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No nuclear terror.
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Chapman 12
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Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]
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Given their inability to do something simple Ohio State University professor John Mueller “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” Russia’s devices are no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.
|
Given their inability to do something simple “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems vanishingly small.” building a bomb requires millions a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus specialized skills Assuming jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. every step means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. al-Qaida has only a minuscule chance Given the formidable odds, it won’t bother.
|
Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.
| 2,150 |
<h4>No nuclear terror.</h4><p><u><strong>Chapman 12</u></strong> [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html<u><mark>]</p><p>Given their inability to do something simple</u></mark> — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued <u>Ohio State University professor John Mueller</u> in a presentation at the University of Chicago, <u><mark>“the likelihood</u></mark> that <u><mark>a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems</u></mark> to be <u><strong><mark>vanishingly small.”</u></strong></mark> The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from <u>Russia’s</u> inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those <u>devices are</u> probably <u>no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards</u> designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of <u><mark>building a bomb</u></mark>. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It <u><mark>requires millions </u></mark>of dollars, <u><mark>a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus</u></mark> people with <u><mark>specialized skills</u></mark>, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. <u><mark>Assuming</u></mark> the <u><mark>jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.</u></mark> Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like <u><mark>every</u></mark> other <u><mark>step</u></mark> in the entire process, <u><mark>means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.</u></mark> That has heartening implications. If <u><mark>al-Qaida </u></mark>embarks on the project, it <u><mark>has <strong>only a minuscule chance</u></strong></mark> of seeing it bear fruit. <u><mark>Given the formidable odds, <strong>it</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>won’t bother.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
2nc Constructed
| 18,931 | 81 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
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Navy
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4
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Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
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Bobbitt
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1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,406 |
Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is
|
Yudkowsky 06
|
Yudkowsky 06 [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.
|
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
Overly detailed reassurances can create false perceptions of safety Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people tend to overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
conjunction fallacy applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible
specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates as well as misdirecting investments into implausibly detailed risk scenarios
people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people underestimate the probability that one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)
In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively.
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)
Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios.
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.)
| 4,274 |
<h4>Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is</h4><p><strong>Yudkowsky</strong> <strong>06</strong> [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.</p><p><u>The <mark>conjunction fallacy</mark> similarly <mark>applies to futurological forecasts</u></mark>. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)</p><p>In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. </p><p><u><mark>According to probability theory, adding additional detail</mark> onto a story <mark>must render the story less probable</u></mark>. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. <u><mark>Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible</mark>.</u> </p><p>People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) </p><p><u>Overly detailed reassurances can</u> also <u>create false perceptions of safety</u>: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." <u>Vivid, <mark>specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates</mark> of security, <mark>as well as misdirecting</mark> defensive <mark>investments into</mark> needlessly narrow or <mark>implausibly detailed risk scenarios</u></mark>. </p><p><u>More generally, <mark>people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and</mark> <mark>underestimate disjunctive probabilities</u></mark>. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>overestimate the probability that</u></mark>, e.g., <u><mark>seven events of 90% probability will all occur</u></mark>. Conversely, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>underestimate the probability that</mark> at least <mark>one of seven events of 10% probability will occur</u></mark>. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) </p>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
|
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 11,979 | 232 | 17,075 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,295 |
A
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Navy
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1
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Steiner
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,459 |
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,407 |
No solve biopower, totalizing approaches to suicide bad
|
Osborne 6
|
Osborne 6 Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006
|
to associate suicide with resistance is to misunderstand the kind of action it embodies aesthetic model of suicide in its ideal-typical form embodies the idea of suicide as pure agency there can be no such thing, not only because of Blanchot's view that suicide is always mixed and double but also because suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others in its web and, on the other hand, because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics, even from within the aesthetic view of suicide itself what sort of a space would suicide 'retreats' possibly occupy other than a bio-political one
What count are not our theories but our practices and the experiences in which they are embedded invocation of the Stoic and other ideas of a beautiful death presupposes not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times but a precise - historical - understanding of the particular context of particular practices in connection with the ethics of one's life and the event of one's death Taken as a regulative ideal the idea of aesthetic suicide the existential suicide understood as an exercise of freedom has its uses taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation At the heart lurks not only agency but passivity Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge It is always ambiguous, always problematic it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case according to a concerned and open-minded empiricism
|
aesthetic model of suicide embodies pure agency there can be no such thing, not only because suicide is always mixed and double but also because suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others and because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics even from within the aesthetic view what sort of a space would suicide 'retreats' possibly occupy other than a bio-political one
What count are not our theories but the experiences in which they are embedded ideas of a beautiful death presuppose not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times but a particular context taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case
|
More than anything, to associate suicide with resistance is to misunderstand the kind of action it embodies. We do not actually need to take any particular moral stance to see that this is so. The aesthetic model of suicide, at least in its ideal-typical form, embodies the idea of suicide as pure agency. And yet there can be no such thing, not only because of Blanchot's view that suicide is always mixed and double, both agency and passivity, but also, on the one hand, because suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others - passively, one might say - in its web (one cannot evade the moral dimension so easily) and, on the other hand, because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics, even from within the aesthetic view of suicide itself. This latter point is not meant as a critique of Foucault (cf. Foucault 1994b). His position came in the context of some speculative remarks only. But we would need to ask, for instance, what sort of a space would the suicide 'retreats' that he invokes possibly occupy other than one which would itself be a bio-political one? The answer would have to come by way of the positing of some sort of cultural 'experience' appropriate to such an institutional form, an experience to be created perhaps but one which at the moment does not pre-exist its speculative invocation - and no doubt Foucault's remarks were meant only to invoke the possibility of such an experience, not to presume its actuality.
The lesson is no doubt an empirical even an empiricist one. What count are not our theories but our practices and the experiences in which they are embedded. No one knew this better than Foucault himself of course. His invocation of the Stoic and other ideas of a beautiful death presupposes not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times and at all periods but a precise - historical - understanding of the particular context of particular practices in connection with the ethics of one's life and the event of one's death (Foucault 2001). Taken as a regulative ideal, no doubt the idea of aesthetic suicide and its family relations - the suicide of free decision, the existential suicide understood as an exercise of freedom - has its uses, not least in combating the kind of moral dismissal of suicide that has been the norm throughout so much of history, as is so well described in the historical sections of The Savage God. But taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia. Indeed, More's Utopia is often credited with being one of the first works in the West to advocate suicide. But More's suicide retreats were in fact not crucibles of freedom but places of passive euthanasia. Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation. At the heart even of the generalized vision of aesthetic suicide, then, lurks not only agency but also passivity, the web of dependence. Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge. It is always ambiguous, always problematic, and certainly always double; it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case according, perhaps, to a concerned and open-minded empiricism.
| 3,413 |
<h4>No solve biopower, totalizing approaches to suicide bad</h4><p><strong>Osborne 6</strong> Thomas Osborne, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, “‘Fascinated dispossession’: suicide and the aesthetics of freedom,” Economy and Society Volume 34, Issue 2, 2005, 8/16/2006</p><p>More than anything, <u>to associate suicide with resistance is to misunderstand the kind of action it embodies</u>. We do not actually need to take any particular moral stance to see that this is so. The <u><mark>aesthetic model of suicide</u></mark>, at least <u>in its ideal-typical form</u>, <u><mark>embodies</mark> the idea of suicide as <mark>pure agency</u></mark>. And yet <u><mark>there can be no such thing, not only because</mark> of Blanchot's view that <mark>suicide is always mixed and double</u></mark>, both agency and passivity, <u><mark>but</u> <u>also</u></mark>, on the one hand, <u><mark>because</mark> <mark>suicide is hardly ever a matter for a single agent but entraps many others</u></mark> - passively, one might say - <u>in its web</u> (one cannot evade the moral dimension so easily) <u><mark>and</mark>, on the other hand, <mark>because of the difficulty of escaping the realm of bio-politics</mark>, <mark>even from within the aesthetic view</mark> of suicide itself</u>. This latter point is not meant as a critique of Foucault (cf. Foucault 1994b). His position came in the context of some speculative remarks only. But we would need to ask, for instance, <u><mark>what sort of a space would</u></mark> the <u><mark>suicide 'retreats'</mark> </u>that he invokes<u> <mark>possibly occupy other than</mark> </u>one which would itself be<u> <mark>a bio-political one</u></mark>? The answer would have to come by way of the positing of some sort of cultural 'experience' appropriate to such an institutional form, an experience to be created perhaps but one which at the moment does not pre-exist its speculative invocation - and no doubt Foucault's remarks were meant only to invoke the possibility of such an experience, not to presume its actuality.</p><p>The lesson is no doubt an empirical even an empiricist one. <u><mark>What count are not our theories but</mark> our practices and <mark>the experiences in which they are embedded</u></mark>. No one knew this better than Foucault himself of course. His <u>invocation of the Stoic and other <mark>ideas of a beautiful death presuppose</mark>s <mark>not some general view of suicide that would apply at all times</u></mark> and at all periods <u><mark>but a</mark> precise - historical - understanding of the <mark>particular context</mark> of particular practices</u> <u>in connection with the ethics of one's life and the event of one's death</u> (Foucault 2001). <u>Taken as a regulative ideal</u>, no doubt <u>the idea of aesthetic suicide</u> and its family relations - the suicide of free decision, <u>the existential suicide understood as an exercise of freedom</u> - <u>has its uses</u>, not least in combating the kind of moral dismissal of suicide that has been the norm throughout so much of history, as is so well described in the historical sections of The Savage God. But <u><mark>taken more or less normatively as a moral panacea it risks exposing us to a kind of moral romanticism, a compromised utopia</u></mark>. Indeed, More's Utopia is often credited with being one of the first works in the West to advocate suicide. But More's suicide retreats were in fact not crucibles of freedom but places of passive euthanasia. <u><mark>Suicide cannot unproblematically be the object of an uncompromised affirmation</u></mark>. <u>At the heart</u> even of the generalized vision of aesthetic suicide, then, <u>lurks not only agency but</u> also <u>passivity</u>, the web of dependence. <u><mark>Suicide cannot be the object of a finite moral or other kind of knowledge</u></mark>. <u>It is always ambiguous, always problematic</u>, and certainly always double; <u><mark>it cannot be legislated away by a politics of affirmation or an aesthetic of freedom - perhaps it cannot be the object of a verdict but only of our continued and probably futile attempts at understanding case by case</mark> according</u>, perhaps, <u>to a concerned and open-minded empiricism</u>.</p>
|
Defense
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Read
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2NC K
| 430,356 | 3 | 17,073 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,303 |
N
|
Navy
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5
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
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Corrigan
|
1AC PAS Biopower
1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns
2NR Ableism
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,408 |
Link applies just as much to donated organs – you can't give away what does not belong to you. A property perspective applies to transfers whether paid for or not
|
Boyer 12
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Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of the value, but the value still exists. Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value
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goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful. Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value.
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Empirical evidence aside, the more fundamental cause of commoditization of organs lies in the distinction between goods and services. Services are valuable only through performance. Therefore, by prohibiting performance, laws can remove all value since no one is willing to pay for nonperformance. n147 Contrarily, goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of the value, but the value still exists. Thus, laws regulating goods can only serve as wealth distribution mechanisms, determining who has access to the value of a good and who is restricted from it. n148 Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value. However, because the law treats organs as a [*335] service, n149 the law assumes that by proscribing the initial sale of an organ it can remove all of the organ's value. Also, it does not restrict access to that value from any of the actors in the transaction - with the exception of the donor. The end result is that the value of the organ, unassigned by the law, is commoditized as other actors in the market divide that value among themselves. n150
| 1,348 |
<h4>Link applies just as much to donated organs – you can't give away what does not belong to you. A property perspective applies to transfers whether paid for or not</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>Empirical evidence aside, the more fundamental cause of commoditization of organs lies in the distinction between goods and services. Services are valuable only through performance. Therefore, by prohibiting performance, laws can remove all value since no one is willing to pay for nonperformance. n147 Contrarily, <u><mark>goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful.</mark> Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of the value, but the value still exists.</u> Thus, laws regulating goods can only serve as wealth distribution mechanisms, determining who has access to the value of a good and who is restricted from it. n148 <u><mark>Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ,</mark> while services such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may facilitate the transaction, <mark>the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value</u>.</mark> However, because the law treats organs as a [*335] service, n149 the law assumes that by proscribing the initial sale of an organ it can remove all of the organ's value. Also, it does not restrict access to that value from any of the actors in the transaction - with the exception of the donor. The end result is that the value of the organ, unassigned by the law, is commoditized as other actors in the market divide that value among themselves. n150</p>
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2AC
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Property DA
|
Property – 2AC - NDT
| 430,691 | 6 | 17,071 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| 565,299 |
A
|
Ndt
|
3
|
Gonzaga Newton-Spraker
|
Deming, Gramzinski, Susko
|
1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets)
1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP
2NC - CP Case
1NR - Property Rights DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,409 |
Prefer conventional weapons.
|
Craig 11
|
Craig 11 [Campbell, professor of international relations at the University of Southampton Special Issue: Bringing Critical Realism and Historical Materialism into Critical Terrorism Studies Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 4, Issue 1, 2011, April, pages 115-124]
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the risk of nuclear terrorism is exceptionally small, along the lines of an asteroid hitting earth. terrorist groups are widely scattered and disorganized – precisely the wrong arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project.
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the risk of nuclear terrorism is , along the lines of an asteroid hitting earth. terrorist groups are – precisely the wrong arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project.
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Let us address each of his claims, in reverse order. Mueller suggests that the risk of an act of major nuclear terrorism is exceptionally small, along the lines of an asteroid hitting the earth. Drawing upon his powerful book against terrorism alarmism, Overblown (2006), he shows that serious anti-Western terrorist groups are today widely scattered and disorganized – precisely the wrong kind of arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project. He points out, as have other authors, that so-called ‘rogue’ nations, even if they obtain a bomb, are never going to hand it over to terrorists: to do so would utterly negate everything they had worked so hard for. A nation such as Iran that somehow decided to give its bomb to al-Qaeda (leaving aide their completely different objectives) would not only be handing over a weapon that it had spent years and billions to build, and giving up the prestige and deterrence the bomb supposedly confers, it would also be putting itself at acute risk of being on the receiving end of a retaliatory strike once the terrorists did their work. By what rationale would any leader make such a move? The potential costs would be astronomical, the benefits non-existent.
| 1,389 |
<h4>Prefer conventional weapons.</h4><p><u><strong>Craig 11</u></strong> [Campbell, professor of international relations at the University of Southampton Special Issue: Bringing Critical Realism and Historical Materialism into Critical Terrorism Studies Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 4, Issue 1, 2011, April, pages 115-124]</p><p>Let us address each of his claims, in reverse order. Mueller suggests that <u><mark>the risk of</u></mark> an act of major <u><mark>nuclear terrorism is <strong></mark>exceptionally small</strong><mark>, along the lines of an asteroid hitting</u></mark> the <u><mark>earth.</u></mark> Drawing upon his powerful book against terrorism alarmism, Overblown (2006), he shows that serious anti-Western<u><mark> terrorist groups are</u></mark> today <u><strong>widely scattered and disorganized</strong><mark> – precisely the wrong</u></mark> kind of <u><mark>arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project.</u></mark> He points out, as have other authors, that so-called ‘rogue’ nations, even if they obtain a bomb, are never going to hand it over to terrorists: to do so would utterly negate everything they had worked so hard for. A nation such as Iran that somehow decided to give its bomb to al-Qaeda (leaving aide their completely different objectives) would not only be handing over a weapon that it had spent years and billions to build, and giving up the prestige and deterrence the bomb supposedly confers, it would also be putting itself at acute risk of being on the receiving end of a retaliatory strike once the terrorists did their work. By what rationale would any leader make such a move? The potential costs would be astronomical, the benefits non-existent.</p>
| null | null |
2nc Constructed
| 267,753 | 5 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,410 |
Low probability impacts should not be evaluated-- even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities
|
Rescher 03
|
Rescher 03 (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)
|
small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off we can forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote possibility can be viewed as being of probability zero Accordingly, such remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect
|
small probabilities can be written off. we can forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of policy remote possibility can be viewed as being of probability zero remote possibilities can be dismissed, and outcomes set aside the real world” people treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero
|
On this issue there is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decision-oriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off. (De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, we can pretty well forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when x ≤ E, then x = 0. We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote possibility can—for all sensible purposes—be viewed as being of probability zero. Accordingly, such remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities. Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it: [P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect.
| 2,046 |
<h4>Low probability impacts should not be evaluated-- even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities</h4><p><strong>Rescher 03</strong> (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)</p><p>On this issue there is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decision-oriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take the view that <u><mark>small probabilities </mark>represent extremely remote prospect and <mark>can be written off</u>. </mark>(De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, <u><mark>we can</u> </mark>pretty well <u><mark>forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of </mark>practical <mark>policy</u></mark>, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when x ≤ E, then x = 0. <u>We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently <mark>remote possibility can</u></mark>—for all sensible purposes—<u><mark>be viewed as being of <strong>probability zero</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Accordingly, such <mark>remote possibilities can </mark>simply <mark>be dismissed, and </mark>the <mark>outcomes </mark>with which they are associated can accordingly be <mark>set aside</mark>.</strong> And in “<mark>the real world” people</mark> do in fact seem to be prepared to <mark>treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities</u>.</mark> Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it: [<u>P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. <mark>Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero</mark>. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect</u>.</p>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
|
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 44,134 | 45 | 17,075 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,295 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Steiner
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,411 |
No need to establish a property right for the plan
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding and unforeseen consequences, receives value and where and how organs should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just results in this increasingly important market.
]
the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is booming in Europe India, China, and Japan A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location while branching elsewhere in Europe, and/or Asia multinational companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia Reasons may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place India has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals The government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.
India is one of the few developing countries with a large production base in pharmaceutical products India‘s trade in pharmaceutical products has increased Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high in terms of technology and quality growth has been remarkable. The industry is fourth largest globally, in terms of volume, Potential growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is great. Multinationals are a part of India‘s pharmaceutical foundation Foreign companies entered the Indian market industrial policies emphasized the importance of foreign capital Indian FDI policies incentives invite foreign firms to start manufacturing facilities leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India and established manufacturing facilities. patent laws8 favourable for the MNCs, were in force India was attractive to foreign firms MNCs did well i They had good knowledge and technology to develop antibiotics and synthetic drugs
|
While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended sales. Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right
Biotech Industry is booming Europe India China, and Japan multinational companies are stepping in countries throughout Asia India has a few hundred biotech companies India creating ten new science parks financially supporting small biotech companies
India is large production base in pharmaceutical India‘s trade i has increased Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high Potential growth is great Multinationals are a part of India‘ foundation Indian market emphasized the importance of foreign capital Indian FDI policies incentives invite foreign firms to start manufacturing facilities leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India and established manufacturing facilities. patent laws8 favourable for the MNCs,
|
The law has struggled to define rights to one's own body in the face of increasing value created by new medical tech-nologies. The lack of appreciation for the new value of the body in the current law's prohibition of organ sales has cre-ated a system whereby control, rights, and value are severed from the donor and recipient and transferred to third par-ties. While there may be substantial reasons to continue to prohibit the inter vivos sale of human organs, the broader prohibition on all sales - including futures contracts - is not supported by these reasons. While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended to restrict their prohibitions to inter vivos sales. Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding and unforeseen consequences, nor would it require an enormity of legislative action to invent a new statutory framework. These limited changes would, however, recognize that individuals do have legal interests in their own tissues, giving them recourse should the tissues be misused. Most importantly, these limited changes would vest the power to designate who receives value and where and how organs should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just results in this increasingly important market.
Global biotech inevitable—solves their biotech good impacts
D'Haeze, ‘7 [Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board, http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html]
Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is still expanding – booming – in the United States and Europe, but also in major Asian countries such as India, China, and Japan. A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location in the United States or Europe while branching elsewhere in the United States, Europe, and/or Asia. Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but multinational companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia as well. Reasons for the latter development may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place. During recent years, India, for example, has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g., production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. The government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.
No intenral link--Biotech companies would just shift production to places like India
Husain 11 (Shahbaaz Husain, Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Article Assistant at Yogesh & Jain, Chartered Accountants, “Foreign Direct Investment In Indian Pharmaceutical Industry” cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/shahbaazInternreportdec2011.pdf)//kyan
Due to the pharmaceutical industry‘s capital and know- how intensity, most of the world‘s production is located in the developed countries. India is one of the few developing countries with a large production base in pharmaceutical products. India‘s trade in pharmaceutical products has increased a lot since the liberalization reforms and it has comparative advantages in trade with pharmaceutical products, both bulk drugs and formulations. The Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high among developing countries, in terms of technology and quality, and is today in the front rank of India‘s science based industries23 . The growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry has been remarkable. The industry is today the fourth largest globally, in terms of volume, and 13 th largest in terms of value24. The industry accounts for 8% of the global sales in volume but in terms of value it is barely 1%. The role of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the international market today is as a supplier of good quality, low cost generic bulk and formulation Potential growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is great. Nearly 65% of India‘s population does not enjoy comprehensive access to quality healthcare today. A large share of the population use alternative medicine and per capita consumption of drugs in India is one of the lowest in the world25 . Multinationals are, in addition to the public sector, a part of India‘s pharmaceutical foundation. Foreign companies entered the Indian market merely as trading companies with small investments. The new industrial policies emphasized the importance of foreign capital and industrial know- how. The Indian government carried out liberal FDI policies and incentives to invite foreign firms to start manufacturing facilities in order to get an inflow of know- how in the sector. The leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India and established manufacturing facilities. Subsequently, the multinationals brought in technology and international manufacturing practices26. Domestic firms were encouraged to tie up with foreign firms, with participation in capital, and there were collaboration agreements in the private sector. The foreign firm Hoechst established a research centre, which enhanced basic research in India27 . During this time product patent laws8, which were favourable for the MNCs, were in force India was attractive to foreign firms mainly due to its large market and increasing demand for drugs. At that time there was lack of competition in the Indian pharmaceutical industry and the MNCs did well in India. They had good knowledge and technology to develop antibiotics and synthetic drugs and advantage of their financial assets and management abilities. Consumer preference for foreign world- wide known drugs was also an advantage for the MNCs in India. They were aggressive in marketing and managed to create a market for themselves in branded products. The foreign companies had, more or less, a monopoly in the Indian pharmaceutical market at this time
| 7,714 |
<h4>No need to establish a property right for the plan</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p> The law has struggled to define rights to one's own body in the face of increasing value created by new medical tech-nologies. The lack of appreciation for the new value of the body in the current law's prohibition of organ sales has cre-ated a system whereby control, rights, and value are severed from the donor and recipient and transferred to third par-ties. While there may be substantial reasons to continue to prohibit the inter vivos sale of human organs, the broader prohibition on all sales - including futures contracts - is not supported by these reasons. <u><mark>While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended</u></mark> to restrict their prohibitions to inter vivos <mark>sales. <u>Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right</mark> with a potentially expansive holding and unforeseen consequences,</u> nor would it require an enormity of legislative action to invent a new statutory framework. These limited changes would, however, recognize that individuals do have legal interests in their own tissues, giving them recourse should the tissues be misused. Most importantly, these limited changes would vest the power to designate who<u><strong> receives value and where and how organs should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just results in this increasingly important market.</p><p></u>Global biotech inevitable—solves their biotech good impacts</p><p>D'Haeze, ‘7 </strong>[Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board, http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html<u>]</p><p></u>Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that <u>the <mark>Biotech</mark> and Pharmaceutical <mark>Industry is</u></mark> still expanding – <u><mark>booming</mark> </u>– <u>in </u>the United States and <u><mark>Europe</u></mark>, but also in major Asian countries such as <u><mark>India</mark>, <mark>China, and Japan</u></mark>. <u>A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location</u> in the United States or Europe <u>while branching elsewhere in</u> the United States, <u>Europe, and/or Asia</u>. Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but <u><mark>multinational companies</mark> have been or <mark>are</mark> <mark>stepping</mark> on land <mark>in countries throughout Asia</u></mark> as well. <u>Reasons </u>for the latter development <u>may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place</u>. During recent years, <u><mark>India</u></mark>, for example, <u><mark>has</mark> become the home of <mark>a few hundred</mark> registered <mark>biotech</mark> and pharmaceutical <mark>companies</mark> and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals</u>. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g., production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. <u>The government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in <mark>India</mark>, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, <mark>creating</mark> at least <mark>ten new science parks</mark> by 2010, <mark>financially</mark> <mark>supporting</mark> new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting <mark>small biotech</mark> and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up <mark>companies<strong></mark>.</p><p></u>No intenral link--Biotech companies would just shift production to places like India</p><p>Husain 11</strong> (Shahbaaz Husain, Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Article Assistant at Yogesh & Jain, Chartered Accountants, “Foreign Direct Investment In Indian Pharmaceutical Industry” cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/shahbaazInternreportdec2011.pdf)//kyan</p><p>Due to the pharmaceutical industry‘s capital and know- how intensity, most of the world‘s production is located in the developed countries. <u><mark>India is </mark>one of the few developing</u> <u>countries with a <mark>large production base in</mark> <mark>pharmaceutical</mark> products</u>. <u><mark>India‘s trade i</mark>n pharmaceutical products <mark>has increased</u></mark> a lot since the liberalization reforms and it has comparative advantages in trade with pharmaceutical products, both bulk drugs and formulations. The <u><mark>Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high</u></mark> among developing countries, <u>in terms of technology and quality</u>, and is today in the front rank of India‘s science based industries23 . The <u>growth</u> of the Indian pharmaceutical industry <u>has been remarkable. The industry is</u> today the <u>fourth largest globally, in terms of volume, </u>and 13 th largest in terms of value24. The industry accounts for 8% of the global sales in volume but in terms of value it is barely 1%. The role of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the international market today is as a supplier of good quality, low cost generic bulk and formulation <u><mark>Potential</mark> <mark>growth</mark> of the Indian pharmaceutical industry <mark>is great</mark>.</u> Nearly 65% of India‘s population does not enjoy comprehensive access to quality healthcare today. A large share of the population use alternative medicine and per capita consumption of drugs in India is one of the lowest in the world25 . <u><mark>Multinationals are</u></mark>, in addition to the public sector, <u><mark>a part of India‘</mark>s pharmaceutical</u> <u><mark>foundation</u></mark>. <u>Foreign companies entered the <mark>Indian market</u></mark> merely as trading companies with small investments. The new <u>industrial policies <mark>emphasized the importance of foreign capital</u></mark> and industrial know- how. The <u><mark>Indian</u></mark> government carried out liberal <u><mark>FDI policies</u></mark> and <u><mark>incentives</u></mark> to <u><mark>invite foreign firms to start <strong>manufacturing</mark> <mark>facilities</strong></mark> </u>in order to get an inflow of know- how in the sector. The <u><strong><mark>leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India</strong></mark> <mark>and established manufacturing facilities.</u></mark> Subsequently, the multinationals brought in technology and international manufacturing practices26. Domestic firms were encouraged to tie up with foreign firms, with participation in capital, and there were collaboration agreements in the private sector. The foreign firm Hoechst established a research centre, which enhanced basic research in India27 . During this time product <u><mark>patent laws8</u></mark>, which were <u><mark>favourable for the MNCs,</mark> were in force India was attractive to foreign firms </u>mainly due to its large market and increasing demand for drugs. At that time there was lack of competition in the Indian pharmaceutical industry and the <u>MNCs did well i</u>n India. <u>They had good knowledge and technology to develop antibiotics and synthetic drugs </u>and advantage of their financial assets and management abilities. Consumer preference for foreign world- wide known drugs was also an advantage for the MNCs in India. They were aggressive in marketing and managed to create a market for themselves in branded products. The foreign companies had, more or less, a monopoly in the Indian pharmaceutical market at this time</p>
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2AC
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Property DA
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Property – 2AC - NDT
| 112,946 | 9 | 17,071 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| 565,299 |
A
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Ndt
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3
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Gonzaga Newton-Spraker
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Deming, Gramzinski, Susko
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1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets)
1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP
2NC - CP Case
1NR - Property Rights DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
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KrMa
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
| 2 |
742,412 |
Link magnifier to any K of PAS – biopower doesn’t stop at the management of life, it also creates the conditions of suicide
|
Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd
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Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd
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Where I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality ucault is invested in the symbolic preservation of suicide, in deliberately belying those modes of suicidality which are the regulated result of biopower Foucault is never concerned about the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living Were he to treat the two forces (suicidal and biopolitical) contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation
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Where I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality Foucault is never concerned about the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living Were he to treat the two forces contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation
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Where precisely in Foucault I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in his (no doubt strategic) dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality, or the contemplation and/or completion of suicide. Like Maurice Blanchot, Foucault is invested in the symbolic preservation of suicide, in deliberately belying those modes of suicidality which are the regulated result of biopower. Where he is concerned with suicide Foucault is never concerned about suicide, about the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living, whose subjectivity consists precisely in exclusion and execration. Were he to treat the two forces (suicidal and biopolitical) contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation and commitment—which he does not precisely do. I will argue later that Blanchot, while he shares much of Foucault’s heartened attitude towards suicide, in fact provides the dialectical thinking about the subject that the discourse on what I have elected to call autodestruction in Foucault ostensibly lacks. What Blanchot’s capacious consideration of the question makes most apparent, though, is the extent to which Foucault’s calculated deferral of a dialectical consideration of suicide is precisely that, a calculation. But we must then ask, what is the object of this rhetorical and political calculation, and what are its rhetorical and political consequences?
| 1,587 |
<h4>Link magnifier to any K of PAS – biopower doesn’t stop at the management of life, it also creates the conditions of suicide</h4><p><strong>Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall,</strong> <strong>http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd</p><p><u></strong><mark>Where</u></mark> precisely in Foucault <u><mark>I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in</mark> </u>his (no doubt strategic) <u><mark>dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality</u></mark>, or the contemplation and/or completion of suicide. Like Maurice Blanchot, Fo<u>ucault is invested in the symbolic preservation of suicide, in deliberately belying those modes of suicidality which are the regulated result of biopower</u>. Where he is concerned with suicide <u><mark>Foucault is never concerned about</u></mark> suicide, about <u><mark>the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living</u></mark>, whose subjectivity consists precisely in exclusion and execration. <u><mark>Were he to treat the two forces</mark> (suicidal and biopolitical) <mark>contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation</u></mark> and commitment—which he does not precisely do. I will argue later that Blanchot, while he shares much of Foucault’s heartened attitude towards suicide, in fact provides the dialectical thinking about the subject that the discourse on what I have elected to call autodestruction in Foucault ostensibly lacks. What Blanchot’s capacious consideration of the question makes most apparent, though, is the extent to which Foucault’s calculated deferral of a dialectical consideration of suicide is precisely that, a calculation. But we must then ask, what is the object of this rhetorical and political calculation, and what are its rhetorical and political consequences? </p>
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Defense
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Read
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2NC K
| 430,354 | 8 | 17,073 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,303 |
N
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Navy
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5
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
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Corrigan
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1AC PAS Biopower
1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns
2NR Ableism
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
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KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,413 |
This means only the alt can ever solve terrorism.
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Butler 4 (
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Butler 4 (Judith, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparitive Literature @ the University of California, Berkley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg 15-18)
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there a way to understand bin Laden as "born" from US imperialism we need to distinguish, between individual and collective responsibility. Those who commit acts of violence are surely responsible for them; they are agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be making a mistake if we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or "evil." to take the self-generated acts of the individual as our point of departure in moral reasoning is precisely to foreclose the possibility of questioning what kind of world gives rise to such individuals. How is it that radical violence becomes an option To ask these questions is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. It is, rather, to rethink the relation between conditions and acts Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? We ask these questions not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but to take a different sort of responsibility pursuing a wayward military solution, the United States perpetrates and displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of terrorist organizations to refuse this cycle of revenge means to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order to form it anew, and in the direction of non-violence and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds the events are not understandable without that history Only then do we reach the disposition to get to the "root" of violence, and begin to offer another vision of the future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying
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there a way to understand bin Laden as "born" from imperialism Those who commit acts of violence are formed, and we would mak a mistake if we reduced their actions to "evil." to take the individual as our point of departure is to foreclose questioning what kind of world gives rise to such To ask these questions is to rethink the relation between conditions and acts To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? We ask these questions to take a different sort of responsibility pursuing a military solution, the U S displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of errorist to refuse this cycle of revenge means to form it anew in the direction of non-violence Only then do we get to the "root" of violence, and offer another future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying
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So, is there a way, in Roy's terms, to understand bin Laden as "born" from the rib of US imperialism (allowing that he is born from several possible historical sources, one of which is, crucially, US imperialism), without claiming that US imperialism is solely responsible for his actions, or those of his ostensible network? To answer this question, we need to distinguish, provisionally, between individual and collective responsibility. But, then we need to situate individual responsibility in light of its collective conditions. Those who commit acts of violence are surely responsible for them; they are not dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be making a mistake if we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or "evil." Both the discourse of individualism and of moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts itself in public acts of denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in a causal chain that forms the meaning of accountability. But to take the self-generated acts of the individual as our point of departure in moral reasoning is precisely to foreclose the possibility of questioning what kind of world gives rise to such individuals. And what is this process of "giving rise"? What social conditions help to form the very ways that choice and deliberation proceed? Where and how can such subject formations be contravened? How is it that radical violence becomes an option, comes to appear as the only viable option for some, under some global conditions? Against what conditions of violation do they respond? And with what resources? To ask these questions is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. It is, rather, to rethink the relation between conditions and acts. Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned. We are at once acted upon and acting, and our "responsibility" lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do to transform them? Being acted upon is not fully continuous with acting, and in this way the forces that act upon us are not finally responsible for what we do. In a certain way, and paradoxically, our responsibility is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others. We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined. Only once we have suffered that violence are we compelled, ethically, to ask how we will respond to violent injury. What role will we assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that we make? To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous -439864526543000-434340045720000-428244011620500denunciation itself. But is this the same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its social transformation in such a way that non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian international relations remain the guiding ideal? -4343400183769000-446849510287000-426402589535000-4495800136207500We ask these latter questions not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but to take a different sort of responsibility for the global conditions of justice. As a result, it made sense after 9/11 to follow two courses of action at once: to find those who planned and implemented the violence and to hold them accountable according to international war crimes standards and in international courts of law, regardless of our skepticism about such institutions (skepticism can furnish grounds for reform or for the making of new law or new institutions for implementing law). In pursuing a wayward military solution, the United States perpetrates and displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of young Muslims to join terrorist organizations. This is poor thinking, strategically and morally. Ignoring its image as the hated enemy for many in the region, the United States has effectively responded to the violence done against it by consolidating its reputation as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the First World. That we now respond with more violence is taken as "further proof" that the United States has violent and anti-sovereign designs on the region. To remember the lessons of Aeschylus, and to refuse this cycle of revenge in the name of justice, means not only to seek legal redress for wrongs done, but to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order to form it anew, and in the -4251960-88138000-4239895-46990000-4596765-136906000-4322445-39941500direction of non-violence. -3971925159829500-445960562293500-43649901968500-43224457112000-430720577533500Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and non-violent cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds. This means, in part, hearing beyond what we are able to hear. And it means as well being open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy, in both its right- and left-wing forms. Can we hear that there were precedents for these events and even know that it is urgent to know and learn from these precedents as we seek to stop them from operating in the present, at the same time as we insist that these precedents do not "justify" the recent violent events? If the events are not understandable without that history, that does not mean that the historical understanding furnishes a moral justification for the events themselves. Only then do we reach the disposition to get to the "root" of violence, and begin to offer another vision of the future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying it, offering instead names for things that restrain us from thinking and acting radically and well about global options.
| 6,430 |
<h4>This means only the alt can ever solve terrorism.</h4><p><strong>Butler 4 (</strong>Judith, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparitive Literature @ the University of California, Berkley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg 15-18)</p><p>So, is <u><strong><mark>there a way</u></strong></mark>, in Roy's terms, <u><strong><mark>to understand bin Laden as "born" from</u></strong></mark> the rib of <u><strong>US <mark>imperialism</u></strong></mark> (allowing that he is born from several possible historical sources, one of which is, crucially, US imperialism), without claiming that US imperialism is solely responsible for his actions, or those of his ostensible network? To answer this question, <u><strong>we need to distinguish,</u></strong> provisionally, <u><strong>between individual and collective responsibility. </u></strong>But, then we need to situate individual responsibility in light of its collective conditions. <u><strong><mark>Those who commit acts of violence</mark> are surely responsible for them; they are</u></strong> not dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but <u><strong>agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals <mark>are formed, and we would</mark> be <mark>mak</mark>ing <mark>a mistake if we reduced their actions to</mark> purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or <mark>"evil."</mark> </u></strong>Both the discourse of individualism and of moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts itself in public acts of denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in a causal chain that forms the meaning of accountability. But <u><strong><mark>to take</mark> the self-generated acts of <mark>the individual as our point of departure</mark> in moral reasoning <mark>is</mark> precisely <mark>to foreclose</mark> the possibility of <mark>questioning what kind of world gives rise to such</mark> individuals.</u></strong> And what is this process of "giving rise"? What social conditions help to form the very ways that choice and deliberation proceed? Where and how can such subject formations be contravened? <u><strong>How is it that radical violence becomes an option</u></strong>, comes to appear as the only viable option for some, under some global conditions? Against what conditions of violation do they respond? And with what resources? <u><strong><mark>To ask these questions</mark> is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. It <mark>is</mark>, rather, <mark>to rethink the relation between conditions and acts</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned</u></strong>. We are at once acted upon and acting, and our "responsibility" lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do to transform them? Being acted upon is not fully continuous with acting, and in this way the forces that act upon us are not finally responsible for what we do. In a certain way, and paradoxically, our responsibility is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others. <u><strong>We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined</u></strong>. Only once we have suffered that violence are we compelled, ethically, to ask how we will respond to violent injury. What role will we assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that we make? <u><strong><mark>To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution?</mark> </u></strong>Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous -439864526543000-434340045720000-428244011620500denunciation itself. But is this the same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its social transformation in such a way that non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian international relations remain the guiding ideal? -4343400183769000-446849510287000-426402589535000-4495800136207500<u><strong><mark>We ask these</u></strong></mark> latter <u><strong><mark>questions </mark>not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but <mark>to take a different sort of responsibility</u></strong></mark> for the global conditions of justice. As a result, it made sense after 9/11 to follow two courses of action at once: to find those who planned and implemented the violence and to hold them accountable according to international war crimes standards and in international courts of law, regardless of our skepticism about such institutions (skepticism can furnish grounds for reform or for the making of new law or new institutions for implementing law). In <u><strong><mark>pursuing a</mark> wayward <mark>military solution, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates perpetrates and <mark>displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of</u></strong></mark> young Muslims to join <u><strong>t<mark>errorist</mark> organizations</u></strong>. This is poor thinking, strategically and morally. Ignoring its image as the hated enemy for many in the region, the United States has effectively responded to the violence done against it by consolidating its reputation as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the First World. That we now respond with more violence is taken as "further proof" that the United States has violent and anti-sovereign designs on the region. To remember the lessons of Aeschylus, and <u><strong><mark>to refuse this cycle of revenge</u></strong></mark> in the name of justice, <u><strong><mark>means</u></strong></mark> not only to seek legal redress for wrongs done, but <u><strong>to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order <mark>to form it anew</mark>, and <mark>in the </u></strong></mark>-4251960-88138000-4239895-46990000-4596765-136906000-4322445-39941500<u><strong><mark>direction of non-violence</u></strong></mark>. -3971925159829500-445960562293500-43649901968500-43224457112000-430720577533500Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and non-violent cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, <u><strong>and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds</u></strong>. This means, in part, hearing beyond what we are able to hear. And it means as well being open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy, in both its right- and left-wing forms. Can we hear that there were precedents for these events and even know that it is urgent to know and learn from these precedents as we seek to stop them from operating in the present, at the same time as we insist that these precedents do not "justify" the recent violent events? If <u><strong>the events are not understandable without that history</u></strong>, that does not mean that the historical understanding furnishes a moral justification for the events themselves. <u><strong><mark>Only then do we </mark>reach the disposition to <mark>get to the "root" of violence, and </mark>begin to <mark>offer another </mark>vision of the <mark>future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying</u></strong></mark> it, offering instead names for things that restrain us from thinking and acting radically and well about global options.</p>
| null | null |
2nc Constructed
| 311,824 | 7 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
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Navy
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4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Jo.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,414 |
Their authors misread Foucault – he didn’t actually think suicide is itself resistance, just that it illustrates a point about biopower – the aff doesn’t do anything. BUT their allegoricization of suicide as resistance trivializes the overwhelming misery and pain that produces suicide.
|
Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall,
|
Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd
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what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance Foucault’s concern with suicide is allegoric a peculiarly methodological tool used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific, emblematic scenario He is invested in what discursively is yielded up by preserving the singularity of suicide as an event that exceeds the regulative purview of biopower it is imperative that the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically” (the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower Foucault’s theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance
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what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance concern with suicide is allegoric a peculiarly methodological tool used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific emblematic scenario it is imperative that the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides) be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower, theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance
|
This equivocal passage from Foucault explodes the possibilities for theorizing suicide. But what, I wonder, are Foucault’s specific motivations for entering this particular dialectic —what productive “distortions” or epistemic agitations do his observations provide to the discourse on selbstmord, or “self-murder”? What use does Foucault make of caching these two critical sentences in Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality within a broader formulation of bio-power (a thing which, as we will see, is at once productive of and threatened by suicidality)? More precisely to the point: what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance vis-à-vis a technology of power that, in Foucault’s account, grows out of the seventeenth century? I contend that Foucault’s concern with suicide is allegoric. This is not to trivialize or understate the complexity of his diffuse consideration of the subject. What I mean here by allegoric is the sense that Walter Benjamin gives the term: a peculiarly methodological tool or turn used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific, emblematic scenario. Foucault is interested in the intersticiality and peripherality which suicide embodies: a thing which operates “at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life” (HS 139). He is invested, moreover, in what discursively is yielded up by preserving the singularity of suicide as an event that, precisely because of its singularity, exceeds the regulative purview of biopower. But it is imperative that the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically” (the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides) be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed. This move, it seems, can only be accomplished by means of a complicity with “sociological analysis” in considering the question of how and under what pretenses to intervene in suicide. Indeed, if we accept Michael J. Cholbi’s provocative and convincing claim that there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower, we are forced also to acknowledge that Foucault’s theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance. Additionally, in order to consider the broader question of the relationship between sovereignty and suicide I will look to an interview conducted by Elisabeth Roudinesco with Jacques Derrida, in which Derrida provides the possibility of thinking the death penalty as an event of disciplinary suicidalization. Derrida’s brief theorization—one might even call it an intimation—of the ways in which execution is made autodestruction, of the manner in which being condemned to death is discursively reformed into an event of taking one’s own life, is one which idiomatically exceeds the critical capacity of available theories and taxonomies of suicide, and will provide the primary means through which to consider a Derridean re-reading of biopolitics.
| 3,081 |
<h4>Their authors misread Foucault – he didn’t actually think suicide is itself resistance, just that it illustrates a point about biopower – the aff doesn’t do anything. BUT their allegoricization of suicide as resistance trivializes the overwhelming misery and pain that produces suicide. </h4><p><strong>Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall,</strong> http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd</p><p><strong>This equivocal passage from Foucault explodes the possibilities for theorizing suicide. But what, I wonder, are Foucault’s specific motivations for entering this particular dialectic —what productive “distortions” or epistemic agitations do his observations provide to the discourse on selbstmord, or “self-murder”? What use does Foucault make of caching these two critical sentences in Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality within a broader formulation of bio-power (a thing which, as we will see, is at once productive of and threatened by suicidality)? More precisely to the point: <u></strong><mark>what are the implications for framing suicide as a kind of resistance</u><strong></mark> vis-à-vis a technology of power that, in Foucault’s account, grows out of the seventeenth century? I contend that <u></strong>Foucault’s <mark>concern with suicide is allegoric</u><strong></mark>. This is not to trivialize or understate the complexity of his diffuse consideration of the subject. What I mean here by allegoric is the sense that Walter Benjamin gives the term: <u></strong><mark>a peculiarly methodological tool</u><strong></mark> or turn <u></strong><mark>used to explain a certain theory by reducing it to a specific</mark>, <mark>emblematic scenario</u><strong></mark>. Foucault is interested in the intersticiality and peripherality which suicide embodies: a thing which operates “at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life” (HS 139). <u></strong>He is invested</u><strong>, moreover, <u></strong>in what discursively is yielded up by preserving the singularity of suicide as an event that</u><strong>, precisely because of its singularity, <u></strong>exceeds the regulative purview of biopower</u><strong>. But <u></strong><mark>it is imperative that</mark> <mark>the consequential shortcomings of treating this matter “allegorically</mark>”</u><strong> <u></strong>(<mark>the likely deliberate disavowal of the bleakness and misery of real suicides</u><strong>) <u></strong>be resolved if a meaningful and engaged consideration of suicide is to be formed</u><strong></mark>. This move, it seems, can only be accomplished by means of a complicity with “sociological analysis” in considering the question of how and under what pretenses to intervene in suicide. Indeed, if we accept Michael J. Cholbi’s provocative and convincing claim that <u></strong><mark>there are situations in which suicide not only authorizes, but demands precisely the kind of coercive surveillance and brute interruption characteristic of the operations of biopower</u><strong>,</mark> we are forced also to acknowledge that <u></strong>Foucault’s <mark>theory of the suicidal astonishment needs some nuance</u><strong></mark>. Additionally, in order to consider the broader question of the relationship between sovereignty and suicide I will look to an interview conducted by Elisabeth Roudinesco with Jacques Derrida, in which Derrida provides the possibility of thinking the death penalty as an event of disciplinary suicidalization. Derrida’s brief theorization—one might even call it an intimation—of the ways in which execution is made autodestruction, of the manner in which being condemned to death is discursively reformed into an event of taking one’s own life, is one which idiomatically exceeds the critical capacity of available theories and taxonomies of suicide, and will provide the primary means through which to consider a Derridean re-reading of biopolitics.</p></strong>
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Defense
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Unread
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2NC K
| 430,354 | 8 | 17,073 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,303 |
N
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Navy
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5
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Florida Cone-Marchini
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Corrigan
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1AC PAS Biopower
1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns
2NR Ableism
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,415 |
None of their ev assumes organs
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Robertson 13
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Robertson 13 John A. Robertson,Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin Law School
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A main argument against paid organ donation is that it will crowd out the unpaid altruistic system,
Epstein Mahoney, and others have examined this claim and have found that the main data used to support it are drawn from situations that are greatly different than organ donation
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main argument against paid donation is owd out
Epstein Mahoney, and others found that the main data used to support it are drawn from situations that are greatly different than organ donation
|
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Winter, 2013 40 Hastings Const. L.Q. 221 ARTICLE: Paid Organ Donations and the Constitutionality of the National Organ Transplant Act lexis
3. Crowding Out Altruism
A main argument against paid organ donation is that it will undermine or crowd out the unpaid altruistic system, which itself is a public good. People who would otherwise donate without payment will now refuse to do so because others are paid, or will do so only if they are paid as well.
