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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
743,105 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state only if they mandate non-profit state-run retail stores that source from small-scale cultivators and are regulated by public health and substance abuse professionals.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state only if they mandate non-profit state-run retail stores that source from small-scale cultivators and are regulated by public health and substance abuse professionals. </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,931 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,106 |
While more could be done, this system has saved hundreds of thousands of lives
|
Fry-Revere 14
|
Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
|
We face an organ shortage because modern medicine makes it possible to transplant organs meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life. Until the 1950s, little could be done to save damaged organs. if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later.
|
transplant organs meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later
|
The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 3
When we say “organ shortage,” we must be clear that this is one of those problems we would have wished for half a century ago. We face an organ shortage because modern medicine makes it possible to transplant organs from one human body to another, meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life. Until the 1950s, little could be done to save damaged organs. If diseases were caught early enough, potential deterioration could be slowed or curtailed by treating the underlying illness, but if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later. The one exception was kidneys. Because dialysis machines simulate, to some extent, the work of kidneys by filtering the blood, death could be forestalled for a few years, but not indefinitely Even now, the average lifespan on dialysis in the United States is only four years. Also, by most accounts, life on dialysis is not much of a life at all. The majority of dialysis patients leave their jobs within a few months of starting dialysis. Fewer than 10 percent of patients are still employed after six months on dialysis. They are too tired, too weak, too stiff, have too many medical appointments, and have to spend too much time watching their diets and getting dialyzed (usually three times a week, for three to four hours each session).'
| 1,453 |
<h4>While more could be done, this system has saved hundreds of thousands of lives</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 3</p><p>When we say “organ shortage,” we must be clear that this is one of those problems we would have wished for half a century ago. <u>We face an organ shortage because modern medicine makes it possible to <mark>transplant organs</mark> </u>from one human body to another,<u> <mark>meaning hundreds of thousands of people who a few years ago had no hope of survival now have a new lease on life</mark>.</u> <u>Until the 1950s, little could be done to save damaged organs. </u>If diseases were caught early enough, potential deterioration could be slowed or curtailed by treating the underlying illness, but<u> <mark>if a vital organ was damaged beyond repair, the patient would inevitably die—sooner rather than later</mark>. </u>The one exception was kidneys. Because dialysis machines simulate, to some extent, the work of kidneys by filtering the blood, death could be forestalled for a few years, but not indefinitely Even now, the average lifespan on dialysis in the United States is only four years. Also, by most accounts, life on dialysis is not much of a life at all. The majority of dialysis patients leave their jobs within a few months of starting dialysis. Fewer than 10 percent of patients are still employed after six months on dialysis. They are too tired, too weak, too stiff, have too many medical appointments, and have to spend too much time watching their diets and getting dialyzed (usually three times a week, for three to four hours each session).'</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,854 | 2 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,107 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
3
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,108 |
Indian pharamecutical industry increasing because of foreign investment and lack of Western competition—the plan causes rebranching back to the United States
|
Husain 11
|
Husain 11 (Shahbaaz Husain, Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Article Assistant at Yogesh & Jain, Chartered Accountants, “Foreign Direct Investment In Indian Pharmaceutical Industry” cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/shahbaazInternreportdec2011.pdf)//kyan
|
India is one of the few developing countries with a large production base in pharmaceutical products India‘s trade in pharmaceutical products has increased Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high in terms of technology and quality growth has been remarkable. The industry is fourth largest globally, in terms of volume, Potential growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is great. Multinationals are a part of India‘s pharmaceutical foundation Foreign companies entered the Indian market industrial policies emphasized the importance of foreign capital Indian FDI policies incentives invite foreign firms to start manufacturing facilities leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India and established manufacturing facilities. patent laws8 favourable for the MNCs, were in force India was attractive to foreign firms MNCs did well i They had good knowledge and technology to develop antibiotics and synthetic drugs
|
India is large production base in pharmaceutical India‘s trade i has increased Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high Potential growth is great Multinationals are a part of India‘ foundation Indian market emphasized the importance of foreign capital Indian FDI policies incentives invite foreign firms to start manufacturing facilities leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India and established manufacturing facilities. patent laws8 favourable for the MNCs,
|
Due to the pharmaceutical industry‘s capital and know- how intensity, most of the world‘s production is located in the developed countries. India is one of the few developing countries with a large production base in pharmaceutical products. India‘s trade in pharmaceutical products has increased a lot since the liberalization reforms and it has comparative advantages in trade with pharmaceutical products, both bulk drugs and formulations. The Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high among developing countries, in terms of technology and quality, and is today in the front rank of India‘s science based industries23 . The growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry has been remarkable. The industry is today the fourth largest globally, in terms of volume, and 13 th largest in terms of value24. The industry accounts for 8% of the global sales in volume but in terms of value it is barely 1%. The role of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the international market today is as a supplier of good quality, low cost generic bulk and formulation Potential growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is great. Nearly 65% of India‘s population does not enjoy comprehensive access to quality healthcare today. A large share of the population use alternative medicine and per capita consumption of drugs in India is one of the lowest in the world25 . Multinationals are, in addition to the public sector, a part of India‘s pharmaceutical foundation. Foreign companies entered the Indian market merely as trading companies with small investments. The new industrial policies emphasized the importance of foreign capital and industrial know- how. The Indian government carried out liberal FDI policies and incentives to invite foreign firms to start manufacturing facilities in order to get an inflow of know- how in the sector. The leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India and established manufacturing facilities. Subsequently, the multinationals brought in technology and international manufacturing practices26. Domestic firms were encouraged to tie up with foreign firms, with participation in capital, and there were collaboration agreements in the private sector. The foreign firm Hoechst established a research centre, which enhanced basic research in India27 . During this time product patent laws8, which were favourable for the MNCs, were in force India was attractive to foreign firms mainly due to its large market and increasing demand for drugs. At that time there was lack of competition in the Indian pharmaceutical industry and the MNCs did well in India. They had good knowledge and technology to develop antibiotics and synthetic drugs and advantage of their financial assets and management abilities. Consumer preference for foreign world- wide known drugs was also an advantage for the MNCs in India. They were aggressive in marketing and managed to create a market for themselves in branded products. The foreign companies had, more or less, a monopoly in the Indian pharmaceutical market at this time
| 3,054 |
<h4>Indian pharamecutical industry increasing <u>because</u> of foreign investment and lack of Western <u>competition—</u>the plan causes rebranching back to the United States </h4><p><strong>Husain 11</strong> (Shahbaaz Husain, Symbiosis Law School, Pune, Article Assistant at Yogesh & Jain, Chartered Accountants, “Foreign Direct Investment In Indian Pharmaceutical Industry” cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/shahbaazInternreportdec2011.pdf)//kyan</p><p>Due to the pharmaceutical industry‘s capital and know- how intensity, most of the world‘s production is located in the developed countries. <u><mark>India is </mark>one of the few developing</u> <u>countries with a <mark>large production base in</mark> <mark>pharmaceutical</mark> products</u>. <u><mark>India‘s trade i</mark>n pharmaceutical products <mark>has increased</u></mark> a lot since the liberalization reforms and it has comparative advantages in trade with pharmaceutical products, both bulk drugs and formulations. The <u><mark>Indian pharmaceutical industry ranks very high</u></mark> among developing countries, <u>in terms of technology and quality</u>, and is today in the front rank of India‘s science based industries23 . The <u>growth</u> of the Indian pharmaceutical industry <u>has been remarkable. The industry is</u> today the <u>fourth largest globally, in terms of volume, </u>and 13 th largest in terms of value24. The industry accounts for 8% of the global sales in volume but in terms of value it is barely 1%. The role of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the international market today is as a supplier of good quality, low cost generic bulk and formulation <u><mark>Potential</mark> <mark>growth</mark> of the Indian pharmaceutical industry <mark>is great</mark>.</u> Nearly 65% of India‘s population does not enjoy comprehensive access to quality healthcare today. A large share of the population use alternative medicine and per capita consumption of drugs in India is one of the lowest in the world25 . <u><mark>Multinationals are</u></mark>, in addition to the public sector, <u><mark>a part of India‘</mark>s pharmaceutical</u> <u><mark>foundation</u></mark>. <u>Foreign companies entered the <mark>Indian market</u></mark> merely as trading companies with small investments. The new <u>industrial policies <mark>emphasized the importance of foreign capital</u></mark> and industrial know- how. The <u><mark>Indian</u></mark> government carried out liberal <u><mark>FDI policies</u></mark> and <u><mark>incentives</u></mark> to <u><mark>invite foreign firms to start <strong>manufacturing</mark> <mark>facilities</strong></mark> </u>in order to get an inflow of know- how in the sector. The <u><strong><mark>leading pharmaceutical companies from the West came to India</strong></mark> <mark>and established manufacturing facilities.</u></mark> Subsequently, the multinationals brought in technology and international manufacturing practices26. Domestic firms were encouraged to tie up with foreign firms, with participation in capital, and there were collaboration agreements in the private sector. The foreign firm Hoechst established a research centre, which enhanced basic research in India27 . During this time product <u><mark>patent laws8</u></mark>, which were <u><mark>favourable for the MNCs,</mark> were in force India was attractive to foreign firms </u>mainly due to its large market and increasing demand for drugs. At that time there was lack of competition in the Indian pharmaceutical industry and the <u>MNCs did well i</u>n India. <u>They had good knowledge and technology to develop antibiotics and synthetic drugs </u>and advantage of their financial assets and management abilities. Consumer preference for foreign world- wide known drugs was also an advantage for the MNCs in India. They were aggressive in marketing and managed to create a market for themselves in branded products. The foreign companies had, more or less, a monopoly in the Indian pharmaceutical market at this time</p>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 543,107 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,109 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| null |
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4><strong>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u> or certain parts of them. In this way <u>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u> at the national level, <u>including</u> for example the <u>legalisation of cannabis</u> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u>Disregarding</u> all or selected components of <u>the treaties</u>, however, <u>raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control</u>. <u>The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could <strong>threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u>selective application</u> of such a principle <u>would <strong>call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Treaties
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,110 |
And, it’s a net turn for their objectives—The anti-politics vacuum is filled by the right, not the left
|
Boggs 97
|
Boggs 97 (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)
|
Both symbolize the prevailing mood of anti-politics The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer imagine a system where the ordinary person might have influence. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control psychological retreat from the public sphere may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their hegemony will simply go unchallenged.
|
most Americans no longer imagine a system where the ordinary person might have influence Individuals feel engulfed beyond their control firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish because they are denigrated their hegemony will go unchallenged.
|
Both mall culture and mass media symbolize the prevailing mood of anti-politics: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man, where citizen involvement in a republic is effaced ``by the belief that social meanings are generated by the feelings of individual human beings,'' so that the common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a ``crisis of citizenship,'' re£ected in the carving up of the public sphere by local, privatized interests.16 The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer imagine a system truly open to citizen participation, where the ordinary person might have influence. Viewed in this way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control ^ bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global economy. Under these conditions psychological retreat from the public sphere may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their hegemony will simply go unchallenged.
| 1,394 |
<h4><strong>And, it’s a <u>net turn</u> for <u>their</u> objectives—The anti-politics vacuum is filled by the <u>right</u>, <u>not</u> the <u>left</h4><p></u>Boggs 97<u></strong> (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)</p><p>Both</u> mall culture and mass media <u>symbolize the prevailing mood of anti-politics</u>: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man, where citizen involvement in a republic is effaced ``by the belief that social meanings are generated by the feelings of individual human beings,'' so that the common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a ``crisis of citizenship,'' re£ected in the carving up of the public sphere by local, privatized interests.16 <u>The point has been reached where <mark>most Americans</mark> can <strong><mark>no longer</strong> imagine a system</u></mark> truly open to citizen participation, <u><mark>where the ordinary person <strong>might have influence</strong></mark>. </u>Viewed in this way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness.<u> <mark>Individuals feel engulfed</mark> by forces <strong><mark>beyond their control</u></strong></mark> ^ bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global economy. Under these conditions <u>psychological retreat from the public sphere may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such <mark>firmly entrenched bastions of power will not <strong>vanish</mark> </strong>simply <mark>because they are <strong>denigrated</strong></mark> or ignored; on the contrary, <strong><mark>their hegemony will</strong> </mark>simply <strong><mark>go unchallenged</strong>.<strong></mark> </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
2NC – Turns Racism
| 168,251 | 7 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,111 |
“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- they cause backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves
|
Leff 2014
|
Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
|
current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. a dualist model state and national is too limited it is important to recognize that localities have conflicts with states conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common in assessing the merits of any particular approach that the federal government could take it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
|
The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism a dualist model state and t national is too limited it is important to recognize that localitie ave conflicts with states, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
|
The previous Part argues that current law plausibly permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. If that is true, federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that a dualist model of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a state government and the national government - is too limited. n196 Instead, it is important to recognize that localities may have inter-jurisdictional conflicts with their states, and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common. n198 Therefore, in assessing the merits [*566] of any particular approach that the federal government could take to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, it makes sense to take into account not just policy made at state level, but the interests of local stakeholders in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony. In effect, the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.
| 6,802 |
<h4><strong>“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- they cause backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves</h4><p>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>The previous Part argues that <u>current law</u> plausibly <u>permits</u> <u>marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E</u> <u>by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations</u>. If that is true, <u><strong>federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that</u></strong>. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that <u>the incentive created in such a strange manner <strong>is good policy</u></strong>. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 <u><mark>The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it <strong>encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that <u><mark>a dualist model</u></mark> of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a <u><mark>state</u></mark> government <u><mark>and</u> t</mark>he <u><mark>national</u> </mark>government - <u><mark>is too limited</u></mark>. n196 Instead, <u><mark>it is important to recognize that localitie</mark>s</u> may <u>h<mark>ave</u></mark> inter-jurisdictional <u><mark>conflicts</u> <u>with</u></mark> their <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, <u><strong><mark>conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common</u></strong></mark>. n198 Therefore, <u>in assessing the merits</u> [*566] <u>of any particular approach that the federal government could take</u> to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, <u><mark>it makes sense to take into account</u></mark> not just policy made at state level, but the interests of <u><mark>local stakeholders</u></mark> in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, <u><mark>nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities</u></mark> because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 <u>The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is <strong>based on local standards</u></strong>, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then <u>it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony</u>. In effect, <u><mark>the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them</u>. <u><strong>This</u></strong></mark> type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue <u><strong><mark>could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict</u></mark>, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
CP
| 430,932 | 5 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,112 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,933 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,113 |
Many more are denied the benefits of this system. The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage of organs for transplant
|
Williams 14
|
Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver
|
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains
|
many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains
|
Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.
| 1,611 |
<h4>Many more are denied the benefits of this system. The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage of organs for transplant</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,245 | 16 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,114 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
|
marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> <u><strong>(Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><mark>marijuana legalization</u></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
3
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,115 |
Pharmecuticial investment is critical to Indian economic growth –employment, and consumption – independently solves disease, tech innovation, and agriculture
|
Prasad 14 (JUST BLUE) JAYANT PRASAD http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/estrangement-and-engagement/article5579354.ece)//trepka
|
Prasad 14 (JUST BLUE) (January 16, 2014 Estrangement and engagement¶ JAYANT PRASAD http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/estrangement-and-engagement/article5579354.ece)//trepka
|
The challenge is to extricate India-U.S. dialogue from the contentious and transactional pattern of complaining or making excessive demands Fresh ideas include U.S. investments in innovative technologies to increase productivity and build manufacturing capacities — without which there cannot be significant growth of employment and consumption in India.¶ India has proven through its resource-constrained development that a different type of ‘frugal’ innovation can be forged, such as GE’s inexpensive drug discovery , joint innovation can be tried for a range of low-cost and sustainable products and services, spanning agriculture, energy, environment and science and technology.
|
Fresh ideas include U.S. investments in manufacturing — without which there cannot be significant growth of employment and consumption in India.¶ , GE’s inexpensive drug discovery joint innovation can be tried for a range of low-cost and sustainable products and services, spanning
|
¶ Future agenda ¶ ¶ The challenge is to extricate India-U.S. dialogue from the contentious and transactional pattern of exchanging ‘crib’ and ‘laundry’ lists, complaining against or making excessive demands on each other. Fresh ideas to be explored include a bilateral investment treaty, a comprehensive cost-benefit study of a free trade agreement, monsoon weather forecasting, clean energy technologies, and U.S. investments in innovative technologies to increase productivity and build manufacturing capacities — without which there cannot be significant growth of employment and consumption in India.¶ ¶ India has proven through its resource-constrained development that a different type of ‘frugal’ innovation can be forged, such as GE’s ultra-low cost ECG machines, hand-held echo-scans, biomass devices, prosthetics, and inexpensive drug discovery. Indeed, joint innovation can be tried for a range of low-cost and sustainable products and services, spanning the areas of agriculture, energy, environment and science and technology.
| 1,039 |
<h4>Pharmecuticial investment is critical to Indian economic growth –employment, and consumption – independently solves disease, tech innovation, and agriculture</h4><p><strong>Prasad 14 (JUST BLUE) </strong>(January 16, 2014 Estrangement and engagement¶ <u><strong>JAYANT PRASAD http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/estrangement-and-engagement/article5579354.ece)//trepka</p><p></u></strong>¶ Future agenda ¶ ¶ <u>The challenge is to extricate India-U.S. dialogue from the <strong>contentious</strong> and transactional <strong>pattern</strong> of </u>exchanging ‘crib’ and ‘laundry’ lists, <u>complaining</u> against <u>or making excessive demands</u> on each other. <u><mark>Fresh ideas</mark> </u>to be explored <u><mark>include</mark> </u>a bilateral investment treaty, a comprehensive cost-benefit study of a free trade agreement, monsoon weather forecasting, clean energy technologies, and <u><mark>U.S. investments in </mark>innovative technologies to increase productivity and build <mark>manufacturing </mark>capacities <mark>— without which there <strong>cannot be</strong> significant growth of <strong>employment</strong> and <strong>consumption</strong> in India.¶</mark> </u>¶ <u>India has proven through its <strong>resource-constrained development</strong> that a different type of ‘frugal’ <strong>innovation</strong> can be forged<mark>, </mark>such as <strong><mark>GE’s</u></strong></mark> ultra-low cost ECG machines, hand-held echo-scans, biomass devices, prosthetics, and <u><strong><mark>inexpensive drug discovery</u></strong></mark>. Indeed<u><strong>, <mark>joint innovation</strong> can be tried <strong>for a range of low-cost and sustainable products and services,</strong> spanning</u></mark> the areas of <u><strong>agriculture</strong>, <strong>energy</strong>, <strong>environment</strong> and <strong>science and technology.</p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 430,934 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,116 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</u></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Treaties
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,117 |
We control uniqueness—If it’s true the world is too conservative, it’s only because of a retreat from effective political engagement
|
Chandler 9
|
Chandler 9 David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – 'The Global Ideology: Rethinking the Politics of the "Global Turn" in IR', International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2009), pp. 530-547.
