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742,505 |
The law is a sight for strategic engagement and disruption of settler colonialism - the perm solves best.
|
Smith 2012 Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)
|
Smith 2012 (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)
|
Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable. The prisoner’s dilemma is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety.
|
it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in the work of anti-trust scholar Leslie to disinvest in the morality of the law is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies Leslie proposes, anti-trust laws that strategically disrupt Unlike justice advocates who focus on making moral statements Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement it suggests an alternative framework to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than many anti-racist scholars If, we were to focus on reforms chosen strategic effects We would be less complacent about the reforms we advocate we might need to rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety
|
Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The prisoner’s dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety.
| 7,239 |
<h4>The law is a sight for strategic engagement and disruption of settler colonialism - the perm solves best.</h4><p><strong>Smith 2012</strong> (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the <u><strong>Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)</p><p></u></strong>Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. <u>Thus, <mark>it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in </mark>an unexpected place, <mark>the work of anti-trust </mark>legal <mark>scholar </mark>Christopher <mark>Leslie</mark>.</u> Again, <u>the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him <mark>to disinvest in the morality of the law </mark>in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do.</u> <u>This disinvestment, I contend <mark>is critical for those who wish to <strong>dismantle settler colonialism</strong> to <strong>rethink their legal strategies</strong></mark>.</u> In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher <u>Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.</u>18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. <u>The prisoner’s dilemma</u>, as described by Leslie, <u>is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them</u>. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. <u>The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence</u>. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. <u>Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices.</u> <u>They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them?</u> Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, <u><mark>Leslie proposes, anti-trust</mark> legislation should focus on <mark>laws that </mark>will <strong><mark>strategically disrupt</strong> </mark>trust mechanisms. <mark>Unlike </mark>racial or gender <mark>justice advocates who focus on making moral statements</mark> through the law, <mark>Leslie proposes <strong>using the law for strategic ends,</strong> even if the law makes a morally</mark> <mark>suspect statement</mark>.</u><strong> </strong>For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. <u>This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty?</u> <u><strong>The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive</u></strong> if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, <u>the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, <mark>it </mark>also <mark>suggests an <strong>alternative</strong> framework </mark>for pursuing social justice through the law, <mark>to employ it for its <strong>strategic effects</strong> <strong>rather than</strong> through the <strong>moral statements</strong> </mark>it purports to make. <mark>It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than </mark>do <mark>many anti-racist</mark>/anti-colonial activists and <mark>scholars </mark>who work through legal reform.20 </u>It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. <u>As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, <strong>it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms.</strong> <mark>If, </mark>however, <mark>we were to focus on</mark> legal <mark>reforms chosen</mark> for their <mark>strategic effects</mark>, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. <mark>We would </mark>also <mark>be less complacent about the </mark>legal <mark>reforms we advocate </mark>as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, <mark>we might <strong>need to</strong></mark> creatively <strong><mark>rethink what</strong> legal <strong>reforms would actually increase safety</mark>.</p></u></strong>
| null |
Case
|
Legality
| 85,452 | 194 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,506 |
Reformism is effective and brings revolutionary change closer rather than pushing it away
|
Delgado 9, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590
|
Richard Delgado 9, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590
|
CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society , an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair The critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. . The critique tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now Crits do not offer evidence. Indeed, incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their heated living room scholars‘ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities,
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Critical scholars reject piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones wholesale reformation an unfair system survives by using piecemeal reform to legitimize oppression The critique of reform is imperialistic and wrong The critique tells oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing authority to disburse funds for heating in housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps families warm It s paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs heat now incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer Not all reforms induce complacency; some whet the appetite for further combat critique of reform misses these possibilities,
|
2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform¶ Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and¶ just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the¶ common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars¶ urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order¶ in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion.¶ The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now,¶ unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars‘ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities,
| 2,075 |
<h4>Reformism is effective and brings revolutionary change closer rather than pushing it away</h4><p>Richard <strong>Delgado 9<u>, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590 </p><p></u></strong>2. The <u>CLS critique of piecemeal reform</u>¶ <u><mark>Critical scholars reject</mark> the idea of <mark>piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones</u></mark> the <u><mark>wholesale reformation </mark>that must occur to create a decent society</u>. Even worse<u>, <mark>an unfair</mark> social <mark>system survives by using piecemeal reform to</mark> disguise and <mark>legitimize oppression</mark>. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to</u>, or periodic court <u>victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair</u> and¶ just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the¶ common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars¶ urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order¶ in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion.¶ <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> CLS <u><strong><mark>critique of</mark> piecemeal <mark>reform is</mark> familiar, <mark>imperialistic and wrong</strong></mark>. </u>Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand<u>. <mark>The</u> <u>critique</u></mark> is imperialistic in that it <u><mark>tells </mark>minorities and other <mark>oppressed peoples</mark> <mark>how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing</mark> a housing <mark>authority to disburse funds for heating in</mark> subsidized <mark>housing may postpone the revolution, <strong>or it may not</strong>. In the meantime, the order keeps</mark> a number of poor <mark>families warm</mark>. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. <mark>It s</mark>macks of <mark>paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs</mark> the certainty of <mark>heat now</u></mark>,¶ unless there is evidence for that possibility. The <u>Crits do not offer</u> such <u>evidence. Indeed,</u> some <u><strong><mark>incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer</strong></mark>, not push them further away. <mark>Not all</mark> small <mark>reforms induce complacency; some</mark> may <mark>whet the appetite for further combat</mark>. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their heated living room</u>. CLS <u>scholars‘ <mark>critique of</mark> piecemeal <mark>reform</mark> often <mark>misses these possibilities,</p></u></mark>
| null |
Case
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Legality
| 14,621 | 727 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,507 |
Decolonizing the mind doesn’t do anything and turns the K
|
Tuck and Yang 14
|
Tuck and Yang 14, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York, **Assistant Professor in Ethnic Studies, Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley (Tuck, E. & Yang, K.W.), “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40
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Fanon told us decolonizing the mind is the first step not the only step we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with Clinton and Funkadelic when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow
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Fanon told us decolonizing the mind is the first step not the only step focus on decolonizing the mind as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land We agree that pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism owever, the front-loading of critical consciousness can waylay decolonization critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism
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Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”
| 1,254 |
<h4>Decolonizing the mind doesn’t do anything and turns the K</h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14</strong>, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York, **Assistant Professor in Ethnic Studies, Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley (Tuck, E. & Yang, K.W.), “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40</p><p><u><mark>Fanon told us</u></mark> in 1963 that <u><mark>decolonizing the mind is the first step</u></mark>, <u><mark>not the only step</u></mark> toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet <u>we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to <mark>focus on decolonizing the mind</mark>, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, <mark>as if it were the sole activity of decolonization;</mark> <mark>to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land</u></mark>. <u><mark>We agree that</mark> curricula, literature, and <mark>pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism</mark>, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. H<mark>owever, the front-loading of critical consciousness</mark> building <mark>can waylay decolonization</u></mark>, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. <u>Until stolen land is relinquished, <mark>critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism</mark>. So, we respectfully disagree</u> <u>with</u> George <u>Clinton and Funkadelic</u> (1970) and En Vogue (1992) <u>when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow</u>.”</p>
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Case
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Decolonizing the Mind
| 13,395 | 232 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,508 |
Structural conditions cause psychic violence, not the other way around—material conditions create the conditions which foster psychic violence b/c they establish unequal power relations –
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Structural conditions cause psychic violence, not the other way around—material conditions create the conditions which foster psychic violence b/c they establish unequal power relations – </h4>
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Case
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Decolonizing the Mind
| 430,720 | 1 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,509 |
The voluntary system is susceptible to influence by the rich
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Epstein 14
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Epstein 14 Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law New York University School of Law
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A objection is that the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor who do not have the means to pay. To this point, , right now rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue. Richer people have more contacts and more resources to spend on getting themselves on, if necessary, multiple queues. Worse still, there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, as major transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere. No system that allocates huge benefits for zero or below market price will be immune from influence,
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A objection is that the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor right now rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue. Richer people have more contacts there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, as major transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere. No system that allocates huge benefits for zero or below market price will be immune from influence,
|
NYU Journal of Law and Liberty The Kidney Crisis
http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis
A second objection is that the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor who do not have the means to pay. To this point, two responses are in order. First, right now rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue. Richer people have more contacts and more resources to spend on getting themselves on, if necessary, multiple queues. Worse still, there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, as major transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere. No system that allocates huge benefits for zero or below market price will be immune from influence, whether we are talking about rent-controlled units in Manhattan or unassigned kidney organs, whose donor, often young and poor, receives not one cent from the successful transfer.
| 1,034 |
<h4>The voluntary system is susceptible to influence by the rich</h4><p><strong>Epstein 14</strong> Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law New York University School of Law</p><p>NYU Journal of Law and Liberty The Kidney Crisis</p><p>http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2014/10/28/the-kidney-crisis</p><p><u><mark>A</mark> </u>second <u><mark>objection is that the voluntary market will discriminate against the poor</mark> who do not have the means to pay. To this point, </u>two responses are in order. First<u>, <mark>right now rich people can influence the UNOS allocation process to work their way up the queue. Richer people have more contacts</mark> and more resources to spend on getting themselves on, if necessary, multiple queues. Worse still, <mark>there are all sorts of opportunities to divert cadaveric organs to favored recipients, as major transplant centers can keep harvested organs for their own patients by claiming that their condition renders them unfit to be transferred elsewhere. No system that allocates huge benefits for zero or below market price will be immune from influence,</mark> </u>whether we are talking about rent-controlled units in Manhattan or unassigned kidney organs, whose donor, often young and poor, receives not one cent from the successful transfer.</p>
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Case
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Stuff
| 430,352 | 2 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,510 |
Our opponents don't get to win just for using their performance. this is because methods are debated against each other using researched scholarship, which means you shouldn't just prioritize one form of knowledge over another. our method is just as performative, but to prioritize an individual "survival strategy" actively does harm to other people by precluding effective discussions and solutions surrounding our opponents' antagonisms
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Welsh 12
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Welsh 12 – Professor of communication at Appalachia state University (Scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23,)
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to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly uninhabitable academic identity but also ¶ Clinging¶ to the idea that produces a fantastic¶ [ignorance] to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that structures academic purpose Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist posture That academic work should have political consequences is broadly¶ assumed within a dominant strain of rhetorical scholarship owing to what¶ is doubtless an incontrovertible feature of reality—words have political¶ consequences. arguments concerning the consequences of scholarship have uncritically¶ referenced such facts. Inseparable from ideology every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it. In this debate, references¶ to the factual, the empirical, or the material are deployed, not incidentally,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit. because scholars spend a large majority of their time in faculty¶ offices, classrooms, and archives of one kind or another, by necessity, mostly¶ talking, reading, and writing about political action, the felt alienation from¶ public life can feel like hypocrisy the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity in the status quo, just as¶ the act of producing expert accounts can be reduced to the demonstration¶ of a lack of trust in democratic publics. The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming¶ ways. Rather the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement
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reducing scholarship to agency not only produces an increasingly uninhabitable identity but also draws our attention away from producing inquiry designed to be useful Clinging¶ to the idea that academic is political produces a fantastic¶ [ignorance] to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that structures academic purpose —words have political¶ consequences. . Inseparable from ideology every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it. , references¶ to the empirical, or material are deployed, ,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit. the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement
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What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic¶ practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants¶ in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more¶ and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that¶ reducing scholarship to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly uninhabitable academic identity but also draws our attention away from producing¶ results of rhetorical inquiry designed to be useful to citizens in democracy. Clinging¶ to the idea that academic practice is a mode of political action produces a fantastic¶ [ignorance] blindness to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that structures academic purpose. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical¶ resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the¶ self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the¶ production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.¶ Now over a decade since the publication of John Michael’s Anxious Intellects¶ (2000), many rhetoric scholars are no less anxious about the relevance of¶ scholarship to public affairs. Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist posture. That academic work should have political consequences is broadly¶ assumed within a dominant strain of rhetorical scholarship owing to what¶ is doubtless an incontrovertible feature of reality—words have political¶ consequences. From this fact, many rhetoric scholars reason that because¶ our academic words have political consequences, even if we do not intend¶ for them to, we should deliberately pursue the consequences we most desire¶ and seek their victory in political contest.¶ Questions as to the logic underlying this relationship of fact and¶ assertion¶ aside, this article is perhaps partly reducible to the claim that arguments concerning the consequences of scholarship have uncritically¶ referenced such facts. Facts, as many of the same scholars would be quick¶ to point out, do not mean anything apart from the contours our ideological¶ lenses project on them. As Kenneth Burke notes, if a martyr can find joy in¶ the receiving of torturous blows, we should expect the meanings projected¶ onto facts to range widely (1984b, 35). With this in mind, we should be no¶ less concerned with the ways, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, that we “look¶ awry” so as to notice particular facts and invest them with the meaning we¶ do (1991, 8–12).¶ What Žižek adds to Burke’s observation regarding the projection of¶ meaning onto selected events is that this act of projection occurs at the¶ intersection of subjectivity and desire. Beyond charting relationships¶ between terms that constitute an ideology in order to map rhetorically constituted¶ motives, Žižek insists that action is propelled by the insufficiency of¶ those very rhetorical relationships (2008, 103–6). Inseparable from ideology every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it. The subject’s desire circulates around the dominant¶ tensions within the language that affords one an identity, continually¶ pursuing the traumatic impossibility of coherent subjectivity or ideological¶ consistency (1989, 124–29). Whereas Burke suggests that every rhetorical¶ language has a kind of rationality that supplies identity and order, Žižek¶ suggests that it is the basic irreconcilability of the competing demands that¶ our symbols place upon us that structures our desire (Žižek 1991, 162–69;¶ Burke 1966, 44–57). We continually pursue not simply the impossible but¶ that which is made impossible by the language of our ideologically constituted¶ identities.¶ I argue that the ongoing debate in rhetorical studies about the relationship¶ between scholarly reflection and political agency is illuminated by¶ Žižek’s account of ideology, identity, and desire. In this debate, references¶ to the factual, the empirical, or the material are deployed, not incidentally,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit. Often¶ pursuing lines of research motivated by a desire to create wholeness¶ amid¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 3¶ social, cultural, political, or institutional brokenness, rhetoric¶ scholars¶ nevertheless¶ become, in the sustained act of academic investigation,¶ significantly¶ alienated¶ from motivating practical concerns. Moreover,¶ because rhetoric scholars spend a large majority of their time in faculty¶ offices, classrooms, and archives of one kind or another, by necessity, mostly¶ talking, reading, and writing about political action, the felt alienation from¶ public life can feel like hypocrisy or, even worse, complicity in the perpetuation¶ of brokenness.¶ The subject position inhabited by many rhetoric scholars is not only¶ structured by a fundamental antagonism between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency but also by an antagonism between the production of expert¶ knowledge and a democratic faith in the judgment of the people. An academic¶ produces accounts or recommendations that are intended to enlighten,¶ supplement, or replace those currently accepted by a public imagined to be,¶ at its best, democratic. At the same time, the rhetoric scholar committed¶ to democracy often imagines that the academic’s role is to resist the expert¶ control of publics. Taken together, the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity in the status quo, just as¶ the act of producing expert accounts can be reduced to the demonstration¶ of a lack of trust in democratic publics. The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming¶ ways. Rather, as Žižek might suggest, the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them (1989, 3, 5,¶ 133; 2005, 242–43). Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement.¶ Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided¶ by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early¶ works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright¶ Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista¶ Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view,¶ even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow¶ academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship¶ and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics¶ working¶ in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how¶ academics¶ might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense,¶ to classical¶ rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize,¶ as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of¶ inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a¶ construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates¶ political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic¶ publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them.
Their arguments here essentially amount to “Not with that attitude” – this is not a sufficient answer. It’s obviously true that it’s impossible to have decolonization without first imagining decolonization but it doesn’t follow that imagining it results in concrete change which is why you should prefer our alt solvency arguments – they’re all practical barriers their speech act doesn’t overcome.
All their science links just say science is Western – doesn’t contest its truth value. Means if we win that they are the altruistic process and that fails, you should spot us aff solvency.
| 8,500 |
<h4>Our opponents don't get to win just for using their performance. this is because methods are debated against each other using researched scholarship, which means you shouldn't just prioritize one form of knowledge over another. our method is just as performative, but to prioritize an individual "survival strategy" actively does harm to other people by precluding effective discussions and solutions surrounding our opponents' antagonisms</h4><p><strong>Welsh 12 </strong>– Professor of communication at Appalachia state University (Scott, “coming to terms with the antagonism between rhetorical reflection and political agency”, vol 45., no. 1, 1-23,) </p><p>What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic¶ practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants¶ in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more¶ and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that¶ <strong><mark>reducing scholarship<u> to</strong> </mark>a mode of political <strong><mark>agency</strong> not only produces an <strong>increasingly</strong> uninhabitable </mark>academic <mark>identity but also </u>draws our attention away from producing<u></mark>¶</u> results of rhetorical <mark>inquiry designed to be useful</mark> to citizens in democracy. <u><mark>Clinging¶ to the idea that </u>academic </mark>practice <mark>is </mark>a mode of <mark>political </mark>action<u> <mark>produces a <strong>fantastic¶ [ignorance]</mark> </u></strong>blindness<u><mark> to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that structures academic purpose</u></mark>. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical¶ resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the¶ self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the¶ production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.¶ Now over a decade since the publication of John Michael’s Anxious Intellects¶ (2000), many rhetoric scholars are no less anxious about the relevance of¶ scholarship to public affairs. <u>Recent exchanges concerning rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement continue to provide evidence of a prominent felt need to prove public relevance, explain away the lack of readily apparent public engagement, or adopt a more activist posture</u>. <u>That academic work should have political consequences is broadly¶ assumed within a dominant strain of rhetorical scholarship owing to what¶ is doubtless an <strong>incontrovertible feature of reality</strong><mark>—words have political¶ consequences.</u></mark> From this fact, many rhetoric scholars reason that because¶ our academic words have political consequences, even if we do not intend¶ for them to, we should deliberately pursue the consequences we most desire¶ and seek their victory in political contest.¶ Questions as to the logic underlying this relationship of fact and¶ assertion¶ aside, this article is perhaps partly reducible to the claim that <u>arguments concerning the consequences of scholarship have uncritically¶ referenced such facts<mark>.</u></mark> Facts, as many of the same scholars would be quick¶ to point out, do not mean anything apart from the contours our ideological¶ lenses project on them. As Kenneth Burke notes, if a martyr can find joy in¶ the receiving of torturous blows, we should expect the meanings projected¶ onto facts to range widely (1984b, 35). With this in mind, we should be no¶ less concerned with the ways, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, that we “look¶ awry” so as to notice particular facts and invest them with the meaning we¶ do (1991, 8–12).¶ What Žižek adds to Burke’s observation regarding the projection of¶ meaning onto selected events is that this act of projection occurs at the¶ intersection of subjectivity and desire. Beyond charting relationships¶ between terms that constitute an ideology in order to map rhetorically constituted¶ motives, Žižek insists that action is propelled by the insufficiency of¶ those very rhetorical relationships (2008, 103–6). <u><mark>Inseparable from ideology every identity is constantly haunted by the lurking antagonisms between¶ the terms that structure it.</u></mark> The subject’s desire circulates around the dominant¶ tensions within the language that affords one an identity, continually¶ pursuing the traumatic impossibility of coherent subjectivity or ideological¶ consistency (1989, 124–29). Whereas Burke suggests that every rhetorical¶ language has a kind of rationality that supplies identity and order, Žižek¶ suggests that it is the basic irreconcilability of the competing demands that¶ our symbols place upon us that structures our desire (Žižek 1991, 162–69;¶ Burke 1966, 44–57). We continually pursue not simply the impossible but¶ that which is made impossible by the language of our ideologically constituted¶ identities.¶ I argue that the ongoing debate in rhetorical studies about the relationship¶ between scholarly reflection and political agency is illuminated by¶ Žižek’s account of ideology, identity, and desire. <u>In this debate<mark>, references¶ to the </mark>factual, the <mark>empirical, or </mark>the <mark>material are deployed, </mark>not incidentally<mark>,¶ to address the impossible subject position that academics inhabit.</u></mark> Often¶ pursuing lines of research motivated by a desire to create wholeness¶ amid¶ coming to terms with the antagonism¶ 3¶ social, cultural, political, or institutional brokenness, rhetoric¶ scholars¶ nevertheless¶ become, in the sustained act of academic investigation,¶ significantly¶ alienated¶ from motivating practical concerns. Moreover,¶ <u>because </u>rhetoric <u>scholars spend a large majority of their time in faculty¶ offices, classrooms, and archives of one kind or another, by necessity, mostly¶ talking, reading, and writing about political action, the felt alienation from¶ public life can feel like hypocrisy</u> or, even worse, complicity in the perpetuation¶ of brokenness.¶ The subject position inhabited by many rhetoric scholars is not only¶ structured by a fundamental antagonism between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency but also by an antagonism between the production of expert¶ knowledge and a democratic faith in the judgment of the people. An academic¶ produces accounts or recommendations that are intended to enlighten,¶ supplement, or replace those currently accepted by a public imagined to be,¶ at its best, democratic. At the same time, the rhetoric scholar committed¶ to democracy often imagines that the academic’s role is to resist the expert¶ control of publics. Taken together, <u><strong><mark>the two antagonisms yield a deeply conflicted¶ scholarly identity: the suspension of immediate action in favor of¶ reflection can be reduced to an act of complicity </mark>in </strong>the status quo, just as¶ the act of producing expert accounts can be reduced to the demonstration¶ of a lack of trust in democratic publics. <mark>The challenge is to resist synthetically¶ resolving these antagonisms</mark>, whether in confirming or disconfirming¶ ways. Rather</u>, as Žižek might suggest, <u><strong><mark>the aim should be to “come to terms”¶ with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in¶ reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them</u></strong></mark> (1989, 3, 5,¶ 133; 2005, 242–43). <u><strong><mark>Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility¶ of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant¶ calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s¶ work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement</u></strong></mark>.¶ Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided¶ by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early¶ works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright¶ Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and¶ political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista¶ Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view,¶ even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow¶ academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship¶ and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics¶ working¶ in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how¶ academics¶ might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense,¶ to classical¶ rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize,¶ as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of¶ inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a¶ construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates¶ political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic¶ publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them. </p><p>Their arguments here essentially amount to “Not with that attitude” – this is not a sufficient answer. It’s obviously true that it’s impossible to have decolonization without first imagining decolonization but it doesn’t follow that imagining it results in concrete change which is why you should prefer our alt solvency arguments – they’re all practical barriers their speech act doesn’t overcome.</p><p>All their science links just say science is Western – doesn’t contest its truth value. Means if we win that they are the altruistic process and that fails, you should spot us aff solvency.</p>
| null |
Case
|
We Are a Performance
| 249,583 | 17 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,511 |
Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.
|
Carle 5
|
Susan Carle, Law @ American University, 2005 (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)
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Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform Dewey saw education as the laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education Fish argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom Dewey repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism ]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change
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because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform Dewey saw education as the laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experienc he ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Fish argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom Dewey repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change,
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Precisely because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. Dewey saw education as the scientific laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experience.279 To Dewey, the ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education. Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. Fish, as we have seen, argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. Dewey, conversely, repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism, arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, “[t]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought” because this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change, and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287
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<h4>Using pedagogical institutions to make prescriptions for change prevents docile acceptance of oppression. Evaluating the likely consequences of our prescriptions shapes successful social change.</h4><p>Susan <strong>Carle</strong>, Law @ American University, 200<strong>5</strong> (“Theorizing Agency.” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 307 lexis)</p><p><u>Precisely <mark>because he believed in the power of human agency, Dewey devoted a great deal of his writing to developing prescriptions for change</u></mark> in response to the issues of his times. It is worth quickly surveying some of those prescriptions here because they help illuminate the relationship between Dewey’s theory of the self and his overall philosophic system. Dewey’s deliberative theory ties elegantly into his theory of democracy, which in turn displays an ascetically pleasing “fit”274 with his pedagogical vision. Dewey’s political theory is a large topic, to which he devoted much writing but to which I can give only passing attention. Suffice it to say that Dewey passionately believed in the virtues of democracy; indeed, Dewey scholars have described democracy as Dewey’s deepest preoccupation— the underlying passion that motivated him in his prolific output.275 Unlike philosophers such as John Rawls, however, Dewey uncoupled democracy from the institutions of Western capitalism, and was intensely critical of capitalism as he saw it developing in his lifetime. To Dewey, capitalism spelled economic inequality, which was anathema to his vision of democracy based in local deliberative processes.276 Dewey saw education as the process through which children would acquire the habits that would allow them to become members of a democracy, well equipped for the kind of reflective thought and deliberation that democracy required.277 Thus, <u><mark>education was for Dewey a fundamental method of social progress and reform</u></mark>.278 For this reason, Dewey, unlike most modern philosophers, gave pedagogy a central place in his philosophy. <u><mark>Dewey saw education as the</mark> </u>scientific<u> <mark>laboratory in which the ideas of pragmatism would be put to the test of experienc</mark>e</u>.279 To Dewey, <u>t<mark>he ability to engage in good deliberative judgment—to exercise clear foresight on ethical as well as instrumental matters—was a habit that could and should be cultivated through education</u>.</mark> Thus Dewey thought that education should not be a “succession of studies but the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience.”280 No relativist on matters concerning his own place and time, Dewey denounced the “inert stupid quality of current customs,” which “perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.”281 In lieu of teaching to new generations habits that represent such “enslavement to old ruts,”282 Dewey wanted to inculcate better habits—“flexible, sensitive” ones that could grow “more varied, more adaptable by practice and use.”283 These, in turn, were the habits Dewey identified as necessary for democracy to succeed. Here, the contrasts with Stanley Fish are stark. <u><mark>Fish</u></mark>, as we have seen, <u><mark>argues that teaching methods of critical analysis to students does not change practice outside the classroom</u></mark>.284 Practice in the world outside the classroom and the doing of theory proceed on two unrelated planes. <u><mark>Dewey</u></mark>, conversely, <u><mark>repudiated the separation of theory and practice as a false dualism</u>,</mark> arguing that those who espouse theory for theory’s sake are in fact espousing “two kinds of practice.”285 Moreover, he argued, <mark>“[t<u>]hose who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought”</mark> because <mark>this “dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile</mark> . . . instruments of execution.”286 Thus, for Dewey, <mark>theory was a form of practice in the world that had great potential to fuel political and social change</u>,</mark> and the decision to do and teach theory as a practice separate from political and social issues was a political decision with particular normative consequences—namely, the promotion of political disengagement and apathy.287</p>
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Carle
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
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Dartmouth KrMa
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Dartmouth
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Endorsing one state action doesn’t legitimize the state
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Frost 1996
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Mervyn Frost, U of Kent, 1996, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1
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A first objection is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state.
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objection that utilizing the state sanctifies the state and that it is not possible with such a language to consider alternatives is not well founded by having the language of i r I am not committed to argue that the state as it exists is the best mode of political organization proposals for reform of the state must be made in the language of the state
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A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.
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<h4>Endorsing one state action doesn’t legitimize the state</h4><p>Mervyn <u><strong>Frost</u></strong>, U of Kent, <u><strong>1996</u></strong>, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1</p><p><u>A first<mark> objection</u></mark> which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach <u>is <mark>that utilizing the </mark>modern <mark>state </mark>domain of discourse in effect <mark>sanctifies the state</mark>: it assumes that people will always live in states <mark>and that it is not possible</mark> <mark>with</mark>in <mark>such a language to consider alternatives</mark> to the system. This objection <mark>is not well founded</mark>, <mark>by having </mark>recourse to <mark>the </mark>ordinary <mark>language of i</mark>nternational<mark> r</mark>elations<mark> I am not</mark> thereby <mark>committed to argue that the state </mark>system <mark>as it exists is the best mode of </mark>human <mark>political organization</mark> or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever <mark>proposals for </mark>piecemeal or large-scale <mark>reform of the state </mark>system are made, they <mark>must</mark> of necessity <mark>be made in the language of the </mark>modern <mark>state</mark>.</u> Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.</p>
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State Link
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
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Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
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Dartmouth KrMa
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No ontological antagonism---conflict is inevitable in politics, but does not have to be demarcated around whiteness and oppression---the alt’s ontological fatalism recreates colonial violence
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Hudson 13
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Peter Hudson 13, Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg , South Africa, has been on the editorial board of the Africa Perspective: The South African Journal of Sociology and Theoria: A Journal of Political and Social Theory and Transformation, and is a member of the Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism, The state and the colonial unconscious, Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, 2013
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There always has to exist an outside to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction are contingent the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. the “curvature of intersubjective space” the modes of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it see Wilderson The social does not have to be divided into white and black the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary because they are signifiers. colonialism institutes an ontological division But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality rest. What gets lost is the specificity of colonialism its “ontological” differential. the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” of the colonised subject The colonised is the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment” where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism whiteness and blackness are sustained by determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial anti-“white” modes of struggle involve the “reactivation” of colonial objectivity itself symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, This is its real that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.” That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity
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exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of death is over-determined deciding exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never settled. modes of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson The social does not have to be divided into white and black they are signifiers colonialism institutes a division But this relation is ontic contingently constructed identities, rather than ultimate unfixity division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may be deeply sediment but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, on which all possible forms of sociality rest. What gets lost is specificity ontological” differential. non-identity is inscribed in “lived experience” whiteness and blackness are (sustained by contingent practices which can always be undone. anti-“white” – modes of struggle involve reactivation of colonial objectivity symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess it can’t totalise its real has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the system but is produced by it That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity
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Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-“white” – modes of struggle are not (just) “psychic” 6 but involve the “reactivation” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant “object” that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity.
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<h4>No ontological antagonism---conflict is inevitable in politics, but does not have to be demarcated around whiteness and oppression---the alt’s ontological fatalism recreates colonial violence </h4><p>Peter<strong> Hudson 13</strong>, Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg , South Africa, has been on the editorial board of the Africa Perspective: The South African Journal of Sociology and Theoria: A Journal of Political and Social Theory and Transformation, and is a member of the Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism, The state and the colonial unconscious, Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, 2013</p><p>Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. <u>There always has to exist an outside</u>, which is also inside, <u>to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule</u> (Badiou 2009, 220). <u>But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal</u> (may be considered “ontological”), <u>its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction</u> – <u>are contingent</u>. In other words, the meaning of<u> the signifier of <mark>exclusion is <strong>not determined</strong> once and for all:</u></mark> the place of <u><mark>the place of</mark> exclusion, of <mark>death is</mark> itself <mark>over-determined</mark>, i.e. the very framework for <mark>deciding</mark> the other and the same, <mark>exclusion and inclusion, is <strong>nowhere engraved in ontological stone</strong> but is political and never </mark>terminally <mark>settled.</u></mark> Put differently, <u>the “curvature of intersubjective space”</u> (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, <u>the</u> specific <u><mark>modes of</u></mark> the “othering” of <u><mark>“otherness”</u> <u>are nowhere decided in advance (as </mark>a certain<strong> </strong><mark>ontological fatalism might have it</u>) (<u>see <strong>Wilderson</u></strong></mark> 2008). <u><strong><mark>The social does not have to be divided into white and black</u></strong></mark>, and <u>the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary</u> – <u>because <mark>they are signifiers</mark>. </u>To be sure, <u><mark>colonialism institutes a</mark>n ontological <mark>division</u></mark>, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. <u><mark>But</u> <u>this</mark> ontological <mark>relation is</mark> really on the side of the <strong><mark>ontic</u></strong></mark> – that is, of <u>all <mark>contingently constructed identities, rather than</mark> the ontology of the social which refers to the <mark>ultimate unfixity</mark>, the indeterminacy or lack of the social.</u> In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – <u><mark>division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may</u></mark> <u>well <mark>be</mark> very <mark>deeply sediment</mark> in modernity</u> itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. <u>It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from</u> the very possibility of <u>order, <mark>but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance</u>,</mark> the <u>transcendental signified <strong><mark>on which all possible forms of sociality</mark> </u></strong>are said to<u><strong> <mark>rest</strong>.</u> <u>What gets lost</u></mark> here, then, <u><mark>is</mark> the <strong><mark>specificity</strong></mark> of colonialism</u>, of its constitutive axis, <u>its “<mark>ontological” differential.</mark> </u>A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, <u>the symbolic and the imaginary give way because <mark>non-identity</u></mark> (the real of the social) <u><mark>is</mark> immediately <mark>inscribed in </mark>the <mark>“lived experience”</u></mark> (vécu) <u>of the colonised subject</u>. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. <u>The colonised is</u>, in other words, <u>the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work</u>, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “<u>Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”</u>5 – he is <u>where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism</u>. Be this as it may, <u><mark>whiteness and blackness are</u> (<u>sustained by</u></mark>) <u>determinate and <strong><mark>contingent practices</strong></mark> of signification; the “structuring relation”</u> of colonialism thus itself <u>comprises a knot of significations <mark>which</mark>, no matter how tight, <mark>can always be undone.</u></mark> <u><strong>Anti-colonial</u></strong> – i.e., <u><mark>anti-“white”</u> – <u>modes of struggle</mark> </u>are not (just) “psychic” 6 but <u><mark>involve</mark> the “<strong><mark>reactivation</strong></mark>”</u> (or “de-sedimentation”)7 <u><strong><mark>of colonial objectivity</strong></mark> itself</u>. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All <u><mark>symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess</mark> over itself, something <mark>it can’t totalise</mark> or make sense of,</u> where its production of meaning falters. <u>This is</u> its internal limit point, <u><mark>its real</u></mark>:9 an errant “object” <u>that <mark>has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the</mark> categories of the <mark>system but is produced by it</mark> – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”</u>10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 <u><mark>That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity</u></mark>.</p>
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Hudson
| 16,688 | 444 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
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Ndt
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6
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Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
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Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
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Kr.....
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,514 |
Without the state, public goods disappear and the population suffers
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Rotberg 2
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Rotberg 2 ROBERT I. ROTBERG, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 127-140 Failed States in a World of Terror JSTOR
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STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of peace and order.