Richard Epstein, Julia Mahoney, and others have examined this claim and have found that the main data used to support it are drawn from situations that are greatly different than organ donation. n193 As Mahoney notes, "whether a particular reward will "crowd out,' "crowd in,' or have a "crowding neutral' effect ... is hard to predict." n194 She goes on to note that "most situations in which researchers have detected "crowding out' differ markedly from organ procurement." n195 She concludes that "until far more work is done, "crowding out' must remain an interesting, but unconvincing, hypothesis." n196 Richard Epstein also agrees. n197 At the very least such speculation would not in itself satisfy the stronger justification needed to ban paid live kidney donations when necessary to protect another person's life.
| 1,332 |
<h4>None of their ev assumes organs</h4><p><strong>Robertson 13</strong> John A. Robertson,Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin Law School</p><p>Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Winter, 2013 40 Hastings Const. L.Q. 221 ARTICLE: Paid Organ Donations and the Constitutionality of the National Organ Transplant Act lexis</p><p>3. Crowding Out Altruism</p><p><u>A <mark>main argument against paid</mark> organ <mark>donation</mark> <mark>is</mark> that it will </u>undermine or <u>cr<mark>owd out</mark> the unpaid altruistic system, </u>which itself is a public good. People who would otherwise donate without payment will now refuse to do so because others are paid, or will do so only if they are paid as well.</p><p>Richard <u><mark>Epstein</u></mark>, Julia <u><mark>Mahoney, and others</mark> have examined this claim and have <mark>found that the main data used to support it are drawn from situations that are greatly different than organ donation</u></mark>. n193 As Mahoney notes, "whether a particular reward will "crowd out,' "crowd in,' or have a "crowding neutral' effect ... is hard to predict." n194 She goes on to note that "most situations in which researchers have detected "crowding out' differ markedly from organ procurement." n195 She concludes that "until far more work is done, "crowding out' must remain an interesting, but unconvincing, hypothesis." n196 Richard Epstein also agrees. n197 At the very least such speculation would not in itself satisfy the stronger justification needed to ban paid live kidney donations when necessary to protect another person's life.</p>
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2AC
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1AR
|
Shortages
| 430,692 | 3 | 17,071 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| 565,299 |
A
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Ndt
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3
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Gonzaga Newton-Spraker
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Deming, Gramzinski, Susko
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1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets)
1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP
2NC - CP Case
1NR - Property Rights DA
2NR - DA Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,416 |
Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction
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Meskill 09
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Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)
|
Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs Why not also choose between them and other, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
|
Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the environmental armageddon this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential scenarios warming asteroid terrorists nuclear-weapons pandemic each risk on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different We get into our cars to buy coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed We are constantly risking death Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety Many movements exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
|
Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.
| 2,774 |
<h4>Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction</h4><p><strong>Meskill 09<u></strong> (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)</p><p></u>Tom <u><mark>Friedman's piece</u> </mark>today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He <u><mark>applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine"</u> </mark>(which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") <u><mark>to the </mark>risk of <mark>environmental armageddon</mark>. <strong>But <mark>this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant</strong></mark>.</u> It is intellectually incoherent because <u><mark>it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential </mark>disaster <mark>scenarios</mark>. In addition to the global-<mark>warming </mark>risk, there's also the <mark>asteroid</mark>-hitting-the-earth risk, the <mark>terrorists</mark>-with-<mark>nuclear-weapons </mark>risk</u> (Cheney's original scenario), <u>the super-duper-<mark>pandemic </mark>risk, etc. Since <mark>each </mark>of these <mark>risk</mark>s, <strong><mark>on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention</strong>, we cannot address all of them simultaneously</mark>. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs</u>. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? <u>Why not also choose between them and other,</u> much more cotidien, <u>things we value? <mark>Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different</u></mark>, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, <u>this is how we behave all the time. <mark>We get into our cars </mark>in order <mark>to buy </mark>a cup of <mark>coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed </mark>on the way to the coffee shop. <mark>We are constantly risking death</mark>, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. <mark>Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would</u> </mark>sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would <u><mark>neither </mark>be able to <mark>act, nor not act, <strong>since it would nowhere discover perfect safety</u></strong></mark>. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, <u>it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. <mark>Many </mark>religious <mark>movements</u> </mark>- for example the early Jesus movement - <u>have <mark>exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action</u></mark>. </p>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 46,317 | 378 | 17,075 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,295 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Steiner
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,417 |
The alternative’s resistance to US-China conflict is key to solve
|
Gries 5
|
Gries 5 [Peter Hays, The University of Colorado, Boulder, USA Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable? European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 11(2): 235–265]
|
we do not invariably pit our nations against other nations. Anti-foreignism is neither in our blood nor hardwired into our psyches. International competition is not the inexorable product of our identification with national groups. Nations do not act; individuals act. Like all peoples, Chinese are neither innately pacifist nor hardwired for conflict. Sino–American relations in the 21st century will not inevitably be conflictual. Individual agency plays a vital role. the actions of individual Chinese and Americans — both in the street and in the corridors of power — will determine whether our need to view our nations positively will lead to Sino–American conflict. social identity theory
|
Anti-foreignism is neither in our blood nor hardwired into our psyches competition is not the inexorable product of identification Nations do not act; individuals act Sino–American relations will not inevitably be conflictual. Individual agency plays a vital role the actions of individual Chinese and Americans — both in the street and corridors of power determine whether our need to view our nations positively will lead to Sino–American conflict.
|
International competition is no different. Although we all, to varying degrees, assimilate ourselves into our national groups and favor our fellow nationals over foreigners, we do not invariably pit our nations against other nations. Anti-foreignism is neither in our blood nor hardwired into our psyches. International competition is not — as Mercer (1995) suggests — the inexorable product of our identification with national groups. Fearon and Laitin’s (1996) quantitative findings on the relative non-occurrence of ethnic conflict support this argument. Assuming that competition precedes conflict, this article has focused on the transition from ingroup positivity to intergroup competition, the second and third stages of the four-stage model of the progression from ingroup identification to intergroup conflict. It has not, therefore, said much about the equally contingent transition between intergroup competition and intergroup conflict, stages three and four. Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin (1998) are right that this transition is a ‘phase shift’ — it is not a change in degree, but a change in kind demanding separate theoretical attention. I disagree with Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 438), however, when they assert that psychological theories cannot account for aggression. Just as I located comparison at the juncture between ingroup positivity and intergroup competition (stages two and three), I suggest that emotion lies at the juncture between intergroup competition and conflict (stages three and four).22 I thus join Mercer (1996) and Neta Crawford (2000) in calling for emotion to be brought back into the study of IR. The psychologies and sociologies of emotion in particular can teach us a great deal about when international competition will lead to war — and when it will not. Although a persuasive case for the pivotal role of affect in transforming competition (stage three) into violent conflict (stage four) requires separate treatment, a brief discussion of one specific emotion — anger — is warranted here to defend psychology from Brubaker and Laitin’s critique. Anger can restore status after it has been taken away unfairly. It ‘seems designed to rectify injustice’, one group of psychologists writes — ‘to reassert power or status, to frighten the offending person into compliance, to restore a desired state of affairs’ (Shaver et al., 1987: 1078). In Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, Barrington Moore (1978: 17) similarly argues that ‘vengeance means retaliation. It also means a reassertion of human dignity or worth, after injury or damage. Both are basic sentiments behind moral anger and the sense of injustice.’ Where Moore highlights the emotional, J.M. Barbalet (1998: 136) stresses the instrumental — ‘Vengefulness is an emotion of power relations. It functions to correct imbalanced or disjointed power relationships. Vengefulness is concerned with restoring social actors to their rightful place in relationships.’ Anger can thus simultaneously have both symbolic and instrumental dimensions. It is such ethical anger, I suggest, that can impel sustained conflict and violence.23 Indeed, Chinese nationalists frequently speak of injustice. Xiong Lei, for instance, writes in 1997’s passionate anti-American bestseller, The Plot to Demonize China, that ‘we do not seek to foment hatred of Americans, only to restore justice’ (Li and Liu, 1996: 83). The Chinese who threw bricks at the US Embassy in Beijing after the bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 were also impelled by an ethical anger that sought to right a wrong. They were genuinely angry — not, as Western pundits generally suggested, playthings in the hands of communist puppet masters. Chinese protesters sought retributive justice — to restore China’s proper place in international society (Gries, 2001). Righteous anger can impel intergroup competition into violent conflict. In this paper I have attempted to advance the theoretic debate over conflict in IR by bringing in agency and contingency. Nations do not act; individuals act. Like all peoples, Chinese are neither innately pacifist nor hardwired for conflict. Instead, history and culture shape how individual Chinese will construe the events of world politics. The social psychology of intergroup relations can then help explain whether they will choose cooperation or conflict in a given situation. Sino–American relations in the 21st century, therefore, will not inevitably be conflictual. Individual agency plays a vital role. It is the actions of individual Chinese and Americans — both in the street and in the corridors of power — that will determine whether our need to view our nations positively will lead to Sino–American conflict. By suggesting which conditions promote intergroup conflict and which diffuse it, social identity theory (SIT) can help us learn to live together, in peace.
| 4,904 |
<h4><u><strong>The alternative’s resistance to US-China conflict is key to solve</h4><p>Gries 5</strong> [Peter Hays, The University of Colorado, Boulder, USA Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable? European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 11(2): 235–265]</p><p></u>International competition is no different. Although we all, to varying degrees, assimilate ourselves into our national groups and favor our fellow nationals over foreigners, <u>we do not invariably pit our nations against other nations. <strong><mark>Anti-foreignism is neither in our blood nor hardwired into our psyches</strong></mark>. International <mark>competition is not</u></mark> — as Mercer (1995) suggests — <u><mark>the inexorable product of</mark> our <mark>identification</mark> with national groups.</u> Fearon and Laitin’s (1996) quantitative findings on the relative non-occurrence of ethnic conflict support this argument. Assuming that competition precedes conflict, this article has focused on the transition from ingroup positivity to intergroup competition, the second and third stages of the four-stage model of the progression from ingroup identification to intergroup conflict. It has not, therefore, said much about the equally contingent transition between intergroup competition and intergroup conflict, stages three and four. Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin (1998) are right that this transition is a ‘phase shift’ — it is not a change in degree, but a change in kind demanding separate theoretical attention. I disagree with Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 438), however, when they assert that psychological theories cannot account for aggression. Just as I located comparison at the juncture between ingroup positivity and intergroup competition (stages two and three), I suggest that emotion lies at the juncture between intergroup competition and conflict (stages three and four).22 I thus join Mercer (1996) and Neta Crawford (2000) in calling for emotion to be brought back into the study of IR. The psychologies and sociologies of emotion in particular can teach us a great deal about when international competition will lead to war — and when it will not. Although a persuasive case for the pivotal role of affect in transforming competition (stage three) into violent conflict (stage four) requires separate treatment, a brief discussion of one specific emotion — anger — is warranted here to defend psychology from Brubaker and Laitin’s critique. Anger can restore status after it has been taken away unfairly. It ‘seems designed to rectify injustice’, one group of psychologists writes — ‘to reassert power or status, to frighten the offending person into compliance, to restore a desired state of affairs’ (Shaver et al., 1987: 1078). In Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, Barrington Moore (1978: 17) similarly argues that ‘vengeance means retaliation. It also means a reassertion of human dignity or worth, after injury or damage. Both are basic sentiments behind moral anger and the sense of injustice.’ Where Moore highlights the emotional, J.M. Barbalet (1998: 136) stresses the instrumental — ‘Vengefulness is an emotion of power relations. It functions to correct imbalanced or disjointed power relationships. Vengefulness is concerned with restoring social actors to their rightful place in relationships.’ Anger can thus simultaneously have both symbolic and instrumental dimensions. It is such ethical anger, I suggest, that can impel sustained conflict and violence.23 Indeed, Chinese nationalists frequently speak of injustice. Xiong Lei, for instance, writes in 1997’s passionate anti-American bestseller, The Plot to Demonize China, that ‘we do not seek to foment hatred of Americans, only to restore justice’ (Li and Liu, 1996: 83). The Chinese who threw bricks at the US Embassy in Beijing after the bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 were also impelled by an ethical anger that sought to right a wrong. They were genuinely angry — not, as Western pundits generally suggested, playthings in the hands of communist puppet masters. Chinese protesters sought retributive justice — to restore China’s proper place in international society (Gries, 2001). Righteous anger can impel intergroup competition into violent conflict. In this paper I have attempted to advance the theoretic debate over conflict in IR by bringing in agency and contingency. <u><mark>Nations do not act; <strong>individuals act</mark>.</strong> Like all peoples, Chinese are neither innately pacifist nor hardwired for conflict.</u> Instead, history and culture shape how individual Chinese will construe the events of world politics. The social psychology of intergroup relations can then help explain whether they will choose cooperation or conflict in a given situation. <u><mark>Sino–American relations</mark> in the 21st century</u>, therefore, <u><strong><mark>will not inevitably be conflictual. Individual agency plays a vital role</mark>.</u></strong> It is <u><mark>the actions of individual Chinese and Americans — both in the street and</mark> in the <mark>corridors of power</mark> — </u>that <u>will <mark>determine whether our need to view our nations positively will lead to Sino–American conflict.</u></mark> By suggesting which conditions promote intergroup conflict and which diffuse it, <u>social identity theory</u> (SIT) <strong>can help us learn to live together, in peace.</p></strong>
| null | null |
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,693 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,418 |
Some suffering may be inevitable – but extreme suffering is unjustified
| null |
Edelglass, 6 (William, Department of Philosophy, Colby College in Maine, “Levinas on Suffering and Compassion,” Sophia, Volume 45, Issue 2, October 2006, pg. 43-59, SpringerLink, pdf, Tashma)
|
mild discomfort can be mastered by consciousness. as suffering increases and overwhelms the subject it becomes meaningless and evil Suffering that leaves the subject without resources is characterized by excessive passivity without consciousness. Suffering is outside the intending capacity of consciousness there is suffering in which exertion of hope is no longer possible. the essence of suffering isdisproportionate to our senses Suffering is a rupture of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys capacity for assimilating the world. Pain isolates itself in consciousness Suffering is an absurdity justifications ofextreme suffering are insensible to the unbearable pain they seek to legitimize. death in suffering menaces freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny who perpetrates violence This tyranny threatens dignity and identity breaking open totality and meaning for nothing extreme suffering that destroys capacity for human activity is generally addressed in the context of metaphysical questions of evil when it is severe and unjustified.
| null |
According to Levinas's phenomenology, mild discomfort can be mastered by consciousness. But, as suffering increases and overwhelms the subject, it becomes a pure passivity, meaningless and evil. Suffering that leaves the subject without resources, Levinas consistently emphasizes, is characterized by an excessive passivity. It is a submission without a synthesizing act of consciousness. Our senses in their receptivity to the world, phenomenologists insist, are still acting, constituting meaning, forming the material content of sensation. As a content of consciousness, suffering lends itself to phenomenological description, not unlike other sensations of vision, hearing, or touch. And yet, according to Levinas's phenomenology, suffering cannot be grasped, it is 'unassumable,' and this elusiveness is its 'content' (US91). Suffering is outside the intending capacity of consciousness or the apperceptive synthesizing activity of the Kantian 'I think.' Levinas thus speaks of the ambiguity of suffering as a consciousness of the refusal of order and this refusal itself. In suffering, Levinas argues, the refusal of meaning is itself a sensible quality: 'In the guise of "experienced" content, the way in which, with a consciousness, the unbearable is precisely not borne, the manner of this not-being-borne; which, paradoxically, is itself a sensation or a datum' (US92). Beyond the ambiguity of patience - the hope and activity of passivity that masters itself- Levinas insists, there is suffering in which even the exertion of the will as hope is no longer possible. Such suffering is an undergoing without initiative, a bearing of the world, a pure passivity not associated with an activity that senses pain as an object. Thus, the very content of suffering is passivity: 'passivity - that is, a modality - signifies as a quiddity' (US92). The passivity of suffering does not derive simply from a great intensity; the essence of suffering isdisproportionate to our senses, an excess beyond the measure of our faculties. Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we constitute through intending acts, Levinas argues, even suffering that is chosen cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole. Suffering is a rupture and disturbance of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys the capacity for systematically assimilating the world. 9 Pain isolates itself in consciousness, overwhelming consciousness with its insistence. Suffering, then, is an absurdity, 'an absurdity breaking out on the ground of signification.'1~ This absurdity is the eidetic character of suffering Levinas seeks to draw out in his phenomenology. Suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, to the various ways in which suffering is employed in character formation, the concerns of practical life, a community's desire for justice, and the needs of the state. Implicit in Levinas's texts is the insistence that the analysis of these sufferings calls for a distinction between the use of pain as a tool, a practice performed on the Other's body for a particular end, and the acknowledgement of the Other's lived pain. A consequence of Levinas's phenomenology is the idea that instrumental justifications ofextreme suffering necessarily are insensible to the unbearable pain they seek to legitimize. Strictly speaking, then, suffering is meaningless and cannot be comprehended or justified by rational argument. Meaningless, and therefore unjustifiable, Levinas insists, suffering is evil. Suffering, according to Levinas's phenomenology, is an exception to the subject's mastery of being; in suffering the subject endures the overwhelming of freedom by alterity. The will that revels in the autonomous grasping of the world, in suffering finds itself grasped by the world. The in-itself of the will loses its capacity to exert itself and submits to the will of what is beyond its grasp. Contrary to Heidegger, it is not the anxiety before my own death which threatens the will and the self. For, Levinas argues, death, announced in suffering, is in a future always beyond the present. Instead of death, it is the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny,' the work of a 'You,' a malicious other who perpetrates violence (TI239). This tyranny, Levinas argues, 'is more radical than sin, for it threatens the will in its very structure as a will, in its dignity as origin and identity' (TI237). Because suffering is unjustifiable, it is a tyranny breaking open my world of totality and meaning 'for nothing.' The gratuitous and extreme suffering that destroys the capacity for flourishing human activity is generally addressed by thinkers in European traditions in the context of metaphysical questions of evil (is evil a positive substance or deviation from the Good?), or problems of philosophical anthropology (is evil chosen or is it a result of ignorance?). For these traditions it is evil, not suffering, that is the great scandal, for they consider suffering to be evil only when it is bothsevere and unjustified.
| 5,162 |
<h4>Some suffering may be inevitable – but extreme suffering is unjustified</h4><p>Edelglass, 6 (William, Department of Philosophy, Colby College in Maine, “Levinas on Suffering and Compassion,” Sophia, Volume 45, Issue 2, October 2006, pg. 43-59, SpringerLink, pdf, Tashma)</p><p>According to Levinas's phenomenology, <u>mild discomfort can be mastered by consciousness.</u> But, <u><strong>as suffering increases and overwhelms the subject</u></strong>, <u><strong>it becomes</u></strong> a pure passivity, <u><strong>meaningless and evil</u></strong>. <u>Suffering that leaves the subject without resources</u>, Levinas consistently emphasizes, <u>is characterized by</u> an <u>excessive passivity</u>. It is a submission <u>without</u> a synthesizing act of <u>consciousness.</u> Our senses in their receptivity to the world, phenomenologists insist, are still acting, constituting meaning, forming the material content of sensation. As a content of consciousness, suffering lends itself to phenomenological description, not unlike other sensations of vision, hearing, or touch. And yet, according to Levinas's phenomenology, suffering cannot be grasped, it is 'unassumable,' and this elusiveness is its 'content' (US91). <u>Suffering is outside the intending capacity of consciousness</u> or the apperceptive synthesizing activity of the Kantian 'I think.' Levinas thus speaks of the ambiguity of suffering as a consciousness of the refusal of order and this refusal itself. In suffering, Levinas argues, the refusal of meaning is itself a sensible quality: 'In the guise of "experienced" content, the way in which, with a consciousness, the unbearable is precisely not borne, the manner of this not-being-borne; which, paradoxically, is itself a sensation or a datum' (US92). Beyond the ambiguity of patience - the hope and activity of passivity that masters itself- Levinas insists, <u><strong>there is suffering in which</u></strong> even the <u><strong>exertion of</u></strong> the will as <u><strong>hope is no longer possible.</u></strong> Such suffering is an undergoing without initiative, a bearing of the world, a pure passivity not associated with an activity that senses pain as an object. Thus, the very content of suffering is passivity: 'passivity - that is, a modality - signifies as a quiddity' (US92). The passivity of suffering does not derive simply from a great intensity; <u>the essence of suffering isdisproportionate to our senses</u>, an excess beyond the measure of our faculties. Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we constitute through intending acts, Levinas argues, even suffering that is chosen cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole. <u>Suffering is a rupture</u> and disturbance <u>of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys</u> the <u>capacity for</u> systematically <u>assimilating the world.</u> 9 <u>Pain isolates itself in consciousness</u>, overwhelming consciousness with its insistence. <u><strong>Suffering</u></strong>, then, <u><strong>is an absurdity</u></strong>, 'an absurdity breaking out on the ground of signification.'1~ This absurdity is the eidetic character of suffering Levinas seeks to draw out in his phenomenology. Suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, to the various ways in which suffering is employed in character formation, the concerns of practical life, a community's desire for justice, and the needs of the state. Implicit in Levinas's texts is the insistence that the analysis of these sufferings calls for a distinction between the use of pain as a tool, a practice performed on the Other's body for a particular end, and the acknowledgement of the Other's lived pain. A consequence of Levinas's phenomenology is the idea that instrumental <u>justifications ofextreme suffering</u> necessarily <u>are insensible to the unbearable pain they seek to legitimize.</u> Strictly speaking, then, suffering is meaningless and cannot be comprehended or justified by rational argument. Meaningless, and therefore unjustifiable, Levinas insists, suffering is evil. Suffering, according to Levinas's phenomenology, is an exception to the subject's mastery of being; in suffering the subject endures the overwhelming of freedom by alterity. The will that revels in the autonomous grasping of the world, in suffering finds itself grasped by the world. The in-itself of the will loses its capacity to exert itself and submits to the will of what is beyond its grasp. Contrary to Heidegger, it is not the anxiety before my own death which threatens the will and the self. For, Levinas argues, <u>death</u>, announced <u>in suffering</u>, is in a future always beyond the present. Instead of death, it is the pure passivity of suffering that <u>menaces</u> the <u>freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny</u>,' the work of a 'You,' a malicious other <u>who perpetrates violence</u> (TI239). <u><strong>This tyranny</u></strong>, Levinas argues, 'is more radical than sin, for it <u><strong>threatens</u></strong> the will in its very structure as a will, in its <u><strong>dignity</u></strong> as origin <u><strong>and identity</u></strong>' (TI237). Because suffering is unjustifiable, it is a tyranny <u><strong>breaking open</u></strong> my world of <u><strong>totality and meaning</u></strong> '<u><strong>for nothing</u></strong>.' The gratuitous and <u>extreme suffering that destroys</u> the <u>capacity for</u> flourishing <u>human activity is generally addressed</u> by thinkers in European traditions <u>in the context of metaphysical questions of evil</u> (is evil a positive substance or deviation from the Good?), or problems of philosophical anthropology (is evil chosen or is it a result of ignorance?). For these traditions it is evil, not suffering, that is the great scandal, for they consider suffering to be evil only <u>when it is</u> both<u>severe and unjustified.</p></u>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
|
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 249,113 | 35 | 17,075 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,295 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Steiner
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,419 |
Iran system has eliminated shortage and illicit market
|
Kelly 13
|
Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
|
the wide gap between organ supply and demand has led economists to propose market-based incentives Iran is the only country with a legal organ market
Following the legalization of financial incentives for organ donation in 1988, Iran's kidney waitlist disappeared in just over a decade The advent of a legal organ market destroyed the previously thriving underground Iranian market
|
Following legalization Iran's kidney waitlist disappeared in just over a decade a legal organ market destroyed the previously thriving underground Iranian market
|
Although the global consensus opposes commoditizing organs, the wide gap between organ supply and demand has led economists to [*1330] propose market-based incentives. n129 While some countries permit compensation for reasonable expenses associated with donation, n130 Iran is the only country with a legal organ market. n131 Prospective donors contact the Iranian Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA) and undergo medical and psychological examinations before attaining its approval. n132 Donors receive one year of free health insurance and a $ 1200 government subsidy, in addition to $ 2000-$ 5000 from recipients. n133 Recipients without the means to pay donors often seek funding from charities and nonprofit organizations. n134
Following the legalization of financial incentives for organ donation in 1988, Iran's kidney waitlist disappeared in just over a decade. n135 DATPA's medical screenings encouraged patients to pursue safer legal channels rather than risk buying unregulated organs in the underground market. n136 Additionally, DATPA's close monitoring displaced organ brokers and removed opportunities for financial exploitation. n137 The advent of a legal organ market destroyed the previously thriving underground Iranian market. n138 Only Iranian citizens may participate as donors and recipients, eliminating any legal opportunity for transplant tourism. n139
| 1,407 |
<h4>Iran system has eliminated shortage and illicit market</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p>Although the global consensus opposes commoditizing organs, <u>the wide gap between organ supply and demand has led economists to </u> [*1330] <u>propose market-based incentives</u>. n129 While some countries permit compensation for reasonable expenses associated with donation, n130 <u>Iran is the only country with a legal organ market</u>. n131 Prospective donors contact the Iranian Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA) and undergo medical and psychological examinations before attaining its approval. n132 Donors receive one year of free health insurance and a $ 1200 government subsidy, in addition to $ 2000-$ 5000 from recipients. n133 Recipients without the means to pay donors often seek funding from charities and nonprofit organizations. n134</p><p><u><mark>Following</mark> the <mark>legalization</mark> of financial incentives for organ donation in 1988, <mark>Iran's kidney waitlist disappeared in just over a decade</u></mark>. n135 DATPA's medical screenings encouraged patients to pursue safer legal channels rather than risk buying unregulated organs in the underground market. n136 Additionally, DATPA's close monitoring displaced organ brokers and removed opportunities for financial exploitation. n137 <u>The advent of <mark>a legal organ market destroyed the previously thriving underground Iranian market</u></mark>. n138 Only Iranian citizens may participate as donors and recipients, eliminating any legal opportunity for transplant tourism. n139</p>
|
2AC
|
1AR
|
Shortages
| 430,694 | 1 | 17,071 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| 565,299 |
A
|
Ndt
|
3
|
Gonzaga Newton-Spraker
|
Deming, Gramzinski, Susko
|
1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets)
1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP
2NC - CP Case
1NR - Property Rights DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,420 |
The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
|
many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number is higher The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations a severe organ shortage remains.
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ</mark>s</u>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number</mark> </u>of Americans <u>requiring organs <mark>is</mark> likely <mark>higher</u></mark>.3 <u>This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen</u>.4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u><mark>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors.</mark> The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used for transplantation</u>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations</u></mark>.9 <u>Despite the implementation of these strategies, <mark>a severe organ shortage remains</u>.</p></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,421 |
The doctrine of preemption is alive and well, ensures ongoing war
|
Elmer and Opel 8 GAL)
|
Elmer and Opel 8 (Greg- Director of the Infoscape research lab and Bell Globemedia Research Chair @ Ryerson University, and Andy, associate professor Dept. of Communication @ Florida State University, Preempting Dissent: The Politics of an Inevitable Future, p. 73-74 , GAL)
|
WHILE THE PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE is most often associated with the second Bush administration this is a much deeper perspective that continues to be both strengthened and challenged well into the next US administration At the same time, “faith” has been integrated and elevated into new levels of political discourse and policy moving beyond religious confines to include a fundamental trust in economic markets, foreign policy, and the day-to-day working of domestic and international security regimes. The coupling of preemptive logic and faith—based politics produces new forms of surveillance, policing, and a growing consensus on appropriate responses to dissent, security, and citizenship.
Preemption looks to the future to disable and displace rigorous political and democratic debate. The current preemptive strategy suggests a radical and at times complex relationship between the future and the present, where in effect the two become one. An unforeseeable future, and in the continuing “War on Terror,” by definition a dangerous one, cannot be tolerated. Thus, in the preemptive mindset, the worst-case scenarios must be taken as inevitable.
Monthly Review
This new age of U.S. imperialism will generate its own contradictions amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than generating a new "Pax Americana" the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts The greatest hope lies in a rising tide of revolt from below both in the United States and globally
|
WHILE THE PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE is most associated with Bush this is much deeper continues to be strengthened well into the next administration political discourse include a trust in foreign policy, and security regimes The coupling of preemptive logic and faith—based politics produces new forms of policing, and a growing consensus on appropriate responses
Preemption looks to disable political debate The current preemptive strategy suggests a radical relationship where An unforeseeable future cannot be tolerated the worst-case scenarios must be taken as inevitable.
imperialism will generate attempts by major powers to assert influence and weaker states to engage in "asymmetric war . Given the unprecedented destructiveness of weapons , the consequences for could be devastating beyond anything ever witnessed the U S may be paving global holocausts
|
WHILE THE PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE is most often associated with the second Bush administration, and for some perhaps more narrowly Dick Cheney’s so-called “1% solution” (Suskind, 2007), it is our contention that this is a much deeper and in many respects controversial perspective and policy that continues to be both strengthened and from time to time challenged well into the next US administration and even in countries where self-proclaimed progressives (Brown’s U.K., Rudd’s Australia) hold power. At the same time, “faith” has been integrated and elevated into new levels of political discourse and policy moving beyond the familiar religious confines to now include a fundamental trust in economic markets, foreign policy, and the day-to-day working of domestic and international security regimes. The coupling of preemptive logic and faith—based politics produces new forms of surveillance, policing, and a growing international consensus on appropriate responses to dissent, security, and citizenship.
Preemption, however, is a means to an end, one that, unlike other conservative projects, looks to the future to disable and displace rigorous political and democratic debate. Conservatism has more often than not been associated with the “good old times”: in the North American context, the 1 950s are often revered as the heyday of modern life born of a seemingly unbreakable nuclear family. Conservative preachers thus continue to extol a return to core family values. The current preemptive strategy; by comparison, suggests a radical and at times complex relationship between the future and the present, where in effect the two become one. An unforeseeable future, and in the continuing “War on Terror,” by definition a dangerous one, cannot be tolerated. Thus, in the preemptive mindset, the worst-case scenarios must be taken as inevitable.
Cycles of blowback cause extinction
Foster 2003 (John Bellamy, Monthly Review, July/August, “The new age of imperialism”)
This new age of U.S. imperialism will generate its own contradictions, amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than generating a new "Pax Americana" the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts. The greatest hope in these dire circumstances lies in a rising tide of revolt from below, both in the United States and globally. The growth of the antiglobalization movement, which dominated the world stage for nearly two years following the events in Seattle in November 1999, was succeeded in February 2003 by the largest global wave of antiwar protests in human history. Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and in such massive numbers in the attempt to stop an imperialist war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. The Vietnam Syndrome, which has so worried the strategic planners of the imperial order for decades, now seems not only to have left a deep legacy within the United States but also to have been coupled this time around with an Empire Syndrome on a much more global scale-something that no one really expected. This more than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed in the long run, and will prove to be its own-we hope not the world's-undoing.
| 3,689 |
<h4><strong>The doctrine of preemption is alive and well, ensures ongoing war</h4><p>Elmer and Opel 8</strong> (Greg- Director of the Infoscape research lab and Bell Globemedia Research Chair @ Ryerson University, and Andy, associate professor Dept. of Communication @ Florida State University, Preempting Dissent: The Politics of an Inevitable Future, p. 73-74 ,<u><strong> GAL)</p><p><mark>WHILE THE PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE is most</mark> often <mark>associated with</mark> the second <mark>Bush</mark> administration</u></strong>, and for some perhaps more narrowly Dick Cheney’s so-called “1% solution” (Suskind, 2007), it is our contention that <u><strong><mark>this is </mark>a <mark>much deeper</u></strong></mark> and in many respects controversial <u><strong>perspective</u></strong> and policy <u><strong>that <mark>continues to be </mark>both <mark>strengthened</mark> and</u></strong> from time to time <u><strong>challenged <mark>well into the next</mark> US <mark>administration</mark> </u></strong>and even in countries where self-proclaimed progressives (Brown’s U.K., Rudd’s Australia) hold power. <u><strong>At the same time, “faith” has been integrated and elevated into new levels of <mark>political</mark> <mark>discourse</mark> and policy moving beyond</u></strong> the familiar <u><strong>religious confines to</u></strong> now <u><strong><mark>include a</mark> fundamental <mark>trust in</mark> economic markets, <mark>foreign policy, and</mark> the day-to-day working of domestic and international <mark>security regimes</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The coupling of preemptive logic and faith—based politics produces new forms of</mark> surveillance, <mark>policing, and a growing</u></strong></mark> international <u><strong><mark>consensus on appropriate responses</mark> to dissent, security, and citizenship.</p><p><mark>Preemption</u></strong></mark>, however, is a means to an end, one that, unlike other conservative projects, <u><strong><mark>looks to</mark> the future to <mark>disable</mark> and displace rigorous <mark>political</mark> and democratic <mark>debate</mark>.</u></strong> Conservatism has more often than not been associated with the “good old times”: in the North American context, the 1 950s are often revered as the heyday of modern life born of a seemingly unbreakable nuclear family. Conservative preachers thus continue to extol a return to core family values. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>current</mark> <mark>preemptive strategy</u></strong></mark>; by comparison, <u><strong><mark>suggests</mark> <mark>a radical</mark> and at times complex <mark>relationship</mark> between the future and the present, <mark>where</mark> in effect the two become one. <mark>An unforeseeable future</mark>, and in the continuing “War on Terror,” by definition a dangerous one, <mark>cannot be tolerated</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Thus, in <mark>the</mark> preemptive mindset, the <mark>worst-case scenarios must be taken as inevitable.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Cycles of blowback cause extinction</p><p><strong>Foster 2003</strong> (John Bellamy, <u>Monthly Review</u>, July/August, “The new age of imperialism”)</p><p><u>This new age of U.S. <mark>imperialism will generate</mark> its own contradictions</u>, <u>amongst them <mark>attempts by </mark>other <mark>major powers to assert</mark> their <mark>influence</mark>, resorting to similar belligerent means, <mark>and</mark> all sorts of strategies by <mark>weaker states </mark>and non-state actors <mark>to engage in "asymmetric</mark>" forms of <mark>war</mark>fare</u><mark>.</mark> <u><mark>Given the unprecedented destructiveness of </mark>contemporary <mark>weapons</mark>, which are diffused ever more widely<mark>, the consequences for </mark>the population of the world <mark>could</mark> well <mark>be devastating beyond anything</mark> <mark>ever</mark> before <mark>witnessed</mark>. Rather than generating a new "Pax Americana" <mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>may be paving</mark> the way to new <mark>global holocausts</u></mark>. <u>The greatest hope</u> in these dire circumstances <u>lies in a rising tide of revolt from below</u>, <u>both in the United States and globally</u>. The growth of the antiglobalization movement, which dominated the world stage for nearly two years following the events in Seattle in November 1999, was succeeded in February 2003 by the largest global wave of antiwar protests in human history. Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and in such massive numbers in the attempt to stop an imperialist war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. The Vietnam Syndrome, which has so worried the strategic planners of the imperial order for decades, now seems not only to have left a deep legacy within the United States but also to have been coupled this time around with an Empire Syndrome on a much more global scale-something that no one really expected. This more than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed in the long run, and will prove to be its own-we hope not the world's-undoing.</p>
| null | null |
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,695 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,422 |
Research is done on tissue and cells, not organs
|
Erin and Harris 94
|
Erin and Harris 94 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson
|
let us draw a distinction between human biological materials. we divide these materials into two classes according to the use to which they are to be put: (i) those which are to be used for therapeutic purposes; and (ii) those which are to be utilized in research. In very general terms, this approximates to the distinction between organs and tissues/ cells respectively.
|
let us draw a distinction between human biological material we divide these into two cla (i) those which are to be used for therapeutic purposes; and (ii) those which are to be utilized in research this approximates to the distinction between organs and tissues/ cells respectively
|
We are about to propose a possible commercial scheme, but first let us draw a distinction between human biological materials. For reasons which will become apparent below we divide these materials into two classes according to the use to which they are to be put: (i) those which are to be used for therapeutic purposes; and (ii) those which are to be utilized in research. In very general terms, this approximates to the distinction between organs and tissues/ cells respectively. An organ is an aggregation of tissues constituting a structural unit with a particular function or functions. A tissue is a collection of cells, again with a specific function. Whilst John Moore’s spleen was removed as part of his therapy for hairy cell leukaemia, it was the tissues and cells of his spleen which were used in the derivation of the Mo cell line (Erin 1994). However, blood, a fluid tissue, defies such a taxonomy as it is put to both therapeutic and research purposes. [140]
| 969 |
<h4>Research is done on tissue and cells, not organs </h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 94</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson </p><p>We are about to propose a possible commercial scheme, but first <u><mark>let us draw a distinction between human biological material</mark>s.</u> For reasons which will become apparent below <u><mark>we divide</mark> <mark>these</mark> materials <mark>into two cla</mark>sses according to the use to which they are to be put: <mark>(i) those which are to be used for therapeutic purposes; and (ii) those which are to be utilized in research</mark>. In very general terms, <mark>this approximates to the distinction between organs and tissues/ cells respectively</mark>.</u> An organ is an aggregation of tissues constituting a structural unit with a particular function or functions. A tissue is a collection of cells, again with a specific function. Whilst John Moore’s spleen was removed as part of his therapy for hairy cell leukaemia, it was the tissues and cells of his spleen which were used in the derivation of the Mo cell line (Erin 1994). However, blood, a fluid tissue, defies such a taxonomy as it is put to both therapeutic and research purposes. [140]</p>
|
2AC
|
1AR
|
DA
| 430,696 | 1 | 17,071 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| 565,299 |
A
|
Ndt
|
3
|
Gonzaga Newton-Spraker
|
Deming, Gramzinski, Susko
|
1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets)
1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP
2NC - CP Case
1NR - Property Rights DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,423 |
1. This is overly generic evidence with no warrants – “threats real” is a question of the link debate and the aff mechanism that Knudsen obviously doesn’t take into account. If we win link arguments this evidence becomes irrelevant and proves they’re not rational risk assessment because they don’t challenge security in a useful way, they only deploy it to serve the worst purposes.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>1. This is overly generic evidence with no warrants – “threats real” is a question of the link debate and the aff mechanism that Knudsen obviously doesn’t take into account. If we win link arguments this evidence becomes irrelevant and proves they’re not rational risk assessment because they don’t challenge security in a useful way, they only deploy it to serve the worst purposes.</h4>
| null |
AT: Knudsen
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,697 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,424 |
Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. the likelihood any of them will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on driver licenses requiring all hospitals to request organ donation the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative Finally legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by donors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
| 9,339 |
<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the transplant industry has examined and adopted <mark>a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance.</mark> All of these, <mark>however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system.</mark> As a result, <mark>the likelihood</mark> that <mark>any of them</mark>, even in combination, <mark>will resolve the organ shortage is remote</u></mark>. <u><mark>At least seven such actions have been implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u>INCREASED <mark>EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on</mark> states’ <mark>driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u><mark>the</mark> </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES</u> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u><mark>Finally</mark>, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u><mark>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct</mark> </u>(explicit) <u><mark>costs incurred by</u></mark> such <mark>d<u>onors</mark> </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u><mark>We must conclude that none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u><mark>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,246 | 21 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,425 |
The shortage means many die
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME
The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME</p><p>The consequences of <u>our failure to adapt our</u> cadaveric <u>organ procurement policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u>suggests that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system.</mark> In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, <mark>the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents</mark> thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of </mark>the expected size of <mark>future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of<mark> 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage</mark>.</u> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,426 |
2. Knudsen concedes representations are key to threat assessment – pure state focus artificially collapses efforts toward deeper understanding.
|
Knudsen 1
|
Knudsen 1 [Olav F., Political Science at Sodertom, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization Security Dialogue September 2001 vol. 32 no. 3 355-368]
|
To the extent that one does focus on states, there is a different danger, which is to reify the state, to believe that it actually ‘is’ an actor with humanoid qualities. neorealists thinking undermines a significant theme of research The phenomenon of representation in itself is at the heart of what we study in IR
|
To the extent that one does focus on states, there is a different danger, which is to reify the state, to believe that it actually ‘is’ an actor with humanoid qualities. neorealists thinking undermines a significant theme of research The phenomenon of representation in itself is at the heart of what we study in IR
|
To the extent that one does focus on states, there is, on the other hand, a different danger, which is to reify the state, to believe that it actually ‘is’ an actor with humanoid qualities. 38 The injunction against this is, of course, another old and familiar one to generations of IR students. Again, too often the warning is mistaken as an argument against studying states as units, or ‘states-as-actors’. It is good practice, however, to refrain from talking about states as if they were humans. The worst sinners in this regard tend to be neorealists and their interlocutors. Their line of thinking potentially undermines a significant theme of research, already alluded to above: the transformation that occurs as actions performed by small groups or individual decisionmakers become perceived as actions performed by the state with which they are associated – that is, the state they are taken to represent. The phenomenon of representation in itself is at the heart of what we study in IR: the representation of the collective unit inward as well as outward. 39 Its problematic dimensions are as equally well shown in the life of trade unions as in the life of states – to illustrate the relativity of the oft-claimed uniqueness of IR.