|
http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/Journal%20of%20Int%20Rels%20-%20Global%20Ideology%20published.pdf
‘critical approaches’ tend to understand the act of theorising idealistically. Critical theorists have tended to conceive of their work as advocacy on the part of the progressive forces in its political struggle against powerful elites, defending the status quo of state-based relations there seems to be a weak link in the chain of argument which asserts that the globalising nature of transformations has run ahead of our capacities to engage with the world politically the enlightened advocates are held to represent arising progressive forces which are yet to make their own appearance. How can the gap be bridged between assertions of transformed social relations and the fact that the social forces, alleged to reflect or be agents of these changes, remain marginal? It seems that we live in a world where politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle rather than as a result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement
|
critical approaches’ understand theorising idealistically Critical theorists conceive their work as progressive struggle against elites advocates are to represent progressive forces yet to make their appearance. How can the gap be bridged between the fact social forces remain marginal politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle
|
http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/Journal%20of%20Int%20Rels%20-%20Global%20Ideology%20published.pdf
While the Cold War discipline of international relations is understood in ideological terms of power and interests, the critical and constructivist theorists who regularly assert the constitutive nature of theorising rarely understand this as a socially mediated relationship. Robert Cox’s breakdown of social theorising into ‘problem solving approaches’, which restrict themselves to attempts to resolve problems on the basis of existing interests and relations of power, and ‘critical approaches’, which take an emancipatory approach,20 has often been reproduced in ways which tend to understand the act of theorising idealistically.21 Theorising is then seen to construct society in line with the political interests or class position of the theorist; critical theorising then increasingly becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency.22 In this context, critical ‘global’ understandings of community and political interaction were often seen to be progressive and a challenge to the power and interests of (nation state-based) political elites. In the 1990s, critical theorists led the call for the globalisation of our conceptions of the international sphere, highlighted in the shift away from understanding security in terms of state security to the security of the individual.23 It was argued that the expansion of the security referent, from the state to the global level, and the expansion of our understanding of threats, from narrow military concerns to concerns of environmental degradation, poverty and women’s rights, would transform the international agenda. States were seen as barriers to a new, more progressive world order based on shared concerns and interests. Rather than being the bearers of security, protecting their citizens, states were increasingly conceived of as a threat to their citizens’ security, through genocide, war and their abuse of human rights. These critical concerns were swiftly taken up by Western governments, international institutions and NGOs and, as they did so, globalised visions of security, focusing on securing the needs of individuals rather than states, became increasingly part of the political mainstream.24 For some theorists, working within constructivist frameworks, the emergence of global politics has been framed in ways less directly confrontational to the interests of states. Instead, it is argued, Western state political elites have begun to conceive of their self-interests in a more enlightened way – one which is less confrontational and more cooperative.25 This shift in the perception of state interests and the manner of their projection in the international sphere has been understood to be a product of global interaction and the construction of new norms of behaviour and ideas of global citizenship. These new norms were often seen to be driven by NGOs and other ‘norm entrepreneurs’ acting in the global political sphere, shaping public perceptions of the global political agenda and forcing states to respond and to gradually take on board assumptions about the importance of issues such as human rights and the rule of law.26 Global politics was therefore often conceived not in geopolitical, territorial terms of realpolitik but in the ethical terms of a contestation between global approaches and state-based ones, which pitted cosmopolitanism and human rights advocacy against narrow national interests, which were alleged to hold back the consistent implementation of emerging global norms.27 Frameworks of global politics in the 1990s tended to contrast the international sphere of progress and NGO activism with an increasingly moribund domestic sphere of political party competition. In the 1990s power was still seen to reside at the level of states, even though the agenda was being set by global interaction and politics operating at the global level. In the 2000s, the globalisation of politics has become increasingly expressed in the erosion of distinctions between the global and the domestic.28 For radical poststructuralist theorists, the erosion of the barrier between the global and the domestic has been commonly articulated in terms of the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, empire, or of biopower. The undermining of the politics of state-based representation and the globalisation of regulatory power has become the starting assumption for the poststructuralist ‘scaling up’ of Foucault in critiques of global governmentality.29 If power was located at the global level then resistance was as well, in a direct challenge to this power.30 This ‘globalisation’ of resistance meant that the focus was not necessarily on narrow NGO activism and lobbying but could include any form of protest and dissent, as long as it was viewed from the perspective of global struggle: from ethical shopping to protests against free trade or the destruction of the rain forests.31 In the dominant frameworks for understanding the globalisation of politics, the problem is not that politics is represented in global, deterritorialised terms, but that our understandings of the global as the political sphere for contestation and progress lag behind the economic and social transformations that have created our globalised world and with it the globalised nature of threats – from global warming to the global war on terror. This framework closes off any need for questioning the politicisation of the global level, suggesting that the only questions concern the manner in which we undertake global politics and/or reorganise our political institutions to adapt to the threats and possibilities of our ‘global world’. This demonstrates the power of what is here conceptualised as the Global Ideology: an ideological framework which naturalises and reifies its subject matter, posing the globalisation of politics as a matter of imposed necessity rather than a social construct which is open to critique. Demystifying the ‘global’ Demystifying the ‘global’ involves articulating the mediating links between our subjective understanding of the globalised world and the attenuated nature of social and political struggle. It is possible to understand the globalisation of politics as a social construct without theoretical positions being directly understood as unmediated reflections of clashing political interests or subject positions. Critical theorists and constructivists have often tended to conceive of their work as advocacy on the part of the progressive forces of global civil society in its political struggle against powerful elites, defending the status quo of state-based international relations. In the same way, critical poststructuralists tend to understand their work as part of the struggle against the power of liberal ‘empire’ ranged against the radical challenge of the ‘multitude’.32 In these frameworks of understanding global politics, the shift towards the global is seen as indicative of new lines of political struggle which have replaced those of the territorialised framework of Left and Right. For liberal and critical theorists, this is the struggle for human rights and emancipation against the sovereign power of states. For poststructuralist theorists, this is seen as the struggle for autonomy and difference against the universalising war waged ‘over ways of life itself’ by neoliberal biopolitical governance. However, these struggles remain immanent ones, in which global political social forces of progress are intimated but are yet to fully develop. There is a problem of the social agency, the collective political subject, which can give content to the theorising of global struggle articulated by academic theorists.33 Without a social agency, which can give global politics the content which academic theorists insist is immanent, there seems to be a weak link in the chain of argument which asserts that the globalising nature of economic and social transformations has run ahead of our capacities to engage with the world politically. On the one hand, there appears to be a crude technological determinism at work: somehow, speeded up communications are held to have transformed social relations to such an extent that we need new frameworks of social and political theorising and practices. On the other hand, there appears to be a crude idealism: the enlightened advocates of global progress are held to represent or express the immanent or arising progressive forces – from global civil society to the ‘multitude’ – which are yet to make their own appearance. How can the theoretical and practical gap be bridged between assertions of transformed social relations, which are alleged to have created a deterritorialised world, and the fact that the social forces, alleged to reflect or be agents of these changes, remain immanent or marginal? It seems that we live in a world where politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle rather than as a result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement
| 9,121 |
<h4><strong>We control uniqueness—If it’s true the world is <u>too conservative</u>, it’s only because of a <u>retreat</u> from effective <u>political engagement</h4><p></u>Chandler 9 </strong>David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – 'The Global Ideology: Rethinking the Politics of the "Global Turn" in IR', International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2009), pp. 530-547.</p><p><u><strong>http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/Journal%20of%20Int%20Rels%20-%20Global%20Ideology%20published.pdf</p><p></u></strong>While the Cold War discipline of international relations is understood in ideological terms of power and interests, the critical and constructivist theorists who regularly assert the constitutive nature of theorising rarely understand this as a socially mediated relationship. Robert Cox’s breakdown of social theorising into ‘problem solving approaches’, which restrict themselves to attempts to resolve problems on the basis of existing interests and relations of power, and<u><strong> ‘<mark>critical approaches’</u></strong></mark>, which take an emancipatory approach,20 has often been reproduced in ways which<u><strong> tend to <mark>understand</mark> the act of <mark>theorising</mark> <mark>idealistically</mark>.</u></strong>21 Theorising is then seen to construct society in line with the political interests or class position of the theorist; critical theorising then increasingly becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency.22 In this context, critical ‘global’ understandings of community and political interaction were often seen to be progressive and a challenge to the power and interests of (nation state-based) political elites. In the 1990s, critical theorists led the call for the globalisation of our conceptions of the international sphere, highlighted in the shift away from understanding security in terms of state security to the security of the individual.23 It was argued that the expansion of the security referent, from the state to the global level, and the expansion of our understanding of threats, from narrow military concerns to concerns of environmental degradation, poverty and women’s rights, would transform the international agenda. States were seen as barriers to a new, more progressive world order based on shared concerns and interests. Rather than being the bearers of security, protecting their citizens, states were increasingly conceived of as a threat to their citizens’ security, through genocide, war and their abuse of human rights. These critical concerns were swiftly taken up by Western governments, international institutions and NGOs and, as they did so, globalised visions of security, focusing on securing the needs of individuals rather than states, became increasingly part of the political mainstream.24 For some theorists, working within constructivist frameworks, the emergence of global politics has been framed in ways less directly confrontational to the interests of states. Instead, it is argued, Western state political elites have begun to conceive of their self-interests in a more enlightened way – one which is less confrontational and more cooperative.25 This shift in the perception of state interests and the manner of their projection in the international sphere has been understood to be a product of global interaction and the construction of new norms of behaviour and ideas of global citizenship. These new norms were often seen to be driven by NGOs and other ‘norm entrepreneurs’ acting in the global political sphere, shaping public perceptions of the global political agenda and forcing states to respond and to gradually take on board assumptions about the importance of issues such as human rights and the rule of law.26 Global politics was therefore often conceived not in geopolitical, territorial terms of realpolitik but in the ethical terms of a contestation between global approaches and state-based ones, which pitted cosmopolitanism and human rights advocacy against narrow national interests, which were alleged to hold back the consistent implementation of emerging global norms.27 Frameworks of global politics in the 1990s tended to contrast the international sphere of progress and NGO activism with an increasingly moribund domestic sphere of political party competition. In the 1990s power was still seen to reside at the level of states, even though the agenda was being set by global interaction and politics operating at the global level. In the 2000s, the globalisation of politics has become increasingly expressed in the erosion of distinctions between the global and the domestic.28 For radical poststructuralist theorists, the erosion of the barrier between the global and the domestic has been commonly articulated in terms of the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, empire, or of biopower. The undermining of the politics of state-based representation and the globalisation of regulatory power has become the starting assumption for the poststructuralist ‘scaling up’ of Foucault in critiques of global governmentality.29 If power was located at the global level then resistance was as well, in a direct challenge to this power.30 This ‘globalisation’ of resistance meant that the focus was not necessarily on narrow NGO activism and lobbying but could include any form of protest and dissent, as long as it was viewed from the perspective of global struggle: from ethical shopping to protests against free trade or the destruction of the rain forests.31 In the dominant frameworks for understanding the globalisation of politics, the problem is not that politics is represented in global, deterritorialised terms, but that our understandings of the global as the political sphere for contestation and progress lag behind the economic and social transformations that have created our globalised world and with it the globalised nature of threats – from global warming to the global war on terror. This framework closes off any need for questioning the politicisation of the global level, suggesting that the only questions concern the manner in which we undertake global politics and/or reorganise our political institutions to adapt to the threats and possibilities of our ‘global world’. This demonstrates the power of what is here conceptualised as the Global Ideology: an ideological framework which naturalises and reifies its subject matter, posing the globalisation of politics as a matter of imposed necessity rather than a social construct which is open to critique. Demystifying the ‘global’ Demystifying the ‘global’ involves articulating the mediating links between our subjective understanding of the globalised world and the attenuated nature of social and political struggle. It is possible to understand the globalisation of politics as a social construct without theoretical positions being directly understood as unmediated reflections of clashing political interests or subject positions. <u><strong><mark>Critical theorists</u></strong></mark> and constructivists <u><strong>have </u></strong>often <u><strong>tended to <mark>conceive</mark> of <mark>their work as</mark> advocacy on the part of the <mark>progressive</mark> forces</u></strong> of global civil society <u><strong>in its political <mark>struggle against</mark> powerful <mark>elites</mark>, defending the status quo of state-based </u></strong>international <u><strong>relations</u></strong>. In the same way, critical poststructuralists tend to understand their work as part of the struggle against the power of liberal ‘empire’ ranged against the radical challenge of the ‘multitude’.32 In these frameworks of understanding global politics, the shift towards the global is seen as indicative of new lines of political struggle which have replaced those of the territorialised framework of Left and Right. For liberal and critical theorists, this is the struggle for human rights and emancipation against the sovereign power of states. For poststructuralist theorists, this is seen as the struggle for autonomy and difference against the universalising war waged ‘over ways of life itself’ by neoliberal biopolitical governance. However, these struggles remain immanent ones, in which global political social forces of progress are intimated but are yet to fully develop. There is a problem of the social agency, the collective political subject, which can give content to the theorising of global struggle articulated by academic theorists.33 Without a social agency, which can give global politics the content which academic theorists insist is immanent, <u><strong>there seems to be a weak link in the chain of argument which asserts that the globalising nature of</u></strong> economic and social <u><strong>transformations has run ahead of our capacities to engage with the world politically</u></strong>. On the one hand, there appears to be a crude technological determinism at work: somehow, speeded up communications are held to have transformed social relations to such an extent that we need new frameworks of social and political theorising and practices. On the other hand, there appears to be a crude idealism: <u><strong>the enlightened <mark>advocates</u></strong></mark> of global progress <u><strong><mark>are</mark> held <mark>to represent</u></strong></mark> or express the immanent or <u><strong>arising <mark>progressive forces</u></strong></mark> – from global civil society to the ‘multitude’ – <u><strong>which are <mark>yet to make their</mark> own <mark>appearance. How can the</u></strong></mark> theoretical and practical <u><strong><mark>gap be bridged between</mark> assertions of transformed social relations</u></strong>, which are alleged to have created a deterritorialised world, <u><strong>and <mark>the fact</mark> that the <mark>social forces</mark>, alleged to reflect or be agents of these changes, <mark>remain</u></strong></mark> immanent or <u><strong><mark>marginal</mark>?</u></strong> <u><strong>It seems that we live in a world where <mark>politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle</mark> rather than as a result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs Vermont lb
|
2nc
|
2NC – Turns Racism
| 220,456 | 7 | 17,094 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| 565,257 |
N
|
Hubervermont
|
1
|
Vermont Lee-Brough
|
Kozak
|
Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,118 |
State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case
|
Kamin 2012
|
Kamin 2012 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)
|
In addition to conflict between state and federal law there is conflict between state and local governments. there is often tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
|
there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
|
V. The State-Local Junction In addition to the ambiguity and conflict between state laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) and the federal law (which continues to criminalize it), there is another level of intergovernmental conflict in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay between state and local governments. Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated at the local level. In Colorado, for example, municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, there will likely be many places in the state where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy.
| 6,885 |
<h4><strong>State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case</h4><p>Kamin 2012</strong> (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)</p><p>V. The State-Local Junction <u>In addition to</u> the ambiguity and <u>conflict between state</u> laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) <u>and</u> the <u>federal law</u> (which continues to criminalize it), <u>there is</u> another level of intergovernmental <u>conflict </u>in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay <u>between state and local governments.</u> Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, <u><mark>there is often</u> a <u>tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated</u></mark> at the local level. <u><mark>In Colorado</u></mark>, for example, <u>municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and <strong><mark>a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright</u></strong>.</mark> n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, <u><strong><mark>there will likely be many places</u></strong></mark> in the state <u><strong><mark>where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased</mark>. </u></strong>In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, <u><mark>it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views</mark> </u>of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so <u><mark>we might be concerned that localism will <strong>allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
CP
| 430,935 | 4 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,119 |
The shortage means many die and suffer
|
Beard 8
|
Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy
|
our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.
|
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.
| 5,967 |
<h4>The shortage means many die and suffer</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,247 | 16 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,120 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,121 |
CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
The United States invested more than any other nation to influence the global control regime If the U.S. proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials have been trying to develop a legal argument that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution if, the U.S. interpretation attracted ceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4>CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>The United States</u></mark> has <u><mark>invested</u></mark> probably <u><mark>more</mark> effort <mark>than any other nation</u></mark> over the past century <u><mark>to</u> <u>influence the</mark> design of the <mark>global control regime</u></mark> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S.</mark> now <mark>proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials </mark>in Washington<mark> have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u>claiming <mark>that the U.S. is not violating the treaties</mark> <mark>because</mark> <mark>cultivation, trade and possession</u></mark> of cannabis <u><mark>are <strong>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>and</mark> <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></mark> for considerable <u><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices</mark>, especially <mark>when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution</mark> and domestic legal system.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u><mark>if, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level of <u>political ac<mark>ceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
3
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,122 |
Indian Economic growth solves stability and extinction -- nuclear winter with Pakistan, China, and Naxalite Insurgents
|
Robinson ’10
|
Robinson ’10 Dr. David Robinson, History lecturer at Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia and published author that holds a PhD in History, and is mid-way through a Master of International Relations degree. “The Regional and Global Implications of India’s Rise as a Great Power.” – June 17th, 2010 – made available at http://lfort.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/indias-rise-as-a-great-power/#_ftn21
|
India is rapidly rising to become a great power, but its ascent depends on maintaining relative domestic stability All four states are nuclear powers, so the consequences of any conflict between them are potentially dire. As Indian power increases it will inevitably challenge existing political, economic and military patterns is China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities that many argue remain the primary military threat to India’s security India’s other major challenge comes from its unstable neighbour Pakistan, with which full-scale war and nuclear exchange have been avoided then India’s average GDP growth rate has hovered at around 7 percent, will surpass China’s to make it the world’s most populous country, and its rapidly expanding middle class may constitute up to 60 percent Despite India’s meteoric economic development India now has 410 million people living below the U.N. poverty line These social inequalities have fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgency Singh identified as the “greatest internal security threat” facing the nation … Unless India can sustain this momentum, its larger foreign policy ambitions cannot be realized” The political stability of India (and China) “is absolutely dependent on continued economic dynamism
|
India is rising but its ascent depends on maintaining relative domestic stability All four states are nuclear powers, so the consequences of any conflict are dire China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities remain the primary military threat to India’s security India’s other major challenge comes from its unstable neighbour Pakistan, with which full-scale war and nuclear exchange have been avoide social inequalities have fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgency the “greatest internal security threat Unless India can sustain this momentum, its larger foreign policy ambitions cannot be realized political stability of India (and China) “is absolutely dependent on continued economic dynamism
|
Over the last decade there has been an increasing focus on India’s economic and military expansion, and its consequences for South Asia and the world. India is rapidly rising to become a great power, but its ascent depends on maintaining relative domestic stability, and carefully crafting its policies towards the United States and its neighbours Pakistan and China. All four states are nuclear powers, so the consequences of any conflict between them are potentially dire.[1] India has found the post-Cold War international environment amenable to expansion of its bilateral ties with all the major powers simultaneously, and has thus pursued a strategy of ‘poly-alignment’ – seeking to be a ‘bridging power’ between the sometimes competing poles of the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union.[2] This inverts India’s traditional non-alignment policy, allowing India to reap the benefits of closer economic and strategic ties while maintaining the same spirit of balanced international relations.[3] To a degree this arises from uncertainty about the shape of the emerging international order, and India’s own lack of a credible vision of its place in that environment.[4] Nonetheless, its growing wealth and population is now enabling India to build up its military might, and as “a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic democracy … India is being asked to shoulder global responsibilities in consonance with its rising global stature”.[5] This paper will consider India’s rise as a global power, and the likely regional and global implications, through a specific focus on its relations with its strategically significant neighbours Pakistan and China, and argue that fundamentally the balance of power between them will not change dramatically in the near future. As Indian power increases it will inevitably challenge existing political, economic and military patterns, but as Harsh Pant argues, “India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities … throughout history, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives”.[6] From independence in 1947 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a strategy of non-alignment that sought to avoid participation in the Cold War, prioritising multilateral institutions and the Non-Aligned Movement. Indian policy was always opposed to the use of military force in international relations.[7] However, as India begins to assert itself as a regional power it is today moving to convert its ‘brown-water’ navy into a ‘blue-water’ navy and is expanding the reach of its air force, moving beyond border control and demonstrating greater concern for strategic issues, such as the protection of shipping lanes.[8] While maintaining constructive relations with the United States, India has also been involved in trilateral dialogue with China and Russia, increasingly sharing their vision of a multipolar world based on consensus among the major powers. India has also become a non-voting member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), through which China and Russia have sought to strategically counterbalance NATO advancement into the Middle East and Central Asia.[9] At the same time, it is China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities that many argue remain the primary military threat to India’s security and the key motivation for India’s own nuclear weapons program; while the United States, under the G.W. Bush administration, negotiated a substantial deal that would assist India’s ‘civilian’ nuclear development. India’s other major challenge comes from its unstable neighbour Pakistan, with which full-scale war and nuclear exchange have been avoided despite clashes in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999, and attacks on India by Pakistani-backed terrorists in 2001 and 2008.[10] The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War confronted India with an unprecedented financial crisis, as India simultaneously lost access to Eastern European markets, global oil prices spiked, and over 100,000 Indians were repatriated from the Gulf region, thus precluding their remittances. These economic shocks forced a dramatic rethink of Indian economic and foreign policies. Under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao India steered towards greater economic liberalisation and diplomatic diversity. The Rao government sought greater engagement with the United States and China, as well as making overtures to Israel and seeking improved relations with Southeast Asia through a ‘Look East’ policy.[11] Since then India’s average GDP growth rate has hovered at around 7 percent, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has predicted that in spite of the global financial crisis, India’s growth should remain at 6.5 percent in 2010.[12] Not only has India maintained this amazing economic growth, but it is also envisaged that in the next two decades India’s population “will surpass China’s to make it the world’s most populous country, and its rapidly expanding middle class may constitute up to 60 percent of its 1.3 billion-plus people”.[13] Internationally the Indian diaspora now numbers over 20 million, and is relatively affluent, successful, and well-integrated – spreading India’s ‘soft’ cultural influence.[14] While the approximately 3.7 million Indian nationals now living in the six Gulf (GCC) states specifically remit around $8 billion annually.[15] Despite India’s meteoric economic development, it can be said India has both the best of the First World and the worst of the Third World within its borders, and faces unprecedented human security challenges.[16] India now has 410 million people living below the U.N. poverty line – 37.2 percent of its population and actually 100 million more people than in 2004 – and millions of India’s rural poor are faced with food price inflation of up to 17 percent.[17] 60 percent of Indian labour is still agricultural, and the integration of hundreds of millions of peasants into a modern economy may be an extremely painful process.[18] And while Indian infrastructure such as roads, civil aviation, ports, and telecommunications have experienced noticeable improvements in recent years, electricity, railways, and irrigation all still need significant investment; and India continues to lag in social infrastructure, such as education and healthcare.[19] These social inequalities have fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgency affecting vast areas throughout eastern and central India, and whose 20,000 insurgents current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh identified as the “greatest internal security threat” facing the nation.[20] These internal issues pose the first challenge to India’s rise as a great power, as external projection must be based on a firm foundation of domestic stability. The requirements for domestic stability also shape India’s international needs. Pant asserts that, “The biggest challenge for India remains that of continuing to achieve the rates of economic growth that it has enjoyed in recent years. Everything else is of secondary importance. … Unless India can sustain this momentum, its larger foreign policy ambitions cannot be realized”.[21] The political stability of India (and similarly its neighbour China) “is absolutely dependent on continued economic dynamism.
| 7,406 |
<h4>Indian Economic growth solves stability and extinction -- nuclear winter with Pakistan, China, and Naxalite Insurgents </h4><p><strong>Robinson ’10</strong> Dr. David Robinson, History lecturer at Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia and published author that holds a PhD in History, and is mid-way through a Master of International Relations degree. “The Regional and Global Implications of India’s Rise as a Great Power.” – June 17th, 2010 – made available at http://lfort.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/indias-rise-as-a-great-power/#_ftn21</p><p>Over the last decade there has been an increasing focus on India’s economic and military expansion, and its consequences for South Asia and the world. <u><mark>India is</mark> rapidly <mark>rising</mark> to become a great power, <mark>but its ascent depends on maintaining relative domestic stability</u></mark>, and carefully crafting its policies towards the United States and its neighbours Pakistan and China. <u><mark>All</u></mark> <u><mark>four states are nuclear powers, so the consequences of any conflict</mark> between them <mark>are</mark> potentially <mark>dire</mark>.</u>[1] India has found the post-Cold War international environment amenable to expansion of its bilateral ties with all the major powers simultaneously, and has thus pursued a strategy of ‘poly-alignment’ – seeking to be a ‘bridging power’ between the sometimes competing poles of the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union.[2] This inverts India’s traditional non-alignment policy, allowing India to reap the benefits of closer economic and strategic ties while maintaining the same spirit of balanced international relations.[3] To a degree this arises from uncertainty about the shape of the emerging international order, and India’s own lack of a credible vision of its place in that environment.[4] Nonetheless, its growing wealth and population is now enabling India to build up its military might, and as “a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic democracy … India is being asked to shoulder global responsibilities in consonance with its rising global stature”.[5] This paper will consider India’s rise as a global power, and the likely regional and global implications, through a specific focus on its relations with its strategically significant neighbours Pakistan and China, and argue that fundamentally the balance of power between them will not change dramatically in the near future. <u>As Indian power increases it will inevitably challenge existing political, economic and military patterns</u>, but as Harsh Pant argues, “India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities … throughout history, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives”.[6] From independence in 1947 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a strategy of non-alignment that sought to avoid participation in the Cold War, prioritising multilateral institutions and the Non-Aligned Movement. Indian policy was always opposed to the use of military force in international relations.[7] However, as India begins to assert itself as a regional power it is today moving to convert its ‘brown-water’ navy into a ‘blue-water’ navy and is expanding the reach of its air force, moving beyond border control and demonstrating greater concern for strategic issues, such as the protection of shipping lanes.[8] While maintaining constructive relations with the United States, India has also been involved in trilateral dialogue with China and Russia, increasingly sharing their vision of a multipolar world based on consensus among the major powers. India has also become a non-voting member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), through which China and Russia have sought to strategically counterbalance NATO advancement into the Middle East and Central Asia.[9] At the same time, it <u>is <mark>China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities</mark> that many argue <mark>remain the primary military threat to India’s security</u></mark> and the key motivation for India’s own nuclear weapons program; while the United States, under the G.W. Bush administration, negotiated a substantial deal that would assist India’s ‘civilian’ nuclear development. <u><mark>India’s other major challenge comes from its unstable neighbour Pakistan, with which full-scale war and nuclear exchange have been avoide</mark>d</u> despite clashes in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999, and attacks on India by Pakistani-backed terrorists in 2001 and 2008.[10] The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War confronted India with an unprecedented financial crisis, as India simultaneously lost access to Eastern European markets, global oil prices spiked, and over 100,000 Indians were repatriated from the Gulf region, thus precluding their remittances. These economic shocks forced a dramatic rethink of Indian economic and foreign policies. Under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao India steered towards greater economic liberalisation and diplomatic diversity. The Rao government sought greater engagement with the United States and China, as well as making overtures to Israel and seeking improved relations with Southeast Asia through a ‘Look East’ policy.[11] Since <u>then India’s average GDP growth rate has hovered at around 7 percent,</u> and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has predicted that in spite of the global financial crisis, India’s growth should remain at 6.5 percent in 2010.[12] Not only has India maintained this amazing economic growth, but it is also envisaged that in the next two decades India’s population “<u>will surpass China’s to make it the world’s most populous country, and its rapidly expanding middle class may constitute up to 60 percent</u> of its 1.3 billion-plus people”.[13] Internationally the Indian diaspora now numbers over 20 million, and is relatively affluent, successful, and well-integrated – spreading India’s ‘soft’ cultural influence.[14] While the approximately 3.7 million Indian nationals now living in the six Gulf (GCC) states specifically remit around $8 billion annually.[15] <u>Despite India’s meteoric economic development</u>, it can be said India has both the best of the First World and the worst of the Third World within its borders, and faces unprecedented human security challenges.[16] <u>India now has 410 million people living below the U.N. poverty line </u>– 37.2 percent of its population and actually 100 million more people than in 2004 – and millions of India’s rural poor are faced with food price inflation of up to 17 percent.[17] 60 percent of Indian labour is still agricultural, and the integration of hundreds of millions of peasants into a modern economy may be an extremely painful process.[18] And while Indian infrastructure such as roads, civil aviation, ports, and telecommunications have experienced noticeable improvements in recent years, electricity, railways, and irrigation all still need significant investment; and India continues to lag in social infrastructure, such as education and healthcare.[19] <u>These <mark>social inequalities have fuelled the widespread ‘Naxalite’ Maoist insurgency</mark> </u>affecting vast areas throughout eastern and central India, and whose 20,000 insurgents current Prime Minister Manmohan <u>Singh identified as <mark>the “greatest internal security threat</mark>” facing the nation</u>.[20] These internal issues pose the first challenge to India’s rise as a great power, as external projection must be based on a firm foundation of domestic stability. The requirements for domestic stability also shape India’s international needs. Pant asserts that, “The biggest challenge for India remains that of continuing to achieve the rates of economic growth that it has enjoyed in recent years. Everything else is of secondary importance. <u>… <mark>Unless India can sustain this momentum, its larger foreign policy ambitions cannot be realized</mark>”</u>.[21] <u>The <mark>political stability of India (and</u></mark> similarly its neighbour <u><mark>China) “is absolutely dependent on continued economic dynamism</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 148,324 | 32 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,123 |
There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay
|
Youngers 2014
|
Youngers 2014 (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)
|
SINCE NIXON DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs the U.S. used its muscle to dictate policies throughout the region the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this The surge in left-leaning governments The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies Washington is suffering from a credibility problem Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws The irony is not lost on Latin American officials the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
|
Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
|
SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON FIRST DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs over 40 years ago, the U.S. government has used its political and economic muscle to dictate policies throughout the region. Now the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force. Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this and other policies. The surge in left-leaning governments in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend. Interestingly, the reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds, with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team, Luis Videgaray, said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status." Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. Perhaps the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. Despite arduous negotiations-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to overcome the 'war on drugs' approach." The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada. Interestingly, Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them. This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
| 8,683 |
<h4><strong>There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay</h4><p>Youngers 2014</strong> <mark>(Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)</p><p><u></mark>SINCE</u> PRESIDENT <u>NIXON</u> FIRST <u>DECLARED</u> <u>THE WAR on Drugs</u> over 40 years ago, <u>the U.S.</u> government has <u>used its</u> political and economic <u>muscle to dictate policies throughout the region</u>. Now <u>the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force</u>. <u>Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this</u> and other policies. <u>The surge in left-leaning governments</u> in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. <u>The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend</u>. Interestingly, the <u><strong>reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds</u></strong>, <u>with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador</u> <u>to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies</u>, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. <u><strong><mark>Washington is suffering from a credibility problem</u></strong>. <u>Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws</u></mark>. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis <mark>markets. <u>The irony is not lost on Latin American officials</u>;</mark> for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), <u>the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team</u>, Luis Videgaray, <u>said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status</u>." <u>Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. </u>Perhaps <u>the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States</u>, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." <u>THE APRIL 2012 <mark>CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point</u>. <u>For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives</u></mark>. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). <u><strong><mark>In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington</u></strong>, <u><strong>the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment</strong> with policies appropriate to their reality</u></mark>. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. <u><mark>Despite arduous negotiations</u></mark>-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-<u><mark>the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda</mark>. </u>Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that <u><mark>the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered</u>,</mark> leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: <u><strong><mark>for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda</u></strong></mark>. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, <u><mark>the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS</u></mark>. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, <u><mark>what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies</mark> to</u> overcome <u><mark>the 'war on drugs'</u></mark> approach." <u><mark>The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad</mark>a</u>. Interestingly, <u>Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution</u> (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). <u>And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries</u> (GRULAC), <u>underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them</u>. <u>This has <mark>emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path<strong>.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
1NC
|
Treaties
| 430,470 | 17 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,124 |
“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts
|
a clear statement rule against commandeering require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political process failure. be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than categorical constitutional rules difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice Commandeering absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism . Imposing a clear statement rule it checks the power of the court
|
Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, political safeguards proponents should insist on a clear statement rule against commandeering. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance. By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced. Thus, they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political [*634] process failure. Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, they may be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than splashier, but less frequently applied categorical constitutional rules. The difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule may mean that Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement. n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer" to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice. Here, the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice of legislative means. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. Commandeering hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process. Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials, a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism. Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies. Imposing a clear statement rule against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as it checks the power of the courts. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.