In contrast, failed states generally share the following characteristics a rise in criminal and political violence rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita and basic food shortages, leading to starvation
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STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods high levels of security from violence political freedom and civil liberties peace and order
failed states characteristics rise in violence rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities use of terror insufficient infrastructure collapsed health system
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STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to standard indicators such as per capita GDP, the UN'S Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World report. Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of peace and order.
In contrast, failed states are tense, conflicted, and dangerous. They generally share the following characteristics: a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation. Failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves, key interest groups show less and less loyalty to the state. The people's sense of political community vanishes and citizens feel disenfranchised and marginalized. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in. The rise of terrorist groups becomes more likely.
| 1,904 |
<h4>Without the state, public goods disappear and the population suffers</h4><p><strong>Rotberg 2<u></strong> ROBERT I. ROTBERG, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 127-140 Failed States in a World of Terror JSTOR</p><p><mark>STRONG STATES control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods</mark> </u>to their citizens. They perform well according to standard indicators such as per capita GDP, the UN'S Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World report. <u>Strong states offer <mark>high levels of security from</mark> political and criminal <mark>violence</mark>, ensure <mark>political freedom and civil liberties</mark>, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of <mark>peace and order</mark>. </p><p>In contrast, <mark>failed states</u></mark> are tense, conflicted, and dangerous. They <u>generally share the following <mark>characteristics</u></mark>: <u>a <mark>rise</mark> <mark>in</mark> criminal and political <mark>violence</u></mark>; a loss of control over their borders; <u><mark>rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities</u></mark>; civil war; <u>the <mark>use of terror</mark> against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or <mark>insufficient</mark> <mark>infrastructure</mark>; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion</u>; high levels of corruption; <u>a <mark>collapsed health system</mark>; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita</u>; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; <u>and basic food shortages, leading to starvation</u>. Failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves, key interest groups show less and less loyalty to the state. The people's sense of political community vanishes and citizens feel disenfranchised and marginalized. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in. The rise of terrorist groups becomes more likely.</p>
| null |
Case
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Public Goods/AT Commons
| 195,091 | 3 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
|
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,515 |
Scientific knowledge is good because it subjects itself to constant refinement based on empirical evidence
|
Hutcheon 93
|
Hutcheon 93—former prof of sociology of education at U Regina and U British Columbia. Former research advisor to the Health Promotion Branch of the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare and as a director of the Vanier Institute of the Family. Phd in sociology, began at Yale and finished at U Queensland. (Pat, A Critique of "Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA", http://www.humanists.net/pdhutcheon/humanist%20articles/lewontn.htm)
|
the popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology comments imply that scientific research could be no more reliable than any other set of opinions. in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do distinguish it from other types of belief formation if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations can be publicly and rigorously tested it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which survived attempts to falsify them These explanations become predictors of future events they lead to further conjectures which must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting science, unlike ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart. A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable to empirical test It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge The conditions established by science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". the theory that wins out does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology The survival of a scientific theory is due to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience while withstanding attempts to refute it and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings attributed to scientists Because ideologies do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected as circumstances change. science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude Science does not aim for "true" theories purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology The tests of science are workability and falsifiability and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific theory is continuously revised and refined An ideology would fail under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time it is this difference that confuses ideological thinkers compelled to attack its success as a scientific theory For them, and the world of desired certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.
|
all science is ideology no more reliable than other opinions to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that distinguish it from other types of belief formation so that cause-and-effect relations can be publicly tested empirical regularities survived attempts to falsify them. These explanations must survive repeated attempts to prove them wanting science has a self-correcting mechanism at its heart. A conjecture must be open to refutation It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the scientist that ensures reliability The conditions is one of defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". The survival of a scientific theory is due to its power to explain and predict observable regularities while withstanding attempts to refute it -- and proving open to elaboration In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective this has little relationship to an absolute objective "truth" apart from human strivings ideologies are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected Science does not aim to reflect the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology.
|
The introductory lecture in this series articulated the increasingly popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his comments seemed to imply that the enterprise of scientific research and knowledge building could therefore be no different and no more reliable as a guide to action than any other set of opinions. The trouble is that, in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do in fact distinguish it from other types and sources of belief formation. Indeed, if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the wisdom and objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change. What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments! Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest and most precise language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations among the parts of the system under study can be publicly and rigorously tested. And it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which have survived all attempts to falsify them. These explanations, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, become predictors of future events. In other words, they lead to further conjectures of additional relationships which, in their turn, must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research. This means that science, unlike mythology and ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart. A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable to empirical test. It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge. The conditions established by the community of science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". Under these conditions the theory that wins out, and subsequently prevails, does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology. The survival of a scientific theory such as Darwin's is due, instead, to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience, while withstanding worldwide attempts to refute it -- and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process. In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings that Lewontin has attributed to scientists. Because ideologies, on the other hand, do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected as circumstances change. Legitimate science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude. Science does not aim for "true" theories purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology. The tests of science, therefore, are in terms of workability and falsifiability, and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific theory is one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is continuously elaborated, revised and refined, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. An ideology, on the other hand, would be considered to have failed under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time. More than anything, it is this difference that confuses those ideological thinkers who are compelled to attack Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of its success as a scientific theory. For them, and the world of desired and imagined certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.
| 6,251 |
<h4>Scientific knowledge is good because it subjects itself to constant <u>refinement</u> based on empirical evidence </h4><p><strong>Hutcheon</strong> <strong>93<u></strong>—former prof of sociology of education at U Regina and U British Columbia. Former research advisor to the Health Promotion Branch of the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare and as a director of the Vanier Institute of the Family. Phd in sociology, began at Yale and finished at U Queensland. (Pat, A Critique of "Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA", http://www.humanists.net/pdhutcheon/humanist%20articles/lewontn.htm)</p><p></u>The introductory lecture in this series articulated <u>the</u> increasingly <u>popular "postmodernist" claim that <mark>all science is</mark> <mark>ideology</u></mark>. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his <u>comments</u> seemed to <u>imply that</u> the enterprise of <u>scientific research</u> and knowledge building <u>could</u> therefore <u>be</u> no different and <u><mark>no more reliable</u></mark> as a guide to action <u><mark>than</mark> any <mark>other</mark> set of <mark>opinions</mark>.</u> The trouble is that, <u><strong>in order <mark>to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those</mark> <mark>aspects of the scientific endeavor that</mark> do</u></strong> in fact <u><strong><mark>distinguish it from other</u></strong> <u><strong>types</u></strong></mark> and sources <u><strong><mark>of belief formation</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u>if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the</u> wisdom and <u>objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble</u>. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change. What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments! <u>Science has to do with the <strong>search for regularities</strong> in what humans experience of their physical and social environments</u>, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. <u>It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest </u>and most precise<u> language possible, <mark>so that cause-and-effect relations</mark> </u>among the parts of the system under study<u> <mark>can be <strong>publicly</mark> and rigorously <mark>tested</u></strong></mark>. And <u>it has to do with devising explanations of those <mark>empirical regularities </mark>which </u>have<u> <mark>survived</mark> </u>all<u> <mark>attempts to falsify them</u>. <u>These</mark> <mark>explanations</u></mark>, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, <u>become <strong>predictors of future events</u></strong>. In other words, <u>they lead to further</u> <u>conjectures</u> of additional relationships <u>which</u>, in their turn, <u><strong><mark>must survive repeated</mark> public <mark>attempts to prove them wanting</u></strong></mark> -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research. This means that <u><strong><mark>science</mark>, unlike</u></strong> mythology and <u><strong>ideology, <mark>has a self-correcting mechanism at its</mark> very <mark>heart.</u></strong> <u>A conjecture</mark>, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable</u> <u>to empirical test</u>. <u><strong>It <mark>must</mark>, above all, <mark>be open to refutation </mark>by experience</u></strong>. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. <u><mark>It is this <strong>process</strong></mark> <mark>-- not the lack of prejudice of the </mark>particular <mark>scientist</u></mark>, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- <u><mark>that ensures</mark> the <mark>reliability</mark> of scientific knowledge</u>. <u><mark>The conditions</mark> established by</u> the community of <u>science <mark>is one</mark> <mark>of</mark> precisely</u> <u><mark>defined and regulated "intersubjectivity".</u></mark> Under these conditions <u>the theory that wins out</u>, and subsequently prevails, <u>does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology</u>. <u><strong><mark>The survival of a scientific theory</u></strong></mark> such as Darwin's <u><strong><mark>is due</u></strong></mark>, instead, <u><strong><mark>to its power to explain</mark> <mark>and predict</mark> <mark>observable regularities</mark> in human experience</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>while withstanding</u></strong></mark> worldwide <u><strong><mark>attempts to refute it</u></strong> -- <u><strong>and proving </mark>itself <mark>open to elaboration</mark> and expansion in the process</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective</mark> and universal. All <mark>this has little relationship to </mark>the claim of <mark>an absolute </mark>universality of <mark>objective "truth"</mark> <mark>apart from human strivings</mark> </u></strong>that Lewontin has<u><strong> attributed to scientists</u></strong>. <u>Because <mark>ideologies</u></mark>, on the other hand, <u>do claim to represent truth<strong>, they <mark>are incapable of</u></strong> <u><strong>generating a means by which they can be corrected</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>as circumstances change.</u></strong> Legitimate <u>science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude</u>. <u><strong><mark>Science does not aim </mark>for "true" theories</u></strong> <u><strong>purporting <mark>to reflect</mark> an accurate picture of <mark>the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology</u></strong>.</mark> <u>The tests of science</u>, therefore, <u>are</u> in terms of <u>workability and falsifiability</u>, <u>and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature.</u> <u><strong>A successful scientific theory is</u></strong> one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is <u><strong>continuously</u></strong> elaborated, <u><strong>revised and refined</u></strong>, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. <u>An ideology</u>, on the other hand, <u>would</u> be considered to have <u>fail</u>ed <u>under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time</u>. More than anything, <u>it is this difference that confuses </u>those<u> ideological thinkers</u> who are <u>compelled to attack</u> Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of <u>its success as a scientific theory</u>. <u>For them, and the world of desired</u> and imagined <u>certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable</u> <u>-- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.</p></u>
| null |
Case
|
Science
| 36,304 | 49 | 17,079 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| 565,300 |
A
|
Ndt
|
6
|
Kansas State Ramirez-Pena
|
Bankey, Feldman, Poapst
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round6.docx
| null | 48,459 |
KrMa
|
Dartmouth KrMa
| null |
Da.....
|
Kr.....
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Jo.....
|
Ma.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,516 |
Artificial organs won't solve anytime soon
|
Clark 13
|
Clark 13 Marcia Clark, attorney and former LA prosecutor (OJ), and William Travis Clark, graduate student in International and Development Economics who has worked for the international Regulatory Reform firm Jacobs, Cordova, & Associates in Washington D.C. 6/13/2013 Forbes Selling Your Organs: Should it be Legal? Do You Own Yourself? http://www.forbes.com/sites/marciaclark/2013/06/13/selling-your-organs-should-it-be-legal-do-you-own-yourself/
|
There is hope that scientific advances may eventually allow us to “grow” organs in the laboratory. . But that day is long in the future. In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor waiting lists will continue to rise.
|
advances may allow us to “grow” that day is long in the future In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor lists will rise.
|
There is hope that scientific advances may eventually allow us to “grow” organs in the laboratory. When that day arrives, none of the above questions will matter. But that day is long in the future. In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor waiting lists will continue to rise.
| 288 |
<h4>Artificial organs won't solve anytime soon</h4><p><strong>Clark 13</strong> Marcia Clark, attorney and former LA prosecutor (OJ), and William Travis Clark, graduate student in International and Development Economics who has worked for the international Regulatory Reform firm Jacobs, Cordova, & Associates in Washington D.C. 6/13/2013 Forbes Selling Your Organs: Should it be Legal? Do You Own Yourself? <u>http://www.forbes.com/sites/marciaclark/2013/06/13/selling-your-organs-should-it-be-legal-do-you-own-yourself/</p><p>There is hope that scientific <mark>advances</mark> <mark>may</mark> eventually <mark>allow us to “grow”</mark> organs in the laboratory. </u>When that day arrives, none of the above questions will matter<u>. But <mark>that day is long in the future</mark>. <mark>In the meantime, the death rate of patients on donor</mark> waiting <mark>lists will </mark>continue to <mark>rise.</p></u></mark>
|
ADV 1
| null | null | 430,722 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,517 |
Artificial organs will be too expensive to stop illegal sales
|
O'Sullivan 11
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O'Sullivan 11 Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html
|
The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards
the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the artificial growth of organs in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that this is still a science in its early stages It is likely that this will not become as widespread as transplantation for at least a decade ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate government funding to the development of embryonic technology
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The impact organ growing” has on the illegal trade will be determined by cost
artificial growth of organs is still a science in its early stages, this will not become widespread ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is offered organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process many consider unethical. for this reason science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate funding
|
The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems.
Artificial organs are years away and stalled by ethical issues O'Sullivan 11 Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html
As the demand for organs rises, and waiting list times stretch out by years, it seems logical that the illegal organ trade will grow. A significant improvement in the lifestyles of first world countries and new cures for organ-destroying disease may reduce the demand for organs. However, the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the artificial growth of organs in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that while this is still a science in its early stages, these organs would be a healthy clone of the organ in need of replacing and would contain the patient’s DNA, thus reducing the risk of rejection. It is likely that this will not become as widespread as transplantation for at least a decade; ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate government funding to the development of embryonic technology. In the face of a possible solution to the exploitative organ trade, is it morally better to allow the destruction of embryos or to allow the organ trade, which harms donors and recipients, to continue? These are questions which those in government and medical technology sectors must address
| 2,689 |
<h4>Artificial organs will be too expensive to stop illegal sales</h4><p><strong>O'Sullivan 11</strong> Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html</p><p><u><mark>The impact</mark> that this “<mark>organ growing” has on the illegal</mark> organ <mark>trade will </mark>undoubtedly <mark>be</mark> <mark>determined by</mark> the <mark>cost</mark> to the party in need of an organ;</u> it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, <u>if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards</u><strong> to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems. </p><p>Artificial organs are years away and stalled by ethical issues O'Sullivan 11</strong> Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html</p><p>As the demand for organs rises, and waiting list times stretch out by years, it seems logical that the illegal organ trade will grow. A significant improvement in the lifestyles of first world countries and new cures for organ-destroying disease may reduce the demand for organs. However, <u>the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the <mark>artificial growth of organs</mark> in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that </u>while <u>this <mark>is still a science in its early stages</u>,</mark> these organs would be a healthy clone of the organ in need of replacing and would contain the patient’s DNA, thus reducing the risk of rejection. <u>It is likely that <mark>this will not become</mark> as <mark>widespread</mark> as transplantation for at least a decade</u>; <u><mark>ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed</mark> <mark>before such a treatment</mark> <mark>is</mark> perfected and <mark>offered</mark> to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these <mark>organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process </mark>which <mark>many consider unethical. </mark>It is <mark>for this reason </mark>that this <mark>science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate </mark>government <mark>funding</mark> to the development of embryonic technology</u>. In the face of a possible solution to the exploitative organ trade, is it morally better to allow the destruction of embryos or to allow the organ trade, which harms donors and recipients, to continue? These are questions which those in government and medical technology sectors must address</p>
|
ADV 1
| null | null | 430,448 | 7 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,518 |
Many more are in need than on the waiting lists -- this means that donation publicity efforts won't be able to reduce the official list
|
Satel 12
|
Satel 12 Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up
|
a “shadow list” of ill people is waiting in the wings. These are patients on dialysis who could benefit from transplantation, but whose doctors have never referred them for the surgery. Schold, an epidemiologist , estimates this pool to number from 80,000 to 130,000 people.
Thus, the true waiting list may be double its current size. And with enhanced public awareness of efforts to generate more donations, people who are not currently listed might now come forward.
In other words, paradoxically, more awareness will bring new donors but also greater demand
| null |
But a “shadow list” of ill people is waiting in the wings. These are patients on dialysis who could benefit from transplantation, but whose doctors have never referred them for the surgery. Jesse Schold, an epidemiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, estimates this pool to number from 80,000 to 130,000 people.
Thus, the true waiting list may be double its current size. And with enhanced public awareness of efforts to generate more donations, people who are not currently listed (perhaps their physician never enrolled them; perhaps they thought their chance for a transplant was too slim to bother) might now come forward. Their family and friends may now be more likely to urge them to do so.
In other words, paradoxically, more awareness will bring new donors but also greater demand. The supply of organs from the deceased will not be able to keep up
More living donors are needed, as well
| 892 |
<h4>Many more are in need than on the waiting lists -- this means that donation publicity efforts won't be able to reduce the official list</h4><p><strong>Satel 12</strong> Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute</p><p>4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up <u>http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up</p><p></u>But <u>a “shadow list” of ill people is waiting in the wings. These are patients on dialysis who could benefit from transplantation, but whose doctors have never referred them for the surgery. </u>Jesse <u>Schold, an epidemiologist </u>at the Cleveland Clinic<u>, estimates this pool to number from 80,000 to 130,000 people.</p><p>Thus, the true waiting list may be double its current size. And with enhanced public awareness of efforts to generate more donations, people who are not currently listed </u>(perhaps their physician never enrolled them; perhaps they thought their chance for a transplant was too slim to bother) <u>might now come forward.</u> Their family and friends may now be more likely to urge them to do so.</p><p><u>In other words, paradoxically, more awareness will bring new donors but also greater demand</u>. The supply of organs from the deceased will not be able to keep up</p><p>More living donors are needed, as well</p>
|
ADV 1
| null | null | 430,723 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,519 |
The availability of organs for transplant has never been sufficient—so the waitlist grows larger
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
As technology and trained transplant teams have become more widely available
the limiting factor for increasing transplants has been the
chronic shortage of organs for transplantation, as the supply of organs has never met the
demand in the U S
were waiting for heart transplants in Houston, Texas hospitals alone, with
The number of patients waiting for
transplants in the United States has dramatically increased in the past two decades as the
number of Americans with organ failure has increased
were waiting;26 by 2000 that number rose to 70,000;27 the 100,000 mark was
as of May 15, 2014, there were 122,628 individuals
waiting
| null |
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
As technology and trained transplant teams have become more widely available
across the United States, the limiting factor for increasing transplants has been the
chronic shortage of organs for transplantation, as the supply of organs has never met the
demand in the United States.24 Less than a year after the first heart transplant, thirty-five
individuals were waiting for heart transplants in Houston, Texas hospitals alone, with
dozens more waiting in hospitals across the country.25 The number of patients waiting for
transplants in the United States has dramatically increased in the past two decades as the
number of Americans with organ failure has increased: in 1990 an estimated 19,000
patients were waiting;26 by 2000 that number rose to 70,000;27 the 100,000 mark was
reached in October of 2008;28 and as of May 15, 2014, there were 122,628 individuals
waiting.29
| 932 |
<h4>The availability of organs for transplant has never been sufficient—so the waitlist grows larger</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>As technology and trained transplant teams have become more widely available</p><p></u>across the United States, <u>the limiting factor for increasing transplants has been the</p><p>chronic shortage of organs for transplantation, as the supply of organs has never met the</p><p>demand in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.24 Less than a year after the first heart transplant, thirty-five</p><p>individuals<u> were waiting for heart transplants in Houston, Texas hospitals alone, with</p><p></u>dozens more waiting in hospitals across the country.25 <u>The number of patients waiting for</p><p>transplants in the United States has dramatically increased in the past two decades as the</p><p>number of Americans with organ failure has increased</u>: in 1990 an estimated 19,000</p><p>patients<u> were waiting;26 by 2000 that number rose to 70,000;27 the 100,000 mark was</p><p></u>reached in October of 2008;28 and <u>as of May 15, 2014, there were 122,628 individuals</p><p>waiting</u>.29</p>
|
ADV 1
| null | null | 430,724 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,520 |
Reliance on altruism fails
|
Schwark 11
|
Schwark 11 DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis
|
The U S system of altruistic, voluntary donation has failed to increase organ supplies and has contributed to the burgeoning black market organ trade.
|
The U S system of altruistic, voluntary donation has failed to increase organ supplies and has contributed to the burgeoning black market
|
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The United States system of altruistic, voluntary donation has failed to increase organ supplies and has contributed to the burgeoning black market organ trade. n120 Proposals to increase organ donation include organ markets, n121 routine request, n122 presumed consent n123 and organ drafts. n124 There have been many proposed reforms, but this Note argues that the best way to ensure adequate organ supply is a compensated, but mandatory, organ draft. n125
| 488 |
<h4>Reliance on altruism fails</h4><p><strong>Schwark 11</strong> DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis</p><p>III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS</p><p><u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>system of altruistic, voluntary donation has failed to increase organ supplies</mark> <mark>and has contributed to the burgeoning black market</mark> organ trade. </u> n120 Proposals to increase organ donation include organ markets, n121 routine request, n122 presumed consent n123 and organ drafts. n124 There have been many proposed reforms, but this Note argues that the best way to ensure adequate organ supply is a compensated, but mandatory, organ draft. n125</p>
|
ADV 2
| null | null | 430,725 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,521 |
Crowd out would not be a net reduction
|
Erin and Harris 94
|
Erin and Harris 94 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson
|
policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield
|
policies could include offering prospective payments for organs It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian groundsf nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield
|
Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such policies could include offering prospective payments for organs retrieved post mortem, Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian or altruistic groundsf but nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an overall increase in organ yield (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).
| 1,276 |
<h4>Crowd out would not be a net reduction</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 94</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson </p><p>Arguing for commerce in the context of organs obtained from cadavers is less morally problematic than in the case of the living. For a start, a cadaver cannot be argued, reasonably, to be a person and thus considerations of personal autonomy do not enter the picture: to talk of the autonomy of the dead is absurd. Each year several thousands of persons die prematurely from the lack of donated organs. Certain organs, hearts for example, can only be obtained from cadavers? Whilst this shortfall of cadaver organs for transplantation persists it seems morally insupportable to ignore policies which would likely save lives unless they are counterbalanced by arguments of comparable moral force. Such <u><mark>policies could include offering prospective payments for organs</mark> retrieved post mortem,</u> Such prospective payments, whether in money or present medical care, are currently offered in some American states in return for the delivery of one’s body at death (Munzer 1990 p. 52). <u><mark>It has been argued that this would lead to a fall in the numbers of organs donated on purely humanitarian</mark> or altruistic <mark>groundsf</mark> but <mark>nevertheless it seems probable that the introduction of such a commercial interest would lead to an <strong>overall increase</strong> in organ yield</u></mark> (Brams 1977; Buc and Bernstein 1984).</p>
|
ADV 2
| null | null | 430,451 | 5 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,522 |
Other sales empirically deny crowd out
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating . Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation
|
allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating Currently the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but donations of these tissues take place without compensation In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation
|
It should also be noted that allowing the sale of organs would not preclude someone from donating without compensation. n156 Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation. n157 In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation by providing donors with more power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by middlemen.
| 550 |
<h4>Other sales empirically deny crowd out</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>It should also be noted that<u> <mark>allowing the sale of</mark> <mark>organs would not preclude someone from donating</mark> </u>without compensation<u>.</u> n156 <u><mark>Currently</mark>, <mark>the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but</mark> many of the <mark>donations of these tissues take place without compensation</u></mark>. n157 <u><mark>In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the value of an uncompensated donation</mark> </u>by providing donors with more power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by middlemen.</p>
|
ADV 2
| null | null | 430,620 | 4 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,523 |
There are so few donations that reducing them won't hurt
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
a number of reasons for being sceptical about the suggestion that kidney sale would undermine the practice of free donation.
The most important of these is that, at least as far as living donation is concerned, there is not a very large practice out there to be undermined. So, even if some altruistic donations are lost as a result of sale being permitted, given the limited scale of altruistic living donation, this may be a worthwhile trade-off
|
a number of reasons for being sceptical about the suggestion that kidney sale would undermine the practice of free donation.
as living donation is concerned, there is not a very large practice out there to be undermined even if some altruistic donations are lost as a result of sale being permitted, given the limited scale of altruistic living donation, this may be a worthwhile trade-off
|
But is it really true that kidney sale would undermine the practice of free donation? Well, it could do and ultimately this is a contested empirical matter about which, as a mere philosopher, one ought not to claim to have an authoritative view. That said, it is worth tentatively noted a number of reasons for being sceptical about the suggestion that kidney sale would undermine the practice of free donation.
The most important of these is that, at least as far as living donation is concerned, there is not a very large practice out there to be undermined. Given the pain, risk, and inconvenience involved, free donation (except by relatives to one another) is likely to remain a minority pursuit. Having said that, living donation is on the rise and a paper in Kidney International reports that in 2006, 27,000 related and unrelated legal living donor kidney transplants were performed worldwide, “representing 39% of all kidney transplants”. The same paper reports that “the number of living kidney donor transplants grew over the last decade, with 62% of countries reporting at least a 50% increase” (Salimah 2009). However, given the figures cited earlier about the scale of unmet need and waiting lists, even these advances seem unlikely to deliver the number of organs required in the foreseeable future. So, even if some altruistic donations are lost as a result of sale being permitted, given the limited scale of altruistic living donation, this may be a worthwhile trade-off. Furthermore, as was noted above, there is nothing to stop a living donor being paid and giving the money away altruistically, thus increasing the extent of her ‘gifting’.
| 1,660 |
<h4>There are so few donations that reducing them won't hurt </h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u>But is it really true that kidney sale would undermine the practice of free donation? Well, it could do and ultimately this is a contested empirical matter about which, as a mere philosopher, one ought not to claim to have an authoritative view. That said, it is worth tentatively noted <u><mark>a number of reasons for being sceptical about the suggestion that kidney sale would undermine the practice of free donation.</p><p></mark>The most important of these is that, at least as far <mark>as living donation is concerned, there is not a very large practice out there to be undermined</mark>.</u> Given the pain, risk, and inconvenience involved, free donation (except by relatives to one another) is likely to remain a minority pursuit. Having said that, living donation is on the rise and a paper in Kidney International reports that in 2006, 27,000 related and unrelated legal living donor kidney transplants were performed worldwide, “representing 39% of all kidney transplants”. The same paper reports that “the number of living kidney donor transplants grew over the last decade, with 62% of countries reporting at least a 50% increase” (Salimah 2009). However, given the figures cited earlier about the scale of unmet need and waiting lists, even these advances seem unlikely to deliver the number of organs required in the foreseeable future. <u>So, <mark>even if some altruistic donations are lost as a result of sale being permitted, given the limited scale of altruistic living donation, this may be a worthwhile trade-off</u></mark>. Furthermore, as was noted above, there is nothing to stop a living donor being paid and giving the money away altruistically, thus increasing the extent of her ‘gifting’.</p>
|
ADV 2
| null | null | 430,726 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,524 |
Sales not hurt altruism
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
Would organ sale displace or reduce altruism?
… if to a voluntary blood donor system we add the possibility of selling blood, we have only expanded the individual's range of alternatives. If he derives satisfaction from giving … he can still give, and nothing has been done to impair that right
there is a puzzle about why permitting payment for blood or organs should be thought to reduce the amount of altruism in the world. For why couldn't paid and unpaid donation systems peacefully coexist, with people who want to give freely continuing to do so? Furthermore, paid donations may even add to the amount of altruism in the world. For there can be cases in which a person sells an organ not for ‘selfish’ reasons, but in order to pay for someone else's medical care
|
4.2 Would organ sale displace altruism?
… if to a voluntary donor system we add the possibility of selling we have only expanded the individual's range of alternatives If he derives satisfaction from giving … he can still give, and nothing has been done to impair that right (
there is a puzzle about why permitting payment should be thought to reduce the amount of altruism in the world. For why couldn't paid and unpaid donation systems peacefully coexist, with people who want to give freely continuing to do so? paid donations may even add to the amount of altruism in the world. For there can be cases in which a person sells an organ not for ‘selfish’ reasons, but in order to pay for someone else's medical care (
|
4.2 Would organ sale displace or reduce altruism?
… if to a voluntary blood donor system we add the possibility of selling blood, we have only expanded the individual's range of alternatives. If he derives satisfaction from giving … he can still give, and nothing has been done to impair that right (Arrow 1972, 350).
As the quotation from Arrow (above) suggests, there is a puzzle about why permitting payment for blood or organs should be thought to reduce the amount of altruism in the world. For why couldn't paid and unpaid donation systems peacefully coexist, with people who want to give freely continuing to do so? Furthermore, paid donations may even add to the amount of altruism in the world. For there can be cases in which a person sells an organ not for ‘selfish’ reasons, but in order to pay (for example) for someone else's medical care (Brecher 1994).
| 868 |
<h4>Sales not hurt altruism</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u><mark>4.2 <u>Would organ sale displace </mark>or reduce <mark>altruism?</p><p></mark> <mark>… if to a voluntary</mark> blood <mark>donor system we add the possibility of selling</mark> blood, <mark>we have only expanded the individual's range of alternatives</mark>. <mark>If he derives satisfaction from giving … he can still give, and nothing has been done to impair that right </u>(</mark>Arrow 1972, 350).</p><p>As the quotation from Arrow (above) suggests, <u><mark>there is a puzzle about why permitting payment</mark> for blood or organs <mark>should be thought to reduce the amount of altruism in the world. For why couldn't paid and unpaid donation systems peacefully coexist, with people who want to give freely continuing to do so?</mark> Furthermore, <mark>paid donations may even add to the amount of altruism in the world. For there can be cases in which a person sells an organ not for ‘selfish’ reasons, but in order to pay</u></mark> (for example) <u><mark>for someone else's medical care</u> (</mark>Brecher 1994).</p>
|
ADV 2
| null | null | 430,727 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,525 |
Bioprinting is only in very basic phases and FDA will hold up
|
Gilpin 14
|
Gilpin 14 Lyndsey, staff writer, Tech Republic; “New 3D bioprinter to reproduce human organs, change the face of healthcare: The inside story” Tech Republic; August 1, 2014; http://www.techrepublic.com/article/new-3d-bioprinter-to-reproduce-human-organs/
|
FDA regulations will certainly hold up the process It can take and ten years to get something approved by the FDA. "It's an interesting conversation because the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities, and if it's from the own patient, that's one thing. But if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors, well now we've got a different ball game." To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells -- but most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible. Much of the research is stop-and-go. Big breakthroughs come every once in a while,
|
FDA regulations will hold up the process It can take ten years to get something approved by the FDA the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors now we've got a different ball game." To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible. Much of the research is stop-and-go breakthroughs come every once in a while
|
FDA regulations will certainly hold up the process, though it's unclear for how long. Once the research phase is complete, the cells will have to be tested on animals, which is why Hoying and Williams are making the prototypes as small as possible. It can take anywhere between two and ten years to get something approved by the FDA. What may work in favor of Advanced Solutions and the researchers at the University of Louisville, however, is that this is all new territory for the FDA, and the bioprinting landscape is advancing faster than anyone can keep up with. bio9.jpg A plastic 3D printed heart in Advanced Solutions office. Image: Lyndsey Gilpin/TechRepublic "It's an interesting conversation because the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells," Hoying said. "They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities, and if it's from the own patient, that's one thing. But if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors, well now we've got a different ball game." Currently, there are no distinct regulations for bioprinting, so researchers at academic institutions, research laboratories, and private companies like Advanced Solutions and Organovo -- which is testing pharmaceuticals and tissue assembly -- are experimenting with bioprinting until they are told otherwise. "It's a little wild west," he said. "It's a big step forward in the capability and technology of bioprinting." Dr. Jay Hoying, CII To speed up the process, Williams is working closely with the FDA to define the boundaries of cell therapy and tissue packaging, because there will have to be different rules for different kinds of tissue replacement procedures. To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells -- but most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible. Much of the research is stop-and-go. Big breakthroughs come every once in a while, and then the team will work for weeks or months on the same issue. They must make sure the cells are working in concert and the science is advancing efficiently. BAB will give them more freedom to do so, but they will still take it day by day, Hoying said.
| 2,294 |
<h4>Bioprinting is only in very basic phases and FDA will hold up</h4><p><strong>Gilpin 14 </strong>Lyndsey, staff writer, Tech Republic; “New 3D bioprinter to reproduce human organs, change the face of healthcare: The inside story” Tech Republic; August 1, 2014; http://www.techrepublic.com/article/new-3d-bioprinter-to-reproduce-human-organs/</p><p><u><mark>FDA regulations will</mark> certainly <mark>hold up the process</u></mark>, though it's unclear for how long. Once the research phase is complete, the cells will have to be tested on animals, which is why Hoying and Williams are making the prototypes as small as possible. <u><mark>It can take</mark> </u>anywhere between two <u>and <mark>ten years to get something approved by the FDA</mark>. </u>What may work in favor of Advanced Solutions and the researchers at the University of Louisville, however, is that this is all new territory for the FDA, and the bioprinting landscape is advancing faster than anyone can keep up with. bio9.jpg A plastic 3D printed heart in Advanced Solutions office. Image: Lyndsey Gilpin/TechRepublic <u>"It's an interesting conversation because <mark>the FDA doesn't really know what to do with cells</u></mark>," Hoying said. "<u><mark>They know devices, but they don't know what a cell is because a cell makes multiple drugs, does multiple activities</mark>, and if it's from the own patient, that's one thing. But <mark>if it's made, harvested and expanded from say, 100 different donors</mark>, well <mark>now</mark> <mark>we've got a different ball game."</mark> </u>Currently, there are no distinct regulations for bioprinting, so researchers at academic institutions, research laboratories, and private companies like Advanced Solutions and Organovo -- which is testing pharmaceuticals and tissue assembly -- are experimenting with bioprinting until they are told otherwise. "It's a little wild west," he said. "It's a big step forward in the capability and technology of bioprinting." Dr. Jay Hoying, CII To speed up the process, Williams is working closely with the FDA to define the boundaries of cell therapy and tissue packaging, because there will have to be different rules for different kinds of tissue replacement procedures. <u><mark>To even reach that point, the researchers still have to overcome the primary obstacles: printing, creating, and testing the cells</u></mark> <u>-- but <mark>most importantly, figuring out the basic biology that will allow this to be possible.</mark> <mark>Much of the research is stop-and-go</mark>. Big <mark>breakthroughs come every once in a while</mark>,</u> and then the team will work for weeks or months on the same issue. They must make sure the cells are working in concert and the science is advancing efficiently. BAB will give them more freedom to do so, but they will still take it day by day, Hoying said.</p>
|
ADV 2
| null | null | 430,728 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,526 |
Publicity / education will not solve shortage
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
procurement organizations have launched substantial promotional campaigns. to both educate the general public and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Recent empirical evidence suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
procurement organizations have launched promotional campaigns empirical evidence suggests further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount.
| 850 |
<h4>Publicity / education will not solve shortage</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p><u><mark>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p></u></mark>■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ <u><mark>procurement</mark> <mark>organizations</u></mark> (opos) created under the 1984 Act <u><mark>have launched</mark> substantial <mark>promotional</mark> <mark>campaigns</mark>. </u>The campaigns have been designed<u> to both educate the general public </u>about the desperate need for donated organs<u> and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors.</u> Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. <u>Recent <mark>empirical evidence</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount.</p></u></mark>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,730 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,527 |
mandated choice has not been proven sucessful
|
Delmonico 2
|
Delmonico 2 FRANCIS L. DELMONICO, M.D. Massachusetts General HospitaL, N Engl J Med, Vol. 346, No. 25 June 20, 2002 www.nejm.org The New England Journal of Medicine ETHICAL INCENTIVES — NOT PAYMENT — FOR ORGAN DONATION http://www.hods.org/pdf/Ethical%20Incentive.pdf
|
Proposals to increase the current supply of cadaveric organ donation have included a policy of presumed consent, and mandated choice, Neither proposal has been tested or demonstrated to be effective in the U S professionals and are unlikely to win widespread support.
| null |
Proposals to increase the current supply of cadaveric organ donation have included a policy of presumed consent, which would allow health professionals to override family members’ objections to donation after a patient’s death unless the patient had formally indicated a preference not to donate organs,5-8 and mandated choice, which would require all citizens to register their preference with regard to organ donation. 9,10 Neither proposal has been tested or demonstrated to be effective in the United States. Such strategies run counter to the expectation of autonomy on the part of most families and health care professionals and are unlikely to win widespread support.
| 674 |
<h4>mandated<strong> choice has not been proven sucessful </h4><p>Delmonico 2 </strong>FRANCIS L. DELMONICO, M.D. Massachusetts General HospitaL, N Engl J Med, Vol. 346, No. 25 June 20, 2002 www.nejm.org The New England Journal of Medicine ETHICAL INCENTIVES — NOT PAYMENT — FOR ORGAN DONATION http://www.hods.org/pdf/Ethical%20Incentive.pdf</p><p><u>Proposals</u> <u>to increase the current supply of cadaveric organ donation have included a policy of presumed consent, </u>which would allow health professionals to override family members’ objections to donation after a patient’s death unless the patient had formally indicated a preference not to donate organs,5-8 <u>and mandated choice,</u> which would require all citizens to register their preference with regard to organ donation. 9,10 <u>Neither proposal has been tested or demonstrated to be effective in the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. Such strategies run counter to the expectation of autonomy on the part of most families and health care <u><strong>professionals and are unlikely to win widespread support.</p></u></strong>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,729 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,528 |
Mandated choice is logistically a problem and does not solve
|
Schwark 11
|
Schwark 11 DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis
|
The mandated choice system would require a citizen's organ donation preference to be recorded if the number of times people were asked was increased, it may be financially and logistically prohibitive to maintain a system that records each citizen's organ donation preference.