| 1,243 |
<h4>2. Knudsen concedes representations are key to threat assessment – pure state focus artificially collapses efforts toward deeper understanding.</h4><p><u><strong>Knudsen 1</u></strong> [Olav F., Political Science at Sodertom, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization Security Dialogue September 2001 vol. 32 no. 3 355-368]</p><p><u><mark>To the extent that one does focus on states, there is</u></mark>, on the other hand, <u><mark>a different danger, which is to <strong>reify the state</strong>, to believe that it actually ‘is’ an actor with humanoid qualities.</u></mark> 38 The injunction against this is, of course, another old and familiar one to generations of IR students. Again, too often the warning is mistaken as an argument against studying states as units, or ‘states-as-actors’. It is good practice, however, to refrain from talking about states as if they were humans. The worst sinners in this regard tend to be <u><mark>neorealists</u></mark> and their interlocutors. Their line of <u><mark>thinking</u></mark> potentially <u><mark>undermines a significant theme of research</u></mark>, already alluded to above: the transformation that occurs as actions performed by small groups or individual decisionmakers become perceived as actions performed by the state with which they are associated – that is, the state they are taken to represent. <u><strong><mark>The phenomenon of representation in itself is at the heart of what we study in IR</u></strong></mark>: the representation of the collective unit inward as well as outward. 39 Its problematic dimensions are as equally well shown in the life of trade unions as in the life of states – to illustrate the relativity of the oft-claimed uniqueness of IR.</p>
| null |
AT: Knudsen
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,698 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,427 |
Waitlist underestimates the need for kidney transplants
|
Goodwin 9
|
Goodwin 9 MICHELE GOODWIN Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of Minnesota Law School. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:327 2009] CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM: A RESPONSE TO JAKE LINFORD
|
three quarters of the transplant waitlist consists of patients needing kidneys. At the end of February 2009, there were 83,447 registrants waiting for kidneys. that figure undercounts the actual number of patients that would benefit from a kidney transplant, because it does not account for the 485,000 Americans with end-stage renal disease, or the more than 341,000 who are on dialysis, those who are registered on Internet websites, like matchingdonor.com, or those who decided that the market might be far more expedient than waiting in the U.S
|
the waitlist does not account for the 485,000 Americans with end-stage renal disease, or the more than 341,000 who are on dialysis, those who are registered on Internet websites r those who decided that the market might be far more expedient than waiting in the U.S
|
Of the patients in line for organs, most need kidneys.29 In fact, three quarters of the transplant waitlist consists of patients needing kidneys. At the end of February 2009, there were 83,447 registrants waiting for kidneys.30 But that number tells us less than what we really need to know. For example, that figure undercounts the actual number of patients that would benefit from a kidney transplant, because it does not account for the 485,000 Americans with end-stage renal disease, or the more than 341,000 who are on dialysis, those who are registered on Internet websites, like matchingdonor.com, or those who decided that the black market might be far more expedient than waiting in the U.S. To be sure, the gains in organ donation pale in comparison with the number of registered patients who can expect to die before ever receiving a transplant.
| 856 |
<h4>Waitlist underestimates the need for kidney transplants</h4><p><strong>Goodwin 9</strong> MICHELE GOODWIN Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of Minnesota Law School. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:327 2009] CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM: A RESPONSE TO JAKE LINFORD</p><p>Of the patients in line for organs, most need kidneys.29 In fact, <u>three quarters of <mark>the</mark> transplant <mark>waitlist</mark> consists of patients needing kidneys. At the end of February 2009, there were 83,447 registrants waiting for kidneys.</u>30 But that number tells us less than what we really need to know. For example, <u>that figure undercounts the actual number of patients that would benefit from a kidney transplant, because it <mark>does not account for the 485,000 Americans with end-stage renal disease, or the more than 341,000 who are on dialysis, those who are registered on Internet websites</mark>, like matchingdonor.com, o<mark>r those who decided that the</u></mark> black <u><mark>market might be far more expedient than waiting in the U.S</u></mark>. To be sure, the gains in organ donation pale in comparison with the number of registered patients who can expect to die before ever receiving a transplant.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,583 | 3 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,428 |
WTO cred controls DSB cred
|
Sutherland 13
|
Sutherland 13 (1/20/13; Peter Sutherland: Former Director General of GATT, WTO, Co-chair of High-level Expert Group on Trade, set up by UK, German, Turkish, and Indonesian governments to examine world trading system; "The Bilateral Threat to Free Trade-WTO has a Credibility Problem"; www.neurope.eu/kn/article/bilateral-threat-free-trade-wto-has-credibility-problem.afm.)
|
The Doha Round of global trade talks appears to have died this year, almost without a whimper. While a small portion of the project may be saved, the essential reality is that this is a unique failure in the history of multilateral trade negotiations Today’s indifference is particularly, though not exclusively, evident in the United States In fact, what we have seen in recent years is an increasing rush to bilateral agreements by the major trading countries and blocs. This has apparently consumed virtually all of their attention. The WTO has been marginalized, and even what has already been achieved in the incomplete Doha Round appears unlikely to be delivered in a final agreement in the foreseeable future. The damage to the credibility of the WTO may yet prove lasting. One of the WTO’s great achievements the so-called Dispute Settlement Mechanism its continued success depends ultimately on the credibility of the WTO itself; it will inevitably suffer collateral damage from a failure of multilateral negotiations. Indeed, the current rush to bilateral trade agreements has been accompanied by a rise in protectionism. Next, no doubt, we will have the prospect of a bilateral free-trade agreement between the EU and the US. Trans-Pacific Partnership” to liberalize trade among the US and major Asian and Latin American economies. If either ever comes to pass a huge share of world trade would be conducted within a discriminatory framework
|
Doha a unique failure in the history of multilateral trade negotiations Today’s indifference is evident recent years increasing rush to bilateral agreements consumed all of their attention The WTO has been marginalized The damage to the credibility of the WTO may prove lasting Dispute Settlement Mechanism continued success depends ultimately on the credibility of the WTO itself it will suffer collateral damage from a failure of multilateral negotiations current rush to bilateral trade agreements accompanied by a rise in protectionism T P P comes to pass a huge share of world trade would be conducted within a discriminatory framework
|
TURKEY -ISTANBUL - The Doha Round of global trade talks appears to have died this year, almost without a whimper. While a small portion of the project may be saved, the essential reality is that this is a unique failure in the history of multilateral trade negotiations, which have transformed the global economy since World War II. Many of the seven previous rounds of negotiations – including the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – took years to complete, but none died of neglect or disinterest. Today’s indifference is particularly, though not exclusively, evident in the United States. President Barack Obama was silent on the issue in his re-election campaign, and breathed scarcely a word about it in his first campaign, too. One wonders whether what is at stake is even fully understood in some capitals. Successful multilateral trade negotiations have significantly shaped the world in which we live and have dramatically enhanced the lives of millions of people. Between 1960 and 1990, only one person in five lived in an economically open society; today, nine in ten do. The rule-based trading system developed by the GATT and the WTO has been embraced by virtually the entire global community. It has provided an effective road map for the former planned and import-substituting economies, facilitating their integration into the global market. Initially, “globalization” was a dirty word to some. But, even among its opponents, its value for poorer countries came to be recognized, as it helped to lift more than a billion people in Asia out of abject poverty. While much more needs to be done for Africa and parts of Latin America, the Doha Round was intended to assist in providing market access (and therefore opportunity) to many more in the developing world. The essence of the multilateral system consists in two principles: non-discrimination and national treatment. The former is described in the trade negotiators’ lexicon as the “most favored nation” principle, which essentially seeks to ensure that trade benefits provided to one country are provided to all. The latter requires member states to provide the same treatment to trading partners within national borders as that provided to nationals. The non-discrimination principle ensured that global trade did not become a “spaghetti bowl” of preferential bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, a multilateral framework for trade negotiations gave weaker states far more balanced conditions than they would face were they forced to negotiate bilaterally with the likes of China, the United States, or the European Union. In fact, what we have seen in recent years is an increasing rush to bilateral agreements by the major trading countries and blocs. This has apparently consumed virtually all of their attention. The WTO has been marginalized, and even what has already been achieved in the incomplete Doha Round appears unlikely to be delivered in a final agreement in the foreseeable future. The damage to the credibility of the WTO – once lauded as the greatest advance in global governance since the inspired institution-building of the immediate postwar period – may yet prove lasting. Worse, it could have a serious impact not merely on trade, but on political relationships more generally. One of the WTO’s great achievements has been the adjudication system that it provides – the so-called Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This independent body has been a resounding success, giving the world an effective quasi-judicial system to resolve disputes between trading partners. But its continued success depends ultimately on the credibility of the WTO itself; it will inevitably suffer collateral damage from a failure of multilateral negotiations. Indeed, the current rush to bilateral trade agreements has been accompanied by a rise in protectionism. For example, there have been 424 new measures of this kind in the EU since 2008. Furthermore, the EU’s non-discriminatory tariffs are fully applicable to only nine trading partners. Everyone else has “exceptional” treatment. Next, no doubt, we will have the prospect of a bilateral free-trade agreement between the EU and the US. An EU-Japan treaty is already in the wind, as is a “Trans-Pacific Partnership” to liberalize trade among the US and major Asian and Latin American economies. If either ever comes to pass, which I doubt, a huge share of world trade would be conducted within a discriminatory framework. Some recognize the risks. In May 2011, Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University and I co-chaired a High Level Group convened by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and Indonesia to attempt to move the multilateral process ahead. Our sponsors welcomed our recommendations, but that and similar efforts have gained little traction, leaving all countries rushing headlong toward a world full of uncertainty and risk. It is not too late to reverse the apparently inexorable tide of bilateralism. But the only way to do so is by proceeding with WTO negotiations. Even if the Doha Round cannot be concluded, there may be other routes, such as implementing what has already been agreed. Another alternative might be to advance multilateral negotiations among willing countries in specific areas, such as services, with other WTO members joining later. But if we are to move forward rather than revert to earlier, more dangerous times, the US, in particular, must reassert a constructive role in multilateralism. The US must lead again, as it did in the past. And now it must do so with China at its side.
| 5,702 |
<h4>WTO cred controls DSB cred</h4><p><strong>Sutherland 13</strong> (1/20/13; Peter Sutherland: Former Director General of GATT, WTO, Co-chair of High-level Expert Group on Trade, set up by UK, German, Turkish, and Indonesian governments to examine world trading system; "The Bilateral Threat to Free Trade-WTO has a Credibility Problem"; www.neurope.eu/kn/article/bilateral-threat-free-trade-wto-has-credibility-problem.afm.)</p><p>TURKEY -ISTANBUL - <u>The <mark>Doha</mark> Round of global trade talks appears to have died this year, almost without a whimper. While a small portion of the project may be saved, the essential reality is that this is <mark>a unique failure in the history of multilateral trade negotiations</u></mark>, which have transformed the global economy since World War II. Many of the seven previous rounds of negotiations – including the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – took years to complete, but none died of neglect or disinterest. <u><mark>Today’s indifference is</mark> particularly, though not exclusively, <mark>evident</mark> in the United States</u>. President Barack Obama was silent on the issue in his re-election campaign, and breathed scarcely a word about it in his first campaign, too. One wonders whether what is at stake is even fully understood in some capitals. Successful multilateral trade negotiations have significantly shaped the world in which we live and have dramatically enhanced the lives of millions of people. Between 1960 and 1990, only one person in five lived in an economically open society; today, nine in ten do. The rule-based trading system developed by the GATT and the WTO has been embraced by virtually the entire global community. It has provided an effective road map for the former planned and import-substituting economies, facilitating their integration into the global market. Initially, “globalization” was a dirty word to some. But, even among its opponents, its value for poorer countries came to be recognized, as it helped to lift more than a billion people in Asia out of abject poverty. While much more needs to be done for Africa and parts of Latin America, the Doha Round was intended to assist in providing market access (and therefore opportunity) to many more in the developing world. The essence of the multilateral system consists in two principles: non-discrimination and national treatment. The former is described in the trade negotiators’ lexicon as the “most favored nation” principle, which essentially seeks to ensure that trade benefits provided to one country are provided to all. The latter requires member states to provide the same treatment to trading partners within national borders as that provided to nationals. The non-discrimination principle ensured that global trade did not become a “spaghetti bowl” of preferential bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, a multilateral framework for trade negotiations gave weaker states far more balanced conditions than they would face were they forced to negotiate bilaterally with the likes of China, the United States, or the European Union. <u>In fact, what we have seen in <mark>recent years</mark> is an <mark>increasing rush to bilateral agreements</mark> by the major trading countries and blocs. This has apparently <mark>consumed</mark> virtually <mark>all of their attention</mark>. <strong><mark>The WTO has been marginalized</strong></mark>, and even what has already been achieved in the incomplete Doha Round appears unlikely to be delivered in a final agreement in the foreseeable future.</u> <u><strong><mark>The damage to the credibility of the WTO</u></strong></mark> – once lauded as the greatest advance in global governance since the inspired institution-building of the immediate postwar period – <u><mark>may </mark>yet<mark> prove lasting</mark>.</u> Worse, it could have a serious impact not merely on trade, but on political relationships more generally. <u>One of the WTO’s great achievements</u> has been the adjudication system that it provides – <u>the so-called <strong><mark>Dispute Settlement Mechanism</u></strong></mark>. This independent body has been a resounding success, giving the world an effective quasi-judicial system to resolve disputes between trading partners. But <u>its <strong><mark>continued success depends ultimately on the credibility of the WTO itself</strong></mark>; <mark>it will</mark> inevitably <mark>suffer collateral damage</mark> <mark>from a failure of multilateral negotiations</mark>. Indeed, the <mark>current rush to bilateral trade agreements</mark> has been <mark>accompanied by a rise in protectionism</mark>.</u> For example, there have been 424 new measures of this kind in the EU since 2008. Furthermore, the EU’s non-discriminatory tariffs are fully applicable to only nine trading partners. Everyone else has “exceptional” treatment. <u>Next, no doubt, we will have the prospect of a bilateral free-trade agreement between the EU and the US.</u> An EU-Japan treaty is already in the wind, as is a “<u><mark>T</mark>rans-<mark>P</mark>acific <mark>P</mark>artnership” to liberalize trade among the US and major Asian and Latin American economies.</u> <u>If either ever <mark>comes to pass</u></mark>, which I doubt, <u><strong><mark>a huge share of world trade would be conducted within a discriminatory framework</u></strong></mark>. Some recognize the risks. In May 2011, Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University and I co-chaired a High Level Group convened by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and Indonesia to attempt to move the multilateral process ahead. Our sponsors welcomed our recommendations, but that and similar efforts have gained little traction, leaving all countries rushing headlong toward a world full of uncertainty and risk. It is not too late to reverse the apparently inexorable tide of bilateralism. But the only way to do so is by proceeding with WTO negotiations. Even if the Doha Round cannot be concluded, there may be other routes, such as implementing what has already been agreed. Another alternative might be to advance multilateral negotiations among willing countries in specific areas, such as services, with other WTO members joining later. But if we are to move forward rather than revert to earlier, more dangerous times, the US, in particular, must reassert a constructive role in multilateralism. The US must lead again, as it did in the past. And now it must do so with China at its side.</p>
| null |
DSB
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 275,980 | 9 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,429 |
Organs from cadavers don’t solve
|
Fry-Revere 14
|
Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6
Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.
|
kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital no matter how the process for retrieving organs improves there will never be enough
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6
At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now, no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.
| 1,179 |
<h4>Organs from cadavers don’t solve</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p><u>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6</p><p></u>At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. <u>Today the number of <mark>kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. </mark>This is true <mark>because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital</mark>.</u> Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs<u> </u>for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now,<u> <mark>no matter how the process for retrieving organs</mark> from the dead <mark>improves</mark>, <mark>there will never be enough</mark> kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,248 | 7 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,430 |
The DSM will inevitably fail and developing nations will never be able to effectively engage because of structural issues with the DSM
|
Odano and Abedin, 2008 http://gsir.iuj.ac.jp/publications/pdf/EDP08-1.pdf
|
Odano and Abedin, 2008 Sumimaru, Shiga University, and Ziaul, Shiga University, “Insufficiency in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: Consequences and Implications for the Multilateral Trading System” http://gsir.iuj.ac.jp/publications/pdf/EDP08-1.pdf
|
two out of six Ministerial Conferences of the WTO completely failed as the countries at the negotiation table could not reach any agreeable solution the success of a multilateral trade negotiation depends on the power of the DSU to provide remedies against unfair trade practices Examining the provisions of the DSU it has considerable insufficiencies Because of the insufficiencies it is very difficult for a country, especially for the small-developing ones, to get adequate relief against unfair trade practices The provisions of the DSU only allow retaliatory measures against a country using unfair trade practices If a small-developing country is affected by such unfair trade practices it is impossible for that small-developing country to “retaliate against the developed country, because in reality most of the developing countries are heavily dependent on few developed countries the countries with considerable financial strength, versatile tradable items and large trade share not only tend to use the dispute settlement mechanism more but win more disputes than the countries with low financial strength if a dispute is prolonged then it may favor the developed countries at the expense of the small-developing ones. These results provide logic for the finding that the developing countries participate in fewer trade disputes Without changes and actions the WTO will always face difficulty ensuring fare trade and successful multilateral trade negotiations.
|
two out of six Ministerial Conferences of the WTO completely failed as the countries could not reach any solution the success of a multilateral trade negotiation depends on the power of the DSU Examining the provisions it has considerable insufficiencies. Because of the insufficiencies it is very difficult for a country, to get adequate relief provisions only allow retaliatory measures it is impossible for that country to “retaliate the countries with considerable financial strength, tend to win more disputes if a dispute is prolonged then it may favor the developed countries at the expense of the small-developing ones. Without changes the WTO will face difficulty ensuring fare trade and successful multilateral trade negotiations.
|
In many respects the WTO system is better than the old GATT system. It included all the GATT provisions plus improved by adding new Agreements covering key sectors and issues of international trade. Yet, two out of six Ministerial Conferences of the WTO completely failed as the countries at the negotiation table could not reach any agreeable solution.20 In addition, although the Doha Conference produced promising Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the commitments laid in the DDA have not yet been fulfilled. This paper assumes that the success of a multilateral trade negotiation depends on the power of the DSU to provide remedies against unfair trade practices,2 because if the remedial measures are not effective then it will induce violation of commitments. As a result, deadlocks in trade negotiations will fail the purpose of the Ministerial Conference. Examining the provisions of the DSU, this paper finds that it has considerable insufficiencies. Because of the insufficiencies it is practically very difficult for a country, especially for the small-developing ones, to get adequate relief against unfair trade practices. The provisions of the DSU only allow retaliatory measures against a country using unfair trade practices. If a small-developing country is affected by such unfair trade practices used by a developed country, then it is virtually impossible for that small-developing country to “retaliate” against the developed country, because in reality most of the developing countries are heavily dependent on few developed countries/regions, for example, to sell their exportable items. Our regression analyses show that the countries with considerable financial strength, versatile tradable items and large trade share not only tend to use the dispute settlement mechanism more but also win more disputes than the countries with low financial strength and small trade share. In addition, we also find that if a dispute is prolonged then it may favor the developed countries at the expense of the small-developing ones. These results provide logic for the empirical finding that the developing countries, especially the least-developed ones, participate in fewer trade disputes than the developed countries.21 Apparently the WTO does not have anything to do with the financial strength or the trade share of a country. However, the gap of financial power between the developed and the developing countries may be neutralized by providing the latter with intensified legal and technical assistance during the litigation process of a dispute. To encourage the developing countries to participate more in the dispute settlement process, the WTO should replace the provision of retaliation by introducing more meaningful measure, such as financial compensation instead of retaliation, in the system. 22 At the same time, the WTO should also take necessary steps to resolve the disputed matters within the time-frame stipulated in the DSU. Without these changes and actions the WTO will always face difficulty ensuring fare trade and successful multilateral trade negotiations.
| 3,093 |
<h4>The DSM will inevitably fail and developing nations will never be able to effectively engage because of structural issues with the DSM </h4><p><strong>Odano and Abedin, 2008</strong> Sumimaru, Shiga University, and Ziaul, Shiga University, “Insufficiency in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: Consequences and Implications for the Multilateral Trading System” <u><strong>http://gsir.iuj.ac.jp/publications/pdf/EDP08-1.pdf</p><p></u></strong>In many respects the WTO system is better than the old GATT system. It included all the GATT provisions plus improved by adding new Agreements covering key sectors and issues of international trade. Yet, <u><mark>two out of six Ministerial Conferences of the WTO <strong>completely failed</u></strong> <u>as the countries</mark> at the negotiation table <mark>could <strong>not reach</strong> any</mark> agreeable <mark>solution</u></mark>.20 In addition, although the Doha Conference produced promising Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the commitments laid in the DDA have not yet been fulfilled. This paper assumes that <u><mark>the success of a</mark> <mark>multilateral trade negotiation</u> <u>depends on the power of the DSU</mark> to provide remedies against unfair trade practices</u>,2 because if the remedial measures are not effective then it will induce violation of commitments. As a result, deadlocks in trade negotiations will fail the purpose of the Ministerial Conference. <u><mark>Examining the <strong>provisions</strong></mark> of the DSU</u>, this paper finds that <u><strong><mark>it has considerable insufficiencies</u></strong>. <u>Because of the insufficiencies it is</u> </mark>practically <u><strong><mark>very difficult</u></strong> <u>for a country,</mark> especially for the small-developing ones, <mark>to <strong>get adequate relief</strong></mark> against unfair trade practices</u>. <u>The <mark>provisions</mark> of the DSU <mark>only allow retaliatory measures</mark> against a country using unfair trade practices</u>. <u>If a small-developing country is affected by such unfair trade practices</u> used by a developed country, then <u><mark>it is</u></mark> virtually <u><strong><mark>impossible for that</mark> small-developing <mark>country to “retaliate</u></strong></mark>” <u>against the developed country, because in reality most of the developing countries are heavily dependent on few developed countries</u>/regions, for example, to sell their exportable items. Our regression analyses show that <u><mark>the countries with considerable financial strength,</mark> versatile tradable items and large trade share not only <mark>tend to</mark> use the dispute settlement mechanism more but </u>also <u><mark>win more disputes</mark> than the countries with low financial strength</u> and small trade share. In addition, we also find that <u><mark>if a dispute is <strong>prolonged</u></strong> <u>then it may favor the developed countries</u> <u><strong>at the expense of the small-developing ones.</u></strong></mark> <u>These results provide</u> <u>logic for the</u> empirical <u>finding that the developing countries</u>, especially the least-developed ones, <u>participate in fewer trade disputes</u> than the developed countries.21 Apparently the WTO does not have anything to do with the financial strength or the trade share of a country. However, the gap of financial power between the developed and the developing countries may be neutralized by providing the latter with intensified legal and technical assistance during the litigation process of a dispute. To encourage the developing countries to participate more in the dispute settlement process, the WTO should replace the provision of retaliation by introducing more meaningful measure, such as financial compensation instead of retaliation, in the system. 22 At the same time, the WTO should also take necessary steps to resolve the disputed matters within the time-frame stipulated in the DSU. <u><mark>Without</u></mark> these <u><strong><mark>changes</mark> and actions</u></strong> <u><mark>the WTO will</mark> <strong>always <mark>face difficulty ensuring fare trade and successful multilateral trade negotiations.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
DSB
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,618 | 13 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,431 |
Artificial organs don’t work
|
Adhikari 14
|
Adhikari 14 Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s
|
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html
According to Jordan Miller at Rice "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," . "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," . "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."
|
Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are several decades away from reaching human patients We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs there are dozens of cell types in these organs We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure
|
03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html
[According to Jordan Miller, assistant professor of bioengineering at Rice University]. "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," Miller said. "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," Miller pointed out. "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."
NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD
| 861 |
<h4>Artificial organs don’t work</h4><p><strong>Adhikari 14</strong> Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s </p><p>03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls <u>http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html</p><p></u>[<u>According to Jordan Miller</u>, assistant professor of bioengineering <u>at Rice</u> University]. <u>"<mark>Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are </mark>still <mark>several decades away from reaching human patients</mark>," </u>Miller said<u>. "<mark>We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs</mark>." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "<mark>there are dozens of cell types in these organs</mark>," </u>Miller pointed out<u>. "<mark>We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure</mark>."</p><p></u><strong>NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,249 | 7 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,432 |
Their meme is wrong—it underestimates the complexity of Chinese diplomacy and overestimates the amount of change.
|
Johnston ’13
|
Johnston ’13, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22951/how_new_and_assertive_is_chinas_new_assertiveness.html?breadcrumb=%2Ftopic%2F16%2Finternational_security_and_defense%3Fpage%3D14
|
China's “new assertiveness” meme suffers from two problems it underestimates the complexity of key episodes in Chinese diplomacy in 2010 and overestimates the amount of change the explanations for the new assertiveness claim suffer from unclear causal mechanisms and lack comparative rigor that would better contextualize China's diplomacy in some instances, China's policy has not changed; in others, it is actually more moderate; and in still others, it is a predictable reaction to changed external conditions. In only one case does one see more assertive Chinese rhetoric The speed and extent with which the newly assertive meme has emerged point to an understudied issue in international relations might constrain policy debates. The assertive China discourse may be a harbinger of this effect as a Sino-U.S. security dilemma emerges.
|
new assertiveness” meme underestimates the complexity Chinese diplomacy and overestimates the amount of change explanations suffer from unclear causal mechanisms and lack comparative rigor in some instances, China's policy has not changed; in others, it is actually more moderate; and in still others, it is a predictable reaction to changed external conditions the meme might constrain policy debates. The assertive China discourse may be a harbinger of this effect as a Sino-U.S. security dilemma emerges.
|
There has been a rapidly spreading meme in U.S. pundit and academic circles since 2010 that describes China's recent diplomacy as “newly assertive.” This “new assertiveness” meme suffers from two problems. First, it underestimates the complexity of key episodes in Chinese diplomacy in 2010 and overestimates the amount of change. Second, the explanations for the new assertiveness claim suffer from unclear causal mechanisms and lack comparative rigor that would better contextualize China's diplomacy in 2010. An examination of seven cases in Chinese diplomacy at the heart of the new assertiveness meme finds that, in some instances, China's policy has not changed; in others, it is actually more moderate; and in still others, it is a predictable reaction to changed external conditions. In only one case—maritime disputes—does one see more assertive Chinese rhetoric and behavior. The speed and extent with which the newly assertive meme has emerged point to an understudied issue in international relations—namely, the role that online media and the blogosphere play in the creation of conventional wisdoms that might, in turn, constrain policy debates. The assertive China discourse may be a harbinger of this effect as a Sino-U.S. security dilemma emerges.
| 1,264 |
<h4>Their meme is wrong—it underestimates the complexity of Chinese diplomacy and overestimates the amount of change.</h4><p><strong>Johnston ’13</strong>, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22951/how_new_and_assertive_is_chinas_new_assertiveness.html?breadcrumb=%2Ftopic%2F16%2Finternational_security_and_defense%3Fpage%3D14</p><p>There has been a rapidly spreading meme in U.S. pundit and academic circles since 2010 that describes <u>China's</u> recent diplomacy as “newly assertive.” This <u>“<mark>new assertiveness” meme </mark>suffers</u> <u>from</u> <u>two problems</u>. First, <u>it <strong><mark>underestimates the complexity</strong> </mark>of key episodes in <mark>Chinese diplomacy</mark> in 2010 <mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>overestimates the amount of change</u></strong></mark>. Second, <u>the <mark>explanations</mark> for the new assertiveness claim <mark>suffer from unclear causal mechanisms and lack comparative rigor</mark> that would better contextualize China's diplomacy </u>in 2010. An examination of seven cases in Chinese diplomacy at the heart of the new assertiveness meme finds that, <u><mark>in some instances, China's policy has not changed; in others, it is actually more moderate; and in still others, it is a predictable reaction to changed external conditions</mark>. In only one case</u>—maritime disputes—<u>does one see more assertive Chinese rhetoric</u> and behavior. <u>The speed and extent with which <mark>the</mark> newly assertive <mark>meme</mark> has emerged point to an understudied issue in international relations</u>—namely, the role that online media and the blogosphere play in the creation of conventional wisdoms that <u><mark>might</u></mark>, in turn, <u><mark>constrain policy debates. <strong>The assertive China discourse may be a harbinger of this effect as a Sino-U.S. security dilemma emerges.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
China
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,699 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,433 |
And they’re too expensive
|
Gopar 14
|
Gopar 14 Jennifer Julisa Gopar ans Dr. Rance LeFebvre 28 July 2014 COSMOS Cluster 7: Biomedical Sciences The Moral and Ethical Debate Regarding Artificial Organ Growth
http://cosmos.ucdavis.edu/archives/2014/Cluster7/Gopar_Jennifer_EthicsofGrowingOrgans.pdf
|
The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating Platt thinks that organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ he says. So it is still unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.
|
organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ it is unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.
|
With these possible outcomes taken consideration, it is now becoming clear that money will play an important role in artificial organ growth. If we begin producing artificial organs, will these be available to everyone? Or will these be only available to the wealthy? The whole purpose of artificial organ growth is to give hope to those waiting for an organ transplant. How would this fulfill that purpose if only the wealthy will be able to afford it? The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating, “[Jeffrey] Platt thinks that organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ he says. On the other hand, ‘I could get a pig for a couple of hundred dollars.’ But [Paolo] Macchiarini argues that organ engineering is in its infancy, and every advance improves efficiency and lowers cost. ‘What we did in 2008 in 6 months, we can now do in a few weeks,’ he says. ‘We do care about getting this to every patient.’ [Joseph] Vacanti adds that mass-producing artificial scaffolds will make organ engineering even more cost-effective. ‘When you scale them up, the bulk materials and manufacturing tech are extremely cheap,’ he says. ‘I think it’s going to be cheaper than growing lots of pigs.’” So it is still unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.
| 1,467 |
<h4><strong>And they’re too expensive</h4><p>Gopar 14</strong> Jennifer Julisa Gopar ans Dr. Rance LeFebvre 28 July 2014 COSMOS Cluster 7: Biomedical Sciences The Moral and Ethical Debate Regarding Artificial Organ Growth</p><p><u>http://cosmos.ucdavis.edu/archives/2014/Cluster7/Gopar_Jennifer_EthicsofGrowingOrgans.pdf</p><p></u>With these possible outcomes taken consideration, it is now becoming clear that money will play an important role in artificial organ growth. If we begin producing artificial organs, will these be available to everyone? Or will these be only available to the wealthy? The whole purpose of artificial organ growth is to give hope to those waiting for an organ transplant. How would this fulfill that purpose if only the wealthy will be able to afford it? <u>The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating</u>, “[Jeffrey] <u>Platt thinks that <mark>organ engineering is too</u> <u>costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over <strong>the entire GDP of a country</strong> to accomplish that,’</mark> he says.</u> On the other hand, ‘I could get a pig for a couple of hundred dollars.’ But [Paolo] Macchiarini argues that organ engineering is in its infancy, and every advance improves efficiency and lowers cost. ‘What we did in 2008 in 6 months, we can now do in a few weeks,’ he says. ‘We do care about getting this to every patient.’ [Joseph] Vacanti adds that mass-producing artificial scaffolds will make organ engineering even more cost-effective. ‘When you scale them up, the bulk materials and manufacturing tech are extremely cheap,’ he says. ‘I think it’s going to be cheaper than growing lots of pigs.’” <u>So <mark>it is</mark> still <mark>unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,251 | 5 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,434 |
The nationalism and anti-americanism hypothesis is an academic joke—Chinese leaders don’t care much about public views and prefer strategic maneuverability over restraint.
|
Johnston ’13
|
Johnston ’13, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf, International Security 37:4, p. 37-38
|
A second explanation for the new assertiveness is rising Chinese nationalism or anti-Americanism This is problematic few of the new assertiveness analyses provide indicators of rising nationalism, let alone show a dramatic spike in nationalist sentiment In fact the evidence for rising nationalism is mixed and depends on the indicators one uses Even if there had been a steep jump in nationalism in 2009, for it to have a causal effect one would have to demonstrate how and why in 2010 Chinese leaders decided to take rising nationalism into greater account when making foreign policy decisions. Proponents of the nationalism argument offer no theory about how popular sentiments are translated into foreign policy The explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity of the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost no systematic evidence In a political system where there are no electoral costs to ignoring public opinion, it is unclear why China’s authoritarian leaders would care much about public views China’s top leaders prefer maneuverability, not constraint.
|
explanation for the new assertiveness is rising Chinese nationalism or anti-Americanism This is problematic few of the new assertiveness analyses provide indicators of rising nationalism, let alone show a dramatic spike in nationalist sentiment vidence for rising nationalism is mixe Even if there had been a steep jump in nationalism for it to have a causal effect one would have to demonstrate how and why in 2010 Chinese leaders decided to take rising nationalism into greater account The explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity of the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost no systematic evidence there are no electoral costs to ignoring public opinion, it is unclear why China’s authoritarian leaders would care much about public views China’s top leaders prefer maneuverability, not constraint.
|
rising chinese nationalism.
A second explanation for the new assertiveness is rising Chinese nationalism or anti-Americanism or both. This is also a problematic explanation. For example, few of the new assertiveness analyses provide indicators of rising nationalism, let alone show a dramatic spike in nationalist sentiment just before 2010. In fact, empirically, the evidence for rising nationalism is mixed and depends on the indicators one uses. Some indicators suggest that the portion of the population with strongly anti-Japanese sentiment is increasing, but the portion of those with strongly anti-American views appears to be steady.80 Other indicators suggest that, while pride in nation is at high levels (and increasing),81 uncritical support for the government (a version of “China, love it or leave it”) is much lower.82 The denigration of American lifestyles and culture among the Chinese population appears to remain relatively low compared to criticisms of U.S. foreign policy.83 Even if there had been a steep jump in nationalism in 2009, for it to have a causal effect one would have to demonstrate how and why in 2010 Chinese leaders decided to take rising nationalism into greater account when making foreign policy decisions. Proponents of the nationalism argument offer no theory about how popular sentiments are translated into foreign policy. The explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity of the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost no systematic evidence as yet. In a political system where there are no electoral costs to ignoring public opinion, it is unclear why China’s authoritarian leaders would care much about public views. Nor is it clear that China’s top leaders would want public opinion to matter on strategically important questions—they prefer maneuverability, not constraint.
| 1,866 |
<h4>The nationalism and anti-americanism hypothesis is an <u>academic joke</u>—Chinese leaders don’t care much about public views and prefer strategic maneuverability over restraint.</h4><p><strong>Johnston ’13</strong>, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf, International Security 37:4, p. 37-38</p><p>rising chinese nationalism. </p><p><u>A second <mark>explanation for the new assertiveness is rising Chinese nationalism or anti-Americanism</u></mark> or both. <u><mark>This is</u></mark> also a <u><mark>problematic</u></mark> explanation. For example, <u><mark>few of the new assertiveness analyses provide indicators of rising nationalism, let alone show a dramatic spike in nationalist sentiment</u></mark> just before 2010. <u>In fact</u>, empirically, <u>the e<mark>vidence for rising nationalism is mixe</mark>d and depends on the indicators one uses</u>. Some indicators suggest that the portion of the population with strongly anti-Japanese sentiment is increasing, but the portion of those with strongly anti-American views appears to be steady.80 Other indicators suggest that, while pride in nation is at high levels (and increasing),81 uncritical support for the government (a version of “China, love it or leave it”) is much lower.82 The denigration of American lifestyles and culture among the Chinese population appears to remain relatively low compared to criticisms of U.S. foreign policy.83 <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> there had been a steep jump in nationalism</mark> in 2009, <mark>for it to have a causal effect one would have to demonstrate how and why in 2010 Chinese leaders decided to take rising nationalism into greater account</mark> when making foreign policy decisions. Proponents of the nationalism argument offer no theory about how popular sentiments are translated into foreign policy</u>. <u><mark>The explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity of the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost <strong>no systematic evidence</u></strong></mark> as yet. <u>In a political system where <mark>there are no electoral costs to ignoring public opinion, it is unclear why China’s authoritarian leaders would care much about public views</u></mark>. Nor is it clear that <u><strong><mark>China’s top leaders</u></strong></mark> would want public opinion to matter on strategically important questions—they <u><strong><mark>prefer maneuverability, not constraint.</u></strong></mark> </p>
| null |
China
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,700 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,435 |
Crowd-out studies are based on Titmuss, who’s wrong
|
Economist 11
|
Economist 11 The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering
|
In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited
|
In a classic study Titmuss compared the voluntary system with the American one in which payments were made. Titmuss reckoned such created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited
|
Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Richard Titmuss compared the voluntary British system favourably with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.
| 1,117 |
<h4>Crowd-out studies are based on Titmuss, who’s wrong</h4><p><strong>Economist 11</strong> The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money</p><p>http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering</p><p>Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. <u><mark>In a classic </mark>1970 <mark>study </mark>called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy"</u> Richard <u><mark>Titmuss compared the voluntary </mark>British</u> <u><mark>system</u></mark> favourably <u><mark>with the American one in which payments were </mark>then widely <mark>made. Titmuss reckoned such </mark>a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it <mark>created shortages and surpluses,</u></mark> and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although <u><mark>he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited</u></mark>, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,253 | 7 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,436 |
Rationality checks miscalculation.
|
Quinlan 9
|
Quinlan 9 [Sir Michael, co-founder and President Emeritus of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principle, Problems, Prospects, p. 68-71]
|
the probability of misinterpretation leading towards mistaken launch is remote. any possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch The probability is very low. the further hypothesis of initiating nuclear exchange is far-fetched No government will take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning info alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack.
|
the probability of misinterpretation leading towards mistaken launch is remote. any possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch The probability is very low. the further hypothesis of initiating nuclear exchange is far-fetched No government will take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning info alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack.
|
Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch-extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered-at least so far as my own observation went-in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system-normally a missile-that was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its earlywarning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the proposals for giving the US Trident SLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of those proposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character-conventional or nuclear-unmistakable. No government will need, and no nonlunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring-by explicit communication if necessary-that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch.
| 4,077 |
<h4>Rationality checks miscalculation.</h4><p><u><strong>Quinlan 9</u></strong> [Sir Michael, co-founder and President Emeritus of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principle, Problems, Prospects, p. 68-71]</p><p>Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch-extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that <u><mark>the probability of</u></mark> initial <u><mark>misinterpretation leading</u></mark> far <u><mark>towards mistaken launch is <strong>remote.</u></strong></mark> Precisely because <u><mark>any</u></mark> nuclear-weapon <u><mark>possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch</u></mark>, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. <u><mark>The probability</u></mark> of it <u><mark>is</u></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>very low.</u></strong></mark> But even if it did happen, <u><mark>the further hypothesis of</u></mark> its <u><mark>initiating</u></mark> a general <u><mark>nuclear exchange is <strong>far-fetched</u></mark>.</strong> It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered-at least so far as my own observation went-in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system-normally a missile-that was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its earlywarning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the proposals for giving the US Trident SLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of those proposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character-conventional or nuclear-unmistakable. <u><mark>No government will</u></mark> need, and no nonlunatic government could wish, to <u><mark>take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning info</u></mark>rmation <u><mark>alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack.</u></mark> The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring-by explicit communication if necessary-that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch.</p>
| null |
China
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 1,856 | 439 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,437 |
New empirical data proves no altruism crowd out
|
Gordon 15
|
Elisa J Gordon 15, PhD/MPH-Research Associate Professor in Center for Healthcare Studies - Institute for Public Health and Medicine, Medical Education-Medical Humanities and Bioethics and Surgery-Organ Transplantation at Northwestern University, “Does Financial Compensation for Living Kidney Donation Change Willingness to Donate?,” American Journal of Transplantation, Volume 15, Issue 1, pages 265–273, January 2015
|
This study assessed public perceptions about the impact of compensation on willingness to donate, The majority of the public surveyed perceived financial compensation for living donors acceptable in general. the majority (70%) would not change their willingness to donate if offered financial compensation and 74% found an offer of compensation to others acceptable, which undermines the positive crowding out hypothesis that the offer of compensation reduces a desired behavior in those already disposed to pursuing the desired behavior. Bryce similarly found 71–76% maintaining the same willingness to be a deceased donor, depending on the type of compensation
|
This study assessed public perceptions The majority surveyed perceived financial compensation acceptable 70%) would not change their willingness to donate if offered financial compensation 74% found an offer of compensation to others acceptable, which undermines the positive crowding out hypothesis Bryce similarly found 71 % maintaining the same willingness
|
This study assessed public perceptions about the impact of compensation on willingness to donate, the amount of compensation that would begin motivating individuals to donate, and the amount that starts to be perceived as undue inducement.¶ The majority of the public surveyed perceived financial compensation for living donors acceptable in general. However, fewer respondents considered financial compensation to themselves to donate acceptable. Moreover, the majority (70%) would not change their willingness to donate if offered financial compensation, and 74% found an offer of compensation to others acceptable, which, together, undermines the positive crowding out hypothesis that the offer of compensation reduces a desired behavior in those already disposed to pursuing the desired behavior. Bryce et al similarly found 71–76% maintaining the same willingness to be a deceased donor, depending on the type of compensation [28]. Our finding suggests that respondents were against personally receiving financial compensation. In other words, this disconnection between tolerance for compensating others and less support for personal compensation suggests that financial compensation would make little difference in individuals' decisions to donate, and that in practice, policies in support of financial compensation would have relatively little traction in increasing living donation rates.
| 1,398 |
<h4>New empirical data proves no altruism crowd out</h4><p>Elisa J <strong>Gordon 15</strong>, PhD/MPH-Research Associate Professor in Center for Healthcare Studies - Institute for Public Health and Medicine, Medical Education-Medical Humanities and Bioethics and Surgery-Organ Transplantation at Northwestern University, “Does Financial Compensation for Living Kidney Donation Change Willingness to Donate?,” American Journal of Transplantation, Volume 15, Issue 1, pages 265–273, January 2015</p><p><u><mark>This study assessed public perceptions</mark> about the impact of compensation on willingness to donate,</u> the amount of compensation that would begin motivating individuals to donate, and the amount that starts to be perceived as undue inducement.¶ <u><mark>The majority</mark> of the public <mark>surveyed perceived financial compensation</mark> for living donors <mark>acceptable</mark> in general. </u>However, fewer respondents considered financial compensation to themselves to donate acceptable. Moreover, <u>the majority (<strong><mark>70%) would not change their willingness to donate if offered financial compensation</u></strong></mark>, <u>and <mark>74% found an offer of compensation to others acceptable, which</u></mark>, together, <u><strong><mark>undermines the positive crowding out hypothesis</strong></mark> that the offer of compensation reduces a desired behavior in those already disposed to pursuing the desired behavior. <mark>Bryce</u></mark> et al <u><mark>similarly found 71</mark>–76<mark>%</mark> <mark>maintaining the same willingness</mark> to be a deceased donor, depending on the type of compensation</u> [28]. Our finding suggests that respondents were against personally receiving financial compensation. In other words, this disconnection between tolerance for compensating others and less support for personal compensation suggests that financial compensation would make little difference in individuals' decisions to donate, and that in practice, policies in support of financial compensation would have relatively little traction in increasing living donation rates.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,584 | 5 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,438 |
The PLA has zero influence on foreign affairs—their evidence is ignorant of Chinese governance.
