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742,805 |
Independetly, Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious—specifically causes tropical disease
|
Franco-Paredes 10
|
Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045
|
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
|
transplantation being performed resulting in an increase in number of immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts The reasons for the growing number include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
|
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
| 1,559 |
<h4><strong>Independetly, Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious—specifically causes tropical disease </h4><p>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u>More <mark>transplantation </mark>procedures are <mark>being performed</mark> annually, <mark>resulting in an increase</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>number of immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been</mark> <mark>a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts</mark> in endemic and non-endemic settings</u>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The</mark> epidemiologic <mark>reasons for the</mark> <mark>growing number</mark> of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u><strong></mark>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market
| 430,431 | 5 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,806 |
Plan solves 2 internal links--
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market
| 430,839 | 1 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,807 |
Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact
|
BOSTROM 2011
|
BOSTROM 2011 (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)
|
a basis for ethical theory can be found in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this projec Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time We owe some loyalty to this project of the human future Since an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity we would have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus
|
basis for ethical theory can be found in commitment to the future of humanity The aspiration for a better society is a part of this project Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity public policy should favor existential-risk mitigation We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations
|
We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]
| 3,812 |
<h4>Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact</h4><p><strong>BOSTROM 2011 </strong>(Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)</p><p>We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe <u>a</u> better <u><mark>basis for ethical theory</u></mark> in this area <u><mark>can be found in</u></mark> quite a different direction—in <u>a <mark>commitment to the future of humanity</mark> as a vast project</u>, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>aspiration for a better society</mark>—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—<mark>is a part of this projec</u>t</mark>. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … <u><mark>Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project</mark> <mark>of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the</mark> <mark>projects</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>our own personal futures</mark>. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time</u>, considered in isolation from how it got that way. <u>We owe</u>, I think, <u>some loyalty to this project of the human future</u>. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) <u>Since <mark>an existential</mark> <mark>catastrophe would</u></mark> either <u><mark>put an end to the project of the future of humanity</u></mark> or drastically curtail its scope for development, <u>we would</u> seem to <u>have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it</u>, in Adams’ view. We also note that <u>an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences</u>, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, <u>an ethical view emphasizing that <mark>public</mark> <mark>policy should</mark> be determined through informed democratic deliberation</u> by all stakeholders <u>would <mark>favor existential-risk mitigation</mark> if we suppose</u>, as is plausible, <u>that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies</u> upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). <u>We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants</u>.[24] <u><mark>We do not want</mark> <mark>to be the failing link in the chain of generations</mark>, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus</u>. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
1NC
|
Adv
| 93,995 | 284 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,808 |
First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
|
By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ, this would become much less commonplace.
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4><strong>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes<u> a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like <strong><mark>this would become much less commonplace.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,809 |
1. Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
|
Allison 90
|
Allison 90, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”)
|
there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing . The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. we are likely to to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
| 1,156 |
<h4>1. Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought</h4><p><strong>Allison 90</strong>, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19<u>90</u> (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) </p><p>And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, <u>there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism.</u> As Raymond Frey puts it, <u><mark>utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing</mark> .</u>.. [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. <u><mark>The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people.</u></mark> <u>Without</u> a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) <u>or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason,</u> <u><mark>we are likely to</mark> </u>turn towards Bentham and <mark>to<u> judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.</p></u></mark>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
1NC
|
Adv
| 419,694 | 10 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,810 |
Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
|
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
|
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4><strong>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u><strong> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market
| 430,264 | 17 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,811 |
2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework
|
Nye, 86
|
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)
|
Imagine an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? ? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
|
an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons
|
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
| 2,258 |
<h4>2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework </h4><p><strong>Nye, 86<u></strong> (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)</p><p></u>The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 <u>Imagine </u>that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where <u><mark>an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants</mark> lined up against a wall.</u> When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle <u><mark>and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other</mark>.</u> Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. <u><mark>Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity</mark> by refusing to play his dirty game? The point</u> of the story <u>is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But <mark>at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden?</u></mark> Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? <u><mark>What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons</mark> from a terrorists' nuclear device?</u> At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others<u>? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences?</u> Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. <u>Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
1NC
|
Adv
| 105,466 | 37 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,812 |
Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite
|
Kaserman, 7
|
Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
|
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives have cited abuses and high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.
|
some opponents of the use of financial incentives ited buses to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized.
|
Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors have cited various human rights abuses and extraordinarily high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets. n32 This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized. Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.
| 2,002 |
<h4><strong>Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite</h4><p>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p><u>In a truly ironic twist of logic, <mark>some opponents of the use of financial incentives</u></mark> for cadaveric organ donors <u>have c<mark>ited</mark> </u>various human rights <u>a<mark>buses</mark> and </u>extraordinarily <u>high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely <mark>to accompany legalized organ markets</u></mark>. n32 <u><mark>This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion</mark>. <mark>This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized</u>.</mark> Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. <u>Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors. </p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market
| 430,263 | 5 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,813 |
SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS AT ACHIEVING DISTRIBITUVE JUSTICE IN THE US CAUSES SHIFT OF HAZARDS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—that’s worse for solving their impacts
|
Low and Gleeson, Senior Lecturer in Architecture- University of Melbourne & Research Fellow at the Australian National University, 1998,
|
Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson, Senior Lecturer in Architecture- University of Melbourne & Research Fellow at the Australian National University, 1998, Justice, Society and Nature: an exploration of political ecology, p. 131
In short, the political critique within developed countries must be shifted from the special allocation of risk to the production of risk. Failing this, the environmental justice movement of the United States, for example, will find itself trapped in the politics of distributional justice (i.e. the LULU problem) that ultimately cannot secure universal justice for all human communities and the global environment. At present, the diverse US environmental justice movement, in concert with a more popular opposition to LULUs, has managed only to “half-transcend” the distributional politics of place. The combined effect of these popular and institutional forces may have created a ‘landscape of resistance’ for risk-producing and risk-managing industries, but this achievement may only have served to ensure that environmental hazards are exported to more “accepting” landscapes, including developing countries.
|
the environmental justice movement received its biggest boost on February 11, 1994, when Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898 requires each federal agency to develop strategies to achieve environmental justice by "identifying and addressing... disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority populations and low-income populations At a minimum, these strategies should: (1) encourage enforcement of federal and state health and environmental statutes in communities with high poor and minority populations; (2) increase public involvement; (3) conduct more accurate research and obtain more precise data regarding the health and environment of poor and minority communities; and (4)analyze disparities with respect to the use of natural resources by poor and minority populations
the EPA developed an environmental justice strategy aimed at integrating environmental justice into the Agency's programs and policies to ensure that "no segment of the population, regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, as a result of the EPA's policies, programs, and activities, suffers disproportionately from adverse human health or environmental effects, and all people live in clean, healthy, and sustainable communities.
In accordance with the Executive Order's emphasis on grassroots community involvement, the EPA based its strategy on three guiding principles: (1) environmental justice begins and ends in communities; (2) helping affected communities gain access to information will enable them to participate meaningfully in activities; and (3) effective leadership will advance environmental justice This "Common Sense" Initiative bring together communities, environmentalists, industry, states, tribes, and others to develop cleaner, cheaper, and smarter solutions to environmental problems the Common Sense Initiative focuses on "public participation, accountability, partnerships, and communication with stakeholders." Based on the realization that effective environmental justice strategies require early involvement by affected communities and other stakeholders, the Agency will actively seek to incorporate the expertise of local, affected community members throughout this process
|
EPA developed an environmental justice strategy ai to ensure that "no segment of the population, suffers disproportionately from adverse human health or environmental effects
Executive Order's emphasis on grassroots community involvement, the EPA based its strategy on three guiding principles: (1) environmental justice begins and ends in communities
|
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12898 REQUIRES AGENCIES TO TAKE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE INTO ACCOUNT IN DECISIONMAKING
Gregory Roberts, Editor, American University Law Review, October, 1998, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 229, p. 241
After achieving only modest success in the courts and suffering repeated failures in Congress, the environmental justice movement received its biggest boost on February 11, 1994, when President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, entitled "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations" (the "Executive Order"). n60 The Executive Order requires each federal agency to develop strategies to achieve environmental justice by "identifying and addressing... disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority populations and low-income populations." n61 At a minimum, these strategies should: (1) encourage enforcement of federal and state health and environmental statutes in communities with high poor and minority populations; (2) increase public involvement; (3) conduct more accurate research and obtain more precise data regarding the health and environment of poor and minority communities; and (4)analyze disparities with respect to the use of natural resources by poor and minority populations. n62
EPA HAS INCORPORATED EO 12898 INTO ITS POLICIES
Gregory Roberts, Editor, American University Law Review, October, 1998, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 229, p. 243-4
Pursuant to the President's Executive Order, the EPA developed an environmental justice strategy aimed at integrating environmental justice into the Agency's programs and policies. n72 The stated goal is to ensure that "no segment of the population, regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, as a result of the EPA's policies, programs, and activities, suffers disproportionately from adverse human health or environmental effects, and all people live in clean, healthy, and sustainable communities." n73
In accordance with the Executive Order's emphasis on grassroots community involvement, the EPA based its strategy on three guiding principles: (1) environmental justice begins and ends in communities; (2) helping affected communities gain access to information will enable them to participate meaningfully in activities; and (3) effective leadership will advance environmental justice. n74 Following these principles, the EPA developed an approach focused on establishing common sense standards and procedures for conducting the Agency's programs. n75 This "Common Sense" Initiative n76 attempts to bring together communities, environmentalists, industry, states, tribes, and others to develop cleaner, cheaper, and smarter solutions to environmental problems. n77 Along with four other mission topics, the Common Sense Initiative focuses on "public participation, accountability, partnerships, and communication with stakeholders." n78 Based on the realization that effective environmental justice strategies require early involvement by affected communities and other stakeholders, the Agency will actively seek to incorporate the expertise of local, affected community members throughout this process. n79
| 3,256 |
<h4>SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS AT ACHIEVING DISTRIBITUVE JUSTICE IN THE US CAUSES SHIFT OF HAZARDS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—that’s worse for solving their impacts </h4><p>Nicholas <strong>Low and</strong> Brendan <strong>Gleeson, Senior Lecturer in Architecture- University of Melbourne & Research Fellow at the Australian National University, 1998,</strong> Justice, Society and Nature: an exploration of political ecology, p. 131</p><p>In short, <u>the political critique within developed countries must be shifted from the special allocation of risk to the production of risk. Failing this, the environmental justice movement of the United States</u>, for example, <u>will find itself trapped in the politics of distributional justice</u> (i.e. the LULU problem) that ultimately cannot secure universal justice for all human communities and the global environment. At present, <u>the diverse US environmental justice movement, in concert with a more popular opposition to LULUs, has managed only to “half-transcend” the distributional politics of place</u>. <u>The combined effect of these popular and institutional forces may have created a ‘landscape of resistance’ for risk-producing and risk-managing industries, but this achievement may only have served to ensure that environmental hazards are exported to more “accepting” landscapes, including developing countries</u><strong>.</p><p>EXECUTIVE ORDER 12898 REQUIRES AGENCIES TO TAKE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE INTO ACCOUNT IN DECISIONMAKING</p><p></strong>Gregory <strong>Roberts, Editor, American University Law Review</strong>, October, <strong>1998</strong>, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 229, p. 241</p><p>After achieving only modest success in the courts and suffering repeated failures in Congress, <u>the environmental justice movement received its biggest boost on February 11, 1994, when</u> President <u>Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898</u>, entitled "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations" (the "Executive Order"). n60 The Executive Order <u>requires each federal agency to develop strategies to achieve environmental justice by "identifying and addressing... disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority populations and low-income populations</u>." n61 <u>At a minimum, these strategies should: (1) encourage enforcement of federal and state health and environmental statutes in communities with high poor and minority populations; (2) increase public involvement; (3) conduct more accurate research and obtain more precise data regarding the health and environment of poor and minority communities; and (4)analyze disparities with respect to the use of natural resources by poor and minority populations</u><strong>. n62</p><p>EPA HAS INCORPORATED EO 12898 INTO ITS POLICIES</p><p></strong>Gregory <strong>Roberts, Editor, American University Law Review</strong>, October, <strong>1998</strong>, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 229, p. 243-4</p><p>Pursuant to the President's Executive Order, <u>the <mark>EPA developed an environmental justice strategy ai</mark>med at integrating environmental justice into the Agency's programs and policies</u>. n72 The stated goal is <u><mark>to ensure that "no segment of the population,</mark> regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, as a result of the EPA's policies, programs, and activities, <mark>suffers disproportionately from adverse human health or environmental effects</mark>, and all people live in clean, healthy, and sustainable communities.</u>" n73</p><p><u> In accordance with the <mark>Executive Order's emphasis on grassroots community involvement, the EPA based its strategy on three guiding principles: (1) environmental justice begins and ends in communities</mark>; (2) helping affected communities gain access to information will enable them to participate meaningfully in activities; and (3) effective leadership will advance environmental justice</u>. n74 Following these principles, the EPA developed an approach focused on establishing common sense standards and procedures for conducting the Agency's programs. n75 <u>This "Common Sense" Initiative</u> n76 attempts to <u>bring together communities, environmentalists, industry, states, tribes, and others to develop cleaner, cheaper, and smarter solutions to environmental problems</u>. n77 Along with four other mission topics, <u>the Common Sense Initiative focuses on "public participation, accountability, partnerships, and communication with stakeholders." </u> n78 <u>Based on the realization that effective environmental justice strategies require early involvement by affected communities and other stakeholders, the Agency will actively seek to incorporate the expertise of local, affected community members throughout this process</u>. n79</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
1NC
|
Evnt Justice
| 430,841 | 1 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,814 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.</h4>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Organ sales will end the illegal market
| 430,842 | 1 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,815 |
Accusing authors of white supremacy makes discussion impossible—their epistemology not valuable
|
Hammersley 93
|
Hammersley, 93, Martyn, British Journal of Sociology, September 1993 “Research and anti-racism: the case of Peter foster and his critics”, 44.3, JSTOR
|
the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black people) have privileged insight into the nature of society the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed this position is no more satisfactory than relativism We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology
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the implication is reality is obscured from those with this background it is suggested, the black people) have privileged insight into the nature of society this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality otherwise everyone could make the same claim it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology
|
The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black, female and/or working class people) have privileged insight into the nature of society. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed. But in other respects this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women's emanci-pation.l9 However, while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology.20
| 2,143 |
<h4>Accusing authors of white supremacy makes discussion impossible—their epistemology not valuable </h4><p><u><strong>Hammersley</u></strong>, <u><strong>93</u></strong>, Martyn, British Journal of Sociology, September 1993 “Research and anti-racism: the case of Peter foster and his critics”, 44.3, JSTOR </p><p>The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time <u><mark>the implication is</mark> that <mark>reality is obscured from those with this background</mark> because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, <mark>it is suggested, the</mark> oppressed (<mark>black</u></mark>, female and/or working class <u><mark>people) have privileged insight into the nature of society</u></mark>. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; <u>the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed</u>. But in other respects <u><mark>this position is no more satisfactory than relativism</u>. <u>We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality</mark>. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; <mark>otherwise everyone could make the same claim</mark> with the same legitimacy</u> (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women's emanci-pation.l9 However, <u>while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, <mark>it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology</u><strong></mark>.20 </p></strong>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
1NC
|
Evnt Justice
| 298,145 | 7 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,816 |
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
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organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices Erin and Harris suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
| 3,354 |
<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u><mark>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u></mark>. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘<mark>organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from <mark>Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u>who <mark>suggest</mark> <mark>that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 429,540 | 21 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,817 |
This approach would maximize organ sales while avoiding common objections – negative arguments must be linked to government purchasing rather than an unregulated market
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
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We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
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2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
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Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
| 1,450 |
<h4><strong>This approach would maximize organ sales while avoiding common objections – negative arguments must be linked to government purchasing rather than an unregulated market</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. <mark>2 <u>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,338 | 11 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,818 |
Whiteness isn’t a monolithic root cause---they shut off productive debate over solutions – means the alt fails
|
Shelby 7
|
Shelby 7 – Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity
|
Others challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage we are rarely able to neatly separate these factors it would be impossible for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism the increasing technological basis of the economy shrinking state budgets world trade conservative ideology poorly funded schools a violent drug trade some combination of these factors or some other explanation altogether There are empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and thus that systematic empirical inquiry historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure We must instead rely on open public debate with the aim of garnering rationally motivated consensus Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to white supremacy A more subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments such as immigration policy
|
it would be impossible, for the black community to determine whether their impoverished condition is due to institutional racism world trade, conservative ideology or some other explanation There are empirical difficulties in determining causal significance of the factors justice will demand practical remedies according to each factor our social world is complicated thus empirical inquiry, are required to reveal systemic structure We must rely on open public debate garnering rationally motivated consensus Attention to distinctions expose superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to white supremacy. A more empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend inequality
|
Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.¶ There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on open public debate—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.¶ These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).
| 3,338 |
<h4>Whiteness isn’t a monolithic root cause---they shut off productive debate over solutions – means the alt fails</h4><p><strong>Shelby 7</strong> – Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity</p><p><u>Others</u> might <u>challenge the distinction between</u> <u>ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage</u>, on the grounds that <u>we are rarely</u>, if ever, <u>able to</u> so <u>neatly separate these factors</u>, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, <u><mark>it would be</u> </mark>difficult, if not <u><strong><mark>impossible</u></strong>, <u>for the </mark>members of a poor <mark>black community to determine</u> <u><strong></mark>with any accuracy</u></strong> <u><mark>whether their impoverished condition is due</u> <u><strong></mark>primarily <mark>to institutional racism</u></strong></mark>, the impact of past racial injustice, <u>the increasing technological basis of the economy</u>, <u>shrinking state budgets</u>, the vicissitudes of <u><strong><mark>world trade</u></strong>,</mark> the ascendancy of <u><strong><mark>conservative ideology</u></strong></mark>, <u>poorly funded schools</u>, lack of personal initiative, <u>a violent drug trade</u> that deters business investment, <u>some combination of these factors</u>, <u><strong><mark>or some other explanation</mark> altogether</u></strong>. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.¶ <u><mark>There are</u> </mark>very real <u><strong><mark>empirical difficulties</u></strong> <u>in determining</mark> the</u> <u><strong>specific <mark>causal significance</u></strong> <u>of the factors</mark> that create and perpetuate black disadvantage</u>; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that <u><mark>justice will demand</u> <u></mark>different <mark>practical remedies according to</u> <u><strong>each</mark> <mark>factor</mark>'s relative impact</u></strong> <u>on blacks' life chances</u>. <u><strong>We must acknowledge that <mark>our social world is complicated</u></strong></mark> and not immediately transparent to common sense, <u>and <mark>thus </mark>that</u> <u><strong>systematic <mark>empirical inquiry</u></strong>, <u></mark>historical studies, and rigorous social analysis <mark>are required to reveal </mark>its <mark>systemic structure</u> </mark>and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. <u><mark>We must </mark>instead <mark>rely on</u> <u><strong>open public debate</u></strong></mark>—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—<u>with the aim of <mark>garnering</u> <u><strong>rationally motivated</u></strong> </mark>and informed <u><strong><mark>consensus</u></strong></mark>. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.¶ These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. <u><mark>Attention to </mark>these <mark>distinctions </mark>might help</u> <u><strong><mark>expose </mark>the <mark>superficiality of theories</u></strong> <u>that seek to</u> <u><strong>reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to</u></strong> </mark>contemporary forms of racism or <u><strong><mark>white supremacy</u></strong>. <u>A more</u> </mark>penetrating, <u><strong>subtle, and <mark>empirically grounded</u></strong> <u><strong>analysis</u></strong> <u>is needed to</u> <u><strong>comprehend </mark>the causes of racial <mark>inequality </mark>and black disadvantage</u></strong>. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some <u>racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments</u> (<u><strong>such as immigration policy</u></strong> or reduced federal funding for higher education).</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
1NC
|
Evnt Justice
| 179,752 | 87 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,819 |
Colorado and Washington prove states can regulate pesticides
|
Stone 2014
|
Stone 2014 (Dave, Associate Professor, Department of Environmental and Molecular Toxicology at Oregon State University, Cannabis, pesticides and conflicting laws: The dilemma for legalized States and implications for public health, Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, Volume 69, Issue 3, August 2014, Pages 284–288, 10.1016/j.yrtph.2014.05.015)
|
Washington’s Initiative 502 mandates the establishment of lot numbers that would identify the date of harvest and calls for uniform testing standards by accredited labs the Washington State Department of Agriculture released a list of pesticide products approved for use on cannabis The approved products from WSDA have label instructions for unspecified or broad use sites Colorado’s Amendment 64 mandates a cannabis testing facility licensed to analyze and certify the safety and potency of the finished product. Several states with legal medical cannabis have implemented testing requirements for pesticides, as well as mold, bacteria and metals Their efforts include approved lists of compounds similar to WSDA’s approach, comparisons of residues found in cannabis with the most stringent acceptable standards for that residue in any food item or adopting maximum residue levels based on broad chemical classes, such as total organophosphates or pyrethroids.
| null |
In 2012, voters in Colorado and Washington State passed initiatives legalizing recreational cannabis for adults. Washington passed Initiative 502, which allows possession of one ounce of dried cannabis, one pound of pot-infused edibles and 72-oz of pot-laced liquid (Reed, 2011). Washington’s Initiative 502 mandates the establishment of lot numbers that would identify the date of harvest and calls for uniform testing standards by accredited labs. Recently, the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) released a list of pesticide products approved for use on cannabis (Washington State Department of Agriculture, 2013). The list includes several pesticides that are exempt from tolerances (primarily biopesticides and pesticides used in organic production) and several minimum risk pesticides (known as section 25b) that are exempt from federal registration and are labeled for use on food crops. Tolerances are developed by the EPA and represent the legal maximum amount of pesticide residue that can be on a raw agricultural product and still be considered safe. The approved products from WSDA have label instructions for unspecified or broad use sites, such as “bedding plants,” which are interpreted as less restrictive compared with label instructions for specific uses, such as apples. Colorado’s Amendment 64 allows for the possession of one ounce of cannabis, or six plants, with no more than three mature and flowering plants (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2014). Amendment 64 mandates a cannabis testing facility licensed to analyze and certify the safety and potency of the finished product. As part of a comprehensive report from a State taskforce, recommendations were made to include warning labels to list all non-organic pesticides used in the cultivation and processing of cannabis sold by licensed retail establishments, as well as a list of prohibited substances. Several states with legal medical cannabis have implemented testing requirements for pesticides, as well as mold, bacteria and metals. Their efforts include approved lists of compounds similar to WSDA’s approach, comparisons of residues found in cannabis with the most stringent acceptable standards for that residue in any food item or adopting maximum residue levels based on broad chemical classes, such as total organophosphates or pyrethroids.
| 2,347 |
<h4><strong>Colorado and Washington prove states can regulate pesticides</h4><p>Stone 2014</strong> (Dave, Associate Professor, Department of Environmental and Molecular Toxicology at Oregon State University, Cannabis, pesticides and conflicting laws: The dilemma for legalized States and implications for public health, Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, Volume 69, Issue 3, August 2014, Pages 284–288, 10.1016/j.yrtph.2014.05.015)</p><p>In 2012, voters in Colorado and Washington State passed initiatives legalizing recreational cannabis for adults. Washington passed Initiative 502, which allows possession of one ounce of dried cannabis, one pound of pot-infused edibles and 72-oz of pot-laced liquid (Reed, 2011). <u>Washington’s Initiative 502 mandates the establishment of lot numbers that would identify the date of harvest and calls for uniform testing standards by accredited labs</u>. Recently, <u>the Washington State Department of Agriculture</u> (WSDA) <u>released a list of pesticide products approved for use on cannabis</u> (Washington State Department of Agriculture, 2013). The list includes several pesticides that are exempt from tolerances (primarily biopesticides and pesticides used in organic production) and several minimum risk pesticides (known as section 25b) that are exempt from federal registration and are labeled for use on food crops. Tolerances are developed by the EPA and represent the legal maximum amount of pesticide residue that can be on a raw agricultural product and still be considered safe. <u>The approved products from WSDA have label instructions for unspecified or broad use sites</u>, such as “bedding plants,” which are interpreted as less restrictive compared with label instructions for specific uses, such as apples. <u>Colorado’s Amendment 64</u> allows for the possession of one ounce of cannabis, or six plants, with no more than three mature and flowering plants (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2014). Amendment 64 <u>mandates a cannabis testing facility licensed to analyze and certify the safety and potency of the finished product.</u> As part of a comprehensive report from a State taskforce, recommendations were made to include warning labels to list all non-organic pesticides used in the cultivation and processing of cannabis sold by licensed retail establishments, as well as a list of prohibited substances. <u>Several states with legal medical cannabis have implemented testing requirements for pesticides, as well as mold, bacteria and metals</u>. <u>Their efforts include approved lists of compounds similar to WSDA’s approach, comparisons of residues found in cannabis with the most stringent acceptable standards for that residue in any food item or adopting maximum residue levels based on broad chemical classes<strong>, such as total organophosphates or pyrethroids.</p></u></strong>
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Neg vs Harvard ad
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2NC/1NR
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A/T “Pesticides”
| 430,843 | 1 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
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Kentucky
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7
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Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
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Evans
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Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,820 |
The legalization of sales, rather than purchases avoids problems with the unregulated market
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Gill 2
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Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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/v012/12.1gill.html
it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
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are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria . Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate our proposal will not be affected either way reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one
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Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
First, we are arguing for the claim that it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. 2 A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. As already noted in our preliminary points, our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
| 11,563 |
<h4>The legalization of sales, rather than purchases avoids problems with the unregulated market </h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p></u>First, we are arguing for the claim that<u> it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We <mark>are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation</mark>; </u>that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. <u>We <mark>assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria</mark>, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs<mark>. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market</mark>.</u> 2 <u>A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products</u>, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe <u>the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die.</u> We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. <u>Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys</u>. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. <u><mark>Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys.</u> <u>For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it</u></mark> will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it <u><mark>will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney.</u> <u>Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate</u></mark>, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. <u>The important point is that <mark>our proposal will not be affected either way</mark>.</u> As already noted in our preliminary points, <u>our proposal can be <mark>reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one<strong></mark>. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well. </p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,594 | 8 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
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1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,821 |
Federal criminalization keeps out tobacco companies and prevents regulatory capture by national corporations- ONLY the CP solves this
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Reuter 2014
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Reuter 2014 (Peter, The difficulty of restricting promotion of legalized marijuana in the United States, Addiction Volume 109, Issue 3, pages 353–354, March 2014, 10.1111/add.12431)
|
Colorado and Washington, in designing their new regimes, seek to keep the distributors small and to restrict promotion the US Supreme Court has been unsympathetic to restrictions on liquor and cigarette advertising. While the drug continues to be illegal federally, it would be hard for the Court to provide any rulings on the matter for the moment the individual states will probably have considerable power to control promotion. With marijuana still illegal at the federal level, neither of the first two states need worry about the cigarette companies entering the market However if, the federal prohibition ends then cigarette companies might well enter the market Their history of successful manipulation of the political and regulatory process suggests that they will be formidable opponents of public health oriented restrictions.
| null |
Colorado and Washington, in designing their new regimes, seek to keep the distributors small and to restrict promotion. As Room notes, the US Supreme Court has been unsympathetic to restrictions on liquor and cigarette advertising. While the drug continues to be illegal federally, it would be hard for the Court to provide any rulings on the matter. These are uncharted legal waters, and for the moment the individual states will probably have considerable power to control promotion. With marijuana still illegal at the federal level, neither of the first two states need worry about the cigarette companies entering the market. However if, as seems quite possible, the federal prohibition ends in the next decade, then cigarette companies, perhaps by now purveyors primarily of e-cigarettes, might well enter the market. Their history of successful manipulation of the political and regulatory process for more than 50 years, until the 2008 Tobacco Control Act gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory powers, suggests that they will be formidable opponents of public health oriented restrictions.
| 1,114 |
<h4><strong>Federal criminalization keeps out tobacco companies and prevents regulatory capture by national corporations- ONLY the CP solves this</h4><p>Reuter 2014</strong> <u>(Peter, The difficulty of restricting promotion of legalized marijuana in the United States, Addiction Volume 109, Issue 3, pages 353–354, March 2014, 10.1111/add.12431)</p><p>Colorado and Washington, in designing their new regimes, seek to keep the distributors small and to restrict promotion</u>. As Room notes, <u>the US Supreme Court has been unsympathetic to restrictions on liquor and cigarette advertising. <strong>While the drug continues to be illegal federally, it would be hard for the Court to provide any rulings on the matter</u></strong>. These are uncharted legal waters, and <u>for the moment the <strong>individual states</strong> <strong>will</strong> probably <strong>have considerable power to control promotion</strong>. With marijuana still illegal at the federal level, neither of the first two states need worry about the cigarette companies entering the market</u>. <u><strong>However if,</u></strong> as seems quite possible, <u><strong>the federal prohibition ends</u></strong> in the next decade, <u><strong>then cigarette companies</u></strong>, perhaps by now purveyors primarily of e-cigarettes, <u>might well <strong>enter the market</u></strong>. <u>Their history of successful manipulation of the political and regulatory process</u> for more than 50 years, until the 2008 Tobacco Control Act gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory powers, <u>suggests that they will be formidable opponents of public health oriented restrictions.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
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2NC/1NR
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A/T “Industry Capture/Big Weed”
| 430,844 | 1 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
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Kentucky
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7
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Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
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Evans
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Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,822 |
government purchaser avoids exploitation
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Erin and Harris 3
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Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
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While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
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organs available for transplantation, we must give ration to any option that may make up the shortfal The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, , safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
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While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
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<h4><strong>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of <mark>organs available for transplantation, we must give</mark> urgent conside<mark>ration to any option that may make up the shortfal</mark>l. </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option.<u> <mark>The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, </mark>for example<strong><mark>, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
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Navy
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1
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Florida Cone-Marchini
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Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,823 |
Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing
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Radcliffe-Richards et al 98
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Radcliffe-Richards et al 98 J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;
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case for allowing kidney sales
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution
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Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
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Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
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<h4><strong>Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing</h4><p>Radcliffe-Richards et al 98</strong> J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;</p><p>Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The<u> case for allowing kidney sales</p><p></u>http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf</p><p><u><mark>Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor.</mark> </u>This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, <u>all <mark>purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution</u><strong>. [12]</p></strong></mark>
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Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,346 | 7 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
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Navy
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1
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Florida Cone-Marchini
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Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,824 |
This is a new net benefit for us- 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities- solves the tax burden and ensures local acceptance and economic development
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Leff 2014
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Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
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the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses very little scholarly attention has been paid to the federal tax situation a properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under 501(c)(4 which exempts social welfare" organizations social welfare organizations are exempt from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income - § 280E does not affect them qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem. these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions for commercial development in the neighborhood Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals While operating for tax-exempt purposes would entail change of operations the benefits exceed the burdens there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying the public policy doctrine applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana laws the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support. federal tax laws provide federal incentives to align state and local policy objectives. I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana
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properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(4 which exempts social welfare" organizations from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales, an a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals the benefits exceed the burdens. there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support federal tax laws, provide federal incentives to align state and local policy obj
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In the past decade and a half, twenty states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. n1 Last November, Colorado n2 and Washington n3 became the first states to legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana, and more states are considering following their lead. n4 The trend appears to be toward liberalization of state marijuana laws not just for medical purposes, but to advance a number of other state policy goals, including reducing crime, improving blighted neighborhoods, giving opportunities to youth impacted by the drug trade, increasing marijuana users' safety, and raising state and local government revenue. n5 Currently, federal laws prevent states from achieving their policy objectives. Legal scholars have focused on the conflict created by the fact that selling marijuana is a federal crime. n6 But, marijuana industry insiders do not cite federal criminal law as the biggest impediment to the development of a legitimate marijuana industry. Instead, the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses and could push the entire industry underground." n7 To date, very little scholarly attention has been [*526] paid to the federal tax situation of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n8 This Article proposes the first tax strategy that entirely solves the "tax situation" for state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. In the early 1980s, Congress added § 280E to the Internal Revenue Code, n9 largely for the purpose of punishing drug dealers. n10 Section 280E provides that sellers of controlled substances must pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of their net income. n11 This way of calculating taxable income produces much higher taxes than those faced by any other business, which was presumably okay when it applied only to drug dealers. Now that the provision applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business. n12 Unlike the Department of Justice, which has not generally pursued criminal charges against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, n13 the Internal Revenue Service has been vigorously enforcing § 280E against those same people. n14 It is this active enforcement of § 280E that has the marijuana industry so alarmed. [*527] I argue that a properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts so-called "social welfare" organizations. n15 Since social welfare organizations, like charities, n16 are exempt from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income - § 280E does not affect them. n17 Therefore, qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem. At the same time, however, these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales, an important motivation for legalization in states like Colorado and Washington. n18 To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-related political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial manner. First, any organization seeking § 501(c)(4) status must be operated for a proper tax-exempt purpose. I propose that a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions for commercial development in the neighborhood. Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals in distressed neighborhoods all over the country, and the IRS has developed criteria for determining when retail operations primarily advance social welfare purposes, and when such purposes are ancillary to a private business purpose. n19 While operating for tax-exempt purposes like these would entail a significant change of operations for any existing marijuana seller, the benefits of doing so may well exceed the burdens. A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its profits to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political activities it engages in; and it may have [*528] to operate in a less "commercial" manner than ordinary, for-profit marijuana sellers. Some of these requirements could have a significant impact on how a marijuana seller operates its business. For example, the fact that it cannot distribute profits to owners or managers may affect its ability to raise start-up capital. n20 Other requirements would likely have little impact. For example, it is unlikely that a marijuana seller would want to devote the majority of its time, energy, or money to a political campaign. But whether the restrictions associated with tax-exempt status are onerous or easy from an operational standpoint, the point is that there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying with all of them. Even once an organization has met these four statutory requirements for exemption, however, the Supreme Court has held that the common law "public policy doctrine" prevents organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable purposes are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy. n21 Because marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3). However, this Article makes the novel argument that the public policy doctrine applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations even if they would be barred from organizing under § 501(c)(3). n22 Even though the public policy doctrine does not apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations, it is plausible that the concept of social welfare excludes certain illegal activities. I argue that the proper measure of social welfare is local, rather than national, and while state or local law may be relevant to such a determination, inconsistent federal law is not. This novel argument is more than just a clever strategy - a "tax loophole" so to speak - to avoid the impact of § 280E. Rather, IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana [*529] laws. The recent legalization movements identify many state policy goals relating to local issues, like crime reduction, neighborhood improvement, and state and local tax revenue. n23 However, as the state-sanctioned marijuana industry matures and states begin the process of creating regulations for the industry, it is becoming more and more clear that the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well. n24 A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support. n25 The federal tax laws, therefore, provide federal incentives to align state and local policy objectives. The IRS could promote state and local policy harmonization by permitting community-based nonprofits to sell marijuana, but only when local community groups favored it in states in which it is legal. This would surely be a better position for the IRS than its current role as a lightning rod of conflict between state and federal policy objectives. In this Article, I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states. But I should be clear that I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana. Current federal policy is that the sale and use of marijuana is bad for individuals and society, and apparently the majority of states still agree. A minority of states have legalized or decriminalized marijuana, but only for medical purposes, and only two states have so far taken the dramatic step of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes. n26 Presumably, we will know more in the future about whether legalizing marijuana is a good or bad policy. We do know, however, that public opinion on marijuana legalization is changing rapidly. In April 2013, a Pew research poll found that 52% of Americans favored marijuana legalization, and a staggering 72% reported that the costs of enforcing marijuana prohibitions exceed the value to [*530] society. n27 More importantly, 60% of respondents said that "the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting the use of marijuana in states where it is legal," while only 35% say it should. n28 In the context of rapidly changing public opinion, it would not be surprising if the federal government was leery of direct confrontation with the states over marijuana policy. In that context, a legitimate mechanism for federal involvement in channeling marijuana selling activities in socially beneficial directions - like the one proposed in this Article - may be preferable to enforcement of federal criminal marijuana laws. n29
| 9,835 |
<h4>This is a new net benefit for us- 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities- solves the tax burden and ensures local acceptance and economic development</h4><p><strong>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>In the past decade and a half, twenty states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. n1 Last November, Colorado n2 and Washington n3 became the first states to legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana, and more states are considering following their lead. n4 The trend appears to be toward liberalization of state marijuana laws not just for medical purposes, but to advance a number of other state policy goals, including reducing crime, improving blighted neighborhoods, giving opportunities to youth impacted by the drug trade, increasing marijuana users' safety, and raising state and local government revenue. n5 Currently, federal laws prevent states from achieving their policy objectives. Legal scholars have focused on the conflict created by the fact that selling marijuana is a federal crime. n6 But, marijuana industry insiders do not cite federal criminal law as the biggest impediment to the development of a legitimate marijuana industry. Instead, <u>the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses </u>and could push the entire industry underground." n7 To date, <u>very little scholarly attention has been</u> [*526] <u>paid to the federal tax situation</u> of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n8 This Article proposes the first tax strategy that entirely solves the "tax situation" for state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. In the early 1980s, Congress added § 280E to the Internal Revenue Code, n9 largely for the purpose of punishing drug dealers. n10 Section 280E provides that sellers of controlled substances must pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of their net income. n11 This way of calculating taxable income produces much higher taxes than those faced by any other business, which was presumably okay when it applied only to drug dealers. Now that the provision applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business. n12 Unlike the Department of Justice, which has not generally pursued criminal charges against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, n13 the Internal Revenue Service has been vigorously enforcing § 280E against those same people. n14 It is this active enforcement of § 280E that has the marijuana industry so alarmed. [*527] I argue that <u>a <mark>properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of</u> § <u>280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under</u> § <u>501(c)(4</u></mark>) of the Internal Revenue Code, <u><mark>which exempts</mark> </u>so-called "<u><mark>social welfare" organizations</u></mark>. n15 Since <u>social welfare organizations</u>, like charities, n16 <u>are exempt <mark>from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income</mark> - § 280E does not affect them</u>. n17 Therefore, <u><strong>qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem.</u></strong> At the same time, however, <u><mark>these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales</u>, an</mark> important motivation for legalization in states like Colorado and Washington. n18 To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-related political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial manner. First, any organization seeking § 501(c)(4) status must be operated for a proper tax-exempt purpose. I propose that <u><mark>a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions</mark> for commercial development in the neighborhood</u>. <u><mark>Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals</u></mark> in distressed neighborhoods all over the country, and the IRS has developed criteria for determining when retail operations primarily advance social welfare purposes, and when such purposes are ancillary to a private business purpose. n19 <u>While operating for tax-exempt purposes</u> like these <u>would entail</u> a significant <u>change of operations</u> for any existing marijuana seller, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>benefits</u></strong></mark> of doing so may well <u><strong><mark>exceed the burdens</u></strong>.</mark> A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its profits to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political activities it engages in; and it may have [*528] to operate in a less "commercial" manner than ordinary, for-profit marijuana sellers. Some of these requirements could have a significant impact on how a marijuana seller operates its business. For example, the fact that it cannot distribute profits to owners or managers may affect its ability to raise start-up capital. n20 Other requirements would likely have little impact. For example, it is unlikely that a marijuana seller would want to devote the majority of its time, energy, or money to a political campaign. But whether the restrictions associated with tax-exempt status are onerous or easy from an operational standpoint, the point is that <u><strong><mark>there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying</mark> </u></strong>with all of them. Even once an organization has met these four statutory requirements for exemption, however, the Supreme Court has held that the common law "public policy doctrine" prevents organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable purposes are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy. n21 Because marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3). However, this Article makes the novel argument that <u>the public policy doctrine</u> <u>applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations</u> even if they would be barred from organizing under § 501(c)(3). n22 Even though the public policy doctrine does not apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations, it is plausible that the concept of social welfare excludes certain illegal activities. I argue that the proper measure of social welfare is local, rather than national, and while state or local law may be relevant to such a determination, inconsistent federal law is not. This novel argument is more than just a clever strategy - a "tax loophole" so to speak - to avoid the impact of § 280E. Rather, <u>IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana</u> [*529] <u>laws</u>. The recent legalization movements identify many state policy goals relating to local issues, like crime reduction, neighborhood improvement, and state and local tax revenue. n23 However, as the state-sanctioned marijuana industry matures and states begin the process of creating regulations for the industry, it is becoming more and more clear that <u>the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well</u>. n24 <u><mark>A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect <strong>ties federal approval to local support</strong></mark>. </u>n25 The <u><mark>federal tax laws</u>,</mark> therefore, <u><mark>provide federal incentives to <strong>align state and local policy obj</mark>ectives</strong>.</u> The IRS could promote state and local policy harmonization by permitting community-based nonprofits to sell marijuana, but only when local community groups favored it in states in which it is legal. This would surely be a better position for the IRS than its current role as a lightning rod of conflict between state and federal policy objectives. In this Article, <u>I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states</u>. But I should be clear that <u><strong>I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana</u></strong>. Current federal policy is that the sale and use of marijuana is bad for individuals and society, and apparently the majority of states still agree. A minority of states have legalized or decriminalized marijuana, but only for medical purposes, and only two states have so far taken the dramatic step of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes. n26 Presumably, we will know more in the future about whether legalizing marijuana is a good or bad policy. We do know, however, that public opinion on marijuana legalization is changing rapidly. In April 2013, a Pew research poll found that 52% of Americans favored marijuana legalization, and a staggering 72% reported that the costs of enforcing marijuana prohibitions exceed the value to [*530] society. n27 More importantly, 60% of respondents said that "the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting the use of marijuana in states where it is legal," while only 35% say it should. n28 In the context of rapidly changing public opinion, it would not be surprising if the federal government was leery of direct confrontation with the states over marijuana policy. In that context, a legitimate mechanism for federal involvement in channeling marijuana selling activities in socially beneficial directions - like the one proposed in this Article - may be preferable to enforcement of federal criminal marijuana laws. n29</p>
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Neg vs Harvard ad
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2NC/1NR
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A/T “Industry Capture/Big Weed”
| 430,845 | 3 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
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Kentucky
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7
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Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
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Evans
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Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,825 |
Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing – experience with egg donations proves
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Sobota 4
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Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis
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, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns In the proposed market system for organ procurement, the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices . With only moderate prices being paid , economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections , and thus no economic coercion would occur. Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical risks involved." These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors
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economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices With only moderate prices being paid economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections thus no economic coercion dditionally arket for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women
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A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement
The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145 With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
| 1,526 |
<h4><strong>Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing – experience with egg donations proves</h4><p>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement</p><p>The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First<u>, the <mark>economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns</mark> </u>about becoming a donor. n144 <u>In the proposed market system for organ procurement, </u>either OPOs or<u> <mark>the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices</mark> </u>paid for organs<u>.</u> n145 <u><mark>With only moderate prices being paid</mark> </u>to organ donors<u>, <mark>economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections</mark> </u>to donation<u>, and <mark>thus no economic coercion</mark> would occur.</u> n146 <u>A<mark>dditionally</mark>, the current m<mark>arket</mark> system <mark>for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement</mark>.</u> n147 <u><strong>A <mark>majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women</strong></mark>, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical</u> [*1246] <u>risks involved." </u>n148<u> These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors</u><strong>.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,597 | 8 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,826 |
This also means we solve black markets better and have an external poverty impact
|
Leff 2014
|
Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
|
Currently, the IRS's enforcement of § 280E dramatically raises the cost of legitimacy if marijuana sellers operated as § 501(c)(4) organizations the benefits would be numerous Sellers that were operated solely to enrich their owners without any community involvement might be driven out of business by § 280E. On the other hand, the federal income tax would not affect sellers that were community-based, that sought primarily to provide relief to the poor, distressed, or underprivileged, to lessen neighborhood tensions, and to combat community deterioration These organizations would have a leg up, not only over the illegal and black-market operators, but over regular for-profit operators as well They might flourish The IRS would be serving not to frustrate the policy goals enunciated by states when they legalized marijuana sales, but to support those goals.
