gone forever is entirely spurious. Any competent farmer can generate new varieties at will, by selecting from -types' in the crop extinction is not forever: there is a continual varietal evolution and turnover that collecting and seed stores fail to capture.
|
The analogy put forward by NGOs that crop varieties are like wild species, once lost they are gone forever is entirely spurious. Any competent farmer can generate new varieties at will, by selecting from apparent 'off-types' in the crop (the source of Golding and Fuggles hops, Cox Pippin apple, Fife wheat, Chevalier barley, and a host of unnamed selections by skilled farmers in developing countries). For crop varieties, extinction is not forever: there is a continual varietal evolution and turnover that collecting and seed stores fail to capture.
| 552 |
<h4>Monoculture doesn’t cause crop extinctions – no impact.</h4><p><strong>Wood 3</strong> [1/08/2003, AgBioView<u>, http://www.agbioworld.org]</p><p></u>The <u><mark>analogy</u></mark> put forward by NGOs <u>that <mark>crop varieties are like wild species, once lost they are gone forever is entirely spurious. Any competent farmer can generate new varieties at will, by selecting from</u> <u></mark>apparent 'off<mark>-types' in the crop</u></mark> (the source of Golding and Fuggles hops, Cox Pippin apple, Fife wheat, Chevalier barley, and a host of unnamed selections by skilled farmers in developing countries). For crop varieties<u>, <mark>extinction is not forever: there is a continual varietal evolution and turnover that collecting and seed stores fail to capture.</p></u></mark>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Monoculture
| 430,785 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,638 |
Genetic diversity is resilient.
|
Harris 1
|
Harris 1 [Jonathan, Tufts University Global Development and Environment Institute, A Survey of Sustainable Development, p 132-3]
|
Given the possible instability of predator-prey interaction as well as external physical variability, the key to system persistence lies in spatial heterogeneity and biotic diversity. These characteristics make an ecological system resilient Part of the answer to the question “why has the world not collapsed?” lies in the resilience of ecosystems. The other part lies in human creativity and adaptive behavior. Human adaptability is the key to economists’ optimism about our ability to substitute for scarce materials and develop successful responses to environmental problems
|
Part of the answer to the question “why has the world not collapsed?” lies in the resilience of ecosystems. The other part lies in human creativity and adaptive behavior. Human adaptability is the key to economists’ optimism about our ability to substitute for scarce materials and develop successful responses to environmental problems
|
Why Has the World not Collapsed Long Ago? Given the possible instability of predator-prey interaction as well as external physical variability, the key to system persistence lies in spatial heterogeneity and biotic diversity. These characteristics make an ecological system resilient – able to withstand internal imbalances or external disturbances. Ecological models show a very wide range of complex behaviors, with multiple stable states, boom-and-bust cycles, and even chaotic behavior. Plant- and animal-specie fluctuations on a local scale interact with geophysical variables on a much larger scale to generate robust and resilient ecosystems. Human population growth and economic activity affects the local-scale relationships in ways that can profoundly change overall ecosystems. The resources management concepts of the maximum sustained yields (e.g., of fish populations) and fixed carrying capacities (e.g., of terrestrial herbivores) have been discredited by these more sophisticated views of broad ecosystem function. The very success of achieving management yield goals tends to reduce variability and damage ecosystem resilience. Part of the answer to the question “why has the world not collapsed?” lies in the resilience of ecosystems. The other part lies in human creativity and adaptive behavior. Human adaptability is the key to economists’ optimism about our ability to substitute for scarce materials and develop successful responses to environmental problems. However, the resilience of natural systems is not unlimited, and human adaptability is limited by specific environmental contexts.
| 1,614 |
<h4>Genetic diversity is resilient.</h4><p><strong>Harris 1</strong> [Jonathan, Tufts University Global Development and Environment Institute, A Survey of Sustainable Development, p 132-3]</p><p>Why Has the World not Collapsed Long Ago? <u>Given the possible instability of predator-prey interaction as well as external physical variability, the key to system persistence lies in spatial heterogeneity and biotic diversity. These characteristics make an ecological system resilient</u> – able to withstand internal imbalances or external disturbances. Ecological models show a very wide range of complex behaviors, with multiple stable states, boom-and-bust cycles, and even chaotic behavior. Plant- and animal-specie fluctuations on a local scale interact with geophysical variables on a much larger scale to generate robust and resilient ecosystems. Human population growth and economic activity affects the local-scale relationships in ways that can profoundly change overall ecosystems. The resources management concepts of the maximum sustained yields (e.g., of fish populations) and fixed carrying capacities (e.g., of terrestrial herbivores) have been discredited by these more sophisticated views of broad ecosystem function. The very success of achieving management yield goals tends to reduce variability and damage ecosystem resilience. <u><mark>Part of the answer to the question “why has the world not collapsed?” lies in the resilience of ecosystems. The other part lies in human creativity and adaptive behavior. Human adaptability is the key to economists’ optimism about our ability to substitute for scarce materials and develop successful responses to environmental problems</u></mark>. However, the resilience of natural systems is not unlimited, and human adaptability is limited by specific environmental contexts.</p>
| null |
1NR
|
AT: Monoculture
| 423,479 | 3 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,639 |
Legalization requires more resources to tamp down black markets
|
Rauch 2014
|
Rauch 2014 (Jonathan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, It’s All in the Implementation, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/its_all_in_the_implementation049294.php?page=2)
|
Voters in Colorado and Washington were told that legalization would produce new gushers of revenue for education and public safety experts warned that the revenue claims were unrealistic. legalization was touted as a public safety measure redirecting policy resources toward more serious forms of crime experts say that suppressing the black market as it fights for market share may require more law enforcement resources not fewer
| null |
Here again, marijuana legalization faces some of the same challenges as Obamacare. Voters in Colorado and Washington were told that legalization would produce new gushers of revenue for education and public safety; many experts at the time warned that the revenue claims were unrealistic. Similarly, legalization was touted as a public safety measure, redirecting policy resources toward more serious forms of crime, but experts say that suppressing the black market as it fights for market share may initially require more law enforcement resources, not fewer.
| 561 |
<h4>Legalization requires more resources to tamp down black markets</h4><p><strong>Rauch 2014</strong> (Jonathan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, It’s All in the Implementation, Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/its_all_in_the_implementation049294.php?page=2)</p><p>Here again, marijuana legalization faces some of the same challenges as Obamacare. <u><strong>Voters in Colorado and Washington were told that legalization would produce new gushers of revenue</u></strong> <u><strong>for education and public safety</u></strong>; many <u><strong>experts</u></strong> at the time <u><strong>warned that the revenue claims were unrealistic.</u></strong> Similarly, <u><strong>legalization was touted as a public safety measure</u></strong>, <u><strong>redirecting policy resources toward more serious forms of crime</u></strong>, but <u><strong>experts say that suppressing the black market as it fights for market share may</u></strong> initially <u><strong>require more law enforcement resources</u></strong>, <u><strong>not fewer</u></strong>.</p>
| null |
1NR
|
Enfrocement
| 430,786 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,640 |
Plan forces cartels to switch to other drugs- causes more violence
|
Jackson et al 2011 )
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel would likely expand into the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine networks the Gulf Cartel, La Familia, and the Juarez cartel are already heavily committed to cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine These other DTOs might respond violently to any attempts by the Sinaloa cartel or Tijuana cartel to take any of their shares of the trafficking market there is also the possibility that the Sinaloa cartel would make a deal with its allies rather than fight them The implications of this are unclear If this occurs then the legalization of marijuana will have brought few security dividends.
|
The cartel would likely expand into the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine networks the Gulf Cartel, La Familia, and the Juarez cartel are already heavily committed These other DTOs might respond violently to any attempts by the Sinaloa cartel or Tijuana cartel to take any of their shares of the trafficking market The implications of this are unclear. If this occurs then the legalization of marijuana will have brought few security dividends.
|
The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel would likely expand into the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine networks. Several experts agree that if marijuana were no longer a profitable enterprise for the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel they would shift towards trafficking in other profitable drugs.126 What is less clear, however, is how this type of transition would affect violence. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Gulf Cartel, La Familia, and the Juarez cartel are already heavily committed to the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine industries to various extents. These other DTOs might respond violently to any attempts by the Sinaloa cartel or Tijuana cartel to take any of their shares of the trafficking market. Given that its revenue streams were disrupted, there is also the possibility that the Sinaloa cartel would make a deal with its allies, the Gulf Cartel and La Familia, rather than fight them. The implications of this are unclear. If this occurs then the legalization of marijuana will have brought few security dividends.
| 1,050 |
<h4>Plan forces cartels to switch to other drugs- causes more violence</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>The</mark> Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana <mark>cartel would likely expand into the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine networks</u></strong></mark>. Several experts agree that if marijuana were no longer a profitable enterprise for the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel they would shift towards trafficking in other profitable drugs.126 What is less clear, however, is how this type of transition would affect violence. As mentioned earlier in this paper, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>Gulf Cartel, La Familia, and the Juarez cartel are already heavily committed</mark> to </u></strong>the<u><strong> cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine</u></strong> industries to various extents. <u><strong><mark>These other DTOs might respond violently to any attempts by the Sinaloa cartel or Tijuana cartel to take any of their shares of the trafficking market</u></strong></mark>. Given that its revenue streams were disrupted, <u><strong>there is also the possibility that the Sinaloa cartel would make a deal with its allies</u></strong>, the Gulf Cartel and La Familia, <u><strong>rather than fight them</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The implications of this are unclear</u></strong>. <u><strong>If this occurs then the legalization of marijuana will have brought few security dividends.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
1NR
|
Shift
| 56,591 | 113 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,641 |
Widespread blackouts won't happen here
|
Leger 12
|
Leger 12 Donna Leinwand Leger, USA TODAY 7/31/2012 Energy experts say blackout like India's is unlikely in U.S.
|
– A massive, countrywide power failure like the one in India is "extremely unlikely" in the U S , energy experts say
The U.S. system is segmented into three parts with safeguards that prevent an outage in one from tripping a blackout in another , "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely
Early reports from government officials in India say excessive demand knocked the country's power generators offline. Experts say India's industry and economy are growing faster than its electrical systems. Last year, the economy grew 7.8% and pushed energy needs higher, but electricity generation did not keep pace, government records show.
"We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here, especially from the perspective of demand exceeding supply," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "We're much more sophisticated in our operations. Most of our issues have been from natural disasters."
The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always have power in reserve, Reed said.
"Fundamentally, it's a different world here," said Mansoo of the Electric Power Research Institute "It's an order of magnitude more reliable here
Grid operators across the country analyze power usage and generation, factoring outside factors such as weather, in real time and can forecast power supply and demand hour by hour,
|
A massive power failure Tuesday is "extremely unlikely" in the U S experts say.
The system is segmented with safeguards that prevent an outage in one from tripping a blackout in another making blackouts across the country unlikely
We are much, much less at ris
|
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-31/usa-india-power-outage/56622978/1
WASHINGTON – A massive, countrywide power failure like the one in India on Tuesday is "extremely unlikely" in the United States, energy experts say.
In India, three of the country's government-operated power grids failed Tuesday, leaving 620 million people without electricity for several hours. The outage, the second in two days in the country of 1.21 billion people, is the world's biggest blackout on record.
The U.S. electricity system is segmented into three parts with safeguards that prevent an outage in one system from tripping a blackout in another system, "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said.
Early reports from government officials in India say excessive demand knocked the country's power generators offline. Experts say India's industry and economy are growing faster than its electrical systems. Last year, the economy grew 7.8% and pushed energy needs higher, but electricity generation did not keep pace, government records show.
"We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here, especially from the perspective of demand exceeding supply," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "We're much more sophisticated in our operations. Most of our issues have been from natural disasters."
The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always have power in reserve, Reed said.
"Fundamentally, it's a different world here," said Arshad Mansoor, senior vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute in Washington and an expert on power grids. "It's an order of magnitude more reliable here than in a developing country."
Grid operators across the country analyze power usage and generation, factoring outside factors such as weather, in real time and can forecast power supply and demand hour by hour, Mansoor said.
| 1,992 |
<h4>Widespread blackouts won't happen here </h4><p><strong>Leger 12</strong> Donna Leinwand Leger, USA TODAY 7/31/2012 Energy experts say blackout like India's is unlikely in U.S.</p><p>http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-31/usa-india-power-outage/56622978/1</p><p>WASHINGTON <u><strong>– <mark>A massive</mark>, countrywide <mark>power failure</mark> like the one in India </u></strong>on <mark>Tuesday<u><strong> is "extremely unlikely" in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates<u><strong>, energy <mark>experts say</u></strong>.</p><p></mark>In India, three of the country's government-operated power grids failed Tuesday, leaving 620 million people without electricity for several hours. The outage, the second in two days in the country of 1.21 billion people, is the world's biggest blackout on record.</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> U.S. </u></strong>electricity<u><strong> <mark>system is segmented</mark> into three parts <mark>with safeguards that prevent an outage in one</mark> </u></strong>system<u><strong> <mark>from tripping a blackout in another</mark> </u></strong>system<u><strong>, "<mark>making blackouts across the country</mark> extremely <mark>unlikely</u></strong></mark>," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said.</p><p><u><strong>Early reports from government officials in India say excessive demand knocked the country's power generators offline. Experts say India's industry and economy are growing faster than its electrical systems. Last year, the economy grew 7.8% and pushed energy needs higher, but electricity generation did not keep pace, government records show.</p><p>"<mark>We are much, much less at ris</mark>k for something like that happening here, especially from the perspective of demand exceeding supply," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "We're much more sophisticated in our operations. Most of our issues have been from natural disasters."</p><p>The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always have power in reserve, Reed said.</p><p>"Fundamentally, it's a different world here," said</u></strong> Arshad <u><strong>Mansoo</u></strong>r, senior vice president <u><strong>of the Electric Power Research Institute</u></strong> in Washington and an expert on power grids. <u><strong>"It's an order of magnitude more reliable here</u></strong> than in a developing country."</p><p><u><strong>Grid operators across the country analyze power usage and generation, factoring outside factors such as weather, in real time and can forecast power supply and demand hour by hour,</u></strong> Mansoor said.</p>
| null |
1NR
|
Blackout
| 41,920 | 68 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,642 |
The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
|
many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number is higher The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations a severe organ shortage remains.