| 6,405 |
<h4><strong>“Clear statement” ruling solves- avoids commandeering and prevents Congressional reauthorization</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Of course, Young's argument still doesn't provide a convincing reason why an adherent of the political safeguards of federalism should prefer that the anti-commandeering doctrine be a "hard" and categorical constitutional rule rather than a "softer" clear statement rule. Externalizing regulatory costs may be a bad thing, but if Congress has put such cost externalization clearly on the political agenda, and passed the various legislative "veto gates," the political safeguard proponent might still be satisfied. Nevertheless, <u>political safeguards proponents should insist on <mark>a clear statement rule against commandeering</u></mark>. As Young argues, clear statement rules have numerous advantages that should appeal to political safeguard proponents. n241 <u>By throwing the federalism issue back to Congress, they <mark>require Congress to engage in dialogue about the proper federal/state policymaking balance</u></mark>. <u>By requiring clarity and explicitness when state autonomy will be curtailed by a federal law, the clear statement requirement <mark>forces Congress to give notice to potential opponents of a bill who might not otherwise have coalesced</mark>.</u> Thus, <u><mark>they promote the working of the political safeguards and deter political</u></mark> [*634] <u><mark>process failure</u>.</mark> Although clear statement rules avoid direct confrontations between the courts and the political branches over the limits of their power, <u>they may <mark>be of greater practical significance in protecting state autonomy than</mark> splashier, but less frequently applied <mark>categorical constitutional</mark> <mark>rules</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>difficulties in enacting legislation and the increased drafting costs in following the clear statement rule</mark> may <mark>mean that <strong>Congress will not ultimately amend the law to make the clear statement</u></strong>.</mark> n242 As the Court stated in Gregory: Inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. "To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." n243 The problem addressed by the clear statement rule is not a pedantic or formalistic insistence on clarity, but rather a concern to ensure that the political safeguards have in fact functioned. As the Court has repeatedly observed, applying the clear statement rule to legislation affecting the federalism balance "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." n244 All of these advantages of clear statement rules are present in the anti-commandeering clear statement rule. Both sides of the federalism debate should agree on a rigorous clear statement rule. For proponents of judicially enforced federalism, the reason is obvious: Commandeering restructures state governments contrary to the constitution and statutes of the state. But proponents of the political safeguards theory should also prefer the clear statement rule because judicially inferred commandeering-by-preemption represents a serious political process failure. There is yet a further reason. <u><mark>Given a statute's silence on any intent to commandeer state officials, there is no way for the Court to "defer"</mark> to a congressional choice when Congress has not made a choice.</u> Here, <u><mark>the commandeering of state officials would represent a significant judicial choice</mark> of legislative means</u>. For a court to infer commandeering from a silent statute - based on its purpose or even legislative history - would represent a dramatic judicial intervention in the choice of legislative means. Put another way, the political process failure of commandeering [*635] through silence or ambiguity does not materialize unless and until a court infers commandeering. The CSA illustrates these issues plainly. <u><mark>Commandeering</mark> hundreds of thousands of police officers and thousands of state prosecutors to enforce federal law is a major step that Congress may or may not have considered. Its <mark>absence from the CSA means that the question did not undergo the rigors of the political process</u>. <u><strong>Given the political checks and vetoes that would face an effort today to amend the CSA to commandeer state officials</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>a decision by politically-insulated courts to read commandeering into the statute would actively promote a major failure of the political safeguards of federalism</mark>. </u>Too often in discussions of federalism, courts flit in and out of view, sprite-like. But when discussing federalism "doctrine," - in this Article, the difficulties in reconciling preemption and anti-commandeering doctrine in particular - we are talking about judge-made law, not legal authority external to courts. <u>Here legislation creates a federalism problem, and is thus a continuing focal point, but my argument focuses on a doctrinal, rather than legislative solution</u>. And what we call "doctrine" is at bottom an exercise of judicial power. The anti-commandeering doctrine is a judicial check on federal legislative power; preemption has elements of both an assertion of federal legislative and judicial power. The clarity with which Congress states an intention to preempt state law varies along a spectrum, both in terms of the linguistic clarity of the statute itself and the degree to which specific applications have or have not been contemplated in the statute. The less clear the preemptive intent, the more a court gains latitude to impose its own idea of policy. <u>Congress simply did not take a position in the CSA on whether state officials had to enforce the federal law irrespective of contrary state policies<mark>. Imposing a clear statement rule</mark> against commandeering thus does not check the power of Congress - because that power wasn't exercised - so much as <mark>it checks the power of the court</mark>s</u><strong>. There can be, but need not be, a hard constitutional anti-commandeering rule standing behind the clear statement rule; were Congress to expressly commandeer state officials, the presumption would be overcome and only then would the exercise of judicial review power be truly at issue. In the meantime, the anti-commandeering clear statement rule limits the power of courts, by preventing them under the cloak of statutory interpretation, from undertaking a potentially major initiative in federal drug policy.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
CP
| 430,571 | 9 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,125 |
There’s only a risk of a link—The AFF’s highly individualized engagement is the thesis of anti-politics—Their focus on community through difference denies all hope of political consensus and pragmatic action ensuring the Right takes over
|
Chandler 7
|
Chandler 7 (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster –
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politics is no less important today. We are less likely to engage in formal politics of elections and governments but in post-territorial politics This type of politics is ‘global’ but, , highly individualised ‘politics’ nowadays it is less the ‘old’ politics, of political parties, and government than ‘new’ politics of global ethical concern the practice of global politics tends to not subordinate to collective associations and give value to aspiration as an end in-itself It is as if we are upholding our goodness in the face of an alienating world The practice is a highly conservative one this is politics as a sedative it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine engagement and transformation ethical politics institutionalises disconnection and atomisation and results in unaccountable government policy making. People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests I disagree these are highly individualised rather than attempts to engage politically It is as if people are more concerned with the creation of a sense of community through differences than with political agreement Rather than political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism is a form of disengagement it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brain-washed more people are ‘doing politics’ in academic work This is the reason for the boom in I R the attraction has not been IR theory but desire to practice global ethics The boom coincided with a rejection of Realist frameworks this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement but an ethical act of rejection of Realism’s focus. our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. theorists support arguing that we should not be as concerned with ‘what is’ as with the potential for the emergence of ethical community the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative Critical thought becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than engagement, in the process this becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research The inward-looking trends in academia, where we are more concerned with awareness than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which frameworks they agreed with and they replied Critical theory despite the fact that they thought that states operated on the basis of power Their preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as individuals than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.
violent neo-colonialism
(Robert E. Kelly an associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, “What Would Chinese Hegemony Look Like?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/what-would-chinese-hegemony-look-like/)//kyan
China has increasingly resorted to bullying and threats In the South China Sea it has pushed a expansive maritime zone of control, down the Philippines ones. Most observers expect U.S. to push back, as indeed they have. The U.S. flew bombers through the new ADIZ without warning, A common theme in the literature on China’s rise is its apparent inevitability. But frequently these would-be hegemons collided with a counter-hegemonic coalition of states unwilling to be conquered. Occasionally the hegemonic aspirant may win; But there is nothing inevitable about this. China seeks hegemony there is a growing consensus that this is indeed the case. Chinese hegemony in Asia we broadly mean something akin to the United States’ position in Latin America. not actual conquest analysts expect a zone of super-ordinate influence over neighbors.
Since the end of the colonial era, the rising powers have been quick to condemn Western racism. Ethnocentrism and color prejudice can be found in virtually all human societies Even now, Americans are dealing with the effects of this monstrous ideological project. It is also true, however, that Americans have been fairly forthright in confronting this legacy The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. Huntington argued, “modernization” and “westernization” a Choe Sang-Hun described the intense discrimination faced by a growing number of migrant workers from impoverished Asian countries Koreans expressed concerns about the end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity, arguing that a larger influx of migrant would lead to a rise in the level of crime and social tension. These anxieties have the air of self-fulfilling prophecy most prize ethnic homogeneity, migrant workers will remain on the margins of society. This, in turn, will fuel alienation and resentment among this class of permanent second-class citizens. And so South Korea’s major cities could very well see the rise of segregated ethnic slums. It’s worth noting that anti-foreigner sentiments are flourishing in a time when South Korea is experiencing rapid economic change, including a new social and economic inequality. Just as racism provided the basis for solidarity among whites in U.S. history, it could be playing a similar role in South Korea. Next to China’s race problem, South Korea’s pales in significance political scientists Valerie Hudson and Andrea van den Boer noted China also has tens of millions of so-called “surplus males” thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children China is not terribly hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities native to China Observers tend to overstate the level of ethnic homogeneity in China because the Han category masks tremendous cultural diversity. “Hanness” is as broad and contingent a category as “whiteness.” Frank Dikötter traditional notions about culturally inferior “barbarians” intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in the 20th century. The “yellows” were locked in a struggle with their equals, the “whites”–and both were superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.” The distrust of Europeans was always mixed with envy The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners remains relatively uncomplicated Maoist China railed against Western imperialism, and saw itself as a leader of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians. Now, as China emerges as an economic and cultural superpower, those notions of Third World solidarity, always skin deep seem to have vanished. It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms the United States has become more culturally open and resilient–
dogmatic better reflexive
long-term persistence of cultural difference is deeply rooted one of the biggest differences between the Americans and the Chinese is that Americans are always trying to re-create themselves, America nation is always trying to recreate itself. The Chinese rarely even ask these questions, and as a nation seem to have more of a sense of where they come from conclusion is Chinese have a deep sense of their own identity is to be found in their long history Americans are in constant search of their identity exhibit certain cultural traits which can be explained by their history that does not mean that cultural characteristics stemming from profound and very long-run influences –like climate, patterns of agriculture, language, the environment, family structure, cosmological beliefs or the longevity of history –don’t persist from the past and leave their mark on the present. According to Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, who have extensively researched the relationship between cultural and genetic evolution, ‘an enormous amount of circumstantial evidence suggests that culturally transmitted traits are stable over time and in the face of changing environments.’
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We are less likely to engage in formal politics This type of politics is highly individualised global politics tends to not subordinate to collective associations The practice is highly conservative this is politics as a sedative at the expense of engagement and results in unaccountable policy making. these are highly individualised rather than political as if people are more concerned with community through differences than political agreement more people are ‘doing politics’ This is the reason for the boom in I R the most dangerous trends have taken up Critical theory Critical thought becomes wishful thinking rather than engagement this becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research
China has increasingly resorted to threats In the South China Sea it pushed a expansive maritime zone of control down the Philippines Most expect the U.S. to push back, as indeed they have. .S. flew bombers through the new ADIZ China’s rise would-be hegemons collided with a counter-hegemonic coalition unwilling to be conquered. Occasionally the hegemonic aspirant may win; China seeks hegemony. there is a growing consensus that this is indeed the case. Chinese hegemony in Asia mean something akin to U S in L A expect a zone of super-ordinate influence
Since colonial era powers have quick to condemn Western racism color prejudice can be found in all human societies Americans are dealing with effects Americans have been fairly forthright in confronting this legacy. The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. A Hun described intense discrimination faced by growing number of migrant workers expressed concerns about the end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity hese anxieties have the air of self-fulfilling prophecy most prize ethnic homogeneity, China’s race problem Hudson noted China also has tens of millions surplus males” China is not hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities . Han category masks diversity. “Hanness” is as broad and contingent as “whiteness.” traditional notions about inferior “barbarians” form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in yellows” were locked in struggle with the “whites both superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.” The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners the United States has become more culturally open and resilient
long-term persistence of cultural difference is deeply rooted the biggest differences between the Americans and the Chinese is Americans re-create themselves Chinese rarely ask these questions Chinese have a deep sense of their own identity Americans are in constant search of their identity
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“The Attraction of Post-Territorial Politics: Ethics and Activism in the International Sphere” – Inaugural Lecture – May – available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/short_articles/Inaugural%20lecture.pdf)
However, politics is no less important to many of us today. Politics still gives us a sense of social connection and social rootedness and gives meaning to many of our lives. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. We are less likely to engage in the formal politics of representation - of elections and governments - but in post-territorial politics, a politics where there is much less division between the private sphere and the public one and much less division between national, territorial, concerns and global ones. This type of politics is on the one hand ‘global’ but, on the other, highly individualised: it is very much the politics of our everyday lives – the sense of meaning we get from thinking about global warming when we turn off the taps when we brush our teeth, take our rubbish out for recycling or cut back on our car use - we might also do global politics in deriving meaning from the ethical or social value of our work, or in our subscription or support for good causes from Oxfam to Greenpeace and Christian Aid. I want to suggest that when we do ‘politics’ nowadays it is less the ‘old’ politics, of self-interest, political parties, and concern for governmental power, than the ‘new’ politics of global ethical concerns. I further want to suggest that the forms and content of this new global approach to the political are more akin to religious beliefs and practices than to the forms of our social political engagement in the past. Global politics is similar to religious approaches in three vital respects: 1) global post-territorial politics are no longer concerned with power, its’ concerns are free-floating and in many ways, existential, about how we live our lives; 2) global politics revolve around practices with are private and individualised, they are about us as individuals and our ethical choices; 3) the practice of global politics tends to be non-instrumental, we do not subordinate ourselves to collective associations or parties and are more likely to give value to our aspirations, acts, or the fact of our awareness of an issue, as an end in-itself. It is as if we are upholding our goodness or ethicality in the face of an increasingly confusing, problematic and alienating world – our politics in this sense are an expression or voice, in Marx’s words, of ‘the heart in a heartless world’ or ‘the soul of a soulless condition’. The practice of ‘doing politics’ as a form of religiosity is a highly conservative one. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ - this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine social engagement and transformation. I want to argue that global ethical politics reflects and institutionalises our sense of disconnection and social atomisation and results in irrational and unaccountable government policy making. I want to illustrate my points by briefly looking at the practices of global ethics in three spheres, those of radical political activism, government policy making and academia. Radical activism People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones - there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creation of a sense of community through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, that political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions, it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brain-washed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever increasing awareness of themselves and by giving ‘political’ meaning to every personal action. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement or organisation. Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that ‘foreign policy is no longer foreign policy’ (Timothy Garten Ash, ‘Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for’, 26 April 2007), this is certainly true. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing ‘identity’. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the ‘value-based’ interventions from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blair’s recent Foreign Affairs article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, 86:1 (2007), pp.79–90). Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political agenda for - the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere – the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making based on a clear political programme to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict etc – of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the US or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the ‘civilised world’, NATO or the EU are on the line in ‘wars of choice’ from the war on terror to the war on global warming lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of Realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or cohere political programmes. As Baudrillard suggests, without a connection to the ‘represented’ masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’ (In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, for example). It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. As Donald Rumsfeld stated about the war on terror, ‘there are no metrics’ to help assess whether the war is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber once counterposed this type of politics – the ‘ethics of conviction’ – to the ‘ethics of responsibility’ in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues from war crimes to EU membership requirements. Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practice global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism’s ontological focus. It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with ‘what is’ as with the potential for the emergence of global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative ‘problem-solving’ while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and positionality before thinking about or teaching on world affairs; in the process this becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull’s perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead. The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our ‘reflectivity’ – the awareness of our own ethics and values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most and they replied mostly Critical theory and Constructivism despite the fact that they thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.
Turns and solves the K—US influence checks a violent china rise—weaking our stance as a hegemon causes neo-colonialism in Asia—it will recreate the colonialism of Latin America
Kelly 2/10/14 (Robert E. Kelly an associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, “What Would Chinese Hegemony Look Like?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/what-would-chinese-hegemony-look-like/)//kyan
Since 2009 however, China has increasingly resorted to bullying and threats. The 2008 Olympics appears to have been read in Beijing as a sign of China’s newfound might and sway. In the South China Sea it has pushed a very expansive definition of its maritime zone of control, and it recently faced down the Philippines in a dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in that sea. Indeed, one possible explanation for China’s expansion of its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea is that a hard line seems to be working in the South China Sea. But China’s northeast Asian neighbors are far stronger and more capable than its southeast Asian ones. Most observers expect Japan, South Korea and the U.S. to push back, as indeed they have. The U.S. flew bombers through the new ADIZ without warning, and both Japanese and South Korean civilian airlines have been instructed by their respective governments not to comply. All this then sets up a bipolar contest between China and Japan, in the context of China’s rapid rise toward regional dominance. Chinese Hegemony? A common theme in the literature on China’s rise is its apparent inevitability. Westerners particularly tend to get carried away with book-titles such as Eclipse (of the U.S. by China), When China Rules the World, or China’s New Empire. History is indeed filled with the rise to dominance of powerful states. China and Japan both sought in the past to dominate Asia. Various European states including the U.S.SR, Germany, and France did the same. But frequently these would-be hegemons collided with a counter-hegemonic coalition of states unwilling to be manipulated or conquered. Occasionally the hegemonic aspirant may win; Europe under Rome was “unipolar,” as was feudal Asia now-and-again under the strongest Chinese dynasties. But there is nothing inevitable about this. Hegemonic contenders as various as Napoleon or Imperial Japan have been defeated. To be fair, it is not clear yet if indeed China seeks regional hegemony. But there is a growing consensus among American and Japanese analysts that this is indeed the case. By Chinese hegemony in Asia we broadly mean something akin to the United States’ position in Latin America. We do not mean actual conquest. Almost no one believes China intends to annex even its weakest neighbors like Cambodia or North Korea. Rather, analysts expect a zone of super-ordinate influence over neighbors.
China is net worse than the united states—sexism, “haness”,
Salam 09 (Reihan Salam is a fellow at the New America Foundation “China’s Race Problem” 11/09/09
http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/08/china-race-racism-opinions-columnists-reihan-salam.html)//kyan
Is racism universal? Since the end of the colonial era, the rising powers of the developing world have been quick to condemn Western racism. Ethnocentrism and color prejudice can be found in virtually all human societies, going back centuries if not thousands of years. Yet racism as we know it first emerged in the late 17th century. While slavery is an ancient institution, the racial slavery that took hold in the Americas in that era was new and very unusual. In the English-speaking colonies of North America, the violent subjugation of enslaved Africans created a perverse solidarity among people of European descent, who were united by their place at the top of a racial hierarchy. Racial boundaries that had once been fairly fluid became increasingly rigid. Because the egalitarian ideals of the Declaration of Independence clearly contradicted the still profitable and pervasive practice of racial slavery, it was vitally important that the enslaved be regarded as subhuman, lest the whole corrupt edifice completely collapse. Even now, Americans are dealing with the scarring effects of this monstrous ideological project. It is also true, however, that Americans have been fairly forthright in confronting this legacy. The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. As the late political scientist Samuel Huntington argued, “modernization” and “westernization” aren’t the same thing. Economic progress in East Asia and South Asia and Latin America doesn’t mean that these regions will become carbon copies of Europe and America. But history has a tendency to rhyme. After decades of breakneck economic growth, South Korea has joined the ranks of the world’s richest and most powerful states. As such, a growth model built on cheap labor has been transformed by the emergence of a large and expensive welfare state, and also labor market rigidities that have led to high youth unemployment rates. Like the rich nations of the West, South Korea also has a low birthrate and, as a direct result, a rapidly aging population. This begs the question of whether South Korea should embrace large-scale immigration. Faced with a similar dilemma, West Germany signed a series of labor agreements in the 1950s and 1960s that led a large influx of guest workers. The idea was that these guest workers would come for a time and then return home. That, of course, is not how things turned out. Over 50 years since the beginning of the guest worker initiative, Germany is still struggling to deal with its growing population of ethnic outsiders. South Korea might have an even harder time. In a fascinating article published in The New York Times last week, Choe Sang-Hun described the intense discrimination faced by a small but growing number of migrant workers from impoverished Asian countries. A number of Koreans have expressed serious concerns about the end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity, arguing that a larger influx of migrant workers would lead to a rise in the level of crime and social tension. These anxieties have the air of self-fulfilling prophecy. Given that many if not most Koreans prize ethnic homogeneity, migrant workers will remain on the margins of society. This, in turn, will fuel alienation and resentment among this class of permanent second-class citizens. And so South Korea’s major cities could very well see the rise of segregated ethnic slums. It’s worth noting that anti-foreigner sentiments are flourishing in a time when South Korea is experiencing rapid economic change, including a new social and economic inequality. Just as racism provided the basis for solidarity among whites in U.S. history, it could be playing a similar role in South Korea. Next to China’s race problem, South Korea’s pales in significance. Earlier this year, the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report that found that the current ratio of 16 retirees to 100 workers is set to double in the next 15 years. In absolute terms, the number of over-65s will go from 166 million to 342 million. Someone will have to care for them, and though China has relaxed its profoundly wrongheaded one-child policy, the reform has come too late to arrest rapid aging. Moreover, as the political scientists Valerie Hudson and Andrea van den Boer noted in their book Bare Branches, China also has tens of millions of so-called “surplus males” thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children. This means that large numbers of Chinese men will have a difficult time finding wives in the near future. One obvious way for the China of 2025 to address this dilemma would be to embrace mass immigration. Because China remains a poor and populous country, the idea that it will become a magnet for immigrants seems faintly ridiculous, not least because millions of Chinese are desperate to emigrate. Of course, the same was once true of Ireland, which is now one of Europe’s most diverse countries. But like South Korea–and, for that matter, Japan–China is not terribly hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities native to China. Observers tend to overstate the level of ethnic homogeneity in China, not least because the Han category masks tremendous cultural diversity. “Hanness” is as broad and contingent a category as “whiteness.” But as Frank Dikötter of the University of Hong Kong argued in his brilliant 1992 book The Discourse of Race in Modern China, traditional notions about culturally inferior “barbarians” intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in the 20th century. The “yellows” were locked in a struggle with their equals, the “whites”–and both were superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.” The dislike and distrust of Europeans was always mixed with envy and admiration. The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners, in contrast, was and remains relatively uncomplicated. Maoist China railed against Western imperialism, and saw itself as a leader of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians. Now, as China emerges as an economic and cultural superpower, those notions of Third World solidarity, always skin deep, seem to have vanished. It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms. This could change over the next couple of decades as China’s labor shortage grows acute. I wouldn’t bet on it. If China remains culturally closed, the Chinese Century will never come to pass. Instead, the United States–a country that has struggled with race and racism for centuries, and in the process has become more culturally open and resilient–will dominate this century as it did the last.
China is dogmatic due to historical identity—the West is comparatively better because it is reflexive
Jacques 09 (Martin, Global Order is a book by British journalist and scholar Martin Jacques “ When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New” 2009)//kyan
The long-term persistence of cultural difference is deeply rooted. In April 1998, I interviewed two Chinese-Americans in Beijing for a television programme: they had decided to go and work in China for a year, where they had never been before, to find out what it was like and to discover more about themselves. One of them, Katherine Gin, who was in her mid twenties and had spent all her life in San Francisco, made the following observation: I think one of the biggest differences between the Americans and the Chinese is that Americans are always trying to re-create themselves, always feel it is important to be the first person to do this or do that. Even America as a nation is always trying to recreate itself. The Chinese rarely even ask these questions, and as a nation seem to have more of a sense of where they come from. Of course, they are changing fast, but they don’t ask who they are, or constantly compare themselves with others. The irresistible conclusion is that the reason why the Chinese have a deep sense of their own identity is to be found in their long, continuous and rich history; in contrast, as products of a relatively new and young nation, Americans are in constant search of their identity. The recognition that the Chinese exhibit certain cultural traits which can be explained by their history does not imply cultural essentialism, the idea that all nations and ethnic groups have a bundle of characteristics which remain fixed and unchanged over time. On the contrary, identities are constantly changing and being renegotiated. But that does not mean that cultural characteristics stemming from profound and very long-run influences –like climate, patterns of agriculture, language, the environment, family structure, cosmological beliefs or the longevity of history –don’t persist from the past and leave their mark on the present. According to Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, who have extensively researched the relationship between cultural and genetic evolution, ‘an enormous amount of circumstantial evidence suggests that culturally transmitted traits are stable over time and in the face of changing environments.’