|
Sellers that were operated solely to enrich their owners without any community involvement might be driven out of business by § 280E. On the other hand, the federal income tax would not affect sellers that were community-based, that sought primarily to provide relief to the poor, distressed, or underprivileged, to lessen neighborhood tensions, and to combat community deterioration These organizations would have a leg up, not only over the illegal and black-market operators, but over regular for-profit operators as well. They might flou
|
In the final analysis, the idea that marijuana sellers could avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as social welfare organizations may seem to some readers like nothing more than a "tax loophole" too clever by half. But I do not think it is. Rather, it is a way to at least partially avoid the federalism problems created by inconsistent federal and state laws regarding marijuana sales. If the Department of Justice is willing to refrain from enforcing criminal statutes against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, the IRS can play a role in cabining such activities in forms that promote their responsible operation. Currently, the IRS's enforcement of § 280E dramatically raises the cost of legitimacy for a marijuana seller. Black-market operators avoid paying taxes by hiding their operations and avoiding detection by the authorities. State-sanctioned operators do not have that luxury, and the IRS is currently punishing them with an unsustainable income-tax regime. Ironically, the tax burden imposed by § 280E makes it virtually impossible for states or localities to levy their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana. The federal tax [*569] makes the price of legitimate operations so high that there is potentially no money left over to pay other taxes. But if marijuana sellers operated as § 501(c)(4) organizations, the benefits would be numerous. Sellers that were operated solely to enrich their owners without any community involvement might be driven out of business by § 280E. On the other hand, the federal income tax would not affect sellers that were community-based, that sought primarily to provide relief to the poor, distressed, or underprivileged, to lessen neighborhood tensions, and to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. These organizations would have a leg up, not only over the illegal and black-market operators, but over regular for-profit operators as well. They might flourish. The IRS would be serving not to frustrate the policy goals enunciated by states when they legalized marijuana sales, but to support those goals.
| 2,080 |
<h4>This also means we solve black markets better and have an external poverty impact</h4><p><strong>Leff 2014</strong> <u>(Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p></u>In the final analysis, the idea that marijuana sellers could avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as social welfare organizations may seem to some readers like nothing more than a "tax loophole" too clever by half. But I do not think it is. Rather, it is a way to at least partially avoid the federalism problems created by inconsistent federal and state laws regarding marijuana sales. If the Department of Justice is willing to refrain from enforcing criminal statutes against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, the IRS can play a role in cabining such activities in forms that promote their responsible operation. <u>Currently, the IRS's enforcement of § 280E dramatically raises the cost of legitimacy</u> for a marijuana seller. Black-market operators avoid paying taxes by hiding their operations and avoiding detection by the authorities. State-sanctioned operators do not have that luxury, and the IRS is currently punishing them with an unsustainable income-tax regime. Ironically, the tax burden imposed by § 280E makes it virtually impossible for states or localities to levy their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana. The federal tax [*569] makes the price of legitimate operations so high that there is potentially no money left over to pay other taxes. But <u>if marijuana sellers operated as § 501(c)(4) organizations</u>, <u>the benefits would be numerous</u>. <u><mark>Sellers that were operated solely to enrich their owners without any community involvement might be driven out of business by § 280E.</u> <u>On the other hand, the <strong>federal income tax would not affect sellers that were community-based,</u></strong> <u>that sought primarily to provide relief to the poor, distressed, or underprivileged, to lessen neighborhood tensions, and to combat community deterioration</u></mark> and juvenile delinquency. <u><strong><mark>These organizations would have a leg up, not only over the illegal and black-market operators, but over regular for-profit operators as well</u></strong>. <u><strong>They might flou</mark>rish</u></strong>. <u>The IRS would be serving not to frustrate the policy goals enunciated by states when they legalized marijuana sales, but to <strong>support those goals</strong>.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
A/T “Industry Capture/Big Weed”
| 430,846 | 1 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,827 |
With sales limited to government purchasing transplants under the plan would be based on medical need
|
Gill 2
|
Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
|
/v012/12.1gill.html
The international market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
|
horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program
First, in the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,
|
Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
The international black market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation, and the popular press has been right to expose it. But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international black market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
| 1,480 |
<h4><strong>With sales limited to government purchasing transplants under the plan would be based on medical need </h4><p>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>The international</u> black <u>market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation</u>, and the popular press has been right to expose it. <u>But the <mark>horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program</mark> we propose.</p><p><mark>First, in</mark> our proposal <mark>the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated</u></mark>. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.</p><p><u><mark>Second,</mark> the domestic program we propose <mark>involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international</u></mark> black <u><mark>market.</mark> <mark>Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,</mark> as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,687 | 5 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,828 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP alone maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP alone maintains compliance</h4><p><strong>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></strong></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
A/T “Industry Capture/Big Weed”
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,829 |
The plan does not introduce the dollar sign into transplants. Organs are already paid for by others in the transplant process
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
Commoditization Has Already Happened the current system, , in fact quantifies the value of the human body. while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ to say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality. organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ. Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient
|
Commoditization Has Already Happened while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality . Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companie each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions
|
B. Commoditization Has Already Happened The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad. n137 However, the current system, to which no ethical qualms are raised, in fact quantifies the value of the human body. n138 As such, an analysis of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation. On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human corpse now has a substantial economic value. n139 And while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ. n140 Simply put, to say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality. n141 The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs for large profits. n142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are [*334] so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative methods of procurement. n143 Further, organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." n144 At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ. n145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in each transaction - again with the exception of the first - and has validated sales contracts for human tissue. n146 Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient.
| 2,129 |
<h4>The plan does not introduce the dollar sign into transplants. Organs are already paid for by others in the transplant process</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>B. <u><mark>Commoditization Has Already Happened</mark> </u>The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad. n137 However,<u> the current system, </u>to which no ethical qualms are raised<u>, in fact quantifies the value of the human body. </u>n138 As such, an analysis of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation. On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human corpse now has a substantial economic value. n139 And <u><mark>while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ</u></mark>. n140 Simply put,<u> to <mark>say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality</mark>.</u> n141 The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs for large profits. n142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are [*334] so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative methods of procurement. n143 Further,<u> organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money<mark>. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companie</mark>s, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." </u>n144 <u>At <mark>each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ</mark>. </u>n145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in each transaction - again with the exception of the first - and has validated sales contracts for human tissue. n146 <u>Thus, <mark>both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions</mark> from donor to recipient</u>. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,691 | 6 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,830 |
Federalism model solves Ukraine war
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014
|
Sasse and Hughes 2014 (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)
|
The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. Ukraine now needs to reestablish regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. a state-wide comprehensive federalization or decentralization of more powers to all regions We could expect greater powers to include self-government reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is experts on , federalism implementation depends critically on leadership The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward in Ukraine
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U.S. officials have encouraged leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines Ukraine’s elites have been moderate Ukraine now needs regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a mechanism decentralization could be achieved by con con These steps would generate engagement, and reunite Ukrainian society. There would be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U S are not short of is experts on federalism implementation depends critically on leadership Ukraine offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of federalism to peacefully manage conflict
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The idea of a remaking of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction. On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reached out to Russophones in the eastern and southern regions, announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution.” Senior U.S. administration officials have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to consider constitutional reform along federal lines. On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. Until recently the federal idea was an anathema among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. Prospects for federalism in Ukraine The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. Overall, Ukraine’s elites have been moderate in their approach to state- and nation-building. The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. Ukraine now needs to reestablish this important regional balance and has the opportunity to formalize a hitherto informal mechanism. There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be a state-wide process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a comprehensive federalization, or decentralization of more powers to all regions. We could expect greater powers to include self-government in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This reform process could be achieved by either a constitutional convention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. These steps would generate a democratic process of debate, dialogue and engagement, and hopefully reunite Ukrainian society. There would almost certainly be international monitoring and advice. This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the United States and the E.U. are not short of is legal experts on autonomy, federalism and minority rights. The implementation of constitutional reform depends critically on political will and leadership, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected. In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). The Ukraine crisis offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of autonomy and federalism to peacefully manage conflict and enhance state stability. It is of note that the federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward not just in Ukraine but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).
| 9,859 |
<h4>Federalism model solves Ukraine war </h4><p><strong>Sasse and Hughes 2014</strong> (Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes 3-19-2014; Professorial Fellow, Nuffield College & University Reader in Comparative Politics at Oxford and London School of Economics political scientist “Building a federal Ukraine?” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/)</p><p><u>The idea of a <strong>remaking</strong> of Ukraine’s constitutional order along federal lines is beginning to gain traction.</u> On March 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy <u>Yatsenyuk</u> <u>reached out to Russophones</u> in the eastern and southern regions, <u>announcing that “new measures linked to decentralization of power will be reflected in a new constitution</u>.” <u>Senior <mark>U.S.</mark> administration <mark>officials have <strong>encouraged</strong></mark> the Ukrainian <mark>leadership to consider constitutional reform <strong>along federal lines</mark>. </u></strong>On March 17, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed the establishment of an international “support group” to manage the crisis. The list of items that Russia wants to be the basis for negotiation in Ukraine includes a new federal structure for Ukraine and the recognition of Russian as a second language. <u>Until recently the federal idea was an anathema</u> among the greater part of Ukraine’s political elite. As a constitutional form it was largely rejected in the 1990s, partly as a negative reaction to the experience of Soviet federalism, and partly from fear of its centrifugal potential for splitting the country along ethnolinguistic fault lines. The negative view of federalism as a destabilizing constitutional order in ethnically divided places was one that was not only perceived by elites as a lived experience in former communist federations, such as the Soviet Union successor states Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but was also prevalent among scholars studying the collapse of communism. Federalism, or “ethnofederalism” as it was usually termed by political scientists, came to be seen as part of the problem of “mismanaging” ethnically diverse countries, not part of the solution. <u>The turmoil in Ukraine suggests that <strong>now is a good time to reassess the potential for federalism</strong>, “ethno-” or otherwise, for managing divided places like Ukraine. </u>Prospects for federalism in Ukraine <u>The de facto loss of Crimea could provide the momentum needed for Ukraine’s political elites to embark on a more fundamental reform of the Ukrainian state</u>. The ideas of decentralization and federalism have undulated in the Ukrainian political discourse since the early 1990s. At first these ideas were an agenda of the western regions. Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil and the ‘national-democratic’ forces he represented promoted federalism as a means to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Western Ukraine. From the mid-to late 1990s, after independence, calls for autonomy or federalism came from the mainly Russophone south-east and Crimea, in particular in crisis situations like the Orange Revolution or the recent protests. <u>Overall, <mark>Ukraine’s elites have been moderate</mark> in their approach to state- and nation-building. </u>The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, did not impose the state language on the southeast or Crimea as envisaged by the Ukrainian language law. The cautious approach continued after the 1994 presidential elections, which saw the “eastern” candidate Leonid Kuchma defeat Kravchuk. Although Kuchma ran on an election platform of more power to the regions and the recognition of the Russian language as an official language, he actually did not deliver on this agenda during his two terms in office between 1994 and 2004. The implicit consensus on balancing regional interests helped to preserve political stability during Ukraine’s transition, while also slowing economic reforms and adjustment. It was also evident in the ambivalent foreign policy approaches toward Russia and the European Union/ NATO. <u><mark>Ukraine now needs</mark> to reestablish</u> this important <u><mark>regional balance</u> <u>and has the opportunity to <strong>formalize a </mark>hitherto informal <mark>mechanism</strong></mark>. </u>There are two scenarios: First, there could be an asymmetric decentralization (that is, different agreements with different regions of the country). The new government in Kiev could engage in bilateral negotiations with individual regions in the south-east. Given the long-standing inability of Ukrainian elites to agree on the reform of center-regional relations as whole, a selective divide and rule strategy offers the advantages of fragmenting the “Russophone” bloc, and the potential for making deals on a case-by-case basis. Such a process would inevitably be largely non-transparent. This asymmetric federal approach, as with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approach to ethnic republics in Russia in the mid-1990s, might generate some short-term stability but it would also antagonize other regions and would be vulnerable to unraveling. Second, there could be <u>a state-wide</u> process of constitutional reform with the aim of either a <u>comprehensive federalization</u>, <u>or <mark>decentralization</mark> of more powers to all regions</u>. <u>We could expect greater powers to include self-government</u> in culture (including language and education), economic management, taxation, and policing. The election (rather than the presidential appointment) of regional governors is an important aspect of reform. This could be part of a synchronization of regional elections, including for governors, with early parliamentary elections. This <u>reform process <mark>could be achieved by </mark>either a <mark>con</mark>stitutional <mark>con</mark>vention, or a constitutional committee in parliament, followed by a state-wide referendum. <mark>These steps would generate </mark>a democratic process of debate, dialogue and <mark>engagement, and</mark> hopefully <strong><mark>reunite Ukrainian society. There would</strong></mark> </u>almost certainly<u><strong><mark> be</strong> <strong>international monitoring and advice</u></strong>. <u>This would be no bad thing, since one thing that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates and the E.U. <mark>are <strong>not short of is</strong></mark> </u>legal<u> <strong><mark>experts on</strong></mark> </u>autonomy<u>, <strong><mark>federalism</strong></mark> </u>and minority rights. The<u> <mark>implementation</mark> </u>of constitutional reform<u> <mark>depends critically on</mark> </u>political will and <u><mark>leadership</u></mark>, and it would have to be championed by the new president to be elected in May. Constitutional reform will be on the agenda in any event, as Ukraine currently finds itself between constitutions (2004 and 2010) – and neither of these constitutions was clearly defined. Regional oligarchs will also have to be part of this process. Just how they are to be managed in the new Ukraine will be one of the greatest challenges facing the political elites. A properly functioning constitutional court that is insulated better against political interference is crucial for decentralization or federalization to be lasting. Opponents of federalization will no doubt raise the dangers of state disintegration and secession that might flow from such a constitutional reform process, especially given the Crimea example and the ongoing unrest in the southeast. The fact that Russia has indicated that greater autonomy is its own preferred outcome for Ukraine means, however, that there is now potential for substantive negotiations to move forward – assuming that Russia can switch off the Russian nationalist mobilization that it has so far been promoting. Reassessing the turn against “ethnofederalism” There was a turn against ethnofederalism in the 1990s that is ripe for a reassessment. Prior to the collapse of communism, there was a dominant paradigm that federalism as “self rule and shared rule” has positive “win-win” effects on promoting stable politics, and indeed, that it was the constitutional order (following the U.S. example) that was most conducive to democracy. Federalism was also seen as an essential constitutional design for the “politics of accommodation” in “deeply divided” or “plural” societies. From the early 1990s this paradigm was shaken by critiques which argued that federalism and autonomy more generally were highly destabilizing in ethnically divided states where the federal administrative architecture and boundaries were drawn to reflect ethnic divisions. The three socialist ethnofederations (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) were used as cases to demonstrate this thesis. The argument is that the mode of socialist federalism, which while it was intrinsically a “sham” in terms of power distribution given that real power resided in communist parties, was flawed because of its “ethnic” structure leading to a mismanagement of nationalism. Consequently, a major cause of the collapse was the fact that the previously disempowered federal architecture became a platform for ethnonational mobilization. Socialist-era federal structures were essentially “subversive institutions”. The negative thesis was developed further in perspectives on the “frozen conflicts” to include even the prospect of autonomy and decentralization. In the Caucasus region, autonomy was seen as “a root cause of conflict” and a driver for secession. <u>The causal link between ethnically defined federalism and state instability appears to be misdirected.</u> <u>In reality, it was precisely the “de-institutionalization of autonomy” by titular nationalities in the successor states that often provoked ethnic conflict</u>. The Russian Federation is partially divided into ethnic units, and only Chechnya posed a serious threat to its territorial integrity. If one analyzes the case of Tatarstan and other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation the fact is that the asymmetric federalism and autonomy in key areas relating to self-rule, culture and, to some extent, economic power, was sufficient to quash secessionist demands and maintain state stability. That stability has persisted even when Putin recentralized powers from the ethnic republics to create his “power vertical” (see this recent Monkey Cage post). A similar argument holds with regard to conflict-prevention in Crimea in the 1990s (see the recent Monkey Cage post). <u>The <mark>Ukraine</mark> crisis <mark>offers an opportune moment to reassess the value of</mark> autonomy and <mark>federalism to <strong>peacefully manage conflict</mark> </strong>and <strong>enhance state stability</u></strong>. It is of note that the <u>federal concept is now central to how policymakers see the way forward</u> not just <u>in Ukraine</u> but in other places of conflict in the post-communist space, and beyond (for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya).</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
A/T “Industry Capture/Big Weed”
| 242,776 | 13 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
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Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,831 |
The ban is limited to organs. Tissue can be sold.
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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Morality concerns opposing commodification of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general,
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commodification we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. n177 We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general
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The objections to human organ sales detailed above all contain some merit, but lose some of their force upon closer analysis and further ignore the reality that markets in human body parts and products are, for all practical purposes, unavoidable. n176 Morality concerns opposing commodification of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when one considers that we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. n177 We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general, without which their health and lives can be expected to suffer. The argument regarding the distributive justice impact of allowing sales (i.e., that the poor would be sellers, and only the rich could be buyers) ignores the fact that organ transplants are still rationed on the basis of ability to pay today. n178 Further, distributive inequity could be partially cured by providing government subsidies to enable the poor to have equal access to available organs. n179 [*106]
| 1,016 |
<h4>The ban is limited to organs. Tissue can be sold.</h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p>The objections to human organ sales detailed above all contain some merit, but lose some of their force upon closer analysis and further ignore the reality that markets in human body parts and products are, for all practical purposes, unavoidable. n176 <u>Morality concerns opposing <mark>commodification</mark> of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when </u>one considers that<u> <mark>we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. </u>n177 <u>We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general</mark>, </u>without which their health and lives can be expected to suffer. The argument regarding the distributive justice impact of allowing sales (i.e., that the poor would be sellers, and only the rich could be buyers) ignores the fact that organ transplants are still rationed on the basis of ability to pay today. n178 Further, distributive inequity could be partially cured by providing government subsidies to enable the poor to have equal access to available organs. n179 [*106] </p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,777 | 3 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,832 |
The ban is limited to organs for transplant. Sales for research are not prohibited.
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her death
|
, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her deat
|
n150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $ 90,000. Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. Further, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof. Cheney, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Also, one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her death. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, Cadaver Calculator, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
| 763 |
<h4>The ban is limited to organs for transplant. Sales for research are not prohibited.</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>n150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $ 90,000. Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. Further<mark>, <u>research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof</u></mark>. Cheney, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Also, <u><mark>one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her deat</mark>h</u>. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, Cadaver Calculator, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). </p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 The Plan establishes well-regulated organ sales
| 430,775 | 3 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,833 |
Nuke war
|
Thompson 14
|
Loren Thompson 4-24-2014 “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
|
this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. the Obama Administration credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO tensions are ratcheting up. successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. It is easy to imagine misjudgments in Ukraine which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives Any deployment could provoke Russian escalation. Misinterpretation of signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
this year’s crisis is a reminder that geopolitical concerns have not vanished Putin might be forced to aid ethnic Russians Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence tensions are ratcheting up revisions of Russian military strategy place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” in response to conventional aggression it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate This isn’t saber-rattling It is easy to imagine misjudgments Misinterpretation can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint — poor intel battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and other influences — it seems reasonable to consider because Ukraine is so close there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed
|
Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, this year’s crisis over Ukraine is a reminder that Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the geopolitical sources of its security concerns have not vanished. In fact, Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. This isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine, which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it seems reasonable to consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250 miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.
| 7,969 |
<h4>Nuke war </h4><p>Loren <strong>Thompson</strong> 4-24-20<strong>14</strong> “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use Of Nuclear Weapons” http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/</p><p>Americans haven’t thought much about such scenarios since the Cold War ended, because the Soviet Union dissolved and the ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow ceased. However, <u><mark>this year’s crisis</mark> over Ukraine <mark>is a reminder that </mark>Russia remains a nuclear superpower, and that the <mark>geopolitical</mark> sources of its security <mark>concerns have not vanished</u></mark>. In fact, <u>Moscow may have greater reason for worrying today, because it has lost the buffer of allies that insulated it from Western attack during the Cold War, and now finds its capital only a few minutes from the eastern border of Ukraine</u> by jet (less by missile). If you know the history of the region, then <u>it is easy to see why Moscow might fear aggression. </u>Although <u>the Obama Administration</u> is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its <u>credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir <mark>Putin</mark> has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his neighbors</u>. <u>Having fomented <strong>revolt</strong> in eastern Ukraine</u>, <u>Moscow now says it <mark>might be forced to</mark> <strong>come to the <mark>aid</mark> of <mark>ethnic Russians</u></strong></mark> there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). <u><mark>Meanwhile, the U.S. has increased its own military presence</mark> in the neighborhood</u>, <u>reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO</u>. So little by little,<u> <strong><mark>tensions</strong> are <strong>ratcheting up</mark>. </u></strong>One facet of the regional military balance that bears watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that <u>successive <mark>revisions of Russian military strategy</mark> appear “to <mark>place a <strong>greater reliance on nuclear</mark> <mark>weapons”</strong> </mark>to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. </u>A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that <u>Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons <mark>in response to <strong>conventional aggression</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but <mark>it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate</mark> a conflict. <mark>This <strong>isn’t</strong></mark> just Russian <strong><mark>saber-rattling</u></strong></mark>. <u>The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility of nuclear use in a European war</u>. <u>The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back away</u> from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, <u>and instead decided it would retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons</u> in Europe under a doctrine known as extended deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S. nuclear weapons nearby. So <u>improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear use in a confrontation over Ukraine</u>. Here are four ways that <u>what started out as a local crisis could turn into something <strong>much worse.</strong> </u>Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military mis-adventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow. For instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. <u><mark>It is easy to imagine</u></mark> similar <u><strong><mark>misjudgments</strong></mark> in Ukraine</u>, <u>which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives</u>. <u>Any</u> sizable <u>deployment</u> of U.S. forces in the region <u>could provoke Russian escalation. </u>Defective signaling. When tensions are high, rival leaders often seek to send signals about their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. <u><mark>Misinterpretation</mark> of </u>such<u> signals <mark>can become a reciprocal process that sends both sides <strong>up the “ladder of escalation” quickly</strong></mark>, to a point where nuclear use seems like the logical next step. </u>Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts. <u>Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons</u>. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. <u><mark>U.S. policy even envisions <strong>letting allies deliver tactical warheads</strong></mark> against enemy targets.</u> Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. <u>Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. <mark>When you consider all the processes working to degrade restraint</mark> in wartime</u> <u><mark>— poor intel</mark>ligence, garbled communication, <mark>battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and</mark> a host of <mark>other influences — it seems reasonable to consider</mark> that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control, even to the point of using nuclear weapons.</u> And <u><mark>because Ukraine is so close</mark> to the Russian heartland</u> (about 250 miles from Moscow) <u><mark>there’s no telling what might happen <strong>once the nuclear “firebreak” is crossed</u></strong></mark>. All this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such thinking.</p>
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Neg vs Harvard ad
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2NC/1NR
|
A/T “Industry Capture/Big Weed”
| 22,852 | 87 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
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Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
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Evans
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Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,834 |
Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction
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Meskill 09
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Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)
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Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs Why not also choose between them and other, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
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Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the environmental armageddon this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential scenarios warming asteroid terrorists nuclear-weapons pandemic each risk on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different We get into our cars to buy coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed We are constantly risking death Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety Many movements exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
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Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.
| 2,774 |
<h4><strong>Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction</h4><p>Meskill 09<u></strong> (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)</p><p></u>Tom <u><mark>Friedman's piece</u> </mark>today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He <u><mark>applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine"</u> </mark>(which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") <u><mark>to the </mark>risk of <mark>environmental armageddon</mark>. <strong>But <mark>this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant</strong></mark>.</u> It is intellectually incoherent because <u><mark>it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential </mark>disaster <mark>scenarios</mark>. In addition to the global-<mark>warming </mark>risk, there's also the <mark>asteroid</mark>-hitting-the-earth risk, the <mark>terrorists</mark>-with-<mark>nuclear-weapons </mark>risk</u> (Cheney's original scenario), <u>the super-duper-<mark>pandemic </mark>risk, etc. Since <mark>each </mark>of these <mark>risk</mark>s, <strong><mark>on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention</strong>, we cannot address all of them simultaneously</mark>. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs</u>. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? <u>Why not also choose between them and other,</u> much more cotidien, <u>things we value? <mark>Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different</u></mark>, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, <u>this is how we behave all the time. <mark>We get into our cars </mark>in order <mark>to buy </mark>a cup of <mark>coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed </mark>on the way to the coffee shop. <mark>We are constantly risking death</mark>, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. <mark>Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would</u> </mark>sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would <u><mark>neither </mark>be able to <mark>act, nor not act, <strong>since it would nowhere discover perfect safety</u></strong></mark>. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, <u>it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. <mark>Many </mark>religious <mark>movements</u> </mark>- for example the early Jesus movement - <u>have <mark>exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action</u></mark>.<strong> </p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
| 46,317 | 378 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,835 |
Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities
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Moran 2011
|
Moran 2011 (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)
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legalization for minority groups might represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound. marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling billions of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing and selling of marijuana To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess cultivating marijuana would require a license fee all applicants to submit to a criminal history background check appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security and compliance with other employment inspection and recordkeeping measures These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital marijuana, if legalized while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[
| null |
C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, legalization makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, for minority groups it might truthfully represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities. In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound.137 As noted earlier, marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually.138 As also noted, the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling.139 These figures tend to reflect that billions, and at the very least hundreds of millions, of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year. With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing140 and the selling141 of marijuana. To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess: cultivating or growing marijuana would require 1) a maximum license fee of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) all license applicants to submit to a criminal history background check;143 3) appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security";144 and 4) compliance with other employment,145 inspection,146 and recordkeeping147 measures. These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital. Therefore, marijuana, if legalized in the California fashion, while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production. Worsening this dilemma, most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[man]."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149
| 3,078 |
<h4>Legalization would increase poverty and be inaccessible to minority communities</h4><p><strong>Moran 2011</strong> (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)</p><p>C. The Money Drain from Minority Communities Much is made by the proponents of marijuana legalization concerning marijuana’s potential to become the next "cash crop" creating billions of dollars in both sales and tax revenue.135 Particularly in the face of decriminalization proposals, which do nothing to divert money from the hands of drug dealers, <u>legalization</u> makes sense. The argument goes something like this: as history has shown, marijuana use will not stop; therefore, we might as well sell the drug legally, putting the money from drug dealers’ wallets into those of the people.136 Although this is generally a sound and sensible argument, <u>for minority groups</u> it <u>might</u> truthfully <u>represent another tool of economic oppression bogging down their communities</u>. <u>In the illegal market, high-quality marijuana costs, on average, over $4,000 per pound, while lower level marijuana nears $1,000 per pound.</u>137 As noted earlier, <u>marijuana sales in the United States, top $100 billion annually</u>.138 As also noted, <u>the highest concentration of drug dealers is found in lower income, urban environments prone to minority dwelling</u>.139 These figures tend to reflect that <u>billions</u>, and at the very least hundreds of millions, <u>of dollars are funneled into such lower income communities each year</u>. <u>With the legalization of marijuana, money expended by consumers will be the same or higher, but minorities must ask where that money will drain</u>. Meaning, will the billions or hundreds of millions of dollars continue their current flow into lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? <u>The California initiative created licensing regulations for both the growing</u>140 <u>and</u> the <u>selling</u>141 <u>of marijuana</u>. <u>To the detriment of minorities, these licensing requirements required both money and a certain amount of business prowess</u>: <u>cultivating</u> or growing <u>marijuana</u> <u>would require</u> 1) <u>a </u>maximum <u>license fee</u> of $5,000 paid by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued";142 2) <u>all</u> license <u>applicants to submit to a criminal history background check</u>;143 3) <u>appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for that security</u>";144 <u>and</u> 4) <u>compliance with other employment</u>,145 <u>inspection</u>,146 <u>and recordkeeping</u>147 <u>measures</u>. <u>These business and licensing regulations provided no assistance to entrepreneurs with little or no start-up capital</u>. Therefore, <u>marijuana, if legalized</u> in the California fashion, <u>while becoming the nation’s next cash crop and a tremendous source of wealth, could potentially be so for mainly non-minorities, ones who have the financial means and business savvy to initiate such production.</u> Worsening this dilemma, <u>most of the money flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts of the new class of "marijuana business[</u>man]."148 Minority community leaders should be mindful of this potential money drain, and wary of its wide range of effects on their communities.149</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
Racism
| 299,332 | 8 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,836 |
Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is
|
Yudkowsky 06
|
Yudkowsky 06 [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.
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The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
Overly detailed reassurances can create false perceptions of safety Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people tend to overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
conjunction fallacy applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible
specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates as well as misdirecting investments into implausibly detailed risk scenarios
people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people underestimate the probability that one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)
In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively.
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)
Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios.
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.)
| 4,274 |
<h4><strong>Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is</h4><p>Yudkowsky</strong> <strong>06</strong> [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.</p><p><u>The <mark>conjunction fallacy</mark> similarly <mark>applies to futurological forecasts</u></mark>. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)</p><p>In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. </p><p><u><mark>According to probability theory, adding additional detail</mark> onto a story <mark>must render the story less probable</u></mark>. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. <u><mark>Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible</mark>.</u> </p><p>People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) </p><p><u>Overly detailed reassurances can</u> also <u>create false perceptions of safety</u>: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." <u>Vivid, <mark>specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates</mark> of security, <mark>as well as misdirecting</mark> defensive <mark>investments into</mark> needlessly narrow or <mark>implausibly detailed risk scenarios</u></mark>. </p><p><u>More generally, <mark>people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and</mark> <mark>underestimate disjunctive probabilities</u></mark>. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>overestimate the probability that</u></mark>, e.g., <u><mark>seven events of 90% probability will all occur</u></mark>. Conversely, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>underestimate the probability that</mark> at least <mark>one of seven events of 10% probability will occur</u></mark>. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) </p>
| null | null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
| 11,979 | 232 | 17,092 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| 565,249 |
A
|
Navy
|
1
|
Florida Cone-Marchini
|
Crane
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,837 |
Legalization wouldn’t repair lives and communities, and would make inequality worse
|
Bouie 2014
|
Bouie 2014 (Jamelle, Slate staff writer covering politics, policy, and race, The Case for Marijuana Reparations, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/07/the_case_for_marijuana_reparations_the_profits_from_drug_legalization_should.single.html)
|
legal weed won’t do anything for the individuals and communities wrecked by our aggressive and disparate enforcement of past marijuana laws. it’s troubling to think of the distribution of profits in an America of legal weed. Thanks to their criminal records, many of the young black men who were victims of marijuana policy won’t have a chance to capitalize on the new permissive environment. Opportunities will go to mainstream businesses, run by well-off white Americans That’s been the situation in Colorado It’s not hard to find the demographics on the state’s pot entrepreneurs, who rely on loans and personal wealth to get their start, an avenue unavailable to many people of color. It’s not hard to imagine a national market for marijuana that reaped billions of dollars in sales and generated hundreds of millions in tax revenue, with little going to the communities most affected by past prohibition.
| null |
Obviously, federal marijuana legalization would put an end to a world where simple possession can derail a person’s life. But legal weed—and more importantly, a legal market for weed—won’t do anything for the individuals and communities wrecked by our aggressive and disparate enforcement of past marijuana laws. What’s more, it’s troubling to think of the distribution of profits in an America of legal weed. Thanks to their criminal records, many of the young black men who were victims of marijuana policy won’t have a chance to capitalize on the new permissive environment. Opportunities will go to mainstream businesses, run mostly by well-off white Americans. That’s been the situation in Colorado (where blacks are 1.9 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession) where marijuana was legalized in 2012 following a statewide referendum. It’s not hard to find the demographics on the state’s pot entrepreneurs, who—like many new business owners—rely on loans and personal wealth to get their start, an avenue unavailable to many people of color. For these marijuana entrepreneurs, Colorado is a vibrant market for turning a profit. According to a recent report from the Colorado Department of Revenue, statewide demand for marijuana is at 121.4 tons a year, a 31 percent increase from previous estimates. Indeed, in its first four months of legal marijuana, the state collected $11 million in taxes from commercial pot and $7 million from its medical cousin. It’s not hard to imagine a national market for marijuana that reaped billions of dollars in sales and generated hundreds of millions in tax revenue, with little going to the communities most affected by past prohibition.
| 1,698 |
<h4>Legalization wouldn’t repair lives and communities, and would make inequality worse</h4><p><strong>Bouie 2014</strong> <u>(Jamelle, Slate staff writer covering politics, policy, and race, The Case for Marijuana Reparations, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/07/the_case_for_marijuana_reparations_the_profits_from_drug_legalization_should.single.html)</p><p></u>Obviously, federal marijuana legalization would put an end to a world where simple possession can derail a person’s life. But <u>legal weed</u>—and more importantly, a legal market for weed—<u>won’t do anything for the individuals and communities wrecked by our aggressive and disparate enforcement of past marijuana laws. </u>What’s more, <u>it’s troubling to think of the distribution of profits in an America of legal weed.</u> <u>Thanks to their criminal records, many of the young black men who were victims of marijuana policy won’t have a chance to capitalize on the new permissive environment. Opportunities will go to mainstream businesses, run </u>mostly <u>by</u> <u>well-off white Americans</u>. <u>That’s been the situation in Colorado</u> (where blacks are 1.9 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession) where marijuana was legalized in 2012 following a statewide referendum. <u>It’s not hard to find the demographics on the state’s pot entrepreneurs, who</u>—like many new business owners—<u>rely on loans and personal wealth to get their start, an avenue unavailable to many people of color. </u>For these marijuana entrepreneurs, Colorado is a vibrant market for turning a profit. According to a recent report from the Colorado Department of Revenue, statewide demand for marijuana is at 121.4 tons a year, a 31 percent increase from previous estimates. Indeed, in its first four months of legal marijuana, the state collected $11 million in taxes from commercial pot and $7 million from its medical cousin. <u>It’s not hard to imagine a national market for marijuana that reaped billions of dollars in sales and generated hundreds of millions in tax revenue, with little going to the communities most affected by past prohibition.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
Racism
| 430,848 | 13 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,838 |
Ending illegal markets would increase poverty and inequality
|
Nakagawa 2014
|
Nakagawa 2014 (Scot, Lifelong political activist, community organizer, organization builder, and trouble-maker, Why I Support Marijuana Legalization, But Not as a Strategy for Winning Racial Justice, http://www.racefiles.com/2014/07/31/why-i-support-marijuana-legalization-but-not-as-a-strategy-for-winning-racial-justice/)
|
Without a job, people are often forced to commit crimes, like selling marijuana. If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy Being excluded from decent employment opportunities will drive some people to drug dealing legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade for their living, legalization is a dead-end. Richer people with the capital to invest in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk involved in developing marijuana markets illegally and squeeze them out
| null |
As a sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, prison is a form of disguised unemployment. That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often don’t work. Without a job, people are often forced to commit crimes, like selling marijuana. Once convicted of that crime, a criminal record can make you unemployable. Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back in prison, and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy, ironically in part because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants, cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. Being excluded from decent employment opportunities will drive some people to drug dealing. Unless we deal with this reality, legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments and less public sympathy. From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade for their living, legalization is a dead-end. Richer people with the capital to invest in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk involved in developing marijuana markets illegally and squeeze them out. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to where?”