Unfortunately, results of required request policies have not been successful.
| null |
B. Routine Request
Proponents of the routine request system, also called mandated choice, argue that if people were forced to choose whether or not to donate, more people would. n143 The mandated choice system would require a citizen's organ donation preference to be recorded at a certain point during his or her life, for example, when a citizen "file[s] a tax return or obtain[s] or renews a driver's license." n144 This system is used today in most places. n145 Furthermore, if the number of times people were asked was increased, it may be financially and logistically prohibitive to maintain a system that records each citizen's organ donation preference. n146 Currently, forty-six states require individuals to opt in or opt out when obtaining driver's licenses, and many hospitals ask for donations on intake forms. n147
The 1987 revision to the UAGA called for health care professionals to ask families of deceased individuals to consent to organ donation if their loved one had [*340] not already signed an organ donor card. n148 There is still debate, however, over who should ask for such consent (i.e., doctor, nurse, hospital staff, or OPO representative), and whether or not it would work in practice. Unfortunately, results of required request policies have not been successful. n149
| 1,308 |
<h4>Mandated choice is logistically a problem and does not solve</h4><p><strong>Schwark 11</strong> DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis</p><p>B. Routine Request</p><p>Proponents of the routine request system, also called mandated choice, argue that if people were forced to choose whether or not to donate, more people would. n143 <u>The mandated choice system would require a citizen's organ donation preference to be recorded </u>at a certain point during his or her life, for example, when a citizen "file[s] a tax return or obtain[s] or renews a driver's license." n144 This system is used today in most places. n145 Furthermore, <u>if the number of times people were asked was increased, it may be financially and logistically prohibitive to maintain a system that records each citizen's organ donation preference.</u> n146 Currently, forty-six states require individuals to opt in or opt out when obtaining driver's licenses, and many hospitals ask for donations on intake forms. n147</p><p>The 1987 revision to the UAGA called for health care professionals to ask families of deceased individuals to consent to organ donation if their loved one had [*340] not already signed an organ donor card. n148 There is still debate, however, over who should ask for such consent (i.e., doctor, nurse, hospital staff, or OPO representative), and whether or not it would work in practice. <u>Unfortunately, results of required request policies have not been successful. </u> n149</p>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,731 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,529 |
Cadaver donation can never be sufficient
|
Shalev 3
|
Shalev 3 Carmel Shalev, Lawyer-Ethicist, Gertner Institute, Tel Hashomer, Israel 23 June 2003 Organs, justice and human dignity Reply to Erin CA, Harris J. An ethical market in organs J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-8. http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.short/reply#medethics_el_104
|
Even if we use all the available cadavers, there will always be many more sick people in need. Organs save lives and the shortage is chronic, so why not pay for them if that’s what it takes?
|
Even if we use all available cadavers, there will be many more sick people in need
|
I read with great interest the June 2003 issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics on human organs. The taboo on buying them is broken. Even if we use all the available cadavers, there will always be many more sick people in need. Organs save lives and the shortage is chronic, so why not pay for them if that’s what it takes?
| 323 |
<h4>Cadaver donation can never be sufficient</h4><p><strong>Shalev 3</strong> Carmel Shalev, Lawyer-Ethicist, Gertner Institute, Tel Hashomer, Israel 23 June 2003 Organs, justice and human dignity Reply to Erin CA, Harris J. An ethical market in organs J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-8. <u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.short/reply#medethics_el_104</p><p></u> I read with great interest the June 2003 issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics on human organs. The taboo on buying them is broken. <u><mark>Even if we use all</mark> the <mark>available cadavers, there will</mark> always <mark>be many more sick people in need</mark>. Organs save lives and the shortage is chronic, so why not pay for them if that’s what it takes?</p></u>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,732 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,530 |
Few deaths enable harvesting of organs
|
Strickland 11
|
Strickland 11 Phoebe Strickland 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/phoebe.html
|
Very few people die in such a way that donation is possible, as the person must die in a hospital where their body can be kept on a ventilator until the organs can be donated
|
Very few people die in such a way that donation is possible, as the person must die in a hospital where their body can be kept on a ventilator until the organs can be donated
|
Many misconceptions currently surrounding organ donation discourage people from becoming organ donors and hence exacerbate the existing shortage of organs. Firstly, people are often led to believe that by having registered to be an organ donor their organs will donated upon the occasion of their death. In reality, there is much more involved in the donation system than this. Possibly the most important factor is that consent must be given by family members; as previously discussed, only 58% of families give permission for the organ and tissue donation to proceed due to being unaware of the wishes of the deceased or finding that the decision is too traumatic (Donate Life, 2011). Moreover, even if a donor is properly registered with family consent their organs cannot always be used in a transplant. Very few people die in such a way that donation is possible, as the person must die in a hospital where their body can be kept on a ventilator until the organs can be donated (Donate Life, 2011). A second common misconception is that the organs of those who die beyond a certain age are no longer useful. However, this is not necessarily true—the organs and tissues of many elderly people or even children have the ability to save the lives of those in desperate need of a transplant. According to Professor James Neuberger, associate medical director at NHS Blood and Transplant, organs can be successfully transplanted from people in their 70s and 80s. Thirdly, the belief that organ donation is not endorsed by most religions due to the fact that a deceased body is being altered in some way, affecting its spiritual wellbeing, prevents many people from agreeing to donate their organs. In reality, organ donation is recognised as an extremely generous act that helps to save or improve the lives of many—so in actuality, organ donation is endorsed by many of the world’s major religions including Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism (Donate Life, 2011). Lastly, those who are unhealthy and/or suffering from lifestyle diseases can still often donate their organs. Although smoking, drinking and being overweight affects the functioning of some organs there are many other organs in the body still useful for donations and medical research. There are only a few conditions that can prevent a person from becoming a donor, mostly transmissible conditions such as HIV (Donate Life, 2011). The misconception that there is a certain age limit or degree of heath that is required for a person to be able to donate useful organs, as well as the false belief that organ donation is not endorsed by most religions, discourage people from donating their organs and contributes to the shortage of organs that exists in society.
| 2,744 |
<h4>Few deaths enable harvesting of organs</h4><p><strong>Strickland 11</strong> Phoebe Strickland 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/phoebe.html</p><p>Many misconceptions currently surrounding organ donation discourage people from becoming organ donors and hence exacerbate the existing shortage of organs. Firstly, people are often led to believe that by having registered to be an organ donor their organs will donated upon the occasion of their death. In reality, there is much more involved in the donation system than this. Possibly the most important factor is that consent must be given by family members; as previously discussed, only 58% of families give permission for the organ and tissue donation to proceed due to being unaware of the wishes of the deceased or finding that the decision is too traumatic (Donate Life, 2011). Moreover, even if a donor is properly registered with family consent their organs cannot always be used in a transplant. <u><mark>Very few people die in such a way that donation is possible, as the person must die in a hospital where their body can be kept on a ventilator until the organs can be donated</u></mark> (Donate Life, 2011). A second common misconception is that the organs of those who die beyond a certain age are no longer useful. However, this is not necessarily true—the organs and tissues of many elderly people or even children have the ability to save the lives of those in desperate need of a transplant. According to Professor James Neuberger, associate medical director at NHS Blood and Transplant, organs can be successfully transplanted from people in their 70s and 80s. Thirdly, the belief that organ donation is not endorsed by most religions due to the fact that a deceased body is being altered in some way, affecting its spiritual wellbeing, prevents many people from agreeing to donate their organs. In reality, organ donation is recognised as an extremely generous act that helps to save or improve the lives of many—so in actuality, organ donation is endorsed by many of the world’s major religions including Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism (Donate Life, 2011). Lastly, those who are unhealthy and/or suffering from lifestyle diseases can still often donate their organs. Although smoking, drinking and being overweight affects the functioning of some organs there are many other organs in the body still useful for donations and medical research. There are only a few conditions that can prevent a person from becoming a donor, mostly transmissible conditions such as HIV (Donate Life, 2011). The misconception that there is a certain age limit or degree of heath that is required for a person to be able to donate useful organs, as well as the false belief that organ donation is not endorsed by most religions, discourage people from donating their organs and contributes to the shortage of organs that exists in society.</p>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,733 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,531 |
Living donor organs are better for transplant
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Calandrillo 4
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Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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The United Network for Organ Sharing states that "transplants from living donors are often more successful, because there is a better tissue match between the living donor and recipient. This higher rate of compatibility also decreases the risk of organ rejection." Many studies have documented an increased chance of positive outcomes when using organs transplanted from living donors vis-a-vis organs transplanted from cadavers. survival rates for recipients of living donor kidneys were significantly higher than for those receiving kidneys from cadavers
|
transplants from living donors are often more successful, because there is a better tissue match between the living donor and recipient This higher rate of compatibility also decreases the risk of organ rejection." Many studies have documented an increased chance of positive outcomes when using organs transplanted from living donors vis-a-vis organs transplanted from cadavers. survival rates for recipients of living donor kidneys were significantly higher than for those receiving kidneys from cadavers
|
n201 The United Network for Organ Sharing states that "transplants from living donors are often more successful, because there is a better tissue match between the living donor and recipient. This higher rate of compatibility also decreases the risk of organ rejection." UNOS, Living Organ Donation, at http://www.unos.org/Resources/factsheets.asp?fs=2 (last visited April 5, 2005). Many studies have documented an increased chance of positive outcomes when using organs transplanted from living donors vis-a-vis organs transplanted from cadavers. See, e.g., J. Cecka and P. Terasaki, The UNOS Scientific Renal Transplant Registry. United Network for Organ Sharing, CLIN. TRANSPL. 1 (1994) (finding that survival rates for recipients of living donor kidneys were significantly higher than for those receiving kidneys from cadavers); J. Lowell and R. Taylor, The Evaluation of the Living Renal Donor, Surgical Techniques And Results, 12 SEMIN. UROL. 102 (1994) (concluding that living-donor renal transplants from either genetically related or unrelated donors have proven to have superior short-term and long-term results when compared to cadaveric transplants).
| 1,163 |
<h4>Living donor organs are better for transplant</h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p>n201 <u>The United Network for Organ Sharing states that "<mark>transplants from living donors are often more successful, because there is a better tissue match between the living donor and recipient</mark>. <mark>This higher rate of compatibility also decreases the risk of organ rejection."</u></mark> UNOS, Living Organ Donation, at http://www.unos.org/Resources/factsheets.asp?fs=2 (last visited April 5, 2005). <u><mark>Many studies have documented an increased chance of positive outcomes when using organs transplanted from living donors vis-a-vis organs transplanted from cadavers.</u></mark> See, e.g., J. Cecka and P. Terasaki, The UNOS Scientific Renal Transplant Registry. United Network for Organ Sharing, CLIN. TRANSPL. 1 (1994) (finding that <u><mark>survival rates for recipients of living donor kidneys were significantly higher than for those receiving kidneys from cadavers</u></mark>); J. Lowell and R. Taylor, The Evaluation of the Living Renal Donor, Surgical Techniques And Results, 12 SEMIN. UROL. 102 (1994) (concluding that living-donor renal transplants from either genetically related or unrelated donors have proven to have superior short-term and long-term results when compared to cadaveric transplants). </p>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,734 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
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Kentucky
|
3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,532 |
Posthumous donations can't solve – Spain proves
|
Satel 9
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Satel 9 Dr. Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C.
Updated Oct. 18, 2009 The Case for Paying Organ Donors -There is no indignity in financial gain.
|
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704322004574477840120222788
even in Spain, which is famously successful at retrieving organs from the newly-deceased because of its robust procurement infrastructure, there are still patients dying on its waiting list.
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even in Spain, which is famously successful at retrieving organs from the newly-deceased because of its robust procurement infrastructure, there are still patients dying on its waiting list.
|
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704322004574477840120222788
Without question, more countries need to improve their rates of obtaining organs at death from volunteers. But even in Spain, which is famously successful at retrieving organs from the newly-deceased because of its robust procurement infrastructure, there are still patients dying on its waiting list.
| 381 |
<h4>Posthumous donations can't solve – Spain proves</h4><p><strong>Satel 9</strong> Dr. Sally Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C. </p><p>Updated Oct. 18, 2009 The Case for Paying Organ Donors -There is no indignity in financial gain.</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704322004574477840120222788</p><p></u>Without question, more countries need to improve their rates of obtaining organs at death from volunteers. But <u><mark>even in Spain, which is famously successful at retrieving organs from the newly-deceased because of its robust procurement infrastructure, there are still patients dying on its waiting list.</p></u></mark>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,735 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
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Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,533 |
Cadaver donations will never be enough
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Satel 12
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Satel 12 Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up
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Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation.
I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one.
Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations
|
Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation
Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (
|
Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation.
I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one.
Transplant Math
Now look more closely at the donor math: Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.)
| 979 |
<h4>Cadaver donations will never be enough</h4><p><strong>Satel 12</strong> Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute</p><p>4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up <u>http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up</p><p></u>Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. <u><mark>Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation</mark>.</p><p>I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one.</p><p></u>Transplant Math</p><p>Now look more closely at the donor math: <u><mark>Of</mark> <mark>the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (</mark>Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations</u>; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.)</p>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,439 | 4 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,534 |
Cadaver donations limited
|
Boyer 12
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Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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Annually, 20,000 Americans die in ways that would make their organs harvestable Only 15% of those deaths are of people who agreed previously to be organ donors
any effort to expand the notion of presumed consent to allow for the harvesting of all suitable organs at death would likely meet stiff political and constitutional resistance , it will be challenging to overcome our traditional emphasis on freedom and voluntary action to muster the political will to promulgate broad-ranging presumed consent legislation.
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Annually, 20,000 Americans die in ways that would make their organs harvestable. Id Only 15% of those deaths are of people who agreed previously to be organ donors
any effort to expand presumed consent would meet stiff political and constitutional resistance it will be challenging to overcome our traditional emphasis on freedom and voluntary action to muster the political will
|
n94. Currently, most transplants are cadaveric, and many transplants, such as hearts and lungs, are only cadaveric. Id. at 60. Annually, 20,000 Americans die in ways that would make their organs harvestable. Id. Only 15% of those deaths are of people who agreed previously to be organ donors. Id. Thus, the potential of futures contracts is an increase greater than 650% in cadaveric donations.
CP links to politics
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
However, a few states have enacted extremely limited forms of presumed consent legislation, including statutes that allow coroners to remove a decedent's corneas absent an objection from their family, or after fair inquiry to ascer-tain whether such an objection exists. n291 These laws have largely survived constitutional due process and takings clause challenges. n292 However, any effort to expand the notion of presumed consent to allow for the harvesting of all suitable organs at death would likely meet stiff political and constitutional resistance. n293 As a practical matter, it will be challenging to overcome our traditional emphasis on freedom and voluntary action to muster the political will to promulgate broad-ranging presumed consent legislation. But, by juxtaposing the decision regarding presumed consent legislation against the inevitable lives that will be lost without it, perhaps some reasonable minds can be influenced in its favor.
| 1,705 |
<h4>Cadaver donations limited</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>n94. Currently, most transplants are cadaveric, and many transplants, such as hearts and lungs, are only cadaveric. Id. at 60. <u><mark>Annually, 20,000 Americans die in ways that would make their organs harvestable</u>. Id</mark>. <u><mark>Only 15% of those deaths are of people who agreed previously to be organ donors</u><strong></mark>. Id. Thus, the potential of futures contracts is an increase greater than 650% in cadaveric donations. </p><p>CP links to politics</p><p>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> However, a few states have enacted extremely limited forms of presumed consent legislation, including statutes that allow coroners to remove a decedent's corneas absent an objection from their family, or after fair inquiry to ascer-tain whether such an objection exists. n291 These laws have largely survived constitutional due process and takings clause challenges. n292 However, <u><mark>any</mark> <mark>effort to expand</mark> the notion of <mark>presumed consent</mark> to allow for the harvesting of all suitable organs at death <mark>would</mark> likely <mark>meet stiff political and constitutional resistance</u></mark>. n293 As a practical matter<u>, <mark>it will be challenging to overcome our traditional emphasis on freedom and voluntary action to muster the political will</mark> to promulgate broad-ranging presumed consent legislation.</u> But, by juxtaposing the decision regarding presumed consent legislation against the inevitable lives that will be lost without it, perhaps some reasonable minds can be influenced in its favor.</p>
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CP
| null | null | 430,736 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,535 |
And to k
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Erin and Harris 94
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Erin and Harris 94 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson
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Any system of commerce in human body parts presupposes that we hold property rights in those parts ‘the right to the capital’ An important point that seems often to be missed is that any system of voluntary donation of body parts and products seems also to presuppose ownership. In essence, whether we sell or donate or bequeath our organs and tissues, we must first own them.
|
Any system of commerce in human body parts presupposes that we hold property rights in those parts the right to the capital’ An important point that seems often to be missed is that any system of voluntary donation of body parts and products seems also to presuppose ownership In essence, whether we sell or donate or bequeath our organs and tissues, we must first own them.
|
Any system of commerce in human body parts and products presupposes that we hold property rights in those parts and products. In particular, for a commercial scheme to be properly predicated we must admit what Honoré terms ‘the right to the capital’, that is, ‘the power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it’ (Honoré 1961 p. 1 18). An important point that seems often to be missed is that any system of voluntary donation of body parts and products seems also to presuppose ownership. In essence, whether we sell or donate or bequeath our organs and tissues, we must first own them. It is a heavy irony that when those who object to commerce in human biological materials say that profit should not figure in human organ procurement what they actually mean is the individual who supplies an organ should not profit — everyone else concerned profits.
| 898 |
<h4>And to k</h4><p> <strong>Erin and Harris 94</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester 1994 A monopsonistic market: or how to buy and sell human organs, tissues and cells ethically in Life and Death Under High Technology Medicin, edited by Ian Robinson </p><p><u><mark>Any system of commerce in human body parts</u></mark> and products <u><mark>presupposes that we hold property rights in those parts</u></mark> and products. In particular, for a commercial scheme to be properly predicated we must admit what Honoré terms <u>‘<mark>the right to the capital’</u></mark>, that is, ‘the power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it’ (Honoré 1961 p. 1 18). <u><mark>An important point that seems often to be missed is that any system of voluntary donation of body parts and products seems also to presuppose ownership</mark>. <mark>In essence, whether we sell or donate or bequeath our organs and tissues, we must first own them.</mark> </u>It is a heavy irony that when those who object to commerce in human biological materials say that profit should not figure in human organ procurement what they actually mean is the individual who supplies an organ should not profit — everyone else concerned profits.</p>
|
CP
| null | null | 430,738 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,536 |
While not purely economic, an organ shortage does exist and can be addressed in policy
|
Jaycox 12
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Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
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The bare fact that the language of economics (supply, demand, scarcity, markets) is what is most commonly
Scheper-Hughes , has doubts about the adequacy of a purely economic mindset that would describe the organ shortage in the language of ‘scarcity’. She makes a rather controversial claim:
The idea of organ scarcity is...an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians for an ever-expanding sick, aging, and dying population . . the hubris of medicine and medical technology in the face of mortality. 56
There is truth in this claim, insofar as advances in expensive, life-extending medical technology have indeed inflated the expectations of the wealthiest members of the world community to the point of effectively promising them immortality. Therefore a purely economic solution to the ‘organ scarcity’ problem would naturally fail to take account of the cultural and technological developments that have arguably created this need. Scheper-Hughes does not, however, seem to recognize that the fact that many countries have no system of cadaveric organ recovery or an under-utilized system also contributes to the ‘artificial’ nature of the organ shortage. The lack of effective cadaveric recovery systems around the world is caused by multiple factors, ranging from a lack of political will or influence on the part of governments, to a lack of transport infrastructure, to significant cultural taboos regarding the treatment of deceased bodies. 57
Such barriers remain very influential and are not likely to change soon. Whereas effective policy-making cannot opt for a purely economic approach, it still must treat the organ shortage as a real shortage and not merely as an invented one, inasmuch as one cannot wait for the larger systemic issues of socioeconomic disparity and technological hubris to be resolved before acting in response to the immediate crisis at hand.
|
Scheper-Hughes, has doubts about the adequacy of a purely economic mindset that would describe the organ shortage in the language of ‘scarcity’. She makes a rather controversial claim
There is truth in this claim, insofar as advances in expensive, life-extending medical technology have indeed inflated the expectations of the wealthiest members of the world community to the point of effectively promising them immortality. Therefore a purely economic solution to the ‘organ scarcity’ problem would naturally fail to take account of the cultural and technological developments that have arguably created this need. Scheper-Hughes does not, however, seem to recognize that the fact that many countries have no system of cadaveric organ recovery or an under-utilized system also contributes to the ‘artificial’ nature of the organ shortage. The lack of effective cadaveric recovery around the world is caused by multiple factors, lack of political will or influence on the part of governments, to a lack of infrastructure to cultural taboos
Such barriers are not likely to change soon. Whereas effective policy-making cannot opt for a purely economic approach, it still must treat the organ shortage as real shortage , one cannot wait for the larger systemic issues of socioeconomic disparity and technological hubris to be resolved before acting in response to the immediate crisis at hand.
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
The bare fact that the language of economics (supply, demand, scarcity, markets) is what is most commonly
used in reference to the global organ trafficking crisis is indicative of the reality that most persons prefer to understand the crisis primarily as an economic problem with an economic solution. In some respects, this perception is accurate and appropriate. After all, people wouldn’t be selling their organs in the first place if socioeconomic disparities weren’t as pronounced as they are. Scheper-Hughes, however, has doubts about the adequacy of a purely economic mindset that would describe the organ shortage in the language of ‘scarcity’. She makes a rather controversial claim:
The idea of organ scarcity is...an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians for an ever-expanding sick, aging, and dying population ....This scarcity...can never be satisfied, for underlying it is the unprecedented possibility of extending life indefinitely with the organs of others. I refer, with no disrespect intended to those now patiently waiting for organ transplants, to the age-old denial and refusal of death. . . the hubris of medicine and medical technology in the face of mortality. 56
There is truth in this claim, insofar as advances in expensive, life-extending medical technology have indeed inflated the expectations of the wealthiest members of the world community to the point of effectively promising them immortality. Therefore a purely economic solution to the ‘organ scarcity’ problem would naturally fail to take account of the cultural and technological developments that have arguably created this need. Scheper-Hughes does not, however, seem to recognize that the fact that many countries (India, Egypt, and Japan, for instance) have no system of cadaveric organ recovery or an under-utilized system also contributes to the ‘artificial’ nature of the organ shortage. The lack of effective cadaveric recovery systems around the world is caused by multiple factors, ranging from a lack of political will or influence on the part of governments, to a lack of transport infrastructure, to significant cultural taboos regarding the treatment of deceased bodies. 57
Such barriers remain very influential and are not likely to change soon. Whereas effective policy-making cannot opt for a purely economic approach, it still must treat the organ shortage as a real shortage and not merely as an invented one, inasmuch as one cannot wait for the larger systemic issues of socioeconomic disparity and technological hubris to be resolved before acting in response to the immediate crisis at hand.
| 2,699 |
<h4>While not purely economic, an organ shortage does exist and can be addressed in policy</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>The bare fact that the language of economics (supply, demand, scarcity, markets) is what is most commonly</p><p></u>used in reference to the global organ trafficking crisis is indicative of the reality that most persons prefer to understand the crisis primarily as an economic problem with an economic solution. In some respects, this perception is accurate and appropriate. After all, people wouldn’t be selling their organs in the first place if socioeconomic disparities weren’t as pronounced as they are. <u><mark>Scheper-Hughes</u>,</mark> however<u>, <mark>has doubts about the adequacy of a purely economic mindset that would describe the organ shortage in the language of ‘scarcity’. She makes a rather controversial claim</mark>:</p><p>The idea of organ scarcity is...an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians for an ever-expanding sick, aging, and dying population </u>....This scarcity...can never be satisfied, for underlying it is<u> </u>the unprecedented possibility of extending life indefinitely with the organs of others. I refer, with no disrespect intended to those now patiently waiting for organ transplants, to the age-old denial and refusal of death.<u> . . the hubris of medicine and medical technology in the face of mortality. 56</p><p><mark>There is truth in this claim, insofar as advances in expensive, life-extending medical technology have indeed inflated the expectations of the wealthiest members of the world community to the point of effectively promising them immortality. Therefore a purely economic solution to the ‘organ scarcity’ problem would naturally fail to take account of the cultural and technological developments that have arguably created this need. Scheper-Hughes does not, however, seem to recognize that the fact that many countries</u></mark> (India, Egypt, and Japan, for instance) <u><mark>have no system of cadaveric organ recovery or an under-utilized system also contributes to the ‘artificial’ nature of the organ shortage.</mark> <mark>The lack of effective cadaveric recovery</mark> systems <mark>around the world is caused by multiple factors, </mark>ranging from a <mark>lack of political will or influence on the part of governments, to a lack of</mark> transport <mark>infrastructure</mark>, <mark>to</mark> significant <mark>cultural taboos</mark> regarding the treatment of deceased bodies. 57</p><p><mark>Such barriers </mark>remain very influential and <mark>are not likely to change soon. Whereas effective policy-making cannot opt for a purely economic approach, it still must treat the organ shortage as </mark>a <mark>real shortage </mark>and not merely as an invented one<mark>,</mark> inasmuch as <mark>one cannot wait for the larger systemic issues of socioeconomic disparity and technological hubris to be resolved before acting in response to the immediate crisis at hand.</p></u></mark>
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Neolib K
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
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A
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Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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Violent backlash precludes the alt
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Alexander ’12,
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Alexander ’12, [Dr. Samuel Alexander is co-director of the Simplicity Institute and a lecturer in ‘Consumerism and Sustainability’ at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne. Aug 6, 2012 Degrowth, Expensive Oil, and the New Economics of Energy http://simplicitycollective.com/degrowth-expensive-oil-and-the-new-economics-of-energy]
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the powers that be are not willing even to entertain ‘degrowth’ or its radical implications, establishing fundamentally new economic systems Empire, will not contemplate self-annihilation; it will struggle for existence all the way down. consumerist cultures are very unlikely to accept any proposal to voluntarily reduce levels of consumption. Overcoming or dealing with these forms of resistance is the near impossible task
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the powers that be are not willing to entertain new economic systems Empire will not contemplate self-annihilation it will struggle for existence all the way down consumerist cultures are very unlikely to accept any proposal to voluntarily reduce levels of consumption. Overcoming resistance is near impossible
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Needless to say, the powers that be are not willing even to entertain this ‘degrowth’ diagnosis or its radical implications, for it implies establishing fundamentally new economic systems that operate on much lower energy inputs. Empire, we can be sure, will not contemplate self-annihilation; it will struggle for existence all the way down. In much the same vein, consumerist cultures are very unlikely to accept any proposal to voluntarily reduce levels of consumption. Overcoming or dealing with these forms of resistance is the near impossible task that lies before those of us who seek a radically alternative, post-carbon economy (Trainer, 2010b; Heinberg and Leach, 2010; Alexander, 2011c).
| 698 |
<h4>Violent backlash precludes the alt</h4><p><u><strong>Alexander ’12,</u></strong> [Dr. Samuel Alexander is co-director of the Simplicity Institute and a lecturer in ‘Consumerism and Sustainability’ at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne. Aug 6, 2012 Degrowth, Expensive Oil, and the New Economics of Energy http://simplicitycollective.com/degrowth-expensive-oil-and-the-new-economics-of-energy]</p><p>Needless to say, <u><mark>the powers that be are not willing</u></mark> <u>even <mark>to entertain</u></mark> this <u>‘degrowth’ </u>diagnosis <u>or its radical implications, </u>for it implies<u> establishing fundamentally <mark>new economic systems</u></mark> that operate on much lower energy inputs. <u><mark>Empire</mark>,</u> we can be sure, <u><mark>will not contemplate self-annihilation</mark>; <mark>it will struggle for existence all the way down<strong></mark>.</u></strong> In much the same vein, <u><mark>consumerist cultures are very unlikely to accept any proposal to voluntarily reduce levels of consumption.</mark> <mark>Overcoming</mark> or dealing with these forms of <mark>resistance is</mark> the <mark>near</mark> <mark>impossible</mark> task</u> that lies before those of us who seek a radically alternative, post-carbon economy (Trainer, 2010b; Heinberg and Leach, 2010; Alexander, 2011c).</p>
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Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,033 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
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Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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742,538 |
Market economies are the only way to effectively allocate resources -- the alternative means mass suffering from resource shortages
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Gongol 9
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Gongol 9—owner Gongol.com[Brian, “Is Socialism Good for the Environment?”,http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/socialismandtheenvironment/]RMT
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Socialism assumes someone or some group has the ability to predict and plan for the needs of the many. This kind of omniscience is plainly impossible. there will inevitably be some difference between what the planner expects supply and demand for Stuff to be and what actually emerges. when too little Stuff is produced to meet demand, people needlessly suffer. this planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by the feedback systems of a market economy, in which freely-moving prices effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little of anything is being produced
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Socialism assumes someone has the ability to plan for the needs of the many. This kind of omniscience is plainly impossible. there will inevitably be difference between what the planner expects supply and demand to be and what actually emerges when too little is produced to meet demand, people suffer planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by the feedback systems of a market economy, in which freely-moving prices effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little is being produced.
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Socialism assumes that someone or some group of people has the ability to predict and plan for the needs of the many. This kind of omniscience is plainly impossible. Pretend, for instance, that everything that people might need or want can be lumped together in a single category, called "Stuff." In any given planning period, the planner must determine how much Stuff people will want and how much Stuff must be produced. But there will inevitably be some difference between what the planner expects supply and demand for Stuff to be and what actually emerges. Even if the planner is occasionally correct, every deviation from the actual demand for Stuff causes waste -- when too little Stuff is produced to meet demand, people needlessly suffer. When too much Stuff is produced to meet demand, all that extra Stuff represents waste. Even a really, really good planner will be unable to accurately predict the vast fluctuations in day-to-day demand for Stuff, leading to huge amounts of either waste or suffering. Yet this planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by the feedback systems of a market economy, in which freely-moving prices effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little of anything is being produced.