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<h4><strong>There’s only a risk of a link—The AFF’s <u>highly individualized</u> engagement is the <u>thesis</u> of anti-politics—Their focus on <u>community</u> through <u>difference</u> denies <u>all</u> hope of political consensus and <u>pragmatic</u> action <u>ensuring</u> the Right takes over</h4><p>Chandler 7</strong> (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – </p><p>“The Attraction of Post-Territorial Politics: Ethics and Activism in the International Sphere” – Inaugural Lecture – May – available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/short_articles/Inaugural%20lecture.pdf) </p><p>However, <u><strong>politics is no less important</u></strong> to many of us <u><strong>today.</u></strong> Politics still gives us a sense of social connection and social rootedness and gives meaning to many of our lives. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. <u><strong><mark>We are less likely to engage in</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>formal politics</u></strong></mark> of representation - <u><strong>of elections and governments</u></strong> - <u><strong>but in post-territorial politics</u></strong>, a politics where there is much less division between the private sphere and the public one and much less division between national, territorial, concerns and global ones. <u><strong><mark>This type of politics is</mark> </u></strong>on the one hand<u><strong> ‘global’ but, </u></strong>on the other<u><strong>, <mark>highly individualised</u></strong></mark>: it is very much the politics of our everyday lives – the sense of meaning we get from thinking about global warming when we turn off the taps when we brush our teeth, take our rubbish out for recycling or cut back on our car use - we might also do global politics in deriving meaning from the ethical or social value of our work, or in our subscription or support for good causes from Oxfam to Greenpeace and Christian Aid. I want to suggest that when we do<u><strong> ‘politics’ nowadays it is less the ‘old’ politics, of </u></strong>self-interest, <u><strong>political parties, and</u></strong> concern for<u><strong> government</u></strong>al power, <u><strong>than</u></strong> the<u><strong> ‘new’ politics of global ethical concern</u></strong>s. I further want to suggest that the forms and content of this new global approach to the political are more akin to religious beliefs and practices than to the forms of our social political engagement in the past. Global politics is similar to religious approaches in three vital respects: 1) global post-territorial politics are no longer concerned with power, its’ concerns are free-floating and in many ways, existential, about how we live our lives; 2) global politics revolve around practices with are private and individualised, they are about us as individuals and our ethical choices; 3) <u><strong>the practice of <mark>global politics tends to</mark> </u></strong>be non-instrumental, we do<u><strong> <mark>not subordinate</mark> </u></strong>ourselves <u><strong><mark>to collective associations</mark> </u></strong>or parties <u><strong>and </u></strong>are more likely to<u><strong> give value to</u></strong> our<u><strong> aspiration</u></strong>s, acts, or the fact of our awareness of an issue, <u><strong>as an end in-itself</u></strong>. <u><strong>It is as if we are upholding our goodness</u></strong> or ethicality <u><strong>in the face of an</u></strong> increasingly confusing, problematic and <u><strong>alienating world</u></strong> – our politics in this sense are an expression or voice, in Marx’s words, of ‘the heart in a heartless world’ or ‘the soul of a soulless condition’. <u><strong><mark>The practice</u></strong></mark> of ‘doing politics’ as a form of religiosity <u><strong><mark>is</mark> a <mark>highly conservative</mark> one</u></strong>. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ - <u><strong><mark>this is politics as a sedative</mark> </u></strong>or pacifier: <u><strong>it feeds an illusory view of change <mark>at the expense of</mark> genuine </u></strong>social <u><strong><mark>engagement</mark> and transformation</u></strong>. I want to argue that global <u><strong>ethical politics</u></strong> reflects and <u><strong>institutionalises </u></strong>our sense of <u><strong>disconnection and</u></strong> social <u><strong>atomisation <mark>and results in</mark> </u></strong>irrational and<u><strong> <mark>unaccountable</mark> government <mark>policy making.</u></strong></mark> I want to illustrate my points by briefly looking at the practices of global ethics in three spheres, those of radical political activism, government policy making and academia. Radical activism <u><strong>People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests</u></strong>, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. <u><strong>I disagree</u></strong>; <u><strong><mark>these</mark> </u></strong>new forms of protest <u><strong><mark>are highly individualised</u></strong></mark> and personal ones - there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, <u><strong><mark>rather than</mark> attempts to engage <mark>political</mark>ly</u></strong> with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. <u><strong>It is <mark>as if people are</mark> <mark>more concerned with</mark> the creation of a sense of <mark>community through differences than</mark> with</u></strong> any <u><strong><mark>political</mark> </u></strong>debate, shared <u><strong><mark>agreement</u></strong></mark> or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, that political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions, it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. <u><strong>Rather than</u></strong> a<u><strong> political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism</u></strong> today <u><strong>is a form of </u></strong>social <u><strong>disengagement</u></strong> – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, <u><strong>it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal</u></strong> <u><strong>commitment or awareness</u></strong> of problems <u><strong>is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brain-washed </u></strong>by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever increasing awareness of themselves and by giving ‘political’ meaning to every personal action. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement or organisation. Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that ‘foreign policy is no longer foreign policy’ (Timothy Garten Ash, ‘Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for’, 26 April 2007), this is certainly true. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing ‘identity’. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the ‘value-based’ interventions from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blair’s recent Foreign Affairs article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, 86:1 (2007), pp.79–90). Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political agenda for - the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere – the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making based on a clear political programme to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict etc – of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the US or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the ‘civilised world’, NATO or the EU are on the line in ‘wars of choice’ from the war on terror to the war on global warming lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of Realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or cohere political programmes. As Baudrillard suggests, without a connection to the ‘represented’ masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’ (In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, for example). It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. As Donald Rumsfeld stated about the war on terror, ‘there are no metrics’ to help assess whether the war is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber once counterposed this type of politics – the ‘ethics of conviction’ – to the ‘ethics of responsibility’ in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues from war crimes to EU membership requirements. Today more and <u><strong><mark>more people are ‘doing politics’</mark> in </u></strong>their <u><strong>academic work</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This is the reason for the boom in I</u></strong></mark>nternational <u><strong><mark>R</u></strong></mark>elations study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that <u><strong>the attraction</u></strong> of IR for many people <u><strong>has not been IR theory but</u></strong> the <u><strong>desire to practice global ethics</u></strong>. <u><strong>The boom</u></strong> in the IR discipline has <u><strong>coincided with a rejection of Realist</u></strong> theoretical <u><strong>frameworks</u></strong> of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that <u><strong>this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement </u></strong>with Realism <u><strong>but an ethical act of rejection of Realism’s</u></strong> ontological <u><strong>focus.</u></strong> It seems that <u><strong>our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in.</u></strong> Normative <u><strong>theorists </u></strong>and Constructivists tend to <u><strong>support </u></strong>the global ethical turn <u><strong>arguing that we should not be as concerned with ‘what is’ as with the potential for the emergence of</u></strong> global <u><strong>ethical community</u></strong>. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But <u><strong><mark>the most dangerous trends</mark> in the discipline today are those frameworks which <mark>have</mark> <mark>taken up Critical theory</mark> and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative</u></strong> ‘problem-solving’ while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. <u><strong><mark>Critical thought</u></strong></mark> then <u><strong><mark>becomes</mark> a process of <mark>wishful thinking rather than</u></strong></mark> one of <u><strong><mark>engagement</mark>,</u></strong> with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and positionality before thinking about or teaching on world affairs; <u><strong>in the process <mark>this becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research</u></strong></mark>. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull’s perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead. <u><strong>The inward-looking</u></strong> and narcissistic <u><strong>trends in academia, where we are more concerned with</u></strong> our ‘reflectivity’ – the <u><strong>awareness</u></strong> of our own ethics and values - <u><strong>than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when</u></strong> <u><strong>I asked my IR students which</u></strong> theoretical <u><strong>frameworks they agreed with</u></strong> most <u><strong>and they replied</u></strong> mostly <u><strong>Critical theory </u></strong>and Constructivism <u><strong>despite the fact that they thought that states operated on the basis of power</u></strong> and self-interest in a world of anarchy. <u><strong>Their</u></strong> theoretical <u><strong>preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as</u></strong> ethical <u><strong>individuals than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.</u> </p><p>Turns and solves the K—US influence checks a <u>violent</u> china rise—weaking our stance as a hegemon causes <u>neo-colonialism</u> in Asia—it will recreate the colonialism of Latin America </p><p>Kelly 2/10/14 <u></strong>(Robert E. Kelly an associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, “What Would Chinese Hegemony Look Like?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/what-would-chinese-hegemony-look-like/)//kyan</p><p></u>Since 2009 however, <u><mark>China has increasingly resorted to</mark> bullying and <mark>threats</u></mark>. The 2008 Olympics appears to have been read in Beijing as a sign of China’s newfound might and sway. <u><mark>In the South China Sea it</mark> has <mark>pushed a</mark> </u>very <u><mark>expansive</u></mark> definition of its <u><mark>maritime zone of control</mark>,</u> and it recently faced <u><mark>down the Philippines</u></mark> in a dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in that sea. Indeed, one possible explanation for China’s expansion of its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea is that a hard line seems to be working in the South China Sea. But China’s northeast Asian neighbors are far stronger and more capable than its southeast Asian <u>ones. <mark>Most </mark>observers <mark>expect</u></mark> Japan, South Korea and <mark>the <u>U.S. to push back, as indeed they have.</mark> The U<mark>.S. flew bombers through the new ADIZ </mark>without warning,</u> and both Japanese and South Korean civilian airlines have been instructed by their respective governments not to comply. All this then sets up a bipolar contest between China and Japan, in the context of China’s rapid rise toward regional dominance. Chinese Hegemony? <u>A common theme in the literature on <mark>China’s rise</mark> is its apparent inevitability.</u> Westerners particularly tend to get carried away with book-titles such as Eclipse (of the U.S. by China), When China Rules the World, or China’s New Empire. History is indeed filled with the rise to dominance of powerful states. China and Japan both sought in the past to dominate Asia. Various European states including the U.S.SR, Germany, and France did the same. <u>But frequently these <mark>would-be hegemons collided with a counter-hegemonic coalition</mark> of states <mark>unwilling to be</mark> </u>manipulated or <u><mark>conquered. Occasionally the hegemonic aspirant may win;</u></mark> Europe under Rome was “unipolar,” as was feudal Asia now-and-again under the strongest Chinese dynasties. <u>But there is nothing inevitable about this.</u> Hegemonic contenders as various as Napoleon or Imperial Japan have been defeated. To be fair, it is not clear yet if indeed <u><mark>China seeks</mark> </u>regional<u> <mark>hegemony</u>.</mark> But <u><mark>there is a growing consensus</u></mark> among American and Japanese analysts <u><mark>that this is indeed the case.</mark> </u>By<u> <mark>Chinese hegemony in Asia</mark> we broadly <mark>mean something akin to</mark> the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates’ position <mark>in L</mark>atin <mark>A</mark>merica.</u> We do <u>not</u> mean <u>actual conquest</u>. Almost no one believes China intends to annex even its weakest neighbors like Cambodia or North Korea. Rather, <u>analysts <mark>expect a zone of super-ordinate influence<strong></mark> over neighbors.</p><p></u>China is net worse than the united states—sexism, “haness”, </p><p>Salam 09 </strong>(Reihan Salam is a fellow at the New America Foundation “China’s Race Problem” 11/09/09</p><p>http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/08/china-race-racism-opinions-columnists-reihan-salam.html)//kyan</p><p>Is racism universal? <u><mark>Since</mark> the end of the <mark>colonial era</mark>, the rising <mark>powers</u></mark> of the developing world <u><mark>have</mark> been <mark>quick to condemn Western racism</mark>. Ethnocentrism and <mark>color prejudice can be found in</mark> virtually <mark>all human societies</u></mark>, going back centuries if not thousands of years. Yet racism as we know it first emerged in the late 17th century. While slavery is an ancient institution, the racial slavery that took hold in the Americas in that era was new and very unusual. In the English-speaking colonies of North America, the violent subjugation of enslaved Africans created a perverse solidarity among people of European descent, who were united by their place at the top of a racial hierarchy. Racial boundaries that had once been fairly fluid became increasingly rigid. Because the egalitarian ideals of the Declaration of Independence clearly contradicted the still profitable and pervasive practice of racial slavery, it was vitally important that the enslaved be regarded as subhuman, lest the whole corrupt edifice completely collapse. <u>Even now, <mark>Americans are dealing with</mark> the</u> scarring <u><mark>effects</mark> of this monstrous ideological project. It is also true, however, that <mark>Americans have been fairly</mark> <mark>forthright in confronting this legacy</u><strong>. <u></strong>The same can’t be said of the new racism that is taking shape in Asia. </u>A</mark>s the late political scientist Samuel <u>Huntington argued, “modernization” and “westernization” a</u>ren’t the same thing. Economic progress in East Asia and South Asia and Latin America doesn’t mean that these regions will become carbon copies of Europe and America. But history has a tendency to rhyme. After decades of breakneck economic growth, South Korea has joined the ranks of the world’s richest and most powerful states. As such, a growth model built on cheap labor has been transformed by the emergence of a large and expensive welfare state, and also labor market rigidities that have led to high youth unemployment rates. Like the rich nations of the West, South Korea also has a low birthrate and, as a direct result, a rapidly aging population. This begs the question of whether South Korea should embrace large-scale immigration. Faced with a similar dilemma, West Germany signed a series of labor agreements in the 1950s and 1960s that led a large influx of guest workers. The idea was that these guest workers would come for a time and then return home. That, of course, is not how things turned out. Over 50 years since the beginning of the guest worker initiative, Germany is still struggling to deal with its growing population of ethnic outsiders. South Korea might have an even harder time. In a fascinating article published in The New York Times last week, <u>Choe Sang-<mark>Hun described</mark> the <strong><mark>intense discrimination</strong> faced by</mark> a</u> small but <u><mark>growing number of migrant workers</mark> from impoverished Asian countries</u>. A number of <u>Koreans</u> have <u><mark>expressed</u></mark> serious <u><mark>concerns about the</mark> <mark>end of the country’s ethnic homogeneity</mark>, arguing that a larger influx of migrant </u>workers <u>would lead to a rise in the level of crime and social tension.</u> <u>T<mark>hese anxieties have the air of <strong>self-fulfilling prophecy</u></strong></mark>. Given that many if not <u><mark>most</u></mark> Koreans <u><mark>prize ethnic homogeneity,</mark> migrant workers will remain on the margins of society. This, in turn, will fuel alienation and resentment among this class of permanent second-class citizens. And so South Korea’s major cities could very well see the rise of segregated ethnic slums. It’s worth noting that anti-foreigner sentiments are flourishing in a time when South Korea is experiencing rapid economic change, including a new social and economic inequality. Just as racism provided the basis for solidarity among whites in U.S. history, it could be playing a similar role in South Korea. Next to <mark>China’s race problem</mark>, South Korea’s pales in significance</u>. Earlier this year, the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report that found that the current ratio of 16 retirees to 100 workers is set to double in the next 15 years. In absolute terms, the number of over-65s will go from 166 million to 342 million. Someone will have to care for them, and though China has relaxed its profoundly wrongheaded one-child policy, the reform has come too late to arrest rapid aging. Moreover, as the <u>political scientists Valerie <mark>Hudson</mark> and Andrea van den Boer <mark>noted</u></mark> in their book Bare Branches, <u><mark>China also has tens of millions</mark> of so-called “<mark>surplus males” </mark>thanks to a strong cultural preference for male children</u>. This means that large numbers of Chinese men will have a difficult time finding wives in the near future. One obvious way for the China of 2025 to address this dilemma would be to embrace mass immigration. Because China remains a poor and populous country, the idea that it will become a magnet for immigrants seems faintly ridiculous, not least because millions of Chinese are desperate to emigrate. Of course, the same was once true of Ireland, which is now one of Europe’s most diverse countries. But like South Korea–and, for that matter, Japan–<u><mark>China is not</mark> terribly <mark>hospitable to ethnic outsiders, including members of non-Han minorities </mark>native to China</u><mark>.</mark> <u>Observers tend to overstate the level of ethnic homogeneity in China</u>, not least <u>because the <mark>Han category masks </mark>tremendous cultural <mark>diversity. “<strong>Hanness” is as broad and contingent</mark> a category <mark>as “whiteness.”</mark> </u></strong>But as <u>Frank Dikötter</u> of the University of Hong Kong argued in his brilliant 1992 book The Discourse of Race in Modern China, <u><mark>traditional notions about</mark> culturally <mark>inferior “barbarians” </mark>intermingled with Western forms of scientific racism to<mark> form a distinctively Chinese racial consciousness in</mark> the 20th century. The “<mark>yellows” were locked in</mark> a <mark>struggle with</mark> their equals, <mark>the “whites</mark>”–and <mark>both</mark> were <strong><mark>superior to the “blacks,” “browns” and “reds.”</strong></mark> The</u> dislike and <u>distrust of Europeans was always mixed with envy</u> and admiration. <u><mark>The disdain for dark-skinned foreigners</u></mark>, in contrast, was and <u>remains relatively uncomplicated</u>. <u>Maoist China railed against Western imperialism, and saw itself as a leader of the global proletariat of Africans and Asians. Now, as China emerges as an economic and cultural superpower, those notions of Third World solidarity, always skin deep</u>, <u>seem to have vanished. It is thus hard to imagine China welcoming millions of hard-working Nigerians and Bangladeshis with open arms</u>. This could change over the next couple of decades as China’s labor shortage grows acute. I wouldn’t bet on it. If China remains culturally closed, the Chinese Century will never come to pass. Instead, <u><mark>the United States</u></mark>–a country that has struggled with race and racism for centuries, and in the process <u><mark>has become more culturally open and resilient</mark>–</u><strong>will dominate this century as it did the last.</p><p>China is <u>dogmatic</u> due to historical identity—the West is comparatively <u>better</u> because it is <u>reflexive</u> </p><p>Jacques 09 </strong>(Martin, Global Order is a book by British journalist and scholar Martin Jacques “ When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New” 2009)//kyan</p><p>The <u><mark>long-term persistence of cultural difference is deeply rooted</u></mark>. In April 1998, I interviewed two Chinese-Americans in Beijing for a television programme: they had decided to go and work in China for a year, where they had never been before, to find out what it was like and to discover more about themselves. One of them, Katherine Gin, who was in her mid twenties and had spent all her life in San Francisco, made the following observation: I think <u>one of <mark>the biggest differences between the Americans and the Chinese is</mark> that <mark>Americans</mark> are always trying to <mark>re-create themselves</mark>,</u> always feel it is important to be the first person to do this or do that. Even <u>America</u> as a <u>nation is always trying to recreate itself. The <mark>Chinese</mark> <mark>rarely</mark> even <mark>ask these questions</mark>, and as a nation seem to have more of a sense of where they come from</u>. Of course, they are changing fast, but they don’t ask who they are, or constantly compare themselves with others. The irresistible <u>conclusion</u> <u>is</u> that the reason why the <u><mark>Chinese have a deep sense of</u> <u>their own identity</mark> is to be found in their long</u>, continuous and rich <u>history</u>; in contrast, as products of a relatively new and young nation, <u><mark>Americans are in constant search of their identity</u></mark>. The recognition that the Chinese <u>exhibit certain cultural traits which can be explained by their history </u>does not imply cultural essentialism, the idea that all nations and ethnic groups have a bundle of characteristics which remain fixed and unchanged over time. On the contrary, identities are constantly changing and being renegotiated. But <u>that does not mean that cultural characteristics stemming from profound and very long-run influences –like climate, patterns of agriculture, language, the environment, family structure, cosmological beliefs or the longevity of history –don’t persist<strong> from the past and leave their mark on the present. According to Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, who have extensively researched the relationship between cultural and genetic evolution, ‘an enormous amount of circumstantial evidence suggests that culturally transmitted traits are stable over time and in the face of changing environments.’</p></u></strong>
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Neg vs Vermont lb
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2nc
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2NC – Turns Racism
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| 565,257 |
N
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Hubervermont
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1
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Vermont Lee-Brough
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Kozak
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Forums CP (2NR)
antipolitics DA
heg DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Hubervermont-Round1.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,126 |
The impact of the shortage falls heaviest on blacks, who have a greater need for transplants
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Pollack 14
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Pollack 14 MARTIN POLLAK and MARK ZEIDEL, respectively, chief of the Division of Nephrology and chairman of the department of medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Sept. 2, 2014
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End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost: Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.
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Kidney disease disproportionately affects minority populations. develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.
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New York Times The Opinion Pages | Letters Ideas to Relieve a Kidney Shortage http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/ideas-to-relieve-a-kidney-shortage.html?_r=0
End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost: About 6 percent of the Medicare budget — more than $30 billion — is spent yearly on end-stage kidney disease care. The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure. Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.
| 715 |
<h4>The impact of the shortage falls heaviest on blacks, who have a greater need for transplants</h4><p><strong>Pollack 14</strong> MARTIN POLLAK and MARK ZEIDEL, respectively, chief of the Division of Nephrology and chairman of the department of medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Sept. 2, 2014 </p><p>New York Times The Opinion Pages | Letters Ideas to Relieve a Kidney Shortage <strong>http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/ideas-to-relieve-a-kidney-shortage.html?_r=0</p><p><u></strong>End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost:</u> About 6 percent of the Medicare budget — more than $30 billion — is spent yearly on end-stage kidney disease care. The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure. <u><mark>Kidney disease </mark>also<mark> disproportionately affects minority populations.</mark> Blacks <mark>develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.</mark> </p></u>
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Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,390 | 3 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
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Navy
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9
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George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
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Allen, Steiner, Taylor
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,127 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,128 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003
|
Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
|
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
| 1,236 |
<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u> or certain parts of them. In this way <u>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u> at the national level, <u>including</u> for example the <u>legalisation of cannabis</u> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><mark>Disregarding</u></mark> all or selected components of <u><mark>the treaties</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u>. <u>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could <strong>threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><mark>selective application</u></mark> of such a principle <u><mark>would <strong>call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
3
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,129 |
No extinction from disease
|
Posner 5
|
Posner 5—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)
|
Homo sapiens managed to survive every disease in 200,000 years none has come close to destroying the human race There is a biological reason Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly there is no danger that likelihood a natural pandemic would cause extinction is even less today than in the past
|
Homo sapiens survive every disease in 200,000 years Natural selection favors limited lethality; they are fitter because genes spread if the germs do not kill their hosts likelihood pandemic would cause extinction is less today
|
Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.
| 1,146 |
<h4>No extinction from disease</h4><p><strong>Posner 5</strong>—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)</p><p>Yet the fact that <u><mark>Homo sapiens</u></mark> has <u>managed to <mark>survive every disease</u></mark> to assail it <u><mark>in</u></mark> the <u><mark>200,000 years</u></mark> or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but <u>none has come close to destroying the</u> entire <u>human race</u>. <u><strong>There is a biological reason</u></strong>. <u><mark>Natural selection favors</u></mark> <u>germs of</u> <u><mark>limited lethality</u>; <u>they are fitter</mark> in an evolutionary sense <mark>because </mark>their <mark>genes </mark>are more likely to be <mark>spread if the germs do not kill their hosts </mark>too quickly</u>. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet <u>there is no danger that</u> AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The <u><mark>likelihood</u></mark> of <u>a natural <mark>pandemic</u></mark> that <u><mark>would</mark> <mark>cause</u></mark> the <u><mark>extinction</u></mark> of the human race <u><mark>is</u></mark> probably <u>even <mark>less today</mark> than in the past</u> (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. </p>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 64,791 | 356 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,130 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP alone maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4><strong>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP alone maintains compliance</h4><p>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p></strong>
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Neg vs NW OW
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2NC
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cp
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,131 |
Keeping the law on the books is competitive
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Walsh 2013
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Walsh 2013 (Senior Associate, Washington Office on Latin America; also includes contributions from Mark Kleiman (John, “Q&A: Legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/21-legal-marijuana-colorado-washington)
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the federal government could enter into cooperative enforcement agreements with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though without making them legal under federal law The CSA itself directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments in enforcing the drug laws and gives power “to enter into contractual agreements [...] to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities Federal accommodation of the new state laws would increase the capacity of governments at all levels to shape the behavior of marijuana-industry participants; it might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions; it would acknowledge the sovereign powers that the states share with the federal government it would involve effective acquiescence by the executive branch in the open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws
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the federal government could enter into c e a s with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though without making them legal The CSA itself directs that the A G “shall cooperate” with state governments in enforcing and gives power “to enter into contractual agreements for cooperative regulatory activities.” Federal accommodation might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions it would involve acquiescence by the executive in open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws
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8. Under current federal law, what are options are available to the federal government in responding to the new state laws? Given the constraints imposed by current federal law, the federal government could (1) sue to invalidate the state laws under the Supremacy Clause and to enjoin state authorities from issuing licenses to marijuana growers and sellers; (2) use injunctions, threats of asset forfeiture, or criminal prosecution to shut down state-licensed marijuana businesses; (3) unilaterally establish a set of enforcement priorities to de-emphasize attacks on state-legal businesses; or (4) enter into cooperative enforcement agreements with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though without making them legal under federal law. The CSA itself (21 U.S.C. §873) directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments in enforcing the drug laws, and gives him the power “to enter into contractual agreements [...] to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities.” Federal accommodation of the new state laws would offer several potential advantages. It would increase the capacity of governments at all levels to shape the behavior of marijuana-industry participants; it might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions; it would acknowledge the sovereign powers that the states share with the federal government; and it would enable the acquisition of more knowledge than is now available about the operations and consequences of legal, open marijuana markets. On the other hand, it would involve effective acquiescence by the executive branch in the open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws, and its consistency with treaty obligations is questionable.
| 1,781 |
<h4><strong>Keeping the law on the books is competitive</h4><p>Walsh 2013</strong> (Senior Associate, Washington Office on Latin America; also includes contributions from Mark Kleiman (John, “Q&A: Legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/21-legal-marijuana-colorado-washington)</p><p>8. Under current federal law, what are options are available to the federal government in responding to the new state laws? Given the constraints imposed by current federal law, <u><mark>the federal government could</u></mark> (1) sue to invalidate the state laws under the Supremacy Clause and to enjoin state authorities from issuing licenses to marijuana growers and sellers; (2) use injunctions, threats of asset forfeiture, or criminal prosecution to shut down state-licensed marijuana businesses; (3) unilaterally establish a set of enforcement priorities to de-emphasize attacks on state-legal businesses; or (4) <u><mark>enter into c</mark>ooperative <mark>e</mark>nforcement <mark>a</mark>greement<mark>s with the states that could implicitly allow state-regulated systems to function, though <strong>without making them legal</strong></mark> under federal law</u>. <u><mark>The CSA itself</u></mark> (21 U.S.C. §873) <u><mark>directs that the A</mark>ttorney <mark>G</mark>eneral <mark>“shall cooperate” with</mark> the <mark>state</mark> and local <mark>governments in enforcing</mark> the drug laws</u>, <u><mark>and gives</u></mark> him the <u><mark>power “to enter into contractual agreements</mark> [...] to provide <mark>for cooperative</mark> enforcement and <mark>regulatory activities</u>.”</mark> <u><mark>Federal accommodation</mark> of the new state laws would</u> offer several potential advantages. It would <u>increase the capacity of governments at all levels to shape the behavior of marijuana-industry participants; it <mark>might enable a joint enforcement focus on inter-state transactions</mark>; it would acknowledge the sovereign powers that the states share with the federal government</u>; and it would enable the acquisition of more knowledge than is now available about the operations and consequences of legal, open marijuana markets. On the other hand, <u><mark>it would involve</mark> effective <mark>acquiescence by the executive</mark> branch <mark>in</mark> the <strong><mark>open violation of unrepealed federal criminal laws</u></mark>, and its consistency with treaty obligations is questionable.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
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2NC
|
CP
| 56,739 | 17 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,132 |
Their musings of utopian societies drain support for hegemony—and we’ll indict their methodology—their K is so deep within the ivory tower that it can’t even access society
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Hanson, 03
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Hanson, 03 (Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, Ph.D. from Stanford, “We Could Still Lose.” National Review Online. August 11. http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3050721.html.)//VP
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If one were to collate the news reports about the Mosul shootout, the lessons would be as follows: read two mass killers their Miranda rights; dodge their bullets when they shoot first; capture them alive; let Europeans cross-examine them lose no friendlies ; do not disturb the residents next door I am not suggesting that we ignore the real dangers profiling or discount the moral issues that arise My point is rather that, because we are products of an affluent and leisured West, we have a special burden to remember how tenuous and fragile civilization remains outside our suburbs. we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured that our economy, our unseen soldiers, or our system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives. Western societies rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous in times of peace and prosperity there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance that for some can be the unfortunate by-product of an enlightened society. I think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism because we are not being gassed or shot or even left hot or hungry. We prefer to cringe at the thought that others like to see proof of their killers’ deaths, prefer to shoot rather than die capturing a mass murderer, and welcome a generic profile of those who wish to kill them en masse. We should take stock of this dangerous and growing mind-set—and remember that wealthy, sophisticated societies like our own are rarely overrun. They simply implode—whining and debating to the end, even as they pass away.
Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony may know they are playing a dangerous game, lest the entire intemational system come crashing down What they may not have calculated is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they did during the Cold War. Americans should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. But , Americans are taking it seriously. there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, grumbling about hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget--even if most of the rest of the world does not-- just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity
As students learn to become active and engaged democratic citizens they are continually faced with contradictions inherent in early 21 st century democracy including: the advantages of wealth in running for office, the conflict between the ideal of the government deriving its powers from the people and the reality of the people being subjected to the power of the government the ideology of democracy may function in such a way as to preserve the current political system through hegemony in order to achieve the consent of present and future generations for the maintenance and reproduction of the current relations of domination.
asserts that hegemony has a material dimension. It is not only a system of ideas, floating above economic structures. Rather, the social action of everyday life produces hegemonic effects describes an American hegemony that is “born in the factory describes how the interplay of our cultural and material surroundings constructs hegemony as follows: Everything that directly or indirectly influences or could influence public opinion belongs to it: libraries, schools clubs hegemony often lies beneath the surface A lived hegemony is always a process It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits He ascribes a high level of importance to the subaltern classes, intellectuals, and revolutionary political parties as agents for social change This occurs as subaltern groups realize their own capacity to become philosophers of their daily experience; they come to understand the hegemonic common sense that they otherwise take for granted It is the embodiment of hegemony in everyday common sense, through the mundane activities connected with , school that secures the consent of capital’s subaltern classes.
evolutionary theory offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions This environment produced egoism, domination even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others or control over ecological circumstances
Scholars may use evolutionary theory to generate new understanding of the origins of war and ethnic conflict Evolutionary theory suggests why some humans organize attacks and why others organize to defend against such attacks. explains why suspicion of strangers contributes to fitness in the course of human evolution Although the causes of modern war are complex, its prevalence throughout human history suggests that it is not caused by modern developments, such as imperialism or militarism, war results from a lust for ag- gression and destruction humans are subject to a unique death instinct that leads to pathological forms of aggression beyond those found in other animals.
Mearsheimer 1
The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War,
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because we are products of an affluent and leisured West, we have a special burden to remember how tenuous and fragile civilization we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured our economy soldiers system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives societies rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance
Those contributing to the chorus of antihegemony are playing a dangerous game lest the entire intemational system come crashing down they may not have calculated the possibility Americans will not respond wisely Americans should not take this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously But Americans are there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America grumbling about hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget how important American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity
As students learn to become active and engaged democratic citizens they are continually faced with contradictions inherent in early 21 st century democracy including the ideology of democracy to preserve the system through hegemony
hegemony has a material dimension the social action of everyday life produces hegemonic effects American hegemony “born in the factory Everything that influences public opinion belongs to schools clubs A lived hegemony is always a process He ascribes a high level of importance to the subaltern classes, intellectuals, as agents for social change It is the embodiment of hegemony in everyday common sense, through the mundane activities connected with school that secures the consent
evolutionary theory offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions This environment produced egoism, domination even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power,
Scholars use evolutionary theory to generate new understanding of the origins of war and ethnic conflict Although the causes of modern war are complex, its prevalence suggests that it is not caused by modern developments, such as imperialism or militarism, war results from a lust for ag- gression and destruction humans are subject to a unique death instinct that leads to pathological forms of aggression beyond those found in other animals.
all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War,
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If one were to collate the news reports about the Mosul shootout, the lessons would be as follows: read two mass killers their Miranda rights; dodge their bullets when they shoot first; capture them alive; let Europeans cross-examine them in the Hague; lose no friendlies in the operation; do not disturb the residents next door; protect the Husseins’ victims from such oppressors (but without cracking their plaster); and in general remember that the entire scene will be filmed and then broadcast as Cops rather than as Hell Is for Heroes. I am not suggesting that we ignore the real dangers involved in ethnic profiling or discount the moral issues that arise from killing our enemy leaders and disseminating gross pictures of their corpses. And, of course, we should seek to distinguish Baathist culprits from ordinary Iraqis. My point is rather that, because we are products of an affluent and leisured West, we have a special burden to remember how tenuous and fragile civilization remains outside our suburbs. Most of us don’t fear much from the fatwa of a murderous mullah, and few have had our sisters shredded before our eyes in one of Uday’s brush chippers—much less ever seen chemical warfare trucks hosing down our block, in the same way that crop dusters fogged our backyards. Instead, we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured that our economy, our unseen soldiers, or our system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives. And in the la-la land of Washington and New York, it is especially easy to forget that we are not even like our own soldiers in Iraq, now sleeping outside without toilets and air conditioners, eating dehydrated food, and trying to distinguish killers from innocents. What does all this mean? Western societies from ancient Athens to imperial Rome to the French republic rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous or formidable in arms—even when those enemies were grim Macedonians or Germans. Rather, in times of peace and prosperity there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance that for some can be the unfortunate by-product of an enlightened society. I think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism—even apart from the election season antics of our politicians—because we are not being gassed or shot or even left hot or hungry. September 11 no longer evokes an image of incinerated firefighters, innocents leaping out of skyscrapers, or the stench of flesh and melted plastic but rather squabbles over architectural designs, lawsuits, snarling over John Ashcroft’s new statutes, or concerns about being too rude to the Arab street. Such smug dispensation—as profoundly amoral as it is—provides us, on the cheap and at a safe distance, with a sense of moral worth. Or perhaps censuring from the bleachers enables us to feel superior to those less fortunate who are still captive to their primordial appetites. We prefer to cringe at the thought that others like to see proof of their killers’ deaths, prefer to shoot rather than die capturing a mass murderer, and welcome a generic profile of those who wish to kill them en masse. We should take stock of this dangerous and growing mind-set—and remember that wealthy, sophisticated societies like our own are rarely overrun. They simply implode—whining and debating to the end, even as they pass away.
Anti-hegemony rhetoric is dangerous—causes a policy movement towards isolationism
Kagan 98 (Robert, Summer, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/a.kaplan.benevolentempire.fp.sum98.pdf, mat)
Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did dur- ing the Cold War, lest the entire intemational system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperial- ism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget--even if most of the rest of the world does not-- just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.
Discussing hegemony in academic settings is key to create social changes and prevent corruption
Walsh 8 (John staff at the University of Rhode Island “The critical role of discourse in Education for Democracy” http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/6-2-04.pdf)JC
As students learn to become active and engaged democratic citizens they are continually faced with contradictions inherent in early 21 st century democracy including: the advantages of wealth in running for office, the conflict between the ideal of the government deriving its powers from the people and the reality of the people being subjected to the power of the government, just to name two. Rather than educate for democracy, the ideology of democracy may function in such a way as to preserve the current political system through hegemony in order to achieve the consent of present and future generations for the maintenance and reproduction of the current relations of domination.
We are the agents of change
Stoddart 7 (Mark phD candidate at the department of sociology at the University of British Colombia “Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and Power” http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/5226/1/STARV28A9.pdf)JC
Gramsci also asserts that hegemony has a material dimension. It is not only a system of ideas, floating above economic structures. Rather, the social action of everyday life produces hegemonic effects. Writing about the emergence of Fordist production in the United States, for example, Gramsci (1992) describes an American hegemony that is “born in the factory” (p. 169). Gramsci (1996) describes how the interplay of our cultural and material surroundings constructs hegemony as follows: The press is the most dynamic part of the ideological structure, but not the only one. Everything that directly or indirectly influences or could influence public opinion belongs to it: libraries, schools, associations and clubs of various kinds, even architecture, the layout of streets and their names (p. 53). Furthermore, hegemony often lies beneath the surface, unarticulated. As Williams (1977) writes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits” (p. 112). This illustrates how hegemony works as a sort of common sense, rather than as a coherent body of thought, such as we would associate with ideology. Gramsci gives us an image of society in which the cultural realm is a central location for the exercise of social power. By comparison with the Frankfurt School theorists, however, hegemonic power is something that is always contested, always historically contingent and always unfinished. He ascribes a high level of importance to the subaltern classes, intellectuals, and revolutionary political parties as agents for social change. For Gramsci, a revolutionary seizure of the means of production is not a viable tactic for creating radical social change in modern capitalist societies. Where a society is characterized primarily by the exercise of hegemonic power instead of coercion, a prolonged cultural “war of position” is more important, where the hegemony of the ruling classes is dissembled and a new hegemony is crystallized (Femia 1975: 34). This occurs as subaltern groups realize their own capacity to become philosophers of their daily experience; they come to understand the hegemonic common sense that they otherwise take for granted. The Gramscian model of hegemony departs significantly from the Marxist notion of ideology, while retaining Marxist foundational categories of class, the capitalist mode of production, and the dis- tinction between the economic base and the cultural superstructure. Among the advances made by Gramscian theory is the attention to hegemonic power as an often-implicit “common sense” rather than a coherent body of thought, which is inherently unfinished and historically contingent. It is the embodiment of hegemony in everyday common sense, through the mundane activities connected with work, school, the family and the church, that secures the consent of capital’s subaltern classes.
FIRST Evolution proves violence is inevitable and explains realismThayer 4 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits are sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).
SECOND Realism best explains war
Thayer 2k (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)
Scholars of international politics may use evolutionary theory to generate new understanding of important issues in international politics, such as the origins of war and ethnic conflict.70 Evolutionary theory suggests why some humans organize attacks and why others organize to defend against such attacks. It also explains why suspicion of strangers contributes to fitness in the course of human evolution. IMPLICATIONS FOR WARFARE War is a phenomenon that has been usefully studied from multiple, often inter- disciplinary, perspectives-psychological, regime type, and systemic, among others.71 Although the causes of modern war are often complex, its prevalence throughout human history suggests that it is not caused principally by modern developments, such as imperialism or militarism, although these no doubt contribute to the scope, if not necessarily the intensity, of conflict.72 The human capacity for aggression and warfare has been widely studied by eminent psychologists such as Sigmund Freud and Erich Fromm. Freud inter- preted aggressive human behavior as the outcome of a drive that constantly seeks release.73 For Freud, war results from many motives, "some of which are openly declared and others which are never mentioned," but "a lust for ag- gression and destruction is certainly among them."74 Building on Freud's work, Fromm argued that humans are subject to a unique death instinct that leads to pathological forms of aggression beyond those found in other animals.75
THIRD Realism is true and inevitable in the international realm– a shift away collapses into chaos.
Mearsheimer 2001 [professor of political science at University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg. 361]
The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.
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<h4><strong>Their musings of utopian societies drain support for hegemony—and we’ll indict their methodology—their K is so deep within the ivory tower that it can’t even access society</h4><p>Hanson, 03 <u></strong>(Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, Ph.D. from Stanford, “We Could Still Lose.” National Review Online. August 11. http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3050721.html.)//VP</p><p>If one were to collate the news reports about the Mosul shootout, the lessons would be as follows: read two mass killers their Miranda rights; dodge their bullets when they shoot first; capture them alive; let Europeans cross-examine them</u> in the Hague; <u>lose no friendlies</u> in the operation<u>; do not disturb the residents next door</u>; protect the Husseins’ victims from such oppressors (but without cracking their plaster); and in general remember that the entire scene will be filmed and then broadcast as Cops rather than as Hell Is for Heroes. <u>I am not suggesting that we ignore the real dangers</u> involved in ethnic <u>profiling or discount the moral issues that arise</u> from killing our enemy leaders and disseminating gross pictures of their corpses. And, of course, we should seek to distinguish Baathist culprits from ordinary Iraqis. <u>My point is rather that, <mark>because we are products of an affluent and leisured West, we have a special burden to remember how tenuous and fragile civilization</mark> remains outside our suburbs.</u> Most of us don’t fear much from the fatwa of a murderous mullah, and few have had our sisters shredded before our eyes in one of Uday’s brush chippers—much less ever seen chemical warfare trucks hosing down our block, in the same way that crop dusters fogged our backyards. Instead, <u><mark>we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured</mark> that <mark>our economy</mark>, our unseen <mark>soldiers</mark>, or our <mark>system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives</mark>. </u>And in the la-la land of Washington and New York, it is especially easy to forget that we are not even like our own soldiers in Iraq, now sleeping outside without toilets and air conditioners, eating dehydrated food, and trying to distinguish killers from innocents. What does all this mean? <u>Western <mark>societies</u></mark> from ancient Athens to imperial Rome to the French republic <u><mark>rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous</mark> </u>or formidable in arms—even when those enemies were grim Macedonians or Germans. Rather, <u>in times of peace and prosperity <mark>there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance</mark> that for some can be the unfortunate by-product of an enlightened society. I think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism</u>—even apart from the election season antics of our politicians—<u>because we are not being gassed or shot or even left hot or hungry. </u>September 11 no longer evokes an image of incinerated firefighters, innocents leaping out of skyscrapers, or the stench of flesh and melted plastic but rather squabbles over architectural designs, lawsuits, snarling over John Ashcroft’s new statutes, or concerns about being too rude to the Arab street. Such smug dispensation—as profoundly amoral as it is—provides us, on the cheap and at a safe distance, with a sense of moral worth. Or perhaps censuring from the bleachers enables us to feel superior to those less fortunate who are still captive to their primordial appetites. <u>We prefer to cringe at the thought that others like to see proof of their killers’ deaths, prefer to shoot rather than die capturing a mass murderer, and welcome a generic profile of those who wish to kill them en masse. We should take stock of this dangerous and growing mind-set—and remember that wealthy, sophisticated societies like our own are rarely overrun. They simply implode—whining and debating to the end<strong>, even as they pass away. </p><p></u>Anti-hegemony rhetoric is dangerous—causes a policy movement towards isolationism</p><p>Kagan 98</strong> (Robert, Summer, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/a.kaplan.benevolentempire.fp.sum98.pdf, mat)</p><p><u><mark>Those contributing to the</mark> growing <mark>chorus of antihegemony</u></mark> and multipolarity <u>may know they <mark>are playing a dangerous game</mark>,</u> one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did dur- ing the Cold War, <u><mark>lest the entire intemational system come crashing down</u></mark> around them. <u>What <mark>they may not have</u></mark> adequately <u><mark>calculated</u></mark>, however, <u>is <mark>the possibility</mark> that <mark>Americans will not respond</mark> as <mark>wisely</mark> as they </u>generally<u> did during the Cold War. <mark>Americans</u></mark> and their leaders <u><mark>should not take</mark> all <mark>this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously</mark>.</u> They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. <u><mark>But</u></mark>, of course<u>, <mark>Americans are</mark> taking it seriously. </u>In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperial- ism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, <u><mark>there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America</mark> today,</u> a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign <u><mark>grumbling about</u></mark> American <u><mark>hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget</mark>--even if most of the rest of the world does not-- just <mark>how important</mark> continued <mark>American dominance is</u></mark> <u><mark>to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity</u><strong></mark>. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling. </p><p>Discussing hegemony in academic settings is key to create social changes and prevent corruption</p><p>Walsh 8</strong> (John staff at the University of Rhode Island “The critical role of discourse in Education for Democracy” http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/6-2-04.pdf)JC</p><p><u><mark>As students learn to become active and engaged democratic citizens they are continually faced with contradictions inherent in early 21 st century democracy including</mark>: the advantages of wealth in running for office, the conflict between the ideal of the government deriving its powers from the people and the reality of the people being subjected to the power of the government</u>, just to name two. Rather than educate for democracy, <u><mark>the ideology of democracy</mark> may function in such a way as <mark>to preserve the</mark> current political <mark>system through hegemony</mark> in order to achieve the consent of present and future generations for the maintenance and reproduction of the current relations of domination.</u><strong> </p><p>We are the agents of change</p><p>Stoddart 7 </strong>(Mark phD candidate at the department of sociology at the University of British Colombia “Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and Power” http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/5226/1/STARV28A9.pdf)JC</p><p>Gramsci also <u>asserts that <mark>hegemony has a material dimension</mark>. It is not only a system of ideas, floating above economic structures. Rather, <mark>the <strong>social action of everyday life produces hegemonic effects</u></strong></mark>. Writing about the emergence of Fordist production in the United States, for example, Gramsci (1992) <u>describes an <mark>American hegemony</mark> that is <mark>“born in the factory</u></mark>” (p. 169). Gramsci (1996) <u>describes how the interplay of our cultural and material surroundings constructs hegemony as follows:</u> The press is the most dynamic part of the ideological structure, but not the only one. <u><mark>Everything that</mark> directly or indirectly <mark>influences</mark> or could influence <mark>public opinion belongs to</mark> it: libraries, <strong><mark>schools</u></strong></mark>, associations and <u><strong><mark>clubs</u></strong></mark> of various kinds, even architecture, the layout of streets and their names (p. 53). Furthermore, <u>hegemony often lies beneath the surface</u>, unarticulated. As Williams (1977) writes, “<u><mark>A lived hegemony is always a process</u></mark>. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. <u>It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits</u>” (p. 112). This illustrates how hegemony works as a sort of common sense, rather than as a coherent body of thought, such as we would associate with ideology. Gramsci gives us an image of society in which the cultural realm is a central location for the exercise of social power. By comparison with the Frankfurt School theorists, however, hegemonic power is something that is always contested, always historically contingent and always unfinished. <u><mark>He ascribes a high level of importance to the subaltern classes, <strong>intellectuals</strong>,</mark> and revolutionary political parties <mark>as agents for social change</u></mark>. For Gramsci, a revolutionary seizure of the means of production is not a viable tactic for creating radical social change in modern capitalist societies. Where a society is characterized primarily by the exercise of hegemonic power instead of coercion, a prolonged cultural “war of position” is more important, where the hegemony of the ruling classes is dissembled and a new hegemony is crystallized (Femia 1975: 34). <u>This occurs as subaltern groups realize their own capacity to become philosophers of their daily experience; they come to understand the hegemonic common sense that they otherwise take for granted</u>. The Gramscian model of hegemony departs significantly from the Marxist notion of ideology, while retaining Marxist foundational categories of class, the capitalist mode of production, and the dis- tinction between the economic base and the cultural superstructure. Among the advances made by Gramscian theory is the attention to hegemonic power as an often-implicit “common sense” rather than a coherent body of thought, which is inherently unfinished and historically contingent. <u><mark>It is the embodiment of hegemony in everyday common sense, through the mundane activities connected with</mark> </u>work<u>, <mark>school</u></mark>, the family and the church, <u><mark>that secures the consent</mark> of capital’s subaltern classes.</u><strong> </p><p>FIRST Evolution proves violence is inevitable and explains realismThayer 4 –</strong> Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that <u><mark>evolutionary theory</mark> </u>also <u><mark>offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior</u></mark>. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. <u><mark>The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic</u></mark>; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. <u><mark>Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions</u></mark>. <u><mark>This environment produced</u></mark> the behaviors examined here: <u><mark>egoism, domination</u></mark>, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits are sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, <u><mark>even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, </mark>defined as either control over others </u>(for example, through wealth or leadership) <u>or control over ecological circumstances</u> (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).</p><p><strong>SECOND Realism best explains war</p><p>Thayer 2k</strong> (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)</p><p><u><mark>Scholars</u></mark> of international politics <u>may <mark>use evolutionary theory to generate new understanding of</u></mark> important issues in international politics, such as <u><mark>the origins of war and ethnic conflict</u></mark>.70 <u>Evolutionary theory suggests why some humans organize attacks and why others organize to defend against such attacks.</u> It also <u>explains why suspicion of strangers contributes to fitness in the course of human evolution</u>. IMPLICATIONS FOR WARFARE War is a phenomenon that has been usefully studied from multiple, often inter- disciplinary, perspectives-psychological, regime type, and systemic, among others.71 <u><mark>Although the causes of modern war are</u></mark> often <u><mark>complex, its prevalence</mark> throughout human history <mark>suggests that it is not caused</u></mark> principally <u><mark>by modern developments,</u> <u>such as imperialism or militarism,</u></mark> although these no doubt contribute to the scope, if not necessarily the intensity, of conflict.72 The human capacity for aggression and warfare has been widely studied by eminent psychologists such as Sigmund Freud and Erich Fromm. Freud inter- preted aggressive human behavior as the outcome of a drive that constantly seeks release.73 For Freud, <u><mark>war results from</u></mark> many motives, "some of which are openly declared and others which are never mentioned," but "<u><mark>a lust for ag- gression and destruction</u></mark> is certainly among them."74 Building on Freud's work, Fromm argued that <u><mark>humans are subject to a unique death instinct that leads to pathological forms of aggression beyond those found in other animals.</u><strong></mark>75</p><p>THIRD Realism is true and inevitable in the international realm– a shift away collapses into chaos.</p><p><u>Mearsheimer</u></strong> 200<u><strong>1</u></strong> [professor of political science at University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg. 361]</p><p><u>The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong.</u> In fact, <u><mark>all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves </u></mark>for the foreseeable future. Consequently, <u><mark>realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century</u>,</mark> and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, <u><mark>the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense</mark>, because <mark>international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War,</mark> </u>and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the<u> </u>best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.</p>
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Additionally, altruistic donations are biased against the poor
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Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014
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there is a tragic consequence inherent in the system of altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. By mandating altruistic living kidney donations, the U S has inadvertently relegated some very specific groups to die on dialysis while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. Someone well-to-do or well-connected. or even someone who is a middle-class. white~collar worker is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; can’t be more than a little overweight These are prevalent illnesses but the problem is especially acute among the poor and minorities. Donors must have time to spare. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips for pre-op meetings and testing Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home. This means taking a good deal of time away from work Donors must have money The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered Donors may have travel-related expenses while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery. the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave. The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class. As a result, the U S has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, to get living donor kidneys for free, while the average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis, waiting for organs that rarely come.
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there is tragic consequence in altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. mandating altruistic donations has relegated some very specific groups to die on dialysis Someone well-to-do or middle-class. is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor : Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; These are prevalent illnesses especially acute among the poor and minorities Donors must have time to spare This means taking a good deal of time away from work Donors must have money. The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered. It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis
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The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 201
But there is another tragic consequence inherent in the American system of altruistic organ donation that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. By mandating altruistic living kidney donations, the United States has inadvertently relegated some very specific groups of Americans to die on dialysis while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. Someone well-to-do or well-connected. or even someone who is a middle-class. white~collar worker is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone who is poor. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. Listed here are some of the qualifications for being a living kidney donor: Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; can’t be more than a little overweight: and preferably don't have a history of diabetes or heart disease in their immediate families. These are prevalent illnesses among Americans—an estimated 8.3 percent of Americans suffer from diabetes, and heart disease caused nearly 25 percent of American deaths in 2OO8—but the problem is especially acute among the poor and minorities. A growing body of evidence points to strong links between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension (a risk factor for heart disease), and end stage renal disease. On top of this, donors need health insurance which practically speaking means that donors or their_spouses must be full-time employees in a business large enough to provide insurance, must be making enough to purchase their own insurance, or must be under 26 and covered by their parents’ health insurance. Donors must have time to spare. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips to a hospital, clinic, or lab for pre-op meetings and testing with lab technicians, doctors, social workers, and psychologists. Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home. Even after three weeks, however, it remains unwise to do any heavy lifting. The period to limit heavy lift- ing might last anywhere from 2 to 6 months or longer depending on ‘the age and general health of the donor, whether there were any complications during surgery or afterwards, and how quickly the donor is healing. This means taking a good deal of time away from work or other responsibilities, particularly if the donor has to do more than is generally required of someone with a desk job. Donors must have a support group with time to spare. They need help during the donation and recovery period. Donors can’t drive themselves home from the hospital after the operation. They need people who can take care of them for at least the first week or two after surgery. And of course, someone must take on the responsibilities donors are unable to fulfill during recovery: any job-related duties as well as home responsibilities, such as caring for children, older relatives, the household, pets, and the yard. Donors must have money. The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, but there are donation related costs that are not covered. Donors may have travel-related expenses like gas, flights, hotels and food while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery. If a donor’s friends and family can't take off time to help the donor (or can’t take off weeks or months), the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations: for example, a babtsitter, a pet sitter, and someone to clean the house and/or mow the lawn It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave. (Recipients are legally permitted to reimburse donors for lost wages, but not all recipients, and particularly not impoverished ones, have the financial means to cover lost wages. Furthermore reimbursing the self-employed is prohibited because there is no clear measure, such as a salary, to value their work. State and federal programs provide some financial assistance for donors, but most of those programs only provide need-based support for travel expenses or only compensate donors a small percentage of their costs after the fact") The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class. The costs of donating are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses that might not be reimbursed. Taking too many days off work can jeopardize a donor’s job status: A donor may lose his or her position altogether. fall behind in work responsibilities, or lose seniority when it comes to promotions or other benefits. There are also secondary costs such as the financial and emotional strain donation puts on family members and friends when they contribute financially or take time off work to help the donor during recovery. Given these restrictions. how many people do you know who would qua]- ify to be kidney donors? W'hite-collar workers might be able to “afford” to donate if they have enough vacation time. enough money saved to pay for donation-related expenses up front. friends and family who can take time off work to help with everyday responsibilities, and a job to return to that doesn’t require heavy lifting. Blue-collar workers are far less likely to have the resources needed to be living donors. They might not have sufficient, if any, paid leave, may not have friends and family who have enough free time to help with children and household responsibilities, and are more likely than white-collar workers to have jobs that require heavy lifting. Now consider the self-employed, people like family farmers and small business owners. How can they find the time or money to donate? And even if the self-employed qualify to donate, who would run their businesses in their absence, and how many of them have jobs that won't require at least some heavy lifting? And what about homemakers or people who care for children or elderly relatives? Who would take on their responsibilities while they arrange for and recover from a kidney donation, let alone the risks of heavy lifting too soon after surgery? _ _ Finally, poor and minority communities are harder hit with problems of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, making it less likely that a potential recipient’s friends and family will even qualify medically as donors, let alone have the financial resources necessary to donate. And what about the unemployed? They don’t qualify because they don’t have insurance. So the unemployed, or even friends or relatives who work part-time, might not qualify to donate because they don’t have adequate insurance coverage. As a result, the United States has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, leisure class, and upper middle-class to get living donor kidneys for free, while the average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis, waiting for second-best cadaver organs that rarely come.