| 1,861 |
<h4>Ending illegal markets would increase poverty and inequality</h4><p><strong>Nakagawa 2014</strong> (Scot, Lifelong political activist, community organizer, organization builder, and trouble-maker, Why I Support Marijuana Legalization, But Not as a Strategy for Winning Racial Justice, http://www.racefiles.com/2014/07/31/why-i-support-marijuana-legalization-but-not-as-a-strategy-for-winning-racial-justice/)</p><p>As a sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, prison is a form of disguised unemployment. That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often don’t work. <u>Without a job, people are often forced to commit crimes, like selling marijuana.</u> Once convicted of that crime, a criminal record can make you unemployable. Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back in prison, and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. <u>If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher</u> (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. <u>Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy</u>, ironically in part because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants, cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. <u>Being excluded from decent employment opportunities will drive some people to drug dealing</u>. Unless we deal with this reality, <u><strong>legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems”</u></strong> <u>for which there are often more stringent punishments</u> and less public sympathy. <u>From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade for their living, <strong>legalization is a dead-end</strong>. Richer people with the capital to invest in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk involved in developing marijuana markets illegally and squeeze them out</u>. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to where?”</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
Racism
| 45,016 | 32 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,839 |
Legal marijuana would replicate racism and economic exploitation of minorities
|
Moran 2011
|
Moran 2011 (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)
|
If minority groups need anything, it is more opportunity for more productivity for further advancement, growth, and welfare. While some studies debate marijuana’s general effect on productivity, minority groups’ overall lower income makes them more vulnerable in this area, largely negating the general conclusions of those arguments marijuana use, particularly acute consumption, retards logical thinking, reasoning, and complex thought Further inhibiting effects, such as lesser hand-eye coordination, weaker driving performance, less ability to concentrate, and diminishing learning rates all relate to marijuana use. for minority groups, the effect of higher use on productivity should be of utmost concern. marijuana use does impair managerial favor, raises, promotions, and the like. Indirect effects such as these could severely inhibit the workforce and overall production of minority groups, by stunting their ability to move up the chain of responsibility and command. with the legalization of marijuana, individuals would have less incentive to hide their habit, making it all the more easier to suffer remaining stigmatizing social consequences in the legalized world e]ach new user would be at some risk of progressing to heavy, chronic use
| null |
The first area of concern for minorities regarding a higher consumption of marijuana within their communities is the association of marijuana use with lower productivity. If minority groups need anything, it is more opportunity for more productivity for further advancement, growth, and welfare. While some studies debate marijuana’s general effect on productivity, minority groups’ overall lower income makes them more vulnerable in this area, largely negating the general conclusions of those arguments.121 Although not necessarily damaging the brain, marijuana use, particularly acute consumption, retards logical thinking, reasoning, and complex thought.122 Further inhibiting effects, such as lesser hand-eye coordination, weaker driving performance, less ability to concentrate, and diminishing learning rates all relate to marijuana use.123 What does all this mean? It is hard to determine. As noted, one of the strongest arguments for the repeal of marijuana prohibition is to get the thousands of minority persons locked up for petty possession back into their communities. But assuming those returning keep using the drug, and considering the probability that legalization will increase use elsewhere, for minority groups, the effect of higher use on productivity should be of utmost concern. It is a tradeoff, but is it a valuable one? For instance, one study finds that marijuana use does not substantially impair individuals’ ability to perform general working tasks, but does impair them as far as managerial favor, raises, promotions, and the like.124 Indirect effects such as these could severely inhibit the workforce and overall production of minority groups, by stunting their ability to move up the chain of responsibility and command. Further complicating this is the fact that with the legalization of marijuana, individuals would have less incentive to hide their habit, making it all the more easier to suffer remaining stigmatizing social consequences.125 Compounding the problem is that in the legalized world "[e]ach new user would be at some risk of progressing to heavy, chronic use . . . ."126
| 2,123 |
<h4>Legal marijuana would replicate racism and economic exploitation of minorities</h4><p><strong>Moran 2011</strong> (Thomas, Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2011, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=crsj&sei-redir=1)</p><p>The first area of concern for minorities regarding a higher consumption of marijuana within their communities is the association of marijuana use with lower productivity. <u>If minority groups need anything, it is more opportunity for more productivity for further advancement, growth, and welfare.</u> <u>While some studies debate marijuana’s general effect on productivity, minority groups’ overall lower income makes them more vulnerable in this area, largely negating the general conclusions of those arguments</u>.121 Although not necessarily damaging the brain, <u>marijuana use, particularly acute consumption, retards logical thinking, reasoning, and complex thought</u>.122 <u>Further inhibiting effects, such as lesser hand-eye coordination, weaker driving performance, less ability to concentrate, and diminishing learning rates all relate to marijuana use.</u>123 What does all this mean? It is hard to determine. As noted, one of the strongest arguments for the repeal of marijuana prohibition is to get the thousands of minority persons locked up for petty possession back into their communities. But assuming those returning keep using the drug, and considering the probability that legalization will increase use elsewhere, <u>for minority groups, the effect of higher use on productivity should be of utmost concern.</u> It is a tradeoff, but is it a valuable one? For instance, one study finds that <u>marijuana use</u> does not substantially impair individuals’ ability to perform general working tasks, but <u>does impair</u> them as far as <u>managerial favor, raises, promotions, and the like.</u>124 <u>Indirect effects such as these could severely inhibit the workforce and overall production of minority groups, by stunting their ability to move up the chain of responsibility and command.</u> Further complicating this is the fact that <u>with the legalization of marijuana, individuals would have less incentive to hide their habit, making it all the more easier to suffer remaining stigmatizing social consequences</u>.125 Compounding the problem is that <u>in the legalized world</u> "[<u>e]ach new user would be at some risk of progressing to heavy, chronic use</u> . . . ."126</p>
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Neg vs Harvard ad
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2NC/1NR
|
Racism
| 430,849 | 3 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,840 |
DA solves the case – can set international norms—we access a bigger internal link
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CFR 13
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CFR 13 The Global Human Rights Regime Issue Brief Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Release Date Updated: June 19, 2013 www.cfr.org/human-rights/global-human-rights-regime/p27450
|
greatest strength of the global governance architecture has been creating norms. treaties have enshrined human rights on the international community's agenda array of treaties establishing standards for human rights commitments is broad—frompolitical and civil liberties to economic, social, and cultural rights to racial discrimination to the rights of women, children, migrant workers, and more recentlythe disabled. as labor rights and human trafficking The United Nations Human Rights Council, guidelines for related business responsibilities
|
greatest strength of the global governance architecture has been creating norms. treaties, have enshrined human rights on the international community's agenda array of treaties establishing standards for human rights commitments is broad—frompolitical and civil liberties to economic, social, and cultural rights to racial discrimination to the rights of women, children, migrant workers, and more recentlythe disabled. as labor rights and human trafficking The United Nations Human Rights Council, guidelines for related business responsibilities
|
The greatest strength of the global governance architecture has been creating norms. Myriad treaties, agreements, and statements have enshrined human rights on the international community's agenda, and some regional organizations have followed suit. These agreements lack binding clauses to ensure that action matches rhetoric, however, and many important violators have not signed on. In addition, states often attach qualifiers to their signatures that dilute their commitments. The array of treaties establishing standards for human rights commitments is broad—frompolitical and civil liberties to economic, social, and cultural rights to racial discrimination to the rights of women, children, migrant workers, and more recentlythe disabled. Other global efforts have focused on areas such as labor rights and human trafficking. Regional organizations, most notably the Council of Europe and theOrganization of American States, have also promulgated related instruments, although less uniformly. In addition, member states have articulated declarations and resolutions establishing human rights standards, and increasingly so in economic affairs. The United Nations Human Rights Council, in a departure from the premise that states are to be held accountable for human rights conduct, in 2011 even passed formal guidelines for related business responsibilities [PDF].
| 1,371 |
<h4>DA solves the case – can set international <u>norms</u>—we access a bigger internal link</h4><p><strong>CFR 13 </strong>The Global Human Rights Regime Issue Brief Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Release Date Updated: June 19, 2013 www.cfr.org/human-rights/global-human-rights-regime/p27450</p><p>The <u><mark>greatest strength of the global governance architecture has been creating norms.</u></mark> Myriad <u><mark>treaties</u>,</mark> agreements, and statements <u><mark>have enshrined human rights on the international community's agenda</u></mark>, and some regional organizations have followed suit. These agreements lack binding clauses to ensure that action matches rhetoric, however, and many important violators have not signed on. In addition, states often attach qualifiers to their signatures that dilute their commitments. The <u><mark>array of treaties establishing standards for human rights commitments is broad—frompolitical and civil liberties to economic, social, and cultural rights to racial discrimination to the rights of women, children, migrant workers, and more recentlythe disabled.</u></mark> Other global efforts have focused on areas such <u><mark>as labor rights and human trafficking</u></mark>. Regional organizations, most notably the <strong>Council of Europe</strong> and the<strong>Organization of American States</strong>, have also promulgated related instruments, although less uniformly. In addition, member states have articulated declarations and resolutions establishing human rights standards, and increasingly so in economic affairs. <u><mark>The United Nations Human Rights Council,</mark> </u>in a departure from the premise that states are to be held accountable for human rights conduct, in 2011 even passed formal <u><mark>guidelines for related business responsibilities</u></mark> [PDF].</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
Racism
| 430,850 | 2 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,841 |
There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay
|
Youngers 2014
|
Youngers 2014 (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)
|
SINCE NIXON DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs the U.S. used its muscle to dictate policies throughout the region the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this The surge in left-leaning governments The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies Washington is suffering from a credibility problem Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws The irony is not lost on Latin American officials the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path
|
Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
|
SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON FIRST DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs over 40 years ago, the U.S. government has used its political and economic muscle to dictate policies throughout the region. Now the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force. Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this and other policies. The surge in left-leaning governments in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend. Interestingly, the reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds, with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team, Luis Videgaray, said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status." Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. Perhaps the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. Despite arduous negotiations-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to overcome the 'war on drugs' approach." The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada. Interestingly, Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them. This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
| 8,683 |
<h4>There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay</h4><p><strong>Youngers 2014</strong> <mark>(Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)</p><p><u></mark>SINCE</u> PRESIDENT <u>NIXON</u> FIRST <u>DECLARED</u> <u>THE WAR on Drugs</u> over 40 years ago, <u>the U.S.</u> government has <u>used its</u> political and economic <u>muscle to dictate policies throughout the region</u>. Now <u>the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force</u>. <u>Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this</u> and other policies. <u>The surge in left-leaning governments</u> in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. <u>The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend</u>. Interestingly, the <u><strong>reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds</u></strong>, <u>with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador</u> <u>to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies</u>, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. <u><strong><mark>Washington is suffering from a credibility problem</u></strong>. <u>Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws</u></mark>. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis <mark>markets. <u>The irony is not lost on Latin American officials</u>;</mark> for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), <u>the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team</u>, Luis Videgaray, <u>said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status</u>." <u>Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. </u>Perhaps <u>the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States</u>, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." <u>THE APRIL 2012 <mark>CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point</u>. <u>For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives</u></mark>. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). <u><strong><mark>In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington</u></strong>, <u><strong>the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment</strong> with policies appropriate to their reality</u></mark>. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. <u><mark>Despite arduous negotiations</u></mark>-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-<u><mark>the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda</mark>. </u>Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that <u><mark>the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered</u>,</mark> leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: <u><strong><mark>for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda</u></strong></mark>. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, <u><mark>the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS</u></mark>. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, <u><mark>what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies</mark> to</u> overcome <u><mark>the 'war on drugs'</u></mark> approach." <u><mark>The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad</mark>a</u>. Interestingly, <u>Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution</u> (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). <u>And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries</u> (GRULAC), <u>underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them</u>. <u>This has <mark>emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path</u>.</p></mark>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
Worse
| 430,470 | 17 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,842 |
That push will be accepted and is key to 2016 reform
|
Oakford 2014
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Oakford 2014 (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)
|
Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Uruguay's Ambassador told We have an interpretation to the side of liberty and rights
|
Russia's meddling in Ukraine could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions
|
But Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Milton Romani Gerner, Uruguay's Ambassador to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, told VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. We have an interpretation to the other side, to the side of liberty and rights."
| 892 |
<h4>That push will be accepted and is key to 2016 reform</h4><p><strong>Oakford 2014</strong> (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)</p><p>But <u><mark>Russia's meddling in Ukraine</mark> has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and <mark>could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy</mark>. </u>There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But <u><mark>as more countries test their legal limits, <strong>a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. </u></strong>"<u>We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions</mark>,"</u> Milton Romani Gerner, <u>Uruguay's</u> <u>Ambassador</u> to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, <u>told</u> VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. <u>We have an interpretation</u> to the other side, <u>to the side of liberty and rights</u>."</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
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2NC/1NR
|
Worse
| 430,783 | 8 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,843 |
Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger strong condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions would be unavoidable Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in agreements countries want to keep parts of the international drug-control regime intact not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems the Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences
|
Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions would be unavoidable ountries want to keep parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes Many countries are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences
|
Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger even stronger condemnations than seen in the case of Bolivia, and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions.37 For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions from the U.S. and the European Union would probably be unavoidable. Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in several other agreements, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most countries now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change want to keep significant parts of the international drug-control regime intact, not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Many countries, however, are already suffering inadequate availability of essential medicines, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems. Moreover, the 1961 and 1971 Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.
| 2,352 |
<h4>Collapsing the drug control treaties causes mass disease spread- abrogation cuts off key medicine trade</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>Withdrawing from the UN drug control conventions completely is likely to trigger</u> even <u>strong</u>er <u>condemnations</u></mark> than seen in the case of Bolivia, <u><strong><mark>and may have serious political, economic and reputational repercussions</u></strong></mark>.37 <u><mark>For countries receiving development aid or benefitting from preferential trade agreements, sanctions</u></mark> from the U.S. and the European Union <u><mark>would</u></mark> probably <u><mark>be</u> <u>unavoidable</u></mark>. <u>Adherence to all three drug control conventions has been made an explicit condition in</u> several other <u>agreements</u>, not only in the sphere of trade and development but it is also a sine qua non for accession to the European Union, for example. Very few countries would be able to confront such pressures alone. Also, most <u>c<mark>ountries</u></mark> now struggling to abide by all its strictures and considering options for change <u><mark>want to keep</u></mark> significant <u><mark>parts of the international drug-control regime intact</u>, <u>not least its control system for production, trade and availability of drugs for medicinal purposes</u></mark>. Denunciation would not automatically exclude access to controlled drugs for licit purposes, since (as an exception in international law) the drug control conventions impose obligations even on non-parties to adhere to the system of estimated requirements and monitoring rules for international trade of controlled drugs for medical and scientific purposes. <u><mark>Many countries</mark>, however, <mark>are already suffering inadequate availability of <strong>essential medicines</strong>, and exiting the treaty system administering their production and trade would only complicate those problems</u></mark>. Moreover, <u>the</u> 1961 and 1971 <u><mark>Conventions provide the INCB the possibility to impose “remedial measures” in terms of restricting or banning trade in medicines</mark> controlled under those treaties to countries if “the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered </u>by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention”.38 While the procedure under that treaty article has only been activated by the INCB a few times, and is operative now in the case of Afghanistan, actual sanctions have never been applied. It would be extremely controversial as <u><strong><mark>such measures would have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences</u></strong></mark> and violate the human right to health, for which the Board would not want to be responsible.</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
causes)
| 430,464 | 8 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,844 |
Disease spread causes extinction
|
Keating 2009
|
Keating 2009 -- Foreign Policy web editor (Joshua, "The End of the World," Foreign Policy, 11-13-9, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the_end_of_the_world?page=full)
|
Throughout history, plagues brought civilizations to their knees The Black Death killed more than half of Europe 1918 flu killed 50 million people Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster global outbreak of a disease such as ebola or a mutated drug-resistant flu could have a civilization-ending impact as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases Bio weapons experimentation add a new and troubling complication
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Throughout history, plagues brought civilizations to their knees The Black Death killed half of Europe Because of globalization, diseases spread even faster global outbreak of a disease such as ebola or a mutated drug-resistant flu could have a civilization-ending impact as humans move into unoccupied areas risk of exposure to unknown pathogens increases . Bio weapons add a new complication
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How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact. How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.
| 1,253 |
<h4>Disease spread causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Keating 2009</strong> -- Foreign Policy web editor (Joshua, "The End of the World," Foreign Policy, 11-13-9, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the_end_of_the_world?page=full)</p><p>How it could happen: <u><mark>Throughout history, plagues </u></mark>have<u> <mark>brought civilizations to their knees</u></mark>. <u><mark>The Black Death killed </u></mark>more off <u>more than <mark>half of Europe</u></mark>'s population in the Middle Ages. In <u>1918</u>, a <u>flu</u> pandemic <u>killed</u> an estimated <u>50 million people</u>, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. <u><mark>Because of globalization, diseases </mark>today <mark>spread even faster</u> </mark>- witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A <u><mark>global outbreak of a disease such as ebola</u> </mark>virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- <u><mark>or a mutated drug-resistant</u> </mark>form of the <u><mark>flu</u> </mark>virus on a global scale <u><mark>could have a</u> </mark>devastating, even <u><mark>civilization-ending impact</u></mark>. How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and <u><mark>as </mark>the world’s population grows and <mark>humans move into</mark> previously <mark>unoccupied areas</mark>, the <mark>risk of exposure to </mark>previously <mark>unknown pathogens increases</u></mark>. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV<mark>. <u>Bio</u></mark>logical <u><mark>weapons </mark>experimentation</u> has <u><mark>add</u></mark>ed <u><mark>a new </mark>and</u> just as <u>troubling <mark>complication</u></mark>.</p>
|
Neg vs Harvard ad
|
2NC/1NR
|
causes)
| 20,050 | 216 | 17,091 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| 565,256 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
7
|
Harvard Asimow-Drecker-Waxman
|
Evans
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA (2NR)
AG Politics
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,845 |
The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
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Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
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many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains
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Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>
|
Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
| null | null | 430,245 | 16 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,846 |
Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
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the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage
|
transplant industry adopted policy options designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, maintain the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo seven actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative KIDNEY EXCHANGES none of the policies resolve the transplant shortage it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.
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<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p> Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the <mark>transplant industry</mark> has examined and <mark>adopted</mark> a series of <mark>policy options</mark> ostensibly <mark>designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these,</mark> however, continue to <mark>maintain the</mark> basic zero-price property of the <mark>altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo</mark>te</u>. <u>At least <mark>seven</mark> such <mark>actions have been</mark> <mark>implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u><mark>INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal <mark>legislation</u></mark> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u><mark>additional</mark> <mark>legislation</u></mark> was passed that requires hospitals<u> <mark>to refer potential organ donors</mark> </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u>the </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ <mark>KIDNEY</mark> <mark>EXCHANGES</u></mark> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u>Finally, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct </u>(explicit) <u>costs incurred by</u> such d<u>onors </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u>We must conclude that <mark>none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies</mark> should be expected to <mark>resolve the transplant</mark> organ <mark>shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, <mark>it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u>.</p></mark>
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Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
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The shortage means many die
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Beard 8
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Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
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our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
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failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
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http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
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<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
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Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
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Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage
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Study by Becker and Elias 14
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Study by Becker and Elias 14 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use.
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
| 10,692 |
<h4><strong>Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage</h4><p>Study by Becker and Elias 14 </strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u>Paying for organs </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p><p></u> </p>
|
Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives
| null | null | 430,254 | 24 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,849 |
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
|
Hughes 9
|
Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
|
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
|
A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences
|
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,256 | 14 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,850 |
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
|
Jaycox 12
|
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
|
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
|
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,255 | 14 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,851 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
|
Bowden 13
|
Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
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Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
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Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking
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[*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
| 1,529 |
<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p> </p>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,258 | 14 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,852 |
trafficking for organs is widespread
|
Kendrick 12
|
Kendrick 12 The Kendrick Theme 2012 Organ Removal http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-million-reasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/
|
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises.
|
Organ trafficking, is widespread. Those targeted are killed or left for dead poor and desperate people are lured by false promises
|
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises. The World Health Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
| 826 |
<h4>trafficking for organs is widespread</h4><p><strong>Kendrick 12</strong> The Kendrick Theme 2012 Organ Removal http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-million-reasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/</p><p><u><mark>Organ</mark> removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor <mark>trafficking, is </mark>quite real and <mark>widespread. Those targeted are</mark> sometimes <mark>killed or left for dead</mark>. More frequently <mark>poor</mark> <mark>and desperate people are lured by false promises</mark>.</u> The World Health Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: <strong>Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.</p></strong>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,315 | 22 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,853 |
Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence
|
Crouse ’07
|
Crouse ’07 (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418, [SG])
|
What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.
|
What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C trafficking must be abolished The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world Those who treat people as commercial commodities are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;
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We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." We join the ambassador in declaring, "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.
| 2,396 |
<h4>Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence </h4><p><strong>Crouse ’07</strong> (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418<u>, [SG]) </p><p></u>We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "<u><mark>What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places.</mark> It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, <strong><mark>the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all</mark>."</u></strong> It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, <u>"It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property."</u> There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, <u>"<mark>There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C</mark>orruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking."</u> CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. <u>We agree with Ambassador Lagon that <mark>trafficking</mark> in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it <mark>must be abolished</mark>." <strong><mark>The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world</mark>."</u></strong> We join the ambassador in declaring, <u>"Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." <mark>Those who treat people as commercial</mark> <mark>commodities</mark> — pimps, madams and johns — <mark>are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods</mark> for their brothels, factories or fields.</u> We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. <u>Otherwise, <mark>such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;<strong></mark> only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.</p></u></strong>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 97,673 | 23 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,854 |
Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation
|
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
|
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
|
Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. , the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. . Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified They harbor the “priming” that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
|
central is a blurring of wartime and peacetime violence humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons there is risk in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices daily enacted These are “invisible” genocides because they are right before our eyes and taken for granted Peacetime crimes suggests war crimes are ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically in the extreme context of war it is essential that we exercise hypervigilance to everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts possible There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life They harbor the priming that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life
|
(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).
| 13,177 |
<h4><strong>Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4</p><p></strong>(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first</p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely <mark>central</mark> to our approach <mark>is a blurring of</mark> categories and distinctions between <mark>wartime and peacetime violence</mark>. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities.</u> More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. <u>The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which <strong><mark>humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons</strong></mark> and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u>it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times.</u> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u><mark>there is</mark>), an even greater <mark>risk</mark> lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, <mark>in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices</mark> and sentiments <mark>daily enacted</mark> as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes</u>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”</u> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u><mark>These are “invisible” genocides</mark> not <mark>because they are</mark> secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed<u>, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are <mark>right before our eyes and</mark> therefore <mark>taken for granted</mark>.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u><mark>Peacetime crimes suggests</mark> the possibility that <mark>war crimes are</mark> merely <mark>ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically</mark> and dramatically <mark>in the extreme context of war</u></mark>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? </u>What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we</mark> recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to <mark>exercise</mark> a defensive <mark>hypervigilance to</mark> the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts</mark> and policies <mark>possible</u></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” <u>Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. <mark>There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life</mark>. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.</u> Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence<u>. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide.</u> But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. <u>Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.</u> It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting <u>that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified</u>. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. <u><mark>They harbor the</u></mark> early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the <u>“<mark>priming</mark>”</u> (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) <u><mark>that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life</u></mark> and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).</p>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 16,028 | 483 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
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Kentucky
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2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
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Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,855 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.</h4>
| null | null | null | 430,851 | 1 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
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Cedanats
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1
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Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,856 |
The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads anti-biotic resistant bacteria
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Kelly 13
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Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
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Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries
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governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies transplant tourism facilitate spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across border
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[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77
| 1,754 |
<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads <u>anti-biotic resistant </u>bacteria</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u>Because <mark>governmental disease control agencies do</mark> <mark>not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases</mark> <mark>like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms</mark> <mark>global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism</mark> and broader medical tourism <mark>facilitate</mark> the <mark>spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u>Because such <mark>bacteria are</mark> <mark>frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique</mark> <mark>strains across border</mark>s upon returning to their home countries</u>. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,429 | 9 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,857 |
Organ sales commodify the body and destroy the value to life justifying things like slavery, only altruistic solutions solve
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Chia 8’
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Chia 8’ (Roland, Chew Hock Hin Professor of Christian Doctrine at Trinity Theological College in Singapore, “Organ Trading: A Christian Perspective”, http://www.gcf.org.sg/resources/organ-trading-a-christian-perspective)
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To allow the sale and purchase of human organs is to reduce these human body parts into mere commodities, like other commodities transacted commercially , the trading of human organs would result in the commodification of human beings. To commodify human beings is to fail to accord him or her with proper respect and dignity To commodify something is to exchange it for money, to treat it as a property that can be bought or sold. To commodify a human being is to treat a being of profound dignity and worth as a mere object to which a price tag can be arbitrarily attached : What is wrong is making a saleable object out of something that should be treated as having value in itself, irrespective of what use might be made of it. . If it’s wrong to make people into objects or things – as slavery does – and if the body is the person, then is it wrong to trade in bodies and their parts? The answer, of course, is “Yes”. , to pay a person for his kidney is already to violate his dignity and exploit his personhood, regardless of how handsomely he is paid for the organ. exploitation does not only occur when the poor are poorly paid for their organs because of unscrupulous middlemen in the black market for human organs. It occurs whenever money is offered – however large or small the amount – as payment for a human organ. former Chairman of the US President’s Council on Bioethics has put it : We surpass all defensible limits of such conventional commodification when we contemplate making the convention-maker – the human being – just another one of the commensurable. The end comes to be treated merely as a means. Selling our bodies, we come perilously close to selling out our souls. if we allow ourselves to suppose that [money] is a universal medium of exchange, we are bound to lose our moral bearings”. Society recognises this very well. That is why most societies respond to slavery and prostitution with revulsion. And that is why society recognises that the public offices, the criminal justice system and human beings are not for sale. To this list, we must add the human body and its parts. elling our organs for financial gain is profoundly different from giving or donating our organs for the good of the recipients without expecting any rewards. . The business transaction is based on demand and supply, but it is not just a matter of supplying something in order to meet a demand. When I sell something that you need to you, my motivation is not merely to enable you to meet that need. My motivation is also to meet my need. Thus, I am only willing to meet your need if in return, my need will be met. If my need is not met, I will not take steps to meet your need. it is always a quid pro quo relationship. A business transaction, strictly speaking, can never be seen as an expression of unconditional or self-sacrificial love. Giving or donating one’s organ is very different. In donating his or her organ, the donor is performing an act of profound nobility is an act of genuine love and sacrifice on the part of the donor. It is an act of self-giving because, as we have seen, the organ is part of the human body, and the human body cannot be separated from the human self. He or she is willing to put himself or herself at risk in order to save the life of another human being, without expecting any rewards
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To allow the sale and purchase of human organs is to reduce these human body parts into mere commodities, like other commodities transacted commercially To commodify human beings is to fail to accord him or her with proper respect and dignity. To commodify something is to exchange it for money, to treat it as a property that can be bought or sold. To commodify a human being is to treat a being of profound dignity and worth as a mere object to which a price tag can be arbitrarily attached wrong is making a saleable object out of something that should be treated as having value in itself to pay a person for his kidney is already to violate his dignity and exploit his personhood, regardless of how handsomely he is paid exploitation does not only occur when the poor are poorly paid for their organs because of unscrupulous middlemen in the black market for human organs. It occurs whenever money is offered – however large or small the amount – as payment for a human organ . The end comes to be treated merely as a means. Selling our bodies, we come perilously close to selling out our souls selling our organs for financial gain is profoundly different from giving or donating our organs for the good of the recipients without expecting any rewards. The business transaction is based on demand and supply, When I sell somethin My motivation is also to meet my need. A business transaction, strictly speaking, can never be seen as an expression of unconditional or self-sacrificial love. Giving or donating one’s organ is very different
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The problem of commodification We now come to the heart of the objection to the trading of human organs. To allow the sale and purchase of human organs is to reduce these human body parts into mere commodities, like other commodities transacted commercially. Based on what I have said about the profound relationship between the person and his or her body, the trading of human organs would result in the commodification of human beings. To commodify human beings is to fail to accord him or her with proper respect and dignity. To commodify something is to exchange it for money, to treat it as a property that can be bought or sold. To commodify a human being is to treat a being of profound dignity and worth as a mere object to which a price tag can be arbitrarily attached. Donna Dickenson explains the implications of this clearly in her book, Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood: What is wrong is making a saleable object out of something that should be treated as having value in itself, irrespective of what use might be made of it. Because people have value in themselves, parts of people, you might think, would be particularly problematic. If it’s wrong to make people into objects or things – as slavery does – and if the body is the person, then is it wrong to trade in bodies and their parts? The answer, of course, is “Yes”. According to this view, to pay a person for his kidney is already to violate his dignity and exploit his personhood, regardless of how handsomely he is paid for the organ. Thus, exploitation does not only occur when the poor are poorly paid for their organs because of unscrupulous middlemen in the black market for human organs. It occurs whenever money is offered – however large or small the amount – as payment for a human organ. As Leon Kass, the former Chairman of the US President’s Council on Bioethics has put it so provocatively: We surpass all defensible limits of such conventional commodification when we contemplate making the convention-maker – the human being – just another one of the commensurable. The end comes to be treated merely as a means. Selling our bodies, we come perilously close to selling out our souls. There is even a danger in contemplating such a prospect – for if we come to think about ourselves like pork bellies, pork bellies we will become. Conventional wisdom tells us that some things are simply not for sale. There is, of course, nothing wrong with commerce. In fact, commerce has brought about human flourishing. But this is true only when human life itself is not turned into a commodity. As the Lutheran ethicist, Gilbert Meilaender has so perceptively pointed out, “if we allow ourselves to suppose that [money] is a universal medium of exchange, we are bound to lose our moral bearings”. Society recognises this very well. That is why most societies respond to slavery and prostitution with revulsion. And that is why society recognises that the public offices, the criminal justice system and human beings are not for sale. To this list, we must add the human body and its parts. The French National Ethics Committee makes this point emphatically when it states that it categorically “does not accept that the human body should be used for commercial purposes”. Selling and donating selling our organs for financial gain is profoundly different from giving or donating our organs for the good of the recipients without expecting any rewards. The relationship that we foster in a business transaction is very different from other relationships. The business transaction is based on demand and supply, but it is not just a matter of supplying something in order to meet a demand. When I sell something that you need to you, my motivation is not merely to enable you to meet that need. My motivation is also to meet my need. Thus, I am only willing to meet your need if in return, my need will be met. If my need is not met, I will not take steps to meet your need. Although a commercial transaction may be many things, it is always a quid pro quo relationship. A business transaction, strictly speaking, can never be seen as an expression of unconditional or self-sacrificial love. Giving or donating one’s organ is very different. In donating his or her organ, the donor is performing an act of profound nobility. Donating one’s organ without reward in order to help a fellow human being – whether related to the donor or a stranger – is an act of genuine love and sacrifice on the part of the donor. It is an act of self-giving because, as we have seen, the organ is part of the human body, and the human body cannot be separated from the human self. Giving therefore is a beautiful expression of the donor’s response to the divine call to love another as we love ourselves. In this way, the donor who gives away his or her organ sacrifices himself or herself for another. He or she is willing to put himself or herself at risk in order to save the life of another human being, without expecting any rewards.
| 5,016 |
<h4><strong>Organ sales commodify the body and destroy the value to life justifying things like slavery, only altruistic solutions solve</h4><p>Chia 8’</strong> (Roland, Chew Hock Hin Professor of Christian Doctrine at Trinity Theological College in Singapore, “Organ Trading: A Christian Perspective”, http://www.gcf.org.sg/resources/organ-trading-a-christian-perspective)</p><p>The problem of commodification We now come to the heart of the objection to the trading of human organs. <u><mark>To allow the sale and purchase of human organs is to reduce these human body parts into mere commodities, like other commodities transacted commercially</u></mark>. Based on what I have said about the profound relationship between the person and his or her body<u>, the trading of human organs would result in the commodification of human beings. <mark>To commodify human beings is to fail to accord him or her with proper respect and dignity</u>. <u>To commodify something is to exchange it for money, to treat it as a property that can be bought or sold.</u> <u>To commodify a human being is to treat a being of profound dignity and worth as a mere object to which a price tag can be arbitrarily attached</u></mark>. Donna Dickenson explains the implications of this clearly in her book, Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood<u>: What is <mark>wrong is making a saleable object out of something that should be treated as having value in itself</mark>, irrespective of what use might be made of it.</u> Because people have value in themselves, parts of people, you might think, would be particularly problematic<u>. If it’s wrong to make people into objects or things – as slavery does – and if the body is the person, then is it wrong to trade in bodies and their parts? The answer, of course, is “Yes”.</u> According to this view<u>, <mark>to pay a person for his kidney is already to violate his dignity and exploit his personhood, regardless of how handsomely he is paid</mark> for the organ. </u>Thus, <u><mark>exploitation does not only occur when the poor are poorly paid for their organs because of unscrupulous middlemen in the black market for human organs. It occurs whenever money is offered – however large or small the amount – as payment for a human organ</mark>. </u>As Leon Kass, the <u>former Chairman of the US President’s Council on Bioethics has put it</u> so provocatively<u>: We surpass all defensible limits of such conventional commodification when we contemplate making the convention-maker – the human being – just another one of the commensurable<mark>. The end comes to be treated merely as a means. Selling our bodies, we come perilously close to selling out our souls</mark>.</u> There is even a danger in contemplating such a prospect – for if we come to think about ourselves like pork bellies, pork bellies we will become. Conventional wisdom tells us that some things are simply not for sale. There is, of course, nothing wrong with commerce. In fact, commerce has brought about human flourishing. But this is true only when human life itself is not turned into a commodity. As the Lutheran ethicist, Gilbert Meilaender has so perceptively pointed out, “<u>if we allow ourselves to suppose that [money] is a universal medium of exchange, we are bound to lose our moral bearings”. Society recognises this very well. That is why most societies respond to slavery and prostitution with revulsion. And that is why society recognises that the public offices, the criminal justice system and human beings are not for sale. To this list, we must add the human body and its parts.</u> The French National Ethics Committee makes this point emphatically when it states that it categorically “does not accept that the human body should be used for commercial purposes”. Selling and donating <mark>s<u>elling our organs for financial gain is profoundly different from giving or donating our organs for the good of the recipients without expecting any rewards.</mark> </u>The relationship that we foster in a business transaction is very different from other relationships<u>. <mark>The business transaction is based on demand and supply,</mark> but it is not just a matter of supplying something in order to meet a demand. <mark>When I sell somethin</mark>g that you need to you, my motivation is not merely to enable you to meet that need. <mark>My motivation is also to meet my need.</mark> Thus, I am only willing to meet your need if in return, my need will be met. If my need is not met, I will not take steps to meet your need.</u> Although a commercial transaction may be many things, <u>it is always a quid pro quo relationship. <mark>A business transaction, strictly speaking, can never be seen as an expression of unconditional or self-sacrificial love. Giving or donating one’s organ is very different</mark>. In donating his or her organ, the donor is performing an act of profound nobility</u>. Donating one’s organ without reward in order to help a fellow human being – whether related to the donor or a stranger – <u>is an act of genuine love and sacrifice on the part of the donor. It is an act of self-giving because, as we have seen, the organ is part of the human body, and the human body cannot be separated from the human self.</u> Giving therefore is a beautiful expression of the donor’s response to the divine call to love another as we love ourselves. In this way, the donor who gives away his or her organ sacrifices himself or herself for another. <u>He or she is willing to put himself or herself at risk in order to save the life of another human being, without expecting any rewards</u>.</p>
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Neg vs Rutgers wm
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1nc
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Commodification 1NC
| 430,852 | 1 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
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Hubervermont
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6
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Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
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Merkle
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1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,858 |
antibiotic-resistance risks extinction
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MacKenzie 13
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MacKenzie 13 Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html
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ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas.
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ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some area
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ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas. What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles.
| 664 |
<h4>antibiotic-resistance risks extinction</h4><p><strong>MacKenzie 13</strong> Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html </p><p><u><mark>ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria</u></mark>" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, <u><mark>our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some area</mark>s.</u><strong> What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles. </p></strong>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,319 | 6 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
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Kentucky
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2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
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Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,859 |
The federal government established the organ transplant system and contracts with non-governmental organizations to operate it.
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Schwark 11
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Schwark 11 DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis
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In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act NOTA established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operates in the U S NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of H H to provide for the establishment and operation of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network which oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country. Some of the OPTN's other duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs; maintaining a national system to match people on the waiting list with available organs; establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system; and coordinating for the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations to transplant centers Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing to administer the OPTN HHS") contracted with UNOS in 1986 and has renewed the contract four times.
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In 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operate the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ther duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs n66 maintaining a national system to match people establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing to administer the OPT
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The National Organ Transplantation Act In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act amid fears of a commercial market in kidneys. n58 Congress also hoped the legislation would alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. n59 NOTA is an important piece of transplant legislation for several reasons. First, it firmly rejected the idea of an organ market by forbidding the sale of human organs in interstate commerce. n60 Lawmakers were worried that a market system would prey upon the poor as a source for organs. n61 Another important part of NOTA was the creation of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation ("Task Force"), which was charged with "conduct[ing] comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation." n62 The Task Force recommended that hospitals "adopt routine inquiry/required request policies and procedures for identifying potential organ and tissue donors and for providing next-of-kin with appropriate opportunities for donation." n63 Congress adopted the [*331] recommendation, and as a result, hospitals can forfeit Medicaid and Medicare funding if they fail to establish "written protocols for the identification of potential organ donors." n64 NOTA also established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operates in the United States. NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to provide for the establishment and operation of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), which oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country. n65 Some of the OPTN's other duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs; n66 maintaining a national system to match people on the waiting list with available organs; n67 establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system; n68 working actively on ways to "increase the supply of organs;" n69 and coordinating for the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations ("OPOs") to transplant centers. n70 NOTA allows the Secretary to make grants for the planning of qualified OPOs. n71 The duties of the OPOs include arranging the acquisition and preservation of all donated organs, identifying potential donors, providing or arranging for the [*332] transportation of donated organs to transplant centers that participate in the OPTN, and determining the quality standards for the acquisition of organs. n72 The nation is divided into sixty-three areas composed of eleven regions under the current system, with huge disparities in waiting times from region to region. n73 In 2006 alone, 7,191 candidates died while waiting for an organ. n74 This figure demonstrates that almost twenty people on the national waiting list die each day while waiting for an organ. Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), an existing central registry of potential kidney recipients, to administer the OPTN. n75 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") contracted with UNOS in 1986 and has renewed the contract four times. n76 In 1998, the HHS released what it called the "Final Rule," which established that "human organs donated for transplantation are a public trust." n77 The Final Rule's stated purpose is "encouraging organ donation; developing an organ allocation system that functions as much as technologically feasible on a nationwide basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of the OPTN . . . and, providing better information about transplantation to patients, families and health care providers." n78 The three main performance goals of the Final Rule are "objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant centers" to ensure that patients within similar states of illness are listed at the same time; standardized "medical status" categories to group transplant candidates by medical urgency; and allocation policies that ensure equitable "organ distribution to those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound medical judgment," without regard to their geographic location. n79 Though these goals appear noble, they have unfortunately been unable to cure the most pressing issue - a lack of transplantable organs.
| 4,327 |
<h4>The federal government established the organ transplant system and contracts with non-governmental organizations to operate it.</h4><p><strong>Schwark 11</strong> DAVID SCHWARK, J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Journal of Law and Health 2011 24 J.L. & Health 323 NOTE: ORGAN CONSCRIPTION: HOW THE DEAD CAN SAVE THE LIVING lexis</p><p>The National Organ Transplantation Act <u><mark>In 1984</mark>, Congress passed the <mark>National Organ Transplantation Act</u></mark> amid fears of a commercial market in kidneys. n58 Congress also hoped the legislation would alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. n59 NOTA is an important piece of transplant legislation for several reasons. First, it firmly rejected the idea of an organ market by forbidding the sale of human organs in interstate commerce. n60 Lawmakers were worried that a market system would prey upon the poor as a source for organs. n61 Another important part of NOTA was the creation of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation ("Task Force"), which was charged with "conduct[ing] comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation." n62 The Task Force recommended that hospitals "adopt routine inquiry/required request policies and procedures for identifying potential organ and tissue donors and for providing next-of-kin with appropriate opportunities for donation." n63 Congress adopted the [*331] recommendation, and as a result, hospitals can forfeit Medicaid and Medicare funding if they fail to establish "written protocols for the identification of potential organ donors." n64 <u>NOTA</u> also <u><mark>established the system of organ procurement and distribution that currently operate</mark>s in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of</u> the Department of <u>H</u>ealth and <u>H</u>uman <strong>S</strong>ervices <u>to provide for the establishment and operation of <mark>the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network</mark> </u>("OPTN"), <u>which oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country.</u> n65 <u>Some of the OPTN's o<mark>ther duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need organs</mark>;</u> <mark>n66 <u>maintaining a national system to match people</mark> on the waiting list with available organs;</u> n67 <u><mark>establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system</mark>; </u>n68 working actively on ways to "increase the supply of organs;" n69 <u>and coordinating for the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations </u>("OPOs") <u>to transplant centers</u>. n70 NOTA allows the Secretary to make grants for the planning of qualified OPOs. n71 The duties of the OPOs include arranging the acquisition and preservation of all donated organs, identifying potential donors, providing or arranging for the [*332] transportation of donated organs to transplant centers that participate in the OPTN, and determining the quality standards for the acquisition of organs. n72 The nation is divided into sixty-three areas composed of eleven regions under the current system, with huge disparities in waiting times from region to region. n73 In 2006 alone, 7,191 candidates died while waiting for an organ. n74 This figure demonstrates that almost twenty people on the national waiting list die each day while waiting for an organ. <u><mark>Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing</u></mark> ("UNOS"), an existing central registry of potential kidney recipients, <u><mark>to administer the OPT</mark>N</u>. n75 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("<u>HHS") contracted with UNOS in 1986 and has renewed the contract four times.</u> n76 In 1998, the HHS released what it called the "Final Rule," which established that "human organs donated for transplantation are a public trust." n77 The Final Rule's stated purpose is "encouraging organ donation; developing an organ allocation system that functions as much as technologically feasible on a nationwide basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of the OPTN . . . and, providing better information about transplantation to patients, families and health care providers." n78 The three main performance goals of the Final Rule are "objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant centers" to ensure that patients within similar states of illness are listed at the same time; standardized "medical status" categories to group transplant candidates by medical urgency; and allocation policies that ensure equitable "organ distribution to those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound medical judgment," without regard to their geographic location. n79 Though these goals appear noble, they have unfortunately been unable to cure the most pressing issue - a lack of transplantable organs.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,853 | 2 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,860 |
While more could be done, this system has saved hundreds of thousands of lives
|
Fry-Revere 14
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Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
|
We face an organ shortage because modern medicine makes it possible to transplant organs meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life. Until the 1950s, little could be done to save damaged organs. if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later.