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<h4>Market economies are the only way to effectively allocate resources -- the alternative means mass suffering from resource shortages</h4><p><strong>Gongol 9</strong>—owner Gongol.com[Brian, “Is Socialism Good for the Environment?”,http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/socialismandtheenvironment/]RMT </p><p><u><mark>Socialism assumes</mark> </u>that<u> <mark>someone</mark> or some group </u>of people <u><mark>has the ability to</mark> predict and <mark>plan for the needs of the many. This kind of omniscience is plainly impossible.</u></mark> Pretend, for instance, that everything that people might need or want can be lumped together in a single category, called "Stuff." In any given planning period, the planner must determine how much Stuff people will want and how much Stuff must be produced. But <u><mark>there will inevitably be</mark> some <mark>difference between what the planner expects supply and demand </mark>for Stuff <mark>to be</mark> <mark>and what</mark> <mark>actually emerges</mark>. </u>Even if the planner is occasionally correct, every deviation from the actual demand for Stuff causes waste -- <u><mark>when too little</mark> Stuff <mark>is produced to meet demand, people</mark> needlessly <mark>suffer</mark>.</u> When too much Stuff is produced to meet demand, all that extra Stuff represents waste. Even a really, really good planner will be unable to accurately predict the vast fluctuations in day-to-day demand for Stuff, leading to huge amounts of either waste or suffering. Yet <u>this <mark>planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by the feedback systems of a market economy, in which freely-moving prices effectively tell everyone in the market</mark> <mark>whether too much or too little </mark>of anything <mark>is being produced</u>.</mark> </p>
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Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,027 | 7 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
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Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,539 |
Their indictment of pure capitalism is irrelevant – the political process guarantees regulated capitalism which avoids all of the problems the K claims
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Newman ’12,
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Newman ’12, Rick Newman, author of Rebounders: How Winners Pivot From Setback To Success. December 6, 2012 USNEWS.com HEADLINE: Why the Tension Between Socialism and Capitalism Will Intensify lexis
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America hasn't had pure capitalism in well over a century Public pressure led to a long series of reforms that morphed into the regulated free-market economy we have today ). We still have a capitalist system centered on private ownership and prices set by the free market, but it's layered with rules meant to prevent abuses.
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America hasn't had pure capitalism in well over a century ublic pressure led to a long series of reforms that morphed into the regulated free-market economy we have today We still have a capitalist system centered on private ownership and prices set by the free market, but it's layered with rules meant to prevent abuses.
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This year's presidential election included many bastardized references to both economic systems, which have been broadly mischaracterized for a long time. Many defenders of capitalism argue that the nation's economic system was more pure a decade ago (or two, or three), but America hasn't had pure capitalism in well over a century. And when it did have a raw form of capitalism, the consequences were often disastrous for significant chunks of the population, which is why public support grew for the kind of [ENJOY: Political Cartoons on the Republican Party] In the 1800s, the federal government largely stayed out of the economy, with nothing like the regulatory apparatus we have now. That's one reason people like Andrew Carnegie, John Jacob Astor, John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and J.P. Morgan built vast fortunes -- often from monopolies or cartels--that still exist in various forms today. But unregulated capitalism also generated speculative bubbles, financial panics and destitution much more frequently than those things have occurred over the last 70 years. Public pressure led to a long series of reforms that morphed into the regulated free-market economy we have today. In the early 1900s, Teddy Roosevelt started to break up some of the all-powerful monopolies that enriched a few while overcharging the masses. Congress created the Federal Reserve and the income tax in 1913. A slew of regulatory agencies grew out of the Great Depression. During the 20th century, presidents of both parties signed legislation creating new agencies to oversee food, medicine, the environment and Wall Street (ahem). We still have a capitalist system centered on private ownership and prices set by the free market, but it's layered with rules meant to prevent abuses.
| 1,786 |
<h4>Their indictment of pure capitalism is irrelevant – the political process guarantees regulated capitalism which avoids all of the problems the K claims</h4><p><strong>Newman ’12,</strong> Rick Newman, author of Rebounders: How Winners Pivot From Setback To Success. December 6, 2012 USNEWS.com HEADLINE: Why the Tension Between Socialism and Capitalism Will Intensify lexis</p><p>This year's presidential election included many bastardized references to both economic systems, which have been broadly mischaracterized for a long time. Many defenders of capitalism argue that the nation's economic system was more pure a decade ago (or two, or three), but <u><mark>America hasn't had pure capitalism in well over a century</u></mark>. And when it did have a raw form of capitalism, the consequences were often disastrous for significant chunks of the population, which is why public support grew for the kind of [ENJOY: Political Cartoons on the Republican Party] In the 1800s, the federal government largely stayed out of the economy, with nothing like the regulatory apparatus we have now. That's one reason people like Andrew Carnegie, John Jacob Astor, John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and J.P. Morgan built vast fortunes -- often from monopolies or cartels--that still exist in various forms today. But unregulated capitalism also generated speculative bubbles, financial panics and destitution much more frequently than those things have occurred over the last 70 years. <u>P<mark>ublic pressure led to a long series of reforms that morphed into the regulated free-market economy we have today</u></mark>. In the early 1900s, Teddy Roosevelt started to break up some of the all-powerful monopolies that enriched a few while overcharging the masses. Congress created the Federal Reserve and the income tax in 1913. A slew of regulatory agencies grew out of the Great Depression. During the 20th century, presidents of both parties signed legislation creating new agencies to oversee food, medicine, the environment and Wall Street (ahem<u><strong>). <mark>We still have a capitalist system centered on private ownership and prices set by the free market, but it's layered with rules meant to prevent abuses.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 194,434 | 9 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,540 |
Status quo is capitalist – government regulated sales are not
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Bowden 13
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Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
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Most countries either adopt a socialist or a capitalist ideology in relation to organ trafficking People adopting a capitalist ideology tend to believe that they should have the right to freely choose how they treat their own body, and that they alone should hold the decision to sell their organs, not the government. the United States allows a person to choose whether he or she wants their organs donated so long as no compensation is provided On the contrary, Iran follows a socialist approach allowing the government to regulate an open organ market to ensure equal distribution.
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Most countries either a socialist or a capitalist ideology in relation to organ trafficking. n172 People adopting a capitalist ideology tend to believe that they should have the right to choose to sell their organs, not the government. the U S allows a person to choose whether she wants their organs donated so long as no compensation is provided On the contrary, Iran follows a socialist approach allowing the government to regulate an open organ market to ensure equal distribution.
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Most countries either adopt a socialist or a capitalist ideology in relation to organ trafficking. n172 People adopting a capitalist ideology tend to believe that they should have the right to freely choose how they treat their own body, and that they alone should [*481] hold the decision to sell their organs, not the government. n173 However, this perspective on organ trading is contrary to U.S. laws and restrictions, which already prohibit a person to freely do as they please with their body in this regard. n174 The United States has an interest in ensuring the safety of their citizens. For example, the United States grants the states the power to prohibit prostitution. n175 Similarly, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) prohibits the sale or transfer of organs for money. n176 Nonetheless, the United States allows a person to choose whether he or she wants their organs donated so long as no compensation is provided. n177 On the contrary, Iran follows a socialist approach allowing the government to regulate an open organ market to ensure equal distribution.
NEXT ARGUMENT IS OPTIONAL
| 1,121 |
<h4>Status quo is capitalist – government regulated sales are not</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p><u><mark>Most countries either </mark>adopt <mark>a socialist or a capitalist ideology in relation to organ trafficking</u>. n172 <u>People</mark> <mark>adopting a capitalist ideology tend to believe that they should have the right to</mark> freely <mark>choose</mark> how they treat their own body, and that they alone should </u> [*481] <u>hold the decision <mark>to sell their organs, not the government.</u></mark> n173 However, this perspective on organ trading is contrary to U.S. laws and restrictions, which already prohibit a person to freely do as they please with their body in this regard. n174 The United States has an interest in ensuring the safety of their citizens. For example, the United States grants the states the power to prohibit prostitution. n175 Similarly, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) prohibits the sale or transfer of organs for money. n176 Nonetheless, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>allows a person to choose whether</mark> he or <mark>she wants their organs donated so long as no compensation is provided</u></mark>. n177 <u><strong><mark>On the contrary, Iran follows a socialist approach allowing the government to regulate an open organ market to ensure equal distribution.</p><p></u></strong></mark>NEXT ARGUMENT IS OPTIONAL</p>
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Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,739 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,541 |
Regulated capitalism –LIKE THE PLAN --avoids the problems of capitalism
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Foster 9
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Foster 9 Nathan Foster SEPTEMBER 14, 2009 Regulated Capitalism vs. Socialism
http://open.salon.com/blog/nathan_foster/2009/09/14/regulated_capitalism_vs_socialism
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Regulated capitalism allows for the private ownership of capital, but regulates its use.
regulated capitalism is really some degree of public control of capital.
1) Having money and influence is just sweet. I know this sounds silly, but the idea should not be discarded. I think there is real public benefit to having a class of people who have more money than they know what to do with. It shows just how good life gets, and motivates the public to improve their position. It is also, obviously, beneficial to those people who have the money. They get to enjoy life, and I think that's good for everybody.
In practically every measurable indicator, [hu] mankind’s lot has improved and continues to improve. In terms of longevity, infant mortality, nutrition, the cost of food, health and wealth, most human beings on the planet are better off now than they have ever been
The major environmental problems of the world, poverty, , poor nutrition and inadequate food, call for critical concern only in developing countries, but even here the progress is impressive. In 1970 the number of people in the world who didn’t get enough to eat was 35%. By 1996 it had dropped by half, and by 2010 the UN expects the figure to drop to 12%. In 1970 only 30% of people in the developing countries had access to good drinking water. In 2000 this figure had risen to 80%. Since 1950 developing countries have tripled their real per capita incomes.
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In every measurable indicator hu] mankind’s lot has improved longevity infant mortality, nutrition health wealth human beings on the planet are better off now than they have ever been
environmental problems poverty and inadequate food, call for critical concern only in developing countries, but even here the progress is impressive In 1970 the number of people in the world who didn’t get enough to eat was 35%. By 1996 it had dropped by half
|
On the other hand, there is at least a hair-thin distinction between socialism and regulated capitalism. Regulated capitalism, as I envision it, allows for the private ownership of capital, but regulates its use. I'll allow for progressive taxation—the rich can be taxed more than the poor, which is justified based on the idea that the rich really don't have anything important to do with 30% of their money anyway. I'll also allow for trust-busting, as this is a form of regulation.
The only possible argument that regulated capitalism is in fact socialism rests on the assumption that any law or regulation reflects a degree of public control, and therefore, in a sense, regulated capitalism is really some degree of public control of capital. But I think this argument falls apart because I'm speaking of laws which protect the safety of the public, not direct control of capital, and every nation on earth, no matter what system of government or socio-economic system you choose to identify it with, has laws to protect the safety of the public. You therefore can't use such laws to discriminate between different socio-economic systems or systems of government.
That said, I prefer regulated capitalism to socialism for a couple of reasons.
1) Having money and influence is just sweet. I know this sounds silly, but the idea should not be discarded. I think there is real public benefit to having a class of people who have more money than they know what to do with. It shows just how good life gets, and motivates the public to improve their position. It is also, obviously, beneficial to those people who have the money. They get to enjoy life, and I think that's good for everybody.
2) Strict regulation should be enough to prevent abuses of capital. You don't have to resort to public ownership to prevent these abuses.
Regulated capitalism means serial policy success
Brinsmead 11 gender paraphrased Robert D. Brinsmead ‘The Environmental Optimist’ A Series of 20 Short Essays 4-25-11 http://www.greatnewstory.com/home/sustainability/economic/the-environmental-optimist-robert-brinsmead/
3. In practically every measurable indicator, [hu] mankind’s lot has improved and continues to improve. In terms of longevity, infant mortality, nutrition, the cost of food, health and safety, education, leisure time and wealth, most human beings on the planet are better off now than they have ever been in the history of the earth. The human race is even becoming taller.
4. The major environmental problems of the world, like over-population, air and water pollution, loss of forests, poverty, lack of education, poor nutrition and inadequate food, call for critical concern only in developing countries, but even here the progress is impressive. In 1970 the number of people in the world who didn’t get enough to eat was 35%. By 1996 it had dropped by half, and by 2010 the UN expects the figure to drop to 12%. In 1970 only 30% of people in the developing countries had access to good drinking water. In 2000 this figure had risen to 80%. Since 1950 developing countries have tripled their real per capita incomes. They now have the same infant mortality rate and longevity as the developed world had in 1950. There remains, of course, an urgent need to further reduce human misery on all these fronts, but enormous improvements being made give us room for optimism on the basis that things are getting better rather than worse.
| 3,453 |
<h4>Regulated capitalism –LIKE THE PLAN --avoids the problems of capitalism</h4><p><strong>Foster 9</strong> Nathan Foster SEPTEMBER 14, 2009 Regulated Capitalism vs. Socialism</p><p>http://open.salon.com/blog/nathan_foster/2009/09/14/regulated_capitalism_vs_socialism</p><p>On the other hand, there is at least a hair-thin distinction between socialism and regulated capitalism. <u>Regulated capitalism</u>, as I envision it,<u> allows for the private ownership of capital, but regulates its use.</u> I'll allow for progressive taxation—the rich can be taxed more than the poor, which is justified based on the idea that the rich really don't have anything important to do with 30% of their money anyway. I'll also allow for trust-busting, as this is a form of regulation.</p><p>The only possible argument that regulated capitalism is in fact socialism rests on the assumption that any law or regulation reflects a degree of public control, and therefore, in a sense,<u> regulated capitalism is really some degree of public control of capital.</u> But I think this argument falls apart because I'm speaking of laws which protect the safety of the public, not direct control of capital, and every nation on earth, no matter what system of government or socio-economic system you choose to identify it with, has laws to protect the safety of the public. You therefore can't use such laws to discriminate between different socio-economic systems or systems of government.</p><p>That said, I prefer regulated capitalism to socialism for a couple of reasons.</p><p><u>1) Having money and influence is just sweet. I know this sounds silly, but the idea should not be discarded. I think there is real public benefit to having a class of people who have more money than they know what to do with. It shows just how good life gets, and motivates the public to improve their position. It is also, obviously, beneficial to those people who have the money. They get to enjoy life, and I think that's good for everybody.</p><p></u>2) <strong>Strict regulation should be enough to prevent abuses of capital. You don't have to resort to public ownership to prevent these abuses.</p><p></strong>Regulated capitalism means serial policy success </p><p><strong>Brinsmead 11 gender paraphrased Robert D. Brinsmead ‘The Environmental Optimist’ A Series of 20 Short Essays 4-25-11 </strong>http://www.greatnewstory.com/home/sustainability/economic/the-environmental-optimist-robert-brinsmead/</p><p><strong>3. <u></strong><mark>In</mark> practically <mark>every measurable indicator</mark>, [<mark>hu] mankind’s lot has improved</mark> and continues to improve. In terms of <mark>longevity</mark>, <mark>infant mortality, nutrition</mark>, the cost of food, <mark>health</mark> and </u>safety, education, leisure time and<u> <mark>wealth</mark>, most <mark>human beings on the planet are better off now than they have ever been</mark> </u>in the history of the earth.<strong> The human race is even becoming taller.</p><p>4. <u></strong>The major <mark>environmental problems</mark> of the world, </u>like over-population, air and water pollution, loss of forests,<u> <mark>poverty</mark>, </u>lack of education<u>, poor nutrition <mark>and inadequate food, call for critical concern only in developing countries, but even here the progress is impressive</mark>.</u><strong> <u></strong><mark>In 1970 the number of people in</mark> <mark>the world who didn’t get enough to eat was 35%. By 1996 it had dropped by half</mark>, and by 2010 the UN expects the figure to drop to 12%. In 1970 only 30% of people in the developing countries had access to good drinking water. In 2000 this figure had risen to 80%. Since 1950 developing countries have tripled their real per capita incomes. </u>They now have the same infant mortality rate and longevity as the developed world had in 1950. There remains, of course, an urgent need to further reduce human misery on all these fronts, but enormous improvements being made give us room for optimism on the basis that things are getting better rather than worse.</p>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 228,999 | 4 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,542 |
Studies proves that capitalism reduces war – the alt makes war 14 times more likely
|
Gartzke, 5
|
Gartzke, 5 Erik Gartzke, Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and a member of the SaltzmanInstitute of War and Peace Studies. 2005
|
the relationship between Economic Freedom and militarized disputes, as estimated by regression appears as a solid line, which slopes slightly down and to the right. In Figure 2.1, the two light dashed lines that appear to run in parallel above and below the line for Economic Freedom represent confidence intervals. Ninety-five percent of all the solid lines estimated from regressions on similar data would be contained within the interval bounded by the two dashed lines. In other words, the relationship depicted in the figure between Economic Freedom and an absence of militarized violence is very likely to be at least approximately correct.
is substantial. The least free states have about a 7% chance of experiencing a dispute, while the freest states experience disputes in only about half of 1% of the years examined. Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. , the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.
|
the relationship between Economic Freedom and militarized disputes, as estimated b regression
The least free states have about a 7% chance of experiencing a dispute, while the freest states experience disputes in only about half of 1% . Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.
|
Chapter 2: Economic Freedom and Peace Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/efw/efw2005/efw2005-2.pdf
The substantive effects of Economic Freedom and the Democracy Score on international disputes can be seen in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. In both figures, the horizontal axis lists the ordinal scales for the respective explanatory variable (either the Index of Economic Freedom or the Polity Democracy Index), while the vertical axis reports the probability of a MID in a given year for states with a given level of either of the two explanatory variables. The solid line sloping down and to the right in Figure 2.1 is the relationship between Economic Freedom and militarized disputes, as estimated by the regression in Table 2.1. In Figure 2.2, the effect of the Democracy Score variable on conflict also appears as a solid line, which slopes slightly down and to the right. In Figure 2.1, the two light dashed lines that appear to run in parallel above and below the line for Economic Freedom represent confidence intervals. Ninety-five percent of all the solid lines estimated from regressions on similar data would be contained within the interval bounded by the two dashed lines. In other words, the relationship depicted in the figure between Economic Freedom and an absence of militarized violence is very likely to be at least approximately correct.
As can be seen from the figure, the impact of free markets and limited government is substantial. The least free states have about a 7% chance of experiencing a dispute, while the freest states experience disputes in only about half of 1% of the years examined. Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.
| 1,855 |
<h4>Studies proves that capitalism reduces war – the alt makes war 14 times more likely</h4><p><strong>Gartzke, 5<u> </u></strong>Erik Gartzke, Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and a member of the SaltzmanInstitute of War and Peace Studies. 2005</p><p>Chapter 2: Economic Freedom and Peace Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/efw/efw2005/efw2005-2.pdf</p><p>The substantive effects of Economic Freedom and the Democracy Score on international disputes can be seen in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. In both figures, the horizontal axis lists the ordinal scales for the respective explanatory variable (either the Index of Economic Freedom or the Polity Democracy Index), while the vertical axis reports the probability of a MID in a given year for states with a given level of either of the two explanatory variables. The solid line sloping down and to the right in Figure 2.1 is <u><mark>the relationship between Economic Freedom and militarized disputes, as estimated b</mark>y</u> the <u><mark>regression</u></mark> in Table 2.1. In Figure 2.2, the effect of the Democracy Score variable on conflict also<u><strong> appears as a solid line, which slopes slightly down and to the right. In Figure 2.1, the two light dashed lines that appear to run in parallel above and below the line for Economic Freedom represent confidence intervals. Ninety-five percent of all the solid lines estimated from regressions on similar data would be contained within the interval bounded by the two dashed lines. In other words, the relationship depicted in the figure between Economic Freedom and an absence of militarized violence is very likely to be at least approximately correct. </p><p></u></strong>As can be seen from the figure, the impact of free markets and limited government<u> is substantial. <mark>The least free states have about a 7% chance of experiencing a dispute, while the freest states experience disputes in only about half of 1%</mark> of the years examined<mark>. Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful</mark>. </u>At the extremes<u>, <strong><mark>the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,034 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,543 |
“Legalization” requires removal of all criminal AND civil penalties for possession, production, trafficking AND use
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Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction in effect making the penalty a civil rather than criminal offense
|
Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>“Legalization” requires removal of all criminal AND civil penalties for possession, production, trafficking AND use</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u><strong><mark>legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals</mark> even though they are sometimes conflated</u></strong>. <u><strong>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u></strong>. <u><strong>„<mark>Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</mark>, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u></strong>.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u><strong><mark>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction</mark> for possession,” <mark>in effect making the penalty</mark> for the possession of marijuana <mark>a civil</u></strong></mark> (fines, counseling etc), <u><strong><mark>rather than criminal offense</u></strong></mark>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u><strong>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u></strong>.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,544 |
Empirically, capitalism reduces absolute poverty
|
Klein 12
|
Klein 12 Joe Klein Dec. 03, 2012 Time Magazine Campaign 2012: The Report Card
|
socialism has been an utter failure, and regulated capitalism has been the greatest eradicator of poverty in the history of the world.
most people are comfortable with a regulated free-enterprise system in which the government helps provide education and health care for everyone and financial support for those who need it most,
|
regulated capitalism has been the greatest eradicator of poverty in the history of the world
most people are comfortable with a regulated free-enterprise system in which the government helps provide education and health care for everyone and financial support for those who need it most
|
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2129804,00.html
I checked the dictionary. And socialism languishes there, just as it always has: "a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state." Is that what 49% of young people favor? I don't think so. If it is, count me on Bennett's team. That sort of socialism has been an utter failure, and regulated capitalism has been the greatest eradicator of poverty in the history of the world. But I suspect--and this would be wonderfully ironic, if true--that all those blacks and young people got their definition of socialism from Rush Limbaugh and the other wing-nut foghorns: socialism is when the government helps people out.
What we've decided in this election is that most people are comfortable with a regulated free-enterprise system in which the government helps provide education and health care for everyone and financial support for those who need it most, especially the elderly. What we'll continue to debate is how extensive those regulations and supports should be. But there is no question--except in the minds of the deluded--that any of our truly basic freedoms, especially the freedom to make money, are threatened in any significant way. In the real world, there is less drama to all this than meets the eye. Lessons have been learned. I remain optimistic that the professional politicians who lead the Republican Party will find a way to close a budget deal long before we reach a cliff, since they know they'll be blamed by a voting majority of Americans for any impasse.
| 1,599 |
<h4>Empirically, capitalism reduces absolute poverty</h4><p><strong>Klein 12</strong> Joe Klein Dec. 03, 2012 Time Magazine Campaign 2012: The Report Card</p><p>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2129804,00.html</p><p>I checked the dictionary. And socialism languishes there, just as it always has: "a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state." Is that what 49% of young people favor? I don't think so. If it is, count me on Bennett's team. That sort of <u>socialism has been an utter failure, and <strong><mark>regulated capitalism has been the greatest eradicator of poverty in the history of the world</mark>. </u></strong>But I suspect--and this would be wonderfully ironic, if true--that all those blacks and young people got their definition of socialism from Rush Limbaugh and the other wing-nut foghorns: socialism is when the government helps people out.</p><p>What we've decided in this election is that <u><mark>most people are comfortable with a regulated free-enterprise system in which the government helps provide education and health care for everyone and financial support for those who need it most</mark>, </u>especially the elderly. What we'll continue to debate is how extensive those regulations and supports should be. But there is no question--except in the minds of the deluded--that any of our truly basic freedoms, especially the freedom to make money, are threatened in any significant way. In the real world, there is less drama to all this than meets the eye. Lessons have been learned. I remain optimistic that the professional politicians who lead the Republican Party will find a way to close a budget deal long before we reach a cliff, since they know they'll be blamed by a voting majority of Americans for any impasse.</p>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 194,438 | 4 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,545 |
2. Nearly all is close to 100%
|
Foley 98
|
Foley 98 JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News
|
Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 99 or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.
| null |
Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.
http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm
Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.
Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.
But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English- to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.
Sixty percent does not come close
``It's completely illegal,'' Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 percent or 99 percent or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent. The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''
| 1,115 |
<h4><strong>2. Nearly all is close to 100%</h4><p>Foley 98</strong> JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer<strong> </strong>September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News </p><p>Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.</p><p>http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm</p><p>Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.</p><p>Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.</p><p>But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English- to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.</p><p>Sixty percent does not come close </p><p>``It's completely illegal,'' <u><strong>Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 </u></strong>percent or<u><strong> 99 </u></strong>percent<u><strong> or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.</u></strong> The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,510 | 11 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,546 |
Empirically, globalization reduces inequality - countries rejecting capitalism are the cause of inequality
|
Dollar 14
|
Dollar 14 David Dollar, Former World Bank Country Director, China and Mongolia 2014
|
I do not accept that the tendency of globalization is to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. The fastest growing incomes in the world are in the developing countries, indicating that integration can be a powerful force that reduces worldwide inequality. The tendency toward inequality in the world today comes from the fact that about half of the developing world population lives in countries that are successfully integrating and catching up with the rich world, while half of the population lives in countries that are largely outside of globalization.
|
I do not accept that globalization is to widen the gap between rich and poor. The fastest growing incomes are in developing countries integration can be powerful The tendency toward inequality in the world today comes from the fact that about half of the developing world population lives in countries that are successfully integrating while half of the population lives in countries outside of globalization
|
Making Globalization Work for the Poor HYPERLINK "http://live.worldbank.org/making-globalization-work-poor" http://live.worldbank.org/making-globalization-work-poor
It is true that corporations everywhere focus on maximizing profits. It is important to have a strong framework of laws and regulations if that profit-seeking is to produce social benefits. I do not accept that the tendency of globalization is to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. The fastest growing incomes in the world are in the developing countries, indicating that integration can be a powerful force for development that reduces worldwide inequality. The tendency toward inequality in the world today comes from the fact that about half of the developing world population lives in countries that are successfully integrating and catching up with the rich world, while half of the population lives in countries that are largely outside of globalization. Does the poor performance of Argentina, much of Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, Myanmar, and other countries result from their integration with the world economy or from their own poor governance? I think the evidence supports the
| 1,166 |
<h4>Empirically, globalization reduces inequality - countries rejecting capitalism are the cause of inequality</h4><p><strong>Dollar 14</strong> David Dollar, Former World Bank Country Director, China and Mongolia 2014</p><p>Making Globalization Work for the Poor HYPERLINK "http://live.worldbank.org/making-globalization-work-poor" http://live.worldbank.org/making-globalization-work-poor</p><p>It is true that corporations everywhere focus on maximizing profits. It is important to have a strong framework of laws and regulations if that profit-seeking is to produce social benefits. <u><mark>I do</mark> <mark>not</mark> <mark>accept that</mark> the tendency of <mark>globalization is to widen the gap between</mark> the <mark>rich and </mark>the <mark>poor.</mark> <mark>The fastest growing incomes</mark> in the world <mark>are in</mark> the <mark>developing countries</mark>, indicating that <mark>integration can be</mark> a <mark>powerful</mark> force </u>for development<u> that reduces worldwide inequality. <mark>The tendency toward inequality in the world today comes from the fact that about half of the developing world population lives in countries that are successfully integrating</mark> and catching up with the rich world, <mark>while half of the population lives in countries</mark> that are largely <mark>outside of globalization</mark>.</u> Does the poor performance of Argentina, much of Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, Myanmar, and other countries result from their integration with the world economy or from their own poor governance? I think the evidence supports the</p>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,011 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,547 |
B. Regulations violate -- the affirmative permits substantial restrictions
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>B. Regulations violate -- the affirmative permits substantial restrictions </h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,740 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,548 |
Empirically, capitalism is better for the environment
|
Gongol 6 Gongol 06
|
Gongol 6 Brian Gongol 2.5.2006 Is Socialism Good for the Environment?
|
It is sometimes claimed that free markets inevitably corrupt and destroy the environment and that the only way to protect the natural environment is to adopt a socialist economy. the argument is categorically wrong. The argument that "socialism protects the environment" ignores the titanic failure of the evidence. Many of the world's worst and most visible ecological failures happened under socialist, Marxist, or Communist governments.
|
It is sometimes claimed that free markets corrupt and destroy the environment the argument is categorically wrong. The argument that "socialism protects the environment" ignores the titanic failure of the evidence. Many of the world's most visible ecological failures happened under Communist governments
|
http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/socialismandtheenvironment/
It is sometimes claimed that free markets inevitably corrupt and destroy the environment and that the only way to protect the natural environment is to adopt a socialist economy. However earnest, the argument is categorically wrong. #1. Socialism Has Consistently Failed to Protect the Environment The argument that "socialism protects the environment" ignores the titanic failure of the evidence. Many of the world's worst and most visible ecological failures happened under socialist, Marxist, or Communist governments. To wit: The Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the catastrophic air pollution of Eastern Europe's "Black Triangle," and the destruction of the Aral Sea each were specifically caused by socialism and took place under socialist government supervision.
| 833 |
<h4>Empirically, capitalism is better for the environment</h4><p><strong>Gongol 6</strong> Brian <strong>Gongol</strong> 2.5.20<u><strong>06</u></strong> Is Socialism Good for the Environment?</p><p>http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/socialismandtheenvironment/</p><p><u><mark>It is sometimes claimed that free markets</mark> inevitably<strong> </strong><mark>corrupt and destroy the environment</mark> and that the only way to protect the natural environment is to adopt a socialist economy.<strong> </u></strong>However earnest, <u><mark>the argument is categorically wrong<strong>.</u></strong></mark> #1. Socialism Has Consistently Failed to Protect the Environment <u><mark>The argument that "socialism protects the environment" ignores the titanic failure of the evidence. Many of the world's</mark> worst and <mark>most visible ecological failures happened under</mark> socialist, Marxist, or <mark>Communist governments</mark>.<strong> </u></strong>To wit: The Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the catastrophic air pollution of Eastern Europe's "Black Triangle," and the destruction of the Aral Sea each were specifically caused by socialism and took place under socialist government supervision. </p>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,027 | 7 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,549 |
1. Regulations are legal restrictions
|
Nolo 14 http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/regulation-term.html
|
Nolo 14 Nolo's Plain-English Law Dictionary 2014 http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/regulation-term.html
|
Regulation
A rule, adopted under authority granted by a statute Although not laws, they have the force of law and often include penalties for violations.
education on drug content (for example, analysis of ecstasy consumed at raves).
|
Regulation
A rule, adopted under authority granted by a statute they have the force of law and often include penalties for violations
|
Regulation
A rule, adopted under authority granted by a statute, issued by a municipal, county, state, or federal agency. Although not laws, they have the force of law and often include penalties for violations. Regulations are not generally published in the books that contain state statutes or federal laws, but often must be obtained from the agency. To adopt a regulation, an agency usually drafts the rule, publishes it in governmental journals intended to give public notice, holds hearings, and then adopts a final, revised regulation. The process is best known to industries and groups concerned with the subject matter. Federal regulations are adopted under the procedure set out in the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA); states usually follow similar procedures.
of prohibition on users, who are focus of its main thrust, by introducing education on drug content (for example, analysis of ecstasy consumed at raves).
| 935 |
<h4>1. Regulations are legal restrictions</h4><p><strong>Nolo 14</strong> Nolo's Plain-English Law Dictionary 2014 <u><strong>http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/regulation-term.html</p><p><mark>Regulation</p><p></mark> <mark>A rule, adopted</mark> <mark>under authority granted by a statute</u></strong></mark>, issued by a municipal, county, state, or federal agency. <u><strong>Although not laws, <mark>they have the force of law and often include penalties for violations</mark>.</u></strong> Regulations are not generally published in the books that contain state statutes or federal laws, but often must be obtained from the agency. To adopt a regulation, an agency usually drafts the rule, publishes it in governmental journals intended to give public notice, holds hearings, and then adopts a final, revised regulation. The process is best known to industries and groups concerned with the subject matter. Federal regulations are adopted under the procedure set out in the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA); states usually follow similar procedures.</p><p>of prohibition on users, who are focus of its main thrust, by introducing<u><strong> education on drug content (for example, analysis of ecstasy consumed at raves).</p><p></u></strong> </p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,741 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,550 |
Capitalism's economic growth is key to environmentalism
|
Taylor 3
|
Taylor 3 Jerry Taylor, director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute. April 23, 2003
|
article was published in the New York Sun, April 22, 2003. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3073
because it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow.
Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply
|
it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century
we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently
|
Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism This article was published in the New York Sun, April 22, 2003. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3073
Earth Day (April 22) is traditionally a day for the Left -- a celebration of government's ability to deliver the environmental goods and for threats about the parade of horribles that will descend upon us lest we rededicate ourselves to federal regulators and public land managers. This is unfortunate because it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow.
Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply
| 992 |
<h4>Capitalism's economic growth is key to environmentalism </h4><p><strong>Taylor 3</strong> Jerry Taylor, director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute. April 23, 2003</p><p>Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism This<u> article was published in the New York Sun, April 22, 2003. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3073</p><p></u>Earth Day (April 22) is traditionally a day for the Left -- a celebration of government's ability to deliver the environmental goods and for threats about the parade of horribles that will descend upon us lest we rededicate ourselves to federal regulators and public land managers. This is unfortunate <u>because <mark>it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century</mark> and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow.</p><p>Indeed, <mark>we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism.</mark> <mark>Environmental amenities</mark>, after all, <mark>are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently</mark> so that we could turn our attention from simply</p></u>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 1,554,080 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,551 |
C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate The affirmative removes the limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. Regulation unlimit by permitting the affirmative to be anywhere between legalization and prohibition.
|
Duncan 9
|
Duncan 9 Cynthia S. Duncan, University of Colorado, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009. Connecticut Law Review July, 2009 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1701
|
Prohibition and legalization represent opposite ends of a broad spectrum . Along that spectrum lie any number of systems
| null |
NOTE: THE NEED FOR CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA POLICY lexis
Part II of this Note examines the current public policy and evaluates the various methods of enforcement and prevention used in the prohibition of marijuana. The costs and benefits, as well as the successes and failures, of those methods are analyzed. n38 Prohibition and legalization represent opposite ends of a broad spectrum of possible marijuana policies. Along that spectrum lie any number of systems involving some degree of decriminalization while prohibiting trafficking, such as allowing medical use only, allowing possession of various quantities for personal use, or allowing cultivation and possession for personal use. One point along that spectrum is the system currently evolving in this country-decriminalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use while maintaining criminal sanctions for sale and distribution. Strict prohibition is still the law, at least at the federal level; yet prohibition is at best an inconsistent policy at state and local levels-in terms of both regulation and enforcement-with states and localities having varying degrees of prohibition and decriminalization. n39 This evolving system shares many of the characteristics of prohibition, but there are differences. In light of the growing support for decriminalizing possession for personal use, Part III evaluates those differences.
| 1,422 |
<h4>C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate The affirmative removes the limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. Regulation unlimit by permitting the affirmative to be anywhere between legalization and prohibition.</h4><p><strong>Duncan 9</strong> Cynthia S. Duncan, University of Colorado, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009. Connecticut Law Review July, 2009 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1701</p><p>NOTE: THE NEED FOR CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA POLICY lexis</p><p>Part II of this Note examines the current public policy and evaluates the various methods of enforcement and prevention used in the prohibition of marijuana. The costs and benefits, as well as the successes and failures, of those methods are analyzed. n38 <u><strong>Prohibition and legalization represent opposite ends of a broad spectrum </u></strong>of possible marijuana policies<u><strong>. Along that spectrum lie any number of systems </u></strong>involving some degree of decriminalization while prohibiting trafficking, such as allowing medical use only, allowing possession of various quantities for personal use, or allowing cultivation and possession for personal use. One point along that spectrum is the system currently evolving in this country-decriminalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use while maintaining criminal sanctions for sale and distribution. Strict prohibition is still the law, at least at the federal level; yet prohibition is at best an inconsistent policy at state and local levels-in terms of both regulation and enforcement-with states and localities having varying degrees of prohibition and decriminalization. n39 This evolving system shares many of the characteristics of prohibition, but there are differences. In light of the growing support for decriminalizing possession for personal use, Part III evaluates those differences.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,742 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,552 |
Market mechanisms promote environmentalism
|
Adler 5 -
|
Adler 5 - JONATHAN ADLER Prof. of environmental law at Case Western, writes for the Case research series: [“Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights & Environmental Protection” Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working Paper 05-16, July 2005]
|
By encouraging a more efficient use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental values Where environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of markets, in particular a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights, that is to blame. Resources that are privately owned or managed and therefore are incorporated into market institutions are typically well-maintained. Environmental problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems" which are solved by the extension, definition, and defense of property rights in environmental resources. Resources that are unowned or politically controlled, on the other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed the tragedy of the commons and cutting trees at a much younger age-at significant economic cost-so as to avoid regulatory proscriptions that could force them to lose their investments altogether.'
|
By encouraging a more efficient use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental value Where environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of markets, a lack of property rights, that is to blame Resources that are owned are typically well-maintained Environmental problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems" which are solved by the extension of property rights unowned or politically controlled, on the other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed
|
The problem with the dominant approach to environmental policy is its reliance upon centralized political mechanisms. The limitations of such mechanisms-whether regulations, fiscal instruments, or direct management of environmental resources-hamper the effectiveness of existing environmental programs. As environmental problems become ever more complex, these limitations will only become more severe. The answer is not greater government control or manipulation of the marketplace, but a greater reliance upon property rights and voluntary arrangements. By encouraging a more efficient use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental values than the modem regulatory state.¶ Property-based environmental protection- commonly referred to as "free market environmentalism" 60 or "FME"- rejects the "market failure" model. "Rather than viewing the world in terms of market failure, we should view the problem of externalities as a failure to permit markets and create markets where they do not yet - or no longer - exist." 61 Where environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of markets, in particular a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights, that is to blame. Resources that are privately owned or managed and therefore are incorporated into market institutions are typically well-maintained. Environmental problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems" which are solved by the extension, definition, and defense of property rights in environmental resources. 62¶ Resources that are unowned or politically controlled, on the other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed. In his seminal essay on the [a] "tragedy of the commons," Garrett Hardin gave an illustration of this principle, stating that there is no incentive for any individual to protect the commonly owned grazing pasture in a rural village. Indeed, it is in every shepherd's self-interest to have his herd overgraze the pasture and before any other herd. Every shepherd who acquires additional livestock gains the benefits of a larger herd, while the cost of overusing the pasture is spread across all members of the village. The benefits of increased use are concentrated, while the costs are dispersed. Inevitably, the consequence is an overgrazed pasture, and everyone loses. The shepherd with foresight, who anticipates that the pasture will become barren in the future, will not exercise forbearance. Quite the opposite: he will have the added incentive to overgraze now to capture gains that otherwise would be lost. Refusing to add another animal to one's own herd does not change the incentive of every other shepherd to do so. The world's fisheries offer a[n] contemporary example of the tragedy of the commons. Because oceans are unowned, nofishing fleet has an incentive to conserve or replenish the fish it takes, but each has every incentive to take as many fish as possible lest the benefits of a larger catch go to someone else.64¶ Efforts to control access through prescriptive regulations do relatively little to change this equation.0 Shorten the fishing season, and the fishing merely becomes more intense. Limit the use of certain gear, and fishermen will simply employ more hands to maximize the catch. Private ownership overcomes the commons problem because owners can prevent overuse by controlling access to the resource. As Hardin noted, "The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it."66 In the case of fisheries, the creation of property rights, whether in fisheries themselves or portions of a given catch, promotes sustainable fishing practices.' With property rights, the incentives faced by fishing fleets are aligned with the long-term sustainability of the underlying resource. As conservation scholar R.J. Smith explains: Wherever we have exclusive private ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.... [P]rivate ownership allows the owner to capture the full capital value of the resource, and self-interest and economic incentive drive the owner to maintain its long-term capital value.0¶ For incentives to work, the property right to a resource must be definable, defendable, and divestible. Where property rights are insecure, owners are less likely to invest in improving or protecting a resource. In many tropical nations, for example, the lack of secure property rights encourages deforestation as there is no incentive to maintain forest land, let alone invest in replanting. 69 Where existing environmental regulations undermine the security of property rights, they discourage conservation. The foremost example of this is the ESA, which effectively punishes private landowners for owning habitat of endangered species by restricting land-use. As Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the State of Texas, noted, "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears."" This economic reality creates a powerful incentive for landowners to destroy present or potential habitat on private land. Thus, in North Carolina, timber owners are dramatically shortening their cutting rotations and cutting trees at a much younger age-at significant economic cost-so as to avoid regulatory proscriptions that could force them to lose their investments altogether.'
| 5,644 |
<h4>Market mechanisms promote environmentalism</h4><p><strong>Adler 5 - </strong>JONATHAN ADLER Prof. of environmental law at Case Western, writes for the Case research series: [“Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights & Environmental Protection” Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working Paper 05-16, July 2005]</p><p>The problem with the dominant approach to environmental policy is its reliance upon centralized political<u><mark> </u></mark>mechanisms. The limitations of such mechanisms-whether regulations, fiscal instruments, or direct management of environmental resources-hamper the effectiveness of existing environmental programs. As environmental problems become ever more complex, these limitations will only become more severe. The answer is not greater government control or manipulation of the marketplace, but a greater reliance upon property rights and voluntary arrangements. <u><mark>By encouraging a more efficient use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental value</mark>s </u>than the modem regulatory state.¶ Property-based environmental protection- commonly referred to as "free market environmentalism" 60 or "FME"- rejects the "market failure" model. "Rather than viewing the world in terms of market failure, we should view the problem of externalities as a failure to permit markets and create markets where they do not yet - or no longer - exist." 61 <u><mark>Where environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of markets,</mark> in particular <mark>a lack of</mark> enforceable and exchangeable <mark>property rights, that is to blame</mark>. <mark>Resources that are</mark> privately <mark>owned</mark> or managed and therefore are incorporated into market institutions <mark>are typically well-maintained</mark>. <mark>Environmental problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems" which are solved by the</mark> <mark>extension</mark>, definition, and defense <mark>of property rights</mark> in environmental resources. </u>62¶ <u>Resources that are <mark>unowned or politically controlled, on the other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed</u></mark>. In his seminal essay on <u>the</u> [a] "<u>tragedy of the commons</u>," Garrett Hardin gave an illustration of this principle, stating that there is no incentive for any individual to protect the commonly owned grazing pasture in a rural village. Indeed, it is in every shepherd's self-interest to have his herd overgraze the pasture and before any other herd. Every shepherd who acquires additional livestock gains the benefits of a larger herd, while the cost of overusing the pasture is spread across all members of the village. The benefits of increased use are concentrated, while the costs are dispersed. Inevitably, the consequence is an overgrazed pasture, and everyone loses. The shepherd with foresight, who anticipates that the pasture will become barren in the future, will not exercise forbearance. Quite the opposite: he will have the added incentive to overgraze now to capture gains that otherwise would be lost. Refusing to add another animal to one's own herd does not change the incentive of every other shepherd to do so. The world's fisheries offer a[n] contemporary example of the tragedy of the commons. Because oceans are unowned, nofishing fleet has an incentive to conserve or replenish the fish it takes, but each has every incentive to take as many fish as possible lest the benefits of a larger catch go to someone else.64¶ Efforts to control access through prescriptive regulations do relatively little to change this equation.0 Shorten the fishing season, and the fishing merely becomes more intense. Limit the use of certain gear, and fishermen will simply employ more hands to maximize the catch. Private ownership overcomes the commons problem because owners can prevent overuse by controlling access to the resource. As Hardin noted, "The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it."66 In the case of fisheries, the creation of property rights, whether in fisheries themselves or portions of a given catch, promotes sustainable fishing practices.' With property rights, the incentives faced by fishing fleets are aligned with the long-term sustainability of the underlying resource. As conservation scholar R.J. Smith explains: Wherever we have exclusive private ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.... [P]rivate ownership allows the owner to capture the full capital value of the resource, and self-interest and economic incentive drive the owner to maintain its long-term capital value.0¶ For incentives to work, the property right to a resource must be definable, defendable, and divestible. Where property rights are insecure, owners are less likely to invest in improving or protecting a resource. In many tropical nations, for example, the lack of secure property rights encourages deforestation as there is no incentive to maintain forest land, let alone invest in replanting. 69 Where existing environmental regulations undermine the security of property rights, they discourage conservation. The foremost example of this is the ESA, which effectively punishes private landowners for owning habitat of endangered species by restricting land-use. As Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the State of Texas, noted, "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears."" This economic reality creates a powerful incentive for landowners to destroy present or potential habitat on private land. Thus, in North Carolina, timber owners are dramatically shortening their cutting rotations <u>and cutting trees at a much younger age-at significant economic cost-so as to avoid regulatory proscriptions that could force them to lose their investments altogether.'</p></u>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,037 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,553 |
D. T is a voter because it's necessary for good clash and debate
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>D. T is a voter because it's necessary for good clash and debate</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,743 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,554 |
Bottom up politics will destroy the environment – the poor are so economically desperate that they don't care about the environment; economic growth is the solution to environmental problems
|
Nangammbi 7
|
Nangammbi 7 Dianah Nangammbi, Cilla CSIR 3/05/2007 Conservation Biologuy POVERTY INFLUENCES ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION http://bcb706.blogspot.com/2007/03/poverty-influences-environmental.html
|
Poverty is considered as a great influence of environmental degradation As the people become poorer, they destroy the resources faster [5]. They tend to overuse the natural resources because they don’t have anything to eat or any means of getting money except through the natural resources, they start to depend more on natural resources.
Poor people harvest natural resources for their survival
Due to the lack of sufficient income people start to use and overuse every resource available to them
The better solution which can rescue both the environment and poor people is through the government by increasing the rate of job creation for poor people
|
Poverty is considered as a great influence of environmental degradation As the people become poorer, they destroy the resources faster [5]. They tend to overuse the natural resources because they don’t have anything to eat
Poor people harvest natural resources for their survival
Due to the lack of sufficient income people start to use and overuse every resource available to them
The better solution which can rescue both the environment and poor people is through the government by increasing the rate of job creation for poor people
|
Poverty is considered as a great influence of environmental degradation. In many regions of the world, regional overgrazing has resulted in destruction of grazing lands, forest and soil. Air and water have been degraded [5]. The carrying capacity of the natural environment has been reduced. As the people become poorer, they destroy the resources faster [5]. They tend to overuse the natural resources because they don’t have anything to eat or any means of getting money except through the natural resources, they start to depend more on natural resources.
Poor people harvest natural resources for their survival or in order to meet their basic needs such as firewood, agricultural productions (such as maize), and water and wild plants for their medicine. All people regardless of being poor or rich depend on natural resources; the concern with poor people is that they are utilizing the resources directly. The rich people do depend on these resource but they do not go to the forest directly and harvest the resources.
Due to the lack of sufficient income people start to use and overuse every resource available to them when their survival is at stake. As desperate hunger leads to desperate strategies for survival, many trees are harvested for fire wood, timber and art craft. Most of the poor people use this fire wood as their source of income by selling them, and art craft products are also used for income generation. The roots of the trees are dug out for medicinal purpose. This leaves the soil exposed as the grasses are also grazed by animals and also collected for roofing the houses. When it rains the entire top and good soil are eroded which makes it difficult for that soil to produce better agricultural products.
Poor people often lack sufficient income and education to afford higher quality life where they can use electricity and also buy electric appliances to ease their domestic life. Instead of cutting trees for fire wood they can use electric stoves for cooking. They can also use electric heaters to warm themselves during winter month. Electricity can also slow down the firewood business as most people will no longer be relying on firewood as it takes time to prepare the fire using wood than just switching on the electricity. The use of electricity will make their lives simpler because it will save time, they won’t go to the field to fetch wood. The chances of been bitten by a snake or get injured are high when they are in field.
They have no quality drinking water as they pollute the rivers by washing inside them and by also using a river as a dumping site for the bins. The lack of education also prohibits them from practicing environmentally sustainable agriculture; protect natural resources against degradation or rehabilitate degraded resources like rivers [6]
In the poorest regions it is estimated that one in five children will not live to see the fifth birthday due to environment-related diseases [7]. Statistics show that almost four million children are dying each year because of acute respiratory infection linked to indoor and out-door air pollution [7]. Other environment-related diseases killing the children are diarrhoea caused by lack of clean water and sanitation and also cholera, malaria and asthma [7].
The better solution which can rescue both the environment and poor people is through the government by increasing the rate of job creation for poor people. If they have jobs they can afford higher quality life which includes affording electricity, they can also afford nice roofing materials instead of using grasses and they can have somewhere to wake up to instead of harvesting the natural resources everyday. Many of poor people are very skilled in a way that a government can build a huge art and craft and timber structures where these people can be employed and still practice their art but in a professional way where the harvesting of plants can be done sustainably.
The government can export these products to other countries where a lot of money can be generated.
Some can also work in guarding the natural environment from culprits. Others can be employed only for harvesting the natural resources for different purposes like medicinal, art and craft, timber, fire wood etc under the supervision of ecologists. This can help in keeping the poor people busy, they will be earning a stable and reliable salary which will keep them away from the natural resources, and after all it will be difficult to access the resources as a close eye will always be kept on them.
| 4,552 |
<h4>Bottom up politics will destroy the environment – the poor are so economically desperate that they don't care about the environment<u>; economic growth is the solution to environmental problems</h4><p></u><strong>Nangammbi 7 </strong> Dianah Nangammbi, Cilla CSIR 3/05/2007 Conservation Biologuy POVERTY INFLUENCES ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION <u>http://bcb706.blogspot.com/2007/03/poverty-influences-environmental.html</p><p><mark>Poverty is considered as a great influence of environmental degradation</u></mark>. In many regions of the world, regional overgrazing has resulted in destruction of grazing lands, forest and soil. Air and water have been degraded [5]. The carrying capacity of the natural environment has been reduced. <u><mark>As the people become poorer, they destroy the resources faster [5]. They tend to overuse the natural resources because they don’t have anything to eat</mark> or any means of getting money except through the natural resources, they start to depend more on natural resources.</p><p><mark>Poor people harvest natural resources for their survival</u></mark> or in order to meet their basic needs such as firewood, agricultural productions (such as maize), and water and wild plants for their medicine. All people regardless of being poor or rich depend on natural resources; the concern with poor people is that they are utilizing the resources directly. The rich people do depend on these resource but they do not go to the forest directly and harvest the resources.</p><p><u><mark>Due to the lack of sufficient income people start to use and overuse every resource available to them</u></mark> when their survival is at stake. As desperate hunger leads to desperate strategies for survival, many trees are harvested for fire wood, timber and art craft. Most of the poor people use this fire wood as their source of income by selling them, and art craft products are also used for income generation. The roots of the trees are dug out for medicinal purpose. This leaves the soil exposed as the grasses are also grazed by animals and also collected for roofing the houses. When it rains the entire top and good soil are eroded which makes it difficult for that soil to produce better agricultural products.</p><p>Poor people often lack sufficient income and education to afford higher quality life where they can use electricity and also buy electric appliances to ease their domestic life. Instead of cutting trees for fire wood they can use electric stoves for cooking. They can also use electric heaters to warm themselves during winter month. Electricity can also slow down the firewood business as most people will no longer be relying on firewood as it takes time to prepare the fire using wood than just switching on the electricity. The use of electricity will make their lives simpler because it will save time, they won’t go to the field to fetch wood. The chances of been bitten by a snake or get injured are high when they are in field.</p><p>They have no quality drinking water as they pollute the rivers by washing inside them and by also using a river as a dumping site for the bins. The lack of education also prohibits them from practicing environmentally sustainable agriculture; protect natural resources against degradation or rehabilitate degraded resources like rivers [6]</p><p>In the poorest regions it is estimated that one in five children will not live to see the fifth birthday due to environment-related diseases [7]. Statistics show that almost four million children are dying each year because of acute respiratory infection linked to indoor and out-door air pollution [7]. Other environment-related diseases killing the children are diarrhoea caused by lack of clean water and sanitation and also cholera, malaria and asthma [7].</p><p><u><mark>The better solution which can rescue both the environment and poor people is through the government by increasing the rate of job creation for poor people</u></mark>. If they have jobs they can afford higher quality life which includes affording electricity, they can also afford nice roofing materials instead of using grasses and they can have somewhere to wake up to instead of harvesting the natural resources everyday. Many of poor people are very skilled in a way that a government can build a huge art and craft and timber structures where these people can be employed and still practice their art but in a professional way where the harvesting of plants can be done sustainably.</p><p>The government can export these products to other countries where a lot of money can be generated.</p><p>Some can also work in guarding the natural environment from culprits. Others can be employed only for harvesting the natural resources for different purposes like medicinal, art and craft, timber, fire wood etc under the supervision of ecologists. This can help in keeping the poor people busy, they will be earning a stable and reliable salary which will keep them away from the natural resources, and after all it will be difficult to access the resources as a close eye will always be kept on them.</p>
|
Neolib K
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 229,019 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,555 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize nearly all marihuana through state-run retail stores in the United States
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize nearly all marihuana through state-run retail stores in the United States</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,744 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,556 |
GOP will win now --- newest polls and data, Obama approval, immigration, and health care
|
Adams 9/26/14
|
Adams 9/26/14 --- Commentary Writer for the Washington Examiner (T., “Here are the most important pre-midterm polls from this week”, http://washingtonexaminer.com/here-are-the-most-important-pre-midterm-polls-from-this-week/article/2554046?custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&utm_medium=referral)//trepka
|
s the 2014 November midterm elections loom ever closer, a new batch of polls released this week offers possible clues as to which party will control Congress next year. This week's surveys suggest a GOP resurgence. Here are the most important polls Alaska Sullivan managed to take the lead against Begich The PPP survey contains a margin of error of 2.6 percentage points A separate Rasmussen survey released Thursday shows Sullivan leading Begich 48 to 43 percent Arkansas Cotton managed to overcome a major deficit in outside spending to take a five-point lead against Pryor Democratic groups have committed $10 million to attacking Cotton, but it doesn’t appear to have slowed the Republican candidate’s momentum. Colorado Gardner has taken a slim two-point lead over incumbent Mark Udall Georgia Republican businessman Perdue narrowly leads against his Democratic opponent, Nunn, 46 percent to 45 percent, Problems for Democrats: President Obama continues to act as something of an albatross around the necks of vulnerable Democratic candidates as his approval rating continues to languish according to the latest data from Gallup Obama’s approval rating has suffered especially badly in the Hispanic community with the president’s decision to punt immigration reform And then, of course, there’s the continued unpopularity of the Affordable Care Act,
|
a new batch of polls offers which party will control Congress This week's surveys suggest a GOP resurgence Sullivan managed to take the lead against Begich A separate Rasmussen survey shows Sullivan leading Cotton managed to overcome a major deficit in outside spending to take a five-point lead against Pryor Gardner has taken a slim two-point lead Republican businessman Perdue narrowly leads Nunn Obama continues to act as an albatross as his approval rating continues to languish according to the latest data from Gallup especially in the Hispanic community with the decision to punt immigration And then, there’s continued unpopularity of A Ca
|
As the 2014 November midterm elections loom ever closer, a new batch of polls released this week offers possible clues as to which party will control Congress next year. The Republican Party had in recent months lost its advantage over Democrats, according to various forecasters, including 538’s Nate Silver. This week's surveys, however, suggest a GOP resurgence. Here are the most important polls released this week. Alaska: Former Attorney General Dan Sullivan, a Republican, has managed to take the lead against his opponent, Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, leading the incumbent senator 43 percent to 41 percent, according to the Democratic polling firm Public Policy Polling. The PPP survey, which was released Tuesday, was conducted Sept. 18 to 21 and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 2.6 percentage points. It surveyed 880 likely voters aged 18 and older. A separate Rasmussen survey released Thursday shows Sullivan leading Begich 48 to 43 percent. This survey was conducted Sept. 23 to 24, and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 4 percentage points. Sullivan’s lead comes at a time when outside groups have poured roughly $20 million into the race, the largest share going to attacks on the Republican candidate. Arkansas: Rep. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., has managed to overcome a major deficit in outside spending to take a five-point lead against incumbent Sen. Mark Pryor, D-Ark., according to Public Policy Polling. A separate USA Today/Suffolk University shows that Pryor holds a slim 45-43 lead over Cotton. This survey, which was released Tuesday, was conducted Sept. 20 to 23 and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 4.4 percentage points. Outside Democratic groups have committed $10 million to attacking Cotton, but it doesn’t appear to have slowed the Republican candidate’s momentum. Colorado: Rep. Cory Gardner, R-Colo., has taken a slim two-point lead over incumbent Sen. Mark Udall, D-Colo., the continuation of what has been a very close race, according to new results from PPP. The Republican challenger currently holds 47-45 lead in the hotly contested race, which is a “statistical tie,” based on the survey’s 3.8 percent margin of error, according to the report. Counting both partisan and non-partisan polls, Gardner now leads in the last five surveys. Georgia: Republican businessman David Perdue narrowly leads against his Democratic opponent, Michelle Nunn, 46 percent to 45 percent, according to SurveyUSA/WXIA report released Monday. The survey was conducted from Sept. 19 to 22 and contains a sampling error of margin of 4.3 percentage points. The poll surveyed 550 likely voters. North Carolina: Incumbent Sen. Kay Hagan, D-N.C., leads Republican challenger state Rep. Thom Thillis 46-42, according to a Gravis Marketing survey released Thursday by Human Events. The survey was conducted Sept. 22 to 23 and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. It surveyed 860 likely voters. Virginia: Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., holds a healthy 48-39 lead over Republican Ed Gillespie, according to a Quinnipiac survey released Thursday. "U.S. Sen. Mark Warner has been the most popular politician in Virginia for the past several years and appears to be in reasonable shape for re-election," assistant director of the Quinnipiac University Poll said Peter A. Brown in a statement. "But his lead is not insurmountable with six weeks to go until Election Day." The Quinnipiac survey was conducted Sept. 17 to 22, polled 1,010 likely voters and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. A separate PPP survey released Friday shows about the same: Warner leads Gillespie 48-35. This survey was conducted Sept. 22 to 23, surveyed 625 likely voters and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 3.9 percentage points. Problems for Democrats: President Obama continues to act as something of an albatross around the necks of vulnerable Democratic candidates as his approval rating continues to languish. The president’s approval rating currently sits at 42 percent, according to the latest data from Gallup, which is a bit of a decrease from the short-lived bump he enjoyed earlier in September. Obama’s approval rating has suffered especially badly in the Hispanic community, diving recently with the president’s decision to punt immigration reform until after the November midterm elections. The Hispanic approval rating plummeted from 74 percent in 2013 to 52 percent in August 2014, according to the monthly Gallup report released Friday. The Gallup survey of the president’s approval rating among Hispanics was conducted from January 2009 through August 2014. The surveys sampled 1,300 Hispanics, aged 18 and older, and contains a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. And then, of course, there’s the continued unpopularity of the Affordable Care Act, Obama’s signature piece of domestic legislation. Forty-seven percent of Americans say they disapprove of the massive healthcare law, while only 35 percent say they approve, according to the latest tracking data from the Kaiser Family Foundation.
| 5,165 |
<h4>GOP will <u>win now</u> --- <u>newest polls and data</u>, Obama approval, immigration, and health care</h4><p><strong>Adams 9/26/14 </strong>--- Commentary Writer for the Washington Examiner (T., “Here are the most important pre-midterm polls from this week”, http://washingtonexaminer.com/here-are-the-most-important-pre-midterm-polls-from-this-week/article/2554046?custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&utm_medium=referral)//trepka</p><p>A<u>s the 2014 November midterm elections loom ever closer, <mark>a <strong>new batch of polls</u></strong></mark> <u>released this week <mark>offers</mark> possible clues as to <mark>which party will control Congress</mark> next year. </u>The Republican Party had in recent months lost its advantage over Democrats, according to various forecasters, including 538’s Nate Silver. <u><mark>This week's surveys</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>suggest a <strong>GOP resurgence</mark>. </strong>Here are the <strong>most important polls</u></strong> released this week. <u>Alaska</u>: Former Attorney General Dan <u><mark>Sullivan</u></mark>, a Republican, has <u><mark>managed to take the <strong>lead against</mark> </u></strong>his opponent, Sen. Mark <u><strong><mark>Begich</u></strong></mark>, D-Alaska, leading the incumbent senator 43 percent to 41 percent, according to the Democratic polling firm Public Policy Polling. <u>The PPP survey</u>, which was released Tuesday, was conducted Sept. 18 to 21 and <u>contains a </u>sampling<u> margin of error of</u> plus or minus <u>2.6 percentage points</u>. It surveyed 880 likely voters aged 18 and older. <u><mark>A <strong>separate Rasmussen survey</strong></mark> released Thursday <mark>shows Sullivan leading</mark> Begich 48 to 43 percent</u>. This survey was conducted Sept. 23 to 24, and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 4 percentage points. Sullivan’s lead comes at a time when outside groups have poured roughly $20 million into the race, the largest share going to attacks on the Republican candidate. <u>Arkansas</u>: Rep. Tom <u><mark>Cotton</u></mark>, R-Ark., has <u><mark>managed to <strong>overcome</strong> a</u> <u>major deficit in outside spending to take a <strong>five-point lead</u></strong> <u>against</u></mark> incumbent Sen. Mark <u><mark>Pryor</u></mark>, D-Ark., according to Public Policy Polling. A separate USA Today/Suffolk University shows that Pryor holds a slim 45-43 lead over Cotton. This survey, which was released Tuesday, was conducted Sept. 20 to 23 and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 4.4 percentage points. Outside <u>Democratic groups have committed $10 million to attacking Cotton, but it <strong>doesn’t appear to have slowed the Republican candidate’s momentum. </strong>Colorado</u>: Rep. Cory <u><mark>Gardner</u></mark>, R-Colo., <u><mark>has taken a <strong>slim two-point lead</strong></mark> over incumbent</u> Sen. <u>Mark Udall</u>, D-Colo., the continuation of what has been a very close race, according to new results from PPP. The Republican challenger currently holds 47-45 lead in the hotly contested race, which is a “statistical tie,” based on the survey’s 3.8 percent margin of error, according to the report. Counting both partisan and non-partisan polls, Gardner now leads in the last five surveys. <u>Georgia</u>: <u><mark>Republican businessman</mark> </u>David<u> <mark>Perdue narrowly <strong>leads</strong></mark> against his Democratic opponent, </u>Michelle<u> <mark>Nunn</mark>, 46 percent to 45 percent,</u> according to SurveyUSA/WXIA report released Monday. The survey was conducted from Sept. 19 to 22 and contains a sampling error of margin of 4.3 percentage points. The poll surveyed 550 likely voters. North Carolina: Incumbent Sen. Kay Hagan, D-N.C., leads Republican challenger state Rep. Thom Thillis 46-42, according to a Gravis Marketing survey released Thursday by Human Events. The survey was conducted Sept. 22 to 23 and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. It surveyed 860 likely voters. Virginia: Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., holds a healthy 48-39 lead over Republican Ed Gillespie, according to a Quinnipiac survey released Thursday. "U.S. Sen. Mark Warner has been the most popular politician in Virginia for the past several years and appears to be in reasonable shape for re-election," assistant director of the Quinnipiac University Poll said Peter A. Brown in a statement. "But his lead is not insurmountable with six weeks to go until Election Day." The Quinnipiac survey was conducted Sept. 17 to 22, polled 1,010 likely voters and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. A separate PPP survey released Friday shows about the same: Warner leads Gillespie 48-35. This survey was conducted Sept. 22 to 23, surveyed 625 likely voters and contains a sampling margin of error of plus or minus 3.9 percentage points. <u>Problems for Democrats: President <mark>Obama continues to act as</mark> something of <mark>an <strong>albatross</strong></mark> around the necks of vulnerable Democratic candidates <mark>as his <strong>approval rating</strong> continues to <strong>languish</u></strong></mark>. The president’s approval rating currently sits at 42 percent, <u><mark>according to the <strong>latest data</u></strong> <u>from Gallup</u></mark>, which is a bit of a decrease from the short-lived bump he enjoyed earlier in September. <u>Obama’s approval rating has suffered <strong><mark>especially</mark> badly</strong> <mark>in the Hispanic community</u></mark>, diving recently <u><mark>with the</mark> president’s <mark>decision to punt immigration</mark> reform </u>until after the November midterm elections. The Hispanic approval rating plummeted from 74 percent in 2013 to 52 percent in August 2014, according to the monthly Gallup report released Friday. The Gallup survey of the president’s approval rating among Hispanics was conducted from January 2009 through August 2014. The surveys sampled 1,300 Hispanics, aged 18 and older, and contains a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. <u><mark>And then,</mark> of course, <mark>there’s</mark> the <strong><mark>continued unpopularity of</mark> the <mark>A</mark>ffordable <mark>Ca</mark>re Act</strong>, </u>Obama’s signature piece of domestic legislation. Forty-seven percent of Americans say they disapprove of the massive healthcare law, while only 35 percent say they approve, according to the latest tracking data from the Kaiser Family Foundation.</p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,747 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,557 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws. The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws. The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,745 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,558 |
Plan won’t affect the election- voters don’t make decisions based on issues
Lenz 2012 (Gabriel, assistant professor of political science at California, Berkeley, Follow the Leader?: How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance, 2012, p. 3)
|
Lenz 2012
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Plan won’t affect the election- voters don’t make decisions based on issues</h4><p><strong>Lenz 2012 </strong>(Gabriel, assistant professor of political science at California, Berkeley, Follow the Leader?: How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance, 2012, p. 3)</p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,746 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,559 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
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only 1 percent of marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u><strong>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u></strong>[*633] The <u><strong>marijuana legalization</u></strong> issue <u><strong>provides a salient example</u></strong>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u><strong>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u></strong>. As of 2008, <u><strong>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u></strong>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of </mark>the roughly 800,000 <mark>marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><strong><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs </mark>onto the states</u></strong>. <u><strong>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass </mark>the significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely <mark>prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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Off
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,560 |
But voters fail the policy tests. In particular, I find surprisingly little evidence that voters judge politicians on their policy stances. They rarely shift their votes to politicians who agree with them—even when a policy issue has just become highly prominent, even when politicians take clear and distinct stances on the issue, and even when voters know these stances. Instead, I usually find the reverse: voters first decide they like a politician for other reasons, then adopt his or her policy views. ¶ My results confirm the views of scholars who see democracy primarily as a means for voters to pass judgment on how well incumbent politicians have been performing rather than as a means for voters to express their own policy preferences. Although perhaps not everyone’s ideal, democracy should therefore at a minimum select competent leaders over incompetent ones. Voters may even be exercising an indirect influence on politicians’ policies by voting out leaders whose policies, in the voters’ eyes, have not turned out well. ¶ My results are likely to disappoint scholars who see democracy as a means for voters to express their policy preferences. In fact, my findings suggest that this idea of democracy has been inverted. Voters don’t choose between politicians based on policy stances; rather, voters appear to adopt the policies that their favorite politicians prefer. Moreover, voters seem to follow rather blindly, adopting a particular politician’s specific policies even when they know little or nothing of that politician’s overall ideology. Politicians, these findings imply, have considerable freedom in the policies they enact without fear of electoral repercussions.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>But <u><strong><mark>voters fail the policy tests</u></strong></mark>. In particular, <u>I find <strong>surprisingly <mark>little evidence</strong> that voters judge politicians on their policy stances. They rarely shift their votes</mark> to politicians who agree with them—<strong><mark>even</mark> <mark>when a policy issue has just become highly prominent</strong></mark>, even <mark>when politicians take clear</mark> and distinct <mark>stances</mark> on the issue, <mark>and even when voters know these stances</u></mark>. Instead, I usually find the reverse: <u><mark>voters first decide they like a politician for other reasons, then adopt</mark> his or her <mark>policy views</u></mark>. ¶ My results confirm the views of scholars who see democracy primarily as a means for voters to pass judgment on how well incumbent politicians have been performing rather than as a means for voters to express their own policy preferences. Although perhaps not everyone’s ideal, democracy should therefore at a minimum select competent leaders over incompetent ones. Voters may even be exercising an indirect influence on politicians’ policies by voting out leaders whose policies, in the voters’ eyes, have not turned out well. ¶ My results are likely to disappoint scholars who see democracy as a means for voters to express their policy preferences. In fact, my findings suggest that this idea of democracy has been inverted. <u><strong><mark>Voters don’t choose between politicians based on policy stances</strong></mark>; rather, voters appear to adopt the policies that their favorite politicians prefer</u>. Moreover, <u>voters seem to follow rather blindly</u>, adopting a particular politician’s specific policies even when they know little or nothing of that politician’s overall ideology. <u><mark>Politicians</u></mark>, these findings imply, <u><mark>have</mark> considerable<mark> freedom</mark> in the policies they enact <strong><mark>without fear of electoral repercussions</strong></mark>.</h4></u>
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Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,748 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,561 |
Prefer our evidence-- Central purchasing avoids politics - government purchase avoids the objections
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Rothman, 6
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Rothman, 6 David J. Rothman, Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine and Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and Professor of History at Columbia University; and Sheila M. Rothman, Professor of Public Health in the Division of Sociomedical Sciences at the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, also Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons. The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales American Journal of Transplantation, 6(7); 1524-1529, 13 February 2006
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Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central, UNOS-like organization, permitting individuals to sell but not to purchase an organ
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Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central organization, permitting individuals to sell but not to purchase an organ
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http://www.societyandmedicine.columbia.edu/organs_challenge.shtml
The Myth of the Regulated Market
Proponents offer very different models for a market in organs, making it difficult to know precisely what is being advocated. Some would restrict compensation to cadaveric organs and give credits to families who agree to the removal. Others, including a committee of the American Medical Association, endorse a futures market in organs: American Journal of Transplantation they would compensate would-be donors for agreeing to organ removal upon death (24–29). Still others urge a regulated market among living vendors but provide almost no details (1,6,20). Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central, UNOS-like organization, permitting individuals to sell but not to purchase an organ (30–32). Such compromises, it should be noted, are inconsistent with proponents’ attachment to the market. After all, people are even more likely to do something if they are very well paid for it—so why not permit auctions?
| 1,100 |
<h4>Prefer our evidence-- Central purchasing avoids politics -<strong> government purchase avoids the objections</h4><p>Rothman, 6 </strong>David J. Rothman, Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine and Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and Professor of History at Columbia University; and Sheila M. Rothman, Professor of Public Health in the Division of Sociomedical Sciences at the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, also Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons.<strong> </strong>The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales<strong> </strong>American Journal of Transplantation, 6(7); 1524-1529, 13 February 2006</p><p>http://www.societyandmedicine.columbia.edu/organs_challenge.shtml</p><p>The Myth of the Regulated Market</p><p>Proponents offer very different models for a market in organs, making it difficult to know precisely what is being advocated. Some would restrict compensation to cadaveric organs and give credits to families who agree to the removal. Others, including a committee of the American Medical Association, endorse a futures market in organs: American Journal of Transplantation they would compensate would-be donors for agreeing to organ removal upon death (24–29). Still others urge a regulated market among living vendors but provide almost no details (1,6,20). <u><mark>Mostly everyone rejects a public auction with the kidney going to the highest bidder; the preference is for distribution by a central</mark>, UNOS-like <mark>organization, permitting individuals <strong>to sell but not to purchase</strong> an organ</u><strong></mark> (30–32). Such compromises, it should be noted, are inconsistent with proponents’ attachment to the market. After all, people are even more likely to do something if they are very well paid for it—so why not permit auctions?</p></strong>
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Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,212 | 17 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,562 |
Contracting solves certainty- provides safe harbor
|
Kleiman 2013 (Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, “Federalism and cannabis policy: the terms of a bargain,” August 23rd, http://www.samefacts.com/2013/08/drug-policy/federalism-and-cannabis-policy-the-terms-of-a-bargain/)
|
Kleiman 2013 (Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, “Federalism and cannabis policy: the terms of a bargain,” August 23rd, http://www.samefacts.com/2013/08/drug-policy/federalism-and-cannabis-policy-the-terms-of-a-bargain/)
|
I offer two alternatives to the options as to how the federal government can deal with state-level cannabis legalization. Washington and Colorado would like the feds to let their new commercial systems operate the Controlled Substances Act orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials in enforcing the law, and authorizes contractual arrangements with states formal deals in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off state-licensed businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal but formalize a program of selective enforcement that would give state licensees an effective safe harbor.