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ</mark>s</u>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number</mark> </u>of Americans <u>requiring organs <mark>is</mark> likely <mark>higher</u></mark>.3 <u>This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen</u>.4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u><mark>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors.</mark> The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used for transplantation</u>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations</u></mark>.9 <u>Despite the implementation of these strategies, <mark>a severe organ shortage remains</u>.</p></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,643 |
Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. the likelihood any of them will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on driver licenses requiring all hospitals to request organ donation the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative Finally legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by donors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
| 9,339 |
<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the transplant industry has examined and adopted <mark>a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance.</mark> All of these, <mark>however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system.</mark> As a result, <mark>the likelihood</mark> that <mark>any of them</mark>, even in combination, <mark>will resolve the organ shortage is remote</u></mark>. <u><mark>At least seven such actions have been implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u>INCREASED <mark>EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on</mark> states’ <mark>driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u><mark>the</mark> </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES</u> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u><mark>Finally</mark>, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u><mark>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct</mark> </u>(explicit) <u><mark>costs incurred by</u></mark> such <mark>d<u>onors</mark> </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u><mark>We must conclude that none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u><mark>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,246 | 21 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,644 |
The shortage means many die
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME
The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME</p><p>The consequences of <u>our failure to adapt our</u> cadaveric <u>organ procurement policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u>suggests that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system.</mark> In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, <mark>the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents</mark> thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of </mark>the expected size of <mark>future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of<mark> 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage</mark>.</u> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,645 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marihuana.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marihuana.</h4>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,787 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,646 |
Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage
|
Study by Becker and Elias 14
|
Study by Becker and Elias 14 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
|
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
|
The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. , sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors waiting times have been largely eliminated The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs.
|
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
| 10,692 |
<h4><strong>Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage</h4><p>Study by Becker and Elias 14 </strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs</mark>—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u>.</mark> In particular<mark>, <u>sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant</mark>. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u><mark>Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have been largely eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u>Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. <mark>The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective</mark> in eliminating the shortage of organs <mark>isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use</mark>.</u> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u><mark>Paying for organs</mark> </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><mark>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs.</mark> More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,254 | 24 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,647 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws. The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws. The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,788 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,648 |
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
|
Hughes 9
|
Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
|
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
|
. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world
|
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage<mark>. A thriving global</u> </mark>black<mark> <u>market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales</u></mark>. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u><mark>The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u><mark>U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,256 | 14 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,649 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u><strong>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u></strong>[*633] The <u><strong>marijuana legalization</u></strong> issue <u><strong>provides a salient example</u></strong>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u><strong>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u></strong>. As of 2008, <u><strong><mark>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u></strong></mark>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><strong><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></strong></mark>.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,650 |
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
|
Jaycox 12
|
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
|
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady and expressed regret the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He found that <mark>almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority </u>(17) <u>of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u><mark>a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, <mark>and</mark> a majority also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that<mark> the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them</mark>:</strong> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,255 | 14 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,651 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
|
Bowden 13
|
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality there is evidence of governmental involvement, which exacerbates the problem
|
[*452] Introduction
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
| 1,530 |
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction</p><p><u><mark>Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades</u></mark>. n1 <u><mark>Imagine living in a poor country</u></mark>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and</mark> <mark>thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection</u></mark>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live</u></mark>. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, <mark>there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality</mark> of organ trafficking.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, <mark>there is evidence of governmental involvement, which</mark> contributes to and <mark>exacerbates the problem</mark>. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p> </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,258 | 14 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,652 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system legislation would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses The measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the industry as a landmark a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The House</u></strong></mark> of Representatives <u><strong><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></strong></mark> Wednesday <u><strong><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The <mark>legislation</mark>, which passed by a 231-192 margin, <mark>would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks</mark> and credit unions <mark>for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses</mark>. </u></strong>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u><strong>the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></strong>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> House <mark>measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u><strong>and was hailed by the</mark> marijuana <mark>industry as a landmark</u></strong></mark>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u><strong>The legislation</u></strong>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u><strong>has yet to pass in the Senate</u></strong>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u><strong>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, <mark>a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies</mark> in those states <mark>have been calling for marijuana</mark> <mark>businesses</mark> <mark>to be brought into the banking system</u></strong></mark>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,653 |
trafficking for organs is widespread
|
Kendrick 12
|
Kendrick 12 The Kendrick Theme 2012 Organ Removal http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-million-reasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/
|
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises.
|
Organ removal is quite real and widespread. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises
|
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises. The World Health Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
| 826 |
<h4>trafficking for organs is widespread</h4><p><strong>Kendrick 12</strong> The Kendrick Theme 2012 Organ Removal http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-million-reasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/</p><p><u><mark>Organ removal</mark>, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, <mark>is quite real and widespread.</mark> Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. <mark>More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises</mark>.</u><strong> The World Health Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,315 | 22 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,654 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><strong><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u><strong>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u></strong>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><strong><mark>the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></strong></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u><strong>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u></strong>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u><strong>such <mark>a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></strong></mark> under Reno. <u><strong><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u></strong>. Put another way, <u><strong>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u></strong>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u><strong><mark>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable</mark> of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u></strong>. Rather <u><strong><mark>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u></strong></mark>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,655 |
Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence
|
Crouse ’07
|
Crouse ’07 (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418, [SG])
|
What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.
|
What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C trafficking must be abolished The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world Those who treat people as commercial commodities are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;
|
We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." We join the ambassador in declaring, "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.
| 2,396 |
<h4>Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence </h4><p><strong>Crouse ’07</strong> (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418<u>, [SG]) </p><p></u>We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "<u><mark>What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places.</mark> It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, <strong><mark>the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all</mark>."</u></strong> It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, <u>"It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property."</u> There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, <u>"<mark>There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C</mark>orruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking."</u> CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. <u>We agree with Ambassador Lagon that <mark>trafficking</mark> in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it <mark>must be abolished</mark>." <strong><mark>The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world</mark>."</u></strong> We join the ambassador in declaring, <u>"Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." <mark>Those who treat people as commercial</mark> <mark>commodities</mark> — pimps, madams and johns — <mark>are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods</mark> for their brothels, factories or fields.</u> We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. <u>Otherwise, <mark>such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;<strong></mark> only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 97,673 | 23 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,656 |
“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts
|
a clear statement rule against commandeering require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure. be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than categorical constitutional rules difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice Commandeering absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism . Imposing a clear statement rule it checks the power of the court
|
Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance. By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. Thus, they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political [*634] process failure. Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules. The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. Here, the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials, a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.
| 6,405 |
<h4>“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, <u><strong>political safeguards proponents should insist on <mark>a clear statement rule against commandeering</u></strong></mark>. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 <u><strong>By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they <mark>require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement <mark>forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced</mark>.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political</u></strong></mark> [*634] <u><strong><mark>process failure</u></strong>.</mark> Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, <u><strong>they may <mark>be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than</mark> splashier, but less frequently applied <mark>categorical constitutional</mark> <mark>rules</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The <mark>difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule</mark> may <mark>mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement</u></strong>.</mark> n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. <u><strong><mark>Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer"</mark> to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice.</u></strong> Here, <u><strong><mark>the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice</mark> of legislative means</u></strong>. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. <u><strong><mark>Commandeering</mark> hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its <mark>absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process</u></strong>. <u><strong>Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. <u><strong>Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution</u></strong>. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. <u><strong>Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies<mark>. Imposing a clear statement rule</mark> against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as <mark>it checks the power of the court</mark>s</u></strong>. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,571 | 9 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,657 |
Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation
|
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
|
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
|
Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. , the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. . Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified They harbor the “priming” that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
|
central to our approach is a blurring of wartime and peacetime violence Close attention to the “little” violences produced in structures of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons it is absolutely necessary to make existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. an even greater risk lies in in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices daily enacted by “ordinary” citizens These are “invisible” genocides because they are right before our eyes and war crimes are ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically in the extreme context of war it is essential that we exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity of ordinary people, to enforce genocidal like crimes There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence mass violence is socially incremental and often experienced as expected, routine They harbor the priming that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
|
(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).
| 13,177 |
<h4><strong>Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4</p><p></strong>(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first</p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely <mark>central</mark> <mark>to our approach</mark> <mark>is a blurring of</mark> categories and distinctions between <mark>wartime and peacetime violence</mark>. <mark>Close attention to the “little” violences produced in</mark> the <mark>structures</mark>, habituses, and mentalites <mark>of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities</mark>.</u> More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. <u>The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which <strong><mark>humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons</strong></mark> and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u><mark>it is absolutely necessary to make</mark> just such <mark>existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times.</u></mark> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u>there is), <mark>an even greater</mark> <mark>risk</mark> <mark>lies in</mark> failing to sensitize ourselves, <mark>in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices</mark> and sentiments <mark>daily enacted</mark> as normative behavior <mark>by “ordinary”</mark> good-enough <mark>citizens</mark>. Peacetime crimes</u>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”</u> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u><mark>These are “invisible” genocides</mark> not <mark>because they are</mark> secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed<u>, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are <mark>right before our eyes and</mark> therefore taken for granted.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u>Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that <mark>war crimes are</mark> merely <mark>ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically</mark> and dramatically <mark>in the extreme context of war</u></mark>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? </u>What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we</mark> recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to <mark>exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the</mark> less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts</mark> <mark>and policies</mark> <mark>possible</u></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” <u><mark>Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence</mark> <mark>allows us to see the capacity</mark> and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - <mark>of ordinary people,</mark> the practical technicians of the social consensus, <mark>to enforce genocidal</mark>-<mark>like</mark> <mark>crimes</mark> against categories of rubbish people. <mark>There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life</mark>. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.</u> Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence<u>. <mark>Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence</mark> and genocide.</u> But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. <u>Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.</u> It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting <u>that <mark>mass violence</mark> is part of a continuum, and that it <mark>is socially incremental and often experienced</mark> by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - <mark>as expected, routine</mark>, even justified</u>. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. <u><mark>They harbor the</u></mark> early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the <u>“<mark>priming</mark>”</u> (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) <u><mark>that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life</u></mark> and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).</p>
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Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 16,028 | 483 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
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A
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Kentucky
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1
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UGA DH
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Katsula
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aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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742,658 |
Federalism model solves Ukraine war
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Sasse and Hughes 2014
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Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)
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The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine
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U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict
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The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).
| 9,859 |
<h4>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p><strong>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u><strong>The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u></strong> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u><strong>Yatsenyuk</u></strong> <u><strong>reached out to Russophones</u></strong> in the eastern and southern regions, <u><strong>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u></strong>.” <u><strong>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have encouraged</mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u><strong>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u></strong> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u><strong>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u></strong>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u><strong>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u></strong>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u><strong>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u></strong>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><strong><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u></strong> this important <u><strong><mark>regional balance</u></strong> <u><strong>and has the opportunity to formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</mark>. </u></strong>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u><strong>a state-wide</u></strong> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u><strong>comprehensive federalization</u></strong>, <u><strong>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u></strong>. <u><strong>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u></strong> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u><strong>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</mark> </u></strong>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u><strong>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are not short of is</mark> </u></strong>legal<u><strong> <mark>experts on</mark> </u></strong>autonomy<u><strong>, <mark>federalism</mark> </u></strong>and minority rights. The<u><strong> <mark>implementation</mark> </u></strong>of constitutional reform<u><strong> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u></strong>political will and <u><strong><mark>leadership</u></strong></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u><strong>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u></strong> <u><strong>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u></strong>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u><strong>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to peacefully manage conflict</mark> and enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u><strong>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u></strong> not just <u><strong>in Ukraine</u></strong> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 242,776 | 13 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,659 |
The illegal market is also a threat to public health
|
Kelly 13
|
Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77
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More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
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More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and transplant tourism’
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Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious
Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
| 2,194 |
<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u><mark>Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u><mark>Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders</mark> upon returning to their home countries</u><strong>. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p><p>Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious</p><p>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u><mark>More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in</mark> the number of <mark>immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings</u></mark>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The epidemiologic reasons</mark> for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and</mark> (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘<mark>transplant tourism’</mark> in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,319 | 6 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,660 |
Nuke war
|
Thompson 14
|
Loren Thompson 4-24-2014 “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
|
this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. the Obama Administration credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO tensions are ratcheting up. successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. It is easy to imagine misjudgments in Ukraine which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives Any deployment could provoke Russian escalation. Misinterpretation of signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
this year’s crisis is a reminder that geopolitical concerns have not vanished Putin might be forced to aid ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence tensions are ratcheting up revisions of Russian military strategy place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” in response to conventional aggression it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate This isn’t saber-rattling It is easy to imagine misjudgments Misinterpretation can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint — poor intel battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and other influences — it seems reasonable to consider because Ukraine is so close there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished. In fact, Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.
| 7,969 |
<h4>Nuke war </h4><p>Loren <strong>Thompson</strong> 4-24-20<strong>14</strong> “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/</p><p>Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, <u><strong><mark>this year’s crisis</mark> over Ukraine <mark>is a reminder that </mark>Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the <mark>geopolitical</mark> sources of its security <mark>concerns have not vanished</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u><strong>Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine</u></strong> by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then <u><strong>it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. </u></strong>Although <u><strong>the Obama Administration</u></strong> is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its <u><strong>credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir <mark>Putin</mark> has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors</u></strong>. <u><strong>Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine</u></strong>, <u><strong>Moscow now says it <mark>might be forced to</mark> come to the <mark>aid</mark> of <mark>ethnic Russians</u></strong></mark> there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). <u><strong><mark>Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence</mark> in the neighborhood</u></strong>, <u><strong>reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO</u></strong>. So little by little,<u><strong> <mark>tensions are ratcheting up</mark>. </u></strong>One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that <u><strong>successive <mark>revisions of Russian military strategy</mark> appear “to <mark>place a greater reliance on nuclear</mark> <mark>weapons” </mark>to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. </u></strong>A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that <u><strong>Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons <mark>in response to conventional aggression</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but <mark>it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate</mark> a conflict. <mark>This isn’t</mark> just Russian <mark>saber-rattling</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war</u></strong>. <u><strong>The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away</u></strong> from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, <u><strong>and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons</u></strong> in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So <u><strong>improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine</u></strong>. Here are four ways that <u><strong>what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. </u></strong>Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. <u><strong><mark>It is easy to imagine</u></strong></mark> similar <u><strong><mark>misjudgments</mark> in Ukraine</u></strong>, <u><strong>which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives</u></strong>. <u><strong>Any</u></strong> sizable <u><strong>deployment</u></strong> of U.S. forces in the region <u><strong>could provoke Russian escalation. </u></strong>Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. <u><strong><mark>Misinterpretation</mark> of </u></strong>such<u><strong> signals <mark>can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly</mark>, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. </u></strong>Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. <u><strong>Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons</u></strong>. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. <u><strong><mark>U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads</mark> against enemy targets.</u></strong> Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. <u><strong>Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. <mark>When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint</mark> in wartime</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>— poor intel</mark>ligence, garbled communication, <mark>battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and</mark> a host of <mark>other influences — it seems reasonable to consider</mark> that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons.</u></strong> And <u><strong><mark>because Ukraine is so close</mark> to the Russian heartland</u></strong> (about 250 miles from Moscow) <u><strong><mark>there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed</u></strong></mark>. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 22,852 | 87 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,661 |
antibiotic-resistance risks extinction
|
MacKenzie 13
|
MacKenzie 13 Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html
|
ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas.
|
ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control
|
ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas. What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles.
| 664 |
<h4>antibiotic-resistance risks extinction</h4><p><strong>MacKenzie 13</strong> Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html </p><p><u><mark>ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria</u></mark>" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, <u><mark>our predicament is even worse</mark> than these words suggest, <mark>with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control</mark> in some areas.</u> What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,319 | 6 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,662 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></strong></mark>.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,663 |
Infectious disease risks extinction
Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.