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transplant organs meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 3
When we say “organ shortage,” we must be clear that this is one of those problems we would have wished for half a century ago. We face an organ shortage because modern medicine makes it possible to transplant organs from one human body to another, meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life. Until the 1950s, little could be done to save damaged organs. If diseases were caught early enough, potential deterioration could be slowed or curtailed by treating the underlying illness, but if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later. The one exception was kidneys. Because dialysis machines simulate, to some extent, the work of kidneys by filtering the blood, death could be forestalled for a few years, but not indefinitely Even now, the average lifespan on dialysis in the United States is only four years. Also, by most accounts, life on dialysis is not much of a life at all. The majority of dialysis patients leave their jobs within a few months of starting dialysis. Fewer than 10 percent of patients are still employed after six months on dialysis. They are too tired, too weak, too stiff, have too many medical appointments, and have to spend too much time watching their diets and getting dialyzed (usually three times a week, for three to four hours each session).'
| 1,453 |
<h4>While more could be done, this system has saved hundreds of thousands of lives</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 3</p><p>When we say “organ shortage,” we must be clear that this is one of those problems we would have wished for half a century ago. <u>We face an organ shortage because modern medicine makes it possible to <mark>transplant organs</mark> </u>from one human body to another,<u> <mark>meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life</mark>.</u> <u>Until the 1950s, little could be done to save damaged organs. </u>If diseases were caught early enough, potential deterioration could be slowed or curtailed by treating the underlying illness, but<u> <mark>if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later</mark>. </u>The one exception was kidneys. Because dialysis machines simulate, to some extent, the work of kidneys by filtering the blood, death could be forestalled for a few years, but not indefinitely Even now, the average lifespan on dialysis in the United States is only four years. Also, by most accounts, life on dialysis is not much of a life at all. The majority of dialysis patients leave their jobs within a few months of starting dialysis. Fewer than 10 percent of patients are still employed after six months on dialysis. They are too tired, too weak, too stiff, have too many medical appointments, and have to spend too much time watching their diets and getting dialyzed (usually three times a week, for three to four hours each session).'</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,854 | 2 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
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Cedanats
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1
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Emporia State Perretta-Turley
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Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,861 |
The aff causes exploitation of the poor – increasing disease spread and theft of disproportionately poor donors– Iran proves. Also, US legalized exploitation would spill over internationally
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Jha and Chugh, ‘6
|
Jha and Chugh, ‘6 [Vivekanand and Kirpal, National Kidney Clinic and Research Centre in India, “The case against a regulated system of living kidney sales”, Nature Clinical Practice Nephrology (2006) 2, 466-467] structural violence= institutionalized policies that hurt a group from getting its basic needs and rights *increases disease spread *increases theft
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The arguments supporting organ sale need to be examined carefully it is imperative that we recognize the immorality of allowing people to do serious damage to themselves for the sole purpose of making money individuals who have already sold a kidney have expressed their willingness to donate a second one and take the risk of living on dialysis Unacceptably high recipient mortality and transmission of infections, including HIV and hepatitis, have been consistently reported following transplantation of purchased kidneys. Some reports from Iran have claimed success rates equivalent to living related donor transplantations;5 however, these have been published only in review papers, and the data not rigorously peer-reviewed There are few data to show that the financial compensation received by organ donors in developing countries has helped improve their lives It is common knowledge that donors are underpaid, and that their postoperative medical care is absent or suboptimal Reports in the lay press have documented high rates of donor mortality and morbidity Interviews with over 300 kidney sellers near Chennai, India6 revealed that about 75% of participants whose motive for selling the kidney was payment of debts continued to be in debt and almost 90% reported significant deterioration in their health after donation Zargooshi7 documented widespread practice of extralegal financial transactions, coercion and blackmail between donors and recipients in Iran, where financial reward through an independent agency is legal independent observations have supported his findings financial compensation for kidney donors in most places has been arbitrary, subject to bargaining between the donor and the middleman and dependent on the donor's level of awareness about the value of a kidney the argument of allotting the purchased kidney only on medical grounds in an open market economy stands on thin ice Enforcement of current transplantation legislation is uneven in many countries There have been allegations of active collusion of transplant surgeons, nephrologists and members of the regulatory bodies in facilitating commercial transplantations, often with the help of forged documents, and the failure of the law in preventing this activity is well-documented there is a strong suspicion that financial gain is the main motivation It is hard to imagine that in societies where there is a combination of desperate individuals, greedy and unscrupulous facilitators and poorly developed justice systems, transplantation would remain untouched by all-pervasive corruption Schemes for setting up government-funded and regulated paid kidney donation programs that give equal opportunity to rich and poor people, and guarantee health care to the donors, have been proposed Getting such programs to work, however, would be a major challenge Once the initial rush of domestic donors is exhausted, the globalization of organ trade, whereby donors would come in large numbers from the developing world to supply organs to the industrialized world, is inevitable The acceptance of even a limited domestic organ market in the advanced nations will act as the proverbial thin end of the wedge and encourage adoption of commercial donation in the developing world. This view was endorsed by the National Kidney Foundation in a testimony to the US Congress where Dr Francis Delmonico argued that "...a US congressional endorsement for payment would propel other countries to sanction unethical and unjust standards...". When cheap organs are available, people often opt to buy one rather than subject a loved one to the risk of donation The arguments supporting a regulated organ market are extremely simplistic, and ignore the ground realities Allowing such an activity in any corner of the world would open the doors for rampant exploitation of the underprivileged in areas that are already plagued by vast economic inequalities
|
it is imperative that we recognize the immorality of allowing people to do serious damage to themselves for the sole purpose of making money Unacceptably high recipient mortality and transmission of infections, including HIV and hepatitis, have been consistently reported following transplantation of purchased kidneys Some reports from Iran have claimed success however, these have been published only in review papers, and the data not rigorously peer-reviewed. It is common knowledge that donors are underpaid, and that their postoperative medical care is absent or suboptimal. Reports in the lay press have documented high rates of donor mortality and morbidity kidney sellers 90% reported significant deterioration in their health after donation Zargooshi documented widespread practice of extralegal financial transactions, coercion and blackmail between donors and recipients in Iran independent observations have supported his findings Schemes that give equal opportunity to rich and poor people would be a major challenge. the globalization of organ trade, whereby donors would come in large numbers from the developing world to supply organs to the industrialized world, is inevitable. The acceptance of even a limited domestic organ market encourage adoption of commercial donation in the developing world
|
The arguments supporting organ sale need to be examined carefully. The differences between the sale of irreplaceable organs and that of essentially renewable tissues such as blood or sperm must be appreciated. Removal of a kidney involves major surgery under anesthetic, which is far more invasive than obtaining any of the aforementioned tissues. Furthermore, it is imperative that we recognize the immorality of allowing people to do serious damage to themselves for the sole purpose of making money. In some instances, individuals who have already sold a kidney have expressed their willingness to donate a second one and take the risk of living on dialysis.1 Unacceptably high recipient mortality and transmission of infections, including HIV and hepatitis, have been consistently reported following transplantation of purchased kidneys.2, 3, 4 There is, however, a remarkable paucity of outcome data from such transplantations. Some reports from Iran have claimed success rates equivalent to living related donor transplantations;5 however, these have been published only in review papers, and the data not rigorously peer-reviewed. There are few data to show that the financial compensation received by organ donors in developing countries has helped improve their lives. It is common knowledge that donors are underpaid, and that their postoperative medical care is absent or suboptimal. Reports in the lay press have documented high rates of donor mortality and morbidity. Interviews with over 300 kidney sellers near Chennai, India6 revealed that about 75% of participants whose motive for selling the kidney was payment of debts continued to be in debt and almost 90% reported significant deterioration in their health after donation. Zargooshi7 documented widespread practice of extralegal financial transactions, coercion and blackmail between donors and recipients in Iran, where financial reward through an independent agency is legal. Although others dispute Zargooshi's observations, independent observations have supported his findings.8 So far, financial compensation for kidney donors in most places has been arbitrary, subject to bargaining between the donor and the middleman and dependent on the donor's level of awareness about the value of a kidney. Accurate figures are not available, but in South Asian countries it is estimated that of US$2,000–2,500 paid by the recipient for a kidney, only about $1,000–1,200 reaches the donor. US estimates of appropriate purchase price of a kidney vary from $45,000 to $90,000.9,10 Once money enters the equation, the argument of allotting the purchased kidney only on medical grounds in an open market economy stands on thin ice. Why should a desperate recipient willing to pay the price not be allowed to go to the top of the waiting list, or the degree of 'matching' between the donor and the recipient not decide the price? Why should the price not be decided at auction so that the seller gets the highest value for an asset that he or she can sell but once? Enforcement of current transplantation legislation is uneven in many countries. The presence of illegal middlemen or brokers is not doubted.8 There have been allegations of active collusion of transplant surgeons, nephrologists and members of the regulatory bodies in facilitating commercial transplantations, often with the help of forged documents, and the failure of the law in preventing this activity is well-documented.11, 12 A charitable view could be that these transplantations are performed out of a sense of pity for the recipients; however, there is a strong suspicion that financial gain is the main motivation. It is hard to imagine that in societies where there is a combination of desperate individuals, greedy and unscrupulous facilitators and poorly developed justice systems, transplantation would remain untouched by all-pervasive corruption. Schemes for setting up government-funded and regulated paid kidney donation programs that give equal opportunity to rich and poor people, and guarantee health care to the donors, have been proposed. Getting such programs to work, however, would be a major challenge. Even the proponents of regulated sales concede that such models can apply only to Western countries that have well-established systems of implementation and monitoring to ensure fair and equitable distribution through existing domestic networks. Inherent in such schemes is the assumption that strict geographical containment is possible. Once the initial rush of domestic donors is exhausted, the globalization of organ trade, whereby donors would come in large numbers from the developing world to supply organs to the industrialized world, is inevitable. The acceptance of even a limited domestic organ market in the advanced nations will act as the proverbial thin end of the wedge and encourage adoption of commercial donation in the developing world. This view was endorsed by the National Kidney Foundation in a testimony to the US Congress where Dr Francis Delmonico argued that "...a US congressional endorsement for payment would propel other countries to sanction unethical and unjust standards...". Paid transplantations negatively affect living related and cadaveric transplantation in developing countries.13 When cheap organs are available, people often opt to buy one rather than subject a loved one to the risk of donation. There are other strategies apart from organ sales that can increase donation rates, such as public awareness campaigns, a 'presumed consent' law, use of marginal donors and performing ABO-incompatible or paired-exchange transplantations. An element of reciprocity could also be injected into the system, so that—for example—people can choose to donate organs only to those who have in turn indicated their willingness for the same. The arguments supporting a regulated organ market are extremely simplistic, and ignore the ground realities. Allowing such an activity in any corner of the world would open the doors for rampant exploitation of the underprivileged in areas that are already plagued by vast economic inequalities. It is important that the transplant community approaches this issue with a sense of responsibility towards society that is equal to the compassion it shows towards its patients.
| 6,304 |
<h4>The aff causes exploitation of the poor – increasing disease spread and theft of disproportionately poor donors– Iran proves. Also, US legalized exploitation would spill over internationally</h4><p><strong>Jha and Chugh, ‘6</strong> [Vivekanand and Kirpal, National Kidney Clinic and Research Centre in India, “The case against a regulated system of living kidney sales”, Nature Clinical Practice Nephrology (2006) 2, 466-467] structural violence= institutionalized policies that hurt a group from getting its basic needs and rights *increases disease spread *increases theft</p><p><u>The arguments supporting organ sale need to be examined carefully</u>. The differences between the sale of irreplaceable organs and that of essentially renewable tissues such as blood or sperm must be appreciated. Removal of a kidney involves major surgery under anesthetic, which is far more invasive than obtaining any of the aforementioned tissues. Furthermore, <u><mark>it is imperative that we recognize the immorality of allowing people to do <strong>serious damage</strong> to themselves for the sole purpose of making money</u></mark>. In some instances, <u>individuals who have already sold a kidney have expressed their willingness to donate a second one and take the risk of living on dialysis</u>.1 <u><mark>Unacceptably high recipient mortality and transmission of infections, including HIV and hepatitis, have been <strong>consistently reported</strong> following transplantation of purchased kidneys</mark>.</u>2, 3, 4 There is, however, a remarkable paucity of outcome data from such transplantations. <u><mark>Some reports from Iran have claimed success</mark> rates equivalent to living related donor transplantations;5 <mark>however, <strong>these have been published only in review papers, and the data not rigorously peer-reviewed</u></strong>.</mark> <u>There are few data to show that the financial compensation received by organ donors in developing countries has helped improve their lives</u>. <u><mark>It is common knowledge that <strong>donors are underpaid</strong>, and that their postoperative medical care is <strong>absent or suboptimal</u></strong>. <u>Reports in the lay press have documented <strong>high rates of donor mortality</strong> and morbidity</u></mark>. <u>Interviews with over 300 <mark>kidney sellers</mark> near Chennai, India6 revealed that about 75% of participants whose motive for selling the kidney was payment of debts continued to be in debt and almost <strong><mark>90%</strong> reported significant deterioration in their health after donation</u></mark>. <u><mark>Zargooshi</mark>7 <mark>documented widespread practice of extralegal financial transactions, <strong>coercion and blackmail</strong> between donors and recipients in Iran</mark>, where financial reward through an independent agency is legal</u>. Although others dispute Zargooshi's observations, <u><strong><mark>independent observations have supported his findings</u></strong></mark>.8 So far, <u>financial compensation for kidney donors in most places has been <strong>arbitrary</strong>, subject to bargaining between the donor and the middleman and dependent on the donor's level of awareness about the value of a kidney</u>. Accurate figures are not available, but in South Asian countries it is estimated that of US$2,000–2,500 paid by the recipient for a kidney, only about $1,000–1,200 reaches the donor. US estimates of appropriate purchase price of a kidney vary from $45,000 to $90,000.9,10 Once money enters the equation, <u>the argument of allotting the purchased kidney only on medical grounds in an open market economy stands on thin ice</u>. Why should a desperate recipient willing to pay the price not be allowed to go to the top of the waiting list, or the degree of 'matching' between the donor and the recipient not decide the price? Why should the price not be decided at auction so that the seller gets the highest value for an asset that he or she can sell but once? <u>Enforcement of current transplantation legislation is <strong>uneven</strong> in many countries</u>. The presence of illegal middlemen or brokers is not doubted.8 <u>There have been allegations of <strong>active collusion</strong> of transplant surgeons, nephrologists and members of the regulatory bodies in facilitating commercial transplantations, often with the help of forged documents, and the failure of the law in preventing this activity is <strong>well-documented</u></strong>.11, 12 A charitable view could be that these transplantations are performed out of a sense of pity for the recipients; however, <u>there is a strong suspicion that financial gain is the <strong>main motivation</u></strong>. <u>It is hard to imagine that in societies where there is a combination of desperate individuals, greedy and unscrupulous facilitators and poorly developed justice systems, transplantation would remain untouched by all-pervasive corruption</u>. <u><mark>Schemes </mark>for setting up government-funded and regulated paid kidney donation programs <mark>that give equal opportunity to rich and poor people</mark>, and guarantee health care to the donors, have been proposed</u>. <u>Getting such programs to work, however, <mark>would be a <strong>major challenge</u></strong>.</mark> Even the proponents of regulated sales concede that such models can apply only to Western countries that have well-established systems of implementation and monitoring to ensure fair and equitable distribution through existing domestic networks. Inherent in such schemes is the assumption that strict geographical containment is possible. <u>Once the initial rush of domestic donors is exhausted, <mark>the globalization of organ trade, whereby donors would come in large numbers from the developing world to supply organs to the industrialized world, is inevitable</u>. <u>The acceptance of even a limited domestic organ market</mark> in the advanced nations will act as the proverbial thin end of the wedge and <strong><mark>encourage adoption of commercial donation in the developing world</strong></mark>. This view was endorsed by the National Kidney Foundation in a testimony to the US Congress where Dr Francis Delmonico argued that "...a US congressional endorsement for payment would propel other countries to sanction unethical and unjust standards...".</u> Paid transplantations negatively affect living related and cadaveric transplantation in developing countries.13 <u>When cheap organs are available, people often opt to buy one rather than subject a loved one to the risk of donation</u>. There are other strategies apart from organ sales that can increase donation rates, such as public awareness campaigns, a 'presumed consent' law, use of marginal donors and performing ABO-incompatible or paired-exchange transplantations. An element of reciprocity could also be injected into the system, so that—for example—people can choose to donate organs only to those who have in turn indicated their willingness for the same. <u>The arguments supporting a regulated organ market are extremely <strong>simplistic</strong>, and ignore the ground realities</u>. <u>Allowing such an activity in any corner of the world would open the doors for rampant exploitation of the underprivileged in areas that are already plagued by vast economic inequalities</u>. It is important that the transplant community approaches this issue with a sense of responsibility towards society that is equal to the compassion it shows towards its patients.</p>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
1nc
|
Commodification 1NC
| 430,855 | 11 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,862 |
Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious—specifically causes tropical disease
|
Franco-Paredes 10
|
Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045
|
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
|
transplantation being performed resulting in an increase in number of immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts The reasons for the growing number include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
|
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
| 1,559 |
<h4><strong>Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious—specifically causes tropical disease </h4><p>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u>More <mark>transplantation </mark>procedures are <mark>being performed</mark> annually, <mark>resulting in an increase</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>number of immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been</mark> <mark>a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts</mark> in endemic and non-endemic settings</u>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The</mark> epidemiologic <mark>reasons for the</mark> <mark>growing number</mark> of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u></mark>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,431 | 5 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,863 |
Dehumanization outweighs death
|
Hayden 10
|
Hayden 10—Patrick Hayden, International Relations @ Univ. of St. Andrews, "The Relevance of Hannah Arendt's Reflections on Evil: Globalization and Rightslessness," Human Rights Review, Vol. 11(4), p. 451, February 2010, gender paraphrased
|
killing is far from the worst that [hu]man can inflict on [hu]man” evils that can be visited upon human beings involve not only murder but more significantly the widespread and thoughtless treatment of certain persons “as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead” Killing people is not the primary issue; generating and perpetuating human superfluousness as a normal condition of the socio-political order is. the meaning of this atrocity is located in the experiential space opened up between the actual killing itself and the preparatory dehumanization carried out independently More than murder itself the deprivation of human status that excludes superfluous persons from a common world is the most terrifying possibility we can now too easily imagine superfluity destroys the fact of existence
|
evils upon human beings involve the widespread and thoughtless treatment of persons “as if they no longer existed, as if what happened were no longer of interest as if they were already dead atrocity is the space between killing and the preparatory dehumanization the deprivation of human status that excludes persons is the most terrifying possibility superfluity destroys the fact of existence
|
Arendt was drawn to formulate the notion of human superfluous-ness by the “chain of catastrophes touched off by the First World War” culminating “in the actual event of totalitarian domination” (1968a, 27). However, the novelty introduced by “the structure and conditions of the twentieth century,” which Arendt insists constitute the “horizon of experience” for the world after the Final Solution, is that “killing is far from the worst that [hu]man can inflict on [hu]man” (1968a, 127). The evils that can be visited upon human beings involve not only murder but more significantly the widespread and thoughtless treatment of certain persons “as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead” (2004, 574). Killing people is not the primary issue; generating and perpetuating human superfluousness as a normal condition of the socio-political order is. To forestall any misunderstanding, Arendt is not suggesting that the mass killing of human beings carried out by the Nazi (or any other) genocide is not evil. What she is suggesting, however, is that the meaning of this atrocity is located in the experiential space opened up between the actual killing itself and the preparatory dehumanization carried out independently of it. How can we make sense of the moral and political distinction between murder on the one hand and exclusion from humanity on the other? More than murder itself, which Arendt regards as “a limited evil” (2004, 570), the deprivation of human status that excludes superfluous persons from a common world is the most terrifying possibility we can now too easily imagine. Whereas murder destroys a life, superfluity destroys reality, “the fact of existence itself” (2004, 571).
| 1,783 |
<h4>Dehumanization outweighs death</h4><p><strong>Hayden 10</strong>—Patrick Hayden, International Relations @ Univ. of St. Andrews, "The Relevance of Hannah Arendt's Reflections on Evil: Globalization and Rightslessness," Human Rights Review, Vol. 11(4), p. 451, February 2010, gender paraphrased</p><p>Arendt was drawn to formulate the notion of human superfluous-ness by the “chain of catastrophes touched off by the First World War” culminating “in the actual event of totalitarian domination” (1968a, 27). However, the novelty introduced by “the structure and conditions of the twentieth century,” which Arendt insists constitute the “horizon of experience” for the world after the Final Solution, is that “<u><strong>killing is far from the worst</strong> that [hu]man can inflict on [hu]man”</u> (1968a, 127). The <u><mark>evils</mark> that can be visited <mark>upon human beings involve</mark> not only murder but more significantly <mark>the <strong>widespread and thoughtless treatment</strong> of</mark> certain <mark>persons “<strong>as if they no longer existed</strong>, as if what happened </mark>to them <mark>were <strong>no longer of </strong></mark>any<mark> <strong>interest </strong></mark>to anybody, <mark>as if they were <strong>already dead</strong></mark>”</u> (2004, 574). <u>Killing people is not the primary issue; generating and perpetuating human superfluousness as a normal condition of the socio-political order is.</u> To forestall any misunderstanding, Arendt is not suggesting that the mass killing of human beings carried out by the Nazi (or any other) genocide is not evil. What she is suggesting, however, is that <u>the meaning of this <mark>atrocity is </mark>located in <mark>the</mark> experiential <mark>space</mark> opened up <mark>between</mark> the actual <mark>killing </mark>itself <mark>and the preparatory dehumanization </mark>carried out independently</u> of it. How can we make sense of the moral and political distinction between murder on the one hand and exclusion from humanity on the other? <u>More than murder itself</u>, which Arendt regards as “a limited evil” (2004, 570), <u><mark>the deprivation of human status that excludes </mark>superfluous <mark>persons </mark>from a common world <mark>is the <strong>most terrifying possibility</strong> </mark>we can now too easily imagine</u>. Whereas murder destroys a life, <u><mark>superfluity destroys</u> </mark>reality, “<u><mark>the fact of existence</u> </mark>itself” (2004, 571).</p>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
1nc
|
Commodification 1NC
| 430,856 | 1 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,864 |
Many more are denied the benefits of this system. The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage of organs for transplant
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
|
many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>Many more are denied the benefits of this system. The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage of organs for transplant</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,865 |
Tropical disease are uniquely likely to spread globally—they’re resistant to immunization
|
Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)
|
Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)
|
the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to prevent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as West Nile , in addition to reemerging diseases the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of deat infectious diseases is of crucial importance to humankind.
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despite progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival Despite advances in medicine the human species still faces serious health problems Among those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as West Nile in addition to reemerging diseases the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death infectious diseases is of crucial importance to humankind.
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Abstract In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to prevent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.
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<h4>Tropical disease are uniquely likely to spread globally—they’re resistant to immunization</h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13<u> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)</p><p></u></strong>Abstract In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since <u>the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive</u>, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, <u><mark>despite</mark> considerable <mark>progress, infectious diseases remain a</mark> <mark>strong challenge to human survival</mark>. </u>Introduction <u><mark>Despite</mark> the great <mark>advances in medicine</mark>, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to prevent diseases, <mark>the</mark> <mark>human species still faces serious health problems</mark>. <mark>Among</mark> these problems, <mark>those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions</u>. <u>An important</mark> feature <mark>of infectious disease is its <strong>potential to arise globally</strong></mark>,</u> as <u><mark>exemplified by known</mark> <mark>devastating past and present pandemics</mark> such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)</u>, in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, <u>other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems</u>, <u>as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). </u>This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. <u>In recent years, <mark>new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important</u></mark> to medical and scientific communities; <u>these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. <mark>With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as</u></mark> SARS, <u><mark>West</mark> <mark>Nile</mark> </u>and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses<u>, <mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</u></mark> like dengue fever, <u><strong><mark>the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded</u></strong></mark> [5]. <u>Moreover, in <mark>the<strong> tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of deat</u>h</mark>.</strong> Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat <u><mark>infectious diseases is of crucial importance</mark> </u>not only to the medical community, but also <u><strong><mark>to humankind.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Contention 2 is illegal markets
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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The courts have denied property rights to body parts because it’s illegal to sell organs, the aff necessarily reverses this and causes a recognition of property rights
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Thompson 13 , lexis)
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Thompson 13 (THE EGGSPLOITATION OF THE UNITED STATES' ORGAN AND EGG DONATION SYSTEMS, Janelle E. Thompson Valparaiso University Law Review Fall, 2013 Valparaiso University Law Review 48 Val. U.L. Rev. 469, J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University Law School (2014); B.A., Political Science, Business, Elmhurst College (2011), lexis)
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State and federal jurisdictions have consistently rejected the argument that a person has an absolute property interest in a living or deceased human body Property is commonly referred to as a bundle of rights. This includes the right to possess, use, exclude, sell, and dispose of the property. Currently, the court system does not acknowledge an absolute property interest in the human body. Arguably, it is difficulty to recognize the body as property because there is not a general right to sell the human body or its subparts; thus, it lacks an essential quality of property The right to sell is so essential to a property interest that the lack of this attribute disqualifies the human body from classification as property ] Congress's decision to criminalize the sale of organs stripped a living person of the ability to claim a property interest in his bodily organs under the legal definition of the term Moore v. Regents of the University of California is a prime example of the judiciary's refusal to recognize the living body as property If courts recognized the human body as property, individuals could buy and sell organs
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HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n195" n195 Property is commonly referred to as a bundle of rights. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n196" n196 This includes the right to possess, use, exclude, sell, and dispose of the property. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n197" n197 Currently, the court system does not acknowledge an ] absolute property interest in the human body. Arguably, it is difficulty to recognize the body as property because there is not a general right to sell thus, it lacks an essential quality of property The right to sell is so essential to a property interest that the lack of this attribute disqualifies the human body from classification as propert Congress's decision to criminalize the sale of organs stripped a living person of the ability to claim a property interest in his bodily organs under the legal definition . If courts recognized the human body as property, individuals could buy and sell organs
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Although some courts recognize a quasi-property right in a decedent's remains and a privacy right in a living person's bodily organs, the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n193" n193 State and federal jurisdictions have consistently rejected the argument that a person has an absolute property interest in a living or deceased human body. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n194" n194 This Part considers the reasons most courts have failed to classify the human body as property in the fullest sense of the term. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n195" n195 Property is commonly referred to as a bundle of rights. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n196" n196 This includes the right to possess, use, exclude, sell, and dispose of the property. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n197" n197 Currently, the court system does not acknowledge an [*501] absolute property interest in the human body. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n198" n198 Arguably, it is difficulty to recognize the body as property because there is not a general right to sell the human body or its subparts; thus, it lacks an essential quality of property. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n199" n199 The right to sell is so essential to a property interest that the lack of this attribute disqualifies the human body from classification as property. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n200" n200 Justice Frankfurter stated that one of the distinguishing characteristics of property is that it is "capable of transfer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some equivalent." HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n201" n201 Through the organ procurement process, human organs and tissues are capable of transfer from owner to owner. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n202" n202 However, Congress established a system, under NOTA, that disallows the exchange for some equivalent. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n203" n203 Thus, [*502] Congress's decision to criminalize the sale of organs stripped a living person of the ability to claim a property interest in his bodily organs under the legal definition of the term. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n204" n204 Moore v. Regents of the University of California is a prime example of the judiciary's refusal to recognize the living body as property. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n205" n205 In Moore, the California Appellate Court properly identified a lack of public policy and statutory authority against realizing an absolute property interest in one's body. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n206" n206 However, the Supreme Court of California expressly denied the conversion of property claim, explaining that public policy implications balanced in favor of not allowing Moore to retain ownership rights in his own cells. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n207" n207 Undoubtedly, the court feared that the creation of such rights would discourage the exchange of biological materials and impede on the biotechnology industry. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n208" n208 Yet, it seems that the opposite result has since occurred, and the court's failure to recognize a property right in the human body instead has inhibited the exchange of human biological materials and contributed to the shortage of transplantable organs. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n209" n209 [*503] The Supreme Court of California failed to consider that recognizing the human body as property would allow for the implementation of a market system for organ donation and would enhance the supply of organs. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n210" n210 Arguably, "courts are likely to award property rights if to do so will enhance such trade." HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n211" n211 Yet, "[i]f . . . the allocation of property rights . . . hinder[s] trade in the good, the court is unlikely to award a property right." HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n212" n212 Recognizing a property interest in humanorgans would enhance the availability of organs. If courts recognized the human body as property, individuals could buy and sell organs
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<h4>The courts have denied property rights to body parts because it’s illegal to sell organs, the aff necessarily reverses this and causes a recognition of property rights </h4><p><strong>Thompson 13</strong> (THE EGGSPLOITATION OF THE UNITED STATES' ORGAN AND EGG DONATION SYSTEMS, Janelle E. Thompson Valparaiso University Law Review Fall, 2013 Valparaiso University Law Review 48 Val. U.L. Rev. 469, J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University Law School (2014); B.A., Political Science, Business, Elmhurst College (2011)<u><strong>, lexis)</p><p></u></strong>Although some courts recognize a quasi-property right in a decedent's remains and a privacy right in a living person's bodily organs, the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n193" n193 <u><strong>State and federal jurisdictions have consistently rejected the argument that a person has an absolute property interest in a living or deceased human body</u></strong>. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n194" n194 This Part considers the reasons most courts have failed to classify the human body as property in the fullest sense of the term. <mark> HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n195" n195 <u>Property is commonly referred to as a bundle of rights. </u> HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n196" n196<u> This includes the right to possess, use, exclude, sell, and dispose of the property. </u> HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n197" n197<u> Currently, the court system does not acknowledge an</u></mark> [*501<mark>] <u>absolute property interest in the human body.</u></mark> HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n198" n198 <u><mark>Arguably, <strong>it is difficulty to recognize the body as property because there is not a general right to sell</strong></mark> the human body or its subparts; <mark>thus, it lacks an essential quality of property</u></mark>. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n199" n199 <u><mark>The right to sell is so essential to a property interest that the lack of this attribute disqualifies the human body from classification as propert</mark>y</u>. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n200" n200 Justice Frankfurter stated that one of the distinguishing characteristics of property is that it is "capable of transfer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some equivalent." HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n201" n201 Through the organ procurement process, human organs and tissues are capable of transfer from owner to owner. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n202" n202 However, Congress established a system, under NOTA, that disallows the exchange for some equivalent. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n203" n203 Thus, [*502<u>] <strong><mark>Congress's decision to criminalize the sale of organs stripped a living person of the ability to claim a property interest in his bodily organs under the legal definition</strong></mark> of the term</u>. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n204" n204 <u>Moore v. Regents of the University of California is a prime example of the judiciary's refusal to recognize the living body as property</u>. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n205" n205 In Moore, the California Appellate Court properly identified a lack of public policy and statutory authority against realizing an absolute property interest in one's body. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n206" n206 However, the Supreme Court of California expressly denied the conversion of property claim, explaining that public policy implications balanced in favor of not allowing Moore to retain ownership rights in his own cells. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n207" n207 Undoubtedly, the court feared that the creation of such rights would discourage the exchange of biological materials and impede on the biotechnology industry. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n208" n208 Yet, it seems that the opposite result has since occurred, and the court's failure to recognize a property right in the human body instead has inhibited the exchange of human biological materials and contributed to the shortage of transplantable organs. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n209" n209 [*503] The Supreme Court of California failed to consider that recognizing the human body as property would allow for the implementation of a market system for organ donation and would enhance the supply of organs. HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n210" n210 Arguably, "courts are likely to award property rights if to do so will enhance such trade." HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n211" n211 Yet, "[i]f . . . the allocation of property rights . . . hinder[s] trade in the good, the court is unlikely to award a property right." HYPERLINK "http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.161206.05767865482&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T20623618145&parent=docview&rand=1411864199286&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n212" n212 Recognizing a property interest in humanorgans would enhance the availability of organs<mark>. <u><strong>If courts recognized the human body as property, individuals could buy and sell organs</mark> </p></u></strong>
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1NC Property Rights DA
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
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6
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Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,867 |
The shortage means many die and suffer
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die and suffer</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,868 |
Infectious disease spread causes extinction
|
Darling 12 (David, Astronomer, “9 Strange Ways the World Really Might End”, Seattle's Big Blog, 3-18, http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2012/03/18/9-strange-ways-the-world-really-might-end/?fb_xd_fragment, Washington State University)
|
Darling 12 (David, Astronomer, “9 Strange Ways the World Really Might End”, Seattle's Big Blog, 3-18, http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2012/03/18/9-strange-ways-the-world-really-might-end/?fb_xd_fragment, Washington State University)
|
Our body is in constant competition with a dizzying array of viruses, bacteria, and parasites these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic spee confronting our bodies with new dangers every year. HIV and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats to humanity Our soaring numbers, ubiquitous international travel, increased the risk of unstoppable pandemics arising from mutant viruses When the death toll gets high enough, it can disrupt the very fabric of society if a global pandemic were to strike today, health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope with the vast numbers of sick and succumbing people The result of so many deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security
|
viruses, bacteria, and parasites these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic spee HIV and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats ur soaring numbers international travel increased the risk of unstoppable pandemics if a global pandemic were to strike health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope with the vast numbers of sick deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security
|
Our body is in constant competition with a dizzying array of viruses, bacteria, and parasites, many of which treat us simply as a source of food or a vehicle for reproduction. What’s troubling is that these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic speed – the more so thanks to the burgeoning human population – confronting our bodies with new dangers every year. HIV, Ebola, bird flu, and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats to humanity that have surfaced over the past few decades. Our soaring numbers, ubiquitous international travel, and the increasing use of chemicals and biological agents without full knowledge of their consequences, have increased the risk of unstoppable pandemics arising from mutant viruses and their ilk. Bubonic plague, the Black Death, and the Spanish Flu are vivid examples from history of how microbial agents can decimate populations. But the consequences aren’t limited to a high body count. When the death toll gets high enough, it can disrupt the very fabric of society. According to U.S. government studies, if a global pandemic affecting at least half the world’s population were to strike today, health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope with the vast numbers of sick and succumbing people. The result of so many deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security of 21st century man. While an untreatable pandemic could strike suddenly and potentially bring civilization to its knees in weeks or months, degenerative diseases might do so over longer periods. The most common degenerative disease is cancer. Every second men and every third women in the western world will be diagnosed with this disease in their lifetime. Degeneration of our environment through the release of toxins and wastes, air pollution, and intake of unhealthy foods is making this problem worse. If cancer, or some other form of degenerative disease, were to become even more commonplace and strike before reproduction, or become infectious (as seen in the transmitted facial cancer of the Tasmanian Devil, a carnivorous marsupial in Australia) the very survival of our species could be threatened.
| 2,198 |
<h4>Infectious disease spread causes extinction </h4><p><strong>Darling 12<u> (David, Astronomer, “9 Strange Ways the World Really Might End”, Seattle's Big Blog, 3-18, http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2012/03/18/9-strange-ways-the-world-really-might-end/?fb_xd_fragment, Washington State University)</p><p></strong>Our body is in constant competition with a dizzying array of <mark>viruses, bacteria, and parasites</u></mark>, many of which treat us simply as a source of food or a vehicle for reproduction. What’s troubling is that <u><mark>these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic spee</u></mark>d – the more so thanks to the burgeoning human population – <u>confronting our bodies with new dangers every year.</u> <u><mark>HIV</u></mark>, Ebola, bird flu, <u><mark>and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats </mark>to humanity </u>that have surfaced over the past few decades. <u>O<mark>ur soaring numbers</mark>, ubiquitous <mark>international travel</mark>,</u> and the increasing use of chemicals and biological agents without full knowledge of their consequences, have <u><mark>increased the risk of <strong>unstoppable pandemics</strong> </mark>arising from mutant viruses</u> and their ilk. Bubonic plague, the Black Death, and the Spanish Flu are vivid examples from history of how microbial agents can decimate populations. But the consequences aren’t limited to a high body count. <u>When the death toll gets high enough, it can disrupt the very fabric of society</u>. According to U.S. government studies, <u><mark>if a global pandemic</u></mark> affecting<u> </u>at least half the world’s population <u><mark>were to strike</mark> today, <mark>health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope</u> <u>with the vast numbers of sick</mark> and succumbing people</u>. <u>The result of so many <mark>deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security</u></mark> of 21st century man. While an untreatable pandemic could strike suddenly and potentially bring civilization to its knees in weeks or months, degenerative diseases might do so over longer periods. The most common degenerative disease is cancer. Every second men and every third women in the western world will be diagnosed with this disease in their lifetime. Degeneration of our environment through the release of toxins and wastes, air pollution, and intake of unhealthy foods is making this problem worse. If cancer, or some other form of degenerative disease, were to become even more commonplace and strike before reproduction, or become infectious (as seen in the transmitted facial cancer of the Tasmanian Devil, a carnivorous marsupial in Australia) the very survival of our species could be threatened.</p>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 26,720 | 95 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,869 |
Plan solves 2 internal links--
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,857 | 1 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,870 |
The impact of the shortage falls heaviest on blacks, who have a greater need for transplants
|
Pollack 14
|
Pollack 14 MARTIN POLLAK and MARK ZEIDEL, respectively, chief of the Division of Nephrology and chairman of the department of medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Sept. 2, 2014
|
End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost: Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.
|
Kidney disease disproportionately affects minority populations. develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.