|
Johnston ’13
|
Johnston ’13, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf, International Security 37:4, p. 42-45
|
example uncritically assuming that a handful of PLA pundits and commentators have influence on foreign policy analysts argue hard-line institutional influence comes from the blog posts, op-eds, and commentary of a handful of retired, quasi-retired, and sometimes still active PLA intellectuals Other commentators argue that these voices may be representative of the PRC leadership Whether the public commentary from hard-line PLA voices reflects official messages from the PLA is open to question The reality is much more complicated despite this political space for hard-line views, these individuals have been criticized internally for their commentary by central authorities There is no particular coherence to some of the views held by some PLA commentators these commentators are not in any position to know much about foreign policy decisionmaking, let alone to influence it the small number of PLA public commentators do not appear to constitute an organized cadre of messengers and signalers It is not pushing China in a more militant direction
|
uncritically assuming PLA pundits and commentators have influence on foreign policy The reality is much more complicated. individuals have been criticized internally for their commentary by central authorities There is no particular coherence to some of the views held by some PLA commentators these commentators are not in any position to know much about foreign policy decisionmaking, let alone to influence it It is not pushing China in a more militant direction
|
This example underscores another problem with attributing China’s new assertiveness to the autonomy of the PLA—uncritically assuming that a handful of PLA pundits and commentators have influence on foreign policy. Many analysts argue that evidence for the PLA’s independent, hard-line institutional influence comes from the blog posts, op-eds, and commentary of a handful of retired, quasi-retired, and sometimes still active PLA intellectuals (e.g., Adm. Yang Yi, Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, Col. Dai Xu, Senior Col. Han Xudong, Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong, and Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian are among the main voices). Some analysts cite these individuals as evidence of more aggressive, anti-American, or expansionist preferences within the PLA.100 Other commentators argue that these voices may be representative of the PRC leadership in that, as CCP members working within the strict hierarchy of the PLA, these individuals have no room to express their own views. Whether the public commentary from hard-line PLA voices reflects official messages from the PLA as an institutional actor, let alone the preferences of China’s top civilian leaders, is open to question.101 The reality is much more complicated. First, it is clear that political space has opened up in public commentary on Chinese foreign policy for a wider range of voices. To be sure, space is greater for more nationalistic and militaristic voices, and there appear to be no legal strictures or norms requiring these PLA voices to coordinate with government policymakers. Thus these commentators, as PLA-connected opinion-makers, ironically have more space to try to push the government in harder-line directions. Some civilian analysts in China complain that there is no norm whereby a senior political leader can publicly admonish military officers who talk out of turn. Thus in the new media environment in China, these PLA authors (especially the quasi- and fully retired ones) may sometimes represent only themselves. Second, despite this political space for hard-line views, these individuals have occasionally been criticized internally for their commentary by central authorities and have had to tone down their rhetoric to stay within certain policy boundaries. When Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan labeled ROC President Ma Yingjeou’s policy toward the PRC as “peaceful separation” in a speech in late November 2009, for instance, he was criticized internally and required to retreat from his comments.102 Other senior civilian foreign policy officials have noted that when the opinions of these PLA commentators are too inconsistent with official policy, their influence is actually diminished.103 In the second half of 2010, Hu Jintao reportedly issued orders for PLA commentators to exercise more self-restraint.104 Third, PLA commentators are less in agreement than meets the eye. Col. Dai Xu’s xenophobia or Senior Col. Liu Mingfu’s advocacy of Chinese hegemonism are not shared by other high-profile officers such as Adm. Yang Yi or Senior Col. Han Xudong.105 Dai Xu’s claim that instability on the Korean Peninsula is entirely a function of the United States provoking the DPRK in hopes of triggering a crisis is inconsistent with an Academy of Military Science study that acknowledges the unpredictability and belligerence of the DPRK regime.106 Liu Mingfu’s argument that China can and should strive to replace the United States as the leading global power has been criticized by Adm. Yin Zhuo and Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, who believe that his projections are unrealistic.107 Yet Adm. Yin Zhuo and Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan have disagreed over the degree to which China should use overt military power to resolve its maritime disputes.108 There is often no particular coherence to some of the views held by some PLA commentators, so it is doubtful the public expression of these views is well coordinated. Finally, in some cases these commentators are not in any position to know much about foreign policy decisionmaking, let alone to influence it. Some of the PLA commentators, for instance, come from propaganda and political work backgrounds; their main responsibilities or training have been in political mobilization, morale, and CCP control of the PLA. Dai Xu, Liu Mingfu, as well as Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (the authors of Unrestricted Warfare, a text whose authoritativeness was overblown by many in U.S. national security circles), are all from the political control system in the PLA; they are not strategists, commanders, or operational planners. In short, the small number of PLA public commentators do not appear to constitute an organized cadre of messengers and signalers, though they reflect some portion of PLA views. What can be said is that the PLA may constitute a constraint on “new thinking” on territorial and sovereignty issues. It is not yet, as an institution, pushing China in a more militant direction as much as it is perhaps ensuring that China does not go in more cooperative directions on issues directly related to the purview of the PLA such as territorial security.
| 5,055 |
<h4>The PLA has <u>zero influence</u> on foreign affairs—their evidence is ignorant of Chinese governance.</h4><p><strong>Johnston ’13</strong>, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf, International Security 37:4, p. 42-45</p><p>This <u>example</u> underscores another problem with attributing China’s new assertiveness to the autonomy of the PLA—<u><strong><mark>uncritically assuming</mark> that a handful of <mark>PLA pundits and commentators have influence on foreign policy</u></strong></mark>. Many <u>analysts</u> <u>argue</u> that evidence for the PLA’s independent, <u>hard-line institutional influence comes from the blog posts, op-eds, and commentary of a handful of retired, quasi-retired, and sometimes still active PLA intellectuals</u> (e.g., Adm. Yang Yi, Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, Col. Dai Xu, Senior Col. Han Xudong, Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong, and Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian are among the main voices). Some analysts cite these individuals as evidence of more aggressive, anti-American, or expansionist preferences within the PLA.100 <u>Other commentators argue that these voices may be representative of the PRC leadership </u>in that, as CCP members working within the strict hierarchy of the PLA, these individuals have no room to express their own views. <u>Whether the public commentary from hard-line PLA voices reflects official messages from the PLA</u> as an institutional actor, let alone the preferences of China’s top civilian leaders, <u>is open to question</u>.101 <u><strong><mark>The reality is much more complicated</u></strong>.</mark> First, it is clear that political space has opened up in public commentary on Chinese foreign policy for a wider range of voices. To be sure, space is greater for more nationalistic and militaristic voices, and there appear to be no legal strictures or norms requiring these PLA voices to coordinate with government policymakers. Thus these commentators, as PLA-connected opinion-makers, ironically have more space to try to push the government in harder-line directions. Some civilian analysts in China complain that there is no norm whereby a senior political leader can publicly admonish military officers who talk out of turn. Thus in the new media environment in China, these PLA authors (especially the quasi- and fully retired ones) may sometimes represent only themselves. Second, <u>despite this political space for hard-line views, these <mark>individuals have</u></mark> occasionally <u><strong><mark>been criticized internally for their commentary by central authorities</u></strong></mark> and have had to tone down their rhetoric to stay within certain policy boundaries. When Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan labeled ROC President Ma Yingjeou’s policy toward the PRC as “peaceful separation” in a speech in late November 2009, for instance, he was criticized internally and required to retreat from his comments.102 Other senior civilian foreign policy officials have noted that when the opinions of these PLA commentators are too inconsistent with official policy, their influence is actually diminished.103 In the second half of 2010, Hu Jintao reportedly issued orders for PLA commentators to exercise more self-restraint.104 Third, PLA commentators are less in agreement than meets the eye. Col. Dai Xu’s xenophobia or Senior Col. Liu Mingfu’s advocacy of Chinese hegemonism are not shared by other high-profile officers such as Adm. Yang Yi or Senior Col. Han Xudong.105 Dai Xu’s claim that instability on the Korean Peninsula is entirely a function of the United States provoking the DPRK in hopes of triggering a crisis is inconsistent with an Academy of Military Science study that acknowledges the unpredictability and belligerence of the DPRK regime.106 Liu Mingfu’s argument that China can and should strive to replace the United States as the leading global power has been criticized by Adm. Yin Zhuo and Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, who believe that his projections are unrealistic.107 Yet Adm. Yin Zhuo and Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan have disagreed over the degree to which China should use overt military power to resolve its maritime disputes.108 <u><mark>There is</u></mark> often <u><strong><mark>no particular coherence to some of the views held by some PLA commentators</u></strong></mark>, so it is doubtful the public expression of these views is well coordinated. Finally, in some cases <u><strong><mark>these commentators are not in any position to know much about foreign policy decisionmaking, let alone to influence it</u></strong></mark>. Some of the PLA commentators, for instance, come from propaganda and political work backgrounds; their main responsibilities or training have been in political mobilization, morale, and CCP control of the PLA. Dai Xu, Liu Mingfu, as well as Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (the authors of Unrestricted Warfare, a text whose authoritativeness was overblown by many in U.S. national security circles), are all from the political control system in the PLA; they are not strategists, commanders, or operational planners. In short, <u>the small number of PLA public commentators do not appear to constitute an organized cadre of messengers and signalers</u>, though they reflect some portion of PLA views. What can be said is that the PLA may constitute a constraint on “new thinking” on territorial and sovereignty issues. <u><mark>It is not</u></mark> yet, as an institution, <u><mark>pushing China in a more militant direction</u></mark> as much as it is perhaps ensuring that China does not go in more cooperative directions on issues directly related to the purview of the PLA such as territorial security.</p>
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China
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2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,701 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
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4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
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Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
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KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,439 |
No crowd out – donations are primarily for friends and relatives
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Gill 2
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Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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In the early 1970s, Titmuss and Singer argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, first the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U S secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate. We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119).
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evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood has reduced blood supply in the U St secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.
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Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
3. In the early 1970s, Titmuss (1971) and Singer (1973) argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, first of all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the United States. And we believe, secondly, that because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate. We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119).
| 1,554 |
<h4>No crowd out – donations are primarily for friends and relatives</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>3. <u>In the early 1970s, Titmuss</u> (1971) <u>and Singer</u> (1973) <u>argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys,</u> leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, <u>first </u>of all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that <u>the available <mark>evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood </mark>products<mark> has reduced blood supply in the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u>t</mark>ates. And we believe, <u><mark>secondly,</mark> </u>that<u> <mark>because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.</mark> We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119). </p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,252 | 7 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
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KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,440 |
PLA falls in line with the CCP
|
Johnston ’13
|
Johnston ’13, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf, International Security 37:4, p. 42
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as an institution the PLA is not publicly expressing views on major policy issues and strategic orientation that are far from the CCP’s message. There is a strong correlation between foreign policy rhetoric in the CCP’s civilian voice—the People’s Daily—and its military voice—the PLA Daily
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as an institution the PLA is not publicly expressing views on major policy issues and strategic orientation that are far from the CCP’s message. There is a strong correlation between foreign policy rhetoric in the CCP’s civilian voice— —and its military voice—
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On the other hand, as an institution the PLA is not publicly expressing views on major policy issues and strategic orientation that are far from the CCP’s message. There is a strong correlation between foreign policy rhetoric in the CCP’s civilian voice—the People’s Daily—and its military voice—the PLA Daily. As figure 11 shows, articles that reference sovereignty (zhuquan) as a percentage of all articles in the People’s Daily and the PLA Daily are closely correlated from year to year (r 0.77, p 0.000). An anecdotal example of this consistency was the recent, apparently off-the-cuff comments by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian. When asked by the press in early June 2012 about the use of force in territorial disputes with the Philippines, he replied that diplomacy was the best method to resolve the issue and that force was a last resort. This was in contrast to PLAconnected pundits who have called for the early use of force to enforce China’s claims.99
| 979 |
<h4>PLA falls in line with the CCP</h4><p><strong>Johnston ’13</strong>, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf, International Security 37:4, p. 42</p><p>On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>as an institution the PLA is not publicly expressing views on major policy issues and strategic orientation that are far from the CCP’s message.</u></strong> <u>There is a <strong>strong correlation</strong> between foreign policy rhetoric in the CCP’s civilian voice—</mark>the People’s Daily<mark>—and its military voice—</mark>the PLA Daily</u>. As figure 11 shows, articles that reference sovereignty (zhuquan) as a percentage of all articles in the People’s Daily and the PLA Daily are closely correlated from year to year (r 0.77, p 0.000). An anecdotal example of this consistency was the recent, apparently off-the-cuff comments by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian. When asked by the press in early June 2012 about the use of force in territorial disputes with the Philippines, he replied that diplomacy was the best method to resolve the issue and that force was a last resort. This was in contrast to PLAconnected pundits who have called for the early use of force to enforce China’s claims.99</p>
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China
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2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,702 | 1 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,441 |
Even if some crowd out occurred, sales would still provide an adequate supply of organs
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Study by Becker and Elias 14
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Study by Becker and Elias 14 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
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The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. , sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors waiting times have been largely eliminated The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs.
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
| 10,692 |
<h4>Even if some crowd out occurred, sales would still provide an adequate supply of organs<u><strong> </h4><p></u>Study by Becker and Elias 14 </strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs</mark>—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u>.</mark> In particular<mark>, <u>sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant</mark>. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u><mark>Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have been largely eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u>Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. <mark>The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective</mark> in eliminating the shortage of organs <mark>isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use</mark>.</u> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u><mark>Paying for organs</mark> </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><mark>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs.</mark> More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives
| 430,254 | 24 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
|
6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,442 |
No risk of money laundering and even if there was, the plan can’t solve – regulated environments are just as susceptible and patchworks of international regulation make enforcement impossible
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Banks 14
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Banks 14 (James, professor of criminology at Sheffield Hallam University, “Online Gambling and Crime: Causes, Controls and Controversies”, google books)
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There is little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments Levi in his assessment of the money laundering risks questions the likelihood of significant sums of money being laundered through such sites, noting that e- gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of European policing organisations generalised and understandable expressions of concern about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’ This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’. a 2005 report undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling. With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded by the Internet Crine Complaint Centre’ the report suggests that Internet gaming does not, contribute to money laundering This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).
Levi suggests that e-gaming does present money laundering risks, but due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits in the regulated sector these risks are significantly lower than in land based gaming online gambling operators may credit gambling profits or unused funds back to a different account than the one from which the gambling account was funded Second, gaming transactions may be completed by ‘front people’ Third, in peer-to-peer games, money may be transferred between both electronic and human players through deliberate losses Fourth, payment to and from gambling establishments may be undertaken via financial intermediaries that adhere to anti-money laundering directives but whose Know Your Customer procedures are of modest or variable quality Fifth, laundering may occur via legal betting The Financial Action Task Force in their report Money Laundering through the Football Sector, suggest that laundering through betting is a ‘huge and increasing problem’ sports betting is a far more attractive approach to laundering money as payout rates have increased from less than 80 per cent for land based establishments to over 92 per cent it is also possible to bet with a host of different online bookmakers With money laundering costs typically exceeding 30 per cent, Internet sports betting offers an extremely attractive means of laundering money with supply costs reduced the profitability and prevalence of laundering and organised crime is increased FATF suggest that:
[The use of the Internet for online betting further increases the risk of money laundering Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations, the gambling market is non-transparent Providers are established ¡n countries which allow the organisation of gambling activities or in countries that do not regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established abroad This in combination with the non-transparency of the gambling market makes betting a laundering vehicle for criminals
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There is little evidence of significant sums of money being laundered through e- gaming ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge laundering in online gambling’ With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded
e-gaming money laundering risks due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits are significantly lower than in land based gaming operators may credit profits back to a different account laundering may occur via legal betting sports betting is a far more attractive approach as payout rates have increased to over 92 per cent Internet sports betting an extremely attractive means of laundering
Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations, the market is non-transparent regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established
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There is, in fact, little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments. Levi (2009: 4), in his European overview and assessment of the money laundering risks of e-gaming, questions the likelihood of significant sums of money — ‘in the billions of Euros’ — being laundered through such sites, noting that e- gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of Europol or other European policing organisations. Moreover, ‘generalised and understandable expressions of concern by Europol and by the Financial Action Task Force about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’ (Levi, 2009: 4, emphasis in original). This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson (2009: 38) who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’. Examining the vulnerability of online gambling to money laundering, the US General Accounting Office (2002) concluded that the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst a 2005 report (NFC Global, 2005) undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council also noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling. With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded by the Internet Crine Complaint Centre’ (1C3)the report suggests that: ‘Internet gaming does not, in and of itself, contribute to money laundering. Rather, it is the financial transactions that are used to move money on the Internet that may be susceptible to money laundering’ (NFC Global, 2005: 4). This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are comparatively modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).
Levi (2009), however, suggests that e-gaming does present money laundering risks, but due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits in the regulated sector these risks are significantly lower than in land based gaming and cash operated businesses. Levi identifies five areas of risk to regulated e-gaming markets. First, online gambling operators may credit gambling profits or unused funds back to a different account than the one from which the gambling account was funded. Although many operators do not allow winnings or cash-ins to be credited to a different account to that that is used for the funding of gaming transactions, they may be obliged to do so at the request of the customer. Second, gaming transactions may be completed by ‘front people’. Such individuals can undertake gaming transactions for undisclosed principals or act as ‘mules’ by allowing their personal accounts to be employed as conduits for financial transactions. Third, in peer-to-peer games, money may be transferred between both electronic and human players through deliberate losses, with little cost to the players. Despite the fact that such laundering poses little financial risk to operators, reputational and punitive damages imposed by regulators may result if such activities are identified. Fourth, payment to and from gambling establishments may be undertaken via financial intermediaries that adhere to anti-money laundering directives but whose Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures are of modest or variable quality. Fifth, laundering may occur via legal (and illegal) betting. The Financial Action Task Force (2009: 8), in their report Money Laundering through the Football Sector, suggest that laundering through betting is a ‘huge and increasing problem’. Today, sports betting is a far more attractive approach to laundering money than it was 15 years ago, as payout rates have increased from less than 80 per cent for land based establishments to over 92 per cent for many of the online companies (SportsAccord, 2011). In many countries, it is also possible to bet with a host of different online bookmakers. By spreading bets between bookmakers with the best odds, payouts of over loo per cent can be achieved (ibid.). With money laundering costs typically exceeding 30 per cent, Internet sports betting offers an extremely attractive means of laundering money. Fiedler (2013) claims that with supply costs reduced the profitability and prevalence of laundering and organised crime is increased. Although there is little empirical evidence to support such a claim, FATF suggest that:
[The use of the Internet for online betting further increases the risk of money laundering ... Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations, the gambling market is non-transparent and is a heterogeneous market with a mix of private and state companies acting both nationally and internationally. Providers are often established ¡n countries which allow the organisation of gambling activities or in countries that do not regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established abroad. This in combination with the non-transparency of the gambling market makes betting an interesting money laundering vehicle for criminals. (Financial Action Task Force, 2009b: 24—25)
| 5,383 |
<h4>No risk of money laundering and <u>even if</u> there was, the plan can’t solve – regulated environments are just as susceptible and patchworks of international regulation make enforcement impossible</h4><p><strong>Banks 14 </strong>(James, professor of criminology at Sheffield Hallam University, “Online Gambling and Crime: Causes, Controls and Controversies”, google books)</p><p><u><mark>There is</u></mark>, in fact, <u><mark>little evidence of </mark>money laundering through regulated gambling environments</u>. <u>Levi</u> (2009: 4), <u>in his</u> European overview and <u>assessment of the money laundering risks</u> of e-gaming, <u>questions the likelihood of <mark>significant sums of money</u></mark> — ‘in the billions of Euros’ — <u><mark>being laundered through</mark> such sites, noting that <mark>e- gaming</mark> ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of</u> Europol or other <u>European policing organisations</u>. Moreover, ‘<u>generalised and understandable expressions of concern</u> by Europol and by the Financial Action Task Force <u>about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’</u> (Levi, 2009: 4, emphasis in original). <u>This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson</u> (2009: 38) <u>who note that: <strong><mark>‘There is little documentation by which to gauge</mark> the extent of actual money <mark>laundering</mark> <mark>in online gambling’</mark>.</u></strong> Examining the vulnerability of online gambling to money laundering, the US General Accounting Office (2002) concluded that the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst <u>a 2005 report</u> (NFC Global, 2005) <u>undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council</u> also <u>noted that</u> <u><strong>there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded</u></strong></mark> <u>by the Internet Crine Complaint Centre’</u> (1C3)<u>the report suggests that</u>: ‘<u>Internet gaming does not,</u> in and of itself, <u>contribute to money laundering</u>. Rather, it is the financial transactions that are used to move money on the Internet that may be susceptible to money laundering’ (NFC Global, 2005: 4). <u>This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are</u> comparatively <u>modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).</p><p>Levi</u> (2009), however, <u>suggests that <mark>e-gaming</mark> does present <mark>money laundering risks</mark>, but <mark>due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits</u></mark> <u><strong>in the regulated sector these risks <mark>are significantly lower than in land based gaming</u></strong></mark> and cash operated businesses. Levi identifies five areas of risk to regulated e-gaming markets. First, <u>online gambling <mark>operators may credit</mark> gambling <mark>profits</mark> or unused funds <mark>back to a different account</mark> than the one from which the gambling account was funded</u>. Although many operators do not allow winnings or cash-ins to be credited to a different account to that that is used for the funding of gaming transactions, they may be obliged to do so at the request of the customer. <u>Second, gaming transactions may be completed by ‘front people’</u>. Such individuals can undertake gaming transactions for undisclosed principals or act as ‘mules’ by allowing their personal accounts to be employed as conduits for financial transactions. <u>Third, in peer-to-peer games, money may be transferred between both electronic and human players through deliberate losses</u>, with little cost to the players. Despite the fact that such laundering poses little financial risk to operators, reputational and punitive damages imposed by regulators may result if such activities are identified. <u>Fourth, payment to and from gambling establishments may be undertaken via financial intermediaries that adhere to anti-money laundering directives but whose Know Your Customer</u> (KYC) <u>procedures are of modest or variable quality</u>. <u>Fifth, <mark>laundering may occur via legal</u></mark> (and illegal) <u><mark>betting</u></mark>. <u>The Financial Action Task Force</u> (2009: 8), <u>in their report Money Laundering through the Football Sector, suggest that</u> <u><strong>laundering through betting is a ‘huge and increasing problem’</u></strong>. Today, <u><strong><mark>sports betting is a far more attractive approach</mark> to laundering money</u></strong> than it was 15 years ago, <u><strong><mark>as payout rates have increased</mark> from less than 80 per cent for land based establishments <mark>to over 92 per cent</u></strong></mark> for many of the online companies (SportsAccord, 2011). In many countries, <u>it is also possible to bet with a host of different online bookmakers</u>. By spreading bets between bookmakers with the best odds, payouts of over loo per cent can be achieved (ibid.). <u>With money laundering costs typically exceeding 30 per cent, <strong><mark>Internet sports betting </mark>offers <mark>an extremely attractive means of laundering </mark>money</u></strong>. Fiedler (2013) claims that <u>with supply costs reduced the profitability and prevalence of laundering and organised crime is increased</u>. Although there is little empirical evidence to support such a claim, <u>FATF suggest that:</p><p>[The use of the Internet for online betting further increases the risk of money laundering</u> ... <u><mark>Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations,</mark> <mark>the</mark> gambling <mark>market is non-transparent</u></mark> and is a heterogeneous market with a mix of private and state companies acting both nationally and internationally. <u>Providers are</u> often <u>established ¡n countries which allow the organisation of gambling activities or in countries that do not <mark>regulate or supervise gambling<strong>. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established</mark> abroad</u></strong>. <u>This in combination with the non-transparency of the gambling market makes betting a</u>n interesting money <u>laundering vehicle for criminals</u>. (Financial Action Task Force, 2009b: 24—25)</p>
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Costa Rica
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 429,741 | 21 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
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4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
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Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,443 |
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
|
Hughes 9
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Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
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U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
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. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world
|
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage<mark>. A thriving global</u> </mark>black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales</u></mark>. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u><mark>The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u><mark>U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,256 | 14 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,444 |
No Indo-Pak war.
|
Loudon 8
|
Loudon 8 [Bruce, The Australian, Doomsday dread, December 04, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24746635-25837,00.html]
|
their fourth war is an unlikely prospect. No one in either capital -- even the hotheads -- is thinking in those terms. Experienced strategic analysts rule it out the political will in both sides, despite muscle-flexing, is overwhelmingly against resort to nuclear arsenals. India has a firm no-first-strike policy and Zardari turned Pakistani policy on its head by articulating a similar stance. On both sides there is a mood of extreme caution
not nuclear weapons
|
their fourth war is an unlikely prospect. No one in either capital -- even the hotheads -- is thinking in those terms. Experienced strategic analysts rule it out the political will in both sides, despite muscle-flexing, is overwhelmingly against resort to nuclear arsenals. India has a firm no-first-strike policy and Zardari turned Pakistani policy on its head by articulating a similar stance. On both sides there is a mood of extreme caution
|
THE doomsayers' published assessments tell the grim story: upwards of 12 million people killed on the first day of a nuclear exchange, more than 150 million dead in a longer nuclear conflict. Devastation and destruction on a scale that is almost unimaginable. A catastrophe that would vastly transcend that seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. That is why, as India and Pakistan muscle up to each other after the Mumbai massacre and leaders from across the world hurry to counsel cool heads and caution in New Delhi and Islamabad, the unspoken fear everywhere is that the two South Asian neighbours could be pushed into the unthinkable: their fourth war, and one in which they would mobilise their nuclear arsenals. It is, it must be said, an unlikely prospect. No one in either capital -- even among the hotheads -- is thinking in those terms. Experienced strategic analysts rule it out. "Don't even think about it. It ain't going to happen," one says. But as the crisis over terrorism across South Asia deepens and jihadist groups linked to al-Qa'ida launch devastating attacks such as the one in Mumbai last week -- attacks designed to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan -- there is, in the view of most analysts, always the potential for events to tumble out of control and lead to a doomsday nuclear conflagration, with enormous loss of life. "South Asia's a nuclear tinderbox," a leading military analyst in New Delhi tells The Australian. "Yes, of course, I'd just about rule it out in the context of the face-off following the Mumbai attack. "But it's always there, always nagging at the edges of the constant tensions in the subcontinent. And there's no doubt that Osama (bin Laden) is doing his bit to stir the pot and do what he can to increase those tensions, since conflict between India and Pakistan serves the jihadist cause." Yesterday, US military officials in Washington, DC, closely monitoring the situation described the military temperature between the two neighbours as "pretty low right now", adding that although Pakistan has moved some aircraft and air defence units closer to the Indian border since the Mumbai attack, "on the nuclear side there is nothing". Which is hardly surprising, for the political will in both sides, despite the muscle-flexing, is overwhelmingly against resort to their nuclear arsenals. India, since it demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998, has maintained a firm no-first-strike policy and a few days ago Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari turned longstanding Pakistani policy on its head (some believe to the annoyance of the country's powerful generals) by articulating a similar stance. On both sides there is a mood of extreme caution on the subject of any possible use of nuclear weapons, matched only by the intense secrecy that surrounds their arsenals.
No nuclear threat—their al queda attacks now ev is in the context of car bombs—not nuclear weapons.
| 2,966 |
<h4>No Indo-Pak war.</h4><p><u><strong>Loudon 8</u></strong> [Bruce, The Australian, Doomsday dread, December 04, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24746635-25837,00.html]</p><p>THE doomsayers' published assessments tell the grim story: upwards of 12 million people killed on the first day of a nuclear exchange, more than 150 million dead in a longer nuclear conflict. Devastation and destruction on a scale that is almost unimaginable. A catastrophe that would vastly transcend that seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. That is why, as India and Pakistan muscle up to each other after the Mumbai massacre and leaders from across the world hurry to counsel cool heads and caution in New Delhi and Islamabad, the unspoken fear everywhere is that the two South Asian neighbours could be pushed into the unthinkable: <u><mark>their fourth war</u></mark>, and one in which they would mobilise their nuclear arsenals. It <u><mark>is</u></mark>, it must be said, <u><strong><mark>an unlikely prospect.</strong> No one in either capital -- even</u></mark> among <u><mark>the hotheads -- is thinking in those terms. <strong>Experienced strategic analysts rule it out</u></strong></mark>. "Don't even think about it. It ain't going to happen," one says. But as the crisis over terrorism across South Asia deepens and jihadist groups linked to al-Qa'ida launch devastating attacks such as the one in Mumbai last week -- attacks designed to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan -- there is, in the view of most analysts, always the potential for events to tumble out of control and lead to a doomsday nuclear conflagration, with enormous loss of life. "South Asia's a nuclear tinderbox," a leading military analyst in New Delhi tells The Australian. "Yes, of course, I'd just about rule it out in the context of the face-off following the Mumbai attack. "But it's always there, always nagging at the edges of the constant tensions in the subcontinent. And there's no doubt that Osama (bin Laden) is doing his bit to stir the pot and do what he can to increase those tensions, since conflict between India and Pakistan serves the jihadist cause." Yesterday, US military officials in Washington, DC, closely monitoring the situation described the military temperature between the two neighbours as "pretty low right now", adding that although Pakistan has moved some aircraft and air defence units closer to the Indian border since the Mumbai attack, "on the nuclear side there is nothing". Which is hardly surprising, for <u><mark>the political will in both sides, despite</u></mark> the <u><mark>muscle-flexing, is <strong>overwhelmingly against</strong> resort to</u></mark> their <u><mark>nuclear arsenals. India</u></mark>, since it demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998, <u><mark>has</u></mark> maintained <u><mark>a firm no-first-strike policy and</u></mark> a few days ago Pakistan's President Asif Ali <u><mark>Zardari turned</u></mark> longstanding <u><mark>Pakistani policy on its head</u></mark> (some believe to the annoyance of the country's powerful generals) <u><mark>by articulating a similar stance. On both sides there is a <strong>mood of extreme caution</u></strong></mark> on the subject of any possible use of nuclear weapons, matched only by the intense secrecy that surrounds their arsenals.</p><p>No nuclear threat—their al queda attacks now ev is in the context of car bombs—<u>not nuclear weapons</u><strong>.</p></strong>
| null |
Costa Rica
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 196,700 | 7 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,445 |
Trafficking is increasing now—global legislation is ineffective—most recent trends prove
|
Da Silva and Frontera 15
|
Da Silva and Frontera 15 (Ivan Rocha Ferreira Da Silva, MD1; Jennifer A. Frontera, MD2 Neurocritical Care Unit and Stroke Department, Hospital Copa D’Or, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2Cerebrovascular Center of the Neurological Institute, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio “Worldwide Barriers to Organ Donation” JAMA Neurol. 2015;72(1):112-118. doi:10.1001/jamaneurol.2014.3083. http://archneur.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1934718)
|
Globally, legislation guiding organ transplant varies widely. Only 20% of African nations report having a transplant organ coordinating structure Even fewer countries have a mechanism for collection and analysis of data related to donation, donor safety, and transplantation activities transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation promulgate illegal transplantation and organ trafficking Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking there is weak enforcement and few international regulations that can effectively police the problem illicit organ trade generates 1.2 billion per yea this market is fueled not only by profit but also by long waiting lists for organs A growing number of countries report patients have traveled to countries to buy organs on the black (illicit) market known as transplant tourism. American citizens received foreign transplants in 35 countries, led by China, the Philippines, and India
|
Globally, legislation guiding organ transplant varies widely.1 Only 20% of African nations report having a coordinating structure Even fewer have a mechanism for c analysis of data related to transplantation activities transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation promulgate organ trafficking Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking, there is weak enforcement illicit organ trade generate 1.2 billion per year this market is fueled not only by profit but also by long waiting lists for organs growing number report patients traveled to buy organs on the illicit) market American citizens received f transplants in 35 countries
|
Globally, legislation guiding organ donation and transplant varies widely.1 Only 20% of African nations report having a transplant and organ donation coordinating structure, while 95% of countries in the Americas have such a system in place. Even fewer countries have a mechanism for collection and analysis of data related to donation, donor safety, and transplantation activities. Some countries report that liver and/or kidney transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation. Such lack of oversight may promulgate illegal transplantation and organ trafficking. Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking, there is weak enforcement and few international regulations that can effectively police the problem.43 A recent report by Global Financial Integrity estimates that the illicit organ trade generates illegal profits between $600 million and $1.2 billion per year.44 It is hypothesized that this market is fueled not only by profit but also by cultural and religious barriers to organ donation and transplantation in some countries, long waiting lists for organs, precarious infrastructure for transplants in the country of origin, and difficult access to chronic life support (in the case of renal replacement therapy).45 A growing number of countries report that patients have allegedly traveled to countries to buy organs on the black (illicit) market, a practice known as transplant tourism. The World Health Organization estimates that 5% to 10% of kidney transplants worldwide occur as a result of commercial transactions.46,47 A study of American citizens who received organ transplants abroad showed that roughly 90% were kidney transplants and that male sex, Asian race, resident and nonresident alien status, and college education were significantly and independently associated with foreign transplant.48 In 2006, patients from 34 states, plus the District of Columbia, received foreign transplants in 35 countries, led by China, the Philippines, and India.48
| 2,009 |
<h4>Trafficking is increasing now—global legislation is <u>ineffective</u>—most recent <u>trends</u> prove</h4><p><strong>Da Silva and Frontera 15 </strong>(Ivan Rocha Ferreira Da Silva, MD1; Jennifer A. Frontera, MD2 Neurocritical Care Unit and Stroke Department, Hospital Copa D’Or, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2Cerebrovascular Center of the Neurological Institute, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio “Worldwide Barriers to Organ Donation” JAMA Neurol. 2015;72(1):112-118. doi:10.1001/jamaneurol.2014.3083. http://archneur.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1934718)</p><p><u><mark>Globally, legislation guiding organ</mark> </u>donation and <u><mark>transplant <strong>varies widely.</u></strong>1 <u>Only <strong>20% of African nations</strong> report having a</mark> transplant</u> and <u>organ</u> donation <u><mark>coordinating structure</u></mark>, while 95% of countries in the Americas have such a system in place. <u><mark>Even</u> <u>fewer</mark> countries <mark>have a mechanism for c</mark>ollection and <mark>analysis of data related to</mark> donation, donor safety, and <mark>transplantation activities</u></mark>. Some countries report that liver and/or kidney <u><mark>transplants are performed despite a lack of legislation</u></mark>. Such lack of oversight may <u><mark>promulgate</mark> <strong>illegal transplantation and <mark>organ trafficking</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Even in countries that have legislation regulating organ trafficking</u>, <u>there is <strong>weak enforcement</strong></mark> and few international regulations</u> <u>that can effectively police the problem</u>.43 A recent report by Global Financial Integrity estimates that the <u><mark>illicit organ trade generate</mark>s</u> illegal profits between $600 million and $<u><strong><mark>1.2 billion</strong> per yea</u>r</mark>.44 It is hypothesized that <u><mark>this</u> <u>market is fueled not only by profit but also by</u></mark> cultural and religious barriers to organ donation and transplantation in some countries, <u><mark>long waiting lists for organs</u></mark>, precarious infrastructure for transplants in the country of origin, and difficult access to chronic life support (in the case of renal replacement therapy).45 <u>A <strong><mark>growing number</strong></mark> of countries</u> <u><mark>report</u></mark> that <u><mark>patients</u></mark> <u>have</u> allegedly <u><mark>traveled</mark> to countries <mark>to buy organs on the</mark> black (<mark>illicit) market</u></mark>, a practice <u>known as transplant tourism.</u> The World Health Organization estimates that 5% to 10% of kidney transplants worldwide occur as a result of commercial transactions.46,47 A study of <u><mark>American citizens</u></mark> who received organ transplants abroad showed that roughly 90% were kidney transplants and that male sex, Asian race, resident and nonresident alien status, and college education were significantly and independently associated with foreign transplant.48 In 2006, patients from 34 states, plus the District of Columbia, <u><mark>received f</mark>oreign <mark>transplants in 35 countries</mark>, led by China, the Philippines, and India</u>.48</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,585 | 4 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,446 |
Legalized online gambling causes proliferation of terrorist money laundering, causing catastrophic terrorism – only prohibition solves
|
Thackston 14 http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317
|
Thackston 14, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317
|
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling Using tech undetectable to operators and regulators, House Commerce Committee witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The demonstration showed tech and techniques terror and crime use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the U S enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like 9/11 The threat is real gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
|
Remote gambling Using tech undetectable to regulators a demonstration a single remote computer took control of computers and used them to play poker The demo showed tech terror and crime use to operate untraceable laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from spread of poker online. An established al-Qaida poker network could extract enough untraceable money in six days to fund 9/11 gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
|
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling because the website operator never has complete control. Using technology undetectable to website operators and their regulators, it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, House Energy and Commerce Committee staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The Harper demonstration showed the technology and techniques that terror and crime organizations could use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online. One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the United States enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The threat is real. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that gambling regulations in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
| 2,997 |
<h4><strong>Legalized online gambling causes <u>proliferation</u> of <u>terrorist money laundering</u>, causing <u>catastrophic terrorism</u> – only prohibition solves</h4><p>Thackston 14</strong>, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.",<u><strong> http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317</p><p><mark>Remote gambling</mark> is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling</u></strong> because the website operator never has complete control. <u><strong><mark>Using tech</u></strong></mark>nology <u><strong><mark>undetectable to</u></strong></mark> website <u><strong>operators and</u></strong> their <u><strong><mark>regulators</mark>,</u></strong> it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, <u><strong>House</u></strong> Energy and <u><strong>Commerce Committee</u></strong> staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., <u><strong>witnessed <mark>a demonstration </mark>in which <mark>a single remote computer took control of </mark>two <mark>computers and used them</mark> as alias machines <mark>to play poker </mark>online. <mark>The</u></strong></mark> Harper <u><strong><mark>demo</mark>nstration <mark>showed</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>tech</u></strong></mark>nology <u><strong>and techniques</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>terror and crime</u></strong></mark> organizations could <u><strong><mark>use to operate untraceable</mark> money <mark>laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from</mark> the <mark>spread of poker online</u></strong>.</mark> One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. <u><strong>A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million </u></strong>as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. <u><strong><mark>An established al-Qaida poker network could extract</mark> from the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>enough untraceable money in six days to fund</mark> an operation like </u></strong>the <u><strong><mark>9/11</mark> </u></strong>attack on the World Trade Center. <u><strong>The threat is real</u></strong>. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that <u><strong><mark>gambling regulations</mark> </u></strong>in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey <u><strong><mark>are no match for determined terrorists and criminals</u></strong>,</mark> we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved <u><strong><mark>it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
Costa Rica
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 429,685 | 23 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,447 |
People sell organs out of economic desperation, but the illicit market leaves them worse off
|
Jaycox 12
|
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
|
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
almost all organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received was an average of 103,000 . As a result, a majority ( ) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady and expressed regret the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>People sell organs out of economic desperation, but the illicit market leaves them worse off</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He found that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although </mark>the <mark>vendors were promised </mark>by third-party brokers<mark> an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was an average of 103,000 </mark>rupees<mark>. As a result, a majority </u>(</mark>17<mark>) <u>of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u><mark>a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, <mark>and</mark> a majority also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that<mark> the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them</mark>:</strong> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,255 | 14 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,448 |
Plan doesn’t solve laundering
|
Fiedler 13
|
Fiedler 13 – Post Doc Researcher at the Division on Gambling at the Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg
|
All forms of money laundering in online gambling involve unregulated or illegal operators as they do not have to oblige to anti-money laundering directives but can hide in regulatory havens The obvious way to tackle money laundering in unregulated/illegal online gambling is to introduce legal markets. But this is far from sufficient. Legal operators are far less attractive to customers due to lower payout ratios which result from taxes and fees the operators have to pay. Even in regulated markets like France the illegal operators still play an important role. The reason is a lack of law enforcement against unregulated/illegal operators the first and most important step in tackling money laundering in online gaming is to enforce the law against illegal/unregulated operators
|
All forms of money laundering in online gambling involve unregulated or illegal operators as they can hide in regulatory havens The obvious way to tackle money laundering is to introduce legal markets. But this is far from sufficient. Legal operators are far less attractive to customers due to lower payout ratios Even in regulated markets like France the illegal operators still play an important role. The reason is a lack of law enforcement against unregulated operators the most important step is to enforce the law against illegal/unregulated operators
|
Ingo, Online Gambling as a Game Changer to Money Laundering?, 4/30/13, http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/bwl/rechtderwirtschaft/institut/Ingo_Fiedler/Online_Gambling_as_a_Game_Changer_to_Money_Laundering_01.pdf
All forms of money laundering in online gambling involve unregulated or illegal operators as they do not have to oblige to anti-money laundering directives but can hide in regulatory havens. Legal operators, in contrast, are not prone to money laundering (Brooks 2012), especially because of the much lower payout ratios. However, the online gambling market is still dominated by illegal operators; legal ones play only a minor role. This leaves penty of opportunities of money laundering.¶ The obvious way to tackle money laundering in unregulated/illegal online gambling is to introduce legal markets. But this is far from sufficient. Legal operators are far less attractive to customers due to lower payout ratios which result from taxes and fees the operators have to pay. Even in regulated markets like France the illegal operators still play an important role. The reason is a lack of law enforcement against unregulated/illegal operators. For example, Germany is the largest online poker market worldwide although it is illegal (Fiedler and Wilcke 2012). Thus, the first and most important step in tackling money laundering in online gaming and preventing it from increasing the prevalence of organized crime in our society is to enforce the law against illegal/unregulated operators.
| 1,509 |
<h4>Plan doesn’t solve laundering </h4><p><strong>Fiedler 13</strong> – Post Doc Researcher at the Division on Gambling at the Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg</p><p>Ingo, Online Gambling as a Game Changer to Money Laundering?, 4/30/13, http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/bwl/rechtderwirtschaft/institut/Ingo_Fiedler/Online_Gambling_as_a_Game_Changer_to_Money_Laundering_01.pdf</p><p><u><mark>All forms of money laundering in online gambling involve unregulated or illegal operators as they</mark> do not have to oblige to anti-money laundering directives but <mark>can <strong>hide in regulatory havens</u></strong></mark>. Legal operators, in contrast, are not prone to money laundering (Brooks 2012), especially because of the much lower payout ratios. However, the online gambling market is still dominated by illegal operators; legal ones play only a minor role. This leaves penty of opportunities of money laundering.¶ <u><mark>The obvious way to tackle money laundering</mark> in unregulated/illegal online gambling <mark>is to introduce legal markets. But <strong>this is far from sufficient</strong>. Legal operators are far less attractive to customers due to lower payout ratios</mark> which result from taxes and fees the operators have to pay. <strong><mark>Even in regulated markets like France the illegal operators still play an important role</strong>. The reason is a lack of law enforcement against unregulated</mark>/illegal <mark>operators</u></mark>. For example, Germany is the largest online poker market worldwide although it is illegal (Fiedler and Wilcke 2012). Thus, <u><mark>the</mark> first and <mark>most important step</mark> in tackling money laundering in online gaming</u> and preventing it from increasing the prevalence of organized crime in our society <u><mark>is to enforce the law against illegal/unregulated operators</u></mark>. </p>
| null |
Costa Rica
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,674 | 49 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,449 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
|
Bowden 13
|
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
|
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality
|
[*452] Introduction
Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
| 1,530 |
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction</p><p><u><mark>Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades</u></mark>. n1 <u><mark>Imagine living in a poor country</u></mark>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and</mark> <mark>thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection</u></mark>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live</u></mark>. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, <mark>there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality</mark> of organ trafficking.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,258 | 14 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,450 |
Russian weapons are secure, have impassable security features, and are easily recovered.
|
Mueller 8
|
Mueller 8 [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD 1/01/2008,
|
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]
Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission.