|
Franca et al. 13
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Infectious disease risks extinction </h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13</strong> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress<u>, <mark>infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival</u>.</mark> Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. <u>Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. <mark>An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such</mark> as the bubonic</u>–pneumonic <u>plague,</u> Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), <u>and the present pandemic of</u> human immunodeficiency virus <u>(<mark>HIV)</mark>,</u> in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, <u><mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</mark> like dengue fever, <mark>the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded</mark> </u>[5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,789 | 1 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,664 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 )
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
|
marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</strong></mark>.</p></u>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,665 |
The availability of organs in the US would dry up demand in the illegal market
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere If demand dried up , transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>The availability of organs in the US would dry up demand in the illegal market</h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination <u>of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of available organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> through compensation, </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere</mark> to pay for an organ</u>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u> </mark>from foreign citizens<mark>, <u>transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u><mark>presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u>If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible </u>that stories like this would become much less commonplace.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,666 |
CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States invested more than any other nation to influence the global control regime If the U.S. proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution if, the U.S. interpretation attracted ceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4>CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The United States</u></strong></mark> has <u><strong><mark>invested</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>more</mark> effort <mark>than any other nation</u></strong></mark> over the past century <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong> <u><strong>influence the</mark> design of the <mark>global control regime</u></strong></mark> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S.</mark> now <mark>proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><strong><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></strong></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><strong>regarding</u></strong> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u><strong>claiming <mark>that the U.S. is not violating the treaties</mark> <mark>because</mark> <mark>cultivation, trade and possession</u></strong></mark> of cannabis <u><strong><mark>are still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>and</mark> <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></strong></mark> for considerable <u><strong><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices</mark>, especially <mark>when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution</mark> and domestic legal system.</u></strong> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u><strong><mark>if, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u></strong>a certain level of <u><strong>political ac<mark>ceptance</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u></strong>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u></strong>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><strong>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation</u></strong> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><strong>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></strong> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u><strong><mark>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u></strong></mark> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u><strong><mark>coffeeshops</u></strong></mark> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,667 |
Legalizing sales in the US would take down the illegal market
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
|
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
|
a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
|
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Legalizing sales in the US would take down the illegal market </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p>Moreover, <u>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, <mark>a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, <mark>it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,264 | 17 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,668 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty<u><strong> of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,669 |
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
| 3,355 |
<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u><mark>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u><mark>who suggest that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 429,540 | 21 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,670 |
This would maximize organ sales
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
|
Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
| 1,450 |
<h4><strong>This would maximize organ sales</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 <u><mark>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,338 | 11 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,671 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p><strong>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u><strong>As long <mark>as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists</u></strong></mark>—and it exists today—<u><strong><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <mark>major violence remains a pivotal task</u></strong></mark> of global security policy. <u><strong>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u></strong> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><strong><mark>arms races are likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u><strong>stabilization remains a key</u></strong> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u><strong>a web of <mark>interlocking agreements</mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u></strong> At the global level, <u><strong><mark>arms limitation</u></strong></mark> or prohibition <u><strong><mark>agreement</u></strong>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><strong><mark>are needed to ban existential dangers</mark> for global stability, <mark>ecological safety, and</mark> maybe <mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><strong><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u></strong> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u></strong>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u><strong>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u></strong>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u><strong>it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><strong><mark>means are available to ensure compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,672 |
Their inflated threat discourse regarding cyberwar leads directly to military interventions – turns case
|
Brito and Watkins 12
|
Brito and Watkins 12 [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol.-3_Brito_Watkins1.pdf]
|
alarmist rhetoric that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting.
|
alarmist rhetoric that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting.
|
Cybersecurity is an important policy issue, but the alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios and conflating cyber threats, government officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting. The public should have access to classified evidence of cyber threats, and further examination of the risks posed by those threats, before sound policies can be proposed, let alone enacted.
| 792 |
<h4>Their inflated threat discourse regarding cyberwar leads directly to military interventions – turns case</h4><p><u><strong>Brito and Watkins 12</u></strong> [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol.-3_Brito_Watkins1.pdf]</p><p>Cybersecurity is an important policy issue, but the <u><mark>alarmist rhetoric</u></mark> coming out of Washington <u><mark>that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios</u></mark> and conflating cyber threats, government <u><mark>officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting.</u></mark> The public should have access to classified evidence of cyber threats<strong>, and further examination of the risks posed by those threats, before sound policies can be proposed, let alone enacted.</p></strong>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 103,159 | 19 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,673 |
government purchaser avoids exploitation
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. . The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, <mark>we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall.</mark> </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option<mark>.<u> The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,674 |
Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98 J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;
|
Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution [12]
|
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution.
|
Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
| 727 |
<h4>Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing</h4><p><strong>Radcliffe-Richards et al 98</strong> J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;</p><p><u>Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales</p><p>http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf</p><p><mark>Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor.</mark> </u>This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, <u><mark>all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution</u>.<u></mark> [12]</p><p> </p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,346 | 7 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,675 |
Our alternative is to demilitarize the public sphere, bottom up rejection of security politics allows us to move beyond an unsustainable system that leads to inevitable threat escalation
| null |
Lal, 2007
|
national security is an antonym for human security the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. put theory into practice Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The U S has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation. questioning and changing structures that oppress us Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come. human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.
|
discourse is power, we can deconstruct the power of elites using their own tool: discourse. we are through discursive practices subjected to the reality the state wants us to see. it is time we defined our own reality citizen action is critical grassroots statecraft challenging policy through contending discursive acts calls for pitting values of society against the state The U S has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain hegemonic and oppressive status to exist changes do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. . Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and Vietnam grassroots action makes individuals the referent of security as people call for demilitarization of issues contrary to human security Britain, France and Germany set aside historical enmities and became a community Cold War rivals are now friends The apartheid regime did collapse India and Pakistan have been moving towards peace with each new friendship , there is one less foe and one less Other The world is not stable in a , nasty brutish framework which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a realistic framework
|
(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)
Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how national security is an antonym for human security. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. The question that arises next is how to put critical theory into practice and deconstruct the national security state. Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation. Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with questioning and changing structures and institutions that oppress us and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin for Booth (2005, 191), as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come. Therefore, human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.
| 8,181 |
<h4><strong>Our alternative is to demilitarize the public sphere, bottom up rejection of security politics allows us to move beyond</strong> an unsustainable system that leads to inevitable threat escalation</h4><p><u>Lal, 2007</p><p></u>(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)</p><p>Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how <u><strong>national security is an antonym for human security</u></strong>. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why <u><strong>the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.”</u></strong> Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how <u><strong>the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. </u></strong>The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that <u><strong>“economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security.</u></strong> The question that arises next is how to <u><strong>put</u></strong> critical <u><strong>theory into practice</u></strong> and deconstruct the national security state. <u><strong>Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth.</u></strong> In other words, <u><strong>there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist</u></strong> Foucaultian <u><strong>analysis that <mark>discourse is power, we can </mark>move towards <mark>deconstruct</mark>ing<mark> the power of </mark>the state and <mark>elites</mark> to securitize <mark>using their own tool: discourse.</u></strong></mark> The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>colonized <mark>through discursive practices </mark>and <mark>subjected to the reality </mark>that <mark>the state wants us to see.</mark> However, definitions belong to the definer, and <mark>it is </mark>high <mark>time</mark> that <mark>we</mark> questioned and <mark>defined our own reality</mark>.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>citizen action is critical</mark> to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security</u></strong>. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of <u><strong>a <mark>grassroots statecraft</mark> that is defined as “<mark>challenging</mark> foreign <mark>policy </mark>of government <mark>through contending discursive</mark> and speech <mark>acts</mark>.”</u></strong> This <u><strong><mark>calls for pitting</mark> the <mark>values of </mark>civil <mark>society against the state </mark>establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. <mark>The U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain</mark> that <mark>hegemonic and oppressive status</mark> in order <mark>to exist</mark>. It is critical to remember that fundamental <mark>changes </mark>in our institutions and structures of power <mark>do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom.</mark> History is case in point<mark>. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and </mark>the <mark>Vietnam </mark>War</u></strong>, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, <u><strong><mark>grassroots </mark>citizen <mark>action </mark>performatively <mark>makes individuals the referent </mark>subject <mark>of security as people </mark>would <mark>call for</mark> the <mark>demilitarization</mark> and desecuritization <mark>of issues </mark>that are <mark>contrary</mark> and irrelevant <mark>to</mark> <mark>human security</mark>. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. </u></strong>As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, <u><strong>“it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” <mark>Britain, France and Germany set aside </mark>their <mark>historical enmities and became </mark>part of <mark>a </mark>European <mark>community</mark>, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. <mark>Cold War rivals </mark>that almost annihilated the world <mark>are now friends </mark>in the “war against terror.” <mark>The apartheid regime</mark> in South Africa <mark>did collapse</mark> eventually.</u></strong> In the past two years, <u><strong><mark>India and Pakistan have been moving towards </mark>a more <mark>peace</mark>ful future</u></strong> that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. <u><strong>While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that <mark>with each new friendship </mark>and alliance<mark>, there is one less foe and one less Other</mark>. <mark>The world is not stable </mark>and stagnant, existing <mark>in a</mark>n anarchic<mark>, nasty </mark>and <mark>brutish framework</mark> in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, <mark>which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a </mark>more <mark>realistic framework </mark>through which we can view international relations.</u></strong> Therefore, <u><strong>our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.</u></strong> Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with <u><strong>questioning and changing structures</u></strong> and institutions <u><strong>that oppress us</u></strong> and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. <u><strong>Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin</u></strong> for Booth (2005, 191), <u><strong>as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept</u></strong>. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal <u><strong>that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come.</u></strong> Therefore, <u><strong>human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.</u></strong> </p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Off
| 430,587 | 4 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,676 |
Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply
|
Beard et al 13
|
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
|
On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives.
|
On balance a fair reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors would increase substantially the number of organs available for transplant both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors respond to incentives
|
On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives.
| 363 |
<h4>Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p><u><mark>On balance</mark>, <mark>a fair</mark>-minded <mark>reading of</mark> <mark>the evidence suggests that compensation for donors</mark>, if done correctly and sensibly, <mark>would increase</mark>, probably <mark>substantially</mark>, <mark>the number of organs available for transplant</mark>. In the cases of <mark>both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors</mark>, available evidence confirms the observation that people <mark>respond to incentives</mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,350 | 6 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,677 |
Before you vote on any single case argument, read the evidence and make sure their highlighting makes the card say anything – we shouldn’t have to respond to warrants that haven’t been read
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Before you vote on any single case argument, read the evidence and make sure their highlighting makes the card say anything – we shouldn’t have to respond to warrants that haven’t been read </h4></strong>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 430,790 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,678 |
Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict
|
Ikenberry and Deudney 9
|
Ikenberry and Deudney 9 (Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)
|
the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces , the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are globalization institutions and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides constraints and opportunities that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete. nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. in the twenty-first century the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the U S with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China revisionist states notably China and Russia are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power Many other global institutions are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions The pathway to modernity is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside the liberal international order. The viability of regimes hinges on their ability to sustain economic growth which is crucially dependent on international trade Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people have increasingly joined the world community citizens of autocratic states are participating in transnational networks. the values of "us versus them" become difficult to generate and sustain. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here China Europe, India, Japan, the United States Iran and Russia share a common interest in security . The declining utility of war and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation
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the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors the most striking features are globalization institutions and interdependence The overall structure provides constraints that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the powers possessing nuclear weapons The prospect of losses has instilled level of restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts trade, investment, and production across international borders raises the costs of war revisionist states, are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo institution are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions their people have increasingly joined the world community the values of us versus them" become difficult to generate China Europe, India, Japan Iran and Russia share a common interest in security The declining utility of and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of cooperation.
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It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint the picture of an international system marked by rising levels of conflict and competition, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark: "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.
| 9,298 |
<h4><strong>Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict </h4><p>Ikenberry and Deudney 9 </strong>(Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)</p><p>It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint <u><mark>the picture of an international system marked by</u></mark> rising levels of <u><mark>conflict and competition</u></mark>, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook <u><mark>is</u></mark> based on <u><strong><mark>an exaggeration</u></strong></mark> of recent developments <u><mark>and ignores powerful <strong>countervailing factors</mark> and forces</u></strong>. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe<u>, <mark>the most striking features</mark> of the contemporary international landscape <mark>are</u></mark> the intensification of economic <u><strong><mark>globalization</u></strong></mark>, thickening <u><strong><mark>institutions</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>shared problems of <mark>interdependence</strong></mark>. <mark>The</u> <u>overall structure</u></mark> of the international system today <u>is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century</u>. Compared to older orders,<u> the contemporary liberal-centered international order <mark>provides</u></mark> a set of <u><mark>constraints</mark> and opportunities</u> — of pushes and pulls — <u><mark>that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.</u></mark> Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and <u><mark>great-power expansion has become</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>obsolete</strong></mark>.</u> Most important, <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>have transformed great-power war</mark> </u>from a routine feature of international politics <u><mark>into an exercise in <strong>national suicide.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>With all of the</mark> great <mark>powers possessing nuclear weapons</mark> and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces</u>, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. <u><mark>The prospect of</mark> such great <mark>losses has instilled</mark> in the great powers a <mark>level <strong>of</mark> caution and <mark>restraint</strong> that <strong>effectively precludes major revisionist efforts</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory</u> inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the<u> density of <mark>trade, investment, and production</mark> networks <mark>across international borders <strong>raises</mark> even more <mark>the costs of war</strong></mark>. </u>A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But <u>in the twenty-first century</u>, <u>the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states</u> in Europe and East Asia <u>whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China</u> or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially <u><mark>revisionist</u></mark> autocratic <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> most <u>notably China and Russia</u>, <u><mark>are</u></mark> already substantial players and <u><strong><mark>stakeholders</strong> in</u></mark> <u><mark>an</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>ensemble of global institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that make up the status quo</mark>, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power</u>). <u>Many other global <mark>institution</mark>s</u>, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, <u><mark>are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice <strong>only by buying into the institutions</u></strong></mark>. <u>The pathway to modernity</u> for rising states <u>is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside</u> and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of <u>the liberal international order.</u> The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. <u>The </u>domestic <u>viability of</u> these <u>regimes hinges on their ability to sustain</u> high <u>economic growth</u> rates, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is crucially dependent on international trade</u> and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. <u>Not only have these states joined the world economy, but <mark>their people</u></mark> — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — <u><mark>have increasingly joined the world community</u></mark>. In large and growing numbers, <u>citizens of autocratic</u> capitalist <u>states are participating in</u> a sprawling array of <u>transnational </u>educational, business, and avocational <u>networks.</u> As individuals are socialized into <u><mark>the values</u></mark> and orientations <u><mark>of</u></mark> these networks, stark: <u>"<mark>us versus them"</u></mark> cleavages <u><mark>become</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>difficult to generate</mark> and sustain</strong>.</u> As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. <u>These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here</u>. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong>, <strong>India</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong></mark>,</u> and <u>the United States</u>, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. These states <u><strong><mark>share a common interest</strong> in</u></mark> price stability and supply <u><mark>security</u></mark> that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building<u>.</u> Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. <u><strong><mark>The declining utility of</mark> war</u></strong>, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, <u><mark>and emerging</u></mark> resource and <u><mark>environmental interdependencies</u></mark> together <u><strong><mark>undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability</u></strong></mark> based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, <u><mark>the conditions of the twenty-first century <strong>point to the renewed value</strong> of</mark> international integration and <mark>cooperation</u>.</p></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 18,192 | 80 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,679 |
Legalization doesn’t free up resources—just have to expend time and money on regulations
|
Felbab-Brown 12 http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown
|
Felbab-Brown 12 Vanda, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings specializing in nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies; “Organized Criminals Won't Fade Away” Brookings; August, 2012; http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown
|
Nor does legalization imply that police would be freed up to focus on other issues The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy
|
Nor does legalization imply police would be freed up to focus on other issues The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy
|
Nor does legalization imply that police would be freed up to focus on other issues or become less corrupt: The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy.