|
New York Times The Opinion Pages | Letters Ideas to Relieve a Kidney Shortage http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/ideas-to-relieve-a-kidney-shortage.html?_r=0
End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost: About 6 percent of the Medicare budget — more than $30 billion — is spent yearly on end-stage kidney disease care. The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure. Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.
| 715 |
<h4>The impact of the shortage falls heaviest on blacks, who have a greater need for transplants</h4><p><strong>Pollack 14</strong> MARTIN POLLAK and MARK ZEIDEL, respectively, chief of the Division of Nephrology and chairman of the department of medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Sept. 2, 2014 </p><p>New York Times The Opinion Pages | Letters Ideas to Relieve a Kidney Shortage <strong>http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/ideas-to-relieve-a-kidney-shortage.html?_r=0</p><p><u></strong>End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost:</u> About 6 percent of the Medicare budget — more than $30 billion — is spent yearly on end-stage kidney disease care. The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure. <u><mark>Kidney disease </mark>also<mark> disproportionately affects minority populations.</mark> Blacks <mark>develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.</mark> </p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,390 | 3 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,871 |
Property rights destroy biotech industry through prohibitive transaction costs that undermine research and commercialization
|
Harrison 2
|
Harrison 2 (Charlotte H., Fellow in Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School; M.P.H. 2000, Harvard School of Public Health, “ARTICLE: Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue,” 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 77, lexis)
|
people should be deemed the legal owners of their body parts, and compensation should be determined through a "direct market between buyer and seller This alternative entails serious ethical complications of its own, including risks to the doctor-patient or researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society. If one accepts the Moore court's assumption that the progress of biotechnology research is highly beneficial to society, it follows that the economic efficiency of such research should be carefully protected. Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based. In an analogous context--involving intangible or intellectual property rather than tangible, personal property--Heller and Eisenberg have detailed the inefficiencies that can result from what they regard as excessive protection of individual property rights in biomedical research they have argued that progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools. serves to highlight , problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts similar tragedy of the "anti-commons" occurs when people hold too little in common--that is, when too many people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual interes In the biotechnology industry, companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product. It would be better, if fewer such property rights were recognized. Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partner . Heller and Eisenberg contend that negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry. These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies' natural preference to control proprietary rights The conflict is rooted in a difference between public and private objectives rather than in mere inefficiency If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors It is likely that the majority of such materials would never be used commercially in such a way as to warrant a significant royalty these circumstances, transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive. This would likely be true whether contributors negotiated directly with companies or with intermediaries such as academic medical centers or private physician practices.
|
: people deemed the legal owners of their body parts entails serious complications including risks to researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based Heller and Eisenberg have argued that progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools. serves to highlight problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts In the biotechnology industry, companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partners. Heller and Eisenberg contend that negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies' If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors. transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive.
|
To the American mind, one obvious solution to the ethical inadequacies of the current system is market-based: people should be deemed the legal owners of their body parts, and compensation should be determined through a "direct market between buyer and seller with prices based on what people are willing to pay and accept." n51 This alternative, already implemented in occasional individual negotiations, n52 directly addresses some of the ethical problems just surveyed. It also entails serious ethical complications of its own, including risks to the doctor-patient or researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society. Examination of four major objections to the property-rights approach begins to suggest the parameters of a more satisfactory alternative.¶ [*86] ¶ A. Economic Inefficiency¶ If one accepts the Moore court's assumption that the progress of biotechnology research is highly beneficial to society, it follows that the economic efficiency of such research should be carefully protected. Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based. n54¶ In an analogous context--involving intangible or intellectual property rather than tangible, personal property--Heller and Eisenberg have detailed the inefficiencies that can result from what they regard as excessive protection of individual property rights in biomedical research. n55 In particular, they have argued that progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools. Heller and Eisenberg's analysis of this intellectual property market serves to highlight, by analogy, problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts.¶ Heller and Eisenberg's argument takes its cue from Garrett Hardin's classic analysis of the problems that arise when people hold property in common. n56 Hardin concluded that people tend to overuse such "commons property" (e.g., air or water) in a way that is ultimately tragic. Without the incentives of private property or the limits of other social arrangements, each person's rational pursuit of self-interest leads to greater and greater exploitation of a common resource until the whole is exhausted or ruined. This, in Hardin's terms, is "the tragedy of the commons." n57¶ According to Heller and Eisenberg, an opposite but similar tragedy of the "anti-commons" occurs when people hold too little in common--that is, when too many people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual interest. n58 In the biotechnology industry, companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product. It would be better, Heller and Eisenberg suggest, if fewer such property rights were recognized. Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers, whom Heller and Eisenberg characterize as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partners. Heller and Eisenberg contend that negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry. n59¶ In understanding the implications of this view for human tissue transactions, it is important to separate concerns about efficiency from differences in strategic or policy goals. The time-consuming nature of academic/industrial negotiations is often due, in part, to the substantive social values expressed in public technology policy. [*87] For example, existing federal policy seeks to ensure that academic inventions made under federal grants and licensed exclusively to industry are actually used in the development of products. The rights are not merely to be held defensively (i.e., to prevent competitors from marketing a similar product) or allowed to languish for too long in a company's portfolio if other projects take on greater commercial priority. n60 To implement this policy, universities commonly require their exclusive licensees to agree to "due diligence" commitments for the development and marketing of products. These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies' natural preference to control proprietary rights. n61 The conflict is rooted in a difference between public and private objectives rather than in mere inefficiency. In addition, each party has a strategic interest in obtaining what it deems to be an acceptable financial return. Of course, both public and private parties may share a larger aim to promote the development of new and better healthcare products, and it is reasonable to consider how the allocation of property rights affects that long-term goal.¶ Individual tissue contributors may have interests analogous to those of government-funded researchers and licensors. In addition to financial considerations, these interests may include the promotion of research on a disease or condition of concern to the contributor. In a market that serves the dual purposes of medical care and entrepreneurship, the extent of protection afforded to a tissue contributor's non-economic interests is a public policy question that goes beyond the scope of this article. It should be considered in conjunction with, but not subsumed by, concerns about financial returns and efficiency.¶ On grounds of economic efficiency alone, however, criticism like Heller and Eisenberg's would likely be warranted if property rights were extended to individual tissue contributors. If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors. Many tissue samples would be acquired either in clinical situations, in which research uses might not yet have been considered, or in research projects at an early stage of development, in which the eventual commercial utility of such materials could be hard to predict. n62 It is likely that the majority of such materials would never be used commercially in such a way as to warrant a significant royalty. n63 In these circumstances, transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive. This would likely be true whether contributors negotiated directly with companies or with intermediaries such as academic medical centers or private physician practices.
| 6,908 |
<h4>Property rights destroy biotech industry through prohibitive transaction costs that undermine research and commercialization</h4><p><strong>Harrison 2</strong> (Charlotte H., Fellow in Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School; M.P.H. 2000, Harvard School of Public Health, “ARTICLE: Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue,” 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 77, lexis<u>)</p><p></u>To the American mind, one obvious solution to the ethical inadequacies of the current system is market-based<mark>: <u>people</mark> should be <mark>deemed the legal owners of their body parts</mark>, and compensation should be determined through a "direct market between buyer and seller</u> with prices based on what people are willing to pay and accept." n51 <u>This alternative</u>, already implemented in occasional individual negotiations, n52 directly addresses some of the ethical problems just surveyed. It also <u><mark>entails serious</mark> ethical <mark>complications</mark> of its own, <mark>including risks to</mark> the doctor-patient or <mark>researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society</mark>. </u>Examination of four major objections to the property-rights approach begins to suggest the parameters of a more satisfactory alternative.¶ [*86] ¶ A. Economic Inefficiency¶ <u>If one accepts the Moore court's assumption that the progress of biotechnology research is highly beneficial to society, it follows that the economic efficiency of such research should be carefully protected. <mark>Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based</mark>.</u> n54¶ <u>In an analogous context--involving intangible or intellectual property rather than tangible, personal property--<mark>Heller and Eisenberg</mark> have detailed the inefficiencies that can result from what they regard as excessive protection of individual property rights in biomedical research</u>. n55 In particular, <u>they <mark>have argued that progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools.</u></mark> Heller and Eisenberg's analysis of this intellectual property market <u><mark>serves to highlight</u></mark>, by analogy<u>, <mark>problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts</u></mark>.¶ Heller and Eisenberg's argument takes its cue from Garrett Hardin's classic analysis of the problems that arise when people hold property in common. n56 Hardin concluded that people tend to overuse such "commons property" (e.g., air or water) in a way that is ultimately tragic. Without the incentives of private property or the limits of other social arrangements, each person's rational pursuit of self-interest leads to greater and greater exploitation of a common resource until the whole is exhausted or ruined. This, in Hardin's terms, is "the tragedy of the commons." n57¶ According to Heller and Eisenberg, an opposite but <u>similar tragedy of the "anti-commons" occurs when people hold too little in common--that is, when too many people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual interes</u>t. n58 <u><mark>In the biotechnology industry, companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product</mark>. It would be better,</u> Heller and Eisenberg suggest, <u>if fewer such property rights were recognized. <mark>Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers</u></mark>, whom Heller and Eisenberg characterize <u><mark>as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partner</u>s<u>. Heller and Eisenberg contend that negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry</mark>.</u> n59¶ In understanding the implications of this view for human tissue transactions, it is important to separate concerns about efficiency from differences in strategic or policy goals. The time-consuming nature of academic/industrial negotiations is often due, in part, to the substantive social values expressed in public technology policy. [*87] For example, existing federal policy seeks to ensure that academic inventions made under federal grants and licensed exclusively to industry are actually used in the development of products. The rights are not merely to be held defensively (i.e., to prevent competitors from marketing a similar product) or allowed to languish for too long in a company's portfolio if other projects take on greater commercial priority. n60 To implement this policy, universities commonly require their exclusive licensees to agree to "due diligence" commitments for the development and marketing of products. <u><mark>These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies'</mark> natural preference to control proprietary rights</u>. n61 <u>The conflict is rooted in a difference between public and private objectives rather than in mere inefficiency</u>. In addition, each party has a strategic interest in obtaining what it deems to be an acceptable financial return. Of course, both public and private parties may share a larger aim to promote the development of new and better healthcare products, and it is reasonable to consider how the allocation of property rights affects that long-term goal.¶ Individual tissue contributors may have interests analogous to those of government-funded researchers and licensors. In addition to financial considerations, these interests may include the promotion of research on a disease or condition of concern to the contributor. In a market that serves the dual purposes of medical care and entrepreneurship, the extent of protection afforded to a tissue contributor's non-economic interests is a public policy question that goes beyond the scope of this article. It should be considered in conjunction with, but not subsumed by, concerns about financial returns and efficiency.¶ On grounds of economic efficiency alone, however, criticism like Heller and Eisenberg's would likely be warranted if property rights were extended to individual tissue contributors. <u><mark>If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors</u>.</mark> Many tissue samples would be acquired either in clinical situations, in which research uses might not yet have been considered, or in research projects at an early stage of development, in which the eventual commercial utility of such materials could be hard to predict. n62 <u>It is likely that the majority of such materials would never be used commercially in such a way as to warrant a significant royalty</u>. n63 In <u>these circumstances, <mark>transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive.<strong></mark> This would likely be true whether contributors negotiated directly with companies or with intermediaries such as academic medical centers or private physician practices.</p></u></strong>
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Neg vs Rutgers wm
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1nc
|
1NC Property Rights DA
| 430,437 | 17 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
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Hubervermont
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6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
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1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,872 |
Biotech solves economic competitiveness
|
Chase-Dunn and Reifer 2
|
Chase-Dunn and Reifer 2 (professor at University of California Riverside, and Reifer, professor University of California Riverside, 2002, Chris and Thomas, The Institute for Research on World-Systems, “U.S. Hegemony and Biotechnology: The geopolitics of new lead technology,” http://repositories.cdlib.org/irows/irows9/)
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*also solves disease
Biotechnology has been heralded as the potential basis for a new round of U.S. economic hegemony Agricultural biotechnology is intended to improve the human food supply by lowering the costs of production and by improving the products. Medical biotechnology is intended to improve human health by developing new techniques for preventing diseases biotechnology might function as the basis of a new round of U.S. economic hegemony Investments in biotechnology would have to produce products that can be profitably sold, and these would need to be purchased within the U S and in the world market. the research and development costs of the biotech industry make it difficult for new centers to emerge, and this has been alleged to be part of the basis for the U.S. lead in biotechnology The allegedly high start-up costs should prevent the early emergence of competitors, and this has been claimed to account for how biotechnology research and development and commercialization in Europe and Japan have lagged behind the U.S.
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Biotechnology has been heralded as the potential basis for a new round of U.S. economic hegemony Agricultural biotechnology is intended to improve the human food supply by lowering the costs of production and by improving the products. Medical biotechnology is intended to improve human health by developing new techniques for preventing diseases Investments in biotechnology would have to produce products that can be profitably sold, and these would need to be purchased within the U S and in the world market The allegedly high start-up costs should prevent the early emergence of competitors, and this has been claimed to account for how biotechnology research and development and commercialization in Europe and Japan have lagged behind
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*also solves disease
Biotechnology has been heralded as the potential basis for a new round of U.S. economic hegemony. In this discussion we will need to use a distinction between medical biotechnology and agricultural biotechnology because of the somewhat different ways in which these branches of the application of applied biology are related to factors that may influence the economic potential of these technologies. Agricultural biotechnology is the application of genomics to create new crops, new sources of animal protein, and to protect crops and domesticated animals from pests. Agricultural biotechnology is intended to improve the human food supply by lowering the costs of production and by improving the products. Medical biotechnology is intended to improve human health by developing new techniques for preventing diseases, curing ailments, producing products for transplants and improving the genetic makeup of individuals. An important literature has emerged that discusses the ethical dimensions and political implications of biotechnology (e.g. Shiva 1997; Rifkin 1998) . Extremely fundamental issues are becoming important in public discourse, and the governance of biotechnology research and applications will be an increasingly central part of politics in the twenty-first century (e.g. Fukuyama 2002). In this paper we will discuss the politics of biotechnology only insofar as it is likely to be an important influence on the potential role of biotechnology as a new lead industry that might function as the basis of a new round of U.S. economic hegemony. In order for biotechnology to function as a new lead industry that could serve as a basis for a new round of U.S. economic hegemony several conditions would have to be met. Investments in biotechnology would have to produce products that can be profitably sold, and these would need to be purchased within the United States and in the world market. Firms producing these biotechnology products would need to be able to obtain technological rents over a period of time long enough to recoup the costs of research and development. And the biotechnology industry would need to serve as a source of spin-offs for the rest of the U.S. economy to a degree greater than in the national economies of contending core powers. Figure 4 illustrates our contentions about factors that will reduce the likelihood of the biotechnology industry serving as a basis for a new round of U.S. hegemony. We note that the huge decreases in transportation costs and communications costs in the most recent wave of globalization have increased the rate at which technologies and new industries can spread to competing regions. It has been thought that the research and development costs of the biotech industry make it difficult for new centers to emerge, and this has been alleged to be part of the basis for the U.S. lead in biotechnology. It is true that the U.S. research universities and publicly funded research have been important sources of both medical and agricultural biotechnological advances. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and federal agricultural policies played a central role in the development of agricultural biotechnology (Kloppenburg 1988a, 1988b; Pistorius and van Wijk1999). And the United States has taken the lead in the creation of an international patent regime to protect “intellectual property”(the so-called TRIPS agreement) that should, in principle, allow firms to recoup research and development costs through technological rents. The allegedly high start-up costs should prevent the early emergence of competitors, and this has been claimed to account for how biotechnology research and development and commercialization in Europe and Japan have lagged behind the U.S.
| 3,777 |
<h4><strong>Biotech solves economic competitiveness</h4><p>Chase-Dunn and Reifer 2</strong> (professor at University of California Riverside, and Reifer, professor University of California Riverside, 2002, Chris and Thomas, The Institute for Research on World-Systems, “U.S. Hegemony and Biotechnology: The geopolitics of new lead technology,” http://repositories.cdlib.org/irows/irows9/)</p><p><u><strong>*also solves disease</p><p><mark>Biotechnology has been heralded as the potential basis for a new round of U.S. economic hegemony</u></strong></mark>. In this discussion we will need to use a distinction between medical biotechnology and agricultural biotechnology because of the somewhat different ways in which these branches of the application of applied biology are related to factors that may influence the economic potential of these technologies. Agricultural biotechnology is the application of genomics to create new crops, new sources of animal protein, and to protect crops and domesticated animals from pests. <u><strong><mark>Agricultural biotechnology is intended to improve the human food supply by lowering the costs of production and by improving the products. Medical biotechnology is intended to improve human health by developing new techniques for preventing diseases</u></strong></mark>, curing ailments, producing products for transplants and improving the genetic makeup of individuals. An important literature has emerged that discusses the ethical dimensions and political implications of biotechnology (e.g. Shiva 1997; Rifkin 1998) . Extremely fundamental issues are becoming important in public discourse, and the governance of biotechnology research and applications will be an increasingly central part of politics in the twenty-first century (e.g. Fukuyama 2002). In this paper we will discuss the politics of biotechnology only insofar as it is likely to be an important influence on the potential role of <u><strong>biotechnology </u></strong>as a new lead industry that <u><strong>might function as the basis of a new round of U.S. economic hegemony</u></strong>. In order for biotechnology to function as a new lead industry that could serve as a basis for a new round of U.S. economic hegemony several conditions would have to be met. <u><strong><mark>Investments in biotechnology would have to produce products that can be profitably sold, and these would need to be purchased within the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>and in the world market</mark>.</u></strong> Firms producing these biotechnology products would need to be able to obtain technological rents over a period of time long enough to recoup the costs of research and development. And the biotechnology industry would need to serve as a source of spin-offs for the rest of the U.S. economy to a degree greater than in the national economies of contending core powers. Figure 4 illustrates our contentions about factors that will reduce the likelihood of the biotechnology industry serving as a basis for a new round of U.S. hegemony. We note that the huge decreases in transportation costs and communications costs in the most recent wave of globalization have increased the rate at which technologies and new industries can spread to competing regions. It has been thought that <u><strong>the research and development costs of the biotech industry make it difficult for new centers to emerge, and this has been alleged to be part of the basis for the U.S. lead in biotechnology</u></strong>. It is true that the U.S. research universities and publicly funded research have been important sources of both medical and agricultural biotechnological advances. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and federal agricultural policies played a central role in the development of agricultural biotechnology (Kloppenburg 1988a, 1988b; Pistorius and van Wijk1999). And the United States has taken the lead in the creation of an international patent regime to protect “intellectual property”(the so-called TRIPS agreement) that should, in principle, allow firms to recoup research and development costs through technological rents. <u><strong><mark>The allegedly high start-up costs should prevent the early emergence of competitors, and this has been claimed to account for how biotechnology research and development and commercialization in Europe and Japan have lagged behind</mark> the U.S.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
1nc
|
1NC Property Rights DA
| 224,736 | 4 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,873 |
Additionally, altruistic donations are biased against the poor
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Fry-Revere 14
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Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
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there is a tragic consequence inherent in the system of altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. By mandating altruistic living kidney donations, the U S has inadvertently relegated some very specific groups to die on dialysis while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. Someone well-to-do or well-connected. or even someone who is a middle-class. white~collar worker is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; can’t be more than a little overweight These are prevalent illnesses but the problem is especially acute among the poor and minorities. Donors must have time to spare. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips for pre-op meetings and testing Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home. This means taking a good deal of time away from work Donors must have money The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered Donors may have travel-related expenses while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery. the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave. The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class. As a result, the U S has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, to get living donor kidneys for free, while the average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis, waiting for organs that rarely come.
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there is tragic consequence in altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. mandating altruistic donations has relegated some very specific groups to die on dialysis Someone well-to-do or middle-class. is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor : Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; These are prevalent illnesses especially acute among the poor and minorities Donors must have time to spare This means taking a good deal of time away from work Donors must have money. The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered. It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 201
But there is another tragic consequence inherent in the American system of altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. By mandating altruistic living kidney donations, the United States has inadvertently relegated some very specific groups of Americans to die on dialysis while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. Someone well-to-do or well-connected. or even someone who is a middle-class. white~collar worker is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. Listed here are some of the qualifications for being a living kidney donor: Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; can’t be more than a little overweight: and preferably don't have a history of diabetes or heart disease in their immediate families. These are prevalent illnesses among Americans—an estimated 8.3 percent of Americans suffer from diabetes, and heart disease caused nearly 25 percent of American deaths in 2OO8—but the problem is especially acute among the poor and minorities. A growing body of evidence points to strong links between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension (a risk factor for heart disease), and end stage renal disease. On top of this, donors need health insurance which practically speaking means that donors or their_spouses must be full-time employees in a business large enough to provide insurance, must be making enough to purchase their own insurance, or must be under 26 and covered by their parents’ health insurance. Donors must have time to spare. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips to a hospital, clinic, or lab for pre-op meetings and testing with lab technicians, doctors, social workers, and psychologists. Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home. Even after three weeks, however, it remains unwise to do any heavy lifting. The period to limit heavy lift- ing might last anywhere from 2 to 6 months or longer depending on ‘the age and general health of the donor, whether there were any complications during surgery or afterwards, and how quickly the donor is healing. This means taking a good deal of time away from work or other responsibilities, particularly if the donor has to do more than is generally required of someone with a desk job. Donors must have a support group with time to spare. They need help during the donation and recovery period. Donors can’t drive themselves home from the hospital after the operation. They need people who can take care of them for at least the first week or two after surgery. And of course, someone must take on the responsibilities donors are unable to fulfill during recovery: any job-related duties as well as home responsibilities, such as caring for children, older relatives, the household, pets, and the yard. Donors must have money. The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered. Donors may have travel-related expenses like gas, flights, hotels and food while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery. If a donor’s friends and family can't take off time to help the donor (or can’t take off weeks or months), the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations: for example, a babtsitter, a pet sitter, and someone to clean the house and/or mow the lawn It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave. (Recipients are legally permitted to reimburse donors for lost wages, but not all recipients, and particularly not impoverished ones, have the financial means to cover lost wages. Furthermore reimbursing the self-employed is prohibited because there is no clear measure, such as a salary, to value their work. State and federal programs provide some financial assistance for donors, but most of those programs only provide need-based support for travel expenses or only compensate donors a small percentage of their costs after the fact") The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class. The costs of donating are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses that might not be reimbursed. Taking too many days off work can jeopardize a donor’s job status: A donor may lose his or her position altogether. fall behind in work responsibilities, or lose seniority when it comes to promotions or other benefits. There are also secondary costs such as the financial and emotional strain donation puts on family members and friends when they contribute financially or take time off work to help the donor during recovery. Given these restrictions. how many people do you know who would qua]- ify to be kidney donors? W'hite-collar workers might be able to “afford” to donate if they have enough vacation time. enough money saved to pay for donation-related expenses up front. friends and family who can take time off work to help with everyday responsibilities, and a job to return to that doesn’t require heavy lifting. Blue-collar workers are far less likely to have the resources needed to be living donors. They might not have sufficient, if any, paid leave, may not have friends and family who have enough free time to help with children and household responsibilities, and are more likely than white-collar workers to have jobs that require heavy lifting. Now consider the self-employed, people like family farmers and small business owners. How can they find the time or money to donate? And even if the self-employed qualify to donate, who would run their businesses in their absence, and how many of them have jobs that won't require at least some heavy lifting? And what about homemakers or people who care for children or elderly relatives? Who would take on their responsibilities while they arrange for and recover from a kidney donation, let alone the risks of heavy lifting too soon after surgery? _ _ Finally, poor and minority communities are harder hit with problems of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, making it less likely that a potential recipient’s friends and family will even qualify medically as donors, let alone have the financial resources necessary to donate. And what about the unemployed? They don’t qualify because they don’t have insurance. So the unemployed, or even friends or relatives who work part-time, might not qualify to donate because they don’t have adequate insurance coverage. As a result, the United States has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, leisure class, and upper middle-class to get living donor kidneys for free, while the average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis, waiting for second-best cadaver organs that rarely come.
| 7,345 |
<h4>Additionally, altruistic donations are biased against the poor</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 201</p><p>But <u><mark>there is</mark> a</u>nother <u><mark>tragic consequence </mark>inherent<mark> in</mark> the</u> American <u>system of <mark>altruistic organ donation</mark> <mark>that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. </mark>By<mark> mandating altruistic</mark> living kidney <mark>donations</mark>, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>has</mark> inadvertently <mark>relegated some very specific groups</mark> </u>of Americans <u><mark>to die on dialysis </mark>while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. <mark>Someone well-to-do or</mark> well-connected. or even someone who is a <mark>middle-class. </mark>white~collar worker <mark>is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone</u> <u>who is poor</mark>. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. </u>Listed here are some of the qualifications for being a living kidney donor<mark>: <u>Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; </mark>can’t be more than a little overweight</u>: and preferably don't have a history of diabetes or heart disease in their immediate families. <u><mark>These are</mark> <mark>prevalent illnesses</u></mark> among Americans—an estimated 8.3 percent of Americans suffer from diabetes, and heart disease caused nearly 25 percent of American deaths in 2OO8—<u>but the problem is <mark>especially acute among the poor and minorities</mark>.</u> A growing body of evidence points to strong links between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension (a risk factor for heart disease), and end stage renal disease. On top of this, donors need health insurance which practically speaking means that donors or their_spouses must be full-time employees in a business large enough to provide insurance, must be making enough to purchase their own insurance, or must be under 26 and covered by their parents’ health insurance. <u><mark>Donors must have time to spare</mark>. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips </u>to a hospital, clinic, or lab<u> for pre-op meetings and testing</u> with lab technicians, doctors, social workers, and psychologists. <u>Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home.</u> Even after three weeks, however, it remains unwise to do any heavy lifting. The period to limit heavy lift-<u> </u>ing might last anywhere from 2 to 6 months or longer depending on ‘the age and general health of the donor, whether there were any complications during surgery or afterwards, and how quickly the donor is healing. <u><mark>This means taking a good deal of time away from work</u></mark> or other responsibilities, particularly if the donor has to do more than is generally required of someone with a desk job. Donors must have a support group with time to spare. They need help during the donation and recovery period. Donors can’t drive themselves home from the hospital after the operation. They need people who can take care of them for at least the first week or two after surgery. And of course, someone must take on the responsibilities donors are unable to fulfill during recovery: any job-related duties as well as home responsibilities, such as caring for children, older relatives, the household, pets, and the yard. <u><mark>Donors must have money</u>. <u><strong>The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid,</strong> but there are donation related costs that are not covered</u>.</mark> <u>Donors may have travel-related expenses </u>like gas, flights, hotels and food <u>while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery.</u> If a donor’s friends and family can't take off time to help the donor (or can’t take off weeks or months), <u>the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations</u>: for example, a babtsitter, a pet sitter, and someone to clean the house and/or mow the lawn <u><mark>It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave</mark>.</u> (Recipients are legally permitted to reimburse donors for lost wages, but not all recipients, and particularly<u> </u>not impoverished ones, have the financial means to cover lost wages. Furthermore reimbursing the self-employed is prohibited because there is no clear measure, such as a salary, to value their work. State and federal programs provide some financial assistance for donors, but most of those programs only provide need-based support for travel expenses or only compensate donors a small percentage of their costs after the fact") <u><mark>The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors</mark>, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class.</u> The costs of donating are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses that might not be reimbursed. Taking too many days off work can jeopardize a donor’s job status: A donor may lose his or her position altogether. fall behind in work responsibilities, or lose seniority when it comes to promotions or other benefits. There are also secondary costs such as the financial and emotional strain donation puts on family members and friends when they contribute financially or take time off work to help the donor during recovery. Given these restrictions. how many people do you know who would qua]-<u> </u>ify to be kidney donors? W'hite-collar workers might be able to “afford” to donate if they have enough vacation time. enough money saved to pay for donation-related expenses up front. friends and family who can take time off work to help with everyday responsibilities, and a job to return to that doesn’t require heavy lifting. Blue-collar workers are far less likely to have the resources needed to be living donors. They might not have sufficient, if any, paid leave, may not have friends and family who have enough free time to help with children and household responsibilities, and are more likely than white-collar workers to have jobs that require heavy lifting. Now consider the self-employed, people like family farmers and small business owners. How can they find the time or money to donate? And even if the self-employed qualify to donate, who would run their businesses in their absence, and how many of them have jobs that won't require at least some heavy lifting? And what about homemakers or people who care for children or elderly relatives? Who would take on their responsibilities while they arrange for and recover from a kidney donation, let alone the risks of heavy lifting too soon after surgery? _ _ Finally, poor and minority communities are harder hit with problems of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, making it less likely that a potential recipient’s friends and family will even qualify medically as donors, let alone have the financial resources necessary to donate. And what about the unemployed? They don’t qualify because they don’t have insurance. So the unemployed, or even friends or relatives who work part-time, might not qualify to donate because they don’t have adequate insurance coverage. <u>As a result, the U</u>nited<u> S</u>tates<u> has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, </u>leisure class, and upper middle-class <u>to get living donor kidneys for free, while the <mark>average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis</mark>, waiting for </u>second-best cadaver<u> organs that rarely come.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,858 | 3 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,874 |
First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like
|
By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ,
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination <u>of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like </u>this would become much less commonplace.</p>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,262 | 14 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,875 |
Obama will get his AG pick now but it will be a fight- needs PC for Dem unity
|
LA Times 10/14
|
LA Times 10/14/2014 (Obama to delay attorney general nomination until after election, http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-na-nn-obama-attorney-general-election-20141014-story.html)
|
Obama will wait until after the election to name a nominee for a g setting the stage for an intense battle Democrats worry that a controversial nominee could put vulnerable Democratic senators in a tougher spot A formal nomination is likely in November Obama’s ability to win confirmation of a controversial nominee would be greatly reduced if he waits until next year Not all Democrats may be pleased by the decision Leahy said the White House should move forward as soon as possible the Senate will act quickly and in bipartisan fashion to confirm
|
setting the stage for an intense battle Democrats worry that a controversial nominee, could put vulnerable Democratic senators in a tougher spot A formal nomination is likely n November Obama’s ability to win confirmation of a controversial nominee would be greatly reduced if he waits until next year. Not all Democrats may be pleased by the decision Leah the White House should move forward as soon as possible the Senate will act quickly and in bipartisan fashion to confirm
|
President Obama will wait until after the November election to name a nominee for attorney general, setting the stage for an intense battle in the postelection Senate that could last until Christmas, a White House official said Tuesday. The delay, which White House officials said came at the request of Senate Democrats, reflected concern about the effect Obama’s pick might have on the midterm election, when Republicans appear to be on the verge of taking control of the Senate. Some Democrats worry that a controversial nominee, such as Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez, could put vulnerable Democratic senators, such as Mary L. Landrieu of Louisiana and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, in a tougher spot. Senate leaders are concerned the nomination will become a campaign issue in an already tight election, according to a White House official who was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. The White House similarly postponed moving forward with its immigration plan, partly out of concern it might hurt Democratic candidates in November. White House officials said Tuesday that Obama may still attempt to win Senate confirmation for his nominee during the lame-duck session after the election, but they acknowledged the delay could push the vote back until after a new Senate takes office in January. The confirmation process for such an important post normally takes about two months or more. A formal nomination is now likely to come in early to mid-November. Obama has been deliberating over who should replace Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr., who last month announced his plans to step down. White House officials said the president had narrowed the field but had not yet made his choice, despite the fact that Holder’s departure had long been anticipated. In addition to Perez, the leading contenders for the job are said to be Solicitor Gen. Donald Verrilli Jr. and former White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler, although officials say others are in the mix. Perez, a liberal attorney long involved in Maryland politics, would be the most controversial pick, in part because of his record as Obama’s assistant attorney general for civil rights. Some Republicans interpreted the delay in announcing the nominee as a sign that Obama intended to name Perez. “This timing shows, once again, that the president and Democrat Senate leaders are willing to play politics with important policy decisions,” said Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, the top Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee. “First it was immigration, and now Senate Democrats have asked the president to delay his announcement for attorney general so they can avoid making clear to the voters of their states where they stand on what could be a controversial choice for attorney general.” If a vote occurs in a Democratic-controlled Senate in a postelection session, Republicans would be powerless to block the nominee under current rules. But with polls indicating that Republicans have a solid chance of winning a majority in the next Senate, Obama’s ability to win confirmation of a controversial nominee would be greatly reduced if he waits until next year. Not all Democrats may be pleased by the decision. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), who will chair any hearings if they occur this year, said two weeks ago that the White House should move forward with a nomination as soon as possible. A Judiciary Committee aide noted Tuesday that a confirmation hearing was scheduled at the sole discretion of the committee chairman. White House officials said the delay would allow their deliberative process to continue. “I would anticipate that it will take a little bit of time for the work to be done to determine ... who the right person is for that important task,” White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said Tuesday when asked about the attorney general nomination. “I also would anticipate that the Senate will act quickly and in bipartisan fashion to confirm that person.” White House officials emphasized that the primary reason for the delay was the request from Senate leadership, not the president’s indecision. In a conference call with reporters Tuesday, Perez, who has been Labor secretary since July 2013, was asked whether he had talked to the White House about the attorney general job. “My conversations with the White House have been all about the long-term unemployed ... all about the progress we’re making as a nation in putting people back to work,” he said. “That’s my singular focus.”
| 4,515 |
<h4><strong>Obama will get his AG pick now but it will be a fight- needs PC for Dem unity</h4><p>LA Times 10/14</strong>/2014 (Obama to delay attorney general nomination until after election, http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-na-nn-obama-attorney-general-election-20141014-story.html)</p><p>President <u>Obama will wait until after the</u> November <u>election to name a nominee for a</u>ttorney <u>g</u>eneral, <u><strong><mark>setting the stage for an intense battle</u></strong></mark> in the postelection Senate that could last until Christmas, a White House official said Tuesday. The delay, which White House officials said came at the request of Senate Democrats, reflected concern about the effect Obama’s pick might have on the midterm election, when Republicans appear to be on the verge of taking control of the Senate. Some <u><mark>Democrats worry that a controversial nominee</u>,</mark> such as Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez, <u><mark>could put vulnerable Democratic senators</u></mark>, such as Mary L. Landrieu of Louisiana and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, <u><mark>in a tougher spot</u></mark>. Senate leaders are concerned the nomination will become a campaign issue in an already tight election, according to a White House official who was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. The White House similarly postponed moving forward with its immigration plan, partly out of concern it might hurt Democratic candidates in November. White House officials said Tuesday that Obama may still attempt to win Senate confirmation for his nominee during the lame-duck session after the election, but they acknowledged the delay could push the vote back until after a new Senate takes office in January. The confirmation process for such an important post normally takes about two months or more. <u><mark>A formal nomination is</u></mark> now <u><mark>likely</u></mark> to come <u>i<mark>n</u></mark> early to mid-<u><mark>November</u></mark>. Obama has been deliberating over who should replace Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr., who last month announced his plans to step down. White House officials said the president had narrowed the field but had not yet made his choice, despite the fact that Holder’s departure had long been anticipated. In addition to Perez, the leading contenders for the job are said to be Solicitor Gen. Donald Verrilli Jr. and former White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler, although officials say others are in the mix. Perez, a liberal attorney long involved in Maryland politics, would be the most controversial pick, in part because of his record as Obama’s assistant attorney general for civil rights. Some Republicans interpreted the delay in announcing the nominee as a sign that Obama intended to name Perez. “This timing shows, once again, that the president and Democrat Senate leaders are willing to play politics with important policy decisions,” said Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, the top Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee. “First it was immigration, and now Senate Democrats have asked the president to delay his announcement for attorney general so they can avoid making clear to the voters of their states where they stand on what could be a controversial choice for attorney general.” If a vote occurs in a Democratic-controlled Senate in a postelection session, Republicans would be powerless to block the nominee under current rules. But with polls indicating that Republicans have a solid chance of winning a majority in the next Senate, <u><mark>Obama’s ability to win confirmation of a controversial nominee would be <strong>greatly reduced</strong> if he waits until next year</u>. <u><strong>Not all Democrats may be pleased by the decision</u></strong></mark>. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. <u><mark>Leah</mark>y</u> (D-Vt.), who will chair any hearings if they occur this year, <u>said</u> two weeks ago that <u><mark>the White House should move forward</u></mark> with a nomination <u><mark>as soon as possible</u></mark>. A Judiciary Committee aide noted Tuesday that a confirmation hearing was scheduled at the sole discretion of the committee chairman. White House officials said the delay would allow their deliberative process to continue. “I would anticipate that it will take a little bit of time for the work to be done to determine ... who the right person is for that important task,” White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said Tuesday when asked about the attorney general nomination. “I also would anticipate that <u><mark>the Senate will act quickly and in bipartisan fashion to confirm</u><strong></mark> that person.” White House officials emphasized that the primary reason for the delay was the request from Senate leadership, not the president’s indecision. In a conference call with reporters Tuesday, Perez, who has been Labor secretary since July 2013, was asked whether he had talked to the White House about the attorney general job. “My conversations with the White House have been all about the long-term unemployed ... all about the progress we’re making as a nation in putting people back to work,” he said. “That’s my singular focus.”</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
1
| 430,859 | 5 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,876 |
Great power war
|
Baru 9 –
|
Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 – 168
|
strong economic performance is the foundation of power Drawing attention to interrelationships between wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection major shifts in military-power balance followed alterations in productive balances the rising and falling of the various empires has been confirmed by major Great Power wars geopolitical consequences of decline, would be inability to sustain military power
|
strong economic performance is the Drawing attention to interrelationships between wealth, tech innovation, and ability of states to mobilize economic and tech resources for power projection
|
Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma.
| 1,354 |
<h4><strong>Great power war</h4><p>Baru 9 – </strong>Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 – 168</p><p>Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that <u><strong><mark>strong economic performance is the </mark>foundation of power</u></strong> was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 <u><strong><mark>Drawing attention to</mark> </u></strong>the <u><strong><mark>interrelationships between</mark> </u></strong>economic <u><strong><mark>wealth, tech</mark>nological <mark>innovation, and</mark> the <mark>ability of states to</mark> efficiently <mark>mobilize economic and tech</mark>nological<mark> resources for power projection</mark> </u></strong>and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the <u><strong>major shifts in</u></strong> the world's <u><strong>military-power balance</u></strong> have <u><strong>followed alterations in</u></strong> the <u><strong>productive balances</u></strong>; and further, that <u><strong>the rising and falling of the various empires</strong> </u>and states in the international system <u><strong>has been confirmed by</u></strong> the outcomes of the <u><strong>major Great Power wars</u></strong>, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the <u><strong>geopolitical consequences of</u></strong> an economic crisis, or even <u><strong>decline, would be</u></strong> transmitted through a nation's <u><strong>inability to</u></strong> find adequate financial resources to simultaneously <u><strong>sustain</strong> </u>economic growth and <u><strong>military power</u></strong>, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma. </p>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
1nc
|
1NC Property Rights DA
| 1,240,559 | 117 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,877 |
Thus, the shortage disproportionately impacts Blacks
|
Jefferson-Jones 13
|
Jefferson-Jones 13 Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis
|
The statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the population, but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting list The number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths.