|
has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out how to work a Russian bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest has security features that would have to be defeated You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits radiation that could easily be detected
|
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]
It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission.
| 1,428 |
<h4>Russian weapons are secure, have impassable security features, and are easily recovered.</h4><p><u><strong>Mueller 8</u></strong> [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD 1/01/2008,</p><p><u> http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]</p><p></u>It might be added that <u>Russia <mark>has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of</mark> any illicit <mark>use by terrorist groups, particularly</u></mark>, of course, <u><mark>Chechen ones</u></mark> with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "<u><mark>it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out</mark> on their own <mark>how to work a Russian</u></mark> or Pakistan <u><mark>bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest</mark> of these "<mark>has</mark> some <mark>security features that would have to be defeated</mark> before it could be used"</u> (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses <u><mark>You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions</mark> before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off.</u> Moreover, continues Linzer, <u><mark>most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits</mark> a great deal of <mark>radiation that could</mark> relatively <mark>easily be detected</mark> by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission. </p></u>
| null |
Costa Rica
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 430,703 | 3 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,451 |
“Legalize” must make an activity lawful--- doesn’t allow discretion to prohibit
|
Quinn 92
|
Quinn 92 – Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis
|
we are satisfied the term "legalize" correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity see also Black's Law legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. we do not construe the word "legalize" as suggesting that the cities retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. Nothing persuades us that the choice of language is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent
|
"legalize correctly expresses true intent and meaning to make legal or lawful legalize" expresses required to legislate to make legal we do not construe legalize" as suggesting cities retain discretion to legalize or prohibit
|
Turning to Verlo's claim, we are satisfied that the Board's use of the term "legalize" in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); see also Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful"). In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. Contrary to Verlo's argument, we do not construe the word "legalize" as somehow suggesting that the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." Nothing in the record persuades us that the Board's choice of language in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.
| 1,748 |
<h4>“Legalize” must make an activity lawful--- doesn’t allow <u>discretion</u> to prohibit </h4><p><strong>Quinn 92</strong> – Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis</p><p>Turning to Verlo's claim, <u>we are satisfied</u> that the Board's use of <u>the term <mark>"legalize</mark>"</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u><mark>correctly</mark> and fairly <mark>expresses</mark> the <strong><mark>true intent and meaning</strong></mark> </u>of the proposed constitutional amendment. <u>The word "legalize" means "<strong>to make legal" or "to give legal validity</strong> </u>or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); <u>see also Black's Law</u> Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (<u>legalize means "<strong><mark>to make legal or lawful</strong></mark>" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful</u>"). <u>In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming</u> in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," <u>the word "<mark>legalize" expresses</mark> the sense that these cities will be <strong><mark>required </strong>to legislate</mark> so as <mark>to make</mark> limited gaming <mark>legal</mark> within their respective municipalities. </u>Contrary to Verlo's argument, <u><mark>we <strong>do not construe</mark> the word "<mark>legalize" as</u></strong></mark> somehow <u><strong><mark>suggesting</mark> that the <mark>cities</u></strong></mark> of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will <u><strong><mark>retain</mark> the <mark>discretion</strong></mark> either <mark>to legalize or</mark> to <mark>prohibit</mark> limited gaming</u> <u>as they see fit.</u> The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." <u>Nothing</u> in the record <u>persuades us that the</u> Board's <u>choice of language</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u>is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent</u> and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,284 | 78 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,452 |
The illegal market is also a threat to public health – spreads antibiotic-resistant bacteria
|
Kelly 13
|
Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
|
Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries
|
Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders
|
[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77
| 1,754 |
<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health – spreads antibiotic-resistant bacteria</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u><mark>Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u><mark>Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders</mark> upon returning to their home countries</u>. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,429 | 9 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,453 |
Russian materials can’t be used - maintenance.
|
Mueller 8
|
Mueller 8 [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD 1/01/2008, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]
|
Russian bombs are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance
|
Russian bombs are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost their effectiveness would be non-existent because they require continual maintenance
|
There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badkhen 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Smith and Hoffman 1997; Langewiesche 2007, 19). By 2007, even such alarmists at Anna Pluto and Peter Zimmerman were concluding that "It is probably true that there are no 'loose nukes', transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way (2007, 56).
| 1,205 |
<h4>Russian materials can’t be used - maintenance.</h4><p><u><strong>Mueller 8</u></strong> [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD 1/01/2008, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]</p><p>There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, <u><mark>Russian</u></mark> nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the <u><mark>bombs</u></mark>, all built before 1991, <u><mark>are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal"</u></mark> (Badkhen 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that <u><mark>it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost</mark> and that, regardless, <mark>their effectiveness would be</mark> very low or even <mark>non-existent because they require continual maintenance</u></mark> (2002, 4, 12; see also Smith and Hoffman 1997; Langewiesche 2007, 19). By 2007, even such alarmists at Anna Pluto and Peter Zimmerman were concluding that "It is probably true that there are no 'loose nukes', transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way (2007, 56).</p>
| null |
Costa Rica
|
2nc Alt Solves War/AT: War Inevitable
| 307,774 | 3 | 17,072 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| 565,302 |
N
|
Navy
|
4
|
Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat
|
Bobbitt
|
1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO)
1NC Security K Ban CP Politics
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,454 |
They “constrain the United States Congress’ constitutional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit marihuana.” This leaves the CSA prohibition on the books- the plan is an example of conditional non-enforcement pending a different legal justification in the courts
|
Treanor and Sperling 1993
|
Treanor and Sperling 1993 (William and Gene, Prof Law @ Fordham, Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy, Columbia LR, Dec)
|
courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is unenforceable but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished the statute is dormant but not dead if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date. jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law the court's view was that since the law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it. Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue have reached the same result It is a law that gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court
|
courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the books if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid Enforcement followed without congressional action a statute declared unconstitutional is unenforceable but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished the court's view was that since the law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it It is law that gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court.
|
Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. 42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable. The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. 43 Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. 44 When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet 45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date. 46 The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " 47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " 48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it. 49 Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [*1914] analysis. 50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, 51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. 52 The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. 53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.
| 5,922 |
<h4>They “constrain the United States Congress’ constitutional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit marihuana.” This leaves the CSA prohibition on the books- the plan is an example of conditional non-enforcement pending a different legal justification in the courts</h4><p><strong>Treanor and Sperling 1993 </strong>(William and Gene, Prof Law @ Fordham, Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy, Columbia LR, Dec)</p><p>Unlike the Supreme Court, several state <u>courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue</u>. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. 42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable. The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, <u>The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the <mark>courts have <strong>no power to repeal or abolish a statute</strong></mark>, and that <mark>notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute <strong>continues to remain on the</mark> statute <mark>books</strong></mark>; and that <mark>if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid</u></mark> from the date it became effective. <strong>43</strong> <u><mark>Enforcement</mark> of the statute <mark>followed without congressional action</u></mark>. <strong>44</strong> When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet <strong>45</strong> held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that <u><mark>a statute</mark> <mark>declared unconstitutional</mark> is void in the sense that it <mark>is</u></mark> inoperative or <u><mark>unenforceable</u></mark>, <u><mark>but <strong>not void in the sense that it is repealed</u></strong> <u><strong>or abolished</u></strong></mark>; that so long as the decision stands <u><strong>the statute is dormant but not dead</u></strong>; and that <u>if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date.</u> <strong>46</strong> The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate <u>jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law</u>.' " <strong>47</strong> Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " <strong>48</strong> Nonetheless, <u><mark>the court's view was that</u> <u>since the</u></mark> minimum wage <u><mark>law had <strong>always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable</strong>, there was no need to reenact it</mark>. </u><strong>49<u></strong> Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue </u>of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived<u> have reached the same result</u> as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [*1914] analysis. <strong>50</strong> The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, <strong>51</strong> a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. <strong>52</strong> The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. <u><mark>It is</u></mark>, instead, <u>a <mark>law</mark> <mark>that</u></mark> once <u><mark>gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed</mark>. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization</u>. Moreover, <u><mark>the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed</u></mark> may have had some support in the early case law, but it <u><mark>has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court</u>.</mark> Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. <strong>53</strong> In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 82,361 | 64 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,455 |
The availability of organs in the US would dry up demand in the illegal market
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere If demand dried up , transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>The availability of organs in the US would dry up demand in the illegal market</h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12<u></strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of available organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> through compensation, </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere</mark> to pay for an organ</u>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u> </mark>from foreign citizens<mark>, <u>transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u><mark>presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u>If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very </u>possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,456 |
Reasons to vote-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Reasons to vote-</h4>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,704 | 1 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,457 |
Legalizing sales in the US would take down the illegal market
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
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a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
|
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Legalizing sales in the US would take down the illegal market </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p>Moreover, <u>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, <mark>a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, <mark>it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 is the Illegal market
| 430,264 | 17 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,458 |
Ground- the only predictable mechanism the neg can prepare for is removal of the law, giving us non-enforcement and states-only CPs which compete on leaving the law on the books- they give the aff too many mechanism options and ways to spike out of DA links
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Ground- the only predictable mechanism the neg can prepare for is removal of the law, giving us non-enforcement and states-only CPs which compete on leaving the law on the books- they give the aff too many mechanism options and ways to spike out of DA links</h4>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,705 | 1 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,459 |
Bidirectionality- their plan doesn’t even find the CSA unconstitutional- it just says that one justification no longer works- this would let them read advantages like “the law would be reasserted under the treaty power- treaty power good” and spike all our legalization bad arguments
|
Dupont et al 04 ]
|
Dupont et al 04 [Robert L. DuPont et al 4, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown Medical School, President of the Institute for Behavior and Health, Inc. and Vice-president of Bensinger, DuPont and Associates, was the first Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the second Director of the White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, 2004, Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, John Ashcroft et al v. Angel McClary Raich et al, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 03-1454, http://www.ibhinc.org/pdfs/ARAmicusBrief.pdf]
|
Treaty Power Provides a Separate and Independent Source of Congressional Power the Commerce Clause does not provide the sole source of congressional authority The United States may enter into treaties governing matters of international concern and impact. Such treaties comprise the supreme law of the land Federal laws, like the CSA, which implement U.S. treaty obligations, are unquestionably a valid exercise of congressional power, even in the face of conflicting state laws." Court upheld the power of Congress to enact legislation, pursuant to a treaty, despite contrary state law. The Court stressed that such legislation stands on a separate basis of congressional power, and rejected the argument that Congress must have independent constitutional authority separate from a treaty as a basis for enacting legislation The CSA's comprehensive regulatory structure is supported by the Treaty Power, as well by Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.
|
Treaty Power Provides a Separate Source of Congressional Power the Commerce Clause does not provide the sole source Federal laws, like the CSA, which implement U.S. treaty obligations, are unquestionably a valid exercise of congressional power, even in the face of conflicting state laws." The Court rejected the argument that Congress must have independent constitutional authority separate from a treaty as a basis for enacting legislation The CSA's structure, is supported by Treaty Power
|
I. The Treaty Power Provides a Separate and Independent Source of Congressional Power in This Case. While Congress must certainly regulate in accordance with its enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause does not provide the sole source of congressional authority in this case. The United States may enter into treaties governing matters of international concern and impact. Such treaties, in conjunction with the federal Constitution and federal legislation, comprise the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 2. cl. 2 (power of the President to enter into treaties); U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Congress has the power to enact all laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution...all...Powers granted by this Constitution." U.S. Const. Art. I, sec.8, cl. 18. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enact laws implementing the United States' obligations under treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sec. 801 et seq. (1970), ("CSA") is such a law, and its regulation of the class of activity in this case is necessary to fulfill those obligations. Federal laws, like the CSA, which implement U.S. treaty obligations, are unquestionably a valid exercise of congressional power, even in the face of conflicting state laws." In Missouri v. Ho/land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), this Court upheld the power of Congress to enact legislation, pursuant to a treaty, despite contrary state law. The Court stressed that such legislation—in that case the Migratory Bird Treaty Act—stands on a separate basis of congressional power, and rejected the argument that Congress must have independent constitutional authority separate from a treaty as a basis for enacting legislation. Id. at 432-33. The CSA's comprehensive regulatory structure, too, is supported by the Treaty Power, as well by Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.
| 1,881 |
<h4>Bidirectionality- their plan doesn’t even find the CSA unconstitutional- it just says that one justification no longer works- this would let them read advantages like “the law would be reasserted under the treaty power- treaty power good” and spike all our legalization bad arguments</h4><p><strong>Dupont et al 04</strong> [Robert L. DuPont et al 4, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown Medical School, President of the Institute for Behavior and Health, Inc. and Vice-president of Bensinger, DuPont and Associates, was the first Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the second Director of the White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, 2004, Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, John Ashcroft et al v. Angel McClary Raich et al, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 03-1454, http://www.ibhinc.org/pdfs/ARAmicusBrief.pdf<u><strong>]</p><p></u></strong>I. The <u><strong><mark>Treaty Power Provides a Separate</mark> and Independent <mark>Source of Congressional Power</u></strong></mark> in This Case. While Congress must certainly regulate in accordance with its enumerated powers, <u><strong><mark>the Commerce Clause does not provide the sole source </mark>of congressional authority</u></strong> in this case. <u><strong>The United States may enter into treaties governing matters of international concern and impact. Such treaties</u></strong>, in conjunction with the federal Constitution and federal legislation, <u><strong>comprise the supreme law of the land</u></strong>. U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 2. cl. 2 (power of the President to enter into treaties); U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Congress has the power to enact all laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution...all...Powers granted by this Constitution." U.S. Const. Art. I, sec.8, cl. 18. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enact laws implementing the United States' obligations under treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sec. 801 et seq. (1970), ("CSA") is such a law, and its regulation of the class of activity in this case is necessary to fulfill those obligations. <u><strong><mark>Federal laws, like the CSA, which implement U.S. treaty obligations, are unquestionably a valid exercise of congressional power, even in the face of conflicting state laws."</u></strong></mark> In Missouri v. Ho/land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), this <u><strong>Court upheld the power of Congress to enact legislation, pursuant to a treaty, despite contrary state law. <mark>The Court</mark> stressed that such legislation</u></strong>—in that case the Migratory Bird Treaty Act—<u><strong>stands on a separate basis of congressional power, and <mark>rejected the argument that Congress must have independent constitutional authority separate from a treaty as a basis for enacting legislation</u></strong></mark>. Id. at 432-33. <u><strong><mark>The CSA's</mark> comprehensive regulatory <mark>structure</u></strong>,</mark> too, <u><strong><mark>is supported by</mark> the <mark>Treaty Power</mark>, as well by Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,706 | 6 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,460 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.</h4>
| null | null |
Plan
| 430,707 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,461 |
FX- even if the effect of the plan would be a removal of the law- it is not a mandate of the plan- effects T is an independent voter because it allows too many unpredictable steps between plan action and the topic which explodes limits
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>FX- even if the effect of the plan would be a removal of the law- it is not a mandate of the plan- effects T is an independent voter because it allows too many unpredictable steps between plan action and the topic which explodes limits</h4>
| null | null |
1NC
| 430,708 | 1 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,462 |
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
| 3,355 |
<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u><mark>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u><mark>who suggest that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 429,540 | 21 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,463 |
Terrorism discourse is wrong and leads to war
|
Cortright 8
|
Cortright 8 [David, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and research fellow for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2008 (“Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.” Pg. 125]
|
terrorism has replaced communism as the frame of dehumanization. to lump together all considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of circumstances The so-called war on terror” is used to justify all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary to defeat “evil” . Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable
| null |
In recent years terrorism has replaced communism as the new frame of dehumanization. It has been used to lump together all those who are considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of the specific circumstances involved. The so-called “global war on terror” is used to justify any and all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary by government officials to defeat the “evil” enemy. Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable, just as during the cold war the fight against communism provided the justification for the unthinkable.
| 719 |
<h4><strong>Terrorism discourse is wrong and leads to war</h4><p>Cortright 8</strong> [David, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and research fellow for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2008 (“Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.” Pg. 125]</p><p>In recent years <u>terrorism has replaced communism as the </u>new<u> frame of dehumanization. </u>It has been used<u> to lump together all </u>those who are <u>considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of</u> the specific<u> circumstances</u> involved. <u>The so-called </u>“global<u> war on terror” is used to justify </u>any and<u> all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary </u>by government officials<u> to defeat </u>the<u> “evil” </u>enemy<u>. Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable</u>, just as during the cold war the fight against communism provided the justification for the unthinkable.</p>
| null | null |
K
| 430,519 | 5 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,464 |
This would maximize organ sales
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
|
Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
| 1,450 |
<h4>This <strong>would maximize organ sales</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 <u><mark>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,338 | 11 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,465 |
government purchaser avoids exploitation
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. .
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, <mark>we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall.</mark> </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option<mark>.<u></mark> The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,466 |
This means only the alt can ever solve terrorism.
|
Butler 4 (
|
Butler 4 (Judith, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparitive Literature @ the University of California, Berkley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg 15-18)
|
there a way to understand bin Laden as "born" from US imperialism we need to distinguish, between individual and collective responsibility. Those who commit acts of violence are surely responsible for them; they are agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be making a mistake if we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or "evil." to take the self-generated acts of the individual as our point of departure in moral reasoning is precisely to foreclose the possibility of questioning what kind of world gives rise to such individuals. How is it that radical violence becomes an option To ask these questions is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. It is, rather, to rethink the relation between conditions and acts Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? We ask these questions not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but to take a different sort of responsibility pursuing a wayward military solution, the United States perpetrates and displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of terrorist organizations to refuse this cycle of revenge means to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order to form it anew, and in the direction of non-violence and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds the events are not understandable without that history Only then do we reach the disposition to get to the "root" of violence, and begin to offer another vision of the future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying
26(2): 271–288)
rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. To equate famine with warfare and threat is to deny the prima facie issue of the responsibility of the industrialized world to those in affected regions To focus on the conflict potential is to ignore the real causes of poverty and vulnerability, namely the economic disadvantages people in the industrializing world experience from their exposure to global capital Ignoring global processes leads to impoverished policy All these mainstream development concerns are ignored or treated as afterthoughts
|
there a way to understand bin Laden as "born" from imperialism Those who commit acts of violence are formed, and we would mak a mistake if we reduced their actions to "evil." to take the individual as our point of departure is to foreclose questioning what kind of world gives rise to such To ask these questions is to rethink the relation between conditions and acts To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? We ask these questions to take a different sort of responsibility pursuing a military solution, the U S displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of errorist to refuse this cycle of revenge means to form it anew in the direction of non-violence Only then do we get to the "root" of violence, and offer another future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying
rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war To equate famine with warfare and threat is to deny the issue of the responsibility of the industrialized world to those in affected regions To focus on the conflict potential is to ignore the real causes of poverty namely the economic disadvantages people in the industrializing world experience from their exposure to global capital Ignoring global processes leads to impoverished policy All these mainstream development concerns are ignored or treated as afterthoughts
|
So, is there a way, in Roy's terms, to understand bin Laden as "born" from the rib of US imperialism (allowing that he is born from several possible historical sources, one of which is, crucially, US imperialism), without claiming that US imperialism is solely responsible for his actions, or those of his ostensible network? To answer this question, we need to distinguish, provisionally, between individual and collective responsibility. But, then we need to situate individual responsibility in light of its collective conditions. Those who commit acts of violence are surely responsible for them; they are not dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be making a mistake if we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or "evil." Both the discourse of individualism and of moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts itself in public acts of denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in a causal chain that forms the meaning of accountability. But to take the self-generated acts of the individual as our point of departure in moral reasoning is precisely to foreclose the possibility of questioning what kind of world gives rise to such individuals. And what is this process of "giving rise"? What social conditions help to form the very ways that choice and deliberation proceed? Where and how can such subject formations be contravened? How is it that radical violence becomes an option, comes to appear as the only viable option for some, under some global conditions? Against what conditions of violation do they respond? And with what resources? To ask these questions is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. It is, rather, to rethink the relation between conditions and acts. Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned. We are at once acted upon and acting, and our "responsibility" lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do to transform them? Being acted upon is not fully continuous with acting, and in this way the forces that act upon us are not finally responsible for what we do. In a certain way, and paradoxically, our responsibility is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others. We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined. Only once we have suffered that violence are we compelled, ethically, to ask how we will respond to violent injury. What role will we assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that we make? To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous -439864526543000-434340045720000-428244011620500denunciation itself. But is this the same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its social transformation in such a way that non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian international relations remain the guiding ideal? -4343400183769000-446849510287000-426402589535000-4495800136207500We ask these latter questions not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but to take a different sort of responsibility for the global conditions of justice. As a result, it made sense after 9/11 to follow two courses of action at once: to find those who planned and implemented the violence and to hold them accountable according to international war crimes standards and in international courts of law, regardless of our skepticism about such institutions (skepticism can furnish grounds for reform or for the making of new law or new institutions for implementing law). In pursuing a wayward military solution, the United States perpetrates and displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of young Muslims to join terrorist organizations. This is poor thinking, strategically and morally. Ignoring its image as the hated enemy for many in the region, the United States has effectively responded to the violence done against it by consolidating its reputation as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the First World. That we now respond with more violence is taken as "further proof" that the United States has violent and anti-sovereign designs on the region. To remember the lessons of Aeschylus, and to refuse this cycle of revenge in the name of justice, means not only to seek legal redress for wrongs done, but to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order to form it anew, and in the -4251960-88138000-4239895-46990000-4596765-136906000-4322445-39941500direction of non-violence. -3971925159829500-445960562293500-43649901968500-43224457112000-430720577533500Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and non-violent cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds. This means, in part, hearing beyond what we are able to hear. And it means as well being open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy, in both its right- and left-wing forms. Can we hear that there were precedents for these events and even know that it is urgent to know and learn from these precedents as we seek to stop them from operating in the present, at the same time as we insist that these precedents do not "justify" the recent violent events? If the events are not understandable without that history, that does not mean that the historical understanding furnishes a moral justification for the events themselves. Only then do we reach the disposition to get to the "root" of violence, and begin to offer another vision of the future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying it, offering instead names for things that restrain us from thinking and acting radically and well about global options.
Linking famine and war kills possible solutions to it and promotes Western interests
Barnett (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) 2k
(Jon, “Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis,” Review of International Studies 26(2): 271–288)
The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict re difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argu mentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: 'the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion', but 'we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate'.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced 'first rate breeding grounds for conflict'; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life. To equate famine with warfare and threat is to deny the prima facie issue of the responsibility of the industrialized world to those in affected regions. To focus on the conflict potential is to ignore the real causes of poverty and vulnerability, namely the economic disadvantages people in the industrializing world experience from their exposure to global capital. Ignoring global processes also leads to impoverished policy.39 Vulnerability to famine can be lessened through substantial increases in access to employment, health care, education for women and children, and contra ception. Resilience to famine can be enhanced by protecting traditional societies from the disruptive effects of modern society, by creating safe political conditions, and by permitting more autonomous governance at the local level. The con sequences of famine can be lessened by making use of the efficient collection and delivery mechanisms that characterize world trade between industrialized nations to deliver necessary supplies. All these mainstream development concerns are ignored or treated as afterthoughts when the issue of population growth is understood as a probable cause of war.
| 8,918 |
<h4>This means only the alt can ever solve terrorism.</h4><p><strong>Butler 4 (</strong>Judith, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparitive Literature @ the University of California, Berkley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg 15-18)</p><p>So, is <u><mark>there a way</u></mark>, in Roy's terms, <u><mark>to understand bin Laden as "born" from</u></mark> the rib of <u>US <mark>imperialism</u></mark> (allowing that he is born from several possible historical sources, one of which is, crucially, US imperialism), without claiming that US imperialism is solely responsible for his actions, or those of his ostensible network? To answer this question, <u>we need to distinguish,</u> provisionally, <u>between individual and collective responsibility. </u>But, then we need to situate individual responsibility in light of its collective conditions. <u><mark>Those who commit acts of violence</mark> are surely responsible for them; they are</u> not dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but <u>agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals <mark>are formed, and we would</mark> be <mark>mak</mark>ing <mark>a mistake if we reduced their actions to</mark> purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or <mark>"evil."</mark> </u>Both the discourse of individualism and of moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts itself in public acts of denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in a causal chain that forms the meaning of accountability. But <u><mark>to take</mark> the self-generated acts of <mark>the individual as our point of departure</mark> in moral reasoning <mark>is</mark> precisely <mark>to foreclose</mark> the possibility of <mark>questioning what kind of world gives rise to such</mark> individuals.</u> And what is this process of "giving rise"? What social conditions help to form the very ways that choice and deliberation proceed? Where and how can such subject formations be contravened? <u>How is it that radical violence becomes an option</u>, comes to appear as the only viable option for some, under some global conditions? Against what conditions of violation do they respond? And with what resources? <u><mark>To ask these questions</mark> is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. It <mark>is</mark>, rather, <mark>to rethink the relation between conditions and acts</u></mark>. <u>Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned</u>. We are at once acted upon and acting, and our "responsibility" lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do to transform them? Being acted upon is not fully continuous with acting, and in this way the forces that act upon us are not finally responsible for what we do. In a certain way, and paradoxically, our responsibility is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others. <u>We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined</u>. Only once we have suffered that violence are we compelled, ethically, to ask how we will respond to violent injury. What role will we assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that we make? <u><mark>To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution?</mark> </u>Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous -439864526543000-434340045720000-428244011620500denunciation itself. But is this the same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its social transformation in such a way that non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian international relations remain the guiding ideal? -4343400183769000-446849510287000-426402589535000-4495800136207500<u><mark>We ask these</u></mark> latter <u><mark>questions </mark>not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but <mark>to take a different sort of responsibility</u></mark> for the global conditions of justice. As a result, it made sense after 9/11 to follow two courses of action at once: to find those who planned and implemented the violence and to hold them accountable according to international war crimes standards and in international courts of law, regardless of our skepticism about such institutions (skepticism can furnish grounds for reform or for the making of new law or new institutions for implementing law). In <u><mark>pursuing a</mark> wayward <mark>military solution, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates perpetrates and <mark>displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of</u></mark> young Muslims to join <u>t<mark>errorist</mark> organizations</u>. This is poor thinking, strategically and morally. Ignoring its image as the hated enemy for many in the region, the United States has effectively responded to the violence done against it by consolidating its reputation as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the First World. That we now respond with more violence is taken as "further proof" that the United States has violent and anti-sovereign designs on the region. To remember the lessons of Aeschylus, and <u><mark>to refuse this cycle of revenge</u></mark> in the name of justice, <u><mark>means</u></mark> not only to seek legal redress for wrongs done, but <u>to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order <mark>to form it anew</mark>, and <mark>in the </u></mark>-4251960-88138000-4239895-46990000-4596765-136906000-4322445-39941500<u><mark>direction of non-violence</u></mark>. -3971925159829500-445960562293500-43649901968500-43224457112000-430720577533500Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and non-violent cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, <u>and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds</u>. This means, in part, hearing beyond what we are able to hear. And it means as well being open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy, in both its right- and left-wing forms. Can we hear that there were precedents for these events and even know that it is urgent to know and learn from these precedents as we seek to stop them from operating in the present, at the same time as we insist that these precedents do not "justify" the recent violent events? If <u>the events are not understandable without that history</u>, that does not mean that the historical understanding furnishes a moral justification for the events themselves. <u><mark>Only then do we </mark>reach the disposition to <mark>get to the "root" of violence, and </mark>begin to <mark>offer another </mark>vision of the <mark>future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying</u></mark> it, offering instead names for things that restrain us from thinking and acting radically and well about global options.</p><p>Linking famine and war kills possible solutions to it and promotes Western interests</p><p><strong>Barnett</strong> (Senior Lecturer, School of Anthropology, Geography, and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies) <strong>2k</strong> </p><p>(Jon, “Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis,” Review of International Studies <u>26(2): 271–288)</p><p></u>The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict re difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argu mentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: 'the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion', but 'we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate'.38 It is possible though, that <u><mark>rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war</mark>. </u>Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced 'first rate breeding grounds for conflict'; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life. <u><mark>To equate famine with warfare and threat is to deny the</mark> prima facie <mark>issue of the responsibility</mark> <mark>of the industrialized world to those in affected regions</u></mark>. <u><mark>To focus on the conflict potential is to ignore the real causes of poverty</mark> and vulnerability, <mark>namely the economic disadvantages people in the industrializing world experience from their exposure to global capital</u></mark>. <u><mark>Ignoring global processes</u></mark> also <u><mark>leads to impoverished policy</u></mark>.39 Vulnerability to famine can be lessened through substantial increases in access to employment, health care, education for women and children, and contra ception. Resilience to famine can be enhanced by protecting traditional societies from the disruptive effects of modern society, by creating safe political conditions, and by permitting more autonomous governance at the local level. The con sequences of famine can be lessened by making use of the efficient collection and delivery mechanisms that characterize world trade between industrialized nations to deliver necessary supplies. <u><mark>All these mainstream development concerns are ignored or treated as afterthoughts</u><strong></mark> when the issue of population growth is understood as a probable cause of war. </p></strong>
| null | null |
K
| 311,824 | 7 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,467 |
Our alternative is to demilitarize the public sphere, bottom up rejection of security politics allows us to move beyond an unsustainable system that leads to inevitable threat escalation
| null |
Lal, 2007
|
national security is an antonym for human security the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. put theory into practice Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The U S has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation. questioning and changing structures that oppress us Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come. human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.
|
discourse is power, we can deconstruct the power of elites using their own tool: discourse. we are through discursive practices subjected to the reality the state wants us to see. it is time we defined our own reality citizen action is critical grassroots statecraft challenging policy through contending discursive acts calls for pitting values of society against the state The U S has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain hegemonic and oppressive status to exist changes do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. . Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and Vietnam grassroots action makes individuals the referent of security as people call for demilitarization of issues contrary to human security Britain, France and Germany set aside historical enmities and became a community Cold War rivals are now friends The apartheid regime did collapse India and Pakistan have been moving towards peace with each new friendship , there is one less foe and one less Other The world is not stable in a , nasty brutish framework which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a realistic framework
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(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)
Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how national security is an antonym for human security. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. The question that arises next is how to put critical theory into practice and deconstruct the national security state. Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation. Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with questioning and changing structures and institutions that oppress us and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin for Booth (2005, 191), as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come. Therefore, human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.
| 8,181 |
<h4><strong>Our alternative is to demilitarize the public sphere, bottom up rejection of security politics allows us to move beyond</strong> an unsustainable system that leads to inevitable threat escalation</h4><p><u>Lal, 2007</p><p></u>(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)</p><p>Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how <u><strong>national security is an antonym for human security</u></strong>. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why <u><strong>the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.”</u></strong> Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how <u><strong>the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. </u></strong>The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that <u><strong>“economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security.</u></strong> The question that arises next is how to <u><strong>put</u></strong> critical <u><strong>theory into practice</u></strong> and deconstruct the national security state. <u><strong>Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth.</u></strong> In other words, <u><strong>there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist</u></strong> Foucaultian <u><strong>analysis that <mark>discourse is power, we can </mark>move towards <mark>deconstruct</mark>ing<mark> the power of </mark>the state and <mark>elites</mark> to securitize <mark>using their own tool: discourse.</u></strong></mark> The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>colonized <mark>through discursive practices </mark>and <mark>subjected to the reality </mark>that <mark>the state wants us to see.</mark> However, definitions belong to the definer, and <mark>it is </mark>high <mark>time</mark> that <mark>we</mark> questioned and <mark>defined our own reality</mark>.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>citizen action is critical</mark> to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security</u></strong>. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of <u><strong>a <mark>grassroots statecraft</mark> that is defined as “<mark>challenging</mark> foreign <mark>policy </mark>of government <mark>through contending discursive</mark> and speech <mark>acts</mark>.”</u></strong> This <u><strong><mark>calls for pitting</mark> the <mark>values of </mark>civil <mark>society against the state </mark>establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. <mark>The U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain</mark> that <mark>hegemonic and oppressive status</mark> in order <mark>to exist</mark>. It is critical to remember that fundamental <mark>changes </mark>in our institutions and structures of power <mark>do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom.</mark> History is case in point<mark>. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and </mark>the <mark>Vietnam </mark>War</u></strong>, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, <u><strong><mark>grassroots </mark>citizen <mark>action </mark>performatively <mark>makes individuals the referent </mark>subject <mark>of security as people </mark>would <mark>call for</mark> the <mark>demilitarization</mark> and desecuritization <mark>of issues </mark>that are <mark>contrary</mark> and irrelevant <mark>to</mark> <mark>human security</mark>. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. </u></strong>As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, <u><strong>“it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” <mark>Britain, France and Germany set aside </mark>their <mark>historical enmities and became </mark>part of <mark>a </mark>European <mark>community</mark>, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. <mark>Cold War rivals </mark>that almost annihilated the world <mark>are now friends </mark>in the “war against terror.” <mark>The apartheid regime</mark> in South Africa <mark>did collapse</mark> eventually.</u></strong> In the past two years, <u><strong><mark>India and Pakistan have been moving towards </mark>a more <mark>peace</mark>ful future</u></strong> that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. <u><strong>While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that <mark>with each new friendship </mark>and alliance<mark>, there is one less foe and one less Other</mark>. <mark>The world is not stable </mark>and stagnant, existing <mark>in a</mark>n anarchic<mark>, nasty </mark>and <mark>brutish framework</mark> in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, <mark>which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a </mark>more <mark>realistic framework </mark>through which we can view international relations.</u></strong> Therefore, <u><strong>our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.</u></strong> Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with <u><strong>questioning and changing structures</u></strong> and institutions <u><strong>that oppress us</u></strong> and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. <u><strong>Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin</u></strong> for Booth (2005, 191), <u><strong>as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept</u></strong>. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal <u><strong>that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come.</u></strong> Therefore, <u><strong>human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.</u></strong> </p>
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
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We legalize sales, not purchases – their turns don’t apply
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Gill 2
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Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
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are not arguing that it ought to be legal to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that buyers be the agencies in charge of procurement allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria not an unregulated market the purchase of kidneys, is a separate question. Many arguments against legalizing the purchase do not apply to the sale . , one argument against permitting buying kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that have no supporting evidence. our proposal will increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one
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Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
First, we are arguing for the claim that it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. 2 A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. As already noted in our preliminary points, our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
| 11,563 |
<h4>We legalize sales, not purchases – their turns don’t apply</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_<u> of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p></u>First, we are arguing for the claim that<u> it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We <mark>are not arguing that it ought to be legal </mark>for a potential recipient <mark>to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that </mark>the <mark>buyers </mark>of kidneys <mark>be the agencies in charge of </mark>kidney <mark>procurement </mark>or transplantation; </u>that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. <u>We assume that <mark>allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria</mark>, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will <mark>not </mark>be traded in <mark>an unregulated market</mark>.</u> 2 <u>A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products</u>, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe <u>the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die.</u> We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. <u>Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys</u>. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. <u>Our proposal does not address <mark>the purchase of kidneys, </mark>which <mark>is a separate question. Many </mark>of the <mark>arguments against legalizing the purchase </mark>of kidneys <mark>do not apply to the sale </mark>of kidneys<mark>.</u> <u></mark>For example<mark>, one argument against permitting </mark>the <mark>buying </mark>of <mark>kidneys is that it</u></mark> will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it <u><mark>will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford </mark>to buy <mark>a kidney.</u> <u>Both arguments rest on empirical claims that </mark>are often stated as fact, yet<mark> have no supporting evidence. </mark>Even if the empirical claims were accurate</u>, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. <u>The important point is that <mark>our proposal will </mark>not be affected either way.</u> As already noted in our preliminary points, <u>our proposal can be reasonably expected both to<mark> increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and </mark>to <mark>increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one</mark>. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well. </p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,594 | 8 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,469 |
Court will rule for the executive in Zivotofsky now but it’s close and requires ruling against Congress
|
Kwan 11/7
|
Victoria Kwan 11/7, Blog Editor for The Brooklyn Quarterly, citing Abed Ayoub, Legal & Policy Director of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, “A Tinderbox of a Case,” http://brooklynquarterly.org/tinderbox-case/
|
it’s going to be a close decision in Zivotofsky the separation of powers battle between Congress and the President I’d predict a 5-4 decision for the State Department Zivotofsky and his parents invoked a 2002 law passed by Congress ordering the State Department to amend the birthplace from “Jerusalem” to “Israel” for any American citizen who requests the change the State Department refused citing Congress’ intrusion into the Executive’s power to determine foreign policy and the harm that even a one-word change would inflict on American diplomacy efforts in the already-volatile Middle East oral argument questions were in line with what we anticipated,” Kagan characterized Section 214(d) as a “very selective vanity plate law” and Jerusalem as a “tinderbox” Alito might vote for the Executive, alongside Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Ayoub is also hopeful that Kennedy will vote to strike down Section 214(d). Kennedy] would probably fall on the side of the government
|
it’s going to be a close decision in Zivotofsky the battle between Congress and President I’d predict a 5-4 decision for the State State refused citing Congress’ intrusion and the harm that would inflict on diplomacy in the Middle East oral questions were what we anticipated Kagan characterized Section 214 as a “ selective vanity plate law” and Jerusalem as a “tinderbox Alito might vote for the Executive, alongside Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan Ayoub is also hopeful that Kennedy will strike down Kennedy] would fall on the side of government
|
Abed Ayoub thinks that it’s going to be a close decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the separation of powers battle between Congress and the President over U.S. policy on Jerusalem that is currently under consideration at the Supreme Court.¶ “I’d predict a 5-4 decision for the State Department, or possibly even 6-3.” Ayoub, the Legal and Policy Director for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), said this week after attending the Court’s oral argument in Zivotofsky.¶ The case’s central figure is a 12-year-old Jerusalem-born American citizen, Menachem Zivotofsky, who wants the birthplace line in his passport to say “Israel.” While this sounds like a simple enough request, the Executive branch has a longstanding policy of not recognizing any state’s sovereignty over the city, so his passport merely says that he is born in “Jerusalem,” with no designated country of birth. Zivotofsky and his parents invoked a 2002 law passed by Congress that included a section (known as Section 214(d)) ordering the State Department to amend the birthplace from “Jerusalem” to “Israel” for any American citizen who requests the change. But the State Department refused to do so for Zivotofsky, citing Congress’ intrusion into the Executive’s power to determine foreign policy and the harm that even a one-word change would inflict on American diplomacy efforts in the already-volatile Middle East. Zivotofsky took the dispute to the Supreme Court, which must decide whether Section 214(d) is a proper exercise of Congress’ constitutional powers.¶ Because the law Congress wrote addresses only Jerusalem’s relationship to Israel, Palestinian Americans born in that city do not have the option of swapping out “Jerusalem” for “Palestine” in their passports, which is where the ADC comes in. The organization, which describes itself as the country’s largest Arab American civil rights grassroots group, is adamant in its belief that Jerusalem is not a part of Israel. If the ADC had its way, the passports of all Americans born in Jerusalem would list “Palestine” as the place of birth. Since it is unlikely that Congress or the Executive would approve such a policy, however, the ADC wants Palestinian Americans to at least be able to pick Palestine as their country of birth—the same right to self-identification that Zivotofsky argues he should have.¶ According to Ayoub, most of the ADC’s staff attended the oral argument on Monday, including the team of attorneys who had submitted an amicus brief in support of the State Department. “The questions were in line with what we anticipated,” he said. They were pleased when Justice Elena Kagan characterized Section 214(d) as a “very selective vanity plate law” and Jerusalem as a “tinderbox” where the United States government’s every move regarding Israel or Palestine matters. They did not agree with Justice Antonin Scalia’s comments that the Palestinians’ feelings toward the matter were “irrelevant” or Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.’s questions about whether the law would actually have “such dramatic effects on American foreign policy.” Overall, though, Ayoub thought that the justices “really got to the nuts and bolts of the questions at hand.”¶ The only moment that was “genuinely surprising” came when Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., in the course of questioning Zivotofsky’s attorney, said that he did not “completely understand… the position of the United States regarding Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem.” Ayoub had expected the justices to be familiar with the Executive’s official policy already. Despite this and Alito’s skepticism of the State Department’s position at oral argument, Ayoub still thinks that the 64-year-old justice might wind up being the fifth or sixth vote for the Executive, alongside Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. “He had good questions.” Ayoub is also hopeful that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy will vote to strike down Section 214(d). He sensed that “Kennedy was thinking about how the United States could be neutral on this”–the justice had suggested early on that the Executive could put “Israel” as the country of birth, but then add a disclaimer to say the birthplace line is neither an acknowledgment nor a declaration by the State Department or the President that Jerusalem belongs to Israel–but predicted that “[Kennedy] would probably fall on the side of the government.”
| 4,399 |
<h4>Court will rule for the executive in Zivotofsky now but it’s <u>close</u> and requires ruling against Congress</h4><p>Victoria <strong>Kwan 11/7</strong>, Blog Editor for The Brooklyn Quarterly, citing Abed Ayoub, Legal & Policy Director of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, “A Tinderbox of a Case,” http://brooklynquarterly.org/tinderbox-case/</p><p>Abed Ayoub thinks that <u><strong><mark>it’s going to be a close decision in Zivotofsky</u></strong></mark> v. Kerry, <u><mark>the</mark> separation of powers <mark>battle between Congress and</mark> the <mark>President</u></mark> over U.S. policy on Jerusalem that is currently under consideration at the Supreme Court.¶ “<u><mark>I’d predict a <strong>5-4 decision for the State </mark>Department</u></strong>, or possibly even 6-3.” Ayoub, the Legal and Policy Director for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), said this week after attending the Court’s oral argument in Zivotofsky.¶ The case’s central figure is a 12-year-old Jerusalem-born American citizen, Menachem Zivotofsky, who wants the birthplace line in his passport to say “Israel.” While this sounds like a simple enough request, the Executive branch has a longstanding policy of not recognizing any state’s sovereignty over the city, so his passport merely says that he is born in “Jerusalem,” with no designated country of birth. <u>Zivotofsky and his parents invoked a 2002 law passed by Congress</u> that included a section (known as Section 214(d)) <u>ordering the State Department to amend the birthplace from “Jerusalem” to “Israel” for any American citizen who requests the change</u>. But <u>the <mark>State </mark>Department <mark>refused</u></mark> to do so for Zivotofsky, <u><mark>citing Congress’ intrusion </mark>into the Executive’s power to determine foreign policy <mark>and the harm that</mark> even a one-word change <mark>would inflict on </mark>American <mark>diplomacy</mark> efforts <mark>in the </mark>already-volatile <mark>Middle East</u></mark>. Zivotofsky took the dispute to the Supreme Court, which must decide whether Section 214(d) is a proper exercise of Congress’ constitutional powers.¶ Because the law Congress wrote addresses only Jerusalem’s relationship to Israel, Palestinian Americans born in that city do not have the option of swapping out “Jerusalem” for “Palestine” in their passports, which is where the ADC comes in. The organization, which describes itself as the country’s largest Arab American civil rights grassroots group, is adamant in its belief that Jerusalem is not a part of Israel. If the ADC had its way, the passports of all Americans born in Jerusalem would list “Palestine” as the place of birth. Since it is unlikely that Congress or the Executive would approve such a policy, however, the ADC wants Palestinian Americans to at least be able to pick Palestine as their country of birth—the same right to self-identification that Zivotofsky argues he should have.¶ According to Ayoub, most of the ADC’s staff attended the <u><mark>oral</mark> argument</u> on Monday, including the team of attorneys who had submitted an amicus brief in support of the State Department. “The <u><mark>questions were</mark> in line with <mark>what we anticipated</mark>,”</u> he said. They were pleased when Justice Elena <u><mark>Kagan characterized Section 214</mark>(d) <mark>as a “</mark>very <mark>selective vanity plate law” and Jerusalem as a “tinderbox</mark>”</u> where the United States government’s every move regarding Israel or Palestine matters. They did not agree with Justice Antonin Scalia’s comments that the Palestinians’ feelings toward the matter were “irrelevant” or Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.’s questions about whether the law would actually have “such dramatic effects on American foreign policy.” Overall, though, Ayoub thought that the justices “really got to the nuts and bolts of the questions at hand.”¶ The only moment that was “genuinely surprising” came when Justice Samuel A. <u><mark>Alito</u></mark>, Jr., in the course of questioning Zivotofsky’s attorney, said that he did not “completely understand… the position of the United States regarding Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem.” Ayoub had expected the justices to be familiar with the Executive’s official policy already. Despite this and Alito’s skepticism of the State Department’s position at oral argument, Ayoub still thinks that the 64-year-old justice <u><strong><mark>might</u></strong></mark> wind up being the fifth or sixth <u><mark>vote for the Executive, alongside</u></mark> Justices <u><mark>Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan</mark>.</u> “He had good questions.” <u><mark>Ayoub is also hopeful that</u></mark> Justice Anthony M. <u><strong><mark>Kennedy</u></strong> <u>will</mark> vote to <mark>strike down</mark> Section 214(d).</u> He sensed that “Kennedy was thinking about how the United States could be neutral on this”–the justice had suggested early on that the Executive could put “Israel” as the country of birth, but then add a disclaimer to say the birthplace line is neither an acknowledgment nor a declaration by the State Department or the President that Jerusalem belongs to Israel–but predicted that “[<u><mark>Kennedy] would</mark> probably <mark>fall on the side of </mark>the <mark>government</u></mark>.”</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 223,602 | 8 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,470 |
Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply
|
Beard et al 13
|
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
|
On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives
|
On balance a fair reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors would increase substantially the number of organs available for transplant both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors respond to incentives
|
On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives.