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two alternatives the Controlled Substances Act orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials contractual arrangements” with states in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal, but formalize selective enforcement that would give state licensees a safe harbor
|
The Journal of Drug Policy Analysis has just published a new paper (behind a paywall) in which I offer two alternatives to the options currently in public discussion as to how the federal government can deal with state-level cannabis legalization. This fall, Washington and Colorado intend to start licensing businesses to produce and sell cannabis under voter-passed initiatives, even though the stuff remains illegal under federal law. The federal government has not yet said what it plans to do about it, and its three obvious options – acquiescing, cracking down, and muddling through – all have fairly serious drawbacks. A number of what Keith calls Formerly Important Persons have demanded that the feds crush the state-legal Colorado and Washington markets. Since every participant in those markets needs a license, that wouldn’t be hard to do: any federal judge would cheerfully enjoin someone applying for license to commit a federal felony from doing so. But the state-legal commercial markets represent only one of three systems that can deliver cannabis to customers. The loosely-regulated “medical marijuana” markets would be a far tougher nut for the feds to crack. And the purely illicit system, which handles the vast bulk of transactions today, is way too big for 4000 DEA agents to suppress without help. More than 90% of arrests for growing and dealing marijuana are made by state and local cops. So the feds need state and local authorities in Washington and Colorado to maintain pressure on illegal growing. Constitutionally, the states have no mandate to even have drug laws, let alone enforce them. In this case, federalism is more than a legal doctrine: it’s a brute fact. So: Washington and Colorado would like the feds to let their new commercial systems operate. And the feds would like Washington and Colorado to suppress production for out-of-state sale. When each of two parties has something the other wants, that’s the basis for a bargain. And the Controlled Substances Act (Sec. 873, if you’re keeping score at home) orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials in enforcing the law, and authorizes him, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” to enter into “contractual arrangements” with states and localities. The paper proposes that he use that authority to make formal deals with Colorado and Washington in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off state-licensed businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade. That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal, but it could formalize a program of targeted, selective enforcement that would give state licensees an effective safe harbor.
| 2,715 |
<h4>Contracting solves certainty- provides safe harbor</h4><p><strong>Kleiman 2013</strong> <u><strong>(Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, “Federalism and cannabis policy: the terms of a bargain,” August 23rd, http://www.samefacts.com/2013/08/drug-policy/federalism-and-cannabis-policy-the-terms-of-a-bargain/)</p><p></u></strong>The Journal of Drug Policy Analysis has just published a new paper (behind a paywall) in which <u><strong>I offer <mark>two alternatives</mark> to the options </u></strong>currently in public discussion <u><strong>as to how the federal government can deal with state-level cannabis legalization. </u></strong>This fall, Washington and Colorado intend to start licensing businesses to produce and sell cannabis under voter-passed initiatives, even though the stuff remains illegal under federal law. The federal government has not yet said what it plans to do about it, and its three obvious options – acquiescing, cracking down, and muddling through – all have fairly serious drawbacks. A number of what Keith calls Formerly Important Persons have demanded that the feds crush the state-legal Colorado and Washington markets. Since every participant in those markets needs a license, that wouldn’t be hard to do: any federal judge would cheerfully enjoin someone applying for license to commit a federal felony from doing so. But the state-legal commercial markets represent only one of three systems that can deliver cannabis to customers. The loosely-regulated “medical marijuana” markets would be a far tougher nut for the feds to crack. And the purely illicit system, which handles the vast bulk of transactions today, is way too big for 4000 DEA agents to suppress without help. More than 90% of arrests for growing and dealing marijuana are made by state and local cops. So the feds need state and local authorities in Washington and Colorado to maintain pressure on illegal growing. Constitutionally, the states have no mandate to even have drug laws, let alone enforce them. In this case, federalism is more than a legal doctrine: it’s a brute fact. So: <u><strong>Washington and Colorado would like the feds to let their new commercial systems operate</u></strong>. And the feds would like Washington and Colorado to suppress production for out-of-state sale. When each of two parties has something the other wants, that’s the basis for a bargain. And <u><strong><mark>the Controlled Substances Act</u></strong></mark> (Sec. 873, if you’re keeping score at home) <u><strong><mark>orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials</mark> in enforcing the law, and authorizes</u></strong> him, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” to enter into “<u><strong><mark>contractual arrangements</u></strong>” <u><strong>with states</u></strong></mark> and localities. The paper proposes that he use that authority to make <u><strong>formal deals</u></strong> with Colorado and Washington <u><strong><mark>in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off</mark> state-licensed <mark>businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal</u></strong>, <u><strong>but</u></strong></mark> it could <u><strong><mark>formalize</mark> a program of</u></strong> targeted, <u><strong><mark>selective enforcement</mark> <mark>that would give state licensees</mark> <mark>a</mark>n effective <mark>safe harbor</mark>.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Off
| 56,742 | 9 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,563 |
Turns out both dems and republicans
|
Gregory ’11
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Gregory, ’11 [Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR]
|
The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal . The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. studies show that this has become a matter of life and death
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organ sales, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice, conservatives claim to favor free markets but self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts studies show that this has become a matter of life and death
|
The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that this has become a matter of life and death.
| 3,584 |
<h4><strong>Turns out both dems and republicans</h4><p>Gregory</strong>, <strong>’11</strong> [Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR]</p><p><u>The very idea of legalization <strong>might sound gruesome</strong> to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list</u>. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. <u><strong>Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's</u></strong>. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. <u>Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful</u>. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. <u>Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that <mark>organ sales,</mark> in and of themselves, <mark>are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal</u>.</mark> Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law<u>. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven <strong>highly controversial</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice</strong>,</mark>" and <mark>conservatives claim to favor free markets</mark>, <mark>but</mark> true <mark>self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts</mark>, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs.</u> In any event, <u><strong><mark>studies show that this has become a matter of life and death</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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Midterms
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Suggested Core to answer Cap K
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
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A
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Kentucky
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3
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Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
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Campbell
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1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
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MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
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Jo.....
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cx
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college
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742,564 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
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Schwartz 2013
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Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
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The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
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We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is clear enough to overcome a strong belief by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of federal anti-drug policy on the states the vote of just one conservative justice could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, in order to make room for commandeering a loophole would make it easier to characterize the as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest perhaps transfer the suspect to federal custody, the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in loopholes , if a federal command to state police to make arrests for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
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B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><strong>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></strong>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u><strong>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u></strong>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is </mark>strong enough and <mark>clear enough to overcome a strong belief </mark>possibly held <mark>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of </mark>a <mark>federal anti-drug</mark> <mark>policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><strong>the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; <mark>the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justice</mark>s<mark> could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>in order to make room for </mark>de facto <mark>commandeering </mark>of state officials under the CSA</u></strong>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u><strong>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u></strong>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u><strong>such <mark>a loophole would make it easier to characterize the </mark>CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - <mark>as "not commandeering"</u></strong></mark> under Reno. <u><strong><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest </mark>and seizure, and <mark>perhaps </mark>to <mark>transfer the suspect </mark>or the marijuana or both <mark>to federal custody, </mark>would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u></strong>. Put another way, <u><strong>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u></strong>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u><strong>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u></strong>. Rather <u><strong><mark>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in </mark>an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived <mark>loopholes </mark>in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u></strong>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests </mark>and seizures <mark>for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
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Kentucky
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4
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Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
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Bagwell
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1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
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Dartmouth MaCr
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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college
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742,565 |
Ebola thumps the link- dominates pre-election media because of House hearings in two weeks
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CNN 10/3
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CNN 10/3/2014 (Ebola becomes an election issue, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/politics/ebola-midterms/)
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Ebola is becoming an issue in the midterm Republicans are seizing on the issue to make the case Obama isn't leading It's part of an effort to force their Democratic opponents to defend Obama's response to Ebola their line of attack will resonate with voters political campaigns in recent weeks have been quick to focus their messages on issues that are on voters' minds Soon after questions were raised about Obama's response to ISIS Americans were increasingly worried about an attack at home a House committee announced on Friday that it will hold a hearing on the Ebola outbreak on Oct. 16
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Ebola is becoming an issue in the midterm Republicans are seizing on the issue to make the case Obama isn't leading It's part of an effort to force their Democratic opponents to defend Obama's response to Ebola. their line of attack will resonate with voters political campaigns in recent weeks have been quick to focus their messages on issues that are on voters' minds Soon after questions were raised about Obama's response to ISIS Americans were worried about an attack at home a House committee announced on Friday that it will hold a hearing on the Ebola outbreak on Oct. 16.
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The recent Ebola outbreak is becoming an issue in the competitive midterm elections. Top Democratic and Republican campaign officials in Washington are uncertain about the political ramifications of Ebola's arrival in the U.S. and are grappling with how to respond. But Republicans are seizing on the issue as an opportunity to again make the case that President Barack Obama isn't leading effectively. They're highlighting Obama's recent assurance that Ebola was "unlikely" to get to the U.S. and calling for the U.S. to impose new travel restrictions for those countries in Africa where the outbreak began. It's all part of an effort to force their Democratic opponents to defend Obama's response to Ebola. GOP officials have reason to believe their line of attack will resonate with voters. CNN has learned from sources at the NRSC, the national campaign organization for Senate Republicans, that the group's internal polling finds 60 percent of voters believe that if a single case of Ebola arises in the U.S., it should be treated as a major crisis by the federal government. "Washington is broken," claimed an NRSC email. "The top-down approach championed by Democrats for decades (and controlled by them at the federal level in Washington) has shown itself to be completely unprepared and ill-equipped for 21st Century challenges." Democrats have been supportive of the administration's efforts, but are pushing for a coordinated effort with other countries to prevent further spread of Ebola. Still, GOP candidates have picked up on the message. Michigan Republican Senate candidate Terri Lynn Land Friday called for a travel ban or other restrictions to ensure more infected people do not enter the country. "I'm a mom. I have kids. People are concerned. Again, this is a safety and security issue," Land told Michigan Public Radio. She called on the president and her opponent, Democratic Rep. Gary Peters, who she is trailing in most polls, to outline a federal response. "The President needs to lead," Land said. "Congressman Peters needs to lead -- to come up with a plan to make sure we can deal with this." A spokeswoman for Peters told CNN that Land is "desperate." "It is sad Terri Lynn Land is now so desperate that she's trying to use a deadly virus as a political issue, and it's shameful," spokeswoman Haley Morris said. "Before playing politics with such a serious issue, Terri Lynn Land should explain why she pushed for the government shutdown last year, which hampered the CDC and our nation's emergency readiness." In North Carolina, Thom Tillis, who is trying to unseat Democrat Kay Hagan in one of the most closely watched Senate races this year, also called for a travel ban from West African countries. "It's time for Washington to take action to protect the American people," said Tillis, who many recent polls show is narrowly trailing Hagan. A Hagan spokeswoman responded that Tillis's approach would not do enough. "Kay believes the U.S. should work together with the international community to take a wide range of steps to fight this epidemic and prevent it from spreading," Sadie Weiner said in an email. "Travel restrictions may be one tool we can use, but they should be part of a broader strategy because simply sealing the borders to these countries won't make the crisis go away." As far back as August, Arkansas Democratic Sen. Mark Pryor tried to use the issue of Ebola against his opponent, GOP Rep. Tom Cotton. In a campaign ad, Pryor accused Cotton of voting against a 2013 bill that included money to respond to pandemics. But Cotton did support the final version that became law, according to an analysis by Politifact. On Friday, Cotton signed a letter to Obama with fellow House Republicans from Arkansas urging him to consider a ban on flights to affected countries. "The quality of our hospitals, we well as our talented doctors, is undoubtedly a draw for people with the means and will to come to the U.S. -- sometimes because exposure to Ebola in their own country and in spite of the risk to the health of Americans," the GOP congressmen wrote. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest told reporters Friday that at this point, the Administration is not considering imposing any travel ban. In an interview on CNN Friday, the number two official with the Senate GOP campaign arm, Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio, said the U.S. needs to be "more aggressive" in screening people coming to the country and pointed to recent report that said the Department of Homeland Security is not equipped right now to deal with a pandemic. "I don't think we're prepared as we should be," Portman said. "I think this is another example where the administration was not as engaged early on as they should have been and now we're playing catch-up." Aides for both the House GOP and Democratic campaign committees tell CNN Ebola has not cropped up in House races at this point. But that could change as political campaigns in recent weeks have been quick to focus their messages on issues that are on voters' minds. Soon after questions were raised about Obama's response to the terror group ISIS, and public opinion polls showed Americans were increasingly worried about an attack at home, Republican candidates began bringing up the issue. The National Republicans Congressional Campaign Committee rolled out television commercials suggesting several Democratic candidates didn't support funding to respond to terrorists threats and they were "dangerous." And though Congress is in recess for the final stretch before the midterm elections, a House committee announced on Friday that it will hold a hearing on the Ebola outbreak on Oct. 16.
| 5,672 |
<h4>Ebola thumps the link- dominates pre-election media because of House hearings in two weeks</h4><p><strong>CNN 10/3</strong>/2014 (Ebola becomes an election issue, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/politics/ebola-midterms/)</p><p>The recent <u><strong><mark>Ebola</u></strong></mark> outbreak <u><strong><mark>is becoming an issue in the</u></strong></mark> competitive <u><strong><mark>midterm</u></strong></mark> elections. Top Democratic and Republican campaign officials in Washington are uncertain about the political ramifications of Ebola's arrival in the U.S. and are grappling with how to respond. But <u><mark>Republicans are <strong>seizing on the issue</u></strong></mark> as an opportunity <u><mark>to</u></mark> again <u><mark>make the case</u></mark> that President Barack <u><mark>Obama isn't leading</u></mark> effectively. They're highlighting Obama's recent assurance that Ebola was "unlikely" to get to the U.S. and calling for the U.S. to impose new travel restrictions for those countries in Africa where the outbreak began. <u><mark>It's</u></mark> all <u><mark>part of an effort to force their Democratic opponents to defend Obama's response to Ebola</u>.</mark> GOP officials have reason to believe <u><mark>their line of attack will resonate with voters</u></mark>. CNN has learned from sources at the NRSC, the national campaign organization for Senate Republicans, that the group's internal polling finds 60 percent of voters believe that if a single case of Ebola arises in the U.S., it should be treated as a major crisis by the federal government. "Washington is broken," claimed an NRSC email. "The top-down approach championed by Democrats for decades (and controlled by them at the federal level in Washington) has shown itself to be completely unprepared and ill-equipped for 21st Century challenges." Democrats have been supportive of the administration's efforts, but are pushing for a coordinated effort with other countries to prevent further spread of Ebola. Still, GOP candidates have picked up on the message. Michigan Republican Senate candidate Terri Lynn Land Friday called for a travel ban or other restrictions to ensure more infected people do not enter the country. "I'm a mom. I have kids. People are concerned. Again, this is a safety and security issue," Land told Michigan Public Radio. She called on the president and her opponent, Democratic Rep. Gary Peters, who she is trailing in most polls, to outline a federal response. "The President needs to lead," Land said. "Congressman Peters needs to lead -- to come up with a plan to make sure we can deal with this." A spokeswoman for Peters told CNN that Land is "desperate." "It is sad Terri Lynn Land is now so desperate that she's trying to use a deadly virus as a political issue, and it's shameful," spokeswoman Haley Morris said. "Before playing politics with such a serious issue, Terri Lynn Land should explain why she pushed for the government shutdown last year, which hampered the CDC and our nation's emergency readiness." In North Carolina, Thom Tillis, who is trying to unseat Democrat Kay Hagan in one of the most closely watched Senate races this year, also called for a travel ban from West African countries. "It's time for Washington to take action to protect the American people," said Tillis, who many recent polls show is narrowly trailing Hagan. A Hagan spokeswoman responded that Tillis's approach would not do enough. "Kay believes the U.S. should work together with the international community to take a wide range of steps to fight this epidemic and prevent it from spreading," Sadie Weiner said in an email. "Travel restrictions may be one tool we can use, but they should be part of a broader strategy because simply sealing the borders to these countries won't make the crisis go away." As far back as August, Arkansas Democratic Sen. Mark Pryor tried to use the issue of Ebola against his opponent, GOP Rep. Tom Cotton. In a campaign ad, Pryor accused Cotton of voting against a 2013 bill that included money to respond to pandemics. But Cotton did support the final version that became law, according to an analysis by Politifact. On Friday, Cotton signed a letter to Obama with fellow House Republicans from Arkansas urging him to consider a ban on flights to affected countries. "The quality of our hospitals, we well as our talented doctors, is undoubtedly a draw for people with the means and will to come to the U.S. -- sometimes because exposure to Ebola in their own country and in spite of the risk to the health of Americans," the GOP congressmen wrote. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest told reporters Friday that at this point, the Administration is not considering imposing any travel ban. In an interview on CNN Friday, the number two official with the Senate GOP campaign arm, Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio, said the U.S. needs to be "more aggressive" in screening people coming to the country and pointed to recent report that said the Department of Homeland Security is not equipped right now to deal with a pandemic. "I don't think we're prepared as we should be," Portman said. "I think this is another example where the administration was not as engaged early on as they should have been and now we're playing catch-up." Aides for both the House GOP and Democratic campaign committees tell CNN Ebola has not cropped up in House races at this point. But that could change as <u><mark>political campaigns in recent weeks have been <strong>quick to focus their messages on issues that are on voters' minds</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Soon after questions were raised about Obama's response to</mark> </u>the terror group <u><mark>ISIS</u></mark>, and public opinion polls showed <u><mark>Americans were</mark> increasingly <mark>worried about an attack at home</u></mark>, Republican candidates began bringing up the issue. The National Republicans Congressional Campaign Committee rolled out television commercials suggesting several Democratic candidates didn't support funding to respond to terrorists threats and they were "dangerous." And though Congress is in recess for the final stretch before the midterm elections, <u><mark>a House committee announced on Friday that it will <strong>hold a hearing on the Ebola outbreak on Oct. 16</u></strong>.</p></mark>
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Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,750 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,566 |
“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts
|
a clear statement rule against commandeering forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced they promote the political safeguards and deter political process failure. difficulties in enacting legislation and drafting mean that Congress will not amend the law to make the clear statement. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer , there is no way for the Court to "defer" the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice Commandeering absence from the CSA means that a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute promote a major failure of federalism . Imposing a clear statement rule it checks the power of the court
|
Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance. By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. Thus, they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political [*634] process failure. Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules. The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. Here, the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials, a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.
| 6,405 |
<h4>“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, <u><strong>political safeguards proponents should insist on <mark>a clear statement rule against commandeering</u></strong></mark>. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 <u><strong>By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance</u></strong>. <u><strong>By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement <mark>forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced</mark>.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>they promote </mark>the working of <mark>the political safeguards and deter political</u></strong></mark> [*634] <u><strong><mark>process failure</u></strong>.</mark> Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, <u><strong>they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules</u></strong>. <u><strong>The <mark>difficulties in enacting legislation and </mark>the increased <mark>drafting </mark>costs in following the clear statement rule may <mark>mean that Congress will not </mark>ultimately <mark>amend the law to make the clear statement</u></strong>.</mark> n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. <u><strong><mark>Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer </mark>state officials<mark>, there is no way for the Court to "defer"</mark> to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice.</u></strong> Here, <u><strong><mark>the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice</mark> of legislative means</u></strong>. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. <u><strong><mark>Commandeering</mark> hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its <mark>absence from the CSA means that </mark>the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process</u></strong>. <u><strong>Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute </mark>would actively <mark>promote a major failure of </mark>the political safeguards of <mark>federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. <u><strong>Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution</u></strong>. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. <u><strong>Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies<mark>. Imposing a clear statement rule</mark> against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as <mark>it checks the power of the court</mark>s</u></strong>. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,571 | 9 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,567 |
A few more Ebola cases will pop up soon- becomes THE election issue
|
San Antonio Express-News 10/3
|
San Antonio Express-News 10/3/2014 (Ebola beginning to infect midterm elections, http://www.expressnews.com/news/us-world/us/article/Ebola-beginning-to-infect-midterm-elections-5800212.php)
|
Americans now have one more reason to fear the deadly outbreak of Ebola: It's become fodder for political campaigns Obama is being blamed for the crisis PRESIDENT EBOLA will the issue have political potency in the midterm if there are a few more popping up here and there, it could blow up. We're five weeks from the election, and this disease has a 21-day incubation period. The timing could end up being a big factor anything in the news will get politicized. Partisans on both sides so despise the other side that they'll blame the other team for just about anything.”
|
Americans now have one more reason to fear Ebola: It's fodder for political campaigns Obama is being blamed for the crisis. “PRESIDENT EBOLA,” will the issue have political potency in the midterm if there are a few more popping up , it could blow up We're five weeks from the election, and this disease has a 21-day incubation period. The timing could end up being a big facto anything in the news will get politicized Partisans so despise the other side they'll blame the other team for anything
|
Americans now have one more reason to fear the deadly outbreak of Ebola: It's become fodder for political campaigns. U.S. Sen. Mark Pryor, D-Ark., appears to have been the first politician to inject Ebola into the midterm elections. In a TV ad criticizing his Republican opponent for opposing funds for public health, Pryor mentioned the Ebola epidemic. Depending on what happens over the next few weeks, more Ebola ads could surface. “Remember, this is politics,” political scientist Cal Jillson of Southern Methodist University said Friday. “So the truth has a role to play, but it's modest at best.” As Americans wait to see how many more U.S. Ebola cases will be diagnosed, a sharp partisan divide is developing around the issue of whether the administration is doing enough to stop the spread of the disease. Particularly in the right-wing media, President Barack Obama is being blamed for the crisis. “PRESIDENT EBOLA,” the conservative Daily Caller site's lead headline trumpeted Friday. Talk radio hosts have been hammering the theory that Obama has been remiss in not ordering limitations on travel from affected African countries to the United States — even though scientists repeatedly have insisted that such a move would be ineffective and probably counterproductive. Conservative America's regard for scientists' pronouncements is not high — and, perhaps more to the point, neither is the regard for Obama, whose approval ratings nationwide are hovering around 40 percent. “But in the great swath of the South that includes ... Texas, Obama's (approval rate is) in the teens,” political scientist Jillson said. “So nothing is too outrageous to say to good effect.” He was referring specifically to a comment from Rep. Louie Gohmert, R-Tyler, who said Thursday: “Political correctness is going to get people killed.” That's a popular theme with the tea party. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., a 2016 presidential hopeful, said much the same in an interview with Breitbart.com: “They're downplaying and underplaying the risk ... because it is being dominated by political correctness, we're not really making sound, rational, scientific decisions.” He called for “travel restrictions at this point in time coming from Africa.” But will the issue have political potency in the midterm elections? “It depends,” Jillson said. “If this (Dallas) case is isolated, not so much. But if there are a few more popping up here and there, it could blow up. “We're five weeks from the election, and this disease has a 21-day incubation period. The timing could end up being a big factor.” Kyle Kondik, a political science professor at the University of Virginia, said: “I don't think it's a shock that anything in the news will get politicized. Partisans on both sides so despise the other side that they'll blame the other team for just about anything.” Lousiana Gov. Bobby Jindal said, “The Obama administration keeps saying they won't shut down flights. They instead say we should listen to the experts. In fact, they said it would be counterproductive to stop these flights. That defies logic.” Still, many of the Texas Republican lawmakers who favor restrictions on travel have been very restrained in the way they have made that case — conscious, perhaps, of the responsibility not to stoke fears needlessly.
| 3,303 |
<h4>A few more Ebola cases will pop up soon- becomes THE election issue</h4><p><strong>San Antonio Express-News 10/3</strong>/2014 (Ebola beginning to infect midterm elections, http://www.expressnews.com/news/us-world/us/article/Ebola-beginning-to-infect-midterm-elections-5800212.php)</p><p><u><mark>Americans now have one more reason to fear</mark> the deadly outbreak of <mark>Ebola: It's</mark> become <mark>fodder for political campaigns</u></mark>. U.S. Sen. Mark Pryor, D-Ark., appears to have been the first politician to inject Ebola into the midterm elections. In a TV ad criticizing his Republican opponent for opposing funds for public health, Pryor mentioned the Ebola epidemic. Depending on what happens over the next few weeks, more Ebola ads could surface. “Remember, this is politics,” political scientist Cal Jillson of Southern Methodist University said Friday. “So the truth has a role to play, but it's modest at best.” As Americans wait to see how many more U.S. Ebola cases will be diagnosed, a sharp partisan divide is developing around the issue of whether the administration is doing enough to stop the spread of the disease. Particularly in the right-wing media, President Barack <u><mark>Obama is being blamed for the crisis</u>. “<u><strong>PRESIDENT EBOLA</u></strong>,”</mark> the conservative Daily Caller site's lead headline trumpeted Friday. Talk radio hosts have been hammering the theory that Obama has been remiss in not ordering limitations on travel from affected African countries to the United States — even though scientists repeatedly have insisted that such a move would be ineffective and probably counterproductive. Conservative America's regard for scientists' pronouncements is not high — and, perhaps more to the point, neither is the regard for Obama, whose approval ratings nationwide are hovering around 40 percent. “But in the great swath of the South that includes ... Texas, Obama's (approval rate is) in the teens,” political scientist Jillson said. “So nothing is too outrageous to say to good effect.” He was referring specifically to a comment from Rep. Louie Gohmert, R-Tyler, who said Thursday: “Political correctness is going to get people killed.” That's a popular theme with the tea party. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., a 2016 presidential hopeful, said much the same in an interview with Breitbart.com: “They're downplaying and underplaying the risk ... because it is being dominated by political correctness, we're not really making sound, rational, scientific decisions.” He called for “travel restrictions at this point in time coming from Africa.” But <u><mark>will the issue have political potency in the midterm</u></mark> elections? “It depends,” Jillson said. “If this (Dallas) case is isolated, not so much. But <u><mark>if there are a few more popping up</mark> here and there<mark>, <strong>it could blow up</strong></mark>. </u>“<u><mark>We're five weeks from the election, and this disease has a 21-day incubation period. The <strong>timing could end up being a big facto</mark>r</u></strong>.” Kyle Kondik, a political science professor at the University of Virginia, said: “I don't think it's a shock that <u><mark>anything in the news will get politicized</mark>. <mark>Partisans</mark> on both sides <mark>so despise the other side</mark> that <mark>they'll blame the other team for</mark> just about <mark>anything</mark>.” </u>Lousiana Gov. Bobby Jindal said, “The Obama administration keeps saying they won't shut down flights. They instead say we should listen to the experts. In fact, they said it would be counterproductive to stop these flights. That defies logic.” Still, many of the Texas Republican lawmakers who favor restrictions on travel have been very restrained in the way they have made that case — conscious, perhaps, of the responsibility not to stoke fears needlessly.</p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,751 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,568 |
Doctors support
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
the American Medical Association voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.
|
, the A M A voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.
|
At its annual meeting in 1999, the British Medical Association voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK moving to a system of presumed consent for organ donation,3 a proposed change in policy that the UK government immediately rejected.4 What else might we do to increase the supply of donor organs? At its annual meeting in 2002, the American Medical Association voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers.5 In 1998, the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.6 In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme.7 Now may be an appropriate time to revisit the idea of a market in donor organs.8 Our focus then, as now, is organs obtained from the living since creating a market in cadaver organs is uneconomic and is more likely to reduce supply than increase it and the chief reason for considering sale of organs is to improve availability.
| 1,159 |
<h4>Doctors support</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>At its annual meeting in 1999, the British Medical Association voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK moving to a system of presumed consent for organ donation,3 a proposed change in policy that the UK government immediately rejected.4 What else might we do to increase the supply of donor organs? At its annual meeting in 2002<mark>, <u>the A</mark>merican <mark>M</mark>edical <mark>A</mark>ssociation <mark>voted to encourage studies to determine whether financial incentives could increase the supply of organs from cadavers</u></mark>.5 In 1998, <u><mark>the International Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that trade in organs should be regulated rather than banned.</u></mark>6 In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme.7 Now may be an appropriate time to revisit the idea of a market in donor organs.8 Our focus then, as now, is organs obtained from the living since creating a market in cadaver organs is uneconomic and is more likely to reduce supply than increase it and the chief reason for considering sale of organs is to improve availability.</p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,752 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,569 |
That influences the election
|
Stone 12
|
Stone 12 Melissa, MD Candidate, Miami University Medical School; “THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION IN THE 1950S AND THE 2000S: FEAR VS. COMPASSION” University of Miami Humanities in Medicine; March 14, 2012; http://umhm.mededu.miami.edu/?p=394
|
As the largest association of physicians and medical students in the United States the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation and how it will influence physicians Over the years, the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation, and this coverage has been given much clout.
|
As the largest association of physicians and medical students the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation this coverage has much clout.
|
The American Medical Association (AMA) has been on both sides of the national health reform campaign since the beginning of the twentieth century when the American Association for Labor Legislation first proposed a national health insurance plan. As the largest association of physicians and medical students in the United States, the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation and how it will influence physicians, specifically with regards to their incomes. Over the years, the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation, and this coverage has been given much clout. In the 1950s, the AMA was vehemently opposed to any changes to the current health care system, whereas in the 2000s, the AMA had a more nuanced view on health care since the organization fought for more health insurance for the less fortunate but disagreed with how the government proposed to do this. In both instances, the AMA enacted a large-scale media campaign opposing the reform, claiming health insurance controlled by the government would limit patients’ choices and freedoms. However, to invoke an anti-health care legislation sentiment in the 1950s, the AMA appealed to the public’s panic of a Socialist agenda while in the 2000s, the AMA appealed to the public’s sympathy for the less fortunate. Ultimately, through these campaigns, the American people have responded more strongly to fear than to compassion.
| 1,457 |
<h4>That influences the election</h4><p><strong>Stone 12 </strong>Melissa, MD Candidate, Miami University Medical School; “THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION IN THE 1950S AND THE 2000S: FEAR VS. COMPASSION” University of Miami Humanities in Medicine; March 14, 2012; http://umhm.mededu.miami.edu/?p=394</p><p>The American Medical Association (AMA) has been on both sides of the national health reform campaign since the beginning of the twentieth century when the American Association for Labor Legislation first proposed a national health insurance plan. <u><mark>As the largest association of physicians and medical students</mark> in the United States</u>,<u> <mark>the AMA deeply cares about health care legislation</mark> and how it will influence physicians</u>, specifically with regards to their incomes. <u>Over the years, <mark>the AMA has used the media to be an advocate for endorsing physicians’ views on health care legislation</mark>, and <mark>this coverage has</mark> been given <mark>much clout.</u></mark> In the 1950s, the AMA was vehemently opposed to any changes to the current health care system, whereas in the 2000s, the AMA had a more nuanced view on health care since the organization fought for more health insurance for the less fortunate but disagreed with how the government proposed to do this. In both instances, the AMA enacted a large-scale media campaign opposing the reform, claiming health insurance controlled by the government would limit patients’ choices and freedoms. However, to invoke an anti-health care legislation sentiment in the 1950s, the AMA appealed to the public’s panic of a Socialist agenda while in the 2000s, the AMA appealed to the public’s sympathy for the less fortunate. Ultimately, through these campaigns, the American people have responded more strongly to fear than to compassion. </p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,753 | 2 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,570 |
Federalism model solves Ukraine war
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine
|
U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).