| 183 |
<h4><strong>Legalization doesn’t free up resources—just have to expend time and money on regulations</h4><p>Felbab-Brown 12 </strong>Vanda, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings specializing in nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies; “Organized Criminals Won't Fade Away” Brookings; August, 2012; <u><strong>http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown</p><p><mark>Nor does legalization imply</mark> that <mark>police would be freed up to focus on other issues</mark> </u></strong>or become less corrupt: <u><strong><mark>The state may have to devote more resources to regulating the legal economy</u></strong></mark>.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 430,774 | 5 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,680 |
Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage
|
Francis 2014 )
|
Francis 2014 (David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous)
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
|
decriminalization would push the price of pot down taking away a key revenue stream for cartels It’s forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests cartels are stealing from energy companies a practice common in West Africa the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May Los Zetas are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from the state oil company
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
| 3,143 |
<h4>Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage</h4><p><strong>Francis 2014 </strong>(David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous<u><strong>)</p><p>Wider <mark>decriminalization would push the price of pot down</mark>, <mark>taking away a key revenue stream for cartels</mark> like Los Zetas and La Familia. </u></strong>It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> also <mark>forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa</mark>, <mark>upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests</mark>.</u></strong> A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. <u><strong>Grayson also said that the <mark>cartels are stealing from energy companies</mark>, <mark>a practice</mark> more <mark>common in West Africa</mark> than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, <mark>the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May</mark> in Veracruz alone. “<mark>Los Zetas</mark>, in particular, <mark>are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from</mark> Pemex, <mark>the state oil company</mark>. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.” </p></u></strong>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 431,057 | 41 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
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1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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742,681 |
Nuclear deterrence checks – all states are rational
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Tepperman 9
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Tepperman 9 (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, 9/7, p.lexis)
|
A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and m a d is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring leaders all came to the same safe conclusion the Cuban missile crisis both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations Ganguly found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962
obsolete will not escalate
major war is obsolete this kind of war, is more than unlikely Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete costs have risen and the benefits have shriveled because of nuclear weapons benefits now seem non-existent The traditional motives for warfare are extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone as a paying proposition ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged are in steep decline the ideology that is now in the ascendant liberalism, tends to be pacific three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely One of these is the rise of democracy democracies tend to be peaceful. a post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy common security negotiated arms limits that reduce insecurity through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack the distinction between powerful states and the less powerful ones now is far less important in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed. The great chess game of international politics is finished A pawn is now just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king
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A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not make the world more dangerous nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 there's never been a nuclear war between two states all states are rational Their leaders tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate Nuclear weapons mak the costs of war obvious and unacceptable Even the craziest tin-pot dictator accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" The iron logic of deterrence and m a d led to nuclear peace nuclear powers have avoided direct combat, and they always will. There have been near misses, but a close look is fundamentally reassuring leaders all came to the same safe conclusion The record shows nuclear enemies slide toward war, then pull back The best example is India and Pakistan Getting weapons didn't lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. the two sides have never fought another war, despite provocations
major war is obsolete this kind of war, is more than unlikely costs have risen and the benefits have shriveled. because of nuclear weapon benefits, now seem, at non-existent the ideology that is now in the ascendant liberalism, tends to be pacific developments have made major war even less likely One is the rise of democracy democracies, tend to be peaceful post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy common security the distinction between powerful states and the less powerful now is far less important there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed
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A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring--because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.
Great power war is obsolete and small conflicts will not escalate
Mandelbaum 99 (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR, Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I mean war waged by the most powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been, their consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, this kind of war, is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, “ Major war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst.” Why is this so? Most simply, the costs have risen and the benefits of major war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this century of nuclear weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the benefits, these now seem, at least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare are in retreat, if not extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, as a paying proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But the ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own, liberalism, tends to be pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of these is the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldn’t go that far. I don’t believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now it’s true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that a post-Cold War innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. It’s not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is the novel distinction between the periphery and the core, between the powerful states and the less powerful ones. This was previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article again, “ While for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed. The great chess game of international politics is finished, or at least suspended. A pawn is now just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king.”
| 11,457 |
<h4>Nuclear deterrence checks – all states are rational </h4><p><strong>Tepperman 9</strong> (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, 9/7, p.lexis)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A growing and compelling body of research</strong> suggests that nuclear weapons may not</mark>, in fact, <mark>make the world more dangerous</u></mark>, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, <u><mark>nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945</mark>. Second, <mark>there's never been a nuclear</mark>, or even a nonnuclear, <mark>war between two states </mark>that possess them</u>. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that <u><mark>all states are <strong>rational</mark> on some basic level</strong>. <mark>Their leaders</mark> may be <strong>stupid</strong>, <strong>petty</strong>, <strong>venal</strong>, <strong>even evil</strong>, but they <mark>tend to do things only when they're <strong>pretty sure they can get away with them</strong></mark>. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. <strong><mark>Not even Hitler or Saddam</strong> waged wars they didn't think they could win</mark>. The problem historically has been that <mark>leaders often make the <strong>wrong gamble and underestimate</strong></mark> the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. <mark>Nuclear weapons</mark> change all that by <mark>mak</mark>ing <mark>the costs of war <strong>obvious</strong></mark>, inevitable, <strong><mark>and unacceptable</u></strong></mark>. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. <u><mark>Even the <strong>craziest tin-pot dictator</strong></mark> is forced to <mark>accept that war with a nuclear state is <strong>unwinnable</strong></mark> and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, <mark>"<strong>Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything</strong>?"</mark> Why indeed? <mark>The iron logic of deterrence and <strong>m</u></strong></mark>utually <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssured <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u>is so compelling, it's <mark>led to</mark> what's known as the <strong><mark>nuclear peace</u></strong></mark>: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, <u>the <mark>nuclear powers have</mark> scrupulously <strong><mark>avoided direct combat</strong>, and</mark> there's very good reason to think <strong><mark>they always will</strong>. There have been</mark> some <mark>near misses, but</u> <u>a close look</mark> at these cases <strong><mark>is fundamentally reassuring</u></strong></mark>--because in each instance, very different <u><strong><mark>leaders all came to the same safe conclusion</u></strong></mark>. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: <u>the Cuban missile crisis</u>. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But <u>both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have <strong>meant curtains</u></strong> for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." <u><mark>The record</mark> since then <mark>shows</mark> the same pattern repeating: <mark>nuclear</mark>-armed <mark>enemies slide toward war, <strong>then pull back</strong></mark>, always for the same reasons. <mark>The best</mark> recent <mark>example is India and Pakistan</u></mark>, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. <u><mark>Getting</mark> their hands on <mark>weapons</mark> of mass destruction <mark>didn't</mark> do anything to <mark>lessen their animosity. But it did <strong>dramatically mellow their behavior</strong>.</mark> Since acquiring atomic weapons, <mark>the two sides have never fought another war, <strong>despite</mark> severe <mark>provocations</u></strong></mark> (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit <u>Ganguly</u>, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has <u>found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962</u>. <strong>The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.</p><p>Great power war is <u>obsolete</u> and small conflicts <u>will not escalate</p><p></u>Mandelbaum 99</strong> (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR, Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)</p><p>My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that <u><mark>major war is <strong>obsolete</u></strong></mark>. By major war, I mean war waged by the most powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been, their consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, <u><mark>this kind of war, is</u></mark> obsolete; less than impossible, but <u><strong><mark>more than unlikely</u></strong></mark>. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, “ Major war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. <u>Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete</u>. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst.” Why is this so? Most simply, the <u><strong><mark>costs have</strong> risen and the benefits</u></mark> of major war <u><mark>have shriveled</u>.</mark> The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high <u><mark>because of</u></mark> the advent in the middle of this century of <u><mark>nuclear weapon</mark>s</u>, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the <u><mark>benefits</u>,</mark> these <u><mark>now seem</u>, at</mark> least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to <u><strong><mark>non-existent</u></strong></mark>. <u>The traditional motives for warfare are</u> in retreat, if not <u>extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone</u>, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, <u>as a paying proposition</u>. And as for the <u>ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged</u> in the past, these <u>are in steep decline</u>. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But <u><mark>the ideology that is now in the ascendant</u></mark>, our own, <u><strong><mark>liberalism, tends to be pacific</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, I would argue that <u>three post-Cold War <mark>developments have made major war even less likely</u></mark> than it was after 1945. <u><mark>One</mark> of these <mark>is the rise of democracy</u></mark>, for <u><mark>democracies</u>,</mark> I believe, <u><mark>tend to be peaceful</mark>.</u> Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldn’t go that far. I don’t believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now it’s true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that <u>a <mark>post-Cold War innovation <strong>counteracts the effects of anarchy</u></strong></mark>. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, <u><strong><mark>common</strong> security</u></mark>. By common security I mean a regime of <u>negotiated arms limits that reduce</u> the <u>insecurity</u> that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and <u>through the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack</u>. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. It’s not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is <u><mark>the</u></mark> novel <u><mark>distinction between</u></mark> the periphery and the core, between the <u><mark>powerful states and the less powerful</mark> ones</u>. This was previously a cause of conflict and <u><mark>now is <strong>far less important</u></strong></mark>. To quote from the article again, “ While for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, <u>in the wake of the Cold War, with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, <mark>there is <strong>no great-power conflict</strong> into which the many local conflicts that have erupted <strong>can be absorbed</strong></mark>. The great chess game of international politics is finished</u>, or at least suspended. <u>A pawn is now just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king</u>.”</p>
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 18,360 | 140 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
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Kentucky
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1
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UGA DH
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Katsula
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aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Ma.....
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Cr.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,682 |
Legalization destabilizes Mexico- rapid drops in cartel funding force them to turn to violence
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Jackson et al 2011
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Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
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Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime. the most obvious short-term effect of marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue. The short-term effects of legalization could very well create chaos for Mexico The cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities--kidnapping, murder-for-hire extortion, theft of oil and other items they are not going to return to the licit world If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion it could lead to a spike in violence that would prove to be destabilizing employees will likely be shed to maintain profitability former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico
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Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime marijuana legalization would rob Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of half their revenue short-term effects could create chaos for Mexico cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into kidnapping, murder-for-hire theft of oil and other items could lead to a spike in violence that would prove destabilizing legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories to become more violent than they are today
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Short-term Effects on Mexican DTOs and Security Implications Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime. Perhaps the most obvious short-term effect of marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue.117 The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the short term. The short-term effects of legalization could very well create chaos for Mexico. “The cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities--kidnapping, murder-for-hire, contraband, illegal 29 immigrant smuggling, extortion, theft of oil and other items, loan-sharking, prostitution, selling protection, etc.”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the same then “they are not going to return to the licit world.”119 If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion, it could lead to a spike in violence that would prove to be destabilizing in those organizations‟ areas of operation. The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel might splinter into smaller groups. In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue would probably force them to downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, employees will likely be shed first in order to maintain profitability.120 These former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers. Therefore it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico.121
| 1,967 |
<h4>Legalization destabilizes Mexico- rapid drops in cartel funding force them to turn to violence</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Short-term Effects on Mexican DTOs and Security Implications <u><strong><mark>Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime</mark>.</u></strong> Perhaps <u><strong>the most obvious short-term effect of <mark>marijuana legalization</mark> is that this <mark>would rob</mark> the <mark>Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of</mark> up to <mark>half</mark> of <mark>their</mark> total <mark>revenue</mark>.</u></strong>117 The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the short term. <u><strong>The <mark>short-term effects</mark> of legalization <mark>could</mark> very well <mark>create chaos for Mexico</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong>The <mark>cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into </mark>other criminal activities--<mark>kidnapping, murder-for-hire</u></strong></mark>, contraband, illegal 29 immigrant smuggling, <u><strong>extortion, <mark>theft of oil and other items</u></strong></mark>, loan-sharking, prostitution, selling protection, etc.”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the same then “<u><strong>they are not going to return to the licit world</u></strong>.”119 <u><strong>If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion</u></strong>, <u><strong>it <mark>could lead to a spike in violence that would prove </mark>to be <mark>destabilizing</u></strong></mark> in those organizations‟ areas of operation. The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel might splinter into smaller groups. In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue would probably force them to downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, <u><strong>employees will likely be shed</u></strong> first in order <u><strong>to maintain profitability</u></strong>.120 These <u><strong>former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers</u></strong>. Therefore <u><strong>it is possible that the <mark>legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause</mark> <mark>territories</mark> currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel <mark>to become more violent than they are today</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico</u></strong>.121</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 56,591 | 113 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,683 |
Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction
|
Socol 11 (
|
Socol 11 (Yehoshua (Ph.D.), an inter-disciplinary physicist, is an expert in electro-optics, high-energy physics and applications, and material science and Moshe Yanovskiy, Jan 2, “Nuclear Proliferation and Democracy”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/nuclear_proliferation_and_demo.html)
|
consequences of use of nuclear weapons would not be great Casualties are estimated at 25,000 civil defense measures, decrease numbers by an order of magnitude There is little doubt that a nation determined to survive would not succumb to losses. fallout worldwide is exaggeration In Japan less than 1,000 cancer cases were recorded in 100,000 survivors - Due to the intensity of nuclear conflict would not last , anticipate winners within days
|
consequences of use of nuclear weapons would not be great Casualties are estimated at 25,000 civil defense measures decrease numbers by an order of magnitude a nation determined to survive would not succumb to losses fallout worldwide is exaggeration In Japan less than 1,000 cancer cases were recorded in 100,000 survivors Due to the intensity nuclear conflict would not last anticipate winners within days
|
Nuclear proliferation should no longer be treated as an unthinkable nightmare; it is likely to be the future reality. Nuclear weapons have been acquired not only by an extremely poor per capita but large country such as India, but also by even poorer and medium-sized nations such as Pakistan and North Korea. One could also mention South Africa, which successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal despite economic sanctions (the likes of which have not yet been imposed on Iran). It is widely believed that sanctions and rhetoric will not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that many countries, in the Middle East and beyond, will act accordingly (see, e.g., recent Heritage report). Nuclear Warfare -- Myths And Facts The direct consequences of the limited use of nuclear weapons -- especially low-yield devices most likely to be in the hands of non-state actors or irresponsible governments -- would probably not be great enough to bring about significant geopolitical upheavals. Casualties from a single 20-KT nuclear device are estimated [1] at about 25,000 fatalities with a similar number of injured, assuming a rather unfortunate scenario (the center of a large city, with minimal warning). Scaling the above toll to larger devices or to a larger number of devices is less than linear. For example, it has been estimated that it would take as many as eighty devices of 20-KT yield each to cause 300,000 civilian fatalities in German cities (a result actually achieved by Allied area attacks, or carpet-bombings, during the Second World War). A single 1-MT device used against Detroit has been estimated by U.S. Congress OTA to result in about 220,000 fatalities. It is anticipated that well-prepared civil defense measures, based on rather simple presently known techniques, would decrease these numbers by maybe an order of magnitude (as will be discussed later). There is little doubt that a nation determined to survive and with a strong sense of its own destiny would not succumb to such losses. It is often argued that the fallout effects of even the limited use of nuclear weapons would be worldwide and would last for generations. This is an exaggeration. The following facts speak for themselves. -- In Japan, as assessed by REFR, less than 1,000 excess cancer cases (i.e., above the natural occurrence) were recorded in over 100,000 survivors over the past sixty years -- compared with about 110,000 immediate fatalities in the two atomic bombings. No clinical or even sub-clinical effects were discovered in the survivors' offspring. -- In the Chernobyl area, as assessed by IAEA, only fifteen cancer deaths can be directly attributed to fallout radiation. No radiation-related increase in congenital formations was recorded. Nuclear Conflict -- Possible Scenarios With reference to a possible regional nuclear conflict between a rogue state and a democratic one, the no-winner (mutual assured destruction) scenario is probably false. An analysis by Anthony Cordesman, et al. regarding a possible Israel-Iran nuclear conflict estimated that while Israel might survive an Iranian nuclear blow, Iran would certainly not survive as an organized society. Even though the projected casualties cited in that study seem to us overstated, especially as regards Israel, the conclusion rings true. Due to the extreme high intensity ("above-conventional") of nuclear conflict, it is nearly certain that such a war, no matter its outcome, would not last for years, as we have become accustomed to in current low-intensity conflicts. Rather, we should anticipate a new geo-political reality: the emergence of clear winners and losers within several days, or at most weeks after the initial outbreak of hostilities. This latter reality will most probably contain fewer nuclear-possessing states than the former.