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<h4>Additionally, altruistic donations are biased against the poor</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 201</p><p>But <u><mark>there is</mark> a</u>nother <u><mark>tragic consequence </mark>inherent<mark> in</mark> the</u> American <u>system of <mark>altruistic organ donation</mark> <mark>that many people are not aware of, an insidious injustice so profound one might question whether our current policy is any less barbaric than the exploitation it sought to eliminate. </mark>By<mark> mandating altruistic</mark> living kidney <mark>donations</mark>, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>has</mark> inadvertently <mark>relegated some very specific groups</mark> </u>of Americans <u><mark>to die on dialysis </mark>while creating opportunities for others to get kidneys for free. <mark>Someone well-to-do or</mark> well-connected. or even someone who is a <mark>middle-class. </mark>white~collar worker <mark>is far more likely to have friends or relatives who qualify to donate than someone</u> <u>who is poor</mark>. unemployed, or a blue-collar worker. </u>Listed here are some of the qualifications for being a living kidney donor<mark>: <u>Donors must be healthy and insured. They can’t have diabetes, hypertension, or heart problems; </mark>can’t be more than a little overweight</u>: and preferably don't have a history of diabetes or heart disease in their immediate families. <u><mark>These are</mark> <mark>prevalent illnesses</u></mark> among Americans—an estimated 8.3 percent of Americans suffer from diabetes, and heart disease caused nearly 25 percent of American deaths in 2OO8—<u>but the problem is <mark>especially acute among the poor and minorities</mark>.</u> A growing body of evidence points to strong links between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension (a risk factor for heart disease), and end stage renal disease. On top of this, donors need health insurance which practically speaking means that donors or their_spouses must be full-time employees in a business large enough to provide insurance, must be making enough to purchase their own insurance, or must be under 26 and covered by their parents’ health insurance. <u><mark>Donors must have time to spare</mark>. First, they need to make 3 to 10 week-day trips </u>to a hospital, clinic, or lab<u> for pre-op meetings and testing</u> with lab technicians, doctors, social workers, and psychologists. <u>Then after the operation, they need ‘two to seven days to recover in the hospital and at least two weeks to recover at home.</u> Even after three weeks, however, it remains unwise to do any heavy lifting. The period to limit heavy lift-<u> </u>ing might last anywhere from 2 to 6 months or longer depending on ‘the age and general health of the donor, whether there were any complications during surgery or afterwards, and how quickly the donor is healing. <u><mark>This means taking a good deal of time away from work</u></mark> or other responsibilities, particularly if the donor has to do more than is generally required of someone with a desk job. Donors must have a support group with time to spare. They need help during the donation and recovery period. Donors can’t drive themselves home from the hospital after the operation. They need people who can take care of them for at least the first week or two after surgery. And of course, someone must take on the responsibilities donors are unable to fulfill during recovery: any job-related duties as well as home responsibilities, such as caring for children, older relatives, the household, pets, and the yard. <u><mark>Donors must have money</u>. <u><strong>The actual nephrectomy is covered through the recipients insurance or federal and state health programs like Medicare and Medicaid,</strong> but there are donation related costs that are not covered</u>.</mark> <u>Donors may have travel-related expenses </u>like gas, flights, hotels and food <u>while getting pre—operative testing done and before and after surgery.</u> If a donor’s friends and family can't take off time to help the donor (or can’t take off weeks or months), <u>the donor might have to hire someone to help with non-work related obligations</u>: for example, a babtsitter, a pet sitter, and someone to clean the house and/or mow the lawn <u><mark>It is also quite possible that donors may need to take off more time from work than they have paid leave</mark>.</u> (Recipients are legally permitted to reimburse donors for lost wages, but not all recipients, and particularly<u> </u>not impoverished ones, have the financial means to cover lost wages. Furthermore reimbursing the self-employed is prohibited because there is no clear measure, such as a salary, to value their work. State and federal programs provide some financial assistance for donors, but most of those programs only provide need-based support for travel expenses or only compensate donors a small percentage of their costs after the fact") <u><mark>The up-front costs associated with kidney donation are simply too great for many potential donors</mark>, particularly if they are members of an underprivileged socioeconomic class.</u> The costs of donating are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses that might not be reimbursed. Taking too many days off work can jeopardize a donor’s job status: A donor may lose his or her position altogether. fall behind in work responsibilities, or lose seniority when it comes to promotions or other benefits. There are also secondary costs such as the financial and emotional strain donation puts on family members and friends when they contribute financially or take time off work to help the donor during recovery. Given these restrictions. how many people do you know who would qua]-<u> </u>ify to be kidney donors? W'hite-collar workers might be able to “afford” to donate if they have enough vacation time. enough money saved to pay for donation-related expenses up front. friends and family who can take time off work to help with everyday responsibilities, and a job to return to that doesn’t require heavy lifting. Blue-collar workers are far less likely to have the resources needed to be living donors. They might not have sufficient, if any, paid leave, may not have friends and family who have enough free time to help with children and household responsibilities, and are more likely than white-collar workers to have jobs that require heavy lifting. Now consider the self-employed, people like family farmers and small business owners. How can they find the time or money to donate? And even if the self-employed qualify to donate, who would run their businesses in their absence, and how many of them have jobs that won't require at least some heavy lifting? And what about homemakers or people who care for children or elderly relatives? Who would take on their responsibilities while they arrange for and recover from a kidney donation, let alone the risks of heavy lifting too soon after surgery? _ _ Finally, poor and minority communities are harder hit with problems of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension, making it less likely that a potential recipient’s friends and family will even qualify medically as donors, let alone have the financial resources necessary to donate. And what about the unemployed? They don’t qualify because they don’t have insurance. So the unemployed, or even friends or relatives who work part-time, might not qualify to donate because they don’t have adequate insurance coverage. <u>As a result, the U</u>nited<u> S</u>tates<u> has a kidney donation system that, in the name of altruism, makes it possible for the well-to-do, </u>leisure class, and upper middle-class <u>to get living donor kidneys for free, while the <mark>average working class laborer, the poor, and the unemployed have to watch their friends and family die on dialysis</mark>, waiting for </u>second-best cadaver<u> organs that rarely come.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,858 | 3 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,134 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
|
Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
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without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,135 |
Economic decline not cause war –
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Economic decline not cause war – </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 430,936 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,136 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
3
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,137 |
Commandeering is THE VITAL INTERNAL LINK to federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
State-federal cooperation in the criminal law field is less governed by hard rules than one might think The power of a state to create a criminal enforcement process and empower officers to arrest persons within the state's territorial jurisdiction is a fundamental constitutional question, and a central attribute of sovereignty State statutes authorize their police, expressly or impliedly, to make arrests for federal crimes. a federal statute requiring state police to make arrests for federal crimes would be unconstitutional and no such statute exists In sum, the constitutional status of a state police power to arrest for federal crimes is not a matter of federal command, but rather a state decision to accept the federal invitation This is one of the kinds of voluntary cooperation identified in Printz as the only clearly ascertainable precedent for state enforcement of federal law
|
The power of a state to create a criminal enforcement process and empower officers to arrest persons within the state's territorial jurisdiction is a fundamental [*583] constitutional question, and a central attribute of sovereignty. n55 State statutes authorize their police, expressly or impliedly, to make arrests for federal crimes. n56 At the same time, a federal statute requiring state police to make arrests for federal crimes would appear to be unconstitutional
|
State-federal cooperation in the criminal law field is less governed by hard rules than one might think. To begin with, the authority of state police to make arrests for any crime, state or federal, would appear to be a question of state constitutions and statutes. The power of a state to create a criminal enforcement process and empower officers to arrest persons within the state's territorial jurisdiction is a fundamental [*583] constitutional question, and a central attribute of sovereignty. n55 State statutes authorize their police, expressly or impliedly, to make arrests for federal crimes. n56 At the same time, a federal statute requiring state police to make arrests for federal crimes would appear to be unconstitutional under Printz, n57 and no such statute exists. Instead, a general federal statute permits state officials to make arrests for federal crimes. n58 In sum, the constitutional status of a state police power to arrest for federal crimes is not a matter of federal command, but rather a state decision to accept the federal invitation to authorize its officers to arrest for federal crimes. This is one of the kinds of voluntary cooperation identified in Printz as the only clearly ascertainable precedent for state enforcement of federal law. n59
| 1,280 |
<h4><strong>Commandeering is THE VITAL INTERNAL LINK to federalism</h4><p>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p><u>State-federal cooperation in the criminal law field is less governed by hard rules than one might think</u>. To begin with, the authority of state police to make arrests for any crime, state or federal, would appear to be a question of state constitutions and statutes. <u><mark>The power of a state to create a criminal enforcement process and empower officers to arrest persons within the state's territorial jurisdiction is a <strong>fundamental</u></strong> [*583] <u><strong>constitutional question, and a central attribute of sovereignty</u></strong>. n55 <u>State statutes authorize their police, expressly or impliedly, to make arrests for federal crimes.</u> n56 At the same time, <u>a federal statute requiring state police to make arrests for federal crimes would</u> appear to <u>be</u> <u>unconstitutional</u></mark> under Printz, n57 <u>and no such statute exists</u>. Instead, a general federal statute permits state officials to make arrests for federal crimes. n58 <u>In sum, the constitutional status of a state police power to arrest for federal crimes is not a matter of federal command, but rather a state decision to accept the federal invitation</u> to authorize its officers to arrest for federal crimes. <u>This is one of the kinds of voluntary cooperation identified in Printz as the only clearly ascertainable precedent for state enforcement of federal law</u>. n59</p>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,937 | 1 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,138 |
Relaxing banking restrictions leads to federal legalization
|
Guardian 8/22/2014
|
Guardian 8/22/2014 (Guardian Weekly: Legal highs and lows of the US marijuana experiment: A new industry is springing up to support Colorado's cannabis 'green rush', but its pioneers remain hampered by the hostility of the federal government, reports Andrew Gumbel, lexis)
|
Colorado has allowed recreational marijuana sales for months Most entrepreneurs are tough enough to put up with the many obstacles, because this is the new frontier and the market is taking off People in the industry are calling this the "green rush" they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions if that happens, they expect big companies to move in, with investment capital, buyout offers and marketing muscle that will add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana. National legalisation is on an expedited path the days of cannabis prohibition will be over soon
[Walter, B.S. Applied Mathematics (William and Mary), Politics and Markets Reporter
A new report from the esteemed Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce presents you a decent idea on how millennials are doing. Were there truly a STEM shortage one would expect that unemployment statistics for recent STEM graduates would be outstandingly low. ¶ The reality? Nope hiring tends to be slower for users of information compared to those who write programs and create software applications. According to the report, new information science graduates have worse unemployment than sociology (9.9%), archaeology (12.6%) and English (9.8%) majors If there's a STEM shortage, why are one in every eleven recent computer science graduates out of a job? Why are one in every seven information science majors out of work if Silicon Valley is so desperate to import talent?¶ The reality is that from an economic perspective we don't have a STEM shortage to say we have a STEM shortage is needlessly hyperbolic.
|
People in the industry are calling this the "green rush they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions if that happens, they expect big companies to move that will add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana. "National legalisation is on an expedited path
|
It is, of course, very early days. Colorado has allowed recreational marijuana sales for seven months and Washington state began a month ago. Most entrepreneurs are tough enough to put up with the many obstacles, because this is the new frontier and the market is taking off. 3D invites customers to tour its indoor plant-growing facility, much as wine buyers in the Napa valley might be invited to tour a winery. Dope tourism is booming, as tour companies offer smoke-clogged limo rides to cannabis shops, tourist sights and even - on the so called Willie Wonka tour offered by Rocky Mountain High Tours - a chocolate factory offering dope-infused food. People are offering rooms and apartments to tourists offering free samples, dope-infused mints on the pillow and, occasionally, instructions that while dope-smoking is tolerated or even encouraged, tobacco is not. People in the industry are calling this the "green rush" and they couldn't be more excited. "We're creating a brand new industry," Fox said. "We have to have patience and also be a little crazy." So they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing. Poiss found another bank willing not only to take his business, but to relieve him of the onerous cash-handling fees his previous bank had levied - about $40,000 in 2014 alone. The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions and bring the industry's tax reporting in line with other businesses. And, if that happens, they expect big companies to move in, with investment capital, buyout offers and marketing muscle that will add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana. "National legalisation is on an expedited path," said Mark Scruggs, who helps run a website called weedmaps, the industry's answer to online directories and review sites like Yelp. "I thought when I got into this business that it would take 20 years longer. It's hard to change the mindset of 70 years of propaganda, but the days of cannabis prohibition will be over soon."
No high skill shortage
Hickey 13 [Walter, B.S. Applied Mathematics (William and Mary), Politics and Markets Reporter
Business Insider, “A Brand New Report Shows Just How Wrong Silicon Valley Is About A Tech Worker Shortage,” Business Insider, 5/31, http://www.businessinsider.com/a-brand-new-report-shows-just-how-wrong-silicon-valleys-claim-of-a-stem-shortage-is-2013-5#ixzz2Wcm0nFLe]
A new report from the esteemed Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce presents a pretty significant rebuttal to that claim. ¶ Released on Wednesday, the annual report looks at how new college graduates are faring in the recession-era economy. ¶ That it's titled "Hard Times" should give you a decent idea on how millennials are doing. ¶ Most interesting is the technology sector numbers. Were there truly a STEM shortage — were demand for STEM majors to exceed supply — one would expect that unemployment statistics for recent STEM graduates would be outstandingly low. ¶ The reality? Nope. From the report:¶ Unemployment seems mostly concentrated in information systems (14.7 %) compared with computer science (8.7%) and mathematics (5.9%). As noted in an earlier report, hiring tends to be slower for users of information compared to those who write programs and create software applications.¶ Let's get a little perspective here. According to the report, new information science graduates have worse unemployment than sociology (9.9%), archaeology (12.6%) and English (9.8%) majors. ¶ Hard Times¶ What gives?¶ If there's a STEM shortage, why are one in every eleven recent computer science graduates out of a job? Why are one in every seven information science majors out of work if Silicon Valley is so desperate to import talent?¶ The reality is that from an economic perspective we don't have a STEM shortage.¶ What we may have is a "STEM majors who have the skills that Silicon Valley prefers" shortage.¶ But to say we have a STEM shortage is needlessly hyperbolic.
| 4,000 |
<h4><strong>Relaxing banking restrictions leads to federal legalization</h4><p>Guardian 8/22/2014</strong> (Guardian Weekly: Legal highs and lows of the US marijuana experiment: A new industry is springing up to support Colorado's cannabis 'green rush', but its pioneers remain hampered by the hostility of the federal government, reports Andrew Gumbel, lexis)</p><p>It is, of course, very early days. <u>Colorado has allowed recreational marijuana sales for</u> seven <u>months</u> and Washington state began a month ago. <u>Most entrepreneurs are tough enough to put up with the many obstacles, because this is the new frontier and the market is taking off</u>. 3D invites customers to tour its indoor plant-growing facility, much as wine buyers in the Napa valley might be invited to tour a winery. Dope tourism is booming, as tour companies offer smoke-clogged limo rides to cannabis shops, tourist sights and even - on the so called Willie Wonka tour offered by Rocky Mountain High Tours - a chocolate factory offering dope-infused food. People are offering rooms and apartments to tourists offering free samples, dope-infused mints on the pillow and, occasionally, instructions that while dope-smoking is tolerated or even encouraged, tobacco is not. <u><mark>People in the industry are calling this the "green</mark> <mark>rush</mark>"</u> and they couldn't be more excited. "We're creating a brand new industry," Fox said. "We have to have patience and also be a little crazy." So <u><mark>they get creative when it comes to the lack of access to financing</u></mark>. Poiss found another bank willing not only to take his business, but to relieve him of the onerous cash-handling fees his previous bank had levied - about $40,000 in 2014 alone. <u><mark>The hope, over time, is that the federal government will lift the banking restrictions</u></mark> and bring the industry's tax reporting in line with other businesses. And, <u><mark>if that happens, they expect big companies to move</mark> in, with investment capital, buyout offers and marketing muscle <mark>that will <strong>add to the clamour for blanket legalisation of marijuana.</mark> </u></strong><mark>"<u>National legalisation is on an expedited path</u></mark>," said Mark Scruggs, who helps run a website called weedmaps, the industry's answer to online directories and review sites like Yelp. "I thought when I got into this business that it would take 20 years longer. It's hard to change the mindset of 70 years of propaganda, but <u>the days of cannabis prohibition will be over soon</u><strong>."</p><p></strong>No high skill shortage</p><p><strong>Hickey 13 <u>[Walter, B.S. Applied Mathematics (William and Mary), Politics and Markets Reporter</p><p></u></strong>Business Insider, “A Brand New Report Shows Just How Wrong Silicon Valley Is About A Tech Worker Shortage,” Business Insider, 5/31, http://www.businessinsider.com/a-brand-new-report-shows-just-how-wrong-silicon-valleys-claim-of-a-stem-shortage-is-2013-5#ixzz2Wcm0nFLe]</p><p><u><strong>A new report from the esteemed</strong> Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce presents </u>a pretty significant rebuttal to that claim. ¶ Released on Wednesday, the annual report looks at how new college graduates are faring in the recession-era economy. ¶ That it's titled "Hard Times" should give <u>you a decent idea on how millennials are doing.</u> ¶ Most interesting is the technology sector numbers. <u>Were there truly a STEM shortage</u> — were demand for STEM majors to exceed supply — <u>one would expect that unemployment statistics for recent STEM graduates would be outstandingly low. ¶ <strong>The reality? Nope</u></strong>. From the report:¶ Unemployment seems mostly concentrated in information systems (14.7 %) compared with computer science (8.7%) and mathematics (5.9%). As noted in an earlier report, <u>hiring tends to be slower for users of information compared to those who write programs and create software applications.</u>¶ Let's get a little perspective here. <u>According to the report, new information science graduates have worse unemployment than sociology (9.9%), archaeology (12.6%) and English (9.8%) majors</u>. ¶ Hard Times¶ What gives?¶ <u>If there's a STEM shortage, why are one in every eleven recent computer science graduates out of a job? Why are one in every seven information science majors out of work if Silicon Valley is so desperate to import talent?¶ The reality is that from an economic perspective we <strong>don't have a STEM shortage</u></strong>.¶ What we may have is a "STEM majors who have the skills that Silicon Valley prefers" shortage.¶ But <u>to say we have a STEM shortage is <strong>needlessly hyperbolic. </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
CP
| 288,267 | 6 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,139 |
Thus, the shortage disproportionately impacts Blacks
|
Jefferson-Jones 13
|
Jefferson-Jones 13 Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis
|
The statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the population, but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting list The number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths.
Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Minnesota.
Racial exploitation is the powerful, conventional challenge to emerging discourses on alternative methodologies of procuring organs, especially markets Yet, to what effect? Those committed to providing equitable opportunities to suffering patients must ask whether challenges to organ markets benefit patients, especially racial minorities? Reduced waitlists? Resolved racial disparities in organ allocation? The evidence, including growing waitlists and thousands of deaths each year, informs us that altruistic organ procurement remains an ineffective approach to meet the growing demand for organs. Race becomes the dominant cover to justify exclusive reliance on altruism in organ procurement. The problem here is that race-based claims against organ markets serve to destabilize any discourse that might involve racial minorities contributing in non-altruistic ways to organ pools. there were 96,928 patients on the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) waitlist. 4 Disproportionately, these individuals are African Americans, stuck in a strange quagmire, where policymakers expect strangers to donate organs and rescue them it provides verylittle relief to vulnerable patients To the contrary, the creation of just rules and regulations and the testing of those rules through a reliable, fair, and unbiased judicial system form an ideal that we strive for in our legal system.
|
statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the population, n38 but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting li number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively. n40 Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths. n41
Racial exploitation is the powerful challenge to emerging discourses on procuring organs, especially markets. Yet, to what effect The evidence, including growing waitlists and thousands of deaths each year, informs us that altruistic organ procurement remains an ineffective ace becomes the dominant cover to justify exclusive reliance on altruism race-based claims serve to destabilize any discourse that might involve racial minorities contributing in non-altruistic ways to organ pools there were 96,928 patients on the waitlist Disproportionately, these individuals are African Americans, stuck in a strange quagmire, where policymakers expect strangers to donate organs and rescue them it provides verylittle relief to vulnerable patients. creation of just rules and regulations and esting through a r fair, and judicial system form an ideal that we strive for in our legal system.
|
The statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the United States population, n38 but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting list. n39 The number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively. n40 Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths. n41
governemtnal purchasing is good for organ sales-only way to ensure fair distribution—african americans are disproportionately effected
Goodwin 07
THE BODY MARKET: RACE POLITICS &
PRIVATE ORDERING
Michele Goodwin*
Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Everett Fraser
Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Minnesota.
Racial exploitation is now the powerful, conventional challenge to emerging discourses on alternative methodologies of procuring organs, especially markets. Yet, to what effect? Those committed to providing equitable opportunities to suffering patients must ask whether challenges to organ markets benefit patients, especially racial minorities? Reduced waitlists? Resolved racial disparities in organ allocation? These questions are relevant to any discussion about equity, access, and class in organ procurement and allocation in the United States. The evidence, including growing waitlists and thousands of deaths each year, informs us that altruistic organ procurement remains an ineffective approach to meet the growing demand for organs. Race becomes the dominant cover or proxy to justify exclusive reliance on altruism in organ procurement. The problem here is that race-based claims against organ markets serve to destabilize any discourse that might involve racial minorities contributing in non-altruistic ways to organ pools. Race plays as an expedient trope here, masking concerns that may be driven by other interests far removed from minority status, class, and access. To be sure, there is a tremendous demand for organs in America, and the situation is worsening. As of August 15, 2007, there were 96,928 patients on the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) waitlist. 4 That number represents an increase of 400 patients in less than three months. Over 6000 of these patients will die before receiving an organ, and thousands of others will be unceremoniously removed from the waitlist because they are no longer attractive candidates, being too sick, weak, or old according to those who set the rationing priorities. Disproportionately, these individuals are African Americans, stuck in a strange quagmire, where policymakers expect strangers to donate organs and rescue them. This normative approach is utilitarian in theory, and although intended to equalize transplantation opportunities, it provides verylittle relief to vulnerable patients. One significant complication in the utilitarian ordering of transplantation is the reliance on blind compassion. Another complication with that normative approach is that it refuses to consider the pragmatic or realistic ordering of collectives, including competing value systems and group biases. In essence it demands the surrendering of lives or organs, in this case with a promise for later returns. Yet, those goals must be understood as aspirational, with very little hope of imminent achievement. If more Americans believed that communal sacrifice is returned in equal measure they would readily surrender their organs at procurement sites throughout the United States. But they do not. This Article does not argue against the value of aspirational thinking. To the contrary, the creation of just rules and regulations and the testing of those rules through a reliable, fair, and unbiased judicial system form an ideal that we strive for in our legal system.
| 4,026 |
<h4>Thus, the shortage disproportionately impacts Blacks </h4><p><strong>Jefferson-Jones 13</strong> Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis</p><p><u>The <mark>statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the</u></mark> United States <u><mark>population,</u> n38 <u>but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting li</mark>st</u>. n39 <u>The <mark>number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively</u>. n40 <u>Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year - a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths.</u> n41</p><p><strong></mark> </p><p>governemtnal purchasing is good for organ sales-only way to ensure fair distribution—african americans are disproportionately effected</p><p>Goodwin 07</p><p></strong>THE BODY MARKET: RACE POLITICS &</p><p>PRIVATE ORDERING</p><p>Michele Goodwin*</p><p>Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Everett Fraser </p><p><u>Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University of Minnesota.</p><p><mark>Racial exploitation is</u></mark> now <u><mark>the powerful</mark>, conventional <mark>challenge to emerging discourses on</mark> alternative methodologies of <mark>procuring organs, especially markets</u>. <u>Yet, to what effect</mark>? Those committed to providing equitable opportunities to suffering patients must ask whether challenges to organ markets benefit patients, especially racial minorities? Reduced waitlists? Resolved racial disparities in organ allocation? </u>These questions are relevant to any discussion about equity, access, and class in organ procurement and allocation in the United States. <u><mark>The evidence, including growing waitlists and thousands of deaths each year, informs us that altruistic organ procurement remains an ineffective</mark> approach to meet the growing demand for organs.</u> <u>R<mark>ace becomes the dominant cover</u></mark> or proxy <u><mark>to justify exclusive reliance on altruism</mark> in organ procurement. The problem here is that</u> <u><mark>race-based claims</mark> against organ markets <mark>serve to destabilize any discourse that might involve racial minorities contributing in non-altruistic ways to organ pools</mark>. </u>Race plays as an expedient trope here, masking concerns that may be driven by other interests far removed from minority status, class, and access. To be sure, there is a tremendous demand for organs in America, and the situation is worsening. As of August 15, 2007, <u><mark>there were 96,928 patients on the</mark> United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) <mark>waitlist</mark>. 4 </u>That number represents an increase of 400 patients in less than three months. Over 6000 of these patients will die before receiving an organ, and thousands of others will be unceremoniously removed from the waitlist because they are no longer attractive candidates, being too sick, weak, or old according to those who set the rationing priorities. <u><mark>Disproportionately, these individuals are African Americans, stuck in a strange quagmire, where policymakers expect strangers to donate organs and rescue them</u></mark>. This normative approach is utilitarian in theory, and although intended to equalize transplantation opportunities, <u><mark>it provides verylittle relief to vulnerable patients</u>.</mark> One significant complication in the utilitarian ordering of transplantation is the reliance on blind compassion. Another complication with that normative approach is that it refuses to consider the pragmatic or realistic ordering of collectives, including competing value systems and group biases. In essence it demands the surrendering of lives or organs, in this case with a promise for later returns. Yet, those goals must be understood as aspirational, with very little hope of imminent achievement. If more Americans believed that communal sacrifice is returned in equal measure they would readily surrender their organs at procurement sites throughout the United States. But they do not. This Article does not argue against the value of aspirational thinking. <u>To the contrary, the <mark>creation of just rules and regulations</mark> <mark>and</mark> the t<mark>esting</mark> of those rules <mark>through a r</mark>eliable, <mark>fair, and</mark> unbiased <strong><mark>judicial system form an ideal that we strive for in our legal system.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,938 | 3 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,140 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,141 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4><strong>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u>, if still controversial, <u>proposal</u> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <strong><mark>one revenue stream</strong> would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u>. <u>In</u> the context of drugs like <u>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></mark> all, or even many, <u><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs</strong> </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u>because of differing state tax rates, <strong>the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 1
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,142 |
A. Empirically denied – 2008
|
Barnett ’9
|
Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, 8/25/200’9, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx
|
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, ensuing conflict and wars globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the ongoing conflicts can be clearly attributed to the global recession with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage but there was no great slide into "trade wars." the W T O is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order
|
the financial crisis struck the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, wars globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had no impact on the international security landscape None of the ongoing conflicts can be attributed to the recession friendly cooperation on stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade there was no great slide into "trade wars." the W T O is functioning , and efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order
|
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.