| 9,859 |
<h4>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p><strong>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u><strong>The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u></strong> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u><strong>Yatsenyuk</u></strong> <u><strong>reached out to Russophones</u></strong> in the eastern and southern regions, <u><strong>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u></strong>.” <u><strong>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have encouraged</mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u><strong>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u></strong> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u><strong>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u></strong>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u><strong>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u></strong>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u><strong>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u></strong>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><strong><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u></strong> this important <u><strong><mark>regional balance</u></strong> <u><strong>and has the opportunity to formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</mark>. </u></strong>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u><strong>a state-wide</u></strong> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u><strong>comprehensive federalization</u></strong>, <u><strong>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u></strong>. <u><strong>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u></strong> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u><strong>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</mark> </u></strong>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u><strong>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are not short of is</mark> </u></strong>legal<u><strong> <mark>experts on</mark> </u></strong>autonomy<u><strong>, <mark>federalism</mark> </u></strong>and minority rights. The<u><strong> <mark>implementation</mark> </u></strong>of constitutional reform<u><strong> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u></strong>political will and <u><strong><mark>leadership</u></strong></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u><strong>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u></strong> <u><strong>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u></strong>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u><strong>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to peacefully manage conflict</mark> and enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u><strong>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u></strong> not just <u><strong>in Ukraine</u></strong> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 242,776 | 13 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,571 |
Differences over sphere of influence make cooperation impossible
|
Bunn et al. 13
|
Bunn et al. 13 [Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship September 2013 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MAD%20English.pdf]
|
there remain real differences in perspective and interests between the U S and Russia. These have mainly to do with how the international community should meet challenges in Libya, Syria, and Iran. Moscow has asserted, and Washington has rejected, a claim of a privileged Russian sphere of influence on regional issues. Russia’s goal of surrounding itself with friendly dominated states would appear to conflict with U.S. policies promoting democracy Russia sees “encirclement,” Russian experts and politicians believe the refusal by the U S to recognize privileged rights of Russia to preserve its influence
|
there remain real differences in interests between the U S and Russia. mainly to do with challenges in Libya, Syria, and Iran. Moscow has asserted a privileged Russian sphere of influence on regional issues Russia’s goal would conflict with U.S. policies promoting democracy, Russia sees “encirclement
|
First, there remain real differences in perspective and interests between the United States and Russia. These differences have mainly to do with regions near Russia, and with whether and how the international community should meet challenges posed by events in states such as Libya, Syria, and Iran. Moscow has asserted, and Washington has rejected, a claim of a privileged Russian sphere of influence on regional issues.17 Russia’s goal of surrounding itself with friendly, partly dominated states would appear to conflict with U.S. policies promoting democracy, sovereignty, and independence in those states. Russia sees “encirclement,” and the United States is haunted by the “ghost of Yalta,” seeing a creeping reestablishment of a Russian empire.18 These disagreements began soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a wide range of issues in the relationships between Russia and its former Soviet neighbors. Russia undertook what it saw as peacekeeping operations in conflict zones in the former Soviet Union, acting either by itself or through the mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).19 The United States saw some of Moscow’s actions as efforts to dominate its sovereign neighbors, which Washington would neither condone nor legitimize. Rather, the United States supported the principles of democracy and self-determination. Russia viewed U.S. policy as an effort to encourage anti-Russian forces (and promote “color revolutions” against pro-Russian governments) on Russia’s borders. Until today, Russian analysts argue that Moscow has stronger interests in the peaceful development of the neighboring states and their territorial integrity than any other country does, and that the economic development of these states requires stronger integration with Russia, the largest economy in the region. Therefore, most Russian experts and politicians believe the refusal by the United States to recognize privileged rights of Russia to preserve its influence in the former Soviet Union is unjustified and contrary to both Russian interests and the long-term interests of Russia’s neighbors.
| 2,122 |
<h4>Differences over sphere of influence make cooperation impossible</h4><p><u><strong>Bunn et al. 13</u></strong> [Matthew Bunn. Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship September 2013 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MAD%20English.pdf] </p><p>First, <u><mark>there remain real differences in</mark> perspective and <mark>interests between the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and Russia.</mark> These</u> differences <u>have <mark>mainly to do with</u></mark> regions near Russia, and with whether and <u>how the international community should meet <mark>challenges</u></mark> posed by events <u><mark>in</u></mark> states such as <u><mark>Libya, Syria, and Iran. Moscow has asserted</mark>, and Washington has rejected, a claim of <mark>a privileged Russian sphere of influence on regional issues</mark>.</u>17 <u><mark>Russia’s goal</mark> of surrounding itself with friendly</u>, partly <u>dominated states <mark>would</mark> appear to <mark>conflict with U.S. policies promoting democracy</u>,</mark> sovereignty, and independence in those states. <u><mark>Russia sees “encirclement</mark>,”</u> and the United States is haunted by the “ghost of Yalta,” seeing a creeping reestablishment of a Russian empire.18 These disagreements began soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a wide range of issues in the relationships between Russia and its former Soviet neighbors. Russia undertook what it saw as peacekeeping operations in conflict zones in the former Soviet Union, acting either by itself or through the mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).19 The United States saw some of Moscow’s actions as efforts to dominate its sovereign neighbors, which Washington would neither condone nor legitimize. Rather, the United States supported the principles of democracy and self-determination. Russia viewed U.S. policy as an effort to encourage anti-Russian forces (and promote “color revolutions” against pro-Russian governments) on Russia’s borders. Until today, Russian analysts argue that Moscow has stronger interests in the peaceful development of the neighboring states and their territorial integrity than any other country does, and that the economic development of these states requires stronger integration with Russia, the largest economy in the region. Therefore, most <u>Russian experts and politicians believe the refusal by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>to recognize privileged rights of Russia to preserve its influence</u> in the former Soviet Union is unjustified and contrary to both Russian interests and the long-term interests of Russia’s neighbors.</p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,755 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,572 |
Nuke war
|
Thompson 14
|
Loren Thompson 4-24-2014 “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
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this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. the Obama Administration credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO tensions are ratcheting up. successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. It is easy to imagine misjudgments in Ukraine which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives Any deployment could provoke Russian escalation. Misinterpretation of signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
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this year’s crisis is a reminder that geopolitical concerns have not vanished Putin might be forced to aid ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence tensions are ratcheting up revisions of Russian military strategy place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” in response to conventional aggression it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate This isn’t saber-rattling It is easy to imagine misjudgments Misinterpretation can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint — poor intel battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and other influences — it seems reasonable to consider because Ukraine is so close there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished. In fact, Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.
| 7,969 |
<h4>Nuke war </h4><p>Loren <strong>Thompson</strong> 4-24-20<strong>14</strong> “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/</p><p>Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, <u><strong><mark>this year’s crisis</mark> over Ukraine <mark>is a reminder that </mark>Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the <mark>geopolitical</mark> sources of its security <mark>concerns have not vanished</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u><strong>Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine</u></strong> by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then <u><strong>it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. </u></strong>Although <u><strong>the Obama Administration</u></strong> is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its <u><strong>credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir <mark>Putin</mark> has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors</u></strong>. <u><strong>Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine</u></strong>, <u><strong>Moscow now says it <mark>might be forced to</mark> come to the <mark>aid</mark> of <mark>ethnic Russians</u></strong></mark> there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). <u><strong><mark>Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence</mark> in the neighborhood</u></strong>, <u><strong>reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO</u></strong>. So little by little,<u><strong> <mark>tensions are ratcheting up</mark>. </u></strong>One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that <u><strong>successive <mark>revisions of Russian military strategy</mark> appear “to <mark>place a greater reliance on nuclear</mark> <mark>weapons” </mark>to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. </u></strong>A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that <u><strong>Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons <mark>in response to conventional aggression</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but <mark>it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate</mark> a conflict. <mark>This isn’t</mark> just Russian <mark>saber-rattling</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war</u></strong>. <u><strong>The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away</u></strong> from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, <u><strong>and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons</u></strong> in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So <u><strong>improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine</u></strong>. Here are four ways that <u><strong>what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. </u></strong>Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. <u><strong><mark>It is easy to imagine</u></strong></mark> similar <u><strong><mark>misjudgments</mark> in Ukraine</u></strong>, <u><strong>which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives</u></strong>. <u><strong>Any</u></strong> sizable <u><strong>deployment</u></strong> of U.S. forces in the region <u><strong>could provoke Russian escalation. </u></strong>Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. <u><strong><mark>Misinterpretation</mark> of </u></strong>such<u><strong> signals <mark>can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly</mark>, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. </u></strong>Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. <u><strong>Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons</u></strong>. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. <u><strong><mark>U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads</mark> against enemy targets.</u></strong> Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. <u><strong>Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. <mark>When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint</mark> in wartime</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>— poor intel</mark>ligence, garbled communication, <mark>battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and</mark> a host of <mark>other influences — it seems reasonable to consider</mark> that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons.</u></strong> And <u><strong><mark>because Ukraine is so close</mark> to the Russian heartland</u></strong> (about 250 miles from Moscow) <u><strong><mark>there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed</u></strong></mark>. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 22,852 | 87 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,573 |
Our interpretation is that the affirmative’s advantages should stem from the implementation of a topical plan.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Our interpretation is that the affirmative’s advantages should stem from the implementation of a topical plan.</h4>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,754 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,574 |
Relations resilient
|
Sawczak 11
|
Sawczak 11 [Dr. Peter Sawczak, Adjunct Research Fellow at Monash University, “Obama’s Russia Policy: The Wages and Pitfalls of the Reset,” peer reviewed paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Feb 3-4 2011, http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf]
|
As a measure of optimism, US officials like to point to a discernible shift in Russian foreign policy towards a more pragmatic, cooperative approach the United States has shown Russia the dividends which flow from enhanced cooperation the Russian foreign policy paper leaked identifies a “need to strengthen relations of mutual interdependence with leading world powers, such as the US that Russia has sought partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests that a rethink is underway There will be temptation on Russia's part to push the United States to entertain grand bargains Both sides, have demonstrated a relatively high level of comfort with agreeing to disagree, and there is now an increasingly even mix of interests on both sides
|
As a measure of optimism, US officials point to a shift in Russian policy towards a pragmatic, cooperative approach the U S has shown Russia the dividends which flow from enhanced cooperation Russian paper leaked identifies a “need to strengthen relations with the US partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests a rethink is underway Both sides have demonstrated high comfort with agreeing to disagree, and there is an increasingly even mix of interests on both sides
|
As a measure of their optimism, US officials like to point – cautiously – to a discernible shift in Russian foreign policy towards a more pragmatic, cooperative approach. Whether or not the Obama administration can claim credit for this, the United States has at least shown Russia the dividends which could flow from enhanced cooperation. This is most palpably reflected in the Russian foreign policy paper leaked in May 2010, which identifies a “need to strengthen relations of mutual interdependence with the leading world powers, such as the European Union and the US,” 5 as well as, more indirectly, in Medvedev’s modernisation agenda. The fact that Russia has sought, in the tragic circumstances attending commemoration ceremonies at Katyn, rapprochement with Poland and moved to demarcate its border with Norway, in addition to partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests to US policy-makers that a rethink, however tenuous, is underway. Noteworthy also is the fact that Russia, gladdened by the emergence of more compliant leaders in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has been remarkably restrained of late in its dealings closer to home, not having waged any major gas wars, threatened leaders, or incited civil war. ¶ How Russia engages on looming challenges – which McFaul has prioritised as cooperation on missile defence, Russia’s WTO accession, future European security architecture and Medvedev’s modernisation agenda 6 – will demonstrate the extent of its willingness to comply with the Obama administration’s preferred modus operandi of identifying shared interests as a means of pursuing US national interests. There will be temptation on Russia's part to push the United States to entertain grand bargains in certain areas, especially - and however unrealistically - on its perceived privileged interests in former Soviet states. Both sides, however, have demonstrated a relatively high level of comfort with agreeing to disagree, and there is now an increasingly even mix of interests on both sides. Immediate impediments that will need to be worked through include reluctance by the Pentagon to share sensitive military technology in relation to missile defence and Russia's slowness to create favourable conditions for foreign investment.
| 2,277 |
<h4>Relations resilient</h4><p><strong>Sawczak 11</strong> [Dr. Peter Sawczak, Adjunct Research Fellow at Monash University, “Obama’s Russia Policy: The Wages and Pitfalls of the Reset,” peer reviewed paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Feb 3-4 2011, http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>As a measure of</u></mark> their <u><mark>optimism, US officials</mark> like to <mark>point</u></mark> – cautiously – <u><mark>to a</mark> discernible <mark>shift in Russian</mark> foreign <mark>policy towards a</mark> more <strong><mark>pragmatic, cooperative approach</u></strong></mark>. Whether or not the Obama administration can claim credit for this, <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has</u></mark> at least <u><mark>shown Russia the dividends which</u></mark> could <u><mark>flow from enhanced cooperation</u></mark>. This is most palpably reflected in <u>the <mark>Russian</mark> foreign policy <mark>paper leaked</u></mark> in May 2010, which <u><mark>identifies a “need to strengthen relations</mark> of mutual interdependence</u> <u><mark>with</u></mark> the <u>leading world powers, such as <mark>the</u></mark> European Union and the <u><mark>US</u></mark>,” 5 as well as, more indirectly, in Medvedev’s modernisation agenda. The fact <u>that Russia has sought</u>, in the tragic circumstances attending commemoration ceremonies at Katyn, rapprochement with Poland and moved to demarcate its border with Norway, in addition to <u><mark>partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests</u></mark> to US policy-makers <u>that <mark>a rethink</u></mark>, however tenuous, <u><mark>is underway</u></mark>. Noteworthy also is the fact that Russia, gladdened by the emergence of more compliant leaders in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has been remarkably restrained of late in its dealings closer to home, not having waged any major gas wars, threatened leaders, or incited civil war. ¶ How Russia engages on looming challenges – which McFaul has prioritised as cooperation on missile defence, Russia’s WTO accession, future European security architecture and Medvedev’s modernisation agenda 6 – will demonstrate the extent of its willingness to comply with the Obama administration’s preferred modus operandi of identifying shared interests as a means of pursuing US national interests. <u>There will be temptation on Russia's part to push the United States to entertain grand</u> <u>bargains</u> in certain areas, especially - and however unrealistically - on its perceived privileged interests in former Soviet states. <u><mark>Both sides</mark>,</u> however, <u><mark>have demonstrated</mark> a relatively <mark>high</mark> level of <strong><mark>comfort with agreeing to disagree</strong>, and there is</mark> now <mark>an increasingly even mix of interests on both sides</u></mark>. Immediate impediments that will need to be worked through include reluctance by the Pentagon to share sensitive military technology in relation to missile defence and Russia's slowness to create favourable conditions for foreign investment. </p>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 217,359 | 12 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,575 |
“USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism
|
Ericson ‘03
|
Ericson ‘03
|
The Debater’s Guide
each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.
|
each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S should adopt The verb should urges action should means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur
|
(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.
| 1,420 |
<h4><u><strong>“USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism</h4><p>Ericson ‘03</p><p></u></strong>(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., <u>The Debater’s Guide</u>, Third Edition, p. 4)</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><strong><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u></strong>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions<u>. <strong>1. <mark>An agent doing the acting</mark> ---“The United States” in “<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should adopt</u></strong></mark> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u>the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. <mark>The verb should</u></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase <u><strong>that <mark>urges action</u></strong></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. <u>For example, <mark>should</mark> adopt</u> here <u><strong><mark>means to put a</u></strong></mark> program or <u><strong><mark>policy into action though governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><strong><mark>The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur</strong></mark>.</u> What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 1,149 | 3,809 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,576 |
Violation—don’t explain how legalize at federal level
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Violation—don’t explain how legalize at federal level</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,756 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,577 |
No Russian war.
|
MacGregor 11
|
MacGregor 11 [Lean, Mean Fighting Machine How to slash the Pentagon budget? Declare victory and go home. BY DOUGLAS MACGREGOR | APRIL 26, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/26/lean_mean_fighting_machine]
|
there is no existential military threat to the U S The nuclear arsenals in Russia could be used but Russian leaders have no incentive to contemplate suicide in a nuclear confrontation with the U S For all its rhetoric, Russia's military focus is on restive Muslim populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, not on NATO.
|
Russian leaders have no incentive to contemplate suicide in a nuclear confrontation with the U S Russia's military focus is on restive Muslim populations in the Caucasus not on NATO.
|
For one thing, there is no existential military threat to the United States or to its vital strategic interests. The nuclear arsenals in Russia and China could be used against the United States and its forces, but Russian and Chinese leaders have no incentive to contemplate suicide in a nuclear confrontation with the United States. Russia's diminished million-man armed forces are hard-pressed to modernize, let alone secure their own country, which borders 14 other states. For all its rhetoric, Russia's military focus is on restive Muslim populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, not on NATO.
| 602 |
<h4>No Russian war.</h4><p><u><strong>MacGregor 11</strong> [Lean, Mean Fighting Machine How to slash the Pentagon budget? Declare victory and go home. BY DOUGLAS MACGREGOR | APRIL 26, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/26/lean_mean_fighting_machine]</p><p></u>For one thing, <u>there is no existential military threat to the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates or to its vital strategic interests. <u>The nuclear arsenals in Russia</u> and China <u>could be used</u> against the United States and its forces, <u>but <mark>Russian</u></mark> and Chinese <u><mark>leaders</mark> <mark>have no incentive to contemplate suicide in a nuclear confrontation with the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. Russia's diminished million-man armed forces are hard-pressed to modernize, let alone secure their own country, which borders 14 other states. <u>For all its rhetoric, <mark>Russia's military focus is on restive Muslim populations in the Caucasus</mark> and Central Asia, <mark>not on NATO.</p></u></mark>
|
Midterms
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 276,501 | 6 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,578 |
The Aff undermines the ability to have a limited and stable number of Affirmatives to prepare against. This is a reason to vote negative.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The Aff undermines the ability to have a limited and stable number of Affirmatives to prepare against. This is a reason to vote negative.</h4>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,757 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,579 |
Impossible to generate offense
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Impossible to generate offense</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,758 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,580 |
The plan is legislative – no need for the court to adjudicate a right. Legislation would keep the courts out. The plan eliminates the need for a property right to be claimed
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The plan is legislative – no need for the court to adjudicate a right. Legislation would keep the courts out. The plan eliminates the need for a property right to be claimed</h4>
|
Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,759 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,581 |
First is Deliberation
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>First is <u>Deliberation</h4></u>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,760 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,582 |
No CP competition—let’s be real, that’s a ton of the topic
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>No CP competition—let’s be real, that’s a ton of the topic</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,761 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,583 |
No need to establish a property right for the plan
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding and unforeseen consequences,
| null |
The law has struggled to define rights to one's own body in the face of increasing value created by new medical tech-nologies. The lack of appreciation for the new value of the body in the current law's prohibition of organ sales has cre-ated a system whereby control, rights, and value are severed from the donor and recipient and transferred to third par-ties. While there may be substantial reasons to continue to prohibit the inter vivos sale of human organs, the broader prohibition on all sales - including futures contracts - is not supported by these reasons. While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended to restrict their prohibitions to inter vivos sales. Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding and unforeseen consequences, nor would it require an enormity of legislative action to invent a new statutory framework. These limited changes would, however, recognize that individuals do have legal interests in their own tissues, giving them recourse should the tissues be misused. Most importantly, these limited changes would vest the power to designate who receives value and where and how organs should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just results in this increasingly important market.
| 1,451 |
<h4>No need to establish a property right for the plan</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p> The law has struggled to define rights to one's own body in the face of increasing value created by new medical tech-nologies. The lack of appreciation for the new value of the body in the current law's prohibition of organ sales has cre-ated a system whereby control, rights, and value are severed from the donor and recipient and transferred to third par-ties. While there may be substantial reasons to continue to prohibit the inter vivos sale of human organs, the broader prohibition on all sales - including futures contracts - is not supported by these reasons. <u>While many have suggested drastic changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing laws need only to be amended</u> to restrict their prohibitions to inter vivos sales. <u>Such changes would not require the finding of a new controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding and unforeseen consequences,</u> nor would it require an enormity of legislative action to invent a new statutory framework. These limited changes would, however, recognize that individuals do have legal interests in their own tissues, giving them recourse should the tissues be misused. Most importantly, these limited changes would vest the power to designate who receives value and where and how organs should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just results in this increasingly important market.</p>
|
Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 453,717 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,584 |
Don’t actually learn anything
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Don’t actually learn anything</h4>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,762 | 1 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,585 |
Legal sale of blood, sperm, apheresis bone marrow, etc empirically the deny the link and make it not unique
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Legal sale of blood, sperm, apheresis bone marrow, etc empirically the deny the link and make it not unique </h4>
|
Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,763 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,586 |
Organ sales are already legal for research purposes. The affirmative’s problem is not only that it is anti-topical, but that it’s wrong about what the topic is to begin with. Increasing the abstraction of debates and undermining stasis hampers democratic deliberation
|
Steinberg ‘8
|
Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8
|
Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest If everyone is in agreement there is no need for debate the matter can be settled by unanimous consent it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," Controversy is an essential prerequisite Where there is no clash of ideas there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration How many are in the United States? Do they take job Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy controversies must be stated clearly Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.
Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations but without a focus for their discussions they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow But if a precise question is posed then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.
Although we now have a general subject It is still too broad What sort of writing are we concerned with What does "effectiveness" mean The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
|
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest If everyone is in agreement there is no need for debate Where there is no clash there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions evidenced by the failure of Congress to make progress on the immigration debate
they could agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or solutions. But if a precise question is posed a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on a concrete solution
To have a debate which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined. the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide basis for clear argumentation
a general subject is too broad This is not to say debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy The point is that debate is best facilitated by focus on a particular point of difference
|
(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.
Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.
Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
| 6,447 |
<h4>Organ sales are already legal for research purposes. The affirmative’s problem is not only that it is anti-topical, but that it’s wrong about what the topic is to begin with. Increasing the abstraction of debates and undermining stasis hampers democratic deliberation</h4><p><strong>Steinberg</strong>, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, <strong>‘8</p><p></strong>(David L. and Austin J., <u><strong>Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making </u></strong>p. 45)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Debate is a means of settling differences,</u></strong> <u><strong>so there must be a</u></strong></mark> difference of opinion or a <u><strong><mark>conflict of interest</u></strong></mark> before there can be a debate. <u><strong><mark>If everyone is in agreement</u></strong></mark> on a tact or value or policy, <u><strong><mark>there is no need for debate</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong>the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, <u><strong>it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"</u></strong> because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (<u><strong>Controversy is an essential prerequisite</u></strong> of debate. <u><strong><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas</u></strong>, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <u><strong><mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>debate cannot produce effective decisions</u></strong> <u><strong>without clear identification of a question</mark> or questions to be answered</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong>general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration</u></strong>. <u><strong>How many</u></strong> illegal immigrants <u><strong>are in the United States?</u></strong> What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? <u><strong>Do they take job</u></strong>s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? <u><strong>Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration</u></strong> by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? <u><strong>Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?</u></strong> Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? <u><strong>Should we build a wall on the Mexican border</u></strong>, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? <u><strong>Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question</u></strong> <u><strong>and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy</u></strong>. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <u><strong>controversies must be stated clearly</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Vague understanding</u></strong> <u><strong>results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions</u></strong></mark>, frustration, and emotional distress, as <u><strong><mark>evidenced by the failure of</mark> the United States <mark>Congress to make progress on the immigration debate</mark> during the summer of 2007.</p><p>Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!</u></strong> They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u><strong>Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations</u></strong>, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, <u><strong>but without a focus for their discussions</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>they could</mark> easily <mark>agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or</mark> potential <mark>solutions.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>A gripe session would follow</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>But if a precise question is posed</u></strong></mark>—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—<u><strong>then <mark>a more profitable area of discussion is opened up</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>simply by placing a focus on</mark> the search for <mark>a concrete solution</mark> step</u></strong>. <u><strong>One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.</u></strong> The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. <u><strong>They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.</p><p><mark>To have a</mark> productive <mark>debate</mark>, <mark>which facilitates effective decision making</u></strong> <u><strong>by</u></strong></mark> directing and <u><strong><mark>placing limits on the decision</u></strong></mark> to be made, <u><strong><mark>the basis for argument should be clearly defined</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong><mark>the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide</mark> much <mark>basis for clear argumentation</mark>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.</p><p>Although we now have <mark>a general subject</u></strong></mark>, we have not yet stated a problem. <u><strong>It <mark>is</mark> still <mark>too broad</u></strong></mark>, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. <u><strong>What sort of writing are we concerned with</u></strong>—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u><strong>What does "effectiveness" mean</u></strong> in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" <u><strong>The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition</u></strong> such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <u><strong><mark>This is not to say</mark> that <mark>debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</u></strong></mark> of the controversy by advocates, <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong> <u><strong>that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy</mark>; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. <mark>The point is that debate is best facilitated by </mark>the guidance provided by <mark>focus on a particular point of difference</mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 51,689 | 1,023 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,587 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
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The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,588 |
(if you think you need CARDS for this, they arein commodification answers)
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>(if you think you need CARDS for this, they arein commodification answers)</h4>
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Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,764 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,589 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 )
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
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marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
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marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</strong></mark>.</p></u>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,590 |
Courts will avoid recognizing a property right to the body
|
Boyer 12
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Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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Courts did recognize some limited quasi-property rights held by the next of kin, allowing family members to oversee the proper burial of the deceased However, most courts enforced these rights only indirectly through claims for infliction of emotional distress brought by the family Thus, while courts sought to respect and protect the wishes of the deceased, they avoided labeling the body as property.
| null |
Traditionally, common law recognized no property rights in a corpse, n43 and technology did not exist to preserve any viable use of an organ outside a living body. Courts did recognize some limited quasi-property rights held by the next of kin, allowing family members to oversee the proper burial of the deceased. n44 Additionally, [*320] American courts recognized the right of the individual to specify through a testamentary instrument the manner and method of disposal of her dead body. n45 However, most courts enforced these rights only indirectly through claims for infliction of emotional distress brought by the family. n46 Thus, while courts sought to respect and protect the wishes of the deceased, they avoided labeling the body as property.
| 756 |
<h4>Courts will avoid recognizing a property right to the body</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT<u>: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p></u>Traditionally, common law recognized no property rights in a corpse, n43 and technology did not exist to preserve any viable use of an organ outside a living body. <u>Courts did recognize some limited quasi-property rights held by the next of kin, allowing family members to oversee the proper burial of the deceased</u>. n44 Additionally, [*320] American courts recognized the right of the individual to specify through a testamentary instrument the manner and method of disposal of her dead body. n45 <u>However, most courts enforced these rights only indirectly through claims for infliction of emotional distress brought by the family</u>. n46<u> Thus, while courts sought to respect and protect the wishes of the deceased, they avoided labeling the body as property.</p></u>
|
Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,765 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,591 |
Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential problems
|
Lundberg 10
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Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311
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the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech debate builds capacity for critical thinking informed decision making, and better public judgment If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid change and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy place such a high premium on education Debate builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.¶ Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including issues of class, gender, and racial justice wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change threats to international stability and increasing challenges of rapid globalization More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with existential challenges
2011, Vol. 7 Issue 2, p34-53, 20p ebsco)
process of democratic governance is more than a means to an end how we deliberate is as important or even more important to the outcome of the debate than the underlying issue itself history is rife with examples of laws that rose and fell on the mechanics of voting in the legislative body or the parliamentary vehicles in which the legislation was offered failure to vet an issue sufficiently is often seen as grounds for rejecting the legislation itself it is routine for legislators of a minority party in Congress to denounce a pending bill because there were not enough hearings on the issue, or that a sufficient number or kind of amendments was not allowed, or even that the time devoted to debate on the floor was insufficient questions of process in legislation dominate headlines rulemaking is especially prone to process- oriented questions , rules must navigate a number of prescribed argumentative hurdles on their way to adoption. This raises the stakes for following proper procedure both logically and practically, as violating protocols makes it likely the rule will be rejected authority of agencies in the federal government is nebulous Agency power to make rules is delegated by Congress, but there is little consensus on the degree of latitude that those designees hold. Since rulemakers lack constitu- tional warrants for coercing citizen behavior, they are highly susceptible to criticism of their authority and jurisdiction. Asked to act both independently and under the watch of the constitutional branches, rulemakers must pay careful attention to process.
|
debate builds capacity for critical thinking informed decision making, and judgment If the picture of political life that underwrites critique of debate is pessimistic of bureaucratic administrative politics, it is a puzzling solution, to argue these conditions warrant giving up on debate. the challenges of political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change Debate builds skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed fostering problem-solving democratic deliberative capacities The combination argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich democratic life and serves as an unmatched practice for meaningful political engagement Expanding this practice is crucial, if democracy is to thrive. Democracy face challenges, class, gender, racial justice environmental destruction climate change threats to international stability and challenges of globalization More than any specific policy an informed citizenry that deliberates with greater skill provides one of the best hopes for dealing with existential challenges
process is more than a means to an end how we deliberate is more important to the outcome of the debate than the underlying issue itself history is rife with examples laws rose and fell on the mechanics of voting failure to vet an issue sufficiently is grounds for rejecting legislation it is routine to denounce a pending bill because there were not enough hearings amendments or time rulemaking is especially prone to process- oriented questions rules must navigate argumentative hurdles raises the stakes for following proper procedure violating will be rejected rulemakers must pay careful attention to process.
|
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.¶ The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:¶ To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)¶ Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.¶ There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.¶ Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.