| 363 |
<h4>Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p><u><mark>On balance</mark>, <mark>a fair</mark>-minded <mark>reading of</mark> <mark>the evidence suggests that compensation for donors</mark>, if done correctly and sensibly, <mark>would increase</mark>, probably <mark>substantially</mark>, <mark>the number of organs available for transplant</mark>. In the cases of <mark>both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors</mark>, available evidence confirms the observation that people <mark>respond to incentives</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,350 | 6 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,471 |
Empirically, sales would not be primarily from the poor. All income groups would participate.
|
Halpern 10
|
Halpern 10 Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns
|
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found Even when we restricted analyses to the lowest income stratum and the highest income stratum no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.
|
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found Even when we restricted analyses to the lowest income stratum and the highest no significant interaction emerged
|
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab
Unjust Inducement
Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found (OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). Even when we restricted analyses to the 57 participants in the lowest income stratum (annual household income ≤$20 000) and the 66 participants in the highest income stratum (annual household income >$100 000), no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.
| 1,068 |
<h4><strong>Empirically, sales would not be primarily from the poor. All income groups would participate.</h4><p>Halpern 10</strong> Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns</p><p>http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab</p><p>Unjust Inducement</p><p><u><mark>Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so <strong>evenly</strong> across the 6 income strata,</mark> such that <mark>no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found</mark> </u>(OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). <u><mark>Even when we restricted analyses to the</u></mark> 57 participants in the <u><mark>lowest income stratum</u></mark> (annual household income ≤$20 000) <u><mark>and the</u></mark> 66 participants in the <u><mark>highest</mark> income stratum</u> (annual household income >$100 000), <u><mark>no significant interaction emerged<strong></mark> (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,596 | 4 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,472 |
The plan trades off---the Court has limited willingness to fight Congress by striking down statutes
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Young 99
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Ernest A. Young 99, Assistant Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, 1999, “ARTICLE: State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,” Supreme Court Review, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, p. lexis
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the Court has limited political capital the judiciary's ability to persuade the populace and public leaders that it is right is determined by the number and frequency of its attempts the felt importance of the policies it disapproves, There is likely to be a limit on the Court's ability to continue striking down federal statutes The important point is that the Justices who matter most on these issues think in terms of limited capital and worry about judicial actions that may draw down the reserves Political capital is likely to function as an internal constraint on the Court's willingness repeatedly to confront Congress
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the Court has limited capital ability to persuade the populace is determined by the number and frequency of its attempts There is likely to be a limit on the Court's ability to continue striking down statutes Justices who matter most think in terms of limited capital and worry judicial actions may draw down the reserves capital is an internal constraint on the Court's willingness repeatedly to confront Congress
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The opportunity cost of immunity rulings. The first reason, and the simplest, is that the Court has limited political capital. n261 As Dean Choper has argued, "the federal judiciary's ability to persuade the populace and public leaders that it is right and they are wrong is determined by the number and frequency of its attempts [*59] to do so, the felt importance of the policies it disapproves, and the perceived substantive correctness of its decisions." n262 There is thus likely to be, at some point, a limit on the Court's ability to continue striking down federal statutes in the name of states' rights. n263 To the extent that this limit exists, then the Court's extended adventure in aggressive enforcement of state sovereign immunity will trade off with its ability to develop a meaningful jurisprudence of process or power federalism. If protecting state authority to regulate private conduct is the key to a viable state/federal balance, then a considered reaffirmation, explanation, or extension of Lopez may do more good than another expansion of Seminole Tribe.¶ "Political capital," of course, is a pretty vague concept. It might be that the Court's ability to enforce federalism limits is more like muscles than money: it atrophies unless it is exercised regularly. n264 The National League of Cities story arguably illustrates this phenomenon, in that the Court's failure to apply the doctrine to check federal power in a series of subsequent cases may have helped lead to the outright rejection of the doctrine in Garcia. n265 The important point, however, is that the Justices who matter most on these issues tend to think in terms of limited capital and worry about judicial actions that may draw down the reserves. n266 Political capital [*60] is thus likely to function as an internal constraint on the Court's willingness repeatedly to confront Congress.
| 1,879 |
<h4>The plan trades off---the Court has <u>limited willingness</u> to fight Congress by striking down statutes</h4><p>Ernest A. <strong>Young 99</strong>, Assistant Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, 1999, “ARTICLE: State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,” Supreme Court Review, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, p. lexis </p><p>The opportunity cost of immunity rulings. The first reason, and the simplest, is that <u><strong><mark>the Court has limited</mark> political <mark>capital</u></strong></mark>. n261 As Dean Choper has argued, "<u>the</u> federal <u>judiciary's <mark>ability to persuade the populace</mark> and public leaders that it is right</u> and they are wrong <u><mark>is</u> <u><strong>determined by the number and frequency of its attempts</u></strong></mark> [*59] to do so, <u>the felt importance of the policies it disapproves,</u> and the perceived substantive correctness of its decisions." n262 <u><mark>There is</u></mark> thus <u><mark>likely to be</u></mark>, at some point, <u><mark>a limit on the Court's ability to continue <strong>striking down </mark>federal <mark>statutes</u></strong></mark> in the name of states' rights. n263 To the extent that this limit exists, then the Court's extended adventure in aggressive enforcement of state sovereign immunity will trade off with its ability to develop a meaningful jurisprudence of process or power federalism. If protecting state authority to regulate private conduct is the key to a viable state/federal balance, then a considered reaffirmation, explanation, or extension of Lopez may do more good than another expansion of Seminole Tribe.¶ "Political capital," of course, is a pretty vague concept. It might be that the Court's ability to enforce federalism limits is more like muscles than money: it atrophies unless it is exercised regularly. n264 The National League of Cities story arguably illustrates this phenomenon, in that the Court's failure to apply the doctrine to check federal power in a series of subsequent cases may have helped lead to the outright rejection of the doctrine in Garcia. n265 <u>The important point</u>, however, <u>is that</u> <u><strong>the <mark>Justices who matter most</u></strong></mark> <u>on these issues</u> tend to <u><strong><mark>think in terms of limited capital</u></strong> <u>and worry</mark> about <mark>judicial actions</mark> that <mark>may <strong>draw down the reserves</u></strong></mark>. n266 <u>Political <mark>capital</u></mark> [*60] <u><mark>is</u></mark> thus <u><strong>likely to function as <mark>an internal constraint</u></strong> <u>on the Court's</u> <u><strong>willingness repeatedly to confront Congress</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 56,412 | 47 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
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tournament
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3
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Boston College Carelli-Kenner
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Rubino, Scher
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,473 |
Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing –egg donations prove
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Sobota 4
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Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis
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, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns In the proposed market system for organ procurement, the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices . With only moderate prices being paid , economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections , and thus no economic coercion would occur. Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical risks involved." These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
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the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices With moderate prices being paid economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections thus no economic coercion would occur dditionally the market for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women
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A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement
The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145 With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
| 1,526 |
<h4><strong>Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing –egg donations prove</h4><p>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement</p><p>The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First<u>, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns </u>about becoming a donor. n144 <u>In the proposed market system for organ procurement, </u>either OPOs or<u> <mark>the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices</mark> </u>paid for organs<u>.</u> n145 <u><mark>With </mark>only <mark>moderate prices being paid</mark> </u>to organ donors<u>, <mark>economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections</mark> </u>to donation<u>, and <mark>thus no economic coercion</mark> <mark>would occur</mark>.</u> n146 <u>A<mark>dditionally</mark>, <mark>the</mark> current <mark>market</mark> system <mark>for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement</mark>.</u> n147 <u><strong>A <mark>majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women</strong></mark>, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical</u> [*1246] <u>risks involved." </u>n148<u> These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.</p></u>
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 430,597 | 8 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,474 |
Destroys US ability to mediate tensions and prevent war in the Middle East
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Ayoub 10/31
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Abed Ayoub 10/31, Legal & Policy Director of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, “Expert Q&A: The US Supreme Court & Jerusalem (Zivotofsky v. Kerry)” http://imeu.org/article/expert-qa-the-us-supreme-court-jerusalem-zivotofsky-v.-kerry
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if the justices rule in favor of the plaintiff it will constitute a concrete and symbolic recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem by the United States this recognition will place the U.S. at odds with its current policy to remain neutral on Jerusalem and the international community consensus that Jerusalem is not part of this will immediately hinder the role of the U.S. in the Middle East. The sensitive status of Jerusalem is at the center of tensions in the Middle East. The U.S.'s neutrality has been key in easing tensions, as well as in bringing both sides to the table to resolve armed conflicts U.S. credibility in the international community be at stake, which has broad implications beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict To indicate recognition of Jerusalem as part of a Jewish state will directly impact and alienate the Christian and Muslim communities the case may set a precedent to allow Congress to legislate on other sensitive foreign affairs usually reserved for the Executive, especially concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East, effectively abrogating the power of the Executive and shifting the balance of powers largely to Congres
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if the justices rule in favor of the plaintiff it will constitute a concrete and symbolic recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem at odds with its current policy this will immediately hinder the role of the U.S. in the Middle East Jerusalem is at the center of tensions in the Middle East. The U.S.'s neutrality has been key in easing tensions, as well as in bringing sides to the table to resolve conflicts
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Q - What would be the implications, legal and otherwise, if the justices rule in favor of the plaintiff?¶ AA - “Preliminarily, the decision may require the U.S. Department of State to comply with all requests by U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to have their country of birth recorded as Israel on their passport. The Department of State will not be able to refuse, contrary to current policy and practice, to record the place of birth as Jerusalem. ¶ “Foremost, it will constitute a concrete and symbolic recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem by the United States. First, this recognition will place the U.S. at odds with its current policy to remain neutral on Jerusalem and the international community consensus that the entire city of Jerusalem is not part of Israel. The pre-1967 boundaries as established by the 1949 armistice agreements and under international law through several United Nations resolutions recognize that East Jerusalem is part of Palestine. Under Section 214(d) all of Jerusalem, not just West Jerusalem, can be identified as part of Israel. Thus Section 214(d) recognition will explicitly constitute U.S. support and approval of Israel’s illegal annexation of East Jerusalem and Israel’s continuous violations of international law through the ongoing building of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. So not only will this case force the Executive to recognize Jerusalem as the capital and under the sovereignty of Israel but also the territorial boundaries of Palestine, disregarding the national origin of thousands of Palestinian Americans and violating international law. Thousands of Palestinian Americans’ right to also recognize Jerusalem as part of and/or the capital of Palestine is not recognized. ¶ “Second, this will immediately hinder the role of the U.S. in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and in the Middle East. The sensitive status of Jerusalem is at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and tensions in the Middle East. The U.S.'s neutrality has been key in easing tensions, as well as in bringing both sides to the table to resolve armed conflicts. Thus not only will U.S. credibility in the international community be at stake, which has broad implications on foreign affairs beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the U.S. role as a key negotiating partner for a two-state solution.¶ “The sensitive status of Jerusalem has further implications. To recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel, a Jewish state, will also recognize Jerusalem as a Jewish state. To indicate recognition of Jerusalem as part of a Jewish state will directly impact and alienate the Christian and Muslim communities. They hold Jerusalem as religious sacred “holy land” and have legitimate ties to Jerusalem. Additionally, the case may also open the door and set a precedent to allow Congress to legislate on other sensitive foreign affairs issues that are usually reserved for the Executive, especially issues concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East, effectively abrogating the power of the Executive and shifting the balance of powers largely to Congress. With this comes serious concern of biased and/or discriminatorily motivated legislation against and/or at the expense of Palestine and Palestinian Americans.”
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<h4>Destroys US ability to <u>mediate tensions</u> and prevent war in the Middle East</h4><p>Abed <strong>Ayoub 10/31</strong>, Legal & Policy Director of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, “Expert Q&A: The US Supreme Court & Jerusalem (Zivotofsky v. Kerry)” http://imeu.org/article/expert-qa-the-us-supreme-court-jerusalem-zivotofsky-v.-kerry</p><p>Q - What would be the implications, legal and otherwise, <u><mark>if the justices rule in favor of the plaintiff</u></mark>?¶ AA - “Preliminarily, the decision may require the U.S. Department of State to comply with all requests by U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to have their country of birth recorded as Israel on their passport. The Department of State will not be able to refuse, contrary to current policy and practice, to record the place of birth as Jerusalem. ¶ “Foremost, <u><mark>it will constitute a concrete and symbolic recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem </mark>by the United States</u>. First, <u>this recognition will place the U.S. <mark>at odds with its current policy </mark>to remain neutral on Jerusalem and the international community consensus that</u> the entire city of <u>Jerusalem is not part of</u> Israel. The pre-1967 boundaries as established by the 1949 armistice agreements and under international law through several United Nations resolutions recognize that East Jerusalem is part of Palestine. Under Section 214(d) all of Jerusalem, not just West Jerusalem, can be identified as part of Israel. Thus Section 214(d) recognition will explicitly constitute U.S. support and approval of Israel’s illegal annexation of East Jerusalem and Israel’s continuous violations of international law through the ongoing building of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. So not only will this case force the Executive to recognize Jerusalem as the capital and under the sovereignty of Israel but also the territorial boundaries of Palestine, disregarding the national origin of thousands of Palestinian Americans and violating international law. Thousands of Palestinian Americans’ right to also recognize Jerusalem as part of and/or the capital of Palestine is not recognized. ¶ “Second, <u><mark>this will <strong>immediately hinder</strong> the role of the U.S.</u></mark> in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and <u><mark>in the Middle East</mark>. The sensitive status of <mark>Jerusalem is <strong>at the center of</u></strong></mark> the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and <u><mark>tensions in the Middle East. <strong>The U.S.'s neutrality has been key</strong> in <strong>easing tensions</strong>, as well as in <strong>bringing </mark>both <mark>sides to the table to resolve </mark>armed <mark>conflicts</u></strong></mark>. Thus not only will <u>U.S. credibility in the international community be at stake, which has broad implications</u> on foreign affairs <u>beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</u>, but also the U.S. role as a key negotiating partner for a two-state solution.¶ “The sensitive status of Jerusalem has further implications. To recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel, a Jewish state, will also recognize Jerusalem as a Jewish state. <u>To indicate recognition of Jerusalem as part of a Jewish state will <strong>directly impact and alienate</strong> the Christian and <strong>Muslim communities</u></strong>. They hold Jerusalem as religious sacred “holy land” and have legitimate ties to Jerusalem. Additionally, <u>the case may</u> also open the door and <u>set a precedent to allow Congress to legislate on other <strong>sensitive foreign affairs</u></strong> issues that are <u>usually reserved for the Executive, especially</u> issues <u>concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East, effectively abrogating the power of the Executive and shifting the balance of powers largely to Congres</u>s. With this comes serious concern of biased and/or discriminatorily motivated legislation against and/or at the expense of Palestine and Palestinian Americans.”</p>
| null | null |
1NC
| 223,622 | 8 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
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Rubino, Scher
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,475 |
Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation
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Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
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Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
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Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. , the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. . Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified They harbor the “priming” that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
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central to our approach is a blurring of wartime and peacetime violence Close attention to the “little” violences produced in structures of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons it is absolutely necessary to make existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. an even greater risk lies in in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices daily enacted by “ordinary” citizens These are “invisible” genocides because they are right before our eyes and war crimes are ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically in the extreme context of war it is essential that we exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity of ordinary people, to enforce genocidal like crimes There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence mass violence is socially incremental and often experienced as expected, routine They harbor the priming that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
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(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).
| 13,177 |
<h4><strong>Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4</p><p></strong>(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first</p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely <mark>central</mark> <mark>to our approach</mark> <mark>is a blurring of</mark> categories and distinctions between <mark>wartime and peacetime violence</mark>. <mark>Close attention to the “little” violences produced in</mark> the <mark>structures</mark>, habituses, and mentalites <mark>of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities</mark>.</u> More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. <u>The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which <strong><mark>humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons</strong></mark> and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u><mark>it is absolutely necessary to make</mark> just such <mark>existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times.</u></mark> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u>there is), <mark>an even greater</mark> <mark>risk</mark> <mark>lies in</mark> failing to sensitize ourselves, <mark>in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices</mark> and sentiments <mark>daily enacted</mark> as normative behavior <mark>by “ordinary”</mark> good-enough <mark>citizens</mark>. Peacetime crimes</u>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”</u> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u><mark>These are “invisible” genocides</mark> not <mark>because they are</mark> secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed<u>, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are <mark>right before our eyes and</mark> therefore taken for granted.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u>Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that <mark>war crimes are</mark> merely <mark>ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically</mark> and dramatically <mark>in the extreme context of war</u></mark>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? </u>What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we</mark> recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to <mark>exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the</mark> less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts</mark> <mark>and policies</mark> <mark>possible</u></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” <u><mark>Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence</mark> <mark>allows us to see the capacity</mark> and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - <mark>of ordinary people,</mark> the practical technicians of the social consensus, <mark>to enforce genocidal</mark>-<mark>like</mark> <mark>crimes</mark> against categories of rubbish people. <mark>There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life</mark>. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.</u> Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence<u>. <mark>Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence</mark> and genocide.</u> But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. <u>Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.</u> It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting <u>that <mark>mass violence</mark> is part of a continuum, and that it <mark>is socially incremental and often experienced</mark> by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - <mark>as expected, routine</mark>, even justified</u>. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. <u><mark>They harbor the</u></mark> early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the <u>“<mark>priming</mark>”</u> (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) <u><mark>that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life</u></mark> and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).</p>
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Contention 4 is risk calculus
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 16,028 | 483 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,476 |
Global nuclear war
|
Russell 9
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James Russell 9, Senior Lecturer Department of National Security Affairs, Spring, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” Security Studies Center Proliferation Papers, http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf
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Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; the presence of non-state actors incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. such an outcome would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
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perceptions by Israel could prompt a preventive attack lack of communications escalation could happen on purpose or miscalc a conflict could quickly escalate in which regional antagonists would consider the use of c b n s. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can keep weapons from being used asymmetries increase in the probability of war escalation could happen quickly such an outcome would be a risk for the entire world.
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Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
| 2,022 |
<h4>Global nuclear war</h4><p>James<strong> Russell 9</strong>, Senior Lecturer Department of National Security Affairs, Spring<u>, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” Security Studies Center Proliferation Papers, http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf</p><p>Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors</u>: (1) <u>asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors;</u> (2) <u>the presence of non-state actors </u>that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) <u>incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship</u> that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) <u><mark>perceptions by Israel</mark> and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which <mark>could prompt a preventive attack</u></mark>; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) <u>the <mark>lack of</mark> a <mark>communications</mark> framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. </u>These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that <u><mark>escalation</mark> by any the parties <mark>could happen</mark> either <mark>on purpose or</mark> as a result of <mark>miscalc</mark>ulation </u>or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, <u>it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which <mark>a conflict could <strong>quickly escalate</strong> in which</mark> the <mark>regional antagonists would consider the use <strong>of c</mark>hemical, <mark>b</mark>iological, or <mark>n</mark>uclear weapon<mark>s</strong>. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can</mark> somehow magically <mark>keep </mark>nuclear <mark>weapons from being used </mark>in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic <mark>asymmetries</mark> between actors in fact suggest a certain <mark>increase in the probability of war</mark> – a war in which <mark>escalation could happen quickly</mark> and from a variety of participants. </u>Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent <u><mark>such an outcome</u></mark>, which <u><mark>would be a</mark>n unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial <mark>risk for the <strong>entire world</strong>.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
1NC
| 54,072 | 393 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,477 |
Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict
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Ikenberry and Deudney 9
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Ikenberry and Deudney 9 (Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)
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the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces , the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are globalization institutions and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides constraints and opportunities that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete. nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. in the twenty-first century the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the U S with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China revisionist states notably China and Russia are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power Many other global institutions are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions The pathway to modernity is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside the liberal international order. The viability of regimes hinges on their ability to sustain economic growth which is crucially dependent on international trade Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people have increasingly joined the world community citizens of autocratic states are participating in transnational networks. the values of "us versus them" become difficult to generate and sustain. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here China Europe, India, Japan, the United States Iran and Russia share a common interest in security . The declining utility of war and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation
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the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors the most striking features are globalization institutions and interdependence The overall structure provides constraints that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the powers possessing nuclear weapons The prospect of losses has instilled level of restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts trade, investment, and production across international borders raises the costs of war revisionist states, are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo institution are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions their people have increasingly joined the world community the values of us versus them" become difficult to generate China Europe, India, Japan Iran and Russia share a common interest in security The declining utility of and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of cooperation.
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It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint the picture of an international system marked by rising levels of conflict and competition, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark: "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.
| 9,298 |
<h4><strong>Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict </h4><p>Ikenberry and Deudney 9 </strong>(Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)</p><p>It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint <u><mark>the picture of an international system marked by</u></mark> rising levels of <u><mark>conflict and competition</u></mark>, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook <u><mark>is</u></mark> based on <u><strong><mark>an exaggeration</u></strong></mark> of recent developments <u><mark>and ignores powerful <strong>countervailing factors</mark> and forces</u></strong>. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe<u>, <mark>the most striking features</mark> of the contemporary international landscape <mark>are</u></mark> the intensification of economic <u><strong><mark>globalization</u></strong></mark>, thickening <u><strong><mark>institutions</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>shared problems of <mark>interdependence</strong></mark>. <mark>The</u> <u>overall structure</u></mark> of the international system today <u>is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century</u>. Compared to older orders,<u> the contemporary liberal-centered international order <mark>provides</u></mark> a set of <u><mark>constraints</mark> and opportunities</u> — of pushes and pulls — <u><mark>that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.</u></mark> Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and <u><mark>great-power expansion has become</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>obsolete</strong></mark>.</u> Most important, <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>have transformed great-power war</mark> </u>from a routine feature of international politics <u><mark>into an exercise in <strong>national suicide.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>With all of the</mark> great <mark>powers possessing nuclear weapons</mark> and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces</u>, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. <u><mark>The prospect of</mark> such great <mark>losses has instilled</mark> in the great powers a <mark>level <strong>of</mark> caution and <mark>restraint</strong> that <strong>effectively precludes major revisionist efforts</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory</u> inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the<u> density of <mark>trade, investment, and production</mark> networks <mark>across international borders <strong>raises</mark> even more <mark>the costs of war</strong></mark>. </u>A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But <u>in the twenty-first century</u>, <u>the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states</u> in Europe and East Asia <u>whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China</u> or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially <u><mark>revisionist</u></mark> autocratic <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> most <u>notably China and Russia</u>, <u><mark>are</u></mark> already substantial players and <u><strong><mark>stakeholders</strong> in</u></mark> <u><mark>an</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>ensemble of global institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that make up the status quo</mark>, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power</u>). <u>Many other global <mark>institution</mark>s</u>, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, <u><mark>are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice <strong>only by buying into the institutions</u></strong></mark>. <u>The pathway to modernity</u> for rising states <u>is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside</u> and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of <u>the liberal international order.</u> The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. <u>The </u>domestic <u>viability of</u> these <u>regimes hinges on their ability to sustain</u> high <u>economic growth</u> rates, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is crucially dependent on international trade</u> and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. <u>Not only have these states joined the world economy, but <mark>their people</u></mark> — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — <u><mark>have increasingly joined the world community</u></mark>. In large and growing numbers, <u>citizens of autocratic</u> capitalist <u>states are participating in</u> a sprawling array of <u>transnational </u>educational, business, and avocational <u>networks.</u> As individuals are socialized into <u><mark>the values</u></mark> and orientations <u><mark>of</u></mark> these networks, stark: <u>"<mark>us versus them"</u></mark> cleavages <u><mark>become</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>difficult to generate</mark> and sustain</strong>.</u> As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. <u>These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here</u>. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong>, <strong>India</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong></mark>,</u> and <u>the United States</u>, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. These states <u><strong><mark>share a common interest</strong> in</u></mark> price stability and supply <u><mark>security</u></mark> that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building<u>.</u> Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. <u><strong><mark>The declining utility of</mark> war</u></strong>, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, <u><mark>and emerging</u></mark> resource and <u><mark>environmental interdependencies</u></mark> together <u><strong><mark>undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability</u></strong></mark> based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, <u><mark>the conditions of the twenty-first century <strong>point to the renewed value</strong> of</mark> international integration and <mark>cooperation</u>.</p></mark>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 18,192 | 80 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,478 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
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All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Treaties
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,479 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
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Rico 2014 )
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
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marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
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marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><mark>marijuana legalization</u></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</strong></mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Treaties
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,480 |
Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is
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Yudkowsky 06
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Yudkowsky 06 [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.
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The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
Overly detailed reassurances can create false perceptions of safety Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people tend to overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
conjunction fallacy applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible
specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates as well as misdirecting investments into implausibly detailed risk scenarios
people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people underestimate the probability that one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)
In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively.
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)
Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios.
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.)
| 4,274 |
<h4>Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is</h4><p><strong>Yudkowsky</strong> <strong>06</strong> [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.</p><p><u>The <mark>conjunction fallacy</mark> similarly <mark>applies to futurological forecasts</u></mark>. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)</p><p>In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. </p><p><u><mark>According to probability theory, adding additional detail</mark> onto a story <mark>must render the story less probable</u></mark>. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. <u><mark>Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible</mark>.</u> </p><p>People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) </p><p><u>Overly detailed reassurances can</u> also <u>create false perceptions of safety</u>: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." <u>Vivid, <mark>specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates</mark> of security, <mark>as well as misdirecting</mark> defensive <mark>investments into</mark> needlessly narrow or <mark>implausibly detailed risk scenarios</u></mark>. </p><p><u>More generally, <mark>people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and</mark> <mark>underestimate disjunctive probabilities</u></mark>. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>overestimate the probability that</u></mark>, e.g., <u><mark>seven events of 90% probability will all occur</u></mark>. Conversely, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>underestimate the probability that</mark> at least <mark>one of seven events of 10% probability will occur</u></mark>. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) </p>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 11,979 | 232 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,481 |
CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States invested more than any other nation to influence the global control regime If the U.S. proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution if, the U.S. interpretation attracted ceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4>CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>The United States</u></mark> has <u><mark>invested</u></mark> probably <u><mark>more</mark> effort <mark>than any other nation</u></mark> over the past century <u><mark>to</u> <u>influence the</mark> design of the <mark>global control regime</u></mark> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S.</mark> now <mark>proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u>claiming <mark>that the U.S. is not violating the treaties</mark> <mark>because</mark> <mark>cultivation, trade and possession</u></mark> of cannabis <u><mark>are <strong>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>and</mark> <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></mark> for considerable <u><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices</mark>, especially <mark>when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution</mark> and domestic legal system.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u><mark>if, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level of <u>political ac<mark>ceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u><mark>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u></mark> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u><mark>coffeeshops</u></mark> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p>
| null | null |
Treaties
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,482 |
Low probability impacts should not be evaluated-- even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities
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Rescher 03
|
Rescher 03 (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)
|
small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off we can forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote possibility can be viewed as being of probability zero Accordingly, such remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect
|
small probabilities can be written off. we can forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of policy remote possibility can be viewed as being of probability zero remote possibilities can be dismissed, and outcomes set aside the real world” people treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero
|
On this issue there is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decision-oriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off. (De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, we can pretty well forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when x ≤ E, then x = 0. We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote possibility can—for all sensible purposes—be viewed as being of probability zero. Accordingly, such remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities. Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it: [P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect.
| 2,046 |
<h4>Low probability impacts should not be evaluated-- even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities</h4><p><strong>Rescher 03</strong> (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)</p><p>On this issue there is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decision-oriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take the view that <u><mark>small probabilities </mark>represent extremely remote prospect and <mark>can be written off</u>. </mark>(De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, <u><mark>we can</u> </mark>pretty well <u><mark>forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of </mark>practical <mark>policy</u></mark>, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when x ≤ E, then x = 0. <u>We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently <mark>remote possibility can</u></mark>—for all sensible purposes—<u><mark>be viewed as being of <strong>probability zero</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Accordingly, such <mark>remote possibilities can </mark>simply <mark>be dismissed, and </mark>the <mark>outcomes </mark>with which they are associated can accordingly be <mark>set aside</mark>.</strong> And in “<mark>the real world” people</mark> do in fact seem to be prepared to <mark>treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities</u>.</mark> Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it: [<u>P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. <mark>Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero</mark>. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect</u>.</p>
| null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 44,134 | 45 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,483 |
No ISIS impact – they’re doomed and regional containment is inevitable
|
Joshi 14
|
Shashank Joshi, 6-25-2014; PhD candidate at Harvard Why an Isis caliphate is no more than a pipe dream http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100277636/why-an-isis-caliphate-is-no-more-than-a-pipe-dream/
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the question is whether it has staying power Isis’ caliphate could run out of steam Isis has hostile forces in every direction It will face resistance from anti-Isis Syrian rebels in the west, the hostility of Kurds in the north, and, eventually, a counter-offensive from government forces to the south Iraq’s Shia majority will not accept a permanent jihadist state let alone allow Isis to stroll into Baghdad Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly at the fact that Isis has kidnapped Turkish diplomats Iran is not just aghast at the rise of a radical Sunni force on its western border, but concerned about losing an ally If Isis attempts to conduct attacks against Western countries, as the prime minister warned it will face the near certainty of air strikes. large stretches of its territory are completely devoid of cover. It will suffer grievous losses Isis’ biggest challenge is closer to home. It depends on a coalition of other Sunni militants and local Sunni tribes coalitions like this can fall apart Isis was defeated once before, in its previous incarnation as Al Qaida in Iraq Their campaign of terror was quelled thanks to a surge of US troops and the so-called ‘awakening’
|
Isis has hostile forces in every direction. It will face resistance from Syrian rebels Kurds in the north, and a counter-offensive from forces to the south Iraq’s majority will not accept a jihadist state Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly Iran is concerned about losing an ally It will suffer grievous losses Isis’ depends on a coalition coalitions like this can fall apart Isis was defeated once before
|
But the question is whether it has staying power. There are good reasons to think that Isis’ caliphate could run out of steam long before it matches the great Islamic empires of history. Isis has hostile forces in every direction. It will face resistance from anti-Isis Syrian rebels in the west, the hostility of Kurds in the north, and, eventually, a counter-offensive from government forces to the south. Even if the government collapses – and we are a long way from that – then Iraq’s Shia majority will not accept a permanent jihadist state on their northern flank, let alone allow Isis to stroll into Baghdad. Saddam slaughtered Shias in 1991, and Isis has been slaughtering Shias for over a decade. The Shias have had quite enough, thank you. Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly at the fact that Isis has kidnapped Turkish diplomats in Mosul. Iran is not just aghast at the rise of a radical Sunni force on its western border, but concerned about losing an ally in Baghdad that it views as more important than even Assad. Tehran is reportedly airlifting over a hundred tons of supplies to Baghdad daily, and deployed its special forces there weeks ago. If Isis attempts to conduct attacks against Western countries, as the prime minister warned last week, then it will face the near certainty of air strikes. It can hunker down safely in urban areas like Mosul, but large stretches of its territory are completely devoid of cover. It will suffer grievous losses. But Isis’ biggest challenge is closer to home. It depends on a coalition of other Sunni militants and local Sunni tribes. Without such allies, it could not possibly have walked over Iraqi security forces so easily. But coalitions like this can fall apart. Remember that Isis was defeated once before, in its previous incarnation as Al Qaida in Iraq. Their campaign of terror was quelled by 2008, thanks to a surge of US troops and the so-called ‘awakening’ of local Sunni tribes who grew tired of the group’s brutality.
| 2,021 |
<h4>No ISIS impact – they’re doomed and regional containment is inevitable</h4><p>Shashank <strong>Joshi</strong>, 6-25-20<strong>14</strong>; PhD candidate at Harvard Why an Isis caliphate is no more than a pipe dream http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100277636/why-an-isis-caliphate-is-no-more-than-a-pipe-dream/</p><p>But <u>the question is whether it has staying power</u>. There are good reasons to think that <u>Isis’ caliphate could run out of steam</u> long before it matches the great Islamic empires of history. <u><mark>Isis has hostile forces in every direction</u>. <u>It will face resistance from </mark>anti-Isis <mark>Syrian rebels</mark> in the west, the hostility of <mark>Kurds in the</mark> <mark>north, and</mark>, eventually, <mark>a counter-offensive from </mark>government <mark>forces to the south</u></mark>. Even if the government collapses – and we are a long way from that – then <u><mark>Iraq’s</mark> Shia <mark>majority will not accept a</mark> permanent <mark>jihadist state</mark> </u>on their northern flank, <u>let alone allow Isis to stroll into Baghdad</u>. Saddam slaughtered Shias in 1991, and Isis has been slaughtering Shias for over a decade. The Shias have had quite enough, thank you. <u><mark>Iraq’s neighbours will also fight back. Ankara does not look kindly</mark> at the fact that Isis has kidnapped Turkish diplomats</u> in Mosul. <u><mark>Iran is</mark> not just aghast at the rise of a radical Sunni force on its western border, but <mark>concerned about losing an ally</u></mark> in Baghdad that it views as more important than even Assad. Tehran is reportedly airlifting over a hundred tons of supplies to Baghdad daily, and deployed its special forces there weeks ago. <u>If Isis attempts to conduct attacks against Western countries, as the prime minister warned</u> last week, then <u>it will face the near certainty of air strikes.</u> It can hunker down safely in urban areas like Mosul, but <u>large stretches of its territory are completely devoid of cover. <mark>It will suffer <strong>grievous losses</u></strong></mark>. But <u><mark>Isis’</mark> biggest challenge is closer to home. It <mark>depends on a coalition</mark> of other Sunni militants and local Sunni tribes</u>. Without such allies, it could not possibly have walked over Iraqi security forces so easily. But <u><mark>coalitions like this <strong>can fall apart</u></strong></mark>. Remember that <u><mark>Isis was defeated once before</mark>, in its previous incarnation as Al Qaida in Iraq</u>. <u>Their campaign of terror was quelled</u> by 2008, <u>thanks to a surge of US troops and the so-called ‘awakening’</u> of local Sunni tribes who grew tired of the group’s brutality.</p>
| null | null |
Treaties
| 430,709 | 6 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
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tournament
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3
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Boston College Carelli-Kenner
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Rubino, Scher
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,484 |
Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction
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Meskill 09
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Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)
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Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs Why not also choose between them and other, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
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Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the environmental armageddon this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential scenarios warming asteroid terrorists nuclear-weapons pandemic each risk on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different We get into our cars to buy coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed We are constantly risking death Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety Many movements exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
|
Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.
2ac
| 2,778 |
<h4>Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction</h4><p><strong>Meskill 09<u></strong> (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)</p><p></u>Tom <u><mark>Friedman's piece</u> </mark>today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He <u><mark>applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine"</u> </mark>(which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") <u><mark>to the </mark>risk of <mark>environmental armageddon</mark>. <strong>But <mark>this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant</strong></mark>.</u> It is intellectually incoherent because <u><mark>it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential </mark>disaster <mark>scenarios</mark>. In addition to the global-<mark>warming </mark>risk, there's also the <mark>asteroid</mark>-hitting-the-earth risk, the <mark>terrorists</mark>-with-<mark>nuclear-weapons </mark>risk</u> (Cheney's original scenario), <u>the super-duper-<mark>pandemic </mark>risk, etc. Since <mark>each </mark>of these <mark>risk</mark>s, <strong><mark>on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention</strong>, we cannot address all of them simultaneously</mark>. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs</u>. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? <u>Why not also choose between them and other,</u> much more cotidien, <u>things we value? <mark>Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different</u></mark>, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, <u>this is how we behave all the time. <mark>We get into our cars </mark>in order <mark>to buy </mark>a cup of <mark>coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed </mark>on the way to the coffee shop. <mark>We are constantly risking death</mark>, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. <mark>Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would</u> </mark>sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would <u><mark>neither </mark>be able to <mark>act, nor not act, <strong>since it would nowhere discover perfect safety</u></strong></mark>. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, <u>it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. <mark>Many </mark>religious <mark>movements</u> </mark>- for example the early Jesus movement - <u>have <mark>exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action</u></mark>.<u> </p><p></u>2ac</p>
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Contention 4 is risk calculus
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Contention 3 The Plan solves
| 46,317 | 378 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,485 |
Treaties solve warming empirically denied – stable drug control won’t make the US sign the Kyoto Protocol, etc.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Treaties solve warming empirically denied – stable drug control won’t make the US sign the Kyoto Protocol, etc.</h4>
| null | null |
Treaties
| 430,710 | 1 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,486 |
This debate should be about who has the best normative political strategy to create change from the status quo. That’s best—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>This debate should be about who has the best normative political strategy to create change from the status quo. That’s best—</h4>
| null |
Case
|
FW
| 430,711 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,487 |
Argumentative testing—creates a laboratory of ideas to determine whether the affirmative is good or bad. That enhances clash, which enhances the skills of preparation.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Argumentative testing—creates a laboratory of ideas to determine whether the affirmative is good or bad. That enhances clash, which enhances the skills of preparation.</h4>
| null |
Case
|
FW
| 430,712 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,488 |
1AC Rauch evidence gives us the spillover link- also gives uniqueness
|
Rauch 2013
|
Rauch 2013 (Jonathan, guest scholar in Governance Studies at Brookings, contributing editor of National Journal and The Atlantic, "Washington Versus Washington (and Colorado): Why the States Should Lead on Marijuana Policy," March 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/~~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/3/26%20marijuana%20legalization%20localism%20rauch/Washington%20Versus%20Washington%20and%20Colorado_Rauch_v17.pdf)
|
The stakes transcend drug policy proper: marijuana legalization, far from standing alone, is an installment in a series state-federal conflict has become a running theme of the national debate On immigration, the federal government demanded that the states follow federal policy. Arizona claimed a right to independently enforce It also asserted a right to supplement federal policies with its own more stringent ones. The federal government objected, and the Supreme Court delivered a mixed ruling which mostly favored the federal government marijuana involves not merely friction between state and federal policy but something closer to outright defiance the outcome will affect not only drug policy but the way in which the country handles other federal-state conflicts
Cole attempted to put many concerns to rest. Needless to say, the situation is evolving gradually and it remains to be seen how this guidance is applied in practice. these state-federal tensions must be considered in a wider context allowing states to determine their own cannabis policy may result in other states demanding further independence with regards to other aspects of federal policy such as gun control, immigration and health care.
|
stakes transcend drug policy proper: marijuana is an installment in a series state-federal conflict has become a running theme On immigration, the federal government demanded that the states follow federal policy. Arizona claimed a right to independently enforce the outcome will affect not only drug policy but the way in which the country handles other federal-state conflicts
Cole attempted to put concerns to rest it remains to be seen how this guidance is applied state-federal tensions must be considered in a wider context allowing states to determine their own cannabis policy may result in other states demanding further independence with aspects of policy such as gun control, immigration and health care
|
How the courts might view such cooperative efforts, and where they might draw the line between states’ violating federal law and their refusing to support it, and how much (if any) congressional action might be needed to sort it all out—all of those are complicated questions on which legal opinions differ, and on which courts undoubtedly will differ as well. The statute books can shape the outcome, but they cannot dictate it. Nor, for that matter, can drug policy preferences decide the matter, though they will certainly bear upon it. Even if the country were united in, say, a desire to liberalize drug policy, the question would remain of who should lead the change, frame the policy, and set the tempo. In short, there is no alternative to the exercise of political judgment. Mature people will have to make conscious choices about how to manage social change and conflict with a minimum of unnecessary pain and disruption. The stakes transcend drug policy proper: marijuana legalization, far from standing alone, is an installment in a series. In the past several years, state-federal conflict has become a running theme of the national debate, on multiple hot-button issues and in multiple permutations: • On immigration, the federal government demanded that the states follow federal policy. Arizona claimed a right to independently enforce federal law, even if its enforcement priorities differed from those of the federal government. It also asserted a right to supplement federal policies with its own more stringent ones. The federal government objected, and the Supreme Court delivered a mixed ruling which mostly favored the federal government. • On Obamacare (the 2010 Affordable Care Act), states demanded the right not to follow federal policy. They challenged the law’s expansion of Medicaid and its mandate to buy health insurance. The Supreme Court again delivered a mixed ruling, this time leaning toward the states. • On gay marriage, states demanded that the federal government follow state policy. In suing to overturn the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act, they claimed that Washington, D.C., had to follow states’ definitions of marriage rather than establish a separate definition of its own. The Supreme Court, at this writing, has yet to rule. Unlike the cases of immigration and Obamacare and the Defense of Marriage Act, marijuana involves not merely friction between state and federal policy but something closer to outright defiance. Even in a context of growing agitation in federal-state relations, this was putting a cat among the pigeons. Avoiding conflict or even chaos is not going to be easy, and the outcome will affect not only drug policy but the way in which the country handles other federal-state conflicts sure to emerge.