| 5,823 |
<h4>A. Empirically denied – 2008 </h4><p><strong><mark>Barnett</strong></mark>, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, 8/25/200<strong><mark>’9</strong></mark>, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx</p><p><u>When<mark> the </mark>global<mark> financial crisis struck </mark>roughly a year ago, <mark>the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of,</u> </mark>and commentary regarding, <u>ensuing conflict and <mark>wars</u> </mark>-- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how <u><mark>globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had</mark> virtually <mark>no impact </mark>whatsoever<mark> on the international security landscape</mark>. <mark>None of the</u> </mark>more than three-dozen <u><mark>ongoing conflicts</u> </mark>listed by GlobalSecurity.org <u><mark>can be </mark>clearly <mark>attributed to the </mark>global <mark>recession</u></mark>. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And <u>with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions</u> (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), <u>our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest</u>, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, <u>we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the <mark>friendly cooperation on </mark>such <mark>stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic </mark>caused by the crisis. </u>Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. <u>The <mark>world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade</u></mark>. In the short run, <u>there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage</u> (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), <u>but <mark>there was no great slide into "trade wars."</u> </mark>Instead, <u><mark>the W</u></mark>orld<u> <mark>T</u></mark>rade<u><mark> O</u></mark>rganization<u><mark> is functioning </mark>as it was designed to function<mark>, and </mark>regional <mark>efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed</u>.</mark> Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, <u>in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. </u>Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that <u><mark>this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 63,397 | 282 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,143 |
We also solve federal enforcement- they’ll shift current resources to ONLY combat cartels (also in fed enforcement key block)
|
Schwartz 2014
|
Schwartz 2014 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, May, lexis)
|
Obama said that an Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state laws Obama followed this What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters." a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme. Obama returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 to the "recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado. the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited resources to address the most significant threats" posed by gangs or cartels while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local enforcement
|
Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state Obama returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach to the recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited resources to address the most significant threats" posed by gangs or cartels, while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local nforcement
|
2. The Obama Administration's Policy. As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama said that an Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state compassionate use laws. n102 As President, Obama followed this policy-to a degree. As a matter of constitutional law, the President's duty to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" would seem to preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand, the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute. n103 A credible [*626] argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the commerce power could not sustain the application of the CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional as applied to medical marijuana. n104 Nevertheless, even assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a politically risky move. Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions. n105 The Obama Administration's policy in this regard was initially laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, entitled "Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana." n106 While reaffirming the Justice Department's "commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all States," the Ogden memo suggested that "the Department is also committed to making [*627] efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources." n107 Noting federal prosecutors are "vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of [their authority over criminal matters]" the memo stated: The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand, prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department. n108 After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to minors, the memo backtracked a bit: Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . . This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . . Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution, [*628] even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests. Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . . n109 To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated picture due to the variation in state laws. For example, while Colorado and California laws authorized the operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office issued cease and desist letters to dispensaries in that state. n110 In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations, raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in various states, charging President Obama with backtracking on the Ogden memo and "betrayal" of his 2008 campaign promise. n111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter's near "zero tolerance" policy. n112 President Obama responded to questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling Stone magazine: [*629] Here's what's up: What I specifically said was that we were not going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say, 'Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books.' What I can say is, 'Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing folks damage.' As a consequence, there haven't been prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. The only tension that's come up-and this gets hyped up a lot-is a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, 'This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way.' That's not something we're going to do. n113 It is important, however, to see through the political rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a tightrope between courting marijuana legalization proponents and avoiding "soft-on-crime" attacks on his flank. What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters." n114 If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence [*630] signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado, n115 which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme. n116 In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the Obama Administration seems to have returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach. Most notably, the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 to the "recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado. In a Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant threats" posed by distribution of marijuana by gangs or cartels, while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local law enforcement under state drug laws. n117 [*631] In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity. n118 The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit on the authority of the federal government to enforce the CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. n119
| 10,235 |
<h4><strong>We also solve federal enforcement- they’ll shift current resources to ONLY combat cartels </strong>(also in fed enforcement key block)</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2014</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, May, lexis)</p><p>2. The Obama Administration's Policy. As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack <u>Obama said that an <mark>Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state</u></mark> compassionate use <u>laws</u>. n102 As President, <u>Obama followed this</u> policy-to a degree. As a matter of constitutional law, the President's duty to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" would seem to preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand, the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute. n103 A credible [*626] argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the commerce power could not sustain the application of the CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional as applied to medical marijuana. n104 Nevertheless, even assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a politically risky move. Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions. n105 The Obama Administration's policy in this regard was initially laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, entitled "Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana." n106 While reaffirming the Justice Department's "commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all States," the Ogden memo suggested that "the Department is also committed to making [*627] efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources." n107 Noting federal prosecutors are "vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of [their authority over criminal matters]" the memo stated: The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand, prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department. n108 After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to minors, the memo backtracked a bit: Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . . This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . . Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution, [*628] even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests. Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . . n109 To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated picture due to the variation in state laws. For example, while Colorado and California laws authorized the operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office issued cease and desist letters to dispensaries in that state. n110 In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations, raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in various states, charging President Obama with backtracking on the Ogden memo and "betrayal" of his 2008 campaign promise. n111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter's near "zero tolerance" policy. n112 President Obama responded to questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling Stone magazine: [*629] Here's what's up: What I specifically said was that we were not going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say, 'Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books.' What I can say is, 'Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing folks damage.' As a consequence, there haven't been prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. The only tension that's come up-and this gets hyped up a lot-is a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, 'This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way.' That's not something we're going to do. n113 It is important, however, to see through the political rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a tightrope between courting marijuana legalization proponents and avoiding "soft-on-crime" attacks on his flank. <u>What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters."</u> n114 If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But <u>a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence</u> [*630] <u>signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter.</u> <u>The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado</u>, n115 <u>which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme.</u> n116 In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> Administration seems to have <u><mark>returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach</u></mark>. Most notably, <u>the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 <mark>to the</mark> "<mark>recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado</mark>.</u> In a Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, <u><mark>the Justice Department expressed its "<strong>commitment to using its limited</u></strong> </mark>investigative and prosecutorial <u><strong><mark>resources to address the most significant threats" posed by</mark> </u></strong>distribution of marijuana by <u><strong><mark>gangs or cartels</u></strong>, <u>while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local</u> </mark>law <u>e<mark>nforcement</u><strong></mark> under state drug laws. n117 [*631] In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity. n118 The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit on the authority of the federal government to enforce the CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. n119</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,939 | 3 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,144 |
State immigration laws are the single biggest possible disaster for heg
|
Steinberg 2010
|
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
|
If S.B. 1070 were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level When the United States incurs criticism is normally in a position to defend the practices If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies such as the Arizona law, these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing immigration enforcement priorities and agendas with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice S.B. 1070 threatens ongoing adverse consequences for important and sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies for our regional and global relations It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to engage effectively with the international community repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature after the fact can be extremely difficult.
|
If S.B. 1070 were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly, as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing agendas, 1070 threatens sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies for our global relations It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature after the fact can be extremely difficult.
|
55.If S.B. 1070, Arizona's attempt to set its own immigration policy in pursuit of "attrition through enforcement," were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level on issues related to immigration and migration policy. Only the national government is in a position to accurately assess the impact of a policy such as S.B. 1070 on our overall foreign relations agenda and to balance the competing foreign relations considerations involved in the adoption and enforcement of such a law. When the United States incurs criticism of immigration law and policies adopted at the federal level, the United States is normally in a position to review the criticism and determine whether to defend the practices against attack or else to take appropriate action to modify its practices. The United States is also able to develop and implement immigration policy in anticipation of these and other foreign relations concerns. In this case, however, the policy being pursued has not been developed, nor would it be implemented, with sensitivity to the full range of foreign policy information and considerations available to the national government, and the United States is unable to calibrate its immigration and foreign policies to respond effectively to these claims. 56.If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies such as the Arizona law, these serious concerns would be multiplied significantly, as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing immigration enforcement priorities and agendas, with little regard for the sensitive diplomatic and foreign relations considerations that immigration policy addresses, and with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice. 57.S.B. 1070 — and in particular the mandatory verification regime requirement — thus poses a risk of provoking retaliatory treatment against U.S. nationals by other states, and threatens ongoing adverse consequences for important and sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies such as Mexico, for our regional relations in the western hemisphere, and for our global relations in regional and multilateral institutions. It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally across a range of trade, security, tourism, and other interests unrelated to immigration. Finally, it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to engage effectively with the international community to promote the advancement and protection of human rights. Moreover, repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature in bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships after the fact can be extremely difficult.
| 2,862 |
<h4><strong>State immigration laws are the single biggest possible disaster for heg</h4><p>Steinberg 2010</strong> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>55.<u><strong><mark>If S.B. 1070</u></strong></mark>, Arizona's attempt to set its own immigration policy in pursuit of "attrition through enforcement," <u><strong><mark>were to go into effect, it would directly call into question the ability of the United States to speak with one voice at the international level</u></strong></mark> on issues related to immigration and migration policy. Only the national government is in a position to accurately assess the impact of a policy such as S.B. 1070 on our overall foreign relations agenda and to balance the competing foreign relations considerations involved in the adoption and enforcement of such a law. <u><strong>When the United States incurs criticism</u></strong> of immigration law and policies adopted at the federal level, the United States <u><strong>is normally in a position to</u></strong> review the criticism and determine whether to <u><strong>defend the practices</u></strong> against attack or else to take appropriate action to modify its practices. The United States is also able to develop and implement immigration policy in anticipation of these and other foreign relations concerns. In this case, however, the policy being pursued has not been developed, nor would it be implemented, with sensitivity to the full range of foreign policy information and considerations available to the national government, and the United States is unable to calibrate its immigration and foreign policies to respond effectively to these claims. 56.<u><strong><mark>If the several states were each allowed to pursue independent immigration enforcement policies</mark> such as the Arizona law, <mark>these serious concerns would be </strong>multiplied significantly</u>, <u><strong>as the United States could be subjected to a cacophony of competing</mark> immigration enforcement priorities and <mark>agendas</u></strong>,</mark> with little regard for the sensitive diplomatic and foreign relations considerations that immigration policy addresses, and <u><strong>with an extreme adverse impact on the United States' ability to speak with one voice</u></strong>. 57.<u><strong>S.B. <mark>1070</u></strong></mark> — and in particular the mandatory verification regime requirement — thus poses a risk of provoking retaliatory treatment against U.S. nationals by other states, and <u><strong><mark>threatens</mark> ongoing adverse consequences for important and <mark>sensitive bilateral relationships with U.S. allies</u></strong></mark> such as Mexico, <u><strong><mark>for our</mark> regional</u></strong> relations in the western hemisphere, <u><strong>and</u></strong> for our <u><strong><mark>global relations</u></strong></mark> in regional and multilateral institutions. <u><strong><mark>It is likely to hinder our ability to secure the cooperation of other states in efforts to promote U.S. interests internationally</u></strong></mark> across a range of trade, security, tourism, and other interests unrelated to immigration. Finally, <u><strong>it is likely to undermine the United States' ability to engage effectively with the international community</u></strong> to promote the advancement and protection of human rights. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>repairing such harm to international relations and U.S. stature</u></strong></mark> in bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships <u><strong><mark>after the fact can be extremely difficult.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
*Heg
| 286,751 | 7 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,145 |
Interpretation-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Interpretation-</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,940 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,146 |
No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—</h4></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 1
| 430,941 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,147 |
Can’t solve—their freeman card talks about Russia lashout when it’s economy decline—that happening now with oil
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Can’t solve—their freeman card talks about Russia lashout when it’s economy decline—that happening now with oil </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 430,942 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,148 |
There is an inherent value to life- death destroys it
|
Bernstein ‘2
|
Bernstein ‘2 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)
|
Jonas challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value Jonas pursues "this underlying theme of all of life through the ascending order of organic powers metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism is the first form freedom takes freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so values and ends are objective modes of being There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for We need a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life" Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth
|
To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value Jonas pursues "this underlying theme of all of life through metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life
|
This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for valueand purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues "this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics.Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)
| 12,757 |
<h4><strong>There is an inherent value to life- death destroys it</h4><p>Bernstein ‘2</strong> (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)</p><p>This is precisely what <u>Jonas</u> does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He <u>challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". <mark>To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value</u></mark>and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) <u><mark>Jonas</u></mark>, in his existential interpretation of bios, <u><mark>pursues "this underlying theme of all of life</u></mark> in its development <u><mark>through</mark> the ascending order of organic powers</u> and functions: <u><mark>metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind</mark> </u>— a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " <u><mark>'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being</u></mark>, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. <u>Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism</u>, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it <u>is the first form freedom takes</u>." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that <u>freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner</u>. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that <u>freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being,</u> <u>so</u> he argues that <u>values and ends are objective modes of being</u>. <u><strong><mark>There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life</u></strong></mark>" (IR 81). 15 "<u><strong><mark>The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being</strong></mark>. . . . <mark>The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being</u></mark>" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — <u><strong>this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings</strong>. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man,</u> who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. <u><mark>He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power</u></mark>. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics.<u>Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid</u>. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. <u>Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the</u> even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained <u>use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for</u> life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." <u>We need</u>, Jonas argued, <u>a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "<mark>Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life</mark>";</u> or expressed negatively: "<u>Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"</u>; or simply: "<u><strong>Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth</u>"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 92,494 | 202 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,149 |
State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. Six states located along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market. If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect. This is because states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated.97
| 1,148 |
<h4><strong>State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift</h4><p>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If California alone legalized marijuana</mark>, and the federal government increased enforcement</u> efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, <u><mark>there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However</u>, <u>if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread</u>.</mark> According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, <u>there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States</u> and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 <u><mark>Six states located along</mark> these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along <mark>the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect</u></mark>. This is because <u>states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and <mark>they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated</u><strong></mark>.97</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,453 | 8 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,150 |
Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange
|
Khalilzad 95
|
Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
|
a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts , U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
| null |
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
| 1,111 |
<h4><strong>Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange</h4><p></strong>Zalmay <strong>Khalilzad</strong>, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 19<strong>95</p><p></strong>Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because <u><strong>a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages</u></strong>. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, <u><strong>such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with</u></strong> the world's major problems, such as <u><strong>nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts</u></strong>. Finally<u><strong>, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling</u></strong> the United States and <u><strong>the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
*Heg
| 137,228 | 55 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,151 |
Nearly all is close to 100%
|
Foley 98
|
Foley 98 JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News
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Sixty percent does not come close Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 99 or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.
| null |
Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy. http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents. Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law. But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English-speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English. Sixty percent does not come close to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it. ``It's completely illegal,'' Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 percent or 99 percent or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent. The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''
| 1,115 |
<h4><strong>Nearly all is close to 100%</h4><p>Foley 98</strong> JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer<strong> </strong>September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News </p><p>Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy. http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents. Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law. But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English-speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English. <u>Sixty percent does not come close </u>to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it. ``It's completely illegal,'' <u>Unz said. ``<strong> `Nearly all' could mean 98 </u></strong>percent or<u><strong> 99 </u></strong>percent<u><strong> or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.</u></strong> The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,510 | 11 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,152 |
Their impact ev is all political hype
|
Stewart 2014
|
Stewart 2014 (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004 the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010 This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism other analysts believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that 2013 immigration was down significantly from historical levels This hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at intervals for years along with the boogeyman of terrorism an analysis of the history of plots and the changes in transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis” is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010.¶ This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border is not new. It is something that has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now, along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While other border security analysts have told reporters that they believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded.
| 2,127 |
<h4><strong>Their impact ev is all political hype</h4><p>Stewart 2014</strong> (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)</p><p><u><mark>Lost in</mark> all <mark>the</mark> <mark>media hype over this “border crisis</u></mark>” <u><mark>is the fact that</mark> in <mark>2013</mark> overall <mark>immigration was down significantly from historical</u></mark> <u><mark>levels</u></mark>. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, <u>there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004</u>. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, <u>the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010</u>.¶ <u><mark>This</mark> type of <strong><mark>hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border</u></strong></mark> is not new. It is something that <u><mark>has surfaced at</mark> irregular <mark>intervals</mark> <mark>for years</mark> now</u>, <u><mark>along with</mark> scaremongering using <mark>the boogeyman of terrorism</u></mark>, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While <u>other</u> border security <u>analysts</u> have told reporters that they <u>believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis</u> and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that <u><mark>an analysis of the history of</mark> <mark>plots</mark> directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas <mark>and</mark> an examination of <mark>the changes in</mark> the dynamics of <mark>transnational terrorism</mark> <mark>show such claims to be unfounded</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 1
| 220,701 | 15 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,153 |
The plan with sales would provide an adequate supply of organs.
|
Becker and Elias 14
|
Becker and Elias 14
Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
|
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
|
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other orga
|
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth
Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.
| 10,811 |
<h4><strong>The plan with sales would provide an adequate supply of organs. </h4><p>Becker and Elias 14 </p><p></strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u><mark>Paying for organs</mark> </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u><mark>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting</mark> <mark>for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other orga</mark>ns. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,254 | 24 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,154 |
B. Studies prove.
|
Miller 2k
|
Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)
|
the Carnegie Endowment After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries concluded that the conventional impact of economic crises may be wrong severity of economic crisis bore no relationship to collapse In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to violence (while dictatorships responded by using one form of violence to abort another.
|
After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries concluded that the conventional impact of economic crises may be wrong severity bore no relationship to collapse changes seldom lead to violence
|
Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.
| 1,563 |
<h4>B. Studies prove.</h4><p><strong>Miller 2k</strong> – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?,<u> http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)</p><p></u>Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of <u>the Carnegie Endowment</u> for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. <u><mark>After studying 93 episodes of economic</mark> <mark>crisis in 22 countries</mark> </u>in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they <u><mark>concluded that</mark> </u>Much of <u><mark>the conventional</mark> </u>wisdom about the political <u><mark>impact of economic crises may be wrong</u></mark>... The <u><mark>severity</mark> of economic crisis</u> - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - <u><mark>bore no relationship to</u></mark> the <u><mark>collapse</u></mark> of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (<u>In democratic states) such <mark>changes seldom lead to</mark> </u>an outbreak of <u><mark>violence</mark> (while</u>) in the cases of <u>dictatorships</u> and semi-democracies, the ruling elites <u>responded</u> to crises <u>by</u> increasing repression (thereby <u><strong>using one form of violence to abort another. </p></u></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
other adv
| 75,904 | 25 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,155 |
reacceding with reservation undermines the treaty system and destroys MULTILATERAL efforts at change
|
Jelsma, 14 – their author
|
Martin Jelsma, 14 – their author, coordinator of the TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf
|
A downside to this approach, besides the already mentioned risk of creating precedents for weakening other UN treaty regimes is that it applies only to the reserving nation and that unilateral escape mechanisms could reduce pressure on the treaty system to undergo a multilateral and more fundamental process of reform It is in effect a one-off fix for an individual state and could not be applied regularly
| null |
Arguing that exempting certain substances from that obligation could in fact even be beneficial for “the health and welfare of mankind” may strengthen the chance of passing the compatibility test with regard to the object and purpose of the treaty. Different schools of thought exist regarding these requirements. Some remain close to the letter of the Single Convention itself, others interpret its object and purpose in view of relevant rules of international law more broadly and in a way that takes into account the fundamental reason or problem it was supposed to address.22 A downside to this approach, besides the already mentioned risk of creating precedents for weakening other UN treaty regimes, is that it applies only to the reserving nation and that unilateral escape mechanisms could reduce pressure on the treaty system to undergo a multilateral and more fundamental process of reform and modernization. It is in effect a one-off fix for an individual state and could not be applied regularly. Nonetheless, the procedure is worthy of consideration under specific circumstances, especially after other avenues for creating more flexibility on a particular topic have been explored and failed.
| 1,206 |
<h4><strong>reacceding with reservation undermines the treaty system and destroys MULTILATERAL efforts at change</h4><p></strong>Martin <strong>Jelsma, 14 – their author</strong>, coordinator of the TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf</p><p>Arguing that exempting certain substances from that obligation could in fact even be beneficial for “the health and welfare of mankind” may strengthen the chance of passing the compatibility test with regard to the object and purpose of the treaty. Different schools of thought exist regarding these requirements. Some remain close to the letter of the Single Convention itself, others interpret its object and purpose in view of relevant rules of international law more broadly and in a way that takes into account the fundamental reason or problem it was supposed to address.22 <u>A downside to this approach, besides the already mentioned <strong>risk of creating precedents for weakening other UN treaty regimes</u></strong>, <u>is that it applies only to the reserving nation and that <strong>unilateral escape mechanisms could reduce pressure on the treaty system to undergo a multilateral and more fundamental process of reform</u></strong> and modernization. <u>It is in effect a one-off fix for an individual state and could not be applied regularly</u><strong>. Nonetheless, the procedure is worthy of consideration under specific circumstances, especially after other avenues for creating more flexibility on a particular topic have been explored and failed.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,943 | 18 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,156 |
State immigration regulations are a bigger internal link to human rights leadership
| null |
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
|
S.B. 1070 threatens to undermine our standing in regional and multilateral bodies that address migration and human rights matters and to hamper our ability to advocate effectively internationally for the advancement of human rights and other U.S. values. Consistency in U.S. practices at home is critical for us to be able to argue for international law consistency abroad. By deviating from national policy in this area, S.B. 1070 may place the U.S. in tension with our international treaty obligations and commitments and compromise our position in conversations regarding human rights.
| null |
11.Third, S.B. 1070 threatens to undermine our standing in regional and multilateral bodies that address migration and human rights matters and to hamper our ability to advocate effectively internationally for the advancement of human rights and other U.S. values. Multilateral, regional and bilateral engagement on human rights issues and the international promotion of the rule of law is a high priority for the United States, and for this Administration. Consistency in U.S. practices at home is critical for us to be able to argue for international law consistency abroad. By deviating from national policy in this area, S.B. 1070 may place the U.S. in tension with our international treaty obligations and commitments and compromise our position in bilateral, regional and multilateral conversations regarding human rights.
| 829 |
<h4><strong>State immigration regulations are a bigger internal link to human rights leadership</h4><p><u></strong>Steinberg 2010</u> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>11.Third, <u><strong>S.B. 1070 threatens to undermine our standing in regional and multilateral bodies that address migration and human rights matters and to hamper our ability to advocate effectively internationally for the advancement of human rights and other U.S. values.</u></strong> Multilateral, regional and bilateral engagement on human rights issues and the international promotion of the rule of law is a high priority for the United States, and for this Administration. <u><strong>Consistency in U.S. practices at home is critical for us to be able to argue for international law consistency abroad. By deviating from national policy in this area, S.B. 1070 may place the U.S. in tension with our international treaty obligations and commitments and compromise our position in</u></strong> bilateral, regional and multilateral <u><strong>conversations regarding human rights.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
Turns HR Cred/Demo Promo
| 430,944 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,157 |
The government purchasing approach of the plan would end the current discrimination in transplant availability
|
Berger 11
|
Berger 11 Alexander Berger is a research analyst for GiveWell, a nonprofit that researches charities to help donors decide where to give. The New York Times December 6, 2011 Why Selling Kidneys Should Be Legal SECTION: Section ; Column 0; National Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Pg. lexis
|
the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not have any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly Only the government would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed. The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare.
|
the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not h ve any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly Only the government would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed. The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare
|
It has been illegal to compensate kidney donors in any way since 1984. The fear behind the law -- that a rich tycoon could take advantage of someone desperately poor and persuade that person to sell an organ for a pittance -- is understandable. But the truth is that the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor. When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family (or, as Steve Jobs did for a liver transplant in 2009, by traveling to a region with a shorter list). Worst of all, the ban encourages an international black market, where desperate people do end up selling their organs, without protection, fair compensation or proper medical care. A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not have any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly -- most experts say somewhere in the ballpark of $50,000 would make sense. Only the government or a chosen nonprofit would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed. The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare. Ideally, so many donors would come forward that no patient would be left on the waiting list.