|
statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the population, n38 but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting li number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively. n40 Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths. n41
|
The statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the United States population, n38 but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting list. n39 The number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively. n40 Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths. n41
| 642 |
<h4>Thus, the shortage disproportionately impacts Blacks </h4><p><strong>Jefferson-Jones 13</strong> Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis</p><p><u>The <mark>statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the</u></mark> United States <u><mark>population,</u> n38 <u>but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting li</mark>st</u>. n39 <u>The <mark>number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively</u>. n40 <u>Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths.</u> n41</p><p></mark> </p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,860 | 1 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,878 |
Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
|
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
|
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
|
Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
|
Contention 2 is illegal markets
| null | null | 430,264 | 17 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,879 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
|
Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
|
As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
|
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4><strong>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p>Downs 12 <u></strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities<strong></mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,880 |
The affirmative recreates the power relations they criticize. Their uncritical affirmation of subjectivity masks the cycle of self-renunciation that defines the modern Western subject – in their case the demand for <masochism > creates a new hierarchy that prevents critique and activism
|
Taylor 13
|
Taylor 13 Dianna Taylor is Associate Professor of Philosophy and current Shula Chair in Philosophy at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio, “Resisting the Subject: A Feminist-Foucauldian Approach to Countering Sexual Violence,” Foucault Studies vol. 16, pp. 88-103
|
the conceptualization within early Christian conversion of a self that can and must be interpreted and deciphered provides the ground for the hermeneutical self-relation that characterizes modern Western subjectivity. Modern subjectivization inherits a power relation that is clearly normalizing modes of thinking and acting that deviate from established norms appear as "abnormal" and thus in need of sanction, up to and including elimination. The resulting reinscription of prevailing norms and simultaneous inhibition of both alternatives elimits the circulation of power. Society thus moves toward domination Within the self-relation that modern Western subjectivity inherits New capacities are merely directed back into recreating the conditions for their possibility: permanent obedience to an authority who interprets an individual's thoughts in order to ensure their purity Foucault identifies a sustained and concerted effort within the tradition of Western philosophy to substitute the autonomous subject for the self-sacrificing and obedient one Because self-renunciation is a condition for the possibility of subjectivity, the hermeneutical mode of self-relation that characterizes the latter cannot be retained without also retaining and thereby rearticulat-ing the former. Moreover, asserting autonomy and its ostensibly positive aspects as defining subjectivity effectively masks this retention and rearticulation, thereby perpetuating a normalizing cycle wherein the self is continually renounced and reasserted
| null |
Foucault argues that the conceptualization within early Christian conversion of a self that can and must be interpreted and deciphered provides the ground for the hermeneutical self-relation that characterizes modern Western subjectivity. Modern subjectivization as he sees it thus inherits and continues to be characterized by a power relation that is clearly normalizing. "Normalization," for Foucault, refers to the interconnection of increased capacities with increasingly limited and limiting ways of exercising them. Persons become adept at performing a very narrow range of actions and behaviors that, insofar as they are performed repeatedly over time, come to be seen as both natural and necessary—as simply "normal" behavior. At the same time, modes of thinking and acting that deviate from established norms appear as "abnormal" and thus in need of sanction, up to and including elimination. The resulting reinscription of prevailing norms and simultaneous inhibition of both alternatives and the conditions for their possibility in turn delimits the circulation of power. Society thus moves toward domination, a condition in which individuals or groups are deprived of their capacity to act and are instead merely acted upon or determined.¶ Within the self-relation that modern Western subjectivity inherits, increased capacities (accessing the truth and attaining salvation) are acquired at the expense of multiple and varied ways in which they might be exercised. New capacities are merely directed back into recreating the conditions for their possibility: permanent obedience to an authority who interprets an individual's thoughts in order to ensure their purity and, hence, continued access to truth and salvation. In the face of this normalizing interconnection of subjectivity and self-renunciation, Foucault identifies a sustained and concerted effort within the tradition of Western philosophy to "save" the "hermeneutics of the self" while at the same time "[get] rid of the necessity of sacrifice of self which was linked to this hermeneutics since the beginning of Christianity"—to, in other words, substitute the autonomous subject for the self-sacrificing and obedient one.18 Such a strategy is ineffective and ultimately normalizing in its own right. Because self-renunciation is a condition for the possibility of subjectivity, the hermeneutical mode of self-relation that characterizes the latter cannot be retained without also retaining and thereby rearticulat-ing the former. Moreover, asserting autonomy and its ostensibly positive aspects as defining subjectivity effectively masks this retention and rearticulation, thereby perpetuating a normalizing cycle wherein the self is continually renounced and reasserted.¶ Given the failure of the Western philosophical tradition to counter the self-renouncing and obedient character that subjectivity inherits, Foucault raises the possibility of exploring alternative modes of self-relation. "Maybe," he suggests, "the problem... is to change those technologies [of the hermeneutical self-relation], or maybe to get rid of those technologies, and then, to get rid of the sacrifice which is linked to those technologies."19 Foucault's genealogy of the modern Western subject illustrates that, as expressed in the epigraph to this essay, subjectivity is simply one possible way of constituting, understanding, and relating to ourselves. Exploring alternative ways of doing so comes through exercising precisely those capacities that subjectivity inhibits: our critical and creative—or disobedient—capacities. Such exercise comprises the practice of freedom.
| 3,635 |
<h4>The affirmative recreates the power relations they criticize. Their uncritical affirmation of subjectivity masks the cycle of self-renunciation that defines the modern Western subject – in their case the demand for <masochism > creates a new hierarchy that prevents critique and activism</h4><p><strong>Taylor 13 </strong>Dianna Taylor is Associate Professor of Philosophy and current Shula Chair in Philosophy at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio, “Resisting the Subject: A Feminist-Foucauldian Approach to Countering Sexual Violence,” Foucault Studies vol. 16, pp. 88-103</p><p>Foucault argues that <u>the conceptualization within early Christian conversion of a self that can and must be interpreted and deciphered provides the ground for the hermeneutical self-relation that characterizes modern Western subjectivity.</u> <u>Modern subjectivization</u> as he sees it thus <u>inherits</u> and continues to be characterized by <u>a power relation that is clearly normalizing</u>. "Normalization," for Foucault, refers to the interconnection of increased capacities with increasingly limited and limiting ways of exercising them. Persons become adept at performing a very narrow range of actions and behaviors that, insofar as they are performed repeatedly over time, come to be seen as both natural and necessary—as simply "normal" behavior. At the same time, <u>modes of thinking and acting that deviate from established norms appear as "abnormal" and thus in need of sanction, up to and including elimination. The resulting reinscription of prevailing norms and simultaneous inhibition of both alternatives</u> and the conditions for their possibility in turn d<u>elimits the circulation of power. Society thus moves toward domination</u>, a condition in which individuals or groups are deprived of their capacity to act and are instead merely acted upon or determined.¶ <u>Within the self-relation that modern Western subjectivity inherits</u>, increased capacities (accessing the truth and attaining salvation) are acquired at the expense of multiple and varied ways in which they might be exercised. <u>New capacities are merely directed back into recreating the conditions for their possibility: permanent obedience to an authority who interprets an individual's thoughts in order to ensure their purity</u> and, hence, continued access to truth and salvation. In the face of this normalizing interconnection of subjectivity and self-renunciation, <u>Foucault identifies a sustained and concerted effort within the tradition of Western philosophy to</u> "save" the "hermeneutics of the self" while at the same time "[get] rid of the necessity of sacrifice of self which was linked to this hermeneutics since the beginning of Christianity"—to, in other words, <u>substitute the autonomous subject for the self-sacrificing and obedient one</u>.18 Such a strategy is ineffective and ultimately normalizing in its own right. <u>Because self-renunciation is a condition for the possibility of subjectivity, the hermeneutical mode of self-relation that characterizes the latter cannot be retained without also retaining and thereby rearticulat-ing the former. Moreover, <strong>asserting autonomy and its ostensibly positive aspects as defining subjectivity</strong> effectively masks this retention and rearticulation, thereby perpetuating a normalizing cycle wherein the self is continually renounced and reasserted</u>.¶ Given the failure of the Western philosophical tradition to counter the self-renouncing and obedient character that subjectivity inherits, Foucault raises the possibility of exploring alternative modes of self-relation. "Maybe," he suggests, "the problem... is to change those technologies [of the hermeneutical self-relation], or maybe to get rid of those technologies, and then, to get rid of the sacrifice which is linked to those technologies."19 Foucault's genealogy of the modern Western subject illustrates that, as expressed in the epigraph to this essay, subjectivity is simply one possible way of constituting, understanding, and relating to ourselves. Exploring alternative ways of doing so comes through exercising precisely those capacities that subjectivity inhibits: our critical and creative—or disobedient—capacities. Such exercise comprises the practice of freedom.</p>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
1nc
|
case
| 430,861 | 1 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,881 |
Sales are needed to increase supply and solve racial disparities (caused by matching requirements)
|
Goodwin 9
|
Goodwin 9 Michele Goodwin, Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Minnesota Law School. Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy Winter, 2009 18 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 208
|
Currently, there are over one hundred thousand in need of organs A disproportionate number of these patients are black They account for more than one-third of kidney waitlist patients African Americans wait longer than all other racial and ethnic groups while on the transplantation list. they experience the highest rate of death on transplantation lists. These dramatic disparities can be linked to the antigen distribution matching requirement, which is deemed essential and ascribed critical importance in the rationing process. While some scholars criticize the organ distribution system in the U S because of its inequitable results in the health care of African Americans, few have recognized the role and potential advantages of market analysis to address the problem
"the consequences of ignoring the possible advantages of incentives for curing organ deficits and thereby enhancing the health opportunities for all especially Black Americans are extreme." Empirical studies documenting the high incidences of high blood pressure, diabetes, hypertension, stress, and other conditions affect African Americans at a disparate rate, and of most concern, these conditions contribute to widespread organ failure.
Until more organs become available for transplantation, Black patients will continue to experience the longest waits while on America's transplantation waitlists. Because they suffer the highest rate of mortality while on the transplantation waitlists this issue deserves urgent address.
|
disproportionate number of patients are black They account for more than one-third of kidney waitlist African Americans wait longer experience the highest rate of death These can be linked to the antigen distribution matching requirement While some scholars criticize the organ distribution system few recognized the role and advantages of market analysis to
curing organ deficits enhancing health opportunities for all especially Black Americans Empirical studies documenti high incidences of high blood pressure, diabetes, hypertension and other conditions affect African Americans at a disparate rate these contribute to widespread organ failure
Until more organs become available Black patients will continue to experience the longest waits
|
ARTICLE: BIO LAW: A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT ALTRUISM AND MARKETS lexis
At the center of these exchanges is the tremendous demand for human biological materials to save the terminally ill or enhance the quality of life for [*213] transplant recipients. The fight against a pronounced tissue and organ market obscures a sad reality: thousands of Americans unnecessarily die each year from treatable illnesses because organs are not available. Currently, there are over one hundred thousand Americans in need of organs. n20 A disproportionate number of these patients are black Americans desperately in need of kidney transplantation. They are caught in a strange confluence of inadequate supply and overwhelming demand, as black Americans account for more than one-third of kidney waitlist patients. n21 African Americans wait longer than all other racial and ethnic groups while on the transplantation list. n22 Moreover, they experience the highest rate of death on transplantation lists. n23 These dramatic disparities can be linked to the antigen distribution matching requirement, which is deemed essential and ascribed critical importance in the rationing process. n24 The unfortunate result has only recently been acknowledged as inequitable and biologically disadvantaging African Americans. n25 While some scholars criticize the organ distribution system in the United States, calling it illogical and even pernicious, because of its inequitable results in the health care of African Americans, few have recognized the role and potential advantages of market analysis to address the problem.
In prior scholarship, I warned that "the consequences of ignoring the possible advantages of incentives for curing organ deficits and thereby enhancing the health opportunities for all Americans, especially Black Americans are extreme." n26 This clarion call remains true; "although organ donating by African Americans has increased in recent years, demand dramatically exceeds supply." n27 Empirical studies documenting the high incidences of high blood pressure, diabetes, hypertension, stress, and other conditions affect African Americans at a disparate rate, and of most concern, these conditions contribute to widespread organ failure. n28
Until more organs become available for transplantation, Black patients will continue to experience the longest waits while on America's transplantation waitlists. Because they suffer the highest rate of mortality while on the transplantation waitlists this issue deserves urgent address. Finally, other health, political, and legal risks will undoubtedly emerge as desperate Americans in greater numbers seek life-saving transplantations outside of the United States from death row inmates in China and others in India, Brazil, [*214] Pakistan and other countries. How they receive their follow-up care may indeed become a political as well as medical issue.
| 2,905 |
<h4>Sales are needed to increase supply and solve racial disparities (caused by matching requirements)</h4><p><strong>Goodwin 9</strong> Michele Goodwin, Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Minnesota Law School. Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy Winter, 2009 18 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 208</p><p>ARTICLE: BIO LAW: A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT ALTRUISM AND MARKETS lexis</p><p>At the center of these exchanges is the tremendous demand for human biological materials to save the terminally ill or enhance the quality of life for [*213] transplant recipients. The fight against a pronounced tissue and organ market obscures a sad reality: thousands of Americans unnecessarily die each year from treatable illnesses because organs are not available. <u>Currently, there are over one hundred thousand</u> Americans <u>in need of organs</u>. n20 <u>A <mark>disproportionate number of</mark> these <mark>patients are black</mark> </u>Americans desperately in need of kidney transplantation. <u><mark>They</mark> </u>are caught in a strange confluence of inadequate supply and overwhelming demand, as black Americans <u><mark>account for more than one-third of kidney waitlist</mark> patients</u>. n21 <u><mark>African Americans wait</mark> <mark>longer</mark> than all other racial and ethnic groups while on the transplantation list.</u> n22 Moreover, <u>they <mark>experience the highest rate of death</mark> on transplantation lists.</u> n23 <u><mark>These</mark> dramatic disparities <mark>can be linked to the antigen distribution matching requirement</mark>, which is deemed essential and ascribed critical importance in the rationing process.</u> n24 The unfortunate result has only recently been acknowledged as inequitable and biologically disadvantaging African Americans. n25 <u><mark>While some scholars criticize the</mark> <mark>organ distribution system</mark> in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, calling it illogical and even pernicious, <u>because of its inequitable results in the health care of African Americans, <mark>few</mark> have <mark>recognized the role and</mark> potential <mark>advantages of market analysis to</mark> address the problem</u>.</p><p>In prior scholarship, I warned that <u>"the consequences of ignoring the possible advantages of incentives for <mark>curing organ deficits</mark> and thereby <mark>enhancing</mark> the <mark>health</mark> <mark>opportunities for all</mark> </u>Americans,<u> <mark>especially Black Americans</mark> are extreme."</u> n26 This clarion call remains true; "although organ donating by African Americans has increased in recent years, demand dramatically exceeds supply." n27 <u><mark>Empirical studies</mark> <mark>documenti</mark>ng the <mark>high incidences of high blood pressure, diabetes, hypertension</mark>, stress, <mark>and other conditions affect African Americans at a disparate rate</mark>, and of most concern, <mark>these</mark> conditions <mark>contribute to widespread organ failure</mark>.</u> n28</p><p><u><mark>Until more organs become available</mark> for transplantation, <mark>Black patients will continue to experience the longest waits</mark> while on America's transplantation waitlists. Because they suffer the highest rate of mortality while on the transplantation waitlists this issue deserves urgent address.</u><strong> Finally, other health, political, and legal risks will undoubtedly emerge as desperate Americans in greater numbers seek life-saving transplantations outside of the United States from death row inmates in China and others in India, Brazil, [*214] Pakistan and other countries. How they receive their follow-up care may indeed become a political as well as medical issue.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,862 | 1 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,882 |
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
|
Wilkinson 11
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Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
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The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
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organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices Erin and Harris suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
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1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
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<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u><mark>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u></mark>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘<mark>organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from <mark>Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u>who <mark>suggest</mark> <mark>that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
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Contention 3 Solvency
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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A
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Kentucky
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2
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Michigan Bayley-Peilen
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Matheson
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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742,883 |
PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee
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Moran 9/28
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Moran 9/28/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)
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Any choice Obama makes will be controversial It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. the nomination probably won't come until after the election If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
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Any choice Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
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Any choice for AG Obama makes will be controversial. It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available. That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so the nomination probably won't come until after the election anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.
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<h4><strong>PC’s key to a liberal-enough nominee</h4><p>Moran 9/28<u></strong>/2014 (Rick, blog editor of The American Thinker, and Chicago editor of PJ Media, Will Obama force a nomination fight for new AG in lame duck session?, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/09/will_obama_force_a_nomination_fight_for_new_ag_in_lame_duck_session.html)</p><p><mark>Any choice</u></mark> for AG <u><mark>Obama makes will be controversial</u>.</mark> <u><mark>It's not likely that the president will choose someone to the right of Holder, and <strong>if he had his druthers, he would nominate the most liberal candidate available.</mark> </u></strong>That won't happen with a Republican Senate. But with Harry Reid having his finger on the nuclear option, a vote before the end of the year could saddle America with someone even worse than Holder. Realistcally, it will take a few weeks to vet all the candidates and make a selection, so <u>the nomination probably won't come until after the election</u> anyway. And with the likelihood of a vote to authorize military force in Syria filling up the congressional agenda in the lame duck session, there may not be time for hearings and a vote to confirm any new AG nominee. But Harry Reid has proved himself resourceful in the past. <u><strong><mark>If Obama wants his nominee confirmed before the end of the lame duck session, it will be hard for the GOP to stop him.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Neg vs cornell KR
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1nc
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1
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
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Hubervermont
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3
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Cornell Kundu-Rooney
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Astacio
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T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
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| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,884 |
Your only concern should be creating the conditions for successful criticism. Their rhetorically powerful demands for immediate action confuse the roles of the intellectual and the activist. Debate is only useful insofar as it allows us to interrogate and reveal the operations of power – if we win that the affirmative makes this network more opaque, vote negative.
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Kelly 2009
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Kelly 2009 ( Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault p 129-131 )
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the role Foucault prescribes for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions, nor of discovering anything new, but of examining what is already known. "If we are not to settle for the ... empty dream of freedom, ... this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one" the invention of concepts is helpful to criticism. Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths. This, was an essential resistance: it is precisely because the world does have ideas that the world is not passively led by those who direct it or by those who would like to teach everyone what to think. Foucault he charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth. Critique is for Foucault not the function only of the philosophers, Foucault "reclaims" the term "intellectual," charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy. society is today in even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become critique, is essential in respect of any resistance movement, regardless of the configuration of forces. "the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the 'agonism' between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence" the fact that power is inescapable, "makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others" Foucault depicts critique as a specific counterpart to the modern art of government, as counter-art; “the art of not being governed quite so much” Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth; critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not. resistance can be either with or against "domination," but "critical resistance" is essentially against it, because "critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces" : while the technology of government essentially implies the question, how should one govern?, there is a simultaneous counter-art in which the governed ask how they can not be governed in the way that they are being governed
To be or not is the ultimate question that humanity must answer Will everything that is good and noble in human evolution, civilization, and culture be abandoned and completely lost or else completely forgotten by the ‘‘lucky’’ remnant that somehow manages to survive The ‘‘second death’’ is most tragic, for not only will our history be lost, but the future will be lost too. Will the yet-born never even be given the opportunity to receive the wisdom and beauty of the human spirit and experience what it means to be alive How can we cheat them of this grand opportunity that should be theirs by right Love will be lost and our planet may very well become just as dead as every other planet that we know about in the universe Perhaps our planet is the only one in which the miracle of life managed to evolve Knowing the ultimate cost, the risk of the complete destruction of human civilization and the possible extermination of our own species and perhaps all life how can we take such a risk 21st century is the most important and critical century because it is the century when humankind will determine whether we fall headlong into that abyss or whether we manage to gather real courage, wisdom and restraint to resist the temptation of self-destructive power. If we fail, we will pay the ultimate price from which there will be no return. we must fight for life and for the yet-born generations of the future, They will look back proudly and say, ‘‘These are our true ancestors who cared enough about us to fight for our right to exist. we would not be able to love, to make music and gaze upon the stars at night We would not be able to be filled with the wonder and joy of life and the beauty of nature Thus, they have bequeathed to us this precious ethic - to care about the future and the yet-born future generations
pg 25, dml)
Scarcely more than half a century after Nietzsche's madman had unleashed his prophecy the Nazis came along to embrace his vision of a normless will to power. Nietzsche had offered the Übermensch Such individuals would have the courage to "transvalue all values" and remake the world his vision was easily usurped by the Nazis who imagined themselves, the pure Aryan race, as the natural embodiment of this superior human being who would recreate the world through a will to power. The Nazi program of attempted genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche ." In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide.
Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,
to Nietzsche the assessment of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. From these teachings a serious problem emerges: if beauty is the criterion for goodness, and if there are no universal criteria for beauty, is there anything to prevent the mass murderer and the child molester on the one hand, or the couch potato on the other, from viewing their lives as beautiful, and thus as good Nietzsche's apparent advocacy of violence and oppression, must certainly be included among his teachings A post-moral world would be one in which each of us could determine his or her own good But that, it might seem, would entail a new form of moral dogmatism, one with the paradoxical form, "the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could Nietzsche defend such a perspective, or such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
a basis for ethical theory can be found in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this projec Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time We owe some loyalty to this project of the human future Since an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity we would have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus
(Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)
Imagine an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? ? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
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‘‘second death’’ is most tragic, our history be lost, the future will be lost too. Will the yet-born never even be given the opportunity to receive the wisdom and beauty of the human spirit and experience what it means to be alive? this grand opportunity should be theirs by right? Love will be lost, Knowing the ultimate cost, the risk of the complete destruction how can we take such a risk If we fail, there will be no retur we must fight for life and for the yet-born generations of the future we would not be able to love, to make music and gaze upon the stars at night. We would not be able to be filled with the wonder and joy of life and the beauty of nature Thus, they have bequeathed to us this precious ethic - to care about the future and the yet-born future generations
the Nazis came along to embrace will to power. Nietzsche had offered the courage to "transvalue all values" his vision was easily usurped who imagined themselves , as the natural embodiment of this superior human The genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide
Nietzsche assessment there are no universal criteria beauty, is there anything to prevent the mass murderer child molester from viewing their lives as beautiful, and thus as good Nietzsche's advocacy of violence A post-moral world would be one in which each of us could determine his own good that would entail a form of moral dogmatism the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could Nietzsche defend such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone?
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment
basis for ethical theory can be found in commitment to the future of humanity The aspiration for a better society is a part of this project Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures an existential catastrophe would put an end to the project of the future of humanity public policy should favor existential-risk mitigation We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations
an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons
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Clearly, the role Foucault prescribes here for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions, nor of discovering anything new, but of examining what is already known. Now, this purely critical vision of philosophy is somewhat surprising in that I earlier portrayed Foucault as engaging in an exercise of conceptual construction, but these two go hand-in-hand for Foucault: "If we are not to settle for the ... empty dream of freedom, ... this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one" (EW1 316); the invention of concepts is helpful to criticism. Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths. This, for him, was a universal human activity, an essential resistance: It is not ideas that guide the world. But it is precisely because the world does have ideas (and because it continuously produces lots of them) that the world is not passively led by those who direct it or by those who would like to teach everyone what to think.4 Conceptual construction is however not the activity which Foucault assigns to philosophy, unlike for Deleuze and Guattari (1994). Rather, he charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth. Critique is for Foucault not the function only of the philosophers, however. Simultaneously with his redefinition of philosophy, Foucault (FL 461) "reclaims" the term "intellectual," charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy. Indeed, as early as 1971, Foucault (Foucault 1974,171) identifies the critique of the functioning of institutions as "the real political task in a society such as ours."5 This was thirty-seven years ago, but society is today in the relevant respects even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become (cf. EW1 317). Indeed, critique, in a general sense, is in fact essential in respect of any resistance movement, regardless of the configuration of forces. In "The Subject and Power," Foucault makes the even broader claim that "the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the 'agonism' between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence" (EW3 343; emphasis added). This follows for him from the fact that power is inescapable, which "makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others" (EW3 343). Foucault is influenced by Kant's interpretation of the Enlightenment :IS, in Kant's own words, "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another" (PT 7). In this spirit, Foucault depicts critique as a specific counterpart to the modern art of government, as counter-art; in Foucault’s words, “the art of not being governed quite so much” (PT 29): Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth; well! critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of considered indocility.6 This self-conscious resistance Foucault identifies as a hallmark of modernity, qua the Enlightenment, as inaugural to "the attitude of modernity" (EW1 309). Indeed, critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not. This is the defining point of David Couzens Hoy's Critical Resistance: that resistance can be either with or against "domination," but what he calls "critical resistance" is essentially against it, because "critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces" (Hoy 2004, 2). This distinction can be understood, in Foucaultian terms, not as normative, but rather as tactical. In Foucault's study of governmentality qua the problematic of modern political thought, he points to a pair of opposites inaugurated simultaneously at the level of macro-practice: while the technology of government essentially implies the question, how should one govern?, there is a simultaneous counter-art in which the governed ask how they can not be governed in the way that they are being governed (PT 27-28). While Foucault does not condemn the macro-practice of government per se, he does refuse to engage in it qua intellectual, Foucault seeing intellectuals as obligated to resist power
Focus on survival is good because it gives future generations the opportunity to love, create, and experience joy
Morgan, Prof. Public Speaking and Current Affairs, December ’09 (Dennis, Hankuk U., Futures, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race”, 41:10, ScienceDirect)
To be or not to be—that is indeed the ultimate question that humanity must answer. Will Shakespeare’s words continue to inspire generations to come, or will his works be completely lost and forgotten? The same question can be asked about all of the great works of art and expressions of the human spirit that have evolved through the ages. Will everything that is good and noble in human evolution, civilization, and culture be abandoned and completely lost or else completely forgotten by the ‘‘lucky’’ remnant that somehow manages to survive—if there are survivors? The ‘‘second death’’ is most tragic, for not only will our history be lost, but the future will be lost too. Will the yet-born never even be given the opportunity to receive the wisdom and beauty of the human spirit and experience what it means to be alive? How can we cheat them of this grand opportunity that should be theirs by right? Love will be lost, and our planet may very well become just as dead as every other planet that we know about in the universe. Who knows? Perhaps our planet is the only one in which the miracle of life managed to evolve. There is still so much more for us to discover about the universe and our own origins. We have not yet ‘‘come of age’’ as one race—the human race. We have yet to understand what it even means to be human, and before we do, are we to just let it slide through our hands and lose it all? Why??? For various psychological reasons, we have shielded ourselves in a state of denial concerning the price of our progress and the real nature and state of industrial civilization and its development. Perhaps we have shielded ourselves from the ugly side of our own human nature. How could we fail to see that we are standing on a precipice, at the very brink of falling headlong into an abyss of no return? We must not fall into this abyss blind and mute without a fight for life. We should look squarely at it and squarely at ourselves and ask ourselves Stephen Hawking’s question. Our species is about 100,000 years old. Civilization is only a fraction of that, yet long before the advent of human civilization, at a very threshold moment in human evolution, man discovered how to make and use fire. But do we really own it, or will we instead burn by the very fire we make? Do we really have as much control over it as we’d like to think we have? Knowing the ultimate cost, the risk of the complete destruction of human civilization and the possible extermination of our own species and perhaps all life, the future itself, how can we take such a risk? We live on a planet of finite resources with a finite atmosphere that miraculously supports life. Now, the development of industrial civilization has taken us to such a point that we have reached the endgame: we are standing on a precipice overlooking the abyss—from which there is no return. The 21st century is the most important and critical century because it is the century when humankind will determine whether we fall headlong into that abyss or whether we manage to gather real courage, wisdom and restraint to resist the temptation of such awful and ultimately self-destructive power. We must tear the scales from our eyes and view that power for what it is. This is the time that represents a moment of challenge for the ultimate survival of the species. If we fail, we will pay the ultimate price from which there will be no return. As long as our hearts still beat and we still breathe the air every day, then we are still alive, and that means that we still have a chance to make a difference and change the course that we’re on now. Let us not fall into the abyss headlong, blind and mute. Indeed, we must fight for life and for the yet-born generations of the future, and they will bear the fruit of our labor. They will look back proudly and say, ‘‘These are our true ancestors who cared enough about us to fight for our right to exist. Without them, we would not be able to love, to make music and gaze upon the stars at night. We would not be able to be filled with the wonder and joy of life and the beauty of nature. Without them, this Earth would have been an unlivable place like so many other planets, and we would not have come into existence. Thus, they have bequeathed to us this precious ethic - to care about the future and the yet-born future generations - to leave them a world that is at least as wonderful and joyous as the one we were born into.’’
Next is the Nazis disad– their vision justifies genocide – Nietzsche may not have been a Nazi but his vision was compatible with theirs – if nothing is true everything is permitted
Fasching 93 (Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia pg 25, dml)
Scarcely more than half a century after Nietzsche's madman had unleashed his prophecy the Nazis came along to embrace his vision of a normless will to power. Nietzsche had offered a vision of a new type of individual who would have to take charge of human history after the death of God; namely, the Übermensch or self-transcending person. Such individuals would have the courage to "transvalue all values" and remake the world in their own image. Nietzsche, of course, had a somewhat aristocratic vision of these new individuals. But his vision was easily usurped by the Nazis who imagined themselves, the pure Aryan race, as the natural embodiment of this superior human being who would recreate the world through a will to power. The Nazi program of attempted genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche's parable of "the Death of God." In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide.
Dionysus disad- their ethics is a violent free-for-all – no value in that world -
White, 90 (Alan, online book, Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth, Professor of Philosophy, Williams College, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty_and_goodness.htm).
Nietzsche exhorts us to live beautifully; on this point, Nehamas and I agree. A second point of our agreement is in attributing to Nietzsche an insistence that the assessment of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. From these teachings a serious problem emerges: if beauty is the criterion for goodness, and if there are no universal criteria for beauty, is there anything to prevent the mass murderer and the child molester on the one hand, or the couch potato on the other, from viewing their lives as beautiful, and thus as good -- even as ideal? This question leads me to one of Nehamas's central concerns: "Nietzsche is clearly much more concerned with the question of how one's actions are to fit together into a coherent, self-sustaining, well-motivated whole than he is with the quality of those actions themselves" (166); for this reason, "the uncomfortable feeling persists that someone might achieve Nietzsche's ideal life and still be nothing short of repugnant" (167). This uncomfortable feeling arises, for Nehamas, from the teaching that life is literature. According to Nehamas's Nietzsche, "one should not take one's misdeeds seriously for long, [because] virtue does not depend on what one does but on whether what one does is an expression of one's whole self, of one's 'own will.'" This position makes sense, Nehamas adds, because "these are exactly the considerations that are relevant to the evaluation of literary characters" (166). Continues... Nietzsche rejects the notion that there are human obligations deriving from a different world; yet he is not one of Marcel's fools. Nehamas stresses, and I stress, that Nietzsche does not want to take the position of encouraging sadists and egotists. Unbridled egotism, he insists, would lead only to "universal wars of annihilation" (BT:15). His position is made yet more explicit in a passage quoted above, but worth repeating: I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. (D:103) Nietzsche does not want to deny "that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, and that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged"; he agrees with Marcel that only fools could think otherwise. Yet he rejects other-worldly sources of obligation; how then can he answer Marcel's questions? What is to be said, or done, to the mass murderer and the child molester, or to the couch potato? Nehamas responds to this question on Nietzsche's behalf, but his response strikes me as in part inaccurate and in part dangerous, and thus, on the whole, unacceptable. In responding, Nehamas first suggests that Nietzsche severely restricts the audience to whom he addresses his transvaluative teachings: Exemplifying the very attitude that prompts him to reject unconditional codes, Nietzsche does not reject them unconditionally. His demand is only that philosophers, and not all people, "take their stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath them" (TIVII:1) Here, Nehamas suggests that only philosophers -- who, he seems to assume, are not "fools" of the sort Marcel and Nietzsche are worried about -- are to recognize that moral judgment is illusory. In this central respect, Nehamas's Nietzsche seems to remain a Platonist: he tells noble lies to the masses in order to keep them in line, reserving the truth for the intellectually privileged few. No doubt, Nietzsche does restrict the scope of some of his teachings; he has Zarathustra announce, for example, "It is a disgrace [Schmach] to pray! Not for everyone, but for you and me and whoever else has his conscience in his head. For you it is a disgrace to pray" (ZIII:8.2; 227.27-29). I grant in addition that Nietzsche points philosophers beyond dogmatic morality; he agrees with Marcel that nothing on this earth obliges us to be thoughtful or kind. Yet even in the passage Nehamas cites, Nietzsche does not present his teachings to philosophers alone. And if we distinguish more generally between esoteric and exoteric strains in Nietzsche's teachings, then his immoralism, his apparent advocacy of violence and oppression, must certainly be included among his teachings for the many. Continues... As long as the illusion of moral judgment holds sway, Nietzsche's question cannot be my guiding question, for as long as that illusion holds, Zarathustra's minotaur rules: good for all, evil for all. A post-moral world, one wherein the minotaur was silenced, would be one in which each of us could determine his or her own good; that would have to be a world within which diversity would be encouraged rather than inhibited. But that, it might seem, would entail a new form of moral dogmatism, one with the paradoxical form, "the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could Nietzsche defend such a perspective, or such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone?
Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact
BOSTROM 2011 (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)
We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]
2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
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<h4>Your only concern should be creating the conditions for successful criticism. Their rhetorically powerful demands for immediate action confuse the roles of the intellectual and the activist. Debate is only useful insofar as it allows us to interrogate and reveal the operations of power – if we win that the affirmative makes this network more opaque, vote negative.</h4><p><strong>Kelly 2009</strong> ( Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault p 129-131 )</p><p>Clearly, <u>the role Foucault prescribes</u> here <u>for the philosopher is essentially critical. It is the exercise not of proposing solutions, nor of discovering anything new, but of examining what is already known.</u> Now, this purely critical vision of philosophy is somewhat surprising in that I earlier portrayed Foucault as engaging in an exercise of conceptual construction, but these two go hand-in-hand for Foucault: <u>"If we are not to settle for the ... empty dream of freedom, ... this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one" </u>(EW1 316); <u>the invention of concepts is helpful to criticism. Foucault's conceptual activity is about trying to invent new ways of thinking-precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths. This,</u> for him, <u>was </u>a universal human activity, <u>an essential resistance:</u> It is not ideas that guide the world. But <u>it is precisely because the world does have ideas</u> (and because it continuously produces lots of them) <u>that the world is not passively led by those who direct it or by those who would like to teach everyone what to think.</u>4 Conceptual construction is however not the activity which <u>Foucault</u> assigns to philosophy, unlike for Deleuze and Guattari (1994). Rather, <u>he charges philosophy with the historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth. Critique is for Foucault not the function only of the philosophers,</u> however. Simultaneously with his redefinition of philosophy, <u>Foucault</u> (FL 461) <u>"reclaims" the term "intellectual," charging intellectuals, who presumably constitute a broader category than philosophers, with the same critical task as philosophy.</u> Indeed, as early as 1971, Foucault (Foucault 1974,171) identifies the critique of the functioning of institutions as "the real political task in a society such as ours."5 This was thirty-seven years ago, but <u>society is today in</u> the relevant respects <u>even more in need of criticism, critique becoming more vital the more sophisticated the integrative functions of the ensemble of power relations become</u> (cf. EW1 317). Indeed, <u>critique,</u> in a general sense, <u>is</u> in fact <u>essential in respect of any resistance movement, regardless of the configuration of forces.</u> In "The Subject and Power," Foucault makes the even broader claim that <u>"the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the 'agonism' between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is ... the political task that is inherent in all social existence"</u> (EW3 343; emphasis added). This follows for him from <u>the fact that power is inescapable,</u> which <u>"makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish others"</u> (EW3 343). Foucault is influenced by Kant's interpretation of the Enlightenment :IS, in Kant's own words, "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another" (PT 7). In this spirit, <u>Foucault depicts critique as a specific counterpart to the modern art of government, as counter-art;</u> in Foucault’s words, <u>“the art of not being governed quite so much”</u> (PT 29): <u>Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to question truth on its power effects and question power on its discourses of truth; </u>well! critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of considered indocility.6 This self-conscious resistance Foucault identifies as a hallmark of modernity, qua the Enlightenment, as inaugural to "the attitude of modernity" (EW1 309). Indeed, <u>critique is necessary to determine whether a given tactic is truly resistant or not.</u> This is the defining point of David Couzens Hoy's Critical Resistance: that <u>resistance can be either with or against "domination," but</u> what he calls <u>"critical resistance" is essentially against it, because "critique is what makes it possible to distinguish emancipatory resistance from resistance that has been co-opted by the repressive forces" </u>(Hoy 2004, 2). This distinction can be understood, in Foucaultian terms, not as normative, but rather as tactical. In Foucault's study of governmentality qua the problematic of modern political thought, he points to a pair of opposites inaugurated simultaneously at the level of macro-practice<u>: while the technology of government essentially implies the question, how should one govern?, there is a simultaneous counter-art in which the governed ask how they can not be governed in the way that they are being governed</u><strong> (PT 27-28). While Foucault does not condemn the macro-practice of government per se, he does refuse to engage in it qua intellectual, Foucault seeing intellectuals as obligated to resist power</p><p>Focus on survival is good because it gives future generations the opportunity to love, create, and experience joy</p><p>Morgan, </strong>Prof. Public Speaking and Current Affairs<strong>, December ’09 </strong> (Dennis, Hankuk U., Futures, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race”, 41:10, ScienceDirect)</p><p><u>To be or not</u> to be—that <u>is</u> indeed <u>the ultimate question that humanity must answer</u>. Will Shakespeare’s words continue to inspire generations to come, or will his works be completely lost and forgotten? The same question can be asked about all of the great works of art and expressions of the human spirit that have evolved through the ages. <u>Will everything that is good and noble in human evolution, civilization, and culture be abandoned and completely lost or else completely forgotten by the ‘‘lucky’’ remnant that somehow manages to survive</u>—if there are survivors? <u>The <mark>‘‘second death’’ is most tragic, </mark>for not only will <mark>our history be lost, </mark>but <mark>the future will be lost too. <strong>Will the yet-born never even be given the opportunity to receive the wisdom and beauty of the human spirit</strong> and experience what it means to be alive</u>? <u></mark>How can we cheat them of <mark>this grand opportunity </mark>that <mark>should be theirs by right</u>? <u><strong>Love will be lost</u>,</strong> <u></mark>and our planet may very well become just as dead as every other planet that we know about in the universe</u>. Who knows? <u>Perhaps our planet is the only one in which the miracle of life managed to</u> <u>evolve</u>. There is still so much more for us to discover about the universe and our own origins. We have not yet ‘‘come of age’’ as one race—the human race. We have yet to understand what it even means to be human, and before we do, are we to just let it slide through our hands and lose it all? Why??? For various psychological reasons, we have shielded ourselves in a state of denial concerning the price of our progress and the real nature and state of industrial civilization and its development. Perhaps we have shielded ourselves from the ugly side of our own human nature. How could we fail to see that we are standing on a precipice, at the very brink of falling headlong into an abyss of no return? We must not fall into this abyss blind and mute without a fight for life. We should look squarely at it and squarely at ourselves and ask ourselves Stephen Hawking’s question. Our species is about 100,000 years old. Civilization is only a fraction of that, yet long before the advent of human civilization, at a very threshold moment in human evolution, man discovered how to make and use fire. But do we really own it, or will we instead burn by the very fire we make? Do we really have as much control over it as we’d like to think we have<strong>? <u><mark>Knowing the ultimate cost, the risk of the complete destruction </mark>of human civilization and the possible extermination of our own species and perhaps all life</u>,</strong> the future itself, <u><strong><mark>how can we take such a risk</u></strong></mark>? We live on a planet of finite resources with a finite atmosphere that miraculously supports life. Now, the development of industrial civilization has taken us to such a point that we have reached the endgame: we are standing on a precipice overlooking the abyss—from which there is no return. The <u>21st century is the most important and critical century because it is the century when humankind will determine whether we fall headlong into that abyss or whether we manage to gather real courage, wisdom and restraint to resist the temptation of </u>such awful and ultimately <u>self-destructive power.</u> We must tear the scales from our eyes and view that power for what it is. This is the time that represents a moment of challenge for the ultimate survival of the species. <u><mark>If we fail, </mark>we will pay the ultimate price from which <mark>there will be no retur</mark>n.</u> As long as our hearts still beat and we still breathe the air every day, then we are still alive, and that means that we still have a chance to make a difference and change the course that we’re on now. Let us not fall into the abyss headlong, blind and mute. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>we must fight for life and for the yet-born generations of the future</mark>, </u></strong>and they will bear the fruit of our labor. <u>They will look back proudly and say, ‘‘These are our true ancestors who cared enough about us to fight for our right to exist.</u> Without them, <u><strong><mark>we would not be able to love, to make music and gaze upon the stars at night</u></strong>. <u><strong>We would not be able to be filled with the wonder and joy of life and the beauty of nature</u></strong></mark>. Without them, this Earth would have been an unlivable place like so many other planets, and we would not have come into existence. <u><strong><mark>Thus, they have bequeathed to us this precious ethic - to care about the future and the yet-born future generations</u></mark> - to leave them a world that is at least as wonderful and joyous as the one we were born into.’’</p><p>Next is the Nazis disad– their vision justifies genocide – Nietzsche may not have been a Nazi but his vision was compatible with theirs – if nothing is true everything is permitted</p><p>Fasching 93 </strong>(Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia<u> pg 25, dml)</p><p>Scarcely more than half a century after Nietzsche's madman had unleashed his prophecy <mark>the Nazis came along to embrace</mark> his vision of a normless <mark>will to power. Nietzsche had offered</u></mark> a vision of a new type of individual who would have to take charge of human history after the death of God; namely, <u>the Übermensch</u> or self-transcending person. <u>Such individuals would have <mark>the courage to "transvalue all values"</mark> and remake the world</u> in their own image. Nietzsche, of course, had a somewhat aristocratic vision of these new individuals. But <u><mark>his vision was easily usurped</mark> by the Nazis <mark>who imagined themselves</mark>, the pure Aryan race<mark>, as the natural embodiment of this superior human</mark> being who would recreate the world through a will to power. <mark>The</mark> Nazi program of attempted <mark>genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche</u></mark>'s parable of "the Death of God<u>." <mark>In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide</mark>.</p><p></u><strong>Dionysus disad- their ethics is a violent free-for-all – no value in that world - </p><p>White, 90</strong> (Alan, online book, <u>Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,</u> Professor of Philosophy, Williams College, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty_and_goodness.htm). </p><p>Nietzsche exhorts us to live beautifully; on this point, Nehamas and I agree. A second point of our agreement is in attributing <u>to <mark>Nietzsche</u></mark> an insistence that <u>the <mark>assessment</mark> of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. From these teachings a serious problem emerges: if beauty is the criterion for goodness, and if <mark>there are no universal criteria</mark> for <mark>beauty, is there anything to prevent the mass murderer</mark> and the <mark>child molester</mark> on the one hand, or the couch potato on the other, <mark>from viewing their lives as beautiful, and thus as good</u></mark> -- even as ideal? This question leads me to one of Nehamas's central concerns: "Nietzsche is clearly much more concerned with the question of how one's actions are to fit together into a coherent, self-sustaining, well-motivated whole than he is with the quality of those actions themselves" (166); for this reason, "the uncomfortable feeling persists that someone might achieve Nietzsche's ideal life and still be nothing short of repugnant" (167). This uncomfortable feeling arises, for Nehamas, from the teaching that life is literature. According to Nehamas's Nietzsche, "one should not take one's misdeeds seriously for long, [because] virtue does not depend on what one does but on whether what one does is an expression of one's whole self, of one's 'own will.'" This position makes sense, Nehamas adds, because "these are exactly the considerations that are relevant to the evaluation of literary characters" (166). Continues... Nietzsche rejects the notion that there are human obligations deriving from a different world; yet he is not one of Marcel's fools. Nehamas stresses, and I stress, that Nietzsche does not want to take the position of encouraging sadists and egotists. Unbridled egotism, he insists, would lead only to "universal wars of annihilation" (BT:15). His position is made yet more explicit in a passage quoted above, but worth repeating: I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. (D:103) Nietzsche does not want to deny "that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, and that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged"; he agrees with Marcel that only fools could think otherwise. Yet he rejects other-worldly sources of obligation; how then can he answer Marcel's questions? What is to be said, or done, to the mass murderer and the child molester, or to the couch potato? Nehamas responds to this question on Nietzsche's behalf, but his response strikes me as in part inaccurate and in part dangerous, and thus, on the whole, unacceptable. In responding, Nehamas first suggests that Nietzsche severely restricts the audience to whom he addresses his transvaluative teachings: Exemplifying the very attitude that prompts him to reject unconditional codes, Nietzsche does not reject them unconditionally. His demand is only that philosophers, and not all people, "take their stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath them" (TIVII:1) Here, Nehamas suggests that only philosophers -- who, he seems to assume, are not "fools" of the sort Marcel and Nietzsche are worried about -- are to recognize that moral judgment is illusory. In this central respect, Nehamas's Nietzsche seems to remain a Platonist: he tells noble lies to the masses in order to keep them in line, reserving the truth for the intellectually privileged few. No doubt, Nietzsche does restrict the scope of some of his teachings; he has Zarathustra announce, for example, "It is a disgrace [Schmach] to pray! Not for everyone, but for you and me and whoever else has his conscience in his head. For you it is a disgrace to pray" (ZIII:8.2; 227.27-29). I grant in addition that Nietzsche points philosophers beyond dogmatic morality; he agrees with Marcel that nothing on this earth obliges us to be thoughtful or kind. Yet even in the passage Nehamas cites, Nietzsche does not present his teachings to philosophers alone. And if we distinguish more generally between esoteric and exoteric strains in <u><mark>Nietzsche's</u></mark> teachings, then his immoralism, his <u>apparent <mark>advocacy of violence</mark> and oppression, must certainly be included among his teachings</u> for the many. Continues... As long as the illusion of moral judgment holds sway, Nietzsche's question cannot be my guiding question, for as long as that illusion holds, Zarathustra's minotaur rules: good for all, evil for all. <u><mark>A post-moral world</u></mark>, one wherein the minotaur was silenced, <u><mark>would be one in which each of us could determine his</mark> or her <mark>own good</u></mark>; that would have to be a world within which diversity would be encouraged rather than inhibited. <u>But <mark>that</mark>, it might seem, <mark>would entail a</mark> new <mark>form of moral dogmatism</mark>, one with the paradoxical form, "<mark>the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could Nietzsche defend </mark>such a perspective, or <mark>such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone</u>?<strong></mark> </p><p></strong>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</p><p><strong>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p><u>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment<strong></mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p><p></u>Human extinction outweighs and turns their impact</p><p>BOSTROM 2011 </strong>(Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html)</p><p>We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe <u>a</u> better <u><mark>basis for ethical theory</u></mark> in this area <u><mark>can be found in</u></mark> quite a different direction—in <u>a <mark>commitment to the future of humanity</mark> as a vast project</u>, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>aspiration for a better society</mark>—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—<mark>is a part of this projec</u>t</mark>. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … <u><mark>Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project</mark> <mark>of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the</mark> <mark>projects</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>our own personal futures</mark>. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time</u>, considered in isolation from how it got that way. <u>We owe</u>, I think, <u>some loyalty to this project of the human future</u>. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) <u>Since <mark>an existential</mark> <mark>catastrophe would</u></mark> either <u><mark>put an end to the project of the future of humanity</u></mark> or drastically curtail its scope for development, <u>we would</u> seem to <u>have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it</u>, in Adams’ view. We also note that <u>an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences</u>, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, <u>an ethical view emphasizing that <mark>public</mark> <mark>policy should</mark> be determined through informed democratic deliberation</u> by all stakeholders <u>would <mark>favor existential-risk mitigation</mark> if we suppose</u>, as is plausible, <u>that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies</u> upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). <u>We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants</u>.[24] <u><mark>We do not want</mark> <mark>to be the failing link in the chain of generations</mark>, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus</u><strong>. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]</p><p>2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework </p><p>Nye, 86<u></strong> (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)</p><p></u>The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 <u>Imagine </u>that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where <u><mark>an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants</mark> lined up against a wall.</u> When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle <u><mark>and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other</mark>.</u> Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. <u><mark>Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity</mark> by refusing to play his dirty game? The point</u> of the story <u>is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But <mark>at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden?</u></mark> Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? <u><mark>What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons</mark> from a terrorists' nuclear device?</u> At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others<u>? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences?</u> Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. <u>Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.</p></u>
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Neg vs Rutgers wm
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1nc
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case
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
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6
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Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
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Merkle
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1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
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The plan with sales would provide an adequate supply of organs.
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Becker and Elias 14
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Becker and Elias 14
Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
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http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
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Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other orga
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http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
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<h4><strong>The plan with sales would provide an adequate supply of organs. </h4><p>Becker and Elias 14 </p><p></strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u><mark>Paying for organs</mark> </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><mark>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting</mark> <mark>for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other orga</mark>ns. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,254 | 24 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,886 |
This would maximize organ sales
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
|
2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
|
Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
| 1,450 |
<h4>This <strong>would maximize organ sales</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. <mark>2 <u>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
|
Contention 3 Solvency
| null | null | 430,338 | 11 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,887 |
Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights
|
Sharpton 9/29
|
Sharpton 9/29/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas Holder lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements from being dismissed, or altered The principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder
|
Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. combatted efforts towards voter suppression the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously he principle this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued
|
Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights. I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG, whoever he or she may be. We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas. Throughout his tenure, Holder has consistently lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies. No other AG combatted efforts towards voter suppression with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements in the areas of civil rights and voting rights from being dismissed, or altered somehow. The governing principle that this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder.
| 3,812 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG key to sentencing reform and voting rights</h4><p>Sharpton 9/29</strong>/2014 (Rev. Al, President of the National Action Network, Replacing Eric Holder Without Displacing Voting Rights and Civil Rights, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-al-sharpton/replacing-eric-holder-wit_b_5901554.html)</p><p>Almost as quickly as news broke that Attorney General Eric Holder was resigning, people began assessing and critiquing his record. They speculated over his replacement, and will likely continue doing so until an official announcement is made. But amid all the noise, it's important that we do not lose sight of one undeniable reality: Eric <u><mark>Holder has been the best Attorney General this nation has ever had in the area of civil rights and voting rights.</u></mark> I challenge anyone to show me an AG who has done more in this realm than Holder. The bottom line is you can't; his work is simply unmatched. <u><mark>Our job is to ensure that his efforts continue on with the next AG</u></mark>, whoever he or she may be. <u>We in the civil rights community must strongly advocate maintenance and continuance of a Justice Department that will fight aggressively in these areas</u>. Throughout his tenure, <u>Holder</u> has consistently <u>lived up to the notion of advancing civil rights</u> in this country in an effort to right some of our past -- and present -- wrongs. <u><mark>No other AG made the moves he did in terms of addressing <strong>sentencing disparities, unfair mandatory sentencing laws and other discriminatory policies</strong>.</u></mark> <u>No other AG <mark>combatted efforts towards <strong>voter suppression</mark> with lawsuits against new voter ID laws and an end to early voting</u></strong>. No other AG aggressively fought for marriage equality, and against gender inequality as he has. And no other AG, including Bobby Kennedy, personally went to the scene of a civil rights complaint as he did in Ferguson, MO. The list goes on; his track record speaks for itself. Holder may be questioned in other areas, such as civil liberties, but in those areas, he still stands without peer in my judgment. <u>The reality is that his commitment towards justice and equality has been unrivaled, and it is <mark>the same reason why many on the right have attacked him continuously</mark> throughout his time as AG. The issue we confront before we get to who will replace Holder is to prevent his achievements </u>in the areas of civil rights and voting rights <u>from being dismissed, or altered</u> somehow. <u><strong>T<mark>he</u></strong></mark> governing <u><strong><mark>principle</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>this Administration has staked out under Holder must be continued</u></strong></mark>. The who should come from the what (meaning policies); the what should not come from the who. When Holder's resignation went public, we immediately contacted the White House's Office of Engagement to encourage that whoever is advising the president on a replacement consider not just the who, but the what. We are sure that advocates in labor, women's rights, the business community and other interest groups will be weighing in their advice as we weigh in ours to whatever team of advisors will engage in deliberations with the president. As a civil rights leader, it is my duty to advocate on behalf of the voiceless and push for a new AG that will carry on Holder's immense work in this space. Ironically, I was holding a press conference at the National Press Club with the parents of Michael Brown (who was killed by police in Ferguson), and the mother of Eric Garner (who was killed by police in Staten Island from an apparent illegal chokehold), when we received word of Holder's resignation. It was Holder that persistently dealt with policing matters, and just this month even announced a new federal initiative to study racial bias and to build trust between law enforcement and communities. Families like that of Michael Brown, Eric Garner and so many others don't know about lists of potential replacements; they just pray that justice and reform as directed from the top continues to impact police departments and neighborhoods around the country. They <u>just hope that whatever leanings the Justice Department began to show in dealing with police accountability will not be displaced in a Beltway shuffle of who replaces Eric Holder</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
1
| 430,830 | 6 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,888 |
Their epistemology is suspect-Discussion of the ethics of organ sales conceals the coercive political and economic structure that dominate
|
Jaycox 12
|
Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College, Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
|
arguments their arguments can yet be strengthened against their objectors by appeal to the moral epistemology implicit in the preferential option for the poor and the revised use of Western bioethical language specified by the present argument ‘bioethical arguments conceal the coercion underlying all dilemmas involving the option of selling one’s organs Epstein’s scathing indictment of traditional bioethical argumentation ultimately implies the necessity of reforming the use of bioethical language, that it might be more suitable for the ongoing task of moral description and for debunking the inadequate arguments that already exist. By tacitly choosing to exclude functionally coercive systemic factors from his discussion of coercion, Taylor conveniently excuses himself from having to consider whether lack of access to the social and material preconditions for exercising autonomy has any decisive influence upon the agency of those who participate in the organ market as vendors is argued here that the concept of coercion be expanded to include all negative conditions which would have a significant impact upon one’s ability to make medical decisions with an eye toward one’s com- prehensive flourishing precisely because those who are poor and vulnerable experience many global systems and other factors as coercive that do not count as a threat of physical harm or literal violence Moreover, a distinction within autonomy between the possession and exercise of rights also provides an effective way to counter Taylor’s claims, inasmuch as poor persons are often coerced by global economic and health care systems into making what are, in effect, self-exploitative though formally autonomous decisions. claims could be contested even more effectively through a revised use of bioethical language and concepts, one which becomes available through the moral epistemology of the preferential option for the poor
|
arguments can yet be strengthened by appeal to the moral epistemology implicit in the preferential option for the poor bioethical arguments conceal the coercion underlying all dilemmas involving the option of selling one’s organs indictment of traditional bioethical argumentation ultimately implies the necessity of reforming the use of bioethical language for the ongoing task of moral description and for debunking the inadequate arguments that exist By tacitly choosing to exclude functionally coercive systemic factors from his discussion of coercion, Taylor conveniently excuses himself from having to consider whether lack of access to the social and material preconditions for exercising autonomy has any decisive influence upon the agency of those who participate in the organ market that the concept of coercion be expanded to include all negative conditions which would have a significant impact upon one’s ability to make medical decisions with an eye toward one’s com- prehensive flourishing because those who are poor and vulnerable experience many global systems that do not count as a threat of literal violence a distinction within autonomy between the possession and exercise of rights also provides an effective way to counter Taylor’s claims inasmuch as poor persons are often coerced by global economic and health care systems
|
* Challenging fundamental assumptions about the way we conduct politics is necessary for awareness of the motives behind political action—which is essential for any effective solution. The way we know shapes the way we act—our understanding of being shapes possibilities and has profound future consequences.
The arguments of Delmonico, Budiani-Saberi, Satz, Zutlevics, and others against the sale of human organs are already strong arguments. But their arguments can yet be strengthened against their objectors by appeal to the moral epistemology implicit in the preferential option for the poor and the revised use of Western bioethical language specified by the present argument. A move to shift the locus of the debate in this direction has already been anticipated by other studies. Observing that standard ‘bioethical arguments conceal the coercion underlying all dilemmas involving the option of selling one’s organs,’ British bioethicist Miran Epstein seeks to move away from the surface-level question of market legalization and regulation toward the deeper question of whether bioethical arguments concerning organ sales function to conceal the most ethically salient aspect of the global crisis: the influence of descriptively coercive socio-political and socioeconomic structures. 69 Epstein’s scathing indictment of traditional bioethical argumentation ultimately implies the necessity of reforming the use of bioethical language, that it might be more suitable for the ongoing task of moral description and for debunking the inadequate arguments that already exist. For instance, in regard to the arguments offered by Arthur Matas in favor of a legalized and government- regulated market system, one can observe that he recognizes that the exploitation suffered by the poor is one of the two best arguments against his own position (the other being the commodification of the human body).70 However, it becomes apparent that the strength of his own arguments depends upon his audience’s acceptance of his uncritical use of the Western bioethical concepts of autonomy and coercion: ‘If the vendor makes an autonomous decision and, in return, receives a substantial payment that may significantly improve his or her quality of life, we must ask, is this truly exploitation?’ 71 ‘No potential vendor can be coerced by the opportunity to sell an organ.’ 72 For another example, observe Taylor’s somewhat more sophisticated pro-legalization argument. He explicitly limits his discussion of coercion to the interpersonal level, the effect being that only family members of vendors, third-party brokers, and possibly medical professionals would constitute potentially coercive parties. 73 By tacitly choosing to exclude functionally coercive systemic factors from his discussion of coercion, Taylor conveniently excuses himself from having to consider whether lack of access to the social and material preconditions for exercising autonomy has any decisive influence upon the agency of those who participate in the organ market as vendors. He simply assumes that an interpersonal concept of coercion is adequate to the task of moral description at the level of global systems. By contrast, it is argued here that the concept of coercion be expanded to include all negative conditions which would have a significant impact upon one’s ability to make medical decisions with an eye toward one’s com- prehensive flourishing, precisely because those who are poor and vulnerable experience many global systems and other factors as coercive that do not count as a threat of physical harm or literal violence. In this way it is possible to respond most effectively to Matas’s explicit claim that an economic opportunity to sell one’s organs is never coercive, as well as his implicit claim that market participation is the most relevant expression of autonomy – an autonomy which is, in concrete situations of exercise, a non-absolute autonomy of degrees directly dependent upon the social matrix in which an individual happens to be embedded. Moreover, a distinction within autonomy between the possession and exercise of rights also provides an effective way to counter Taylor’s claims, inasmuch as poor persons are often coerced by global economic and health care systems into making what are, in effect, self-exploitative though formally autonomous decisions. Therefore, one could rebut such arguments on their own terms, but these claims could be contested even more effectively through a revised use of bioethical language and concepts, one which becomes available through the moral epistemology of the preferential option for the poor.
| 4,642 |
<h4><strong>Their epistemology is suspect-Discussion of the ethics of organ sales conceals the coercive political and economic structure that dominate</h4><p>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College, Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p>* Challenging fundamental assumptions about the way we conduct politics is necessary for awareness of the motives behind political action—which is essential for any effective solution. The way we know shapes the way we act—our understanding of being shapes possibilities and has profound future consequences.</p><p> The<u> <mark>arguments</u></mark> of Delmonico, Budiani-Saberi, Satz, Zutlevics, and others against the sale of human organs are already strong arguments. But <u>their arguments <mark>can yet be strengthened</mark> against their objectors <mark>by appeal to the moral epistemology implicit in the preferential option for the poor</mark> and the revised use of Western bioethical language specified by the present argument</u>. A move to shift the locus of the debate in this direction has already been anticipated by other studies. Observing that standard <u>‘<mark>bioethical arguments conceal the coercion underlying all dilemmas involving the option of selling one’s organs</u></mark>,’ British bioethicist Miran Epstein seeks to move away from the surface-level question of market legalization and regulation toward the deeper question of whether bioethical arguments concerning organ sales function to conceal the most ethically salient aspect of the global crisis: the influence of descriptively coercive socio-political and socioeconomic structures. 69 <u>Epstein’s scathing <mark>indictment of traditional bioethical argumentation ultimately implies the necessity of reforming the use of bioethical language</mark>, that it might be more suitable <mark>for the ongoing task of moral description and for debunking the inadequate arguments that </mark>already<mark> exist</mark>.</u> For instance, in regard to the arguments offered by Arthur Matas in favor of a legalized and government- regulated market system, one can observe that he recognizes that the exploitation suffered by the poor is one of the two best arguments against his own position (the other being the commodification of the human body).70 However, it becomes apparent that the strength of his own arguments depends upon his audience’s acceptance of his uncritical use of the Western bioethical concepts of autonomy and coercion: ‘If the vendor makes an autonomous decision and, in return, receives a substantial payment that may significantly improve his or her quality of life, we must ask, is this truly exploitation?’ 71 ‘No potential vendor can be coerced by the opportunity to sell an organ.’ 72 For another example, observe Taylor’s somewhat more sophisticated pro-legalization argument. He explicitly limits his discussion of coercion to the interpersonal level, the effect being that only family members of vendors, third-party brokers, and possibly medical professionals would constitute potentially coercive parties. 73 <u><mark>By tacitly choosing to exclude functionally coercive systemic factors from his discussion of coercion, Taylor conveniently excuses himself from having to consider whether lack of access to the social and material preconditions for exercising autonomy has any decisive influence upon the agency of those who participate in the organ market</mark> as vendors</u>. He simply assumes that an interpersonal concept of coercion is adequate to the task of moral description at the level of global systems. By contrast, it <u>is argued here <mark>that the concept of coercion be expanded to include all negative conditions which would have a significant impact upon one’s ability to make medical decisions with an eye toward one’s com- prehensive flourishing</u></mark>, <u>precisely <mark>because those who are poor and vulnerable experience many global systems</mark> and other factors as coercive <mark>that do not count as a threat of </mark>physical harm or <mark>literal violence</u></mark>. In this way it is possible to respond most effectively to Matas’s explicit claim that an economic opportunity to sell one’s organs is never coercive, as well as his implicit claim that market participation is the most relevant expression of autonomy – an autonomy which is, in concrete situations of exercise, a non-absolute autonomy of degrees directly dependent upon the social matrix in which an individual happens to be embedded. <u>Moreover, <mark>a distinction within autonomy between the possession and exercise of rights also provides an effective way to counter Taylor’s claims</mark>, <mark>inasmuch as poor persons are often coerced by global economic and health care systems</mark> into making what are, in effect, self-exploitative though formally autonomous decisions.</u> Therefore, one could rebut such arguments on their own terms, but these <u>claims could be contested even more effectively through a revised use of bioethical language and concepts, one which becomes available through the moral epistemology of the preferential option for the poor</u><strong>. </p></strong>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
2NC
|
Epistemology – 2NC
| 430,863 | 1 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,889 |
The government purchasing approach of the plan would end the current discrimination in transplant availability
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Berger 11
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Berger 11 Alexander Berger is a research analyst for GiveWell, a nonprofit that researches charities to help donors decide where to give. The New York Times December 6, 2011 Why Selling Kidneys Should Be Legal SECTION: Section ; Column 0; National Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Pg. lexis
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the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not have any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly Only the government would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed. The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare.
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the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not h ve any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly Only the government would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed. The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare
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It has been illegal to compensate kidney donors in any way since 1984. The fear behind the law -- that a rich tycoon could take advantage of someone desperately poor and persuade that person to sell an organ for a pittance -- is understandable. But the truth is that the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family (or, as Steve Jobs did for a liver transplant in 2009, by traveling to a region with a shorter list). Worst of all, the ban encourages an international black market, where desperate people do end up selling their organs, without protection, fair compensation or proper medical care. A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not have any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly -- most experts say somewhere in the ballpark of $50,000 would make sense. Only the government or a chosen nonprofit would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed. The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare. Ideally, so many donors would come forward that no patient would be left on the waiting list.
| 1,439 |
<h4>The government purchasing approach of the plan would end the current discrimination in transplant availability</h4><p><strong>Berger 11</strong> Alexander Berger is a research analyst for GiveWell, a nonprofit that researches charities to help donors decide where to give. The New York Times December 6, 2011 Why Selling Kidneys Should Be Legal SECTION: Section ; Column 0; National Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Pg. lexis</p><p>It has been illegal to compensate kidney donors in any way since 1984. The fear behind the law -- that a rich tycoon could take advantage of someone desperately poor and persuade that person to sell an organ for a pittance -- is understandable. But the truth is that <u><mark>the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor.</mark> When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family</u> (or, as Steve Jobs did for a liver transplant in 2009, by traveling to a region with a shorter list). Worst of all, the ban encourages an international black market, where desperate people do end up selling their organs, without protection, fair compensation or proper medical care. <u><mark>A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not h</mark>a<mark>ve any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly</mark> </u>-- most experts say somewhere in the ballpark of $50,000 would make sense. <u><mark>Only the government</mark> </u>or a chosen nonprofit<u> <mark>would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed.</u> <u>The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare</mark>.</u><strong> Ideally, so many donors would come forward that no patient would be left on the waiting list.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,864 | 9 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,890 |
government purchaser avoids exploitation
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
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While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
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organs available for transplantation, we must give ration to any option that may make up the shortfal The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, , safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
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While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of <mark>organs available for transplantation, we must give</mark> urgent conside<mark>ration to any option that may make up the shortfal</mark>l. </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option.<u> <mark>The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, </mark>for example<mark>, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></mark>
|
Contention 3 Solvency
| null | null | 430,342 | 13 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,891 |
Sentencing reform key to US credibility
|
CGS 2013
|
CGS 2013 (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)
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The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
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The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
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The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare.
| 569 |
<h4><strong>Sentencing reform key to US credibility</h4><p>CGS 2013</strong> (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)</p><p><u>The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates</u>. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. <u><mark>The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform</u>,</mark> and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit <u><mark>prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society</u>. <u><strong>As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
1
| 430,865 | 7 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,892 |
Commodification decreases value to life
|
Varjavand 12
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Varjavand 12 Reza Varjavand (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma), associate professor of economics and finance at the Graham School of management, Saint Xavier University, of Chicago. Life Arts 2/18/2012 Legalized Market for Human Kidneys: a Problem or a Panacea? http://www.opednews.com/articles/Legalized-Market-for-Human-by-Reza-varjavand-120215-546.html
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there are many things people do charitably that they are not willing to do for money. Donating an organ is a compassionate act, while selling it is considered callous and mercenary and our society is not yet ready to sanction it Commoditization of the human body will diminish the dignity and inviolability of human life.
]
Then there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. . Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise give cause for concern there are shades of the 1930s, when global finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices China is perhaps even more fragile its economic growth depend on foreign investment Both will be constricted in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
|
there are consequences of a collapse of the world's financial architecture. Russia and China's rise give cause for concern. there are shades of the 30s, when global finance ground to a halt peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers rose up rogue states may choose to become reckless with their nuclear toys Russian stock market has demonstrated fragility China is even more fragile, None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
|
Foremost, there are many things people do charitably that they are not willing to do for money. Donating an organ is a compassionate act, while selling it is considered callous and mercenary and our society is not yet ready to sanction it. Even though the monetary reward is tempting, most people donate a kidney for the good feeling of personal satisfaction, the pride that comes with a selfless act of kindness, and the joy of saving someone's life. Commoditization of the human body will undermine such altruistic gestures, and diminish the dignity and inviolability of human life. Moral and ethical values, according to these people, should not be sacrificed for monetary gain.
U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war
Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008 [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
| 3,428 |
<h4><strong>Commodification decreases value to life</h4><p>Varjavand 12</strong> Reza Varjavand (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma), associate professor of economics and finance at the Graham School of management, Saint Xavier University, of Chicago. Life Arts 2/18/2012 Legalized Market for Human Kidneys: a Problem or a Panacea? http://www.opednews.com/articles/Legalized-Market-for-Human-by-Reza-varjavand-120215-546.html</p><p>Foremost, <u>there are many things people do charitably that they are not willing to do for money. Donating an organ is a compassionate act, while selling it is considered callous and mercenary and our society is not yet ready to sanction it</u>. Even though the monetary reward is tempting, most people donate a kidney for the good feeling of personal satisfaction, the pride that comes with a selfless act of kindness, and the joy of saving someone's life. <u>Commoditization of the human body will </u>undermine such altruistic gestures, and<u> diminish the dignity and inviolability of human life.</u><strong> Moral and ethical values, according to these people, should not be sacrificed for monetary gain.</p><p>U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for nuclear war</p><p>Friedberg and Schoenfeld</strong>, 20<strong>08 </strong> [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html<u>]</p><p>Then <mark>there are</u></mark> the dolorous <u><mark>consequences of a</u></mark> potential <u><mark>collapse of the world's financial architecture.</mark> </u>For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos<u>.<mark> Russia</mark>'s new militancy <mark>and China's</mark> seemingly relentless <mark>rise </u></mark>also <u><mark>give cause for concern</u>.</mark> If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario <u><mark>there are shades of the</mark> 19<mark>30s,</mark> <mark>when global</u></mark> trade and <u><mark>finance ground</mark> nearly <mark>to a halt</mark>, the <mark>peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers</mark> led by the remorseless fanatics who <mark>rose up</mark> on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that <mark>rogue states may choose to become</u></mark> ever more <u><mark>reckless with their nuclear toys</mark>, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors</u> even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the <u><mark>Russian stock market has demonstrated</mark> the <mark>fragility</mark> of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices</u>, now driven down by the global slowdown. <u><mark>China is</mark> perhaps <mark>even more fragile</u>,</mark> <u>its economic growth depend</u>ing heavily <u>on foreign investment</u> and access to foreign markets. <u>Both will</u> now <u>be constricted</u>, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest <u>in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. <mark>None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders</mark> of these countrie<strong><mark>s seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
2NC
|
Epistemology – 2NC
| 42,129 | 155 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,893 |
Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98 J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;
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Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution
|
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
|
Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
| 727 |
<h4>Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing</h4><p><strong>Radcliffe-Richards et al 98</strong> J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;</p><p>Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales</p><p>http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf</p><p><u><mark>Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor.</mark> </u>This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, <u>all <mark>purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution</u>. [12]</p></mark>
|
Contention 3 Solvency
| null | null | 430,346 | 7 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,894 |
The legalization of sales to the government, rather than purchases in a open market would mean equitable distribution of organs -- and avoid crowd out
|
Gill 2
|
Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
|
/v012/12.1gill.html
it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
|
are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria . Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate our proposal will not be affected either way reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one
|
Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
First, we are arguing for the claim that it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. 2 A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. As already noted in our preliminary points, our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
| 11,563 |
<h4>The legalization of sales to the government, rather than purchases in a open market would mean equitable distribution of organs -- and avoid crowd out</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p></u>First, we are arguing for the claim that<u> it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We <mark>are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation</mark>; </u>that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. <u>We <mark>assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria</mark>, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs<mark>. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market</mark>.</u> 2 <u>A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products</u>, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe <u>the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die.</u> We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. <u>Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys</u>. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. <u><mark>Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys.</u> <u>For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it</u></mark> will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it <u><mark>will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney.</u> <u>Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate</u></mark>, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. <u>The important point is that <mark>our proposal will not be affected either way</mark>.</u> As already noted in our preliminary points, <u>our proposal can be <mark>reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one</mark>. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well. </p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,594 | 8 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,895 |
Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, anti- Americanism is becoming entrenched America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is a core challenge for the global rule of law
|
America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power U S must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, , a core challenge for global rule of law
|
The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, and that anti- Americanism increasingly is becoming entrenched in the twenty-first century. 3 4 America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, and must remain, a core challenge for all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are the guardians of tomorrow's global rule of law
| 2,254 |
<h4><strong>Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions</h4><p>Koh 2007</strong> <u><strong>(Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)</p><p></u></strong>The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that <u>the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11,</u> and that <u>anti- Americanism</u> increasingly <u>is becoming entrenched</u> in the twenty-first century. 3 4 <u><strong><mark>America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power</u></strong></mark>. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, <strong>holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others</u></strong></mark> .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, <u><mark>America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation</u></mark> and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. <u><mark>Protecting our human rights system and reputation is</u>, </mark>and must remain<mark>, <u><strong>a core challenge</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are <u>the</u> guardians of tomorrow's <u><strong><mark>global rule of law</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
1
| 430,866 | 7 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,896 |
Yes extinction—consensus of recent studies—Robock indicts don’t apply
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Farnsworth 2011
|
Farnsworth 2011 – editor and a contributor for Arms Control Now (2/18, Tim, Arms Control Now, “Thinking Existentially about the Worldwide Threat”, http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/02/18/thinking-existentially-about-the-worldwide-threat/, WEA)
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A panel of scientists provided a useful update today on the latest thinking the nuclear Sword of Damocles still hangs over all nations Georgiy Stenchikov (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology), Luke Oman (NASA Goddard Space Flight Center), and Michael Mills (National Center for Atmospheric Research) shared results benefiting from extensive studies in recent decades, such as massive forest fires, volcanic eruptions, and oil well fires. Unlike the “nuclear winter” studies of the 1980s the latest research looked at limited nuclear war soot would be lofted into the stratosphere adversely affecting the ozone layer, world temperatures, and precipitation for years.
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A panel of scientists provided the latest thinking Abdullah University NASA and N C A R shared results from extensive studies in recent decades, such as forest fires Unlike the “nuclear winter” studies of the 1980s research looked at limited nuclear war soot would be lofted affecting ozone temperatures, and precipitation
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A panel of scientists provided a useful update today on the latest thinking about the climatic consequences of nuclear weapons use. The presentation provided a grim reminder that the nuclear Sword of Damocles still hangs over all nations of the earth, nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike – notwithstanding the significant achievement of New START ratification by the United States and Russia.¶ At the annual meeting in Washington of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Georgiy Stenchikov (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology), Luke Oman (NASA Goddard Space Flight Center), and Michael Mills (National Center for Atmospheric Research) shared results of their research, benefiting from extensive studies of related phenomenon in recent decades, such as massive forest fires, volcanic eruptions, and oil well fires. Unlike the “nuclear winter” studies of the 1980s, which focused on the impact of an all-out US-Soviet nuclear exchange, the latest research looked at the environment effects of a more limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan.¶ The speakers reported on their estimates of the environmental consequences resulting from theoretical detonation of 100 15kt-yield nuclear weapons over Indian and Pakistani cities. In such an exchange, millions of tons of soot in the smoke plumes from urban fires would be lofted into the stratosphere, circulating around the earth within days, but adversely affecting the ozone layer, world temperatures, and precipitation for years.
| 1,517 |
<h4><strong>Yes extinction—consensus of recent studies—Robock indicts don’t apply</h4><p>Farnsworth 2011</strong> – editor and a contributor for Arms Control Now (2/18, Tim, Arms Control Now, “Thinking Existentially about the Worldwide Threat”, http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/02/18/thinking-existentially-about-the-worldwide-threat/, WEA)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A panel of scientists</strong> provided </mark>a useful <strong>update today on <mark>the latest thinking</u></strong></mark> about the climatic consequences of nuclear weapons use. The presentation provided a grim reminder that <u>the nuclear Sword of Damocles still hangs over all nations</u> of the earth, nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike – notwithstanding the significant achievement of New START ratification by the United States and Russia.¶ At the annual meeting in Washington of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, <u>Georgiy Stenchikov (King <mark>Abdullah University</mark> of Science and Technology), Luke Oman (<mark>NASA</mark> Goddard Space Flight Center), <mark>and</mark> Michael Mills (<mark>N</mark>ational <mark>C</mark>enter for <mark>A</mark>tmospheric <mark>R</mark>esearch) <strong><mark>shared results</u></strong></mark> of their research, <u>benefiting <mark>from <strong>extensive studies</u></strong></mark> of related phenomenon <u><mark>in recent decades, such as</mark> massive <mark>forest fires</mark>, volcanic eruptions, and oil well fires. <strong><mark>Unlike the “nuclear winter” studies of the 1980s</u></strong></mark>, which focused on the impact of an all-out US-Soviet nuclear exchange, <u>the latest <mark>research looked at</u></mark> the environment effects of a more <u><strong><mark>limited nuclear war</strong></mark> </u>between India and Pakistan.¶ The speakers reported on their estimates of the environmental consequences resulting from theoretical detonation of 100 15kt-yield nuclear weapons over Indian and Pakistani cities. In such an exchange, millions of tons of <u><mark>soot</mark> </u>in the smoke plumes from urban fires <u><mark>would be lofted</mark> into the stratosphere</u>, circulating around the earth within days, but <u>adversely <mark>affecting </mark>the <mark>ozone</mark> layer, world <mark>temperatures, and precipitation</mark> for years.</p></u>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
2NC
|
Epistemology – 2NC
| 117,955 | 15 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,897 |
Government purchaser also avoids exploitation of poor donors
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
organs available for transplantation, we must give ration to any option that may make up the shortfal The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, , safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4><u>G</u>overnment purchaser also avoids exploitation of poor donors</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of <mark>organs available for transplantation, we must give</mark> urgent conside<mark>ration to any option that may make up the shortfal</mark>l. </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option.<u> <mark>The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, </mark>for example<mark>, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,898 |
Iran Proves success; recent problems have been because of budget cuts
|
Beard et al 13
|
Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses
|
The Iranian system has been successful historically, increasing the numbers of transplants performed by 577 percent
However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes Zargooshi (2008a, b) reports that the recent annual kidney transplant figure has decreased and now amounts to about one-tenth of the annual number of new ESRD patients. Obviously, the official public payment to donors of Tolman Imio (around U.S.$1,000) has been eroded by inflation. Kidney vendors seem to ask for increasing private copayments from the re¬cipients. The "market price" for a donation is now likely to be around three times the official public payment. During certain periods, it is reported that the public system was unable to pay any compensation to donors. Lack of public funds seems to have also eroded the formerly strictly regulated donor system, and today there is a tolerated "free market" in which recipient income status has become a major determinant in the acquisition of a kidney. Thus, although the Iranian experience strongly suggested the viability of compensated living-donor kidney supply in some settings, it also provides a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of underfunding for such systems.
|
Iranian system has been successful historically, increasing transplants performed by 577 percent
However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes.
|
The Iranian system has, by most accounts, been successful historically, increasing the numbers of transplants performed by 577 percent between 1988 and 2003. This result has been obtained within a bureaucratized framework in which religious judges examine potential living donors, looking for signs of coercion or mixed motivations. Great emphasis has been placed on continuing care for donors, with medical follow-up, insurance benefits, and so on made widely available, at least in principle. Foreigners may not donate or receive a transplant in Iran, except under special, rare circumstances. This latter practice has apparently gone some distance in allowing Iran to avoid the sorts of com¬mercialization that would offend ethical sensibilities.