| 3,823 |
<h4><strong>Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction </h4><p>Socol 11 (</strong>Yehoshua (Ph.D.), an inter-disciplinary physicist, is an expert in electro-optics, high-energy physics and applications, and material science and Moshe Yanovskiy, Jan 2, “Nuclear Proliferation and Democracy”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/nuclear_proliferation_and_demo.html)</p><p>Nuclear proliferation should no longer be treated as an unthinkable nightmare; it is likely to be the future reality. Nuclear weapons have been acquired not only by an extremely poor per capita but large country such as India, but also by even poorer and medium-sized nations such as Pakistan and North Korea. One could also mention South Africa, which successfully acquired a nuclear arsenal despite economic sanctions (the likes of which have not yet been imposed on Iran). It is widely believed that sanctions and rhetoric will not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that many countries, in the Middle East and beyond, will act accordingly (see, e.g., recent Heritage report). Nuclear Warfare -- Myths And Facts The direct<u> <strong><mark>consequences of</u></strong></mark> the limited <u><strong><mark>use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> -- especially low-yield devices most likely to be in the hands of non-state actors or irresponsible governments -- <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>not be great</strong></mark> </u>enough to bring about significant geopolitical upheavals. <u><mark>Casualties</u></mark> from a single 20-KT nuclear device<u> <strong><mark>are </strong>estimated</mark> </u>[1]<u> <mark>at</mark> </u>about<u> <mark>25,000</mark> </u>fatalities with a similar number of injured, assuming a rather unfortunate scenario (the center of a large city, with minimal warning). Scaling the above toll to larger devices or to a larger number of devices is less than linear. For example, it has been estimated that it would take as many as eighty devices of 20-KT yield each to cause 300,000 civilian fatalities in German cities (a result actually achieved by Allied area attacks, or carpet-bombings, during the Second World War). A single 1-MT device used against Detroit has been estimated by U.S. Congress OTA to result in about 220,000 fatalities. It is anticipated that well-prepared<u> <mark>civil defense measures</mark>,</u> based on rather simple presently known techniques, would<u> <mark>decrease</u></mark> these <u><mark>numbers by</u></mark> maybe <u><mark>an order of magnitude</u></mark> (as will be discussed later). <u>There is little doubt that</u> <u><mark>a nation determined to survive</u></mark> and with a strong sense of its own destiny <u><mark>would <strong>not succumb</strong> to</mark> </u>such<u> <mark>losses</mark>.</u> It is often argued that the<u> <mark>fallout</mark> </u>effects<u> </u>of even the limited use of nuclear weapons would be <u><mark>worldwide</u></mark> and would last for generations. This<u> <mark>is</mark> </u>an<u> <strong><mark>exaggeration</u></strong></mark>. The following facts speak for themselves. -- <u><mark>In Japan</u></mark>, as assessed by REFR, <u><mark>less than 1,000</mark> </u>excess<u> <mark>cancer cases</mark> </u>(i.e., above the natural occurrence) <u><mark>were recorded in</mark> </u>over<u> <mark>100,000 survivors </u></mark>over the past sixty years<u> -</u>- compared with about 110,000 immediate fatalities in the two atomic bombings. No clinical or even sub-clinical effects were discovered in the survivors' offspring. -- In the Chernobyl area, as assessed by IAEA, only fifteen cancer deaths can be directly attributed to fallout radiation. No radiation-related increase in congenital formations was recorded. Nuclear Conflict -- Possible Scenarios With reference to a possible regional nuclear conflict between a rogue state and a democratic one, the no-winner (mutual assured destruction) scenario is probably false. An analysis by Anthony Cordesman, et al. regarding a possible Israel-Iran nuclear conflict estimated that while Israel might survive an Iranian nuclear blow, Iran would certainly not survive as an organized society. Even though the projected casualties cited in that study seem to us overstated, especially as regards Israel, the conclusion rings true. <u><mark>Due to the</mark> </u>extreme high<u> <mark>intensity</u></mark> ("above-conventional") <u>of <mark>nuclear conflict</u></mark>, it is nearly certain that<u> </u>such a war, no matter its outcome, <u><strong><mark>would not last</strong> </u></mark>for years<u>,</u> as we have become accustomed to in current low-intensity conflicts. Rather, we should<u> <mark>anticipate</mark> </u>a new geo-political reality: the emergence of<u> </u>clear<u> <mark>winners </u></mark>and losers<u> <strong><mark>within</strong></mark> </u>several<u> <strong><mark>days</u></strong></mark>, or at most weeks after the initial outbreak of hostilities. This latter reality will most probably contain fewer nuclear-possessing states than the former.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 152,207 | 51 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,684 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs, paying cash or vouchers at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs, paying cash or vouchers at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network</h4>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,791 | 1 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,685 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p><strong>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u><strong>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u></strong>, if still controversial, <u><strong>proposal</u></strong> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u><strong>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <mark>one revenue stream would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u></strong>. <u><strong>In</u></strong> the context of drugs like <u><strong>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></strong></mark> all, or even many, <u><strong><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></strong></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></strong></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u><strong>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u></strong> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><strong><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u></strong>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u><strong>because of differing state tax rates, the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></strong></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,686 |
No oil shocks – newest research.
|
Kahn 11
|
Kahn 11 [Jeremy Kahn, Boston Globe, Crude reality Will a Middle Eastern oil disruption crush the economy? New research suggests the answer is no -- and that a major tenet of American foreign policy may be fundamentally wrong. By February 13, 2011 http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/]
|
The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973. Gholz and Press analyzed every major oil disruption since 1973. The results, published in a recent issue of the journal Strategic Studies, showed that in almost all cases, the ensuing rise in prices, while sometimes steep, was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact. When oil runs short the market is usually adept at filling the gap.
|
growing body of economic research suggests conventional view of oil shocks is wrong US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in supply than previously assumed Scholars examining recent oil disruptions found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls The US economy has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices than in 73 Gholz and Press analyzed every major oil disruption in almost all cases, the rise in prices was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact
|
Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973. These findings have led a few bold political scientists and foreign policy experts to start asking an uncomfortable question: If the United States could withstand a disruption in Persian Gulf oil supplies, why does it need a permanent military presence in the region at all? There’s a lot riding on that question: America’s presence in the Middle East exacts a heavy toll in political capital, financial resources, and lives. Washington’s support for Middle East autocrats makes America appear hypocritical on issues of human rights and democracy. The United States spends billions of dollars every year to maintain troops in the Middle East, and the troops risk their lives simply by being there, since they make tempting targets for the region’s Islamic extremists. And arguably, because the presence of these forces inflames radicals and delegitimizes local rulers, they may actually be undermining the very stability they are ostensibly there to ensure. Among those asking this tough question are two young professors, Eugene Gholz, at the University of Texas, and Daryl Press, at Dartmouth College. To find out what actually happens when the world’s petroleum supply is interrupted, the duo analyzed every major oil disruption since 1973. The results, published in a recent issue of the journal Strategic Studies, showed that in almost all cases, the ensuing rise in prices, while sometimes steep, was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact. When there have been prolonged price rises, they found the cause to be panic on the part of oil purchasers rather than a supply shortage. When oil runs short, in other words, the market is usually adept at filling the gap.
| 2,984 |
<h4>No oil shocks – newest research.</h4><p><u><strong>Kahn 11</u></strong> [Jeremy Kahn, Boston Globe, Crude reality Will a Middle Eastern oil disruption crush the economy? New research suggests the answer is no -- and that a major tenet of American foreign policy may be fundamentally wrong. By February 13, 2011 http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/<u>]</p><p></u>Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. <u>The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche</u>, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. <u>But a <mark>growing body of economic research suggests</mark> that this <mark>conventional view of oil shocks is wrong</mark>. The <mark>US economy is <strong>far less susceptible</strong> to interruptions in</mark> the oil <mark>supply than previously assumed</u></mark>, according to these studies. <u><mark>Scholars examining</mark> the <mark>recent</mark> history of <mark>oil disruptions</mark> have <mark>found the worldwide oil market to be <strong>remarkably adaptable</strong> and <strong>surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls</strong></mark>. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. <mark>The US economy</mark>, meanwhile, <mark>has become <strong>less dependent</strong> on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices</mark> overall <mark>than</mark> it was <mark>in</mark> 19<mark>73</mark>.</u> These findings have led a few bold political scientists and foreign policy experts to start asking an uncomfortable question: If the United States could withstand a disruption in Persian Gulf oil supplies, why does it need a permanent military presence in the region at all? There’s a lot riding on that question: America’s presence in the Middle East exacts a heavy toll in political capital, financial resources, and lives. Washington’s support for Middle East autocrats makes America appear hypocritical on issues of human rights and democracy. The United States spends billions of dollars every year to maintain troops in the Middle East, and the troops risk their lives simply by being there, since they make tempting targets for the region’s Islamic extremists. And arguably, because the presence of these forces inflames radicals and delegitimizes local rulers, they may actually be undermining the very stability they are ostensibly there to ensure. Among those asking this tough question are two young professors, Eugene <u><mark>Gholz</u></mark>, at the University of Texas, <u><mark>and</u></mark> Daryl <u><mark>Press</u></mark>, at Dartmouth College. To find out what actually happens when the world’s petroleum supply is interrupted, the duo <u><mark>analyzed every major oil disruption</mark> since 1973. The results, published in a recent issue of the journal Strategic Studies, showed that <mark>in almost all cases, the</mark> ensuing <mark>rise in prices</mark>, while sometimes steep, <mark>was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact</mark>.</u> When there have been prolonged price rises, they found the cause to be panic on the part of oil purchasers rather than a supply shortage. <u>When oil runs short</u>, in other words, <u>the market is usually adept at filling the gap.</p></u>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 224,080 | 109 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,687 |
Legalization includes implementing regulation
|
Kay 2
|
Kay 2 Amanda Kay, J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2003 Fordham Urban Law Journal June, 2002 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 2133 COMMENT: THE AGONY OF ECSTASY: RECONSIDERING THE PUNITIVE APPROACH TO UNITED STATES DRUG POLICY lexis
|
Legalization is often misunderstood. As most advocates define it, legalization involves the repeal of laws prohibiting drug use and the implementation of regulated system of distribution similar to that which currently exists for alcohol and cigarettes state-run sales,
| null |
D. Legalization with Regulation
Legalization is often misunderstood. As most advocates define it, legalization involves the repeal of laws prohibiting drug use and the implementation of regulated system of Ecstasy distribution [*2184] similar to that which currently exists for alcohol and cigarettes, with state-run sales, quality and price control, and regulated advertising. n433 The goal of such legalization is to undercut the criminal element. n434 Advocates claim that legalization would reduce health risks to users because pills would be tested as part of the regulation process; only a set strength and purity level would be available for purchase. n435 Advocates also cite the high financial cost and ineffectiveness of the drug war as reasons for legalization. In addition to the Office of Drug Control Policy's annual budget, "It costs approximately $ 8.6 billion per year to keep drug law violators behind bars." n436 Drug-related criminal and medical costs total over $ 67 billion, and almost seventy percent of that is attributable to drug-related crime. n437 While legalization may initially drive drug use up, proponents argue that any such increase would taper off and the net result would be less harm than exists under the current prohibition-based drug policy. n438 Some argue that legalization would reduce crimes committed indirectly because of drug use, such as those related to the black market for drug sales which has developed in response to drug prohibition. n439
| 1,495 |
<h4>Legalization includes implementing regulation</h4><p><strong>Kay 2</strong> Amanda Kay, J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2003 Fordham Urban Law Journal June, 2002 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 2133 COMMENT: THE AGONY OF ECSTASY: RECONSIDERING THE PUNITIVE APPROACH TO UNITED STATES DRUG POLICY lexis</p><p>D. Legalization with Regulation</p><p><u>Legalization is often misunderstood. As most advocates define it, legalization involves the repeal of laws prohibiting drug use and the implementation of regulated system of</u> Ecstasy <u>distribution </u> [*2184] <u>similar to that which currently exists for alcohol and cigarettes</u>, with <u><strong>state-run sales,</u></strong> quality and price control, and regulated advertising. n433 The goal of such legalization is to undercut the criminal element. n434 Advocates claim that legalization would reduce health risks to users because pills would be tested as part of the regulation process; only a set strength and purity level would be available for purchase. n435 Advocates also cite the high financial cost and ineffectiveness of the drug war as reasons for legalization. In addition to the Office of Drug Control Policy's annual budget, "It costs approximately $ 8.6 billion per year to keep drug law violators behind bars." n436 Drug-related criminal and medical costs total over $ 67 billion, and almost seventy percent of that is attributable to drug-related crime. n437 While legalization may initially drive drug use up, proponents argue that any such increase would taper off and the net result would be less harm than exists under the current prohibition-based drug policy. n438 Some argue that legalization would reduce crimes committed indirectly because of drug use, such as those related to the black market for drug sales which has developed in response to drug prohibition. n439</p>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,792 | 11 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,688 |
Contextual
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one
While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade:
… far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated.
says that:
At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care.
| null |
An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say:
It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market.
While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade:
… far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated.
Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that:
At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care.
| 1,325 |
<h4>Contextual</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p> An important preliminary point is that <u>almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one</u>. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say:</p><p> It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market.</p><p><u>While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade:</p><p></u> <u>… far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated.</p><p></u>Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example,<u> says that:</p><p></u> <u>At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care.</p></u>
| null | null |
Plan
| 429,540 | 21 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,689 |
Heg doesn’t solve conflict.
|
Fettweis 11
|
Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]
|
hegemony is not the cause of stability the U S may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Since most of the world is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. empirical evidence suggests there is little connection between U.S. activism and international stability. During the 90s The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe its security was endangered No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred once the presence of the military was diminished. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America globalization would continue, deepening economic interdependence democracy would not shrivel the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.
| null |
The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-*7 exis*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.
| 11,216 |
<h4>Heg doesn’t solve conflict.</h4><p><u><strong>Fettweis 11</u></strong> [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page<u> 73-6]</p><p></u>The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US <u><strong>hegemony is not the</u></strong> primary <u><strong>cause of</u></strong> the current era of <u>s<strong>tability</u></strong>. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>may be patrolling a neighborhood that has <strong>already rid itself of crime.</u></strong> Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. <u>Since most of the world</u> today <u>is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work.</u> Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited <u><strong>empirical evidence</u></strong> we have <u>suggests</u> that <u>there is <strong>little connection</strong> between</u> the relative level of <u>U.S. activism and international stability. During the</u> 19<u>90s</u> the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: <u>The world grew more peaceful while the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>cut its forces. No state seemed to believe</u> that <u>its security was endangered</u> by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. <u><strong>No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred</strong> once the</u> stabilizing <u>presence of the</u> U.S. <u>military was diminished.</u> The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. <u>The incidence and magnitude of global conflict <strong>declined</u></strong> while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that <u>none of the other explanations for the decline of War—<strong>nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms</strong> necessitate an activist America</u> to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of <u>globalization would continue, deepening</u> the complexity of <u>economic interdependence</u>; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and <u>democracy would not shrivel</u> where it cur-*7 exis*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, <u>the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.</p></u>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
Cartels
| 42,650 | 583 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,690 |
Almost all advocates of organ sales favor the plan structure – government central buyer
|
Beard et al 13
|
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
|
Almost all analysts who favor compensation for organ donation envision a state-sponsored and tightly regulated monopsony structure so financial incentives would be used solely to obtain organs
| null |
11.Almost all analysts who favor compensation for organ donation envision a state-sponsored and tightly regulated monopsony structure so financial incentives would be used solely to obtain organs, while organ distribution among potential recipients would continue to be based on medical and ethical criteria and would be subject to public oversight.
| 349 |
<h4>Almost all advocates of organ sales favor the plan structure – government central buyer</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p>11.<u>Almost all analysts who favor compensation for organ donation envision a state-sponsored and tightly regulated monopsony structure so financial incentives would be used solely to obtain organs</u>, while organ distribution among potential recipients would continue to be based on medical and ethical criteria and would be subject to public oversight.</p>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,793 | 1 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,691 |
Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets
|
Executionists 2014 http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Does the legalization of marijuana contribute to cyber crime? considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
|
Does legalization contribute to cyber crime? cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent How does a drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They downsize or diversify Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce will look like easy pickings to criminals. hacking will rise with legalization of marijuana There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites
|
Does the rapid legalization of medical marijuana in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world contribute to cyber crime? This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream. The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals. This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
| 1,935 |
<h4>Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets</h4><p><strong>Executionists 2014 </strong>an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals<strong> </strong>“Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; <u><strong>http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/</p><p><mark>Does</mark> the </u></strong>rapid <u><strong><mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>of</u></strong> medical <u><strong>marijuana</u></strong> in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world <u><strong><mark>contribute to cyber crime?</mark> </u></strong>This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but <u><strong>considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow.</u></strong> A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug <u><strong><mark>cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent</u></strong></mark> across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. <u><strong>So what’s a drug lord to do? <mark>How does a</mark> smart (<mark>drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up?</mark> <mark>They</mark> either <mark>downsize or diversify</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord</u></strong>, <u><strong>cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The rise of e-commerce</mark> and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites <mark>will look like easy pickings to </mark>forward-thinking <mark>criminals</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>This is why we believe that cyber crime and <mark>hacking will rise with</mark> the ongoing <mark>legalization of marijuana</mark>.</u></strong> E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, <u><strong>they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>There will be an increasing demand for</mark> <mark>network security professionals and services that “harden” websites</mark> to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.</p></u></strong>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
FBI
| 430,794 | 5 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,692 |
Bioprinting is only in very basic phases and FDA will hold up
|
Gilpin 14
|
Gilpin 14 Lyndsey, staff writer, Tech Republic; “New 3D bioprinter to reproduce human organs, change the face of healthcare: The inside story” Tech Republic; August 1, 2014; http://www.techrepublic.com/article/new-3d-bioprinter-to-reproduce-human-organs/
|
FDA regulations will certainly hold up the process It can take and ten years to get something approved by the FDA. "It's an interesting conversation because the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities, and if it's from the own patient, that's one thing. But if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors, well now we've got a different ball game." To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells -- but most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible. Much of the research is stop-and-go. Big breakthroughs come every once in a while,
|
FDA regulations will hold up the process It can take ten years to get something approved by the FDA the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors now we've got a different ball game." To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible. Much of the research is stop-and-go breakthroughs come every once in a while
|
FDA regulations will certainly hold up the process, though it's unclear for how long. Once the research phase is complete, the cells will have to be tested on animals, which is why Hoying and Williams are making the prototypes as small as possible. It can take anywhere between two and ten years to get something approved by the FDA. What may work in favor of Advanced Solutions and the researchers at the University of Louisville, however, is that this is all new territory for the FDA, and the bioprinting landscape is advancing faster than anyone can keep up with. bio9.jpg A plastic 3D printed heart in Advanced Solutions office. Image: Lyndsey Gilpin/TechRepublic "It's an interesting conversation because the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells," Hoying said. "They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities, and if it's from the own patient, that's one thing. But if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors, well now we've got a different ball game." Currently, there are no distinct regulations for bioprinting, so researchers at academic institutions, research laboratories, and private companies like Advanced Solutions and Organovo -- which is testing pharmaceuticals and tissue assembly -- are experimenting with bioprinting until they are told otherwise. "It's a little wild west," he said. "It's a big step forward in the capability and technology of bioprinting." Dr. Jay Hoying, CII To speed up the process, Williams is working closely with the FDA to define the boundaries of cell therapy and tissue packaging, because there will have to be different rules for different kinds of tissue replacement procedures. To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells -- but most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible. Much of the research is stop-and-go. Big breakthroughs come every once in a while, and then the team will work for weeks or months on the same issue. They must make sure the cells are working in concert and the science is advancing efficiently. BAB will give them more freedom to do so, but they will still take it day by day, Hoying said.
| 2,294 |
<h4>Bioprinting is only in very basic phases and FDA will hold up</h4><p><strong>Gilpin 14 </strong>Lyndsey, staff writer, Tech Republic; “New 3D bioprinter to reproduce human organs, change the face of healthcare: The inside story” Tech Republic; August 1, 2014; http://www.techrepublic.com/article/new-3d-bioprinter-to-reproduce-human-organs/</p><p><u><mark>FDA regulations will</mark> certainly <mark>hold up the process</u></mark>, though it's unclear for how long. Once the research phase is complete, the cells will have to be tested on animals, which is why Hoying and Williams are making the prototypes as small as possible. <u><mark>It can take</mark> </u>anywhere between two <u>and <mark>ten years to get something approved by the FDA</mark>. </u>What may work in favor of Advanced Solutions and the researchers at the University of Louisville, however, is that this is all new territory for the FDA, and the bioprinting landscape is advancing faster than anyone can keep up with. bio9.jpg A plastic 3D printed heart in Advanced Solutions office. Image: Lyndsey Gilpin/TechRepublic <u>"It's an interesting conversation because <mark>the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells</u></mark>," Hoying said. "<u><mark>They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities</mark>, and if it's from the own patient, that's one thing. But <mark>if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors</mark>, well <mark>now</mark> <mark>we've got a different ball game."</mark> </u>Currently, there are no distinct regulations for bioprinting, so researchers at academic institutions, research laboratories, and private companies like Advanced Solutions and Organovo -- which is testing pharmaceuticals and tissue assembly -- are experimenting with bioprinting until they are told otherwise. "It's a little wild west," he said. "It's a big step forward in the capability and technology of bioprinting." Dr. Jay Hoying, CII To speed up the process, Williams is working closely with the FDA to define the boundaries of cell therapy and tissue packaging, because there will have to be different rules for different kinds of tissue replacement procedures. <u><mark>To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells</u></mark> <u>-- but <mark>most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible.</mark> <mark>Much of the research is stop-and-go</mark>. Big <mark>breakthroughs come every once in a while</mark>,</u> and then the team will work for weeks or months on the same issue. They must make sure the cells are working in concert and the science is advancing efficiently. BAB will give them more freedom to do so, but they will still take it day by day, Hoying said.</p>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,728 | 2 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,693 |
Drug policy changes don’t solve recruitment issues
|
Tracy 14
|
Tracy 14 Sam, Chairman, Students for Sensible Drug Policy & Social Media & Activism Director for TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank; “The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be” Huffington Post; May 27, 2014; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html
|
Of course, reforming their drug policies alone won't bring a flood of talented, cannabis-using programmers to the FBI, NSA, or other federal law enforcement agencies. Compensation would need updating to allow for more merit pay to reward the most prolific hackers so they aren't scooped up by the private sector Protecting whisteblowers who expose injustices, rather than treating them as threats, would be two or three steps if it wants to stay strong enough to fight constantly-evolving dangers in the cyber world, the FBI should implement these reforms
|
reforming drug policies alone won't bring a flood of talented, cannabis-using programmers to the FBI Compensation would need updating to allow for more merit pay to reward the most prolific hackers so they aren't scooped up by the private sector Protecting whisteblowers who expose injustices, would be steps
|
Of course, reforming their drug policies alone won't bring a flood of talented, cannabis-using programmers to the FBI, NSA, or other federal law enforcement agencies. Compensation would need updating to allow for more merit pay to reward the most prolific hackers so they aren't scooped up by the private sector. An end to the use of anti-terrorism surveillance measures to target low-level marijuana traffickers, as the latest Snowden revelations detail the NSA and DEA collaborating on in the Bahamas, would also be a step in the right direction. Protecting whisteblowers who expose injustices, rather than treating them as threats, would be two or three steps. But if it wants to stay strong enough to fight constantly-evolving dangers in the cyber world, the FBI should implement these reforms and start recruiting the talent it had mistakenly passed over before.
| 867 |
<h4>Drug policy changes don’t solve recruitment issues</h4><p><strong>Tracy 14 </strong>Sam, Chairman, Students for Sensible Drug Policy & Social Media & Activism Director for TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank; “The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be” Huffington Post; May 27, 2014; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html</p><p><u><strong>Of course, <mark>reforming</mark> their <mark>drug policies alone won't bring a flood of talented, cannabis-using programmers to the FBI</mark>, NSA, or other federal law enforcement agencies. <mark>Compensation would need updating to allow for more merit pay to reward the most prolific hackers so they aren't scooped up by the private sector</u></strong></mark>. An end to the use of anti-terrorism surveillance measures to target low-level marijuana traffickers, as the latest Snowden revelations detail the NSA and DEA collaborating on in the Bahamas, would also be a step in the right direction. <u><strong><mark>Protecting whisteblowers who expose injustices,</mark> rather than treating them as threats, <mark>would be</mark> two or three <mark>steps</u></strong></mark>. But <u><strong>if it wants to stay strong enough to fight constantly-evolving dangers in the cyber world, the FBI should implement these reforms</u></strong> and start recruiting the talent it had mistakenly passed over before.</p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
FBI
| 419,229 | 7 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,694 |
Artificial organs won't solve anytime soon
|
Clark 13
|
Clark 13 Marcia Clark, attorney and former LA prosecutor (OJ), and William Travis Clark, graduate student in International and Development Economics who has worked for the international Regulatory Reform firm Jacobs, Cordova, & Associates in Washington D.C. 6/13/2013 Forbes Selling Your Organs: Should it be Legal? Do You Own Yourself? http://www.forbes.com/sites/marciaclark/2013/06/13/selling-your-organs-should-it-be-legal-do-you-own-yourself/
|
There is hope that scientific advances may eventually allow us to “grow” organs in the laboratory. . But that day is long in the future. In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor waiting lists will continue to rise.
|
advances may allow us to “grow” that day is long in the future In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor lists will rise.
|
There is hope that scientific advances may eventually allow us to “grow” organs in the laboratory. When that day arrives, none of the above questions will matter. But that day is long in the future. In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor waiting lists will continue to rise.
| 288 |
<h4>Artificial organs won't solve anytime soon</h4><p><strong>Clark 13</strong> Marcia Clark, attorney and former LA prosecutor (OJ), and William Travis Clark, graduate student in International and Development Economics who has worked for the international Regulatory Reform firm Jacobs, Cordova, & Associates in Washington D.C. 6/13/2013 Forbes Selling Your Organs: Should it be Legal? Do You Own Yourself? <u>http://www.forbes.com/sites/marciaclark/2013/06/13/selling-your-organs-should-it-be-legal-do-you-own-yourself/</p><p>There is hope that scientific <mark>advances</mark> <mark>may</mark> eventually <mark>allow us to “grow”</mark> organs in the laboratory. </u>When that day arrives, none of the above questions will matter<u>. But <mark>that day is long in the future</mark>. <mark>In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor</mark> waiting <mark>lists will </mark>continue to <mark>rise.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,722 | 2 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,695 |
Recruits just lie
|
Roberts 14
|
Roberts 14 Daniel, technology reporter, Fortune; “Does the FBI's marijuana policy breed dishonest applicants?” Fortune; May 28, 2014; http://fortune.com/2014/05/28/does-the-fbis-marijuana-policy-breed-dishonest-applicants/
|
‘These young men and women coming in today, they’ve all smoked a couple times. They all know our policy and they know that if they say they’ve ever smoked a joint, they’re out of the process. So they all lie.’ the FBI could not expect its applicants to have completely refrained, in their entire lives, from recreational marijuana usage Assuming that incoming agents know the specific policy, they’re still, in a sense, encouraged to lie. A potential FBI techie who just smoked a joint the day before is incentivized to claim he hasn’t smoked in three years.
|
These young men and women coming in they’ve all smoked a couple times. They know our policy . So they all lie.’ Assuming incoming agents know the policy they’re encouraged to lie. A potential FBI techie who just smoked a j is incentivized to claim he hasn’t in three years
|
I said to our guys, ‘Look, I’m 42, most of you guys are 50, have you ever smoked marijuana?’ They said no, and I believed them. But I said, ‘These young men and women coming in today, they’ve all smoked a couple times. They all know our policy and they know that if they say they’ve ever smoked a joint, they’re out of the process. So they all lie.’ And they said, ‘We never really thought about it that way.’ So I asked, ‘Do we want our new agents’ first interaction with the Bureau to be a lie?’ So I changed the policy. A lot of guys said, ‘This is wrong, boss, you can’t do it.’ I said, ‘My purpose is not to encourage people to smoke marijuana, but I don’t want people lying to us on their first application when they come in.’ So, if Louis smoked five joints in the past, never sold to anyone, as long as he discloses it, it’s okay. And that’s still the case and I think it’s gotten even more liberal. Freeh’s idea (alarming to many of his colleagues at the time) to refrain from even asking applicants whether they had smoked marijuana was too radical to be adopted; today, the question is still asked. The only change made back in Freeh’s day was that mere past and very minor usage would not be an automatic bar to employment. Today, the grace period is three years. But Freeh had the foresight to know that, realistically, the FBI could not expect its applicants to have completely refrained, in their entire lives, from recreational marijuana usage. And his point is still well-taken under today’s three-year policy: Assuming that incoming agents know the specific policy, they’re still, in a sense, encouraged to lie. A potential FBI techie who just smoked a joint the day before is incentivized to claim he hasn’t smoked in three years.