The plan spills over to decentralization in immigration policy
Crick, et al, 13 [Emily Crick - Research Assistant, Global Drug Policy Observatory, Heather J. Haase - Consultant, International Drug Policy Consortium/Harm Reduction Coalition, Dave Bewley-Taylor - Director, Global Drug Policy Observatory, “Legally regulated cannabis markets in the US: Implications and possibilities,” November, http://konyvtar.eski.hu/tmpimg/378746103_0.pdf]
Furthermore, the CSA calls on the federal government ‘to enter into contractual agreements… to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities.’151 This means that in theory the federal government could come to agreements with the individual states on their cannabis regulation policies, which may be exactly what the Department of Justice is seeking to do in issuing its guidance. Indeed, some have argued that it would be preferable for them to do so rather than let the states merely give up enforcing the federal prohibition on marijuana.152 It has also been argued that despite the recent Department of Justice guidance there are no guarantees that state attorneys will cease to prosecute those who work in the marijuana industry especially in the light of federal crackdowns on the medical marijuana industry.153 In a recent hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue, James M. Cole, US Deputy Attorney General (and author of the memorandum) attempted to put many of these concerns to rest.154 Needless to say, the situation is evolving gradually and it remains to be seen how this guidance is applied in practice. Moreover, these state-federal tensions must be considered in a wider context, and it has been argued that allowing states to determine their own cannabis policy may result in other states demanding further independence with regards to other aspects of federal policy such as gun control, immigration and health care.155
| 4,680 |
<h4>1AC Rauch evidence gives us the spillover link- also gives uniqueness</h4><p><strong>Rauch 2013</strong> (Jonathan, guest scholar in Governance Studies at Brookings, contributing editor of National Journal and The Atlantic, "Washington Versus Washington (and Colorado): Why the States Should Lead on Marijuana Policy," March 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/~~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/3/26%20marijuana%20legalization%20localism%20rauch/Washington%20Versus%20Washington%20and%20Colorado_Rauch_v17.pdf)</p><p>How the courts might view such cooperative efforts, and where they might draw the line between states’ violating federal law and their refusing to support it, and how much (if any) congressional action might be needed to sort it all out—all of those are complicated questions on which legal opinions differ, and on which courts undoubtedly will differ as well. The statute books can shape the outcome, but they cannot dictate it. Nor, for that matter, can drug policy preferences decide the matter, though they will certainly bear upon it. Even if the country were united in, say, a desire to liberalize drug policy, the question would remain of who should lead the change, frame the policy, and set the tempo. In short, there is no alternative to the exercise of political judgment. Mature people will have to make conscious choices about how to manage social change and conflict with a minimum of unnecessary pain and disruption. <u>The <mark>stakes transcend drug policy proper: marijuana</mark> legalization, far from standing alone, <mark>is an installment in a series</u></mark>. In the past several years, <u><mark>state-federal conflict has become a running theme</mark> of the national debate</u>, on multiple hot-button issues and in multiple permutations: • <u><mark>On immigration, the federal government demanded that the states follow federal policy. Arizona claimed a right to independently enforce</u></mark> federal law, even if its enforcement priorities differed from those of the federal government. <u>It also asserted a right to supplement federal policies with its own more stringent ones. The federal government objected, and the Supreme Court delivered a mixed ruling which mostly favored the federal government</u>. • On Obamacare (the 2010 Affordable Care Act), states demanded the right not to follow federal policy. They challenged the law’s expansion of Medicaid and its mandate to buy health insurance. The Supreme Court again delivered a mixed ruling, this time leaning toward the states. • On gay marriage, states demanded that the federal government follow state policy. In suing to overturn the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act, they claimed that Washington, D.C., had to follow states’ definitions of marriage rather than establish a separate definition of its own. The Supreme Court, at this writing, has yet to rule. Unlike the cases of immigration and Obamacare and the Defense of Marriage Act, <u>marijuana involves not merely friction between state and federal policy but something closer to outright defiance</u>. Even in a context of growing agitation in federal-state relations, this was putting a cat among the pigeons. Avoiding conflict or even chaos is not going to be easy, and <u><strong><mark>the outcome will affect not only drug policy but the way in which the country handles other federal-state conflicts</u></mark> sure to emerge.</p><p>The plan spills over to decentralization in immigration policy</p><p>Crick, et al, 13</strong> [Emily Crick - Research Assistant, Global Drug Policy Observatory, Heather J. Haase - Consultant, International Drug Policy Consortium/Harm Reduction Coalition, Dave Bewley-Taylor - Director, Global Drug Policy Observatory, “Legally regulated cannabis markets in the US: Implications and possibilities,” November, http://konyvtar.eski.hu/tmpimg/378746103_0.pdf]</p><p>Furthermore, the CSA calls on the federal government ‘to enter into contractual agreements… to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities.’151 This means that in theory the federal government could come to agreements with the individual states on their cannabis regulation policies, which may be exactly what the Department of Justice is seeking to do in issuing its guidance. Indeed, some have argued that it would be preferable for them to do so rather than let the states merely give up enforcing the federal prohibition on marijuana.152 It has also been argued that despite the recent Department of Justice guidance there are no guarantees that state attorneys will cease to prosecute those who work in the marijuana industry especially in the light of federal crackdowns on the medical marijuana industry.153 In a recent hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue, James M. <u><mark>Cole</u></mark>, US Deputy Attorney General (and author of the memorandum) <u><mark>attempted to put</mark> many</u> of these <u><mark>concerns to rest</mark>.</u>154 <u>Needless to say, the situation is evolving gradually and <mark>it remains to be seen how this guidance is applied</u></mark> <u>in practice.</u> Moreover, <u>these <mark>state-federal tensions must be considered in a wider context</u></mark>, and it has been argued that <u><mark>allowing states to determine their own cannabis policy may result in other states<strong> demanding further independence with</mark> regards to other <mark>aspects of </mark>federal <mark>policy such</strong> as gun control, immigration and health care</mark>.</u>155</p>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 48,948 | 63 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
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tournament
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3
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Boston College Carelli-Kenner
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Rubino, Scher
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1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,489 |
Decentralization causes highly restrictionist state measures and federal follow-on---collapses open immigration
|
Ramakrishnan 12
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S. Karthick Ramakrishnan 12, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside; and Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University, Winter 2012, “ARTICLE: The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism,” Arizona State Law Journal, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1431
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this paper based on extensive quantitative and qualitative investigation lays the groundwork for a fundamental rethinking of current appraisals of state and local immigration regulation
When state and local policy proliferation is motivated by political challenges the purported values of decentralized decisionmaking are highly compromised states cease to be idealized "laboratories" of policy experimentation and fail to produce instructive responses to demographic problems highlighting the salience of ethnic nationalism, the model suggests equality-based frameworks to evaluate state immigration laws
While scholars have carved out important normative space for state efforts to integrate immigrants, they have done so by adopting the unsupported demographic assumptions popularized by issue entrepreneurs steam-valve" theories of immigration federalism maintain that isolated subfederal enactments are desirable because they dissipate restrictionist or anti-immigrant sentiment thereby relieving the pressure to enact those laws at the federal level Polarized Change, however, suggests proliferating policies in politically receptive subfederal jurisdictions builds, rather than dissipates, pressure for restrictive action at the federal level and enshrines a more restrictionist status quo
states immigration-related lawmaking are rarely driven by pressing demographic problems the federal gridlock purportedly compelling these state laws is not merely a "given." Instead, it is purposefully engineered by restrictive issue entrepreneurs who seek to proliferate restrictionist legislation at the subfederal level our new theory of immigration regulation elegantly accounts for both federal legislative stagnation and state and local policy proliferation
|
this paper based on extensive quantitative investigation, lays the groundwork for rethinking state immigration regulation
purported values of decentralized decisionmaking are compromised states cease to be laboratories" of policy experimentation highlighting the salience of ethnic nationalism, the model suggests equality-based frameworks to evaluate state immigration laws
steam-valve" theories of immigration federalism maintain subfederal enactments dissipate restrictionist sentiment however proliferating policies in subfederal jurisdictions builds pressure for restrictive action at the federal level and enshrines a more restrictionist s quo
states immigration lawmaking are rarely driven by demographic problems it is engineered by restrictive entrepreneurs who proliferate restrictionist legislation at the subfederal level
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Our purpose in this paper has been to foreground the politicized nature of immigration policy and to provide a thick description of the mechanism fomenting both state and local policy proliferation, and federal policy stagnation. This description, based on extensive quantitative and qualitative investigation, lays the groundwork for a fundamental rethinking of the current judicial and scholarly appraisals of this recent spate of state and local immigration regulation. We leave that task for a future project, n225 but we briefly note some of those implications.
Because restrictionist issue entrepreneurs appear to be engaging a strategy of judicial, rather than congressional, engagement, the Polarized Change model challenges some of the basic tenets of federalism analysis. When state and local policy proliferation is motivated by political, rather than regional demographic challenges, the purported values of decentralized decisionmaking are highly compromised. In short, states and localities cease to be idealized "laboratories" of policy experimentation and fail to produce instructive responses to demographic problems. n226 Rather, by highlighting the salience of ethnic nationalism, the polarized change model suggests that courts should consider equality-based, as opposed to structural power, frameworks to evaluate the constitutionality of state and local immigration laws.
More globally, both courts and commentators must abandon functionalist explanations of state and local immigration regulation. While scholars have carved out important normative space for state and local immigrant efforts to integrate immigrants, they have done so by adopting the unsupported demographic assumptions popularized by issue entrepreneurs. Moreover, Polarized Change challenges "steam-valve" theories of immigration federalism which maintain that isolated subfederal enactments are desirable because they dissipate restrictionist or anti-immigrant sentiment at the local [*1484] level, thereby relieving the pressure to enact those laws at the federal level. Polarized Change, however, suggests that proliferating policies in politically receptive subfederal jurisdictions builds, rather than dissipates, pressure for restrictive action at the federal level and, more generally, enshrines a more restrictionist status quo. These critical developments require extensive and detailed analysis, which we pursue elsewhere.
For the better part of the last decade, states and localities have markedly increased their immigration-related lawmaking. Our prior statistical analysis has shown that these laws are rarely driven by pressing demographic problems and that local political contexts are better predictors of restrictive action. Further, we have argued that the federal gridlock purportedly compelling these state and local laws is not merely a "given." Instead, it is purposefully engineered by restrictive issue entrepreneurs who seek to proliferate restrictionist legislation at the subfederal level. Thus, our new theory of immigration regulation elegantly accounts for both federal legislative stagnation and state and local policy proliferation.
| 3,160 |
<h4>Decentralization causes <u>highly restrictionist</u> state measures and <u>federal follow-on</u>---<u>collapses</u> open immigration </h4><p>S. Karthick <strong>Ramakrishnan 12</strong>, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside; and Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University, Winter 2012, “ARTICLE: The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism,” Arizona State Law Journal, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1431</p><p>Our purpose in <u><mark>this paper</u></mark> has been to foreground the politicized nature of immigration policy and to provide a thick description of the mechanism fomenting both state and local policy proliferation, and federal policy stagnation. This description, <u><mark>based on</u> <u>extensive quantitative</mark> and qualitative <mark>investigation</u>, <u>lays the groundwork for</mark> a fundamental <mark>rethinking</mark> of</u> the <u>current</u> judicial and scholarly <u>appraisals of</u> this recent spate of <u><mark>state</mark> and local <mark>immigration regulation</u></mark>. We leave that task for a future project, n225 but we briefly note some of those implications.</p><p>Because restrictionist issue entrepreneurs appear to be engaging a strategy of judicial, rather than congressional, engagement, the Polarized Change model challenges some of the basic tenets of federalism analysis. <u>When state and local policy proliferation is motivated by political</u>, rather than regional demographic <u>challenges</u>, <u>the</u> <u><mark>purported values of decentralized decisionmaking are </mark>highly <mark>compromised</u></mark>. In short, <u><mark>states</u></mark> and localities <u><mark>cease to be</mark> idealized "<mark>laboratories" of policy experimentation</u></mark> <u>and fail to produce instructive responses to demographic problems</u>. n226 Rather, by <u><mark>highlighting the</u> <u>salience of ethnic nationalism, the</u></mark> polarized change <u><mark>model suggests</u></mark> that courts should consider <u><mark>equality-based</u></mark>, as opposed to structural power, <u><mark>frameworks to evaluate</u></mark> the constitutionality of <u><mark>state</u></mark> and local <u><mark>immigration laws</u></mark>.</p><p>More globally, both courts and commentators must abandon functionalist explanations of state and local immigration regulation. <u>While scholars have carved out important normative space for state</u> and local immigrant <u>efforts to integrate immigrants, they have done so by adopting the</u> <u>unsupported demographic assumptions popularized by issue entrepreneurs</u>. Moreover, Polarized Change challenges "<u><mark>steam-valve" theories of immigration federalism</u></mark> which <u><mark>maintain</mark> that isolated <mark>subfederal enactments</mark> are desirable because they <mark>dissipate restrictionist</mark> or anti-immigrant <mark>sentiment</u></mark> at the local [*1484] level, <u>thereby relieving the pressure to enact those laws at the federal level</u>. <u>Polarized Change, <mark>however</mark>, suggests</u> that <u><mark>proliferating policies in</mark> politically receptive <mark>subfederal jurisdictions</u> <u>builds</mark>, rather than dissipates, <mark>pressure for restrictive action at the federal level</u> <u>and</u></mark>, more generally, <u><mark>enshrines a more restrictionist s</mark>tatus <mark>quo</u></mark>. These critical developments require extensive and detailed analysis, which we pursue elsewhere.</p><p>For the better part of the last decade, <u><mark>states</u></mark> and localities have markedly increased their <u><mark>immigration</mark>-related <mark>lawmaking</u></mark>. Our prior statistical analysis has shown that these laws <u><mark>are</u> <u>rarely driven by</mark> pressing <mark>demographic problems</u></mark> and that local political contexts are better predictors of restrictive action. Further, we have argued that <u>the federal gridlock purportedly compelling these state</u> and local <u>laws is not merely a "given." Instead, <mark>it is</u></mark> <u>purposefully <mark>engineered by restrictive </mark>issue <mark>entrepreneurs who</mark> seek to</u> <u><mark>proliferate restrictionist legislation at the subfederal level</u></mark>. Thus, <u>our new theory of immigration regulation elegantly accounts for both federal legislative stagnation and state and local policy proliferation</u>.</p>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 64,328 | 8 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,490 |
Prior questions fail and paralyze politics
|
Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]
|
Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]
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‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” signals this philosophical turn such a turn is not without its dangers it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter were merely a simple function of the former. the explanatory and interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. It may be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful f this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. since there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on action, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’ this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. the preceding combine to encourage the formation of a Highlander view’ an image of warring theoretical approaches the prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.
|
this philosophical turn’ has a tendency to prioritise ontology and epistemology over explanatory power rational choice theory may provide the best account available because prioritisation promotes theory-construction it cultivates a theory-driven approach to IR this slips into the pursuit of generality over empirical validity prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right This image feeds back into IR exacerbating dangers, and a vicious circle arises
|
Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.
| 4,827 |
<h4>Prior questions fail and paralyze politics</h4><p><strong>Owen 2<u> [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]</p><p></u></strong>Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that <u>‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology”</u> often <u>signals <mark>this philosophical turn</u>’</mark>, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, <u>such a </u>philosophical<u> turn is not without its dangers </u>and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that <u>it <mark>has a</mark>n inbuilt <mark>tendency to<strong> prioritise </strong></mark>issues of <mark>ontology and epistemology over explanatory</mark> and/or interpretive <mark>power</mark> as if the latter</u> two <u>were merely a <strong>simple function</strong> of the former. </u>But while <u>the explanatory and</u>/or <u>interpretive power of a theoretical account is not </u>wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, <u>wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments.</u> Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded.<u> It may</u>, of course, <u>be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful </u>in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, i<u>f this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this <strong>does not undermine</strong> the point that, for a certain class of problems, <mark>rational choice theory may <strong>provide the best account available</mark> to us.</u></strong> In other words, <u>while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the <strong>most important </strong>kind</u>. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that <u><mark>because prioritisation</mark> of ontology and epistemology <mark>promotes theory-construction</u></mark> from philosophical first principles,<u><strong> <mark>it cultivates a theory-driven</mark> rather than problem-driven <mark>approach to IR</mark>.</u></strong> Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this:<u> since</u> it is the case that <u>there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions </u>of a given action, event or phenomenon,<u> the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous <strong>grip on</u></strong> the <u><strong>action,</u></strong> event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, <u>‘theory-driven work is part of a <strong>reductionist program’</strong> in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the <strong>preferred model </strong>or theory’.5 The justification</u> offered for this strategy <u>rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. </u>However, as Shapiro points out,<u><strong> this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science</strong> since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, <strong>not to be prejudged </strong>before conducting that inquiry’</u>.6 Moreover, <u><mark>this</mark> strategy easily <mark>slips</mark> <mark>into</mark> the promotion of <mark>the pursuit of <strong>generality over</strong> </mark>that of <strong><mark>empirical validity</mark>.</u></strong> The third danger is that <u>the preceding</u> two <u>combine to encourage the formation of a</u> particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the <u>Highlander view’</u>—namely, <u>an image of warring theoretical approaches</u> with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because <u>the</u> turn to, and <u><strong><mark>prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right</u></strong></mark>, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. <u><mark>This image feeds back into IR exacerbating</mark> the first and second <mark>dangers, and</mark> so <mark>a</mark> potentially <strong><mark>vicious circle arises</mark>.</p></u></strong>
| null |
Case
|
FW
| 1,128 | 393 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,491 |
Turns the other advantage - criticism in international organizations and official challenges under international law
| null |
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
|
the federal government is held accountable internationally for the actions of state authorities International bodies and foreign governments do not distinguish between the conduct of the national government and the conduct of an individual state This is starkly evidenced by the United States' experience in cases where state authorities have failed to comply with U.S. obligations under the VCCR led to three suits by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico against the United States in the International Court of Justice criticism from an international body over immigration human rights issues can directly undercut the credibility of U.S. efforts to advance human rights and can lead to significant diplomatic obstacles — both on immigration issues and on other interests S.B 1070's sweep into subjects left properly to federal direction and control subjects the United States to this criticism while denying the United States the tools to decide for itself whether and how to adjust such policies
|
the federal government is held accountable internationally for the actions of state authorities foreign governments do not distinguish between the conduct of the national government and the conduct of an individual state state authorities have failed to comply with U.S. obligations under the VCCR led to three suits by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico criticism from an international body over immigration issues can directly undercut the credibility of U.S. efforts to advance human rights and can lead to significant diplomatic obstacles both on immigration and other interests
|
32.As both a matter of international law and practice, the federal government is held accountable internationally for the actions of state and local authorities regarding our treatment of foreign nationals. International bodies and foreign governments do not typically distinguish between the conduct of the national government and the conduct of an individual state within a federal system. This is starkly evidenced by the United States' experience in cases where state and local government authorities have failed to comply with U.S. obligations under the VCCR to provide consular notification to all foreign nationals in U.S. custody. Failure to provide such notice by state officials has led to three suits by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico against the United States in the International Court of Justice, an advisory opinion sought by Mexico in the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, a petition against the United States in the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, and bilateral complaints by numerous foreign governments. 33.The United States takes seriously allegations that it has failed to adhere to its international law obligations and foreign policy commitments and engages in these fora to address such claims. Although the government is fully prepared to defend U.S. practices against unjustified claims of human rights shortcomings, criticism from an international body over immigration human rights issues can directly undercut the credibility of U.S. efforts to advance human rights and can lead to significant diplomatic obstacles — both on immigration issues of bilateral concern and on other interests that might be the subject of diplomatic negotiations. As discussed below, in this context, S.B 1070's sweep into subjects left properly to federal direction and control subjects the United States to this criticism while denying the United States the tools to decide for itself whether and how to adjust such policies. The federal government should have to make its defenses or consider appropriate modifications only with regard to policies that are adopted through a considered process that reflects the interests of all the American people
| 2,175 |
<h4>Turns the other advantage - criticism in international organizations and official challenges under international law</h4><p><u>Steinberg 2010</u> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>32.As both a matter of international law and practice, <u><mark>the federal government is held accountable internationally for the actions of state</u></mark> and local <u><mark>authorities</u></mark> regarding our treatment of foreign nationals. <u>International bodies and <mark>foreign governments do not</u></mark> typically <u><mark>distinguish between the conduct of the national government and the conduct of an individual state</u></mark> within a federal system. <u>This is starkly evidenced by the United States' experience in cases where <mark>state</u></mark> and local government <u><mark>authorities</mark> <mark>have failed to comply with U.S. obligations under the VCCR</u></mark> to provide consular notification to all foreign nationals in U.S. custody. Failure to provide such notice by state officials has <u><mark>led to three suits by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico</mark> against the United States in the International Court of Justice</u>, an advisory opinion sought by Mexico in the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, a petition against the United States in the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, and bilateral complaints by numerous foreign governments. 33.The United States takes seriously allegations that it has failed to adhere to its international law obligations and foreign policy commitments and engages in these fora to address such claims. Although the government is fully prepared to defend U.S. practices against unjustified claims of human rights shortcomings, <u><mark>criticism from an international body over immigration</mark> human rights <mark>issues</mark> <mark>can directly undercut the credibility of U.S. efforts to advance human rights and can lead to significant diplomatic obstacles</mark> — <mark>both on immigration</mark> issues </u>of bilateral concern <u><mark>and</mark> on <mark>other interests</u></mark> that might be the subject of diplomatic negotiations. As discussed below, in this context, <u>S.B 1070's sweep into subjects left properly to federal direction and control subjects the United States to this criticism while denying the United States the tools to decide for itself whether and how to adjust such policies</u>. The federal government should have to make its defenses or consider appropriate modifications only with regard to policies that are adopted through a considered process that reflects the interests of all the American people</p>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 286,758 | 7 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,492 |
Prefer the AFF over the alternative – an imagination of a perfect world does nothing, the land won’t be given back – The plan can save lives and reduce colonial exploitation. (Organs/donations/illicit market)
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Prefer the AFF over the alternative – an imagination of a perfect world does nothing, the land won’t be given back – The plan can save lives and reduce colonial exploitation. (Organs/donations/illicit market)</h4>
| null |
Case
|
Perm
| 430,713 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,493 |
Perm—do both.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Perm—do both.</h4>
| null |
Case
|
Perm
| 430,714 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,494 |
State immigration regulations kill the economy- uncertainty and inability to operate across state lines
|
Fitz 10
|
Fitz 10 (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)
|
The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniable Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules and regulations governing hiring practices. And requiring U.S. citizens traveling throughout the country to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion
|
The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniabl . Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules governing hiring requiring U.S. citizens to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns
|
The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniable. Congress’s power to establish the nation’s immigration policy was enshrined in the Constitution because of the critical foreign policy implications that it triggers. But there are equally significant practical implications in modern America. Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules and regulations governing hiring practices. And requiring U.S. citizens traveling throughout the country to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns and constitutional questions. This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion. It is time to put the brakes on this movement once and for all, and the administration’s brief in Candelaria is an important first step.
| 918 |
<h4>State immigration regulations kill the economy- uncertainty and inability to operate across state lines</h4><p><strong>Fitz 10</strong> (Marshall, Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Arizona Calls the Question, June, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/candelaria_column.html)</p><p><u><mark>The need for uniformity in immigration policy is undeniabl</mark>e</u>. Congress’s power to establish the nation’s immigration policy was enshrined in the Constitution because of the critical foreign policy implications that it triggers. But there are equally significant practical implications in modern America<mark>. <u>Businesses operating in multiple states suffer significant economic uncertainty and inefficiency when each state can impose different rules</mark> and regulations <mark>governing hiring</mark> practices. And <mark>requiring U.S. citizens</mark> traveling throughout the country <mark>to carry different documents in different states raises obvious practical concerns</u></mark> and constitutional questions. <u>This movement to enact state and local immigration laws and regulations threatens legal uniformity and social cohesion</u>. It is time to put the brakes on this movement once and for all, and the administration’s brief in Candelaria is an important first step.</p>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 42,129 | 155 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,495 |
Econ decline causes major power war- stats
|
Reghr 2013
|
Reghr 2013 (Ernie, Senior Fellow in Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation, 2-4-13, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627)
|
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a country’s vulnerability to conflict the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people. And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger group based inequalities are especially destabilizing international economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers and these factors frequently combine with internal political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
|
The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk is economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states there is a clear correlation between income and conflict the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely weak economies often translate into fragile states One study argues Changes in rates of economic growth lead to changes in threats of conflict international economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers these factors frequently combine with internal circumstances that create conditions conducive to armed conflict
|
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific, nevertheless, says Paffenholz, there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a country’s vulnerability to conflict. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient. Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other, it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review of the literature makes the general point that “the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks. As a general rule, “weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people. And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger. In other words, group based inequalities are especially destabilizing.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably international economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers (in short, globalization),[8] and these factors frequently combine with internal political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
| 5,276 |
<h4>Econ decline causes major power war- stats</h4><p><strong>Reghr 2013 </strong>(Ernie, Senior Fellow in Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation, 2-4-13, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng<u>=en&id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627)</p><p>“<mark>The <strong>most robustly significant predictor</strong> of [armed] conflict risk</mark> and its duration <mark>is</mark> some indicator of <mark>economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose</mark> from the destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “<mark>since 1990, more than 50% of all conflict-prone countries have been low income states</u></mark>…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific, nevertheless, says Paffenholz, <u><mark>there is a clear correlation between</mark> a low and declining per capita <mark>income and</mark> a country’s vulnerability to <mark>conflict</u></mark>. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient. Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other, it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review of the literature makes the general point that “<u><mark>the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more likely</mark> in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” </u>That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks. As a general rule, “<u><mark>weak economies often translate into</mark> weak and <mark>fragile states</mark> and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” <mark>One study argues</mark> that “the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports.” <mark>Changes in rates of economic growth</mark> thus <mark>lead to changes in threats of conflict</mark>. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets</u>.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). <u>The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people. And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger</u>. In other words, <u>group based inequalities are especially destabilizing</u>.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably <u><mark>international economic and security conditions and the <strong>interests of the major powers</strong></mark> </u>(in short, globalization),[8] <u>and <mark>these factors frequently combine with internal</mark> political/religious/ethnic <mark>circumstances that create conditions</mark> especially <mark>conducive to</mark> conflict and <mark>armed conflict</mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 100,076 | 66 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,496 |
the method approached by the 1ac is a much better performance to solve the alternative. we think this debate is supposed to be about determining the best normative political strategy instead of authenticity testing each other. this legal and political strategy helps build the necessary legal skills to challenge colonial oppression better than the alt. THIS IS THEIR AUTHOR.
|
Smith 12 Andrea, Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, and is the author Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide, and Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement,” Settler Colonial Studies 2:2, 69-88
|
Smith 12 Andrea, Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, and is the author Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide, and Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement,” Settler Colonial Studies 2:2, 69-88
|
In the debates prevalent within Native sovereignty and racial justice movements we are presented with two seemingly orthogonal positions long-term revolutionary movements or reformist legalist strategies Short-term legal strategies are accused of investing activists within a white supremacist system incapable of significant change revolutionaries are accused of sacrificing the immediate needs of vulnerable populations for the sake of an endlessly deferred revolution. reality of violence highlights the untenability of these positions lives are at stake now they cannot wait for revolution At the same time short-term strategies have often increased violence While this reformist versus revolutionary dichotomy suggests radically different positions they share a common assumption the only way to pursue legal reform is to fight for laws that reinforce the appropriate moral statement Because the US legal system is immoral and colonial attempts to moralise the law generally fail It is not surprising the response to these failures is to simply give up on pursuing legal strategies. However the works of Bell Leslie and Deer point to a different approach. We can challenge the assumption that the law will reflect our morals and instead seek to use the law for its strategic effects. we might advocate for laws that might contradict some of our morals because we recognize the law cannot mirror our morals anyway We might then be free to engage in a relationship with the law which would free us to change our strategies as we assess its strategic effects. by divesting from the morality of the law we then will also simultaneously be free to invest in building our own forms of community accountability and justice outside the legal system. Our extra-legal strategies would go beyond ceremonial tactics designed to shame a system that is not capable of shame. we might focus on actually building the political power to create an alternative system to the heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, settler state
|
CONCLUSION
In debates within justice movements we are presented with two seemingly orthogonal positions long-term revolution or legalist strategies legal strategies are accused of investing activists within a white supremacist system Because the US is colonial attempts to moralise the law generally fail It is not surprising the response is to simply give up legal strategies We can challenge the assumption the law will reflect our morals and seek to use the law for strategic effects we might advocate laws that might contradict some of our morals because we recognize the law cannot mirror our morals We might be free to engage the law which would free us change our strategies as we assess effects by divesting from t morality of the law we will simultaneously be free to invest in justice outside the legal system we might focus on building political power to create an alternative system to the white supremacist, settler state
|
CONCLUSION
In the debates prevalent within Native sovereignty and racial justice movements, we are often presented with two seemingly orthogonal positions – long-term revolutionary extra-legal movements or shortterm reformist legalist strategies. Short-term legal strategies are accused of investing activists within a white supremacist and settler colonial system that is incapable of significant change. Meanwhile, revolutionaries are accused of sacrificing the immediate needs of vulnerable populations for the sake of an endlessly deferred revolution. The reality of gender violence in Native communities highlights the untenability of these positions. Native women’s lives are at stake now – they cannot wait for the revolution to achieve some sort of safety. At the same time, the short-term strategies often adopted to address gender violence have often increased violence in Native women’s lives by buttressing the prison industrial complex and its violent logics. While this reformist versus revolutionary dichotomy suggests two radically different positions, in reality they share a common assumption: that the only way to pursue legal reform is to fight for laws that that reinforce the appropriate moral statement (for instance, that the only way to address violence against Native women is through the law and to make this violence a ‘crime’). Because the US legal system is inherently immoral and colonial, however, attempts to moralise the law generally fail. It is not surprising that the response to these failures is to simply give up on pursuing legal strategies. However, the works of Derrick Bell, Christopher Leslie, and Sarah Deer, while working in completely different areas of the law, point to a different approach. We can challenge the assumption that the law will reflect our morals and instead seek to use the law for its strategic effects. In doing so, we might advocate for laws that might in fact contradict some of our morals because we recognize that the law cannot mirror our morals anyway. We might then be free to engage in a relationship with the law which would free us to change our strategies as we assess its strategic effects. At the same time, by divesting from the morality of the law, we then will also simultaneously be free to invest in building our own forms of community accountability and justice outside the legal system. Our extra-legal strategies would go beyond ceremonial civil disobedience tactics designed to shame a system that is not capable of shame. Rather, we might focus on actually building the political power to create an alternative system to the heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, settler colonial state.
| 2,676 |
<h4>the method approached by the 1ac is a much better performance to solve the alternative. we think this debate is supposed to be about determining the best normative political strategy instead of authenticity testing each other. this legal and political strategy helps build the necessary legal skills to challenge colonial oppression better than the alt. THIS IS THEIR AUTHOR.</h4><p><strong>Smith 12 Andrea, Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, and is the author Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide, and Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement,” Settler Colonial Studies 2:2, 69-88</p><p><mark>CONCLUSION</p><p><u></strong>In</mark> the <mark>debates</mark> prevalent <mark>within</mark> Native sovereignty and racial <mark>justice movements</u></mark>, <u><mark>we are</u></mark> often <u><mark>presented</mark> <mark>with</u> <u>two</mark> <strong><mark>seemingly</mark> </strong><mark>orthogonal</u> <u>positions</mark> </u>– <u><mark>long-term revolution</mark>ary</u> extra-legal <u>movements <mark>or</mark> </u>shortterm <u>reformist <mark>legalist strategies</u></mark>. <u>Short-term <mark>legal strategies are <strong>accused </strong>of investing activists</u> <u>within a white</mark> <mark>supremacist</u></mark> and settler colonial <u><mark>system</mark> </u>that is <u>incapable of significant change</u>. Meanwhile, <u>revolutionaries are accused of sacrificing the immediate needs of vulnerable populations for the sake of an endlessly deferred revolution.</u> The <u>reality of</u> gender <u>violence </u>in Native communities <u>highlights the untenability of these positions</u>. Native women’s <u>lives</u> <u>are at stake</u> <u><strong>now </u></strong>– <u>they <strong>cannot wait for</u></strong> the <u><strong>revolution </u></strong>to achieve some sort of safety. <u>At the same time</u>, the <u>short-term strategies</u> often adopted to address gender violence <u>have often increased violence</u> in Native women’s lives by buttressing the prison industrial complex and its violent logics. <u>While this reformist versus revolutionary dichotomy <strong>suggests</strong> </u>two <u>radically different positions</u>, in reality <u>they share a common assumption</u>: that <u>the <strong>only way</u></strong> <u>to pursue legal reform is to fight for laws that</u> that <u>reinforce the appropriate moral statement</u> (for instance, that the only way to address violence against Native women is through the law and to make this violence a ‘crime’). <u><mark>Because the US</mark> legal system <mark>is</u></mark> inherently <u>immoral and <mark>colonial</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>attempts to moralise the law <strong>generally</strong> fail</u></mark>. <u><mark>It is</mark> <mark>not surprising</u></mark> that <u><mark>the response</mark> to these failures <mark>is to</mark> <strong><mark>simply give</strong> <strong>up</strong></mark> on pursuing <mark>legal strategies</mark>.</u> <u>However</u>, <u>the works of</u> Derrick <u>Bell</u>, Christopher <u>Leslie</u>, <u>and </u>Sarah <u>Deer</u>, while working in completely different areas of the law, <u>point to a different approach<strong>. <mark>We can challenge</mark> <mark>the assumption</mark> that <mark>the law will reflect our morals</u></strong> <u><strong>and</mark> instead <mark>seek to use the law for</mark> its <mark>strategic effects</mark>.</u></strong> In doing so, <u><mark>we</mark> <mark>might advocate</mark> for <mark>laws that</u> <u>might</mark> </u>in fact <u><mark>contradict <strong>some</strong> of our morals</u> <u>because we recognize</u></mark> that <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>law cannot <strong>mirror</strong> our morals</mark> anyway</u>. <u><mark>We</mark> <mark>might</mark> then <mark>be free to <strong>engage</mark> in a relationship with <mark>the law</strong></mark> <mark>which <strong>would free us</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to <mark>change our strategies as we assess </mark>its strategic <mark>effects</mark>. </u></strong>At the same time, <u><mark>by divesting from t</mark>he <mark>morality of the law</u></mark>, <u><mark>we</mark> then <mark>will</mark> also <strong><mark>simultaneously</strong></mark> <mark>be free to invest in </mark>building our own forms of community accountability and <mark>justice</mark> <mark>outside the legal system</mark>. Our extra-legal strategies would go beyond ceremonial</u> civil disobedience <u>tactics designed to shame a system that is not capable of shame.</u> Rather, <u><mark>we</mark> <mark>might focus on</mark> actually <mark>building</mark> the <mark>political power to create an alternative system to the</mark> heteropatriarchal, <mark>white supremacist,</u> <u>settler</mark> </u>colonial <u><mark>state</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
| null |
Case
|
Perm
| 85,452 | 194 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,497 |
Food shocks inevitable – too many alt causes.
|
Tipson 12
|
Tipson 12 [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339595984Tipson_GlobalFoodInsecurity_Jun12.pdf]
|
this decade, we face a more pervasive environment of global “food shocks” The combined effects of population trends, climate changes, water shortages, soil erosion or contamination, increased meat consumption, fisheries depletion, major livestock epidemics, or serious crop failures in overlapping and cascading ripple effects will strain already-vulnerable economies and political systems.
|
this decade, we face a more pervasive environment of global “food shocks” The combined effects of population trends, climate changes, water shortages, soil erosion or contamination, increased meat consumption, fisheries depletion, major livestock epidemics, or serious crop failures in overlapping and cascading ripple effects will strain already-vulnerable economies and political systems.
|
Meanwhile, the political dimensions of “food insecurity” go well beyond our compassion for people in the poorest countries who are most vulnerable to famine and malnutrition. Even during the remainder of this decade, we face a transition from localized food shortages and insecurities toward a more pervasive environment of global “food shocks” that have serious political consequences even for the richer world. 3 The combined effects of population trends, climate changes, water shortages, soil erosion or contamination, increased meat consumption, fisheries depletion, major livestock epidemics, or serious crop failures in overlapping and cascading ripple effects will strain already-vulnerable economies and political systems. Sudden price increases or shortages could prompt volatile popular reactions, especially if citizens even in “well-fed” locations lose trust in markets and governments to assure their access to adequate food supplies.
| 963 |
<h4>Food shocks inevitable – too many alt causes.</h4><p><strong>Tipson 12</strong> [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339595984Tipson_GlobalFoodInsecurity_Jun12.pdf]</p><p>Meanwhile, the political dimensions of “food insecurity” go well beyond our compassion for people in the poorest countries who are most vulnerable to famine and malnutrition. Even during the remainder of <u><mark>this decade, we face</u></mark> a transition from localized food shortages and insecurities toward <u><mark>a more pervasive environment of global “food shocks”</u></mark> that have serious political consequences even for the richer world. 3 <u><mark>The <strong>combined effects</strong> of population trends, climate changes, water shortages, soil erosion or contamination, increased meat consumption, fisheries depletion, major livestock epidemics, or serious crop failures in overlapping and cascading ripple effects will strain already-vulnerable economies and political systems.</u></mark> Sudden price increases or shortages could prompt volatile popular reactions, especially if citizens even in “well-fed” locations lose trust in markets and governments to assure their access to adequate food supplies.</p>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 430,716 | 3 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,498 |
The removal of the government would leave all Native American open to extermination. It would be the 18th - 19th century all over again as people forcefully take what they consider their property.
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Fire Rider 2005
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Fire Rider 2005 (Marty, American Indian Movement “Why Churchill political agenda is wrong for Indians Tulsa”, Native American Times. Vol. XI, Iss. 13; pg. 8. 3/30/05. Retrieved 7/7/09)
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if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill or anyone believe that in a chaotic world with no laws that Indians would fair any better. It would be a world of unchecked Indian racism and discrimination by all hate groups be it left or right.
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if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill believe that in a chaotic world with no laws would fair any better It would be a world of unchecked racism and discrimination by hate groups
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I think we can agree that Churchill's political philosophy is liberal socialism regarding foreign policy. If that is his position he is entitled to that. In describing his fellow Americans, for instance, Churchill cannot refrain from using the language of spite. The victims of the Sept. 11 attacks he compares to Nazis; even middle-class Americans he disparages as vapid hedonists too engrossed in materialism to care about the sufferings of "brown-skinned" people overseas. Basically, he advocates that America is the evil empire of the world and needs to be replaced or severely weakened. But if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill or anyone believe that in a chaotic world with no laws that Indians would fair any better. It would be a world of unchecked Indian racism and discrimination by all hate groups be it left or right.If the September 11th victims are technocrats supporting the evil economic empire of America as Churchill professes, then is not he a hypocrite by educating American youth who will graduate with degrees to enter the technocratic economy of America? But what does the U.S. foreign policy have to do with a starving Indian on the Reservation or urban living? What has Churchill done for the poor Indian? Our AIM organization has helped to repair Indian elders homes; provide reservation security to protect the people against police abuse and tribal goons; written legal constitutions for reservations; legal research for tribes and individuals; feeding and clothing Indians; having the local Bureau of Indian Affairs office investigated for incompetence and complacency by the Inspector Generals Office, including other agencies as well, or advising Tribal governments. Further, our national Indian radio talk show is effective in educating and empowering our people. In other words we are in the field fighting daily for our people. We are AIM and we would lay our lives down in defense of our people, but only if attacked. If violence was the only Indian way we as a people would have been exterminated a long time ago. We in AIM do not support, nor condone violence. We do not need someone making noisy speeches about foreign policy, we need leaders fighting for and helping our people on domestic issues, that is the real AIM. Sadly, there is much discrimination in the world regarding indigenous people. But American Indians have problems nearly as equal such as third world living conditions on many reservations.
| 2,474 |
<h4>The removal of the government would leave all Native American open to extermination. It would be the 18th - 19th century all over again as people forcefully take what they consider their property.</h4><p><strong>Fire Rider 2005</strong> (Marty, American Indian Movement “Why Churchill political agenda is wrong for Indians Tulsa”, Native American Times. Vol. XI, Iss. 13; pg. 8. 3/30/05. Retrieved 7/7/09)</p><p>I think we can agree that Churchill's political philosophy is liberal socialism regarding foreign policy. If that is his position he is entitled to that. In describing his fellow Americans, for instance, Churchill cannot refrain from using the language of spite. The victims of the Sept. 11 attacks he compares to Nazis; even middle-class Americans he disparages as vapid hedonists too engrossed in materialism to care about the sufferings of "brown-skinned" people overseas. Basically, he advocates that America is the evil empire of the world and needs to be replaced or severely weakened. But <u><strong><mark>if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill</mark> or anyone <mark>believe that in a chaotic world with no laws</mark> that Indians <mark>would fair any better</mark>. <mark>It would be a world of unchecked</mark> Indian <mark>racism and discrimination by</mark> all <mark>hate groups</mark> be it left or right.</u></strong>If the September 11th victims are technocrats supporting the evil economic empire of America as Churchill professes, then is not he a hypocrite by educating American youth who will graduate with degrees to enter the technocratic economy of America? But what does the U.S. foreign policy have to do with a starving Indian on the Reservation or urban living? What has Churchill done for the poor Indian? Our AIM organization has helped to repair Indian elders homes; provide reservation security to protect the people against police abuse and tribal goons; written legal constitutions for reservations; legal research for tribes and individuals; feeding and clothing Indians; having the local Bureau of Indian Affairs office investigated for incompetence and complacency by the Inspector Generals Office, including other agencies as well, or advising Tribal governments. Further, our national Indian radio talk show is effective in educating and empowering our people. In other words we are in the field fighting daily for our people. We are AIM and we would lay our lives down in defense of our people, but only if attacked. If violence was the only Indian way we as a people would have been exterminated a long time ago. We in AIM do not support, nor condone violence. We do not need someone making noisy speeches about foreign policy, we need leaders fighting for and helping our people on domestic issues, that is the real AIM. Sadly, there is much discrimination in the world regarding indigenous people. But American Indians have problems nearly as equal such as third world living conditions on many reservations.</p>
| null |
Case
|
Fire Rider
| 426,398 | 9 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,499 |
Can’t solve – political reforms are a prerequisite.
|
Tipson 12 ]
|
Tipson 12 [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339595984Tipson_GlobalFoodInsecurity_Jun12.pdf]
|
conditions that affect ag productivity depend on “public goods” that effective governments facilitate Political capacity becomes the “gating factor” in determining how ag reform can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed without the political underpinnings that enable their implementation. principal impediments to increased productivity are not technical or economic but political — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can only go so far. Without addressing political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements can be severely limited.
|
conditions that affect ag productivity depend on “public goods” that effective governments facilitate Political capacity becomes the “gating factor” in determining how ag reform can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed without the political underpinnings that enable their implementation. principal impediments to increased productivity are not technical or economic but political — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can only go so far. Without addressing political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements can be severely limited.
|
All farming, like all politics (so the saying goes), is local. The conditions that affect agricultural productivity begin with the water, climate, soil, diet, community and family structure, land tenure system, and other localized factors that account for the distinctive farming cultures of particular locales. But they also depend on those “public goods” that effective governments facilitate, including regional infrastructure, reliable land transfer systems, available credit options, and some minimum level of public order — not to mention, in the best cases, schools, clinics, and municipal services. Unfortunately, under the strain of population growth and economic competition, it is exactly these kinds of political support systems that are lacking in many of the communities that need them most. Political capacity therefore often becomes the “gating factor” in determining how ambitious an agricultural reform agenda can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed in enhancing yields and resilience without the political underpinnings (and “readiness” to change) 4 that enable their implementation. One promising approach for increasing local political capacity is to expand and supplement the resources and capabilities of “agricultural extension” agencies. The traditional channels for technical assistance to farmers have centered around extension agents, who are generally employees of local, provincial, or national governments, but who may also be experts employed by suppliers, international development agencies, or NGOs. The ideal agent has the knowledge and skills to assist local farmers in increasing their productivity and reducing their risk of crop or financial failure. Drawing on the latest science to improve crop varieties, create safer fertilizers and pesticides, reduce losses both before and after harvests, and apply more productive farming methods, extension services may be the best hope for achieving the scale of increases necessary to feed the planet. In many locations, however, the principal impediments to increased productivity and profitability are not technical or economic but political — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can only go so far. Without progress in addressing the political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements in agricultural performance can be severely limited.