Debate is a question of skills not content – saying the world is dominated by [whiteness] is an inherency claim that voting aff can’t resolve – endorsing our political method teaches the tools that have a much better chance of dismantling those power structures
Paroske 11 – Marcus, Assistant professor of communication, Department of Communication and Visual Arts, University of Michigan-Flint ( Argumentation and Federal Rulemaking. Controversia; Fall 2011, Vol. 7 Issue 2, p34-53, 20p ebsco)
The process of democratic governance is more than a means to an end. Often, how we deliberate a policy is as important or even more important to the outcome of the debate than the underlying issue itself. Recent history is rife with examples of laws that rose and fell on the mechanics of voting in the legislative body or the parliamentary vehicles in which the legislation was offered. There is a normative element to deliberation in a democracy, and failure to vet an issue sufficiently is often seen as grounds for rejecting the legislation itself (Paroske, 2009). For example, it is routine for legislators of a minority party in Congress to denounce a pending bill because there were not enough hearings on the issue, or that a sufficient number or kind of amendments was not allowed, or even that the time devoted to debate on the floor was insufficient. These questions of process in legislation dominate headlines. Less studied, but perhaps even more interesting, are questions of process in a regulatory framework. Given its complexity, rulemaking is especially prone to process- oriented questions. Far more than legislation, rules must navigate a number of prescribed argumentative hurdles on their way to adoption. This raises the stakes for following proper procedure both logically and practically, as violating protocols makes it likely the rule will be rejected. In addition, the authority of agencies in the federal government is nebulous. Agency power to make rules is delegated by Congress, but there is little consensus on the degree of latitude that those designees hold. Since rulemakers lack constitu- tional warrants for coercing citizen behavior, they are highly susceptible to criticism of their authority and jurisdiction. Asked to act both independently and under the watch of the constitutional branches, rulemakers must pay careful attention to process.
| 8,780 |
<h4>Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential problems</h4><p>Christian O. <strong>Lundberg 10</strong> Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in <u>Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century</u> By Allan D. Louden, p311</p><p>The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But <u><strong>the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech</u></strong>—as indicated earlier, <u><strong><mark>debate builds capacity for critical thinking</u></strong></mark>, analysis of public claims, <u><strong><mark>informed decision making, and </mark>better public <mark>judgment</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>If the picture of </mark>modem <mark>political life that underwrites </mark>this <mark>critique of debate is </mark>a <mark>pessimistic </mark>view <mark>of </mark>increasingly labyrinthine and <mark>bureaucratic administrative politics, </mark>rapid</u></strong> scientific and technological <u><strong>change</u></strong> outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, <u><strong>and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics,<mark> it is a puzzling solution, </mark>at best, <mark>to argue </mark>that <mark>these conditions warrant giving up on debate</u></strong>.</mark> If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because <u><strong>as <mark>the challenges of </mark>modern <mark>political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change</mark>, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy</u></strong> such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems <u><strong>place such a high premium on education</u></strong> (Dewey 1988,63, 154). <u><strong><mark>Debate</u></strong> </mark>provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it <u><strong><mark>builds </mark>precisely the <mark>skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed </mark>about policy decisions that impact them</u></strong>, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.¶ <u><strong>The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy</u></strong>. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:¶ To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)¶ Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that <u><strong>debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in <mark>fostering </mark>the kind of <mark>problem-solving </mark>skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity</u></strong>. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.¶ There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, <u><strong>the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice</u></strong> in the classroom as a technology <u><strong>for enhancing <mark>democratic deliberative capacities</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The </mark>unique <mark>combination </mark>of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues <mark>argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich </mark>and vital <mark>democratic life</u></strong></mark>. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, <u><strong><mark>and serves as an unmatched practice for </mark>creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of <mark>meaningful political engagement </mark>and new articulations of democratic life.¶ <mark>Expanding this practice is crucial,</mark> if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary <mark>if democracy is </mark>not only to survive, but <mark>to thrive.</u></strong> <u><strong>Democracy face</mark>s a myriad of <mark>challenges, </mark>including</u></strong>: domestic and international <u><strong>issues of <mark>class, gender, </mark>and <mark>racial justice</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>wholesale <mark>environmental destruction</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>and the potential for rapid <mark>climate change</u></strong></mark>; emerging <u><strong><mark>threats to international stability</u></strong> </mark>in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; <u><strong><mark>and </mark>increasing <mark>challenges of </mark>rapid <mark>globalization</u></strong> </mark>including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. <u><strong><mark>More than any specific policy </mark>or proposal, <mark>an informed </mark>and active <mark>citizenry that deliberates with greater skill </u></strong></mark>and sensitivity <u><strong><mark>provides one of the best hopes for </mark>responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for <mark>dealing with </u></strong></mark>the <u><strong><mark>existential challenges</u></strong> <strong></mark>to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world. </p><p>Debate is a question of skills not content – saying the world is dominated by [whiteness] is an inherency claim that voting aff can’t resolve – endorsing our political method teaches the tools that have a much better chance of dismantling those power structures</p><p>Paroske 11 </strong>– Marcus<strong>, </strong>Assistant professor of communication, Department of Communication and Visual Arts, University of Michigan-Flint ( Argumentation and Federal Rulemaking. Controversia; Fall <u><strong>2011, Vol. 7 Issue 2, p34-53, 20p ebsco)</p><p></u></strong>The <u><strong><mark>process</mark> of democratic governance <mark>is more than a means to an end</u></strong></mark>. Often, <u><strong><mark>how we deliberate</u></strong></mark> a policy <u><strong><mark>is</mark> as important or even <mark>more important to the outcome of the debate than the underlying issue itself</u></strong></mark>. Recent <u><strong><mark>history is rife with examples</mark> of <mark>laws</mark> that <mark>rose and fell on the mechanics of voting</mark> in the legislative body or the parliamentary vehicles in which the legislation was offered</u></strong>. There is a normative element to deliberation in a democracy, and <u><strong><mark>failure to vet an issue sufficiently is</mark> often seen as <mark>grounds for rejecting </mark>the <mark>legislation</mark> itself</u></strong> (Paroske, 2009). For example, <u><strong><mark>it is routine</mark> for legislators of a minority party in Congress <mark>to denounce a pending bill because there were not enough hearings</mark> on the issue, or that a sufficient number or kind of <mark>amendments</mark> was not allowed, <mark>or</mark> even that the <mark>time</mark> devoted to debate on the floor was insufficient</u></strong>. These <u><strong>questions of process in legislation dominate headlines</u></strong>. Less studied, but perhaps even more interesting, are questions of process in a regulatory framework. Given its complexity, <u><strong><mark>rulemaking is especially prone to process- oriented questions</u></strong></mark>. Far more than legislation<u><strong>, <mark>rules must navigate</mark> a number of prescribed <mark>argumentative hurdles</mark> on their way to adoption. This <mark>raises the stakes for following proper procedure</mark> both logically and practically, as <mark>violating</mark> protocols makes it likely the rule <mark>will be rejected</u></strong></mark>. In addition, the <u><strong>authority of agencies in the federal government is nebulous</u></strong>. <u><strong>Agency power to make rules is delegated by Congress, but there is little consensus on the degree of latitude that those designees hold. Since rulemakers lack constitu- tional warrants for coercing citizen behavior, they are highly susceptible to criticism of their authority and jurisdiction. Asked to act both independently and under the watch of the constitutional branches, <mark>rulemakers must pay careful attention to process.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 54,857 | 497 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,592 |
Next is substantive side bias
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Next is <u>substantive side bias</h4></u>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,766 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,593 |
CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States invested more than any other nation to influence the global control regime If the U.S. proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution if, the U.S. interpretation attracted ceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4>CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The United States</u></strong></mark> has <u><strong><mark>invested</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>more</mark> effort <mark>than any other nation</u></strong></mark> over the past century <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong> <u><strong>influence the</mark> design of the <mark>global control regime</u></strong></mark> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S.</mark> now <mark>proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><strong><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></strong></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><strong>regarding</u></strong> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u><strong>claiming <mark>that the U.S. is not violating the treaties</mark> <mark>because</mark> <mark>cultivation, trade and possession</u></strong></mark> of cannabis <u><strong><mark>are still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>and</mark> <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></strong></mark> for considerable <u><strong><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices</mark>, especially <mark>when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution</mark> and domestic legal system.</u></strong> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u><strong><mark>if, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u></strong>a certain level of <u><strong>political ac<mark>ceptance</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u></strong>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u></strong>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><strong>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation</u></strong> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><strong>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></strong> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u><strong><mark>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u></strong></mark> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u><strong><mark>coffeeshops</u></strong></mark> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,594 |
Link applies just as much to donated organs – you can't give away what does not belong to you. A property perspective applies to transfers whether paid for or not
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of the value, but the value still exists. Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value
| null |
Empirical evidence aside, the more fundamental cause of commoditization of organs lies in the distinction between goods and services. Services are valuable only through performance. Therefore, by prohibiting performance, laws can remove all value since no one is willing to pay for nonperformance. n147 Contrarily, goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of the value, but the value still exists. Thus, laws regulating goods can only serve as wealth distribution mechanisms, determining who has access to the value of a good and who is restricted from it. n148 Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value. However, because the law treats organs as a [*335] service, n149 the law assumes that by proscribing the initial sale of an organ it can remove all of the organ's value. Also, it does not restrict access to that value from any of the actors in the transaction - with the exception of the donor. The end result is that the value of the organ, unassigned by the law, is commoditized as other actors in the market divide that value among themselves. n150
| 1,348 |
<h4>Link applies just as much to donated organs – you can't give away what does not belong to you. A property perspective applies to transfers whether paid for or not</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>Empirical evidence aside, the more fundamental cause of commoditization of organs lies in the distinction between goods and services. Services are valuable only through performance. Therefore, by prohibiting performance, laws can remove all value since no one is willing to pay for nonperformance. n147 Contrarily, <u>goods have inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of the value, but the value still exists.</u> Thus, laws regulating goods can only serve as wealth distribution mechanisms, determining who has access to the value of a good and who is restricted from it. n148 <u>Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has inherent value</u>. However, because the law treats organs as a [*335] service, n149 the law assumes that by proscribing the initial sale of an organ it can remove all of the organ's value. Also, it does not restrict access to that value from any of the actors in the transaction - with the exception of the donor. The end result is that the value of the organ, unassigned by the law, is commoditized as other actors in the market divide that value among themselves. n150</p>
|
Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,691 | 6 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,595 |
Surely the Aff will say the Neg can still debate them on the substance of their advocacy but not defending the clear actor and mechanism of the resolutional produces a substantive side bias.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Surely the Aff will say the Neg can still debate them on the substance of their advocacy but not defending the clear actor and mechanism of the resolutional produces a <u>substantive side bias</u>.</h4>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,767 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,596 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty<u><strong> of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Off
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,597 |
Transplant organs are treated as a "service"
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
Statutes categorically treat the transfer of organs from one individual to another as a service rather than a transaction for goods or products even though a tangible, physical item (the organ) is traded when the end recipient enters the equation, the organ is deemed a service.
The jurisprudence underpinning the legal status of human body parts is, at best, confused this debate implicates recent doctrines of the constitutional right of privacy, adding yet another wrinkle to the legal framework.
| null |
In addition to the common law, statutes specifically regulating organ transfers have resulted in similar unintended consequences. Blood Shield Statutes n59 and other state health and safety legislation categorically treat the transfer of organs from one individual to another as a service rather than a transaction for goods or products. n60 In other words, even though a tangible, physical item (the organ) is traded between doctors, hospitals, and medical companies, and is [*322] treated as a good for the purposes of those transactions, when the end recipient enters the equation, the organ is deemed a service. n61 The end result of this classification is to preclude products liability claims, essentially exculpating tissue banks whose negligence may result in contaminated products. n62 Because the tissue is not a good, tissue recipients are not protected by the standard product warranties that might otherwise deter tissue banks from negligently supplying infected tissue. n63 Further, because the tissue is a service, an injured party's primary recourse is through medical malpractice suits against the doctors and hospitals involved in the transplant. n64 Thus, the law shifts the burden of ensuring that tissue is safe for implantation from tissue banks and other suppliers, who are in the best position to test for disease and ensure proper handling of tissues, to doctors and hospitals, who have much less control over the quality of tissues they receive. n65
Such negligent treatment of tissue transplants can result in tragic consequences. n66 Bryan Lykins stands as a poign-ant example. Bryan received a cadaveric tendon as part of a knee surgery. n67 Although the surgery was common, and in many ways routine, the tendon Bryan received was from a cadaver that had been unrefrigerated for nineteen hours. n68 The bacteria that had been allowed to grow during that time resulted in Bryan's death only four days after the surgery. n69 Even worse is the fact that Bryan's story is not a singular or isolated incident. n70 Yet, even though tissue banks may negligently place contaminated tissue on the market, they cannot be held liable if their products result in illness or even death. n71 Further, insofar as lawmakers have been slow to act, n72 tissue banks have little incentive [*323] to change their behavior, and some have been continually careless in the products and "services" they are providing. n73
Privacy right would be sufficient for judicial doctrine
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
The jurisprudence underpinning the legal status of human body parts is, at best, confused. This, in part, is due to the various legal theories that interact when discussing the transfer of human organs. The common law tradition that has protected some interests in body parts is now inadequate since the value in a dead body has only recently been - and is continually being - established by modern technology. Additionally, statutes concerned with tissue transfer have sought to preserve a distinction between the body and property, but with unintended consequences. Finally, this debate implicates recent doctrines of the constitutional right of privacy, adding yet another wrinkle to the legal framework.
| 3,484 |
<h4>Transplant organs are treated as a "service"</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>In addition to the common law, statutes specifically regulating organ transfers have resulted in similar unintended consequences. Blood Shield <u>Statutes </u>n59 and other state health and safety legislation <u>categorically treat the transfer of organs from one individual to another as a service rather than a transaction for goods or products</u>. n60 In other words, <u>even though a tangible, physical item (the organ) is traded</u> between doctors, hospitals, and medical companies, and is [*322] treated as a good for the purposes of those transactions, <u>when the end recipient enters the equation, the organ is deemed a service.</u> n61 The end result of this classification is to preclude products liability claims, essentially exculpating tissue banks whose negligence may result in contaminated products. n62 Because the tissue is not a good, tissue recipients are not protected by the standard product warranties that might otherwise deter tissue banks from negligently supplying infected tissue. n63 Further, because the tissue is a service, an injured party's primary recourse is through medical malpractice suits against the doctors and hospitals involved in the transplant. n64 Thus, the law shifts the burden of ensuring that tissue is safe for implantation from tissue banks and other suppliers, who are in the best position to test for disease and ensure proper handling of tissues, to doctors and hospitals, who have much less control over the quality of tissues they receive. n65</p><p>Such negligent treatment of tissue transplants can result in tragic consequences. n66 Bryan Lykins stands as a poign-ant example. Bryan received a cadaveric tendon as part of a knee surgery. n67 Although the surgery was common, and in many ways routine, the tendon Bryan received was from a cadaver that had been unrefrigerated for nineteen hours. n68 The bacteria that had been allowed to grow during that time resulted in Bryan's death only four days after the surgery. n69 Even worse is the fact that Bryan's story is not a singular or isolated incident. n70 Yet, even though tissue banks may negligently place contaminated tissue on the market, they cannot be held liable if their products result in illness or even death. n71<strong> Further, insofar as lawmakers have been slow to act, n72 tissue banks have little incentive [*323] to change their behavior, and some have been continually careless in the products and "services" they are providing. n73</p><p>Privacy right would be sufficient for judicial doctrine</p><p>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p> <u>The jurisprudence underpinning the legal status of human body parts is, at best, confused</u>. This, in part, is due to the various legal theories that interact when discussing the transfer of human organs. The common law tradition that has protected some interests in body parts is now inadequate since the value in a dead body has only recently been - and is continually being - established by modern technology. Additionally, statutes concerned with tissue transfer have sought to preserve a distinction between the body and property, but with unintended consequences. Finally, <u>this debate implicates recent doctrines of the constitutional right of privacy, adding yet another wrinkle to the legal framework.</p></u>
|
Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,690 | 3 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,598 |
Affirmatives that don’t defend the resolution make deploying other strategies against them inordinately Aff tilted. They have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, emphasize different prescriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like perms to make being impossible inordinately difficult.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Affirmatives that don’t defend the resolution make deploying other strategies against them inordinately Aff tilted. They have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, emphasize different prescriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like perms to make being impossible inordinately difficult.</h4>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,768 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,599 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p><strong>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u><strong>As long <mark>as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists</u></strong></mark>—and it exists today—<u><strong><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <mark>major violence remains a pivotal task</u></strong></mark> of global security policy. <u><strong>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u></strong> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><strong><mark>arms races are likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u><strong>stabilization remains a key</u></strong> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u><strong>a web of <mark>interlocking agreements</mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u></strong> At the global level, <u><strong><mark>arms limitation</u></strong></mark> or prohibition <u><strong><mark>agreement</u></strong>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><strong><mark>are needed to ban existential dangers</mark> for global stability, <mark>ecological safety, and</mark> maybe <mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><strong><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u></strong> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u></strong>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u><strong>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u></strong>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u><strong>it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><strong><mark>means are available to ensure compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>
| null | null |
Off
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
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No.....
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Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,600 |
No judicial support for property right here (at most some economic liberty interest)
|
Boyer 12
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Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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no court has held that organ sales are a constitutionally protected interest
| null |
While no court has held that organ sales are a constitutionally protected interest, there is some jurisprudence sup-porting the heightened scrutiny theory. In cases challenging statutes authorizing the removal of corneas without the consent of the next of kin, courts have justified these statutes by characterizing the state's interest as compelling. n85 These cases seem to indicate that because some enhanced right is implicated, courts are inclined to take a harder look at laws overriding an individual's choice regarding what to do with her own organs.
| 558 |
<h4>No judicial support for property right here (at most some economic liberty interest)</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>While <u>no court has held that organ sales are a constitutionally protected interest</u>, there is some jurisprudence sup-porting the heightened scrutiny theory. In cases challenging statutes authorizing the removal of corneas without the consent of the next of kin, courts have justified these statutes by characterizing the state's interest as compelling. n85 These cases seem to indicate that because some enhanced right is implicated, courts are inclined to take a harder look at laws overriding an individual's choice regarding what to do with her own organs.</p>
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Property Rights
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,770 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,601 |
Advocacy skills are developed by testing both sides – if the neg is not prepared to debate the aff then NEITHER TEAM develops the necessary education to produce effective change
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Advocacy skills are developed by testing both sides – if the neg is not prepared to debate the aff then NEITHER TEAM develops the necessary education to produce effective change</h4>
| null | null |
FW Short 1NC
| 430,769 | 1 | 17,087 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,246 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
Wake Forest Chui-Cronin
|
Najor
|
1AC Self-determination
1NC Framework Foucault K
2NC K
1NR FW
2NR K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
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Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
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Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,602 |
An advocacy for 'small farms' naturalizes Whiteness by valorizing a group of largely white farmers and whitewashes immigrant and minority exploitation - our alternative is to begin with FOOD JUSTICE.
|
Allen 10
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Patricia Allen. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2010
|
a prevalent viewpoint within local food movements is that a sustainable and equitable agrifood economy can and should be based upon a family-farm agrarian structure local food campaigns and many of those involved in direct marketing prioritize supporting farmers, although to date there has been little discussion of other food-system workers. This is in keeping with American agrarianism, which upholds a belief in the moral and economic primacy of farming over other occupations and ways of producing The greater emphasis on farmers than on food-system workers in the local food movement inadvertently gives less attention to ethnic minori- ties simply because few farms are owned by non- whites. Taken together, Latinos and African- Americans own only 3% of farms in the USA and only 1.5% of farmland (US Department of Agricul- ture, 2009). In contrast, most hired farm labourers, not currently prioritized in most food-system local- ization efforts, are ethnic minorities. Workers and owners in the food system have interests that are not necessarily consonant. . While this is a beautiful vision, localities contain within them wide demographic ranges and social relationships of power and privilege embed- ded within the place itself. At both global and local scales, those who benefit—and those who do not—are arranged along already familiar lines of class, ethnicity and gender. Given the disparate ma- terial and cultural conditions within localities, local food actors must be wary of the assumption that people within a community will necessarily have the same understandings or interests by dint of the fact that they share the same geographic place or are involved in the food system Working toward social equity in local food systems requires questioning an assumption of shared interests among all members of the community when there are often substantially different material interests and power allocations. highlighting social justice issues can alienate others in the food system working on different priorities. For example, local food policy councils are illustrative of deliberate efforts to prac- tice food democracy at a local level. However, these efforts have had challenges in addressing the di- verse interests of their members, at times due to social justice issues. In an early study of local food policy councils, for instance We can learn from the efforts in Toronto, Canada, where strong leader- ship and commitment to justice have led to the creation of a food policy for the city that prioritizes food justice ). Anderson (2008) differentiates local- and community-based food systems. For her, community-based refers to residents having control over and making decisions about their food system, while local means physical geographic dimensions.
|
a prevalent viewpoint is that a sustainable agrifood economy should be based upon a family-farm structure there has been little discussion of other food-system worker emphasis on farmers gives less attention to ethnic minori- ties simply because few farms are owned by non- whites , hired farm labourers, not prioritized in most food-system local- ization efforts, are minorities Workers and owners have interests that are not consonant. , l , those who benefit—and those who do not—are arranged along already familiar lines . highlighting social justice issues can alienate others in the food system working on different priorities. s strong leader- ship and commitment to justice have led to the creation of a food policy for the city that prioritizes food justice,
|
Yet a prevalent viewpoint within local food movements is that a sustainable and equitable agrifood economy can and should be based upon a family-farm agrarian structure (Allen and Hinrichs, 2007; Guthman et al., 2006). Nearly all local food campaigns and many of those involved in direct marketing prioritize supporting farmers, although to date there has been little discussion of other food-system workers. This is in keeping with American agrarianism, which upholds a belief in the moral and economic primacy of farming over other occupations and ways of producing (Fink, 1992). The greater emphasis on farmers than on food-system workers in the local food movement inadvertently gives less attention to ethnic minori- ties simply because few farms are owned by non- whites. Taken together, Latinos and African- Americans own only 3% of farms in the USA and only 1.5% of farmland (US Department of Agricul- ture, 2009). In contrast, most hired farm labourers, not currently prioritized in most food-system local- ization efforts, are ethnic minorities. Workers and owners in the food system have interests that are not necessarily consonant. In the local food movement there is a sense that, because people live together in a locality and en- counter each other, they will make better, more equitable decisions that prioritize the common good. While this is a beautiful vision, localities contain within them wide demographic ranges and social relationships of power and privilege embed- ded within the place itself. At both global and local scales, those who benefit—and those who do not—are arranged along already familiar lines of class, ethnicity and gender. Given the disparate ma- terial and cultural conditions within localities, local food actors must be wary of the assumption that people within a community will necessarily have the same understandings or interests by dint of the fact that they share the same geographic place or are involved in the food system (Allen, 2004). Working toward social equity in local food systems requires questioning an assumption of shared interests among all members of the community when there are often substantially different material interests and power allocations. In some cases, highlighting social justice issues can alienate others in the food system working on different priorities. For example, local food policy councils are illustrative of deliberate efforts to prac- tice food democracy at a local level. However, these efforts have had challenges in addressing the di- verse interests of their members, at times due to social justice issues. In an early study of local food policy councils, for instance, Dahlberg (1994) found that the formation of food policy councils failed where there was more emphasis on hunger than on other food system issues. We can learn from the efforts in Toronto, Canada, where strong leader- ship and commitment to justice have led to the creation of a food policy for the city that prioritizes food justice, establishing the right of all residents to adequate, nutritious food and promoting food production and distribution systems that are grounded in equity (Toronto Food Policy, 2010). Toronto is also an example of a community in which people from many regions and cultures share a particular place and are developing socially in- clusive ‘creative food economies’ (Donald and Blay-Palmer, 2006). Anderson (2008) differentiates local- and community-based food systems. For her, community-based refers to residents having control over and making decisions about their food system, while local means physical geographic dimensions.
| 3,627 |
<h4>An advocacy for 'small farms' naturalizes Whiteness by valorizing a group of largely white farmers and whitewashes immi<u><strong>grant and minority exploitation - our alternative is to begin with FOOD JUSTICE. </h4><p></u></strong>Patricia <u><strong>Allen</u></strong>. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 20<u><strong>10</p><p></u></strong>Yet <u><strong><mark>a prevalent viewpoint</mark> within local food movements <mark>is that a sustainable</mark> and equitable <mark>agrifood economy</mark> can and <mark>should be based upon a family-farm </mark>agrarian <mark>structure</u></strong></mark> (Allen and Hinrichs, 2007; Guthman et al., 2006). Nearly all <u><strong>local food campaigns and many of those involved in direct marketing prioritize supporting farmers, although to date <mark>there has been little discussion of other food-system worker</mark>s.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is in keeping with American agrarianism, which upholds a belief in the moral and economic primacy of farming over other occupations and ways of producing</u></strong> (Fink, 1992). <u><strong>The greater <mark>emphasis</mark> <mark>on farmers</mark> than on food-system workers in the local food movement inadvertently <mark>gives less attention to ethnic minori- ties simply because few farms are owned by non- whites</mark>. Taken together, Latinos and African- Americans own only 3% of farms in the USA and only 1.5% of farmland (US Department of Agricul- ture, 2009). In contrast<mark>, </mark>most <mark>hired farm labourers, not </mark>currently <mark>prioritized in most food-system local- ization efforts, are </mark>ethnic <mark>minorities</mark>. <mark>Workers and owners </mark>in the food system<mark> have interests that are not </mark>necessarily <mark>consonant.</mark> </u></strong>In the local food movement there is a sense that, because people live together in a locality and en- counter each other, they will make better, more equitable decisions that prioritize the common good<u><strong>. While this is a beautiful vision<mark>, l</mark>ocalities contain within them wide demographic ranges and social relationships of power and privilege embed- ded within the place itself. At both global and local scales<mark>, those who benefit—and those who do not—are arranged along already familiar lines </mark>of class, ethnicity and gender<mark>.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Given the disparate ma- terial and cultural conditions within localities, local food actors must be wary of the assumption that people within a community will necessarily have the same understandings or interests by dint of the fact that they share the same geographic place or are involved in the food system</u></strong> (Allen, 2004). <u><strong>Working toward social equity in local food systems requires questioning an assumption of shared interests among all members of the community when there are often substantially different material interests and power allocations. </u></strong>In some cases, <u><strong><mark>highlighting social justice issues can alienate others in the food system working on different priorities.</mark> For example, local food policy councils are illustrative of deliberate efforts to prac- tice food democracy at a local level. However, these efforts have had challenges in addressing the di- verse interests of their member<mark>s</mark>, at times due to social justice issues. In an early study of local food policy councils, for instance</u></strong>, Dahlberg (1994) found that the formation of food policy councils failed where there was more emphasis on hunger than on other food system issues. <u><strong>We can learn from the efforts in Toronto, Canada, where <mark>strong leader- ship and commitment to justice have led to the creation of a food policy for the city that prioritizes food justice</u></strong>,</mark> establishing the right of all residents to adequate, nutritious food and promoting food production and distribution systems that are grounded in equity (Toronto Food Policy, 2010). Toronto is also an example of a community in which people from many regions and cultures share a particular place and are developing socially in- clusive ‘creative food economies’ (Donald and Blay-Palmer, 2006<u><strong>). Anderson (2008) differentiates local- and community-based food systems. For her, community-based refers to residents having control over and making decisions about their food system, while local means physical geographic dimensions.</p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Off
| 430,771 | 4 | 17,086 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,245 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Bagwell
|
1AC Marihuana (Cartels Small Farms)
1NC T-nearly all ASPEC-ish Federalism CP Treaties DA Neolib K
2NC T-nearly all CP
1NR DA
2NR CP DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,603 |
Denying people the right to sell organs is what really commodifies them
|
Radcliffe Richards 1
|
Radcliffe Richards 1 Janet Radcliffe Richards, PhD., Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Walton Hall, UK. Issues in Medical Ethics, IX(1), January-March 2001Issues in Medical Ethics, IX(1), January-March 2001 Organs for sale http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16334470
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The trade is alleged to be wrong because it treats parts of the body as purchasable commodities. We should, however, guard against the common trick in rhetoric of using a term carrying derogatory overtones without proving the grounds for such condemnation. A fundamental issue of autonomy is involved here. Treating people as commodities - with no say in their destinies — is vastly different from letting them decide for themselves what to do with their own bodies.
|
The trade is alleged to be wrong because it treats parts of the body as commodities We should guard against the trick of using a term carrying derogatory overtones without proving grounds for condemnation A fundamental issue of autonomy is involved here. Treating people as commodities - with no say in their destinies — is vastly different from letting them decide what to do with their own bodies.
|
Collateral damage
The trade is alleged to be wrong because it treats parts of the body as purchasable commodities. We should, however, guard against the common trick in rhetoric of using a term carrying derogatory overtones without proving the grounds for such condemnation. A fundamental issue of autonomy is involved here. Treating people as commodities - with no say in their destinies — is vastly different from letting them decide for themselves what to do with their own bodies. Whilst it may be degrading to be in a state where organ selling is the best option left, this does not mean that actually selling , the organ worsens the degradation. On the contrary, many vendors may feel an increase in self-respect after what is perceived as a duty done.
| 758 |
<h4>Denying people the right to sell organs is what really commodifies them</h4><p><strong>Radcliffe Richards 1</strong> Janet Radcliffe Richards, PhD., Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Walton Hall, UK. Issues in Medical Ethics, IX(1), January-March 2001Issues in Medical Ethics, IX(1), January-March 2001 Organs for sale http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16334470</p><p>Collateral damage</p><p><u><mark>The trade is alleged to be wrong because it treats parts of the body as</mark> purchasable <mark>commodities</mark>. <mark>We should</mark>, however, <mark>guard against the</mark> common <mark>trick</mark> in rhetoric <mark>of using a term carrying derogatory overtones</u> <u>without proving</mark> the <mark>grounds for</mark> such <mark>condemnation</mark>. <mark>A fundamental issue of autonomy is involved here. Treating people as commodities - with no say in their destinies — is vastly different from letting them decide</mark> for themselves <mark>what to do with their own bodies.</u></mark> Whilst it may be degrading to be in a state where organ selling is the best option left, this does not mean that actually selling , the organ worsens the degradation. On the contrary, many vendors may feel an increase in self-respect after what is perceived as a duty done.</p>
|
1ar cards
| null |
Suggested Core to answer Cap K
| 430,772 | 1 | 17,085 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| 565,243 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
3
|
Harvard Narayan-Sanjeev
|
Campbell
|
1ac-- Organ Sales
1nc-- Mandatory Choice CP Midterms Property Rights DA Neolib K
Block--CP K Property Rights
2nr--K
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/MaCr/Dartmouth-Martin-Cramer-Aff-Kentucky-Round3.docx
| null | 48,453 |
MaCr
|
Dartmouth MaCr
| null |
Jo.....
|
Ma.....
|
No.....
|
Cr.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,604 |
Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff
|
Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)
|
Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)
|
substantive normative guidance through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity Attempt to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life The potential is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language Habermas acknowledges the dominance of instrumental reason his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the conditions of that dominance yet he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view Benhabib constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of modernity differs in two key respects Habermas’s emphasis on consensus distorts his account of communicative ethics Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus Benhabib champions a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing conversation, we begin to ask not what all would agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the conversation The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Benhabib opposes any politics that privileges the detached self over the concrete, embodied, self she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”: Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans without endorsing all these pluralities as valid While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary conditions interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the concrete process in politics Benhabib’s position attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm enabling crucial distinctions between notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and promotes encounters with otherness to nurture a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ community redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion but not in the sense that poststructuralist critics do as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.
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substantive normative guidance through appeal to reciprocity wishes to retrieve emancipatory communicative reason derived from intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of norms is possible instead we view the normative constraints of speech community as “ pragmatic presuppositions Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates reciprocity as “constituents of the moral view Benhabib champions a model geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test to the idea of an ongoing conversation we begin to ask not what all would agree to be morally impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of sustaining the practice of conversation The emphasis now is on sustaining normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Interactive universalism acknowledges differences agreeing that disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the process in politics all cannot include those who have forfeited their place as participants in the community redefinition of universalism insists on exclusion but not in the sense of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness victimizing those disempowered by race Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are required by the principles of recognition that underpin democratic practices
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25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.
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<h4>Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff </h4><p><strong>Anderson 6<u>—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)</p><p></u></strong>25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any <u><strong><mark>substantive normative guidance</u></strong></mark> is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics <u><strong><mark>through appeal to </mark>the principles of respect and <mark>reciprocity</u></strong></mark> that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. <u><strong>Attempt</u></strong>ing <u><strong>to redress the</u></strong> <u><strong>overwhelmingly negative forms of critique</u></strong> <u><strong>characteristic of </u></strong>both the Frankfurt School and <u><strong>poststructuralist traditions,</u></strong> <u><strong>he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the</u></strong> powerful <u><strong>instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute</u></strong> <u><strong>“a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life</u></strong>.” <u><strong>The potential</u></strong> he refers to <u><strong>is the potential for mutual</u></strong> <u><strong>understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language</u></strong>.” 7 <u><strong>Habermas acknowledges the dominance</u></strong> and reach <u><strong>of instrumental reason</u></strong>—<u><strong>his project is largely devoted to a</u></strong> <u><strong>systematic analysis of the</u></strong> historical <u><strong>conditions</u></strong> and social effects <u><strong>of that</u></strong> <u><strong>dominance</u></strong>—<u><strong>yet</u></strong> at the same time <u><strong>he <mark>wishes to retrieve </mark>an <mark>emancipatory</mark> model of <mark>communicative</u></strong></mark>¶ ¶ 26¶ <u><strong><mark>reason derived from</mark> a linguistic understanding of <mark>intersubjective relations</u></strong></mark>. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that <u><strong><mark>he does not believe any metaphysical grounding</mark> <mark>of</mark> such <mark>norms is possible</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>he insists <mark>instead </mark>that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>we view the normative constraints of</u></strong> </mark>the ideal <u><strong><mark>speech community</u></strong> <u><strong>as “</mark>universal <mark>pragmatic</mark> <mark>presuppositions</mark>” </u></strong>of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. <u><strong><mark>Benhabib</u></strong></mark>, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by <u><strong><mark>promot</u></strong></mark>ing <u><strong><mark>a</mark> </u></strong>“historically <u><strong><mark>self-conscious universalism</u></strong></mark>” <u><strong><mark>that locates</mark> the ethical</u></strong> <u><strong>principles of respect and <mark>reciprocity as “constituents of the moral </mark>point of <mark>view</mark> </u></strong>from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). <u><strong>Benhabib</u></strong>’s work thus <u><strong>constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of</u></strong> specific potentialities of <u><strong>modernity</u></strong>. She <u><strong>differs</u></strong> from him <u><strong>in two key respects</u></strong>, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that <u><strong>Habermas’s emphasis</u></strong> <u><strong>on</u></strong> <u><strong>consensus</u></strong> seriously <u><strong>distorts his account of communicative ethics</u></strong>. <u><strong>Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus</u></strong>,<mark> <u><strong>Benhabib champions</u></strong></mark> instead <u><strong><mark>a</mark> discourse <mark>model</mark> of ethics that is <mark>geared toward keeping the conversation going:</mark>¶ <mark>When we shift the burden of the moral test</mark> in communicative ethics from consensus <mark>to the idea of an ongoing</mark> </u></strong>moral<u><strong> <mark>conversation</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>we begin to ask not what all would</u></strong></mark> or could <u><strong><mark>agree</mark> to as a result of practical discourses <mark>to be morally </mark>permissible or <mark>impermissible</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but what would be allowed</mark> </u></strong>and perhaps even necessary<u><strong> <mark>from the standpoint of </mark>continuing and <mark>sustaining the practice of </mark>the</u></strong> moral <u><strong><mark>conversation</u></strong></mark> among us. <u><strong><mark>The emphasis now is</mark> less on rational agreement, but more <mark>on sustaining</mark> those <mark>normative</u></strong> <u><strong>practices</u></strong></mark> and moral relationships <u><strong><mark>within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish</u></strong></mark> and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for <u><strong>Benhabib</u></strong> undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly <u><strong>opposes any </u></strong>ethics or <u><strong>politics that privileges the</u></strong> unencumbered or <u><strong>detached self over the concrete, embodied,</u></strong> situated <u><strong>self</u></strong>. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead <u><strong>she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:</u></strong>¶ <u><strong><mark>Interactive universalism acknowledges</mark> the plurality of modes of being human, and <mark>differences</mark> among humans</u></strong>, <u><strong>without endorsing all</u></strong> <u><strong>these pluralities</u></strong> and differences <u><strong>as</u></strong> morally and politically <u><strong>valid</u></strong>. <u><strong>While <mark>agreeing that</mark> normative <mark>disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are</mark> </u></strong>constituents, that is, <u><strong><mark>necessary </mark>conditions </u></strong>of the moral standpoint, <u><strong>interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection</u></strong> and action. <u><strong>In this sense, “<mark>universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied</mark> </u></strong>and embedded<u><strong> <mark>identity</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but aims at developing</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>moral <mark>attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a </mark>point of <mark>view acceptable to all</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Universality is not</mark> </u></strong>the ideal<u><strong> <mark>consensus</mark> </u></strong>of fictitiously defined selves, <u><strong><mark>but the </mark>concrete <mark>process in politics</u></strong></mark> and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of <u><strong>Benhabib’s position</u></strong>, which <u><strong>attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism</u></strong> as traditionally understood. <u><strong>On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm</u></strong>, <u><strong>enabling crucial distinctions between </u></strong>those<u><strong> notions of the good life</u></strong> <u><strong>that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles</u></strong>. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. <u><strong>On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.”</u></strong> <u><strong>It understands identity as “embodied</u></strong> and embedded” <u><strong>and promotes encounters with otherness</u></strong> so as <u><strong>to nurture</u></strong> the development of <u><strong>a moral attitude</u></strong> <u><strong>that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “<mark>all</mark>” here <mark>cannot</mark> coherently <mark>include those who have</u></strong></mark>, according to universalism’s own principles,<u><strong> <mark>forfeited their place as </mark>equal <mark>participants in the </mark>ethicopolitical¶ </u></strong>¶ 28¶ <u><strong><mark>community</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s <u><strong><mark>redefinition of universalism insists on </mark>inevitable <mark>exclusion</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but not in the sense </mark>that </u></strong>many <u><strong>poststructuralist</u></strong> and postmodernist cultural <u><strong>critics</u></strong> <u><strong>do</u></strong>, <u><strong>as the hardwired effect <mark>of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness</mark>, and</u></strong> <u><strong>as <mark>victimizing those</mark> <mark>disempowered by race</mark>, class, gender, or sexuality</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness</mark> </u></strong>and plurality, <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>prove self-undermining in their toleration of</mark> </u></strong>communities, individuals, and <u><strong><mark>practices that exclude others arbitrarily</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>interactive universalism</mark> <mark>claims that certain</mark> <mark>exclusions are</mark> not only justified, but indeed <mark>required by the</mark> <mark>principles of recognition</mark> and respect <mark>that underpin democratic </mark>institutions and <mark>practices</mark>.</p></u></strong>
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