| 1,749 |
<h4>Recruits just lie</h4><p><strong>Roberts 14 </strong>Daniel, technology reporter, Fortune; “Does the FBI's marijuana policy breed dishonest applicants?” Fortune; May 28, 2014; http://fortune.com/2014/05/28/does-the-fbis-marijuana-policy-breed-dishonest-applicants/</p><p>I said to our guys, ‘Look, I’m 42, most of you guys are 50, have you ever smoked marijuana?’ They said no, and I believed them. But I said, <u><strong>‘<mark>These young men and women coming in</mark> today, <mark>they’ve all smoked a couple times. They</mark> all <mark>know our policy</mark> and they know that if they say they’ve ever smoked a joint, they’re out of the process<mark>. So they all lie.’</u></strong></mark> And they said, ‘We never really thought about it that way.’ So I asked, ‘Do we want our new agents’ first interaction with the Bureau to be a lie?’ So I changed the policy. A lot of guys said, ‘This is wrong, boss, you can’t do it.’ I said, ‘My purpose is not to encourage people to smoke marijuana, but I don’t want people lying to us on their first application when they come in.’ So, if Louis smoked five joints in the past, never sold to anyone, as long as he discloses it, it’s okay. And that’s still the case and I think it’s gotten even more liberal. Freeh’s idea (alarming to many of his colleagues at the time) to refrain from even asking applicants whether they had smoked marijuana was too radical to be adopted; today, the question is still asked. The only change made back in Freeh’s day was that mere past and very minor usage would not be an automatic bar to employment. Today, the grace period is three years. But Freeh had the foresight to know that, realistically, <u><strong>the FBI could not expect its applicants to have completely refrained, in their entire lives, from recreational marijuana usage</u></strong>. And his point is still well-taken under today’s three-year policy: <u><strong><mark>Assuming</mark> that <mark>incoming agents know the</mark> specific <mark>policy</mark>, <mark>they’re</mark> still, in a sense, <mark>encouraged to</mark> <mark>lie.</u></strong> <u><strong>A potential FBI techie who just smoked a j</mark>oint the day before <mark>is incentivized to claim he hasn’t</mark> smoked <mark>in three years</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
1NC
|
FBI
| 430,795 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,696 |
They don’t want to come anyway
|
Peterson 13
|
Peterson 13
|
Former NSA and CIA chief Gen. Michael Hayden went on to dismiss Snowden supporters as "nihilists, anarchists, activists, Lulzsec, Anonymous, twenty-somethings who haven't talked to the opposite sex in five or six years."¶ That probably wasn't the smartest thing to say because the government desperately needs hackers And usually, when you desperately need someone, implying that they're sex-starved, basement-dwelling, would-be terrorists isn't a good idea.
|
Hayden went on to dismiss Snowden supporters as "nihilists anarchists twenty-somethings who haven't talked to the opposite sex in five years That probably wasn't the smartest thing to say because the government desperately needs hackers implying that they're sex-starved terrorists isn't a good idea
|
Why a former NSA chief just made a big mistake by dissing hackers
By Andrea Peterson, Published: August 7 at 2:58 pm http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/why-a-former-nsa-chief-just-made-a-big-mistake-by-dissing-hackers/
Former NSA and CIA chief Gen. Michael Hayden speculated on Tuesday that hackers and transparency groups would turn to cyberterror attacks if the United States captured NSA leaker Edward Snowden. He went on to dismiss Snowden supporters as "nihilists, anarchists, activists, Lulzsec, Anonymous, twenty-somethings who haven't talked to the opposite sex in five or six years."¶ That probably wasn't the smartest thing to say because the government desperately needs hackers. And usually, when you desperately need someone, implying that they're sex-starved, basement-dwelling, would-be terrorists isn't a good idea.
| 857 |
<h4><strong>They don’t want to come anyway</h4><p>Peterson 13</p><p></strong>Why a former NSA chief just made a big mistake by dissing hackers</p><p>By Andrea Peterson, Published: August 7 at 2:58 pm http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/why-a-former-nsa-chief-just-made-a-big-mistake-by-dissing-hackers/</p><p><u><strong>Former NSA and CIA chief Gen. Michael <mark>Hayden</u></strong></mark> speculated on Tuesday that hackers and transparency groups would turn to cyberterror attacks if the United States captured NSA leaker Edward Snowden. He <u><strong><mark>went on to dismiss Snowden supporters as "nihilists</mark>, <mark>anarchists</mark>, activists, Lulzsec, Anonymous, <mark>twenty-somethings who haven't talked to the opposite sex in five</mark> or six <mark>years</mark>."¶ <mark>That probably wasn't the smartest thing to say because the government desperately needs hackers</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>And usually, when you desperately need someone, <mark>implying that they're sex-starved</mark>, basement-dwelling, would-be <mark>terrorists isn't a good idea</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
2NC
|
FBI
| 430,796 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,697 |
Artificial organs will be too expensive to stop illegal sales
|
O'Sullivan 11
|
O'Sullivan 11 Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html
|
The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards
|
The impact organ growing” has on the illegal trade will be determined by cost
|
The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems.
| 898 |
<h4>Artificial organs will be too expensive to stop illegal sales</h4><p><strong>O'Sullivan 11</strong> Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html</p><p><u><mark>The impact</mark> that this “<mark>organ growing” has on the illegal</mark> organ <mark>trade will </mark>undoubtedly <mark>be</mark> <mark>determined by</mark> the <mark>cost</mark> to the party in need of an organ;</u> it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, <u>if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards</u> to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems. </p>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,448 | 7 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,698 |
Cyberattacks won’t result in nuclear war --- airgapping solves
|
Green 2
|
Green 2 – editor of The Washington Monthly (Joshua, 11/11, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html)
|
There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale says Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts cyberterrorism is not anywhere near as serious as other physical threats people tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons The government is miles ahead when it comes to cybersecurity," says Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a computer security company Particularly the most sensitive military systems nuclear weapons they're "air-gapped," meaning that they're not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers Nuclear weapons also contain "permissive action links," mechanisms to prevent weapons from being armed without inputting codes carried by the president.) the Defense Department has been particularly vigilant to protect key systems by isolating them from the Net Terrorists could not gain control of our spacecraft, nuclear weapons, or any high-consequence asset," says Air Force Chief Information Officer John Gilligan. It's impossible to hijack a plane remotely, which eliminates the scenario in which planes are used as weapons. The CIA's classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI They've been paranoid about this forever,"
|
There is no compelling ev that any terrorist has resorted to computers it is impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale nuclear weapons they're "air-gapped and inaccessible to hackers (Nuc s also contain p a l s to prevent from being armed without codes carried by the president Terrorists could not gain control of our spacecraft, nuc s, or any asset They've been paranoid about this forever,"
|
There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," says Dorothy Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown University and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts. "Not only does [cyberterrorism] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it is not anywhere near as serious as other potential physical threats like car bombs or suicide bombers." Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn't a serious problem--it's just not one that involves terrorists. Interviews with terrorism and computer security experts, and current and former government and military officials, yielded near unanimous agreement that the real danger is from the criminals and other hackers who did $15 billion in damage to the global economy last year using viruses, worms, and other readily available tools. That figure is sure to balloon if more isn't done to protect vulnerable computer systems, the vast majority of which are in the private sector. Yet when it comes to imposing the tough measures on business necessary to protect against the real cyberthreats, the Bush administration has balked. Crushing BlackBerrys When ordinary people imagine cyberterrorism, they tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons, airliners, or military computers from halfway around the world. Given the colorful history of federal boondoggles--billion-dollar weapons systems that misfire, $600 toilet seats--that's an understandable concern. But, with few exceptions, it's not one that applies to preparedness for a cyberattack. "The government is miles ahead of the private sector when it comes to cybersecurity," says Michael Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a Virginia-based computer security company with government and private-sector clients. "Particularly the most sensitive military systems." Serious effort and plain good fortune have combined to bring this about. Take nuclear weapons. The biggest fallacy about their vulnerability, promoted in action thrillers like WarGames, is that they're designed for remote operation. "[The movie] is premised on the assumption that there's a modem bank hanging on the side of the computer that controls the missiles," says Martin Libicki, a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. "I assure you, there isn't." Rather, nuclear weapons and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security: they're "air-gapped," meaning that they're not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers. (Nuclear weapons also contain "permissive action links," mechanisms to prevent weapons from being armed without inputting codes carried by the president.) A retired military official was somewhat indignant at the mere suggestion: "As a general principle, we've been looking at this thing for 20 years. What cave have you been living in if you haven't considered this [threat]?" When it comes to cyberthreats, the Defense Department has been particularly vigilant to protect key systems by isolating them from the Net and even from the Pentagon's internal network. All new software must be submitted to the National Security Agency for security testing. "Terrorists could not gain control of our spacecraft, nuclear weapons, or any other type of high-consequence asset," says Air Force Chief Information Officer John Gilligan. For more than a year, Pentagon CIO John Stenbit has enforced a moratorium on new wireless networks, which are often easy to hack into, as well as common wireless devices such as PDAs, BlackBerrys, and even wireless or infrared copiers and faxes. The September 11 hijackings led to an outcry that airliners are particularly susceptible to cyberterrorism. Earlier this year, for instance, Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) described "the absolute havoc and devastation that would result if cyberterrorists suddenly shut down our air traffic control system, with thousands of planes in mid-flight." In fact, cybersecurity experts give some of their highest marks to the FAA, which reasonably separates its administrative and air traffic control systems and strictly air-gaps the latter. And there's a reason the 9/11 hijackers used box-cutters instead of keyboards: It's impossible to hijack a plane remotely, which eliminates the possibility of a high-tech 9/11 scenario in which planes are used as weapons. Another source of concern is terrorist infiltration of our intelligence agencies. But here, too, the risk is slim. The CIA's classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI's entire computer system. "They've been paranoid about this forever," says Libicki, adding that paranoia is a sound governing principle when it comes to cybersecurity. Such concerns are manifesting themselves in broader policy terms as well. One notable characteristic of last year's Quadrennial Defense Review was how strongly it focused on protecting information systems.
| 5,542 |
<h4>Cyberattacks won’t result in nuclear war --- airgapping solves</h4><p><strong>Green 2</strong> – editor of The Washington Monthly (Joshua, 11/11, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html)</p><p>There's just one problem: <u><strong><mark>There is no</mark> such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist </u></strong>(or anyone else)<u><strong> using a computer. Nor is there <mark>compelling ev</mark>idence <mark>that</mark> al Qaeda or <mark>any</mark> other <mark>terrorist</mark> organization <mark>has resorted to computers</mark> </u></strong>for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, <u><strong>computer security specialists believe <mark>it is</mark> virtually <mark>impossible to use the Internet to</mark> <mark>inflict death on a large scale</u></strong></mark>, and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," <u><strong>says</u></strong> Dorothy <u><strong>Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown</u></strong> University <u><strong>and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts</u></strong>. "Not only does [<u><strong>cyberterrorism</u></strong>] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it <u><strong>is not anywhere near as serious as other </u></strong>potential<u><strong> physical threats</u></strong> like car bombs or suicide bombers." Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn't a serious problem--it's just not one that involves terrorists. Interviews with terrorism and computer security experts, and current and former government and military officials, yielded near unanimous agreement that the real danger is from the criminals and other hackers who did $15 billion in damage to the global economy last year using viruses, worms, and other readily available tools. That figure is sure to balloon if more isn't done to protect vulnerable computer systems, the vast majority of which are in the private sector. Yet when it comes to imposing the tough measures on business necessary to protect against the real cyberthreats, the Bush administration has balked. Crushing BlackBerrys When ordinary<u><strong> people </u></strong>imagine cyberterrorism, they<u><strong> tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons</u></strong>, airliners, or military computers from halfway around the world. Given the colorful history of federal boondoggles--billion-dollar weapons systems that misfire, $600 toilet seats--that's an understandable concern. But, with few exceptions, it's not one that applies to preparedness for a cyberattack. "<u><strong>The government is miles ahead</u></strong> of the private sector <u><strong>when it comes to cybersecurity," says</u></strong> Michael <u><strong>Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a </u></strong>Virginia-based <u><strong>computer security company</u></strong> with government and private-sector clients. "<u><strong>Particularly the most sensitive military systems</u></strong>." Serious effort and plain good fortune have combined to bring this about. Take nuclear weapons. The biggest fallacy about their vulnerability, promoted in action thrillers like WarGames, is that they're designed for remote operation. "[The movie] is premised on the assumption that there's a modem bank hanging on the side of the computer that controls the missiles," says Martin Libicki, a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. "I assure you, there isn't." Rather, <u><strong><mark>nuclear</u></strong> <u><strong>weapons</u></strong></mark> and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security: <u><strong><mark>they're "air-gapped</mark>," meaning that they're not physically connected to the Internet <mark>and</mark> are therefore <mark>inaccessible to</mark> outside <mark>hackers</u></strong></mark>. <mark>(<u><strong>Nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s also contain</mark> "<mark>p</mark>ermissive <mark>a</mark>ction <mark>l</mark>ink<mark>s</mark>," mechanisms <mark>to prevent</mark> weapons <mark>from being armed without </mark>inputting <mark>codes carried by the president</mark>.)</u></strong> A retired military official was somewhat indignant at the mere suggestion: "As a general principle, we've been looking at this thing for 20 years. What cave have you been living in if you haven't considered this [threat]?" When it comes to cyberthreats, <u><strong>the Defense Department has been particularly vigilant to protect key systems by isolating them from the Net</u></strong> and even from the Pentagon's internal network. All new software must be submitted to the National Security Agency for security testing. "<u><strong><mark>Terrorists could not gain control of our spacecraft, nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s, or any</mark> </u></strong>other type of<u><strong> high-consequence <mark>asset</mark>," says Air Force Chief Information Officer John Gilligan.</u></strong> For more than a year, Pentagon CIO John Stenbit has enforced a moratorium on new wireless networks, which are often easy to hack into, as well as common wireless devices such as PDAs, BlackBerrys, and even wireless or infrared copiers and faxes. The September 11 hijackings led to an outcry that airliners are particularly susceptible to cyberterrorism. Earlier this year, for instance, Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) described "the absolute havoc and devastation that would result if cyberterrorists suddenly shut down our air traffic control system, with thousands of planes in mid-flight." In fact, cybersecurity experts give some of their highest marks to the FAA, which reasonably separates its administrative and air traffic control systems and strictly air-gaps the latter. And there's a reason the 9/11 hijackers used box-cutters instead of keyboards: <u><strong>It's impossible to hijack a plane remotely, which eliminates the </u></strong>possibility of a high-tech 9/11 <u><strong>scenario in which planes are used as weapons. </u></strong>Another source of concern is terrorist infiltration of our intelligence agencies. But here, too, the risk is slim. <u><strong>The CIA's classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI</u></strong>'s entire computer system. "<u><strong><mark>They've been paranoid about this forever,"</u></strong></mark> says Libicki, adding that paranoia is a sound governing principle when it comes to cybersecurity. Such concerns are manifesting themselves in broader policy terms as well. One notable characteristic of last year's Quadrennial Defense Review was how strongly it focused on protecting information systems. </p>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
2NC
|
FBI
| 44,822 | 72 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,699 |
Public health responses are weak in times of pandemics—trade is shut down and prevents cooperation—makes all your DA impacts more likely
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Public health responses are weak in times of pandemics—trade is shut down and prevents cooperation—makes all your DA impacts more likely</h4>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,797 | 1 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,700 |
CI—Debate is a question of competing political and discursive strategies. The aff can weigh the impacts of their advocacy against our political strategy.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>CI—Debate is a question of competing political and discursive strategies. The aff can weigh the impacts of their advocacy against our political strategy.</h4>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
AT: Framework
|
FBI
| 430,798 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,701 |
Evans 10—Jane, department of Military Strategic Studieshttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Evans%20PANDEMICS.pdf