| 2,576 |
<h4>Can’t solve – political reforms are a prerequisite.</h4><p><strong>Tipson 12</strong> [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339595984Tipson_GlobalFoodInsecurity_Jun12.pdf<u><strong><mark>]</p><p></u></strong></mark>All farming, like all politics (so the saying goes), is local. The <u><mark>conditions that affect ag</u></mark>ricultural <u><mark>productivity</u></mark> begin with the water, climate, soil, diet, community and family structure, land tenure system, and other localized factors that account for the distinctive farming cultures of particular locales. But they also <u><mark>depend on</u></mark> those <u><mark>“public goods” that effective governments facilitate</u></mark>, including regional infrastructure, reliable land transfer systems, available credit options, and some minimum level of public order — not to mention, in the best cases, schools, clinics, and municipal services. Unfortunately, under the strain of population growth and economic competition, it is exactly these kinds of political support systems that are lacking in many of the communities that need them most. <u><mark>Political capacity</u></mark> therefore often <u><mark>becomes the “gating factor” in determining how</u></mark> ambitious an <u><mark>ag</u></mark>ricultural <u><mark>reform</u></mark> agenda <u><mark>can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed</u></mark> in enhancing yields and resilience <u><mark>without the political underpinnings</u></mark> (and “readiness” to change) 4 <u><mark>that enable their implementation.</u></mark> One promising approach for increasing local political capacity is to expand and supplement the resources and capabilities of “agricultural extension” agencies. The traditional channels for technical assistance to farmers have centered around extension agents, who are generally employees of local, provincial, or national governments, but who may also be experts employed by suppliers, international development agencies, or NGOs. The ideal agent has the knowledge and skills to assist local farmers in increasing their productivity and reducing their risk of crop or financial failure. Drawing on the latest science to improve crop varieties, create safer fertilizers and pesticides, reduce losses both before and after harvests, and apply more productive farming methods, extension services may be the best hope for achieving the scale of increases necessary to feed the planet. In many locations, however, the <u><mark>principal impediments to increased productivity</u></mark> and profitability <u><mark>are not technical or economic but <strong>political</strong> — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can <strong>only go so far.</strong> Without</u></mark> progress in <u><mark>addressing</u></mark> the <u><mark>political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements</u></mark> in agricultural performance <u><mark>can be <strong>severely limited.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Commerce Clause
| 430,533 | 2 | 17,080 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| 565,305 |
N
|
tournament
|
3
|
Boston College Carelli-Kenner
|
Rubino, Scher
|
1AC - MarijuanaCommerce Clause (Treaties Federalism)
1NC - T-Legalize Security K Court Politics DA Case
2NC - K Case
1NR - DA
2NR - DA Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round3.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,500 |
The indigenous disproportionately need transplants
|
Boltz 13
|
Boltz 13 Gina Boltz, Native Village Feb 2013 Native Village Youth and Education News
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Abbot, a nursing professor said with the increase in Native American health disparities – kidney disease, obesity, renal disease, and hypertension – we’re going to need more organ donators.” Of the 112,000 people on organ transplant lists, a disproportionate number are Native Americans. Chronic kidney disease is a major health problem in Native American communities. Compared to the white population, Native Americans are 2.8 times more likely to experience End Stage Renal Disease related to diabetes. For a successful organ donation, you have to have a good match In order for Native Americans to have successful kidney transplants, you need Native Americans donating organs
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with the increase in Native American health disparities kidney disease renal disease, and hypertension we’re going to need more organ donators Of the 112,000 people on organ transplant lists, a disproportionate number are Native Americans Native Americans are 2.8 times more likely to experience End Stage Renal Disease related to diabetes. For a successful organ donation, you have to have a good matc In order for Native Americans to have successful kidney transplants, you need Native Americans donating organs
|
A spiritual sacrifice? Lakota culture's view of organ donation is focus of SDSU Study www.therepublic.com and www.capjournal.com Condensed by Native Village http://www.nativevillage.org/Archives/ 2013%20News%20Archives/ FEB2013%20News/A%20spiritual%20sacrifice.htm
Karla Abbot, a nursing professor at Augustana College, is a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux and part of Fahrenwald’s research team. She sees her people's declining health from the viewpoint of a healthcare professional. “Culturally, Native Americans believe that when we leave this life and go onto the next, we need to have everything with us,” Abbott said. “But with the increase in Native American health disparities – kidney disease, obesity, renal disease, and hypertension – we’re going to need more organ and tissue donators.” Of the 112,000 people on organ transplant lists, a disproportionate number are Native Americans. Chronic kidney disease is a major health problem in Native American communities. Compared to the white population, Native Americans are 2.8 times more likely to experience End Stage Renal Disease related to diabetes. “Some of this is due to genetics, but a lot of it is change in lifestyle,” Abbott said. “Colonization changed our whole way of life. We were a people that lived by the water. We were very active. But all of those [environmental] changes have really led to our health demise.” Fahrenwald's team consulted traditional healers who acknowledge that diseases leading to kidney failure are very real in their communities. They conclude that through prayer and ceremony, the spirits of the people who chose to donate or receive an organ could be at rest. Abbott says that traditional stories also encourage people to help each other through the Lakota virtue of generosity. In the old days, one’s place in society was not based on what you owned, but by what you gave away. “For a successful organ donation, you have to have a good match,” Abbott said. “In order for Native Americans to have successful kidney transplants, you need Native Americans donating organs and getting tested. This isn’t just limited to kidneys, but renal disease is our biggest problem by far.” Fahrenwald is asking Native dialysis patients for their opinions about improving organ donation and what information they would find useful. “It takes time to build relationships. I’m not a tribal member, but as a researcher, I need to honor tribal members’ time and not conduct research for the sake of research,” Fahrenwald said. “We need to conduct research that makes a difference for the tribe.” So far, Farenwald's research is making a difference. A previous study with Native American college students resulted in 20% of them registering as organ donors.
| 2,744 |
<h4>The indigenous disproportionately need transplants</h4><p><strong>Boltz 13</strong> Gina Boltz, Native Village Feb 2013 Native Village Youth and Education News</p><p>A spiritual sacrifice? Lakota culture's view of organ donation is focus of SDSU Study www.therepublic.com and www.capjournal.com Condensed by Native Village http://www.nativevillage.org/Archives/ 2013%20News%20Archives/ FEB2013%20News/A%20spiritual%20sacrifice.htm</p><p>Karla <u>Abbot, a nursing professor</u> at Augustana College, is a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux and part of Fahrenwald’s research team. She sees her people's declining health from the viewpoint of a healthcare professional. “Culturally, Native Americans believe that when we leave this life and go onto the next, we need to have everything with us,” Abbott <u>said</u>. “But <u><mark>with the increase in Native American health disparities</mark> – <mark>kidney disease</mark>, obesity, <mark>renal disease, and hypertension</mark> – <mark>we’re going to need more organ</u></mark> and tissue <u><mark>donators</mark>.” <mark>Of the 112,000 people on organ transplant lists, a disproportionate number are Native Americans</mark>. Chronic kidney disease is a major health problem in Native American communities. Compared to the white population, <mark>Native Americans are 2.8 times more likely to experience End Stage Renal Disease related to diabetes.</mark> </u>“Some of this is due to genetics, but a lot of it is change in lifestyle,” Abbott said. “Colonization changed our whole way of life. We were a people that lived by the water. We were very active. But all of those [environmental] changes have really led to our health demise.” Fahrenwald's team consulted traditional healers who acknowledge that diseases leading to kidney failure are very real in their communities. They conclude that through prayer and ceremony, the spirits of the people who chose to donate or receive an organ could be at rest. Abbott says that traditional stories also encourage people to help each other through the Lakota virtue of generosity. In the old days, one’s place in society was not based on what you owned, but by what you gave away. “<u><mark>For a successful organ donation, you have to have a good matc</mark>h</u>,” Abbott said. “<u><mark>In order for Native Americans to have successful kidney transplants, you need Native Americans donating organs</u></mark> and getting tested. This isn’t just limited to kidneys, but renal disease is our biggest problem by far.” Fahrenwald is asking Native dialysis patients for their opinions about improving organ donation and what information they would find useful. “It takes time to build relationships. I’m not a tribal member, but as a researcher, I need to honor tribal members’ time and not conduct research for the sake of research,” Fahrenwald said. “We need to conduct research that makes a difference for the tribe.” So far, Farenwald's research is making a difference. A previous study with Native American college students resulted in 20% of them registering as organ donors.</p>
| null |
Case
|
Indigenous Transplants
| 430,717 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,501 |
You should reject our opponents' argument that their position is "unintelligible"... this argument links back to the "solipsism disadvantage" by prioritizing their argument as inherently true against widely established truth claims in the name of collegiality. This form of moral relativism actively harms an effective pedagogy while opening the floodgates for other ways of knowing the world, especially radical conservative principles
|
Pendlebury 5
|
Pendlebury 5 - Professor of Education, head, Division of Curriculum, University of the Witwatersrand (Shirley Pendlebury, in The Routledge Falmer Reader in Philosophy of Education, Wilfred Carr, 2005)
|
Is a commitment to permanent partiality not the start down the of subjectivism?
The danger here is that once partiality of perspective is presented as epistemologically desirable, there is no justification for halting its progress: this has the devastating consequence that there is no way of justifying the maintenance of any shared belief-system without committing a act of
Without a shared -system we clearly cannot sustain the minimal realism which I have argued is necessary to feminist politics…nor maintain norms for belief; nor sustain systematic self-critical practice.
The notion of situated knowledge is closely related to the idea that evidence and justification depend on contextual as well as epistemic value Knowers and would-be knowers are all always somewhere—at once enabled and constrained by their locations and their position in relation to other epistemic subjects. But there are very different ways of characterizing this ‘somewhere’, which is seldom singular More often than not we are situated in multiple, overlapping communities and social positions. One such ‘somewhere’ is the place of the subjugated (women, ethnic minorities, slaves, children and other legally defined minors). For some this view from below has special epistemic authority
Two considerations compel me to reject the presumption in favour of the view from below While the view from below may be the most telling view for some kinds of knowledge claims, . More seriously, in education, granting special epistemic authority to the view from below leads to the absurd, idea that pupils have epistemic authority over their teachers
Caring theorists challenge liberal education on at least four counts. For a start they argue that the declared universalism of liberal education is not universal at all since its singular ideal of an educated person assumes the person to be male Third, they reject both instrumental and generalized conceptions of care: caring and other ‘private sphere’ values are not limited to performing a service on behalf of justice and other ‘public sphere’ values; nor can pupils’ needs be determined outside a personal relationship where the teacher attends to the particularities of each pupil
Caring theorists reject both disciplinary-based and content-saturated curricula
Even so, from the vantage of feminist epistemology, caring theorists turn a blind eye to crucial aspects of subjectivity by failing to place and in the critical field They ignore their own and pupils’ subjectivity by neglecting to ask what trust and caring mean when teachers and their pupils belong to different ethnic groups or social classes
their arguments for a homelike school seem to rest on the notion of a , a ‘rationalised, purified environment’ where teachers become surrogate mothers they seem to ignore the role that one version of a caring ethic has played in a social order inimical to By singling out individuals for attention, perhaps it pays to the importance of sustaining and invigorating epistemic , and Education , is a matter of getting people to care about practices , a matter of getting them to care about evidence and justification as well as about other people It is partly a matter of socializing them into so that they might, in time, use the language of those practices to criticize, advance and perhaps overturn them; as well as a matter of habituating character through critical and disciplined practice for the purpose of nurturing practical reasoning
performative pedagogy reject traditional teaching as well as the standard views of reflective teaching and critical pedagogy on the grounds that all presuppose the possibility of one self coming to know and understand other selves
Performative pedagogy honours the ‘situatedness’ and ‘contingency’ of learners’ responses opening ways for their personal meanings to emerge in a series of exquisite pedagogical moments that leave no visible trace and can neither be planned nor repeated It aims to elicit personal responses not coherent understanding As one line of feminist attack on the discourse of reason, it opens the closet of the ‘private’ and allows outlaw emotions out
Performative pedagogy takes through a radical turn to specificity where, if anyone has authority, it is the learner rests on a presumption in because there is no singular view from below, but many
Taking subjectivity seriously in this way and undermines the constitutive goods of teaching
without normative benchmarks, anything goes. By treating all voices and views as equally valid Carmen Luke (herself a feminist) argues the teacher risks a dangerous sameness: ‘Views and voices from everywhere and every body are views and voices from nowhere and no body If anything goes, then changing learners’ perceptions teaching would seem to be thoroughly luck-dependent,
Authority is among the enabling conditions for teaching to accomplish its ends and sustain its goods performative pedagogy can accomplish neither its feminist nor its educative ends without the teacher selecting and sequencing texts and other artefacts to be presented for students’ responses Like it or not epistemological labour puts the teacher in a position of pedagogical authority in relation to the learner
|
Is a commitment to permanent partiality not the start down the slippery slope of subjectivism?
this has the devastating consequence of justifying pernicious coercion
Without a shared system we cannot sustain feminist politics… norms for belief nor any self-critical practice
we are in multiple, social positions. One is the subjugated (women, minorities For some this view from below has special epistemic authority
Two considerations compel me to reject the view While the view may be the most telling for some knowledge claims it cannot be so for all
Caring theorists challenge liberal education that liberal education assumes the person to be male
Caring theorists reject disciplinary curricula
caring theorists turn a blind eye to crucial aspects of subjectivity by failing to place themselves and their ideas in the critical field They ignore their own and pupils’ subjectivity
their arguments for a homelike school seem to rest on the notion of a school as an idealized home, where teachers become surrogate mothers they seem to ignore the role that one caring ethic has played in sustaining women’s empowerment By singling out individuals it pays too little heed to the importance of invigorating communities their practices their bodies of knowledge Education is centrally a matter of getting people to care about practices that might otherwise have meant nothing to them, as well as about other people It is a matter of socializing practices so that they might use the language of those practices to criticize and overturn them
performative pedagogy reject traditional teaching on the grounds that all presuppose the possibility of one self coming
Performative pedagogy takes subjectivity seriously through a radical turn where, if anyone has authority, it is the learner Learner-centredness rests on a presumption in favour of the view from below because there is no singular view from below
subjectivity thwarts the very project and undermines teaching
Luke argues Views from everywhere are views from nowhere and no body If anything goes, then changing perceptions becomes a matter of chance
|
So we return to the idea of artefacts bearing their makers’ fingerprints. Strong objectivity (Harding 1991), or taking subjectivity seriously, requires us to look for these fingerprints, not to erase them—for they are indelible— reminding ourselves that impartiality is impossible. Every view is a partial view and permanent partiality is definitive of all our theories, observations and claims (Haraway 1990; Harding 1991). But this brings us full circle: Is a commitment to permanent partiality not the start down the slippery slope of subjectivism?
Much depends on how we understand the notion of permanent partiality. A weak reading, Miranda Fricker (1994) suggests, takes permanent partiality as an expression of the situated nature of knowledge, whereas a strong reading takes permanent partiality as an epistemological ideal. On the weak reading, permanent partiality is a methodological imperative for the knowing subject to place herself within the critical field and be open to how her own situation may influence her beliefs. Or, to put the matter in communal rather than individual terms, permanent partiality may be read as an injunction for an epistemic community to place itself within a critical field of reflection. To say that permanent partiality is an epistemological ideal is to say, crudely, that the more partial the view, the more reliable the beliefs issuing from it.
The danger here is that once partiality of perspective is presented as epistemologically desirable, there is no justification for halting its progress: this has the devastating consequence that there is no way of justifying the maintenance of any shared belief-system without committing a pernicious act of coercion: the eclipsing of the perspective or potential perspective of some person or group.
Without a shared belief-system we clearly cannot sustain the minimal realism which I have argued is necessary to feminist politics…nor can we maintain norms for belief; nor sustain any systematic self-critical practice. (Fricker 1994:102)
Strong permanent partiality seems to rule out the possibility of education. For now, I shall accept the weak reading, although not quite with warts and all.
The notion of situated knowledge is closely related to the idea that evidence and justification depend on contextual as well as epistemic values. Knowers and would-be knowers are all always somewhere—at once enabled and constrained by their locations and their position in relation to other epistemic subjects. But there are very different ways of characterizing this ‘somewhere’, which is seldom singular. More often than not we are situated in multiple, overlapping communities and social positions. One such ‘somewhere’ is the place of the subjugated (women, ethnic minorities, slaves, children and other legally defined minors). For some feminists, this view from below has special epistemic authority.
Two considerations compel me to reject the presumption in favour of the view from below: one concerning its sweep, the other concerning its consequences for the practice of education. While the view from below may be the most telling view for some kinds of knowledge claims, it cannot be so for all. More seriously, in education, granting special epistemic authority to the view from below leads to the absurd, albeit perhaps seductive, idea that pupils have epistemic authority over their teachers. But education cannot get off the ground unless we grant teachers some sort of epistemic authority and unless we recognize pupils as being capable of coming to know.
Safe homes and disappearing acts
What might it mean to take subjectivity seriously in education? Or to put it in more formal, analytical terms: What is involved in paying as much attention to S as to p in locutions of the form ‘S knows that p’? Who is S in an educational situation? Teachers or learners or those about whom they learn? Individuals or epistemic communities?
I approach these questions via a brief critical discussion of two sets of feminist challenges to mainstream education, each of which echoes aspects of feminist challenges to mainstream epistemology. One—apparently gentle and humane—falls under the rubric of caring and seems to some of its critics to control through cosy domestication; the other—a pedagogy assertive in intent and motivation—is designed to disappear at the moment of its own performance. Both caring theory and performative pedagogy take subjectivity seriously in ways that may undermine the enabling conditions for education; nonetheless each is rich in insights into educational practice and its dilemmas.
Caring theorists (see, for example, Gilligan 1982; Martin 1981, 1992; Noddings 1984, 1992) challenge liberal education on at least four counts. For a start they argue that the declared universalism of liberal education is not universal at all since its singular ideal of an educated person assumes the person to be male. In emphasizing the ‘masculine virtues’ of rationality and the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, the liberal ideal is seen to cast women either as uneducated and feminine or as educated but failed women. Second, caring theorists argue that reason- and justice-based frameworks for education ignore the fact that reason and justice require caring, at least as their complement if not as their ground. Third, they reject both instrumental and generalized conceptions of care: caring and other ‘private sphere’ values are not limited to performing a service on behalf of justice and other ‘public sphere’ values; nor can pupils’ needs be determined outside a personal relationship where the teacher attends to the particularities of each pupil.
Like knowing, caring is situated and it is a primary not a parasitic virtue. In education, caring is no pedagogical sweetener but the very ground of curriculum meaning and value. This brings us to a fourth challenge. Caring theorists reject both disciplinary-based and content-saturated curricula. Instead, curriculum should have its basis in what Jane Roland Martin (1992) has called the three Cs of care, concern and connection, and not in bodies and bits of knowledge.
In several respects these challenges to liberal education match the feminist challenges to mainstream epistemology I listed earlier in the chapter. To wit: there is no disinterested view from nowhere from which teachers can properly see what their pupils need in order to flourish; a pupil’s identity is a crucial consideration in founding and sustaining a pedagogical relationship; care and love are central to the content as well as the processes of teaching and learning. Caring theorists take subjectivity seriously by requiring teachers to respect and nurture what is special in each pupil and to nurture in pupils an attitude of respect and care for others.
Even so, from the vantage of feminist epistemology, caring theorists turn a blind eye to crucial aspects of subjectivity by failing to place themselves and their ideas in the critical field. They ignore their own and pupils’ subjectivity by neglecting to ask what trust and caring mean when teachers and their pupils belong to different ethnic groups or social classes; when, to quote Audrey Thompson’s example, ‘the teacher is Anglo and the students are Ute, or the teacher is middle-class and the students from poor families’ (Thompson 1997:338). Caring theory thus fails the test of strong objectivity in so far as it takes the meaning of caring for granted.
Also, although caring theorists criticize liberal education for its rationalism, their arguments for a homelike school seem to rest on the notion of a school as an idealized home, a ‘rationalised, purified environment’ where teachers become surrogate mothers (Thompson 1997:337). Here, too, caring theorists may stand accused of failing the test of strong objectivity because they seem to ignore the role that one version of a caring ethic has played in sustaining a social order inimical to women’s empowerment. In short, despite their professed feminism, caring theorists take subjectivity seriously in ways that put the feminist project at risk. What of the educational project more broadly conceived? Does caring theory promote or impede education? By singling out individuals for attention, perhaps it pays too little heed to the importance of sustaining and invigorating epistemic communities, their practices and their bodies of knowledge. Education, in my view, is centrally a matter of getting people to care about practices that might otherwise have meant nothing to them, a matter of getting them to care about evidence and justification as well as about other people. It is partly a matter of socializing them into traditions and practices so that they might, in time, use the language of those practices to criticize, advance and perhaps overturn them; as well as a matter of habituating character through critical and disciplined practice for the purpose of nurturing practical reasoning.2 But I am casting ahead. I shall pick up and offer some defence for this position in the final section of the chapter.
Feminists who advocate performative pedagogy reject traditional teaching as well as the standard views of reflective teaching and critical pedagogy on the grounds that all presuppose the possibility of one self coming to know and understand other selves (see, for example, Orner et al. 1996; Phelan 1993).3 In their view, such ‘inter-subjective’ understanding between teacher and learners can be accomplished, if at all, only at the cost of reducing the historical and embodied richness of self to one who is present in the classroom in the form of a rational argument. Here the teacher maintains superficial order by banishing all other aspects of self to a private world, outside the classroom. Feminist teachers who reject the discourse of reason face the challenge of giving full play to learners’ expressive selves and yet exerting sufficient authority to meet feminism’s normative ideals, ideals that require the teacher to alter the learners’ perceptions and concerns.
How is it possible for a teacher to change her pupils’ perceptions without either imposing her own views or silencing theirs and without exacting a class of pared-down selves? Through enactment not teaching, through performance not argument, say the advocates of performative pedagogy.
Performative pedagogy honours the ‘situatedness’ and ‘contingency’ of learners’ responses by opening ways for their personal meanings to emerge in a series of exquisite pedagogical moments that leave no visible trace and can neither be planned nor repeated. Hence the description: a pedagogy for disappearance (Phelan 1993). It aims to elicit personal responses not coherent understanding, multiple readings not singular arguments or teacher-led dialogue. As one line of feminist attack on the discourse of reason, it opens the closet of the ‘private’ and allows outlaw emotions out. (‘Pandoras all’, a nervous rationalist might brand these feminists of performative bent. Be that as it may, the principle of multiple readings also allows for a Pandora whose remaining hope is not to recall the pestilential emotions and trap them once more beneath the lid of authority but rather that they might go into the world and shake up reason’s tyranny.)
Performative pedagogy calls on the teacher to see her own slippery position, to be aware and wary of her own authorial and authoritative positioning. It takes subjectivity seriously through a radical turn to specificity, an ever-shifting play of relationships, perspectives and voices where, if anyone has authority, it is the learner – and then only at the moment of expression. Learner-centredness here rests on an apparent presumption in favour of the view from below – apparent because it involves something of a pretence by the teacher and because there is no singular view from below, but many.
Taking subjectivity seriously in this way thwarts the very project it intends to quicken and undermines the constitutive goods of teaching. How so?
For a start, without normative benchmarks, anything goes. By treating all voices and views as equally valid, Carmen Luke (herself a feminist) argues, the feminist teacher risks a dangerous sameness: ‘Views and voices from everywhere and every body potentially are views and voices from nowhere and no body” (Luke, 1996: 291). If anything goes, then changing learners’ perceptions becomes a matter of chance and if the teacher has a role at all, it is to play stagehand to happenstance. Here teaching would seem to be thoroughly luck-dependent, leaving the teacher without resources to establish the enabling conditions for fulfilling the definitive ends of her practice (cf Pendlebury 1995).
Authority of some sort is among the enabling conditions for teaching to accomplish its ends and sustain its goods. This is a formal point and in no way presupposes agreement on the substantive goods of teaching. In her critique of performative pedagogy, Yael Shalem (1997) argues for the importance of what she calls pedagogical authority. Roughly, the argument runs as follows. Every teacher worth her salt conducts some kind of epistemological labour to bring learners into a working relationship with the traditions and practices that inform the curriculum. Save by luck, performative pedagogy can accomplish neither its feminist nor its educative ends without the teacher selecting and sequencing texts and other artefacts to be presented for students’ responses. Like it or not, this epistemological labour puts the teacher in a position of pedagogical authority in relation to the learner. For it is the teacher who selects the pedagogical entry point into a tradition and who casts ahead, listening attentively for points of resolution to signify the end of a pedagogical episode.
| 13,832 |
<h4>You should reject our opponents' argument that their position is "unintelligible"... this argument links back to the "solipsism disadvantage" by prioritizing their argument as inherently true against widely established truth claims in the name of collegiality. This form of moral relativism actively harms an effective pedagogy while opening the floodgates for other ways of knowing the world, especially radical conservative principles</h4><p><strong>Pendlebury 5</strong> - Professor of Education, head, Division of Curriculum, University of the Witwatersrand (Shirley Pendlebury, in The Routledge Falmer Reader in Philosophy of Education, Wilfred Carr, 2005)</p><p>So we return to the idea of artefacts bearing their makers’ fingerprints. Strong objectivity (Harding 1991), or taking subjectivity seriously, requires us to look for these fingerprints, not to erase them—for they are indelible— reminding ourselves that impartiality is impossible. Every view is a partial view and permanent partiality is definitive of all our theories, observations and claims (Haraway 1990; Harding 1991). But this brings us full circle: <u><mark>Is a commitment to permanent partiality not the <strong>start down the </u></strong>slippery slope<u><strong> of subjectivism?</p><p></u></strong></mark>Much depends on how we understand the notion of permanent partiality. A weak reading, Miranda Fricker (1994) suggests, takes permanent partiality as an expression of the situated nature of knowledge, whereas a strong reading takes permanent partiality as an epistemological ideal. On the weak reading, permanent partiality is a methodological imperative for the knowing subject to place herself within the critical field and be open to how her own situation may influence her beliefs. Or, to put the matter in communal rather than individual terms, permanent partiality may be read as an injunction for an epistemic community to place itself within a critical field of reflection. To say that permanent partiality is an epistemological ideal is to say, crudely, that the more partial the view, the more reliable the beliefs issuing from it.</p><p><u>The danger here is that once partiality of perspective is presented as epistemologically desirable, there is no justification for halting its progress: <mark>this has the devastating consequence</mark> that there is no way <mark>of justifying</mark> the maintenance of any shared belief-system <strong>without</strong> committing a </u><mark>pernicious<u><strong></mark> act of </u></strong><mark>coercion</mark>: the eclipsing of the perspective or potential perspective of some person or group.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Without a shared</strong></mark> </u>belief<u>-<strong><mark>system</strong> we</mark> clearly <mark>cannot sustain </mark>the minimal realism which I have argued is necessary to <mark>feminist politics…</mark>nor</u> can we <u>maintain <mark>norms for belief</mark>; <mark>nor</mark> sustain </u><mark>any<u></mark> systematic <mark>self-critical practice</mark>.</u> (Fricker 1994:102)</p><p>Strong permanent partiality seems to rule out the possibility of education. For now, I shall accept the weak reading, although not quite with warts and all.</p><p><u>The notion of situated knowledge is closely related to the idea that evidence and justification depend on contextual as well as epistemic value</u>s. <u>Knowers and would-be knowers are all always somewhere—at once enabled and constrained by their locations and their position in relation to other epistemic subjects. But there are very different ways of characterizing this ‘somewhere’, which is seldom singular</u>. <u><strong>More often than not <mark>we are </mark>situated <mark>in multiple</strong>,</mark> overlapping communities and <strong><mark>social positions</strong>. One </mark>such ‘somewhere’ <mark>is</mark> the place of <mark>the subjugated (women,</mark> ethnic <mark>minorities</mark>, slaves, children and other legally defined minors). <strong><mark>For some</u></strong></mark> feminists, <u><strong><mark>this view from below has</mark> <mark>special epistemic authority</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Two considerations <strong>compel me to reject</strong></mark> the presumption in favour of <strong><mark>the view </mark>from below</u></strong>: one concerning its sweep, the other concerning its consequences for the practice of education. <u><mark>While the view</mark> from below <mark>may be the most telling</mark> view <strong><mark>for some</strong></mark> kinds of <mark>knowledge</mark> <mark>claims</mark>, </u><mark>it cannot be so for all<u></mark>. More seriously, in education, granting special epistemic authority to the view from below leads to the absurd, </u>albeit perhaps seductive,<u> idea that pupils have epistemic authority over their teachers</u>. But education cannot get off the ground unless we grant teachers some sort of epistemic authority and unless we recognize pupils as being capable of coming to know.</p><p>Safe homes and disappearing acts</p><p>What might it mean to take subjectivity seriously in education? Or to put it in more formal, analytical terms: What is involved in paying as much attention to S as to p in locutions of the form ‘S knows that p’? Who is S in an educational situation? Teachers or learners or those about whom they learn? Individuals or epistemic communities?</p><p>I approach these questions via a brief critical discussion of two sets of feminist challenges to mainstream education, each of which echoes aspects of feminist challenges to mainstream epistemology. One—apparently gentle and humane—falls under the rubric of caring and seems to some of its critics to control through cosy domestication; the other—a pedagogy assertive in intent and motivation—is designed to disappear at the moment of its own performance. Both caring theory and performative pedagogy take subjectivity seriously in ways that may undermine the enabling conditions for education; nonetheless each is rich in insights into educational practice and its dilemmas.</p><p><u><mark>Caring theorists</u></mark> (see, for example, Gilligan 1982; Martin 1981, 1992; Noddings 1984, 1992) <u><mark>challenge liberal education</mark> on at least four counts. For a start they argue <mark>that</mark> the declared universalism of <mark>liberal education</mark> is not universal at all since its singular ideal of an educated person <mark>assumes the person to be male</u></mark>. In emphasizing the ‘masculine virtues’ of rationality and the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, the liberal ideal is seen to cast women either as uneducated and feminine or as educated but failed women. Second, caring theorists argue that reason- and justice-based frameworks for education ignore the fact that reason and justice require caring, at least as their complement if not as their ground. <u>Third, they reject both instrumental and generalized conceptions of care: caring and other ‘private sphere’ values are not limited to performing a service on behalf of justice and other ‘public sphere’ values; nor can pupils’ needs be determined outside a personal relationship where the teacher attends to the particularities of each pupil</u>.</p><p>Like knowing, caring is situated and it is a primary not a parasitic virtue. In education, caring is no pedagogical sweetener but the very ground of curriculum meaning and value. This brings us to a fourth challenge. <u><mark>Caring theorists reject</mark> both <strong><mark>disciplinary</mark>-based and content-saturated <mark>curricula</u></strong></mark>. Instead, curriculum should have its basis in what Jane Roland Martin (1992) has called the three Cs of care, concern and connection, and not in bodies and bits of knowledge.</p><p>In several respects these challenges to liberal education match the feminist challenges to mainstream epistemology I listed earlier in the chapter. To wit: there is no disinterested view from nowhere from which teachers can properly see what their pupils need in order to flourish; a pupil’s identity is a crucial consideration in founding and sustaining a pedagogical relationship; care and love are central to the content as well as the processes of teaching and learning. Caring theorists take subjectivity seriously by requiring teachers to respect and nurture what is special in each pupil and to nurture in pupils an attitude of respect and care for others.</p><p><u>Even so, from the vantage of feminist epistemology, <mark>caring theorists turn a <strong>blind eye to crucial aspects of subjectivity</strong> by <strong>failing to place </u></strong>themselves<u> and </u>their ideas<u> in the critical field</u></mark>. <u><mark>They ignore their own and pupils’ subjectivity</mark> by neglecting to ask what trust and caring mean when teachers and their pupils belong to different ethnic groups or social classes</u>; when, to quote Audrey Thompson’s example, ‘the teacher is Anglo and the students are Ute, or the teacher is middle-class and the students from poor families’ (Thompson 1997:338). Caring theory thus fails the test of strong objectivity in so far as it takes the meaning of caring for granted.</p><p>Also, although caring theorists criticize liberal education for its rationalism, <u><mark>their arguments for a homelike school seem to rest on the notion of a </u>school as an idealized home<u>,</mark> a ‘rationalised, purified environment’ <mark>where teachers become surrogate mothers</u></mark> (Thompson 1997:337). Here, too, caring theorists may stand accused of failing the test of strong objectivity because <u><strong><mark>they seem to ignore the role that</strong> <strong>one</strong></mark> version of a <strong><mark>caring ethic has played in </u></strong>sustaining<u></mark> a social order inimical to </u><mark>women’s empowerment</mark>. In short, despite their professed feminism, caring theorists take subjectivity seriously in ways that put the feminist project at risk. What of the educational project more broadly conceived? Does caring theory promote or impede education? <u><mark>By singling out <strong>individuals</strong></mark> for attention, perhaps <mark>it pays </u>too little heed<u> <strong>to the importance of </mark>sustaining and <mark>invigorating</strong></mark> epistemic </u><mark>communities<u></mark>, </u><mark>their practices<u></mark> and </u><mark>their bodies of knowledge</mark>. <u><mark>Education</u></mark>, in my view<u>, <mark>is </u>centrally<u><strong> a matter</strong> of getting people to care about practices </u>that might otherwise have meant nothing to them<u>,</mark> a matter of getting them to care about evidence and justification <mark>as well as about other people</u></mark>. <u><mark>It is</mark> partly <mark>a matter of socializing </mark>them into </u>traditions and <mark>practices<u></mark> <mark>so that they might</mark>, in time, <strong><mark>use the language of those practices to criticize</mark>, advance <mark>and</mark> perhaps <mark>overturn them</strong></mark>; as well as a matter of habituating character through critical and disciplined practice for the purpose of nurturing practical reasoning</u>.2 But I am casting ahead. I shall pick up and offer some defence for this position in the final section of the chapter.</p><p>Feminists who advocate <u><mark>performative pedagogy reject traditional teaching</mark> as well as the standard views of reflective teaching and critical pedagogy <mark>on the grounds that all presuppose the possibility of one <strong>self coming</mark> to know and understand other selves</u></strong> (see, for example, Orner et al. 1996; Phelan 1993).3 In their view, such ‘inter-subjective’ understanding between teacher and learners can be accomplished, if at all, only at the cost of reducing the historical and embodied richness of self to one who is present in the classroom in the form of a rational argument. Here the teacher maintains superficial order by banishing all other aspects of self to a private world, outside the classroom. Feminist teachers who reject the discourse of reason face the challenge of giving full play to learners’ expressive selves and yet exerting sufficient authority to meet feminism’s normative ideals, ideals that require the teacher to alter the learners’ perceptions and concerns.</p><p>How is it possible for a teacher to change her pupils’ perceptions without either imposing her own views or silencing theirs and without exacting a class of pared-down selves? Through enactment not teaching, through performance not argument, say the advocates of performative pedagogy.</p><p><u>Performative pedagogy honours the ‘situatedness’ and ‘contingency’ of learners’ responses</u> by <u>opening ways for their personal meanings to emerge in a series of exquisite pedagogical moments that leave no visible trace and can neither be planned nor repeated</u>. Hence the description: a pedagogy for disappearance (Phelan 1993). <u>It aims to elicit personal responses not coherent understanding</u>, multiple readings not singular arguments or teacher-led dialogue. <u>As one line of feminist attack on the discourse of reason, it opens the closet of the ‘private’ and allows outlaw emotions out</u>. (‘Pandoras all’, a nervous rationalist might brand these feminists of performative bent. Be that as it may, the principle of multiple readings also allows for a Pandora whose remaining hope is not to recall the pestilential emotions and trap them once more beneath the lid of authority but rather that they might go into the world and shake up reason’s tyranny.)</p><p><u><mark>Performative pedagogy</u></mark> calls on the teacher to see her own slippery position, to be aware and wary of her own authorial and authoritative positioning. It <u><mark>takes </u>subjectivity seriously<u> through a radical turn</mark> to specificity</u>, an ever-shifting play of relationships, perspectives and voices <u><mark>where, if anyone has authority, it is the learner</u></mark> – and then only at the moment of expression. <mark>Learner-centredness</mark> here <u><mark>rests on a</u></mark>n apparent <u><mark>presumption in </u>favour of the view from below</mark> – apparent because it involves something of a pretence by the teacher and <u><strong><mark>because there is no singular view from below</mark>, but many</u></strong>.</p><p><u>Taking <mark>subjectivity </mark>seriously in this way </u><mark>thwarts the very project</mark> it intends to quicken<u> <mark>and <strong>undermines</strong></mark> the constitutive goods of <mark>teaching</u></mark>. How so?</p><p>For a start, <u>without normative benchmarks, anything goes. By treating all voices and views as equally valid</u>, <u>Carmen <mark>Luke</mark> (herself a feminist)</u> <u><mark>argues</u></mark>, <u>the</u> feminist <u>teacher risks a dangerous sameness: ‘<strong><mark>Views</mark> and voices <mark>from everywhere</mark> and every body</strong> </u>potentially<u> <strong><mark>are</strong> <strong>views </mark>and voices <mark>from nowhere and no body</u></strong></mark>” (Luke, 1996: 291). <u><mark>If anything goes, then changing</mark> learners’ <mark>perceptions </u>becomes a matter of chance</mark> and if the teacher has a role at all, it is to play stagehand to happenstance. Here <u>teaching would seem to be thoroughly luck-dependent, </u>leaving the teacher without resources to establish the enabling conditions for fulfilling the definitive ends of her practice (cf Pendlebury 1995).</p><p><u>Authority</u> of some sort <u>is among the enabling conditions for teaching to accomplish its ends and sustain its goods</u>. This is a formal point and in no way presupposes agreement on the substantive goods of teaching. In her critique of performative pedagogy, Yael Shalem (1997) argues for the importance of what she calls pedagogical authority. Roughly, the argument runs as follows. Every teacher worth her salt conducts some kind of epistemological labour to bring learners into a working relationship with the traditions and practices that inform the curriculum. Save by luck, <u>performative pedagogy can accomplish neither its feminist nor its educative ends without the teacher selecting and sequencing texts and other artefacts to be presented for students’ responses</u>. <u>Like it or not</u>, this <u>epistemological labour puts the teacher in a position of pedagogical authority in relation to the learner</u>. For it is the teacher who selects the pedagogical entry point into a tradition and who casts ahead, listening attentively for points of resolution to signify the end of a pedagogical episode.</p>
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
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Radical negativity is wrong --- positive reforms are possible
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Omi 13,
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Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory
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racial conflict is a fundamentally political process people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national level down to the personal While racism is not monolithic movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.
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people of colour are not so powerless and whites are not so omnipotent white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national level down to the personal movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and scores victories. Challenges to racism continue within the state and civil society Movements may experience setbacks leaders may be co-opted but racial subjectivity abides. Resistance is not futile.
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We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.
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<h4>Radical negativity is wrong --- positive reforms are possible</h4><p>Michael<strong> Omi 13, <u></strong>and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory</p><p></u>We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that <u>racial conflict</u>, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, <u>is a fundamentally political process</u>. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that <u><mark>people of colour</mark> in the USA <mark>are not so powerless</mark>, <mark>and</mark> that <mark>whites are not so omnipotent</u></mark>, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that <u><mark>white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national</u></mark> and indeed global <u><mark>level down to the personal</u></mark> and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. <u>While racism</u> – largely white – continues to flourish, it <u>is not monolithic</u>. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But <u><mark>movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and</mark> sometimes <mark>scores victories. Challenges</mark> <mark>to</mark> white <mark>racism continue</mark> both <mark>within the state and</mark> in <mark>civil society</mark>.</u> Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. <u><mark>Movements may experience setbacks</mark>, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their <mark>leaders may be co-opted</mark> or even eliminated, <mark>but racial subjectivity</mark> and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, <mark>abides. <strong>Resistance is not futile.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Case
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Positionality
| 40,320 | 654 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,503 |
Rage causes violence – turns the K
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Wenning 9
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Wenning 9 (Mario, Phd., Assistant professor of philosophy @ the University of Macau, “The Return of Rage,” Parrhesia No.8)
|
the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason dictates Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition Confucius already warns his students “to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person is that not misguided judgment? Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand “how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love.” Acts of punishment are then seen as merciful rather than vindictive because they aim at the good of the victim that the erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as archaic forms of militancy that mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice, equality and compassion. Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages Philosophy of Right of the infinite chain of violence, the economy of pay-back that results from blind vengeance and selfadministered acts of justice. The excesses of rage can easily lead to tragic repetitions of an original act of violence that might be impossible to get out of
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the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition Confucius already warns his students “to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person is that not misguided judgment? Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand “how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love.” erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as archaic forms of militancy that mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages The excesses of rage can easily lead to tragic repetitions of an original act of violence that might be impossible to get out of
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The valorization of erotic emotions and virtues over thymotic ones is as old as philosophy itself. Aristotle already insists that the virtuous person cultivates mildness of temper “the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason dictates.” 15 Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge. The virtuous character does not lose the control that is necessary to provide for a self-sufficient emotional economy, which is the precondition for achieving a life that is marked by wisdom, even-temperedness, and justice. Seneca’s influential work on rage, De ira, which was immensely influential for Christian and humanist ethics, calls for a Stoic control of the dangerous affect. The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition. Confucius already warns his students “to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person or even that of your parents, is that not misguided judgment?” 16 Daoism and ZenBuddhism promote meditative practices and compassion to overcome our fixation on the need of being angry with ourselves and the world surrounding us. More recently, Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand “how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love.” 17 According to Nussbaum, anger should at best operate as a tool of compassion. Acts of punishment are then seen as merciful rather than vindictive because they aim at the good of the victim. These representative examples illustrate that the erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as archaic forms of militancy that, it is contended, mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice, equality and compassion. We might think that the dislike of negative emotions in general and potentially aggressive ones in particular results from an insight into the misfortunes these emotions bring about. Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages. Hegel, for example, reminds us in the Philosophy of Right of the infinite chain of violence, the economy of pay-back that results from blind vengeance and selfadministered acts of justice. 18 The excesses of rage can easily lead to tragic repetitions of an original act of violence that might be impossible to get out of. Honor killings often lead to new honor killings rather than the reestablishment of justice and the fight against terror breed more terrorists.
| 2,771 |
<h4>Rage causes violence – turns the K </h4><p><strong>Wenning 9</strong> (Mario, Phd., Assistant professor of philosophy @ the University of Macau, “The Return of Rage,” Parrhesia No.8) </p><p>The valorization of erotic emotions and virtues over thymotic ones is as old as philosophy itself. Aristotle already insists that the virtuous person cultivates mildness of temper “<u><mark>the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way</mark>, at the things, and for the length of time that reason dictates</u>.” 15 <u><strong><mark>Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge</u></strong></mark>. The virtuous character does not lose the control that is necessary to provide for a self-sufficient emotional economy, which is the precondition for achieving a life that is marked by wisdom, even-temperedness, and justice. Seneca’s influential work on rage, De ira, which was immensely influential for Christian and humanist ethics, calls for a Stoic control of the dangerous affect. <u><strong><mark>The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Confucius already warns his students “to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person</u></mark> or even that of your parents, <u><strong><mark>is that not misguided judgment?</u></strong></mark>” 16 Daoism and ZenBuddhism promote meditative practices and compassion to overcome our fixation on the need of being angry with ourselves and the world surrounding us. More recently, <u><mark>Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand “how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love.”</u></mark> 17 According to Nussbaum, anger should at best operate as a tool of compassion. <u>Acts of punishment are then seen as merciful rather than vindictive because they aim at the good of the victim</u>. These representative examples illustrate <u>that the <mark>erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as archaic forms of militancy that</u></mark>, it is contended, <u><strong><mark>mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice</strong></mark>, equality and compassion.</u> We might think that the dislike of negative emotions in general and potentially aggressive ones in particular results from an insight into the misfortunes these emotions bring about. <u><mark>Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages</u></mark>. Hegel, for example, reminds us in the<u> Philosophy of Right of the infinite chain of violence, the economy of pay-back that results from blind vengeance and selfadministered acts of justice. </u>18 <u><mark>The excesses of rage can easily lead to tragic repetitions of an original act of violence that might be impossible to get out of</u></mark>. Honor killings often lead to new honor killings rather than the reestablishment of justice and the fight against terror breed more terrorists.</p>
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Case
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Rage Fails
| 105,861 | 32 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,504 |
Unwillingness to explain means you should preserve alt doesn’t solve
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Unwillingness to explain means you should preserve alt doesn’t solve</h4>
| null |
Case
|
Rage Fails
| 430,719 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
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