| 1,439 |
<h4>The government purchasing approach of the plan would end the current discrimination in transplant availability</h4><p><strong>Berger 11</strong> Alexander Berger is a research analyst for GiveWell, a nonprofit that researches charities to help donors decide where to give. The New York Times December 6, 2011 Why Selling Kidneys Should Be Legal SECTION: Section ; Column 0; National Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Pg. lexis</p><p>It has been illegal to compensate kidney donors in any way since 1984. The fear behind the law -- that a rich tycoon could take advantage of someone desperately poor and persuade that person to sell an organ for a pittance -- is understandable. But the truth is that <u><mark>the victims of the current ban are disproportionately African-American and poor.</mark> When wealthy white people find their way onto the kidney waiting list, they are much more likely to get off it early by finding a donor among their friends and family</u> (or, as Steve Jobs did for a liver transplant in 2009, by traveling to a region with a shorter list). Worst of all, the ban encourages an international black market, where desperate people do end up selling their organs, without protection, fair compensation or proper medical care. <u><mark>A well-regulated legal market for kidneys would not h</mark>a<mark>ve any of these problems. It could ensure that donors were compensated fairly</mark> </u>-- most experts say somewhere in the ballpark of $50,000 would make sense. <u><mark>Only the government</mark> </u>or a chosen nonprofit<u> <mark>would be allowed to purchase the kidneys, and they would allocate them on the basis of need rather than wealth, the same way that posthumously donated organs are currently distributed.</u> <u>The kidneys would be paid for by whoever covers the patient, whether that is their insurance company or Medicare</mark>.</u><strong> Ideally, so many donors would come forward that no patient would be left on the waiting list.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,864 | 9 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,158 |
“Legalization” requires removal of all penalties for possession, production, trafficking and use
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil rather than criminal offense What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization
| null |
Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that legalization and decriminalization are terms for very different proposals even though they are sometimes conflated. Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production. „Legalization‟ authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil (fines, counseling etc), rather than criminal offense. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers. This is what separates decriminalization from legalization.
| 2,020 |
<h4>“Legalization” requires removal of all penalties for possession, production, trafficking and use</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p>Any white paper that includes a policy review of drug legislation must include key term definitions that are clear, accurate, and coherent. Thus, there are various definitions of „legalization‟ of marijuana use and commerce strewn across countless reports, papers and analyses of drug policy. It is critical to note that <u>legalization and decriminalization are terms for <strong>very different proposals</strong> even though they are sometimes conflated</u>. <u>Decriminalization proposes the removal of the criminal penalty for possession of marijuana, but not for its trafficking and production</u>. <u>„Legalization‟ <strong>authorizes the possession, production and trafficking of marijuana</strong>, and therefore enables the state to tax and regulate its sale and consumption</u>.4 This study takes a holistic approach to examining how legalization of marijuana in the United States would affect Mexican DTOs. However, in the United States there has been no example of true marijuana legalization since the inception of the modern drug control regime. This is why our case studies will look at changes that occurred after various countries relaxed their system of marijuana prohibition. We will look at decriminalization in Mexico and Portugal, as well as a special case of toleration/de facto legalization in the Netherlands. However, we will first lay out in detail what each type of change entails. Decriminalization is one of the most common methods employed by countries that seek to ease or lighten anti-marijuana policies. <u>A common definition of decriminalization is “the removal of the criminal sanction for possession,” in effect making the penalty for the possession of marijuana a civil</u> (fines, counseling etc), <u>rather than criminal offense</u>. 5 One common example of this type of reform is the 2001 Law 30/2000 in Portugal. <u>What is important here is that criminal penalties for possession are removed, but there is still some type of civil sanction in place that punishes both users and producers.</u> <u><strong>This is what separates decriminalization from legalization</u></strong>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,568 | 11 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,159 |
CP solves- we boost domestic production enough to crowd them out AND shift all state enforcement resources to illegal sources and markets- our Schwartz evidence says the feds won’t enforce against LEGAL marijuana post-CP
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>CP solves- we boost domestic production enough to crowd them out AND shift all state enforcement resources to illegal sources and markets- our Schwartz evidence says the feds won’t enforce against LEGAL marijuana post-CP</h4>
|
2nc
| null |
Solvency: Cartels
| 430,945 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,160 |
No Iranian support for latin America terrorism
| null |
Inside of Iran, June 28, 2013 [“Iranian Influence In Latin America On the Wane, State Department Report Says”, http://www.insideofiran.org/en/component/content/article/25-important-news/7525-iranian-influence-in-latin-america-on-the-wane-state-department-report-says.html//cc]
|
Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America, the U.S. State Department acknowledged in a recent report – even though for years it has insisted the influence was growing. The report, which said that the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region is still a “concern,” said that due to strong sanctions imposed on the country by both the United States and the European Union, Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America. As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning Republican lawmakers said that it was too lax on Iran and downplayed the Middle Eastern nation’s threat in the U.S.’s perceived backyard the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home I question the methodology that was used in developing this report The U.S. government and analysts throughout the region will be keeping a close eye on Iranian-Latin American relations in the coming in the wake of Iran’s presidential election two weeks ago
|
Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America due to sanctions Iran has been unable to expand its ties in Latin America As a result of diplomatic outreach allies’ capacity nonproliferation efforts, a and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America is waning . “I question the methodology that was used in developing report
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Fox News - Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America, the U.S. State Department acknowledged in a recent report – even though for years it has insisted the influence was growing. The report, which said that the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region is still a “concern,” said that due to strong sanctions imposed on the country by both the United States and the European Union, Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America. “As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” the report stated, according to Bloomberg News. While the State Department declined to comment on the report because it had not yet been sent to Congress, some Republican lawmakers said that it was too lax on Iran and downplayed the Middle Eastern nation’s threat in the U.S.’s perceived backyard. “I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home,” said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report, told Bloomberg. “I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.” Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran had forged strong relationships with the left-leaning governments of Bolivian President Evo Morales and the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. Current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced in late May that three surveillance drones built with Iran’s help were launched by the Venezuelan government as part of an initiative to curb drug trafficking. The U.S. government and analysts throughout the region will be keeping a close eye on Iranian-Latin American relations in the coming in the wake of Iran’s presidential election two weeks ago.
| 1,959 |
<h4><strong>No Iranian support for latin America terrorism </h4><p><u></strong>Inside of Iran, June 28, 2013 [“Iranian Influence In Latin America On the Wane, State Department Report Says”, http://www.insideofiran.org/en/component/content/article/25-important-news/7525-iranian-influence-in-latin-america-on-the-wane-state-department-report-says.html//cc]</p><p></u>Fox News - <u><mark>Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America</mark>, the U.S. State Department acknowledged in a recent report – even though for years it has insisted the influence was growing. The report, which said that the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region is still a “concern,” said that <mark>due to </mark>strong <mark>sanctions</mark> imposed on the country by both the United States and the European Union, <mark>Iran has been unable to expand its</mark> economic and political <mark>ties in Latin America</mark>. </u>“<u><mark>As a result of diplomatic outreach</mark>, strengthening of <mark>allies’ capacity</mark>, international <mark>nonproliferation</mark> <mark>efforts, a</mark> strong sanctions policy, <mark>and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America</mark> and the Caribbean <mark>is</mark> <mark>waning</u></mark>,” the report stated, according to Bloomberg News. While the State Department declined to comment on the report because it had not yet been sent to Congress, some<u> Republican lawmakers said that it was too lax on Iran and downplayed the Middle Eastern nation’s threat in the U.S.’s perceived backyard</u>. “I believe <u>the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home</u>,” said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report, told Bloomberg<mark>. “<u>I question the methodology that was used in developing </mark>this <mark>report</u></mark>.” Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran had forged strong relationships with the left-leaning governments of Bolivian President Evo Morales and the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. Current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced in late May that three surveillance drones built with Iran’s help were launched by the Venezuelan government as part of an initiative to curb drug trafficking.<u> The U.S. government and analysts throughout the region will be keeping a close eye on Iranian-Latin American relations in the coming in the wake of Iran’s presidential election two weeks ago</u><strong>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 1
| 283,434 | 3 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,161 |
This is a new net benefit for us- 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities- solves the tax burden and ensures local acceptance and economic development
|
Leff 2014
|
Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
|
the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses very little scholarly attention has been paid to the federal tax situation a properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under 501(c)(4 which exempts social welfare" organizations social welfare organizations are exempt from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income - § 280E does not affect them qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem. these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions for commercial development in the neighborhood Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals While operating for tax-exempt purposes would entail change of operations the benefits exceed the burdens there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying the public policy doctrine applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana laws the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support. federal tax laws provide federal incentives to align state and local policy objectives. I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana
|
properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(4 which exempts social welfare" organizations from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales, an a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals the benefits exceed the burdens. there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support federal tax laws, provide federal incentives to align state and local policy obj
|
In the past decade and a half, twenty states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. n1 Last November, Colorado n2 and Washington n3 became the first states to legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana, and more states are considering following their lead. n4 The trend appears to be toward liberalization of state marijuana laws not just for medical purposes, but to advance a number of other state policy goals, including reducing crime, improving blighted neighborhoods, giving opportunities to youth impacted by the drug trade, increasing marijuana users' safety, and raising state and local government revenue. n5 Currently, federal laws prevent states from achieving their policy objectives. Legal scholars have focused on the conflict created by the fact that selling marijuana is a federal crime. n6 But, marijuana industry insiders do not cite federal criminal law as the biggest impediment to the development of a legitimate marijuana industry. Instead, the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses and could push the entire industry underground." n7 To date, very little scholarly attention has been [*526] paid to the federal tax situation of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n8 This Article proposes the first tax strategy that entirely solves the "tax situation" for state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. In the early 1980s, Congress added § 280E to the Internal Revenue Code, n9 largely for the purpose of punishing drug dealers. n10 Section 280E provides that sellers of controlled substances must pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of their net income. n11 This way of calculating taxable income produces much higher taxes than those faced by any other business, which was presumably okay when it applied only to drug dealers. Now that the provision applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business. n12 Unlike the Department of Justice, which has not generally pursued criminal charges against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, n13 the Internal Revenue Service has been vigorously enforcing § 280E against those same people. n14 It is this active enforcement of § 280E that has the marijuana industry so alarmed. [*527] I argue that a properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of § 280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts so-called "social welfare" organizations. n15 Since social welfare organizations, like charities, n16 are exempt from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income - § 280E does not affect them. n17 Therefore, qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem. At the same time, however, these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales, an important motivation for legalization in states like Colorado and Washington. n18 To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-related political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial manner. First, any organization seeking § 501(c)(4) status must be operated for a proper tax-exempt purpose. I propose that a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions for commercial development in the neighborhood. Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals in distressed neighborhoods all over the country, and the IRS has developed criteria for determining when retail operations primarily advance social welfare purposes, and when such purposes are ancillary to a private business purpose. n19 While operating for tax-exempt purposes like these would entail a significant change of operations for any existing marijuana seller, the benefits of doing so may well exceed the burdens. A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its profits to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political activities it engages in; and it may have [*528] to operate in a less "commercial" manner than ordinary, for-profit marijuana sellers. Some of these requirements could have a significant impact on how a marijuana seller operates its business. For example, the fact that it cannot distribute profits to owners or managers may affect its ability to raise start-up capital. n20 Other requirements would likely have little impact. For example, it is unlikely that a marijuana seller would want to devote the majority of its time, energy, or money to a political campaign. But whether the restrictions associated with tax-exempt status are onerous or easy from an operational standpoint, the point is that there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying with all of them. Even once an organization has met these four statutory requirements for exemption, however, the Supreme Court has held that the common law "public policy doctrine" prevents organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable purposes are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy. n21 Because marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3). However, this Article makes the novel argument that the public policy doctrine applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations even if they would be barred from organizing under § 501(c)(3). n22 Even though the public policy doctrine does not apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations, it is plausible that the concept of social welfare excludes certain illegal activities. I argue that the proper measure of social welfare is local, rather than national, and while state or local law may be relevant to such a determination, inconsistent federal law is not. This novel argument is more than just a clever strategy - a "tax loophole" so to speak - to avoid the impact of § 280E. Rather, IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana [*529] laws. The recent legalization movements identify many state policy goals relating to local issues, like crime reduction, neighborhood improvement, and state and local tax revenue. n23 However, as the state-sanctioned marijuana industry matures and states begin the process of creating regulations for the industry, it is becoming more and more clear that the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well. n24 A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect ties federal approval to local support. n25 The federal tax laws, therefore, provide federal incentives to align state and local policy objectives. The IRS could promote state and local policy harmonization by permitting community-based nonprofits to sell marijuana, but only when local community groups favored it in states in which it is legal. This would surely be a better position for the IRS than its current role as a lightning rod of conflict between state and federal policy objectives. In this Article, I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states. But I should be clear that I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana. Current federal policy is that the sale and use of marijuana is bad for individuals and society, and apparently the majority of states still agree. A minority of states have legalized or decriminalized marijuana, but only for medical purposes, and only two states have so far taken the dramatic step of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes. n26 Presumably, we will know more in the future about whether legalizing marijuana is a good or bad policy. We do know, however, that public opinion on marijuana legalization is changing rapidly. In April 2013, a Pew research poll found that 52% of Americans favored marijuana legalization, and a staggering 72% reported that the costs of enforcing marijuana prohibitions exceed the value to [*530] society. n27 More importantly, 60% of respondents said that "the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting the use of marijuana in states where it is legal," while only 35% say it should. n28 In the context of rapidly changing public opinion, it would not be surprising if the federal government was leery of direct confrontation with the states over marijuana policy. In that context, a legitimate mechanism for federal involvement in channeling marijuana selling activities in socially beneficial directions - like the one proposed in this Article - may be preferable to enforcement of federal criminal marijuana laws. n29
| 9,835 |
<h4><strong>This is a new net benefit for us- 280E would force businesses to reorganize as 501-c-4s which have to focus on social welfare activities- solves the tax burden and ensures local acceptance and economic development</h4><p>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>In the past decade and a half, twenty states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. n1 Last November, Colorado n2 and Washington n3 became the first states to legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana, and more states are considering following their lead. n4 The trend appears to be toward liberalization of state marijuana laws not just for medical purposes, but to advance a number of other state policy goals, including reducing crime, improving blighted neighborhoods, giving opportunities to youth impacted by the drug trade, increasing marijuana users' safety, and raising state and local government revenue. n5 Currently, federal laws prevent states from achieving their policy objectives. Legal scholars have focused on the conflict created by the fact that selling marijuana is a federal crime. n6 But, marijuana industry insiders do not cite federal criminal law as the biggest impediment to the development of a legitimate marijuana industry. Instead, <u>the marijuana industry's lead trade publication reports that "the federal tax situation is the biggest threat to [state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses </u>and could push the entire industry underground." n7 To date, <u>very little scholarly attention has been</u> [*526] <u>paid to the federal tax situation</u> of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n8 This Article proposes the first tax strategy that entirely solves the "tax situation" for state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. In the early 1980s, Congress added § 280E to the Internal Revenue Code, n9 largely for the purpose of punishing drug dealers. n10 Section 280E provides that sellers of controlled substances must pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of their net income. n11 This way of calculating taxable income produces much higher taxes than those faced by any other business, which was presumably okay when it applied only to drug dealers. Now that the provision applies to state-sanctioned marijuana sellers as well as illegal drug dealers, it creates a federal tax situation that some believe may drive legitimate marijuana sellers out of business. n12 Unlike the Department of Justice, which has not generally pursued criminal charges against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers, n13 the Internal Revenue Service has been vigorously enforcing § 280E against those same people. n14 It is this active enforcement of § 280E that has the marijuana industry so alarmed. [*527] I argue that <u>a <mark>properly organized and operated marijuana seller could avoid the impact of</u> § <u>280E by qualifying as an exempt organization under</u> § <u>501(c)(4</u></mark>) of the Internal Revenue Code, <u><mark>which exempts</mark> </u>so-called "<u><mark>social welfare" organizations</u></mark>. n15 Since <u>social welfare organizations</u>, like charities, n16 <u>are exempt <mark>from federal income tax - they pay no tax on either gross revenue or net income</mark> - § 280E does not affect them</u>. n17 Therefore, <u><strong>qualifying as a social welfare organization would solve a marijuana seller's federal tax problem.</u></strong> At the same time, however, <u><mark>these statutes would not prevent states from imposing their own sales or excise taxes on marijuana sales</u>, an</mark> important motivation for legalization in states like Colorado and Washington. n18 To qualify as a § 501(c)(4) organization, a marijuana seller would have to meet four statutory requirements: (1) it must have a proper tax-exempt purpose; (2) it must not distribute its profits to any private persons; (3) it must avoid excessive campaign-related political activity; and (4) it must not operate in an excessively commercial manner. First, any organization seeking § 501(c)(4) status must be operated for a proper tax-exempt purpose. I propose that <u><mark>a marijuana seller could operate to advance the purpose of improving a neighborhood's social and economic conditions by providing job training, employment opportunities, and enhanced business conditions</mark> for commercial development in the neighborhood</u>. <u><mark>Many tax-exempt community development corporations run retail operations to accomplish these goals</u></mark> in distressed neighborhoods all over the country, and the IRS has developed criteria for determining when retail operations primarily advance social welfare purposes, and when such purposes are ancillary to a private business purpose. n19 <u>While operating for tax-exempt purposes</u> like these <u>would entail</u> a significant <u>change of operations</u> for any existing marijuana seller, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>benefits</u></strong></mark> of doing so may well <u><strong><mark>exceed the burdens</u></strong>.</mark> A § 501(c)(4) marijuana seller also would have to refrain from distributing its profits to any managers or owners; it may have to limit the amount of campaign-related political activities it engages in; and it may have [*528] to operate in a less "commercial" manner than ordinary, for-profit marijuana sellers. Some of these requirements could have a significant impact on how a marijuana seller operates its business. For example, the fact that it cannot distribute profits to owners or managers may affect its ability to raise start-up capital. n20 Other requirements would likely have little impact. For example, it is unlikely that a marijuana seller would want to devote the majority of its time, energy, or money to a political campaign. But whether the restrictions associated with tax-exempt status are onerous or easy from an operational standpoint, the point is that <u><strong><mark>there is no legal impediment to a marijuana seller complying</mark> </u></strong>with all of them. Even once an organization has met these four statutory requirements for exemption, however, the Supreme Court has held that the common law "public policy doctrine" prevents organizations from qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities if their charitable purposes are illegal or contrary to a well-established, fundamental public policy. n21 Because marijuana sales are still illegal under federal law, the public policy doctrine acts as an absolute bar to exemption as a charity under § 501(c)(3). However, this Article makes the novel argument that <u>the public policy doctrine</u> <u>applies only to charities, and not to "social welfare organizations," and thus, marijuana sellers could organize as § 501(c)(4) organizations</u> even if they would be barred from organizing under § 501(c)(3). n22 Even though the public policy doctrine does not apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations, it is plausible that the concept of social welfare excludes certain illegal activities. I argue that the proper measure of social welfare is local, rather than national, and while state or local law may be relevant to such a determination, inconsistent federal law is not. This novel argument is more than just a clever strategy - a "tax loophole" so to speak - to avoid the impact of § 280E. Rather, <u>IRS recognition of tax-exempt status for marijuana sellers, together with enforcement of § 280E, could provide a mechanism to soften the substantial federalism issues raised by the conflict between state and federal marijuana</u> [*529] <u>laws</u>. The recent legalization movements identify many state policy goals relating to local issues, like crime reduction, neighborhood improvement, and state and local tax revenue. n23 However, as the state-sanctioned marijuana industry matures and states begin the process of creating regulations for the industry, it is becoming more and more clear that <u>the potential for conflict is between not only the state and federal government, but between states and their local governments and communities as well</u>. n24 <u><mark>A federal policy that incentivizes marijuana sellers to be nonprofit, neighborhood-based organizations whose primary purpose is improving the neighborhood in effect <strong>ties federal approval to local support</strong></mark>. </u>n25 The <u><mark>federal tax laws</u>,</mark> therefore, <u><mark>provide federal incentives to <strong>align state and local policy obj</mark>ectives</strong>.</u> The IRS could promote state and local policy harmonization by permitting community-based nonprofits to sell marijuana, but only when local community groups favored it in states in which it is legal. This would surely be a better position for the IRS than its current role as a lightning rod of conflict between state and federal policy objectives. In this Article, <u>I argue that a federal policy of recognizing tax-exempt status for properly-operated marijuana sellers is a way for the federal government to legitimately influence state and local marijuana policy while avoiding a direct inter-jurisdictional conflict with the states</u>. But I should be clear that <u><strong>I do not mean to make the case in favor of legalizing marijuana</u>. Current federal policy is that the sale and use of marijuana is bad for individuals and society, and apparently the majority of states still agree. A minority of states have legalized or decriminalized marijuana, but only for medical purposes, and only two states have so far taken the dramatic step of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes. n26 Presumably, we will know more in the future about whether legalizing marijuana is a good or bad policy. We do know, however, that public opinion on marijuana legalization is changing rapidly. In April 2013, a Pew research poll found that 52% of Americans favored marijuana legalization, and a staggering 72% reported that the costs of enforcing marijuana prohibitions exceed the value to [*530] society. n27 More importantly, 60% of respondents said that "the federal government should not enforce federal laws prohibiting the use of marijuana in states where it is legal," while only 35% say it should. n28 In the context of rapidly changing public opinion, it would not be surprising if the federal government was leery of direct confrontation with the states over marijuana policy. In that context, a legitimate mechanism for federal involvement in channeling marijuana selling activities in socially beneficial directions - like the one proposed in this Article - may be preferable to enforcement of federal criminal marijuana laws. n29</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,845 | 3 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,162 |
Arizona immigration law is the biggest internal link to US-Mexico relations
| null |
Steinberg 2010 (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)
|
S.B. 1070 has unquestionably generated negative reaction that has damaged the public image of the United States and undermined the United States' ability to pursue diplomatic objectives In Mexico, S.B. 1070 has precipitated a sharply negative public perception which in turn has negatively affected diplomatic processes with Mexican officials. The Mexican President Cabinet Congress, and opinion makers in Mexico all have reacted strongly A recent poll in Mexico whereas before the adoption of the Arizona law 62 percent of those polled had a favorable attitude toward the United States following its adoption only 44 percent had a favorable attitude while 48 had an unfavorable attitude divergent immigration policy by a single state can significantly harm foreign attitudes Such effect in turn can seriously undermine support among important Mexican constituencies for Mexico's cooperation with the United States.
| null |
A. Impact on Bilateral Relationships 36.S.B. 1070 has unquestionably generated negative reaction that has damaged the public image of the United States and has thereby undermined the United States' ability to pursue various diplomatic objectives. The law has provoked numerous public criticisms by governments with which the United States maintains important and sensitive diplomatic relations. 37.In Mexico, S.B. 1070 has precipitated a sharply negative public perception of the attitude toward immigrants in Arizona (and potentially by extension elsewhere in the U.S.), which in turn has negatively affected diplomatic processes with Mexican government officials. The Mexican President, Mexican Cabinet Members, the Mexican Congress, and opinion makers in Mexico all have reacted strongly in response to the law. These voices have also expressed concern about the safety of Mexicans in Arizona. 38.During his recent visit to Washington, for example, Mexico's President Calder& pointedly criticized the law, both during his joint press conference with President Obama on May 19 and in his address to the United States Congress on May 20. Speaking to the Congress, he emphasized the need for comprehensive immigration reform and focused attention specifically on the Arizona law: I am convinced that comprehensive immigration reform is also crucial to secure our common border. However, I strongly disagree with the recently adopted law in Arizona. It is a law that not only ignores a reality that cannot be erased by decree but also introduces a terrible idea: using racial profiling as a basis for law enforcement. And that is why I agree with President Obama, who said the new law "carries a great amount of risk when core values that we all care about are breached." I want to bridge the gap of feelings and emotions between our countries and our peoples. I believe in this. I believe in communications, I believe in cooperation, and we together must find a better way to face and fix this common problem. 39.President CalderOn's criticisms reflect how negatively S.B. 1070 has affected public attitudes in Mexico toward the United States. A recent poll in Mexico by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, for example, indicates that whereas before the adoption of the Arizona law 62 percent of those polled had a favorable attitude toward the United States and only 27 percent had an unfavorable attitude, following its adoption only 44 percent had a favorable attitude toward the U.S., while 48 had an unfavorable attitude. See The A rizona Effect on U.S. Favorability in Mexico, available at www.pewglobal.org . The poll demonstrates that an effort to establish a divergent immigration policy by a single state, which has not yet even gone into effect, nevertheless can significantly harm foreign attitudes toward the United States as a whole. Such effect in turn can seriously undermine support among important Mexican constituencies for Mexico's cooperation with the United States.
| 2,985 |
<h4><strong>Arizona immigration law is the biggest internal link to US-Mexico relations</h4><p><u></strong>Steinberg 2010</u> (James B., Deputy Secretary of State, former Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Deputy National Security Adviser on the staff of the National Security Council, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, affidavit filed in US v. Arizona, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Case 2:10-cv-01413-NVW Document 6-1 Filed 07/06/10, http://www.scribd.com/doc/33977183/U-S-v-Arizona-Exh-1-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Affidavit-of-James-Steinberg)</p><p>A. Impact on Bilateral Relationships 36.<u><strong>S.B. 1070 has unquestionably generated negative reaction that has damaged the public image of the United States and</u></strong> has thereby <u><strong>undermined the United States' ability to pursue</u></strong> various <u><strong>diplomatic objectives</u></strong>. The law has provoked numerous public criticisms by governments with which the United States maintains important and sensitive diplomatic relations. 37.<u><strong>In Mexico, S.B. 1070 has precipitated a sharply negative public perception</u></strong> of the attitude toward immigrants in Arizona (and potentially by extension elsewhere in the U.S.), <u><strong>which in turn has negatively affected diplomatic processes with Mexican</u></strong> government <u><strong>officials.</u></strong> <u><strong>The Mexican President</u></strong>, Mexican <u><strong>Cabinet</u></strong> Members, the Mexican <u><strong>Congress, and opinion makers in Mexico all have reacted strongly</u></strong> in response to the law. These voices have also expressed concern about the safety of Mexicans in Arizona. 38.During his recent visit to Washington, for example, Mexico's President Calder& pointedly criticized the law, both during his joint press conference with President Obama on May 