However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes. Zargooshi (2008a, b) reports that the recent annual kidney transplant figure has decreased and now amounts to about one-tenth of the annual number of new ESRD patients. Obviously, the official public payment to donors of Tolman Imio (around U.S.$1,000) has been eroded by inflation. Kidney vendors seem to ask for increasing private copayments from the re¬cipients. The "market price" for a donation is now likely to be around three times the official public payment. During certain periods, it is reported that the public system was unable to pay any compensation to donors. Lack of public funds seems to have also eroded the formerly strictly regulated donor system, and today there is a tolerated "free market" in which recipient income status has become a major determinant in the acquisition of a kidney. Thus, although the Iranian experience strongly suggested the viability of compensated living-donor kidney supply in some settings, it also provides a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of underfunding for such systems.
| 1,872 |
<h4>Iran Proves success; recent problems have been because of budget cuts</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p><u>The <mark>Iranian system has</u></mark>, by most accounts, <u><mark>been successful historically, increasing</mark> the numbers of <mark>transplants performed by 577 percent</u></mark> between 1988 and 2003. This result has been obtained within a bureaucratized framework in which religious judges examine potential living donors, looking for signs of coercion or mixed motivations. Great emphasis has been placed on continuing care for donors, with medical follow-up, insurance benefits, and so on made widely available, at least in principle. Foreigners may not donate or receive a transplant in Iran, except under special, rare circumstances. This latter practice has apparently gone some distance in allowing Iran to avoid the sorts of com¬mercialization that would offend ethical sensibilities.</p><p><u><mark>However, a recent lack of public funding seems to have undermined the past successes</u>.<u></mark> Zargooshi (2008a, b) reports that the recent annual kidney transplant figure has decreased and now amounts to about one-tenth of the annual number of new ESRD patients. Obviously, the official public payment to donors of Tolman Imio (around U.S.$1,000) has been eroded by inflation. Kidney vendors seem to ask for increasing private copayments from the re¬cipients. The "market price" for a donation is now likely to be around three times the official public payment. During certain periods, it is reported that the public system was unable to pay any compensation to donors. Lack of public funds seems to have also eroded the formerly strictly regulated donor system, and today there is a tolerated "free market" in which recipient income status has become a major determinant in the acquisition of a kidney. Thus, although the Iranian experience strongly suggested the viability of compensated living-donor kidney supply in some settings, it also provides a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of underfunding for such systems.</p><p> </p></u>
|
Contention 3 Solvency
| null | null | 430,448 | 7 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
|
Kentucky
|
2
|
Michigan Bayley-Peilen
|
Matheson
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,899 |
Credible heg solves several existential impacts
|
Keck 2014
|
Keck 2014 (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)
|
on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar , much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world there is good reason to fear relative decline compared with China hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority can govern interactions We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East As China grows more powerful, it has sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This has to come at the expense of other powers these have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day All of this highlights the advantages of a unipolar system although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of casualties America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests even if the transitions are managed successfully, there are significant negative effects on international relations it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples include climate change, health pandemics terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and compel others to fall in line the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
|
It’s difficult to imagine China defending open order if it were a power transition periods have been the most destabilizing eras in history the rise of new powers necessitates revisions to rules This is impossible to do in any organized fashion although the U.S. has asserted military force frequently its wars have been fairly limited preponderance has prevented great power war, and restrained regional powers from coming to blows. the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Iran-Iraq wars many challenges can only be solved through multilateral coop Examples include climate change, pandemics terrorism financial crises, and prolif A unipolar system, is uniquely suited for organizing global action preponderance lessens the intensity of competition among players
|
Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
| 4,352 |
<h4><strong>Credible heg solves several existential impacts</h4><p>Keck 2014</strong> (Zachary, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/,)</p><p>Still, <u>on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world</u>, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, <u>it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly</u> if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. <u><mark>It’s difficult to imagine China defending</mark> a rule-based, <mark>open </mark>international <mark>order if it were a</mark> unipolar </u><mark>power<u></mark>, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world</u>. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, <u>there is good reason to fear</u> its <u>relative decline compared with China</u> and other emerging nations. To begin with, <u>hegemonic <mark>transition periods have </mark>historically<mark> been <strong>the most destabilizing eras</strong> in history</u></mark>. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). <u>Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, <mark>the rise of new </mark>global <mark>powers</mark> <mark>necessitates revisions to </mark>the “<mark>rules </mark>of the road.” <mark>This is <strong></mark>nearly <mark>impossible</strong> to do in any organized fashion </mark>given the anarchic nature of the international system, where</u> there is <u>no central authority</u> that <u>can govern interactions</u> between states. <u>We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific</u> (<u>and</u> arguably the <u>Middle East</u>). <u>As China grows more</u> economically and militarily <u>powerful, it has</u> unsurprisingly <u>sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This</u> necessarily <u>has to come at the expense of other powers</u>, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, <u>these</u> powers <u>have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation <strong>grows more tense</strong> with each passing day</u>. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. <u>All of this highlights</u> some of <u>the advantages of a unipolar system</u>. Namely, <u><mark>although the U.S. has asserted military force</u></mark> quite <u><mark>frequently</u></mark> in the post-Cold War era, <u>it has only fought weak powers and thus <mark>its wars have been <strong>fairly limited</strong> </mark>in terms of</u> the number of <u>casualties</u> involved. At the same time, <u>America’s <mark>preponderance</mark> of power <mark>has prevented </mark>a <strong><mark>great power war</strong>, and </mark>even <mark>restrained </mark>major <strong><mark>regional powers from coming to blows.</u></strong></mark> For instance, <u><mark>the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the </mark>Israeli-Arab or <mark>Iran-Iraq wars </mark>of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises <strong>dramatically</strong>. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers</u> like Japan <u>acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests</u> against their newly empowered rivals. But <u>even if the transitions</u> caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises <u>are managed successfully, there are</u> still likely to be <u>significant negative effects on international relations</u>. In today’s “globalized” world, <u>it is commonly asserted that <mark>many </mark>of the defining <mark>challenges </mark>of our era <mark>can only be solved through multilateral coop</mark>eration. <mark>Examples</u> </mark>of this <u><mark>include <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong></mark>health <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>, organized crime and <u><strong><mark>terrorism</strong></mark>, <strong>global <mark>financial crises</strong>, and </mark>the <strong><mark>prolif</mark>eration of weapons of mass destruction</u></strong>, among many others. <u><mark>A unipolar system,</u> </mark>for all its limitations, <u><mark>is <strong>uniquely suited</strong> for organizing </mark>effective <strong><mark>global action</strong></mark> on these transnational issues</u>. This is because <u>there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and</u>, to some degree, <u>compel others to fall in line</u>. In addition, <u>the unipole’s <mark>preponderance </mark>of power <strong><mark>lessens the intensity of competition</strong> among </mark>the global <mark>players </mark>involved</u>. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that <u>global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War<strong>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs cornell KR
|
1nc
|
1
| 45,610 | 739 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,900 |
Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing – experience with egg donations proves
|
Sobota 4
|
Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis
|
, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns In the proposed market system for organ procurement, the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices . With only moderate prices being paid , economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections , and thus no economic coercion would occur. Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical risks involved." These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
|
economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices With only moderate prices being paid economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections thus no economic coercion dditionally arket for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women
|
A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement
The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145 With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
| 1,526 |
<h4>Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing – experience with egg donations proves</h4><p><strong>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement</p><p>The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First<u>, the <mark>economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns</mark> </u>about becoming a donor. n144 <u>In the proposed market system for organ procurement, </u>either OPOs or<u> <mark>the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices</mark> </u>paid for organs<u>.</u> n145 <u><mark>With only moderate prices being paid</mark> </u>to organ donors<u>, <mark>economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections</mark> </u>to donation<u>, and <mark>thus no economic coercion</mark> would occur.</u> n146 <u>A<mark>dditionally</mark>, the current m<mark>arket</mark> system <mark>for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement</mark>.</u> n147 <u><strong>A <mark>majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women</strong></mark>, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical</u> [*1246] <u>risks involved." </u>n148<u> These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,597 | 8 | 17,095 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| 565,252 |
A
|
Cedanats
|
1
|
Emporia State Perretta-Turley
|
Eriksen
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Cedanats-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,901 |
Identifying root cause is not only incorrect, but destructive. Justifies atrocities and solution failures.
|
Morson 07
|
Morson 07 (Gary, Professor of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History at Northwestern, “Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely,” P. 152-4)
|
intellectuals seek “root cause” revolutionaries reduce the complexities of social ills to a single conspiracy or institution intellectuals view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws this habit of thought feeds utopianism because if the diversity of misery had a single cause then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing What could be easier Abolish private property and evil will disappear Looking back on the twentieth century the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In order to grasp events more easily we reduce countless infinitesimal forces to a single cause so social scientists look for some super-cause that sums up all those small actions. logical fallacies in simplification assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven social theorists favor generalizations permitting a simple story They find what they seek when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.” In disciplines pretending to be social sciences
Postmodernism )
Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war, famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the subversive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations, question our faith in science, reason, and logic, or reinscribe questions in new contexts, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of theory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privileges no one narrative or understanding over another, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another?
90
there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing . The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
intellectuals seek “root cause this feeds utopianism the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause logical fallacies in simplification when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.”
world experiences , war, famine, problems emerge and solutions will be sought. we might problematize current knowledge question our faith in science, reason, logic, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the search for understanding seems absurd. If we abandon logic and reason, dump objectivity , and succumb to blind relativism how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another?
utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. we are likely to to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
If Levin resembled so may intellectuals in his time and ours, he might seek “root cause” (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of historical events in a single decision, an much as revolutionaries often reduce the complexities of social ills to a single conspiracy or institution, so intellectuals often view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws. It is just this habit of thought that feeds utopianism, because if the diversity of evil an misery had a single cause, then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing What could be easier? Abolish private property, alter the way children are educated, pass laws to regulate morals according to a given code, and evil will disappear or, at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. Looking back on the twentieth century, we may wonder whether the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In fact, many things happen contingently, just “for some reason.” Friction When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong. When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent, whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty. flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains, one cannot understand in what difficulties constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119) The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction: "Countless minor incidents —the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119). No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340). Friction defeats the reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it? TTic Elemental Force 'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say: The bailiff listened attentively, and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified, and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other expression than "as God wills." (165) Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it. In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force" when its outcome is cruel. Ihe rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely. Clauscwitz's explanation stops at friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point for understanding why some plans arc more likely to fail than others. In order to grasp the course of events more easily, we tend to reduce the countless infinitesimal forces making up the elemental force to a single cause. After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And so historians and social scientists naturally look for some super-cause that sums up all those small actions. They may presume laws or postulate narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the logical fallacies in both forms of simplification, which, at some point, either assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven. Historians, social theorists, and biographers favor generalizations or symmetries permitting a clear analysis or simple story. They find what they seek, their success demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.” In disciplines pretending to be social sciences, it is repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear.
A. Abandoning calculability leaves no way to measure between competing policy options
Jarvis, senior lecturer @ University of Australia, 2K
(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism )
To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding, the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war, famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the subversive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations, question our faith in science, reason, and logic, or reinscribe questions in new contexts, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of theory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privileges no one narrative or understanding over another, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another?
B.
Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
Allison 90, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”)
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
| 10,216 |
<h4>Identifying root cause is not only incorrect, but destructive. Justifies atrocities and solution failures.</h4><p><strong>Morson 07<u></strong> (Gary, Professor of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History at Northwestern, “Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely,” P. 152-4)</p><p></u>If Levin resembled so may <u><mark>intellectuals</u></mark> in his time and ours, he might <u><mark>seek “root cause</mark>”</u> (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of historical events in a single decision, an much as <u>revolutionaries</u> often <u>reduce the complexities of social ills to a single</u> <u>conspiracy or institution</u>, so <u>intellectuals</u> often <u>view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws</u>. It is just <u><mark>this</u></mark> <u>habit of thought</u> that <u><mark>feeds utopianism</u></mark>, <u>because if the diversity of</u> evil an <u>misery had a single cause</u>, <u>then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing</u> <u>What could be easier</u>? <u>Abolish private property</u>, alter the way children are educated, pass laws to regulate morals according to a given code, <u>and evil will disappear</u> or, at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. <u>Looking back on the twentieth century</u>, we may wonder whether <u><mark>the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause</mark> of human misery.</u> In fact, many things happen contingently, just “for some reason.” Friction When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong. When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent, whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty. flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains, one cannot understand in what difficulties constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119) The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction: "Countless minor incidents —the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119). No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340). Friction defeats the reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it? TTic Elemental Force 'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say: The bailiff listened attentively, and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified, and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other expression than "as God wills." (165) Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it. In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force" when its outcome is cruel. Ihe rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely. Clauscwitz's explanation stops at friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point for understanding why some plans arc more likely to fail than others. <u>In order to grasp</u> the course of <u>events more easily</u>, <u>we</u> tend to <u>reduce</u> the <u>countless infinitesimal forces</u> making up the elemental force <u>to a single cause</u>. After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And <u>so</u> historians and <u>social scientists</u> naturally <u>look for some</u> <u>super-cause that sums up all those small actions.</u> They may presume laws or postulate narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the <u><mark>logical fallacies in</u></mark> both forms of <u><mark>simplification</u></mark>, which, at some point, either <u>assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven</u>. Historians, <u>social theorists</u>, and biographers <u>favor generalizations</u> or symmetries <u>permitting a</u> clear analysis or <u>simple story</u>. <u>They find what they seek</u>, their success demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that <u><mark>when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.”</u></mark> <u>In disciplines pretending to be social sciences</u><strong>, it is repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear. </p><p>A. Abandoning calculability leaves no way to measure between competing policy options </p><p>Jarvis</strong>, senior lecturer @ University of Australia, <strong>2K</p><p></strong>(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of <u>Postmodernism )</p><p></u>To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding, the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. <u>Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a<mark> world</mark> much the same as today, one that <mark>experiences</mark> the recurring problems of inequality, injustice<mark>, war, famine, </mark>violence, and conflict. Various <mark>problems </mark>will <mark>emerge and solutions </mark>to them <mark>will be sought.</mark> These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the subversive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while <mark>we might problematize current knowledge </mark>and interpretations, <mark>question our faith in science, reason, </mark>and <mark>logic,</mark> or reinscribe questions in new contexts, <mark>to suppose these endeavors contrary to </mark>the activity of theory and <mark>the search for </mark>meaning and <mark>understanding seems </mark>plainly <mark>absurd. If we abandon </mark>the principles of <mark>logic and reason, dump </mark>the yardsticks of <mark>objectivity </mark>and assessment<mark>, and succumb to </mark>a <mark>blind relativism</mark> that privileges no one narrative or understanding over another, <mark>how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another?<strong></mark> </p><p></u>B. </p><p>Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought</p><p>Allison 90</strong>, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19<u>90</u> (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) </p><p>And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, <u>there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism.</u> As Raymond Frey puts it, <u><mark>utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing</mark> .</u>.. [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. <u><mark>The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people.</u></mark> <u>Without</u> a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) <u>or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason,</u> <u><mark>we are likely to</mark> </u>turn towards Bentham and <mark>to<u> judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.</p></u></mark>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
2NC
|
AT: Root Cause
| 15,781 | 69 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,902 |
Organ sales are key—artificial organs can’t solve
|
O'Sullivan 11
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O'Sullivan 11 Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html
|
the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the artificial growth of organs in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that this is still a science in its early stages It is likely that this will not become as widespread as transplantation for at least a decade ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate government funding to the development of embryonic technology The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards
|
artificial growth of organs is still a in its early stages this will not becom widespread ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate funding The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards
|
As the demand for organs rises, and waiting list times stretch out by years, it seems logical that the illegal organ trade will grow. A significant improvement in the lifestyles of first world countries and new cures for organ-destroying disease may reduce the demand for organs. However, the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the artificial growth of organs in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that while this is still a science in its early stages, these organs would be a healthy clone of the organ in need of replacing and would contain the patient’s DNA, thus reducing the risk of rejection. It is likely that this will not become as widespread as transplantation for at least a decade; ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public. It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to allocate government funding to the development of embryonic technology. In the face of a possible solution to the exploitative organ trade, is it morally better to allow the destruction of embryos or to allow the organ trade, which harms donors and recipients, to continue? These are questions which those in government and medical technology sectors must address. The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ; it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems.
| 2,333 |
<h4>Organ <u>sales </u>are key—artificial organs can’t solve </h4><p><strong>O'Sullivan 11</strong> Sophia O'Sullivan, historical contributor 9 August 2011 Heart to Heart- An Investigation of Globalisation and the Illegal Organ Trade http://smartsgroupd.blogspot.com/p/sophia.html</p><p>As the demand for organs rises, and waiting list times stretch out by years, it seems logical that the illegal organ trade will grow. A significant improvement in the lifestyles of first world countries and new cures for organ-destroying disease may reduce the demand for organs. However, <u>the best alternative to organ transplantation appears to be the <mark>artificial growth of organs</mark> in a laboratory. The Human Genome Project reports that </u>while <u>this <mark>is still a</mark> science <mark>in its early stages</u></mark>, these organs would be a healthy clone of the organ in need of replacing and would contain the patient’s DNA, thus reducing the risk of rejection. <u>It is likely that <mark>this will not becom</mark>e as <mark>widespread</mark> as transplantation for at least a decade</u>; <u><mark>ethical, legal and clinical concerns must be addressed before such a treatment is perfected and offered to the public.</mark> It is interesting to note that, at present, these organs are grown from embryonic stem cells, a process which many consider unethical. It is for this reason that this <mark>science has stalled; conservative legislators refuse to</mark> <mark>allocate</mark> government <mark>funding</mark> to the development of embryonic technology</u>. In the face of a possible solution to the exploitative organ trade, is it morally better to allow the destruction of embryos or to allow the organ trade, which harms donors and recipients, to continue? These are questions which those in government and medical technology sectors must address.<u> <mark>The impact that this “organ growing” has on the illegal organ trade will undoubtedly be determined by the cost to the party in need of an organ</mark>;</u> it is safer and preferable than travelling overseas for a transplant but if it is significantly more expensive the organ trade may still thrive. Another possibility is that the organ trade will be opened to classes in the donor country; relatively wealthy residents in a poor country may be able to buy organs from those who would have previously sold organs to foreigners. There is an increased international awareness of the epidemic of the organ trade, and legislation of both vendors and recipients is becoming tougher. However, <u><mark>if the international response is to be truly successful in ceasing the exploitation of such desperate people, all nations must look inwards</u></mark> to solve the problems of inescapable poverty and inadequate healthcare systems. </p>
|
Contention 3 Solvency
| null | null | 430,448 | 7 | 17,093 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| 565,247 |
A
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Kentucky
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2
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Michigan Bayley-Peilen
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Matheson
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
742,903 |
Interpretation –
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<h4><strong>Interpretation – </h4></strong>
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Neg vs cornell KR
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1nc
|
4
| 430,867 | 1 | 17,096 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| 565,258 |
N
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Hubervermont
|
3
|
Cornell Kundu-Rooney
|
Astacio
|
T-legalize
Cap k (2NR)
Attorney General Politics
Treaty DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
742,904 |
Deleuzian politics ignore the material suffering of others, refusing to engage in structures like the State is an aristocratic form of politics.
|
Paugh 5
|
Tim Paugh, B.A. St. Francis Xavier University and Master of Arts in Political Science @ U of Victoria, 2005, "Gilles Deleuze And the Apolitical Production of Being" https://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8443/dspace/bitstream/1828/942/1/Tim%20Paugh-Master%27s%20Thesis-Final%20Draft.pdf
|
Badiou argues that it is committed not to liberating the multiplicities of being, but to renewing the metaphysical tenets of “the One”, conceived of as a univocal power of ontological production. Deleuze’s entire enterprise implies a general devaluation of the reality and integrity of the actual. Deleuze’s conception of thought is based on a process of asceticism and dispossession, one which is, by nature, “aristocratic” in orientation Deleuze is quite simply indifferent to the politics of this world, articulating a philosophy that is much more spiritualistic than most of his commentators care to acknowledge the only ontologically productive disposition available to thinking subjects is to stand posed to sacrifice any element of their lived actuality that hampers the One’s expression any distinctive space for political thought can only be subsumed in an ethical and apolitical practice, functioning to make us maximally receptive to the One – even at the price of rendering us indifferent to the politics of this world it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this “ontological” praxis with a genuinely political praxis, for the very process of thought in Deleuze remains premised on a subjective involuntarism, wherein any successful intuition of the singularities of Being is premised on our being transfixed by the preindividual movements of the One Deleuze’s fundamental problem is to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One for Deleuze “politics is not an autonomous form of thought” actual distinct beings can only ever serve to mask, through an illusory, equivocal distribution, the univocity of the One, which alone is real. such a conception of thought is “profoundly aristocratic” in that it links thought, and thus the seizing of revolutionary potential presented by the One, to a renunciation of our occupied socio-political actuality, one that “individuals are not equally capable” of offering up our attachments to actual relations, memories, commitments may potentially act to prevent us from being traversed by the impersonal power of thought – and must be resisted if necessary the consequence for some individuals, who survive in large part because of actual relations, organizational structures, commitments – those who simply cannot afford to undergo the loss of these attachments – is a foreclosure to thought’s transformative power.
|
Deleuze’s implies a general devaluation of the reality and integrity of the actual Deleuze’s is based on a process of asceticism and dispossession indifferent to the politics of this world, articulating a philosophy that is much more spiritualistic the only ontologically productive disposition available to thinking subjects is to stand posed to sacrifice any element of their lived actuality that hampers the One’s expression it is impossible, to reconcile this “ontological” praxis with a genuinely political praxis, for the very process of thought in Deleuze remains premised on a subjective involuntarism, w Deleuze’s fundamental problem is to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One actual distinct beings can only ever serve to mask the univocity of the One the consequence for some individuals, those say, who survive in large part because of actual relations, organizational structures, commitments – those, in short, who simply cannot afford to undergo the loss of these attachments – is a foreclosure to thought’s transformative power.
|
In this chapter we will attempt to better grasp this tension-filled relation between ethics and politics in Deleuze’s work by examining how it corresponds to philosophical discrepancies pointed out by several of his major critics. Of these, Alain Badiou and his book Deleuze: The Clamor of Being has done the most to challenge the orthodoxy that has built up in Deleuze studies, and its supposed affinity with the political virtues of his commentators (not only pluralism, but radical democracy, anarchism, and so on). In contrast to almost all of the prevailing assumptions about Deleuze’s philosophy, Badiou argues that it is committed not to liberating the multiplicities of being, but to renewing the metaphysical tenets of “the One”, conceived of as a univocal power of ontological production. For Badiou, Deleuze’s entire enterprise implies a general devaluation of the reality and integrity of the actual. What’s more, he charges that Deleuze’s conception of thought is based on a process of asceticism and dispossession, one which is, by nature, “aristocratic” in orientation. Building on Badiou’s reading of Deleuze as metaphysician of the One, Peter Hallward will argue that Deleuze is quite simply indifferent to the politics of this world, articulating a philosophy that is much more spiritualistic than most of his commentators care to acknowledge. Both Badiou and Hallward’s critiques imply that the virtual is unilaterally determinative of actual being in Deleuze’s ontology. From this point of view, the only ontologically productive disposition available to thinking subjects is to stand posed to sacrifice any element of their lived actuality that hampers the One’s expression. It follows that any distinctive space for political thought can only be subsumed in an ethical and apolitical practice, functioning to make us maximally receptive to the One – even at the price of rendering us indifferent to the politics of this world. By contrast, Alberto Toscano’s The Theatre of Production: Individuation between Kant and Deleuze offers space for rethinking Deleuze’s conception of ontological production from more of a political vantage point. Toscano sees ontological production in Deleuze as dependent upon the construction of distinct modes of individuation, the creation of a set of correspondences between disparate or metastable virtualities. In so much as thought participates in the production of unique regimes of individuation, it can be said to be actively involved in the creation of being itself. Thus, Toscano insists that there is a necessary element of praxis in Deleuze’s ontology, for the necessity of the invention of regimes of individuation implies that the trajectory of ontological production does not move unilaterally from the virtual to the actual. Rather, every production of being must be said to be an utterly anomalous process. As we will see, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this “ontological” praxis with a genuinely political praxis, for the very process of thought in Deleuze remains premised on a subjective involuntarism, wherein any successful intuition of the singularities of Being is premised on our being transfixed by the preindividual movements of the One. Moreover, it is clear that ultimately, even Toscano is led to affirm the primacy of ethics, and the apolitical nature of Deleuze’s philosophy of ontological production. Deleuze as Metaphysician of the One Alain Badiou’s short book on Deleuze must have come as a shock to those who felt that Deleuze possessed an unchallengeable sensitivity to the multiple differences and the singular trajectories hidden beneath our representations of the world. In essence, Badiou makes the case that “Deleuze’s fundamental problem is most certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One”.137 That Badiou should make such a claim is consistent with his efforts to re-energize philosophy and ontology with a thorough revision of the categories of being and event. In his engagement with Deleuze’s work he makes clear that he considers his vision of the multiple nature of being, inspired by the mathematics of set-theory and his conception of the event as a “pure supplement” subtracted from every regime of identification, in direct competition with the ontology of Deleuze.138 Significantly, Badiou is also very much a political thinker, and his philosophical critique of Deleuze points to a deeper political dispute. Though he offers some limited praise for Deleuze’s insight into “certain aspects of…political experimentation”, Badiou nonetheless insists their philosophical divergence stems from the fact that, for Deleuze “politics is not an autonomous form of thought”.139 But on what grounds does Badiou make his case against Deleuze? After all, doesn’t Deleuze’s philosophy demand that ontological production be thought free from the determination of any sovereign unity or encompassing space, of any “One” which would inhibit the unfolding of a revolutionary singularity? Badiou sees Deleuze’s metaphysical orientation as being overdetermined by his insistence that Being is univocal: the thesis, according to Deleuze, that Being is expressed or “said in one and the same ‘sense’ of everything about which it is said”.140 He argues that by holding fast to univocity, Deleuze cannot conceive of local, singular trajectories of ontological production as anything but formally distinct deployments of the univocal power of the One – that, for all their formal (or modal) uniqueness, each process of actualization expresses a productive power which is ontologically One.141 To be clear then: Badiou is not saying that Deleuze’s conception of being is such that it is numerically One, whereby the pure multiples and unique singularities of Being could be reduced to a simple unity or totality, a fixed classification or structure of terms and forms. As Badiou writes: “For Deleuze, beings are local degrees of intensity or inflections of power that are in constant movement and entirely singular. And as power is but a name of Being, beings are only expressive modalities of the One”.142 Consequently, though Being is univocal, and said in the same sense, “we have to admit an equivocity of that of which Being is said: its immanent modalities, that is, beings”.143 For as much as Badiou’s thesis is surprising, in a sense it ought not to be. We have already noted that Deleuze’s concept of singularity is indebted to Spinoza, for whom the absolute power of ontological production (God) was distributed in an infinite number of formally distinct attributes. It remains to be seen, however, what consequences – especially what political consequences – follow from this initial point. As Badiou reads it, the thesis of univocity has dramatic consequences for the status of actuality in Deleuze’s ontology. For if beings represent mere equivocal permutations of the One, whose nature is univocal, then “the equivocal status of beings, has no real status”.144 That is to say, actual, formally distinct beings can only ever serve to mask, through an illusory, equivocal distribution, the univocity of the One, which alone is real. Badiou develops this point in a very lucid, yet harshly critical examination of the concept of the virtual. Recall that for Deleuze (as for Spinoza) singularities, and their corresponding Ideas, are completely real and determinate prior to their actualization in states of affairs or lived experiences – the virtual is not a formless or passive matter, nor a static reservoir of potential (an essence). But if this is true, then the virtual must be doubly determinate: on the one hand, every convergence of virtuality determines a process of actualization, represented in instances of a “solution”; on the other hand, every convergence of virtuality, represented in the formation of a “problem”, determines the other virtualities that lie in proximity to that problem, “because every virtuality interferes with the others, just as a problem is only constituted as a problematic locus in the proximity of other problems”.145 The virtual thus determines both the actual and itself. If we still wish to maintain, as Deleuze does, that both the actual and virtual are real, as immanent and co-existent dimensions of the real object, we are compelled to reconcile this with the thesis of univocity. And if the thesis of univocity is to be upheld, then Being cannot be said in two senses of the same object, or else its reality would of necessity be equivocal. Thus, Badiou says, Deleuze is forced to argue, rather mystically, that the virtual and actual dimensions of the real object are, in the final instance, indiscernible. But, he charges, we can only maintain both, that the virtual is determinate and real, and that it is ultimately indiscernible from the reality of the actual, by depriving the actual of its integrity and reality: “the more Deleuze attempts to wrest the virtual from irreality, indetermination, and nonobjectivity, the more irreal, indetermined, and finally non-objective the actual (or beings) becomes, because it phantasmatically splits into two”.146 We end up, once again, with the realm of “being” or the actual reduced to but a simulacrum of the self-communicating surface of the One. Moreover, if the entire realm of the actual or being is reduced to mere simulacra, then we can only properly think Being by means of a fundamental “dispossession and asceticism” vis-à-vis our social and political actuality.147 Again, that Badiou would make this point is not altogether surprising, and we have already examined how thought for Deleuze was a wholly involuntary movement, in which the faculties enter into such a state of discord that they become equal to a site of ontological production. For Badiou, the nature of Deleuze’s ontology leaves no place for choice as a dimension of thought. Or rather, the only choice involved in thought is the choice to choose, which for Deleuze means the choice to make ourselves available to the transfixing power of the One, independently of the content of any particular choice. Such a view is ascetic in that it is premised on “a sustained renunciation of the obviousness of our needs and occupied positions” because any attachment to such needs or positions is likely to serve as an obstacle to thought’s essential involuntarism.148 And this, in turn, implies that thought can only be a process of dispossession, in that the only individuals who can be said to truly think are those who reach “the point where…they are seized by their preindividual determination”, those who “endure the transfixion and disintegration of their actuality by infinite virtuality, which is actuality’s veritable being”.149 For Badiou, such a conception of thought is “profoundly aristocratic” in that it links thought, and thus the seizing of revolutionary potential presented by the One, to a renunciation of our occupied socio-political actuality, one that “individuals are not equally capable” of offering up.150 After all, the status of lived experience in thought, he argues, is purely negative: our attachments to actual relations, memories, commitments may potentially act to prevent us from being traversed by the impersonal power of thought – and must be resisted if necessary. And the consequence for some individuals, those say, who survive in large part because of actual relations, organizational structures, commitments – those, in short, who simply cannot afford to undergo the loss of these attachments – is a foreclosure to thought’s transformative power.
| 11,619 |
<h4>Deleuzian politics ignore the material suffering of others, refusing to engage in structures like the State is an aristocratic form of politics.</h4><p>Tim <strong>Paugh</strong>, B.A. St. Francis Xavier University and Master of Arts in Political Science @ U of Victoria, 200<strong>5</strong>, "Gilles Deleuze And the Apolitical Production of Being" https://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8443/dspace/bitstream/1828/942/1/Tim%20Paugh-Master%27s%20Thesis-Final%20Draft.pdf</p><p>In this chapter we will attempt to better grasp this tension-filled relation between ethics and politics in Deleuze’s work by examining how it corresponds to philosophical discrepancies pointed out by several of his major critics. Of these, Alain Badiou and his book Deleuze: The Clamor of Being has done the most to challenge the orthodoxy that has built up in Deleuze studies, and its supposed affinity with the political virtues of his commentators (not only pluralism, but radical democracy, anarchism, and so on). In contrast to almost all of the prevailing assumptions about Deleuze’s philosophy, <u>Badiou argues that it is committed not to liberating the multiplicities of being, but to renewing the metaphysical tenets of “the One”, conceived of as a univocal power of ontological production.</u> For Badiou, <u><mark>Deleuze’s</mark> entire enterprise <mark>implies a general devaluation of the reality and integrity of the actual</mark>.</u> What’s more, he charges that <u><mark>Deleuze’s</mark> conception of thought <mark>is based on a process of asceticism and dispossession</mark>, one which is, by nature, “aristocratic” in orientation</u>. Building on Badiou’s reading of Deleuze as metaphysician of the One, Peter Hallward will argue that <u>Deleuze is quite simply <mark>indifferent to</mark> <mark>the politics of this world, articulating a philosophy that is much more spiritualistic</mark> than most of his commentators care to acknowledge</u>. Both Badiou and Hallward’s critiques imply that the virtual is unilaterally determinative of actual being in Deleuze’s ontology. From this point of view, <u><mark>the only ontologically productive disposition available to thinking subjects is to stand posed to sacrifice any element of their lived actuality that hampers the One’s expression</u></mark>. It follows that <u>any distinctive space for political thought can only be subsumed in an ethical and apolitical practice, functioning to make us maximally receptive to the One – even at the price of rendering us indifferent to the politics of this world</u>. By contrast, Alberto Toscano’s The Theatre of Production: Individuation between Kant and Deleuze offers space for rethinking Deleuze’s conception of ontological production from more of a political vantage point. Toscano sees ontological production in Deleuze as dependent upon the construction of distinct modes of individuation, the creation of a set of correspondences between disparate or metastable virtualities. In so much as thought participates in the production of unique regimes of individuation, it can be said to be actively involved in the creation of being itself. Thus, Toscano insists that there is a necessary element of praxis in Deleuze’s ontology, for the necessity of the invention of regimes of individuation implies that the trajectory of ontological production does not move unilaterally from the virtual to the actual. Rather, every production of being must be said to be an utterly anomalous process. As we will see, however, <u><mark>it is</mark> difficult, if not <mark>impossible, to reconcile this “ontological” praxis</mark> <mark>with a genuinely political praxis, for the very process of thought in Deleuze remains premised on a subjective involuntarism, w</mark>herein any successful intuition of the singularities of Being is premised on our being transfixed by the preindividual movements of the One</u>. Moreover, it is clear that ultimately, even Toscano is led to affirm the primacy of ethics, and the apolitical nature of Deleuze’s philosophy of ontological production. Deleuze as Metaphysician of the One Alain Badiou’s short book on Deleuze must have come as a shock to those who felt that Deleuze possessed an unchallengeable sensitivity to the multiple differences and the singular trajectories hidden beneath our representations of the world. In essence, Badiou makes the case that “<u><mark>Deleuze’s fundamental problem is</u></mark> most certainly not to liberate the multiple but <u><mark>to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One</u></mark>”.137 That Badiou should make such a claim is consistent with his efforts to re-energize philosophy and ontology with a thorough revision of the categories of being and event. In his engagement with Deleuze’s work he makes clear that he considers his vision of the multiple nature of being, inspired by the mathematics of set-theory and his conception of the event as a “pure supplement” subtracted from every regime of identification, in direct competition with the ontology of Deleuze.138 Significantly, Badiou is also very much a political thinker, and his philosophical critique of Deleuze points to a deeper political dispute. Though he offers some limited praise for Deleuze’s insight into “certain aspects of…political experimentation”, Badiou nonetheless insists their philosophical divergence stems from the fact that, <u>for Deleuze “politics is not an autonomous form of thought”</u>.139 But on what grounds does Badiou make his case against Deleuze? After all, doesn’t Deleuze’s philosophy demand that ontological production be thought free from the determination of any sovereign unity or encompassing space, of any “One” which would inhibit the unfolding of a revolutionary singularity? Badiou sees Deleuze’s metaphysical orientation as being overdetermined by his insistence that Being is univocal: the thesis, according to Deleuze, that Being is expressed or “said in one and the same ‘sense’ of everything about which it is said”.140 He argues that by holding fast to univocity, Deleuze cannot conceive of local, singular trajectories of ontological production as anything but formally distinct deployments of the univocal power of the One – that, for all their formal (or modal) uniqueness, each process of actualization expresses a productive power which is ontologically One.141 To be clear then: Badiou is not saying that Deleuze’s conception of being is such that it is numerically One, whereby the pure multiples and unique singularities of Being could be reduced to a simple unity or totality, a fixed classification or structure of terms and forms. As Badiou writes: “For Deleuze, beings are local degrees of intensity or inflections of power that are in constant movement and entirely singular. And as power is but a name of Being, beings are only expressive modalities of the One”.142 Consequently, though Being is univocal, and said in the same sense, “we have to admit an equivocity of that of which Being is said: its immanent modalities, that is, beings”.143 For as much as Badiou’s thesis is surprising, in a sense it ought not to be. We have already noted that Deleuze’s concept of singularity is indebted to Spinoza, for whom the absolute power of ontological production (God) was distributed in an infinite number of formally distinct attributes. It remains to be seen, however, what consequences – especially what political consequences – follow from this initial point. As Badiou reads it, the thesis of univocity has dramatic consequences for the status of actuality in Deleuze’s ontology. For if beings represent mere equivocal permutations of the One, whose nature is univocal, then “the equivocal status of beings, has no real status”.144 That is to say, <u><mark>actual</u></mark>, formally <u><mark>distinct beings can only ever serve to mask</mark>, through an illusory, equivocal distribution, <mark>the univocity of the One</mark>, which alone is real.</u> Badiou develops this point in a very lucid, yet harshly critical examination of the concept of the virtual. Recall that for Deleuze (as for Spinoza) singularities, and their corresponding Ideas, are completely real and determinate prior to their actualization in states of affairs or lived experiences – the virtual is not a formless or passive matter, nor a static reservoir of potential (an essence). But if this is true, then the virtual must be doubly determinate: on the one hand, every convergence of virtuality determines a process of actualization, represented in instances of a “solution”; on the other hand, every convergence of virtuality, represented in the formation of a “problem”, determines the other virtualities that lie in proximity to that problem, “because every virtuality interferes with the others, just as a problem is only constituted as a problematic locus in the proximity of other problems”.145 The virtual thus determines both the actual and itself. If we still wish to maintain, as Deleuze does, that both the actual and virtual are real, as immanent and co-existent dimensions of the real object, we are compelled to reconcile this with the thesis of univocity. And if the thesis of univocity is to be upheld, then Being cannot be said in two senses of the same object, or else its reality would of necessity be equivocal. Thus, Badiou says, Deleuze is forced to argue, rather mystically, that the virtual and actual dimensions of the real object are, in the final instance, indiscernible. But, he charges, we can only maintain both, that the virtual is determinate and real, and that it is ultimately indiscernible from the reality of the actual, by depriving the actual of its integrity and reality: “the more Deleuze attempts to wrest the virtual from irreality, indetermination, and nonobjectivity, the more irreal, indetermined, and finally non-objective the actual (or beings) becomes, because it phantasmatically splits into two”.146 We end up, once again, with the realm of “being” or the actual reduced to but a simulacrum of the self-communicating surface of the One. Moreover, if the entire realm of the actual or being is reduced to mere simulacra, then we can only properly think Being by means of a fundamental “dispossession and asceticism” vis-à-vis our social and political actuality.147 Again, that Badiou would make this point is not altogether surprising, and we have already examined how thought for Deleuze was a wholly involuntary movement, in which the faculties enter into such a state of discord that they become equal to a site of ontological production. For Badiou, the nature of Deleuze’s ontology leaves no place for choice as a dimension of thought. Or rather, the only choice involved in thought is the choice to choose, which for Deleuze means the choice to make ourselves available to the transfixing power of the One, independently of the content of any particular choice. Such a view is ascetic in that it is premised on “a sustained renunciation of the obviousness of our needs and occupied positions” because any attachment to such needs or positions is likely to serve as an obstacle to thought’s essential involuntarism.148 And this, in turn, implies that thought can only be a process of dispossession, in that the only individuals who can be said to truly think are those who reach “the point where…they are seized by their preindividual determination”, those who “endure the transfixion and disintegration of their actuality by infinite virtuality, which is actuality’s veritable being”.149 For Badiou, <u>such a conception of thought is “profoundly aristocratic” in that it links thought, and thus the seizing of revolutionary potential presented by the One, to a renunciation of our occupied socio-political actuality, one that “individuals are not equally capable” of offering up</u>.150 After all, the status of lived experience in thought, he argues, is purely negative: <u>our attachments to actual relations, memories, commitments may potentially act to prevent us from being traversed by the impersonal power of thought – and must be resisted if necessary</u>. And <u><mark>the consequence for some individuals,</u> those say, <u>who survive in large part because of actual relations, organizational structures, commitments – those</u>, in short, <u><strong>who simply cannot afford to undergo the loss of these attachments – is a foreclosure to thought’s transformative power.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs Rutgers wm
|
1nr
|
AT: Root Cause
| 430,868 | 1 | 17,097 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| 565,259 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
6
|
Rutgers-Newark Williams-Murphy
|
Merkle
|
1AC - Masochism and advocated the entire rez
PIC out of organ sales (2NR)
Organ Sales Commodification DA (2NR)
Property Rights DA (2NR)
NietzscheDnG Turns on Case
Foucault Turn on Case
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round6.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
Subsets and Splits
Filtered Text and Summaries
This query fetches 100 rows where the text length is between 400 and 600 and ensures that summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing a simple filtered dataset but limited analytical insights.
Filtered Text Length 9900-1
Retrieves specific records with a text length between 9900 and 10100 characters, ensuring all text fields are not null, which provides limited insight into data distribution.
Filtered Text Length 4900-5
Returns a sample of records with text lengths between 4900 and 5100 where both summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are present, providing limited insight into the dataset's structure.
Filtered Text Length 3900-4
This query retrieves a limited set of records that meet specific criteria, which can be useful for a closer look at specific data points but doesn't provide deeper insights.
Filtered Text Length 2900-3
Retrieves a sample of rows with textLength between 2900 and 3100, ensuring none of the summary, spoken, or fulltext fields are null.
Filtered Text Length 1900-2
Retrieves a sample of records with text length between 1900 and 2100 characters where summary, spoken, and fulltext fields are not null, providing limited filtering for data exploration.
Filtered Text Length 900-11
Retrieves a sample of entries with text lengths between 900 and 1100 characters, ensuring that the entries have both summaries and spoken text available, providing a basic filtering of the dataset.