Recent developments in medicine, hygiene, and public health have virtually eliminated widespread disease from industrialized countries like the U.S., making pandemics of new or emerging diseases the salient national security issue. A pandemic is an epidemic spread over a wide geographical area and affecting many people, and while a pandemic does not threaten the survival of humanity, it challenges the prosperity and stability of political institutions and human society. Andrew Price-Smith argues that “rapid worldwide changes may accelerate the diffusion, the lethality, and the resistance of the plethora of species within the microbial world” (5). For instance, changes in agricultural practices have created new ecological niches for disease – vast bovine, avian, and swine farms, in huge numbers and often in close proximity that can facilitate cross-species infection. Transportation of persons, animals, and food products around the world also presents a serious problem. New pathogens are emerging at an increasingly accelerated rate; “Alteration in the processing of cattle feed in the U.K. resulted in extended host range and emergence of [mad cow disease]… New opportunities can be created by climatic changes such as global warming and ecologic alterations facilitated through changed land use and movements of infected hosts, susceptible animals, or disease vectors” (Cutler 2). A disease can change in several important ways: it can jump to a new species (swine to human), change transmission method (blood-borne to aerosol dispersion), become more lethal, or become drug-resistant (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus – MRSA). Emerging diseases or those thought to be wiped out are becoming more of an issue with globalization and changing societal practices. There are many ways diseases can threaten national security. First, they cause increased rates of morbidity and mortality – people sicken and die, putting huge strains on public health and the nation’s workforce, leading to political instability, class strife, and economic volatility. For example, AIDS has led to numerous problems in many African countries. When marginalized or poor people cannot afford treatment and the government cannot or will not provide it, faith in the political system crumbles; class and ethnic conflict emerges and without a sufficient working class, GDP decreases and each problem begets more problems. Second, in the article “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” author Susan Peterson argues that the most direct threat posed by a disease to the United States arises from its vulnerability to biological weapons attack (45). It is important to note that the result of a naturally spreading disease and something like bioterrorism is one and the same. Failure to prevent a biological weapons attack results in the same outcome – infection of the population – and requires the same solution. Preparation for widespread disease should therefore be a key focus of national security. More indirect threats to national security include “the health of the armed forces and, most significantly, to the social, economic, and political stability of certain key regions – especially Russia – that also challenge American security” (Peterson 46). In this sense, diseases lower the ability of the State Department or the Department of Defense to adequately provide international security to the United States. Both internal and external national security is threatened by the spread of disease. In October 2009, the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC organized a conference that addressed many of the issues pertaining to the threat of biological weapons attacks. The Director of the Center referenced a recent National Intelligence Estimate that identified bioterrorism as the intelligence community’s most important WMD concern, because “the knowledge, equipment, and pathogens required to construct a biological weapon are now globally dispersed, and there is no single technological methodology chokepoint or process that can be regulated to prevent the development of biological weapons” (Gronvall 433). For many of the reasons listed so far in this paper, the outcome of a biological attack is particularly worrisome, necessitating a closer examination of malicious bio-threats. Unlike nuclear technologies, biological materials and information are easy to obtain, and the nature of biosciences is such that equipment, expertise, and infrastructure in the field supports an important function to society and cannot, nor should it, be limited. Any attempt to prevent the development of biological weapons would also limit much needed medical advancements. The CDC defines a bioterrorism attack as “the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants” (CDC/Bioterrorism). These agents have a high potential for abuse by terrorist groups for several reasons. First, a disease can be difficult to detect due to the incubation period between when an individual is infected and when symptoms begin to show. Second, the dispersion capability of some diseases allows a wider range of influence than an explosive device. Third, one bioweapon can have a multiplicative effect – although only 100 people are initially infected, with a disease like smallpox, each person can then infect multiple other people, who in turn pass it on to even more. Outside the anthrax attacks of 2001, the U.S. has yet to experience a serious confirmed bioterrorist attack. However, this does not mean the threat should be minimized until an incident such as 9/11 acts as the catalyst; biological weapons are a direct threat to national security. Of the more indirect threats to U.S. national security, there are three mechanisms through which infectious diseases cause instability within a foreign nation of the outbreak of military conflict. Peterson describes these as the balance of power among adversaries, health and human rights policy conflicts, and domestic instability (55). The first and most obvious mechanism involves one side of a dispute or conflict disproportionately suffering from a disease, leading to an imbalance of power and a possible preemptive attack. If a nation’s military capabilities are strongly affected by AIDS, this can present a vulnerable weakness. However, as with all three causal mechanisms, this type of situation will generally only occur when a pandemic is particularly severe or when the involved nations are unstable to begin with; this can be seen in warring African states with high HIV/AIDS incidence rates. The second mechanism concerns policies in response to an outbreak. For example, a nation may restrict freedom of movement and goods, or impose involuntary quarantine of infected individuals. While these policies likely will not cause conflict, they can lead to social and economic volatility if the practices persist. The third and most important mechanism is domestic instability. Consider AIDS, which largely affects people in their most economically productive years, and leads to the destruction of a country’s workforce, diminished productivity, and a dwindling professional and middle class (Peterson 59). Furthermore, the AIDS crisis is leaving behind a generation of orphans which the CIA says are “unable to cope and vulnerable to exploitation and radicalization,” as seen by the violence of alienated youths in Zimbabwe (Peterson 61). All of the examples above are representative of a critical pattern; as Price-Smith writes, “infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure” (121). The U.S. should be concerned on the level of national security, because it has been demonstrated repeatedly that failed states foster terrorism, regional instability, and often necessitate foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Evans 10—Jane, department of Military Strategic Studieshttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Evans%20PANDEMICS.pdf</h4><p>Recent developments in medicine, hygiene, and public health have virtually eliminated widespread disease from industrialized countries like the U.S., making pandemics of new or emerging diseases the salient national security issue. A pandemic is an epidemic spread over a wide geographical area and affecting many people, and while a pandemic does not threaten the survival of humanity, it challenges the prosperity and stability of political institutions and human society. Andrew Price-Smith argues that <u>“rapid worldwide changes may accelerate the diffusion, the lethality, and the resistance of the plethora of species within the microbial world</u>” (5). For instance, changes in agricultural practices have created new ecological niches for disease – vast bovine, avian, and swine farms, in huge numbers and often in close proximity that can facilitate cross-species infection. Transportation of persons, animals, and food products around the world also presents a serious problem. New pathogens are emerging at an increasingly accelerated rate; “Alteration in the processing of cattle feed in the U.K. resulted in extended host range and emergence of [mad cow disease]… New opportunities can be created by climatic changes such as global warming and ecologic alterations facilitated through changed land use and movements of infected hosts, susceptible animals, or disease vectors” (Cutler 2). A disease can change in several important ways: it can jump to a new species (swine to human), change transmission method (blood-borne to aerosol dispersion), become more lethal, or become drug-resistant (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus – MRSA). Emerging diseases or those thought to be wiped out are becoming more of an issue with globalization and changing societal practices. There are many ways diseases can threaten national security. First, <u>they cause increased rates of morbidity and mortality – people sicken and die, putting huge strains on public health and the nation’s workforce, leading to political instability, class strife, and economic volatility. </u>For example, AIDS has led to numerous problems in many African countries. <u>When marginalized or poor people cannot afford treatment and the government cannot or will not provide it, faith in the political system crumbles; class and ethnic conflict emerges</u> and without a sufficient working class, <u>GDP decreases</u> and each problem begets more problems. Second, in the article “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” author Susan Peterson argues that the most direct threat posed by a disease to the United States arises from its vulnerability to biological weapons attack (45). It is important to note that the result of a naturally spreading disease and something like bioterrorism is one and the same. Failure to prevent a biological weapons attack results in the same outcome – infection of the population – and requires the same solution. Preparation for widespread disease should therefore be a key focus of national security. More indirect threats to national security include “the health of the armed forces and, most significantly, to the social, economic, and political stability of certain key regions – especially Russia – that also challenge American security” (Peterson 46). In this sense, diseases lower the ability of the State Department or the Department of Defense to adequately provide international security to the United States. Both internal and external national security is threatened by the spread of disease. In October 2009, the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC organized a conference that addressed many of the issues pertaining to the threat of biological weapons attacks. The Director of the Center referenced a recent National Intelligence Estimate that identified bioterrorism as the intelligence community’s most important WMD concern, because “the knowledge, equipment, and pathogens required to construct a biological weapon are now globally dispersed, and there is no single technological methodology chokepoint or process that can be regulated to prevent the development of biological weapons” (Gronvall 433). For many of the reasons listed so far in this paper, the outcome of a biological attack is particularly worrisome, necessitating a closer examination of malicious bio-threats. Unlike nuclear technologies, biological materials and information are easy to obtain, and the nature of biosciences is such that equipment, expertise, and infrastructure in the field supports an important function to society and cannot, nor should it, be limited. Any attempt to prevent the development of biological weapons would also limit much needed medical advancements. The CDC defines a bioterrorism attack as “the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants” (CDC/Bioterrorism). These agents have a high potential for abuse by terrorist groups for several reasons. First, <u>a disease can be difficult to detect due to the incubation period between when an individual is infected and when symptoms begin to show</u>. Second, the dispersion capability of some diseases allows a wider range of influence than an explosive device. Third, one bioweapon can have a multiplicative effect – although only 100 people are initially infected, with a disease like smallpox, each person can then infect multiple other people, who in turn pass it on to even more. Outside the anthrax attacks of 2001, the U.S. has yet to experience a serious confirmed bioterrorist attack. However, this does not mean the threat should be minimized until an incident such as 9/11 acts as the catalyst; biological weapons are a direct threat to national security. Of the more indirect threats to U.S. national security, there are three mechanisms through which infectious diseases cause instability within a foreign nation of the outbreak of military conflict. Peterson describes these as the balance of power among adversaries, health and human rights policy conflicts, and domestic instability (55). The first and most obvious mechanism involves one side of a dispute or conflict disproportionately suffering from a disease, leading to an imbalance of power and a possible preemptive attack. If a nation’s military capabilities are strongly affected by AIDS, this can present a vulnerable weakness. However, as with all three causal mechanisms, this type of situation will generally only occur when a pandemic is particularly severe or when the involved nations are unstable to begin with; this can be seen in warring African states with high HIV/AIDS incidence rates. The second mechanism concerns policies in response to an outbreak. For example, a <u>nation may restrict freedom of movement and goods, or impose involuntary quarantine of infected individuals</u>. While these policies likely will not cause conflict, they can lead to social and economic volatility if the practices persist. The third and most important mechanism is domestic instability. Consider AIDS, which largely affects people in their most economically productive years, and leads to the destruction of a country’s workforce, diminished productivity, and a dwindling professional and middle class (Peterson 59). Furthermore, the AIDS crisis is leaving behind a generation of orphans which the CIA says are “unable to cope and vulnerable to exploitation and radicalization,” as seen by the violence of alienated youths in Zimbabwe (Peterson 61). All of the examples above are representative of a critical pattern; as Price-Smith writes, “infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure” (121). The U.S. should be concerned on the level of national security, because it has been demonstrated repeatedly that failed states foster terrorism, regional instability, and often necessitate foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. </p>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,799 | 1 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,702 |
They begs the question of the K—if we win the assumptions behind the aff are important and flawed, offering alternatives is key to education and negative ground.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>They begs the question of the K—if we win the assumptions behind the aff are important and flawed, offering alternatives is key to education and negative ground.</h4>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
AT: Framework
|
FBI
| 430,800 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,703 |
No burnout—research and empirics prove—their authors faultily assume resistance and hosts
Casadevall 12. (Arturo, MD and Ph.D from New York University. “The Future of Biological Warfare” Microbial Biotechnology. March 21 2012 Wiley http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/fullab)In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.
|
Casadevall 12.
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>No burnout—research and empirics prove—their authors faultily assume resistance and hosts</h4><p>Casadevall 12. </strong>(Arturo, MD and Ph.D from New York University. “The Future of Biological Warfare” Microbial Biotechnology. March 21 2012 Wiley http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/fullab)In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at <u>three <mark>major existential threats</mark> to humanity</u>: (i) large-scale <u>thermonuclear war</u> followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) <u>a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) <mark>infectious disease</mark>.</u> To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). <u>As to an existential threat from microbes <mark>recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence</mark> for the ability of certain <mark>pathogens</mark> to <mark>cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species</u></mark> (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, <u><mark>the view that</mark> infectious <mark>diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts</mark> and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant.</u> However, <u>that calculation <mark>does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host</mark>,</u> <u>such as the majority of fungal pathogens</u>. <u>For those types of host–microbe interactions <mark>it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species</mark> without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, <mark>from the viewpoint of existential threats</mark> environmental <mark>microbes could</mark> potentially <mark>pose a</mark> much <mark>greater threat to humanity</mark> than the known pathogenic microbes</u>, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), <u>especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution </u>or bioengineering.</p>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,801 | 1 | 17,089 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,242 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
UGA DH
|
Katsula
|
aff Organ Sales
1nc WHO DA ISIS Politics T--Must Tax ASPEC
2nc Politics
1nr Case
2nr Politics Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,704 |
K’s are key to negative strategy—it’s not 1995 anymore.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>K’s are key to negative strategy—it’s not 1995 anymore.</h4>
|
Kentucky Round 2 vs. GMU KL
|
AT: Framework
|
FBI
| 430,802 | 1 | 17,088 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,244 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
George Mason KL
|
Ryan Galloway
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels FBI)
1NC States Clear Statement Rule CP Federalism DA Treaties DA Security K
2NC K Case
1NR Case Treaties
2NR K Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
Subsets and Splits
Filtered Text and Summaries
This query fetches 100 rows where the text length is between 400 and 600 and ensures that summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing a simple filtered dataset but limited analytical insights.
Filtered Text Length 9900-1
Retrieves specific records with a text length between 9900 and 10100 characters, ensuring all text fields are not null, which provides limited insight into data distribution.
Filtered Text Length 4900-5
Returns a sample of records with text lengths between 4900 and 5100 where both summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are present, providing limited insight into the dataset's structure.
Filtered Text Length 3900-4
This query retrieves a limited set of records that meet specific criteria, which can be useful for a closer look at specific data points but doesn't provide deeper insights.
Filtered Text Length 2900-3
Retrieves a sample of rows with textLength between 2900 and 3100, ensuring none of the summary, spoken, or fulltext fields are null.
Filtered Text Length 1900-2
Retrieves a sample of records with text length between 1900 and 2100 characters where summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing limited filtering for data exploration.
Filtered Text Length 900-11
Retrieves a sample of entries with text lengths between 900 and 1100 characters, ensuring that the entries have both summaries and spoken text available, providing a basic filtering of the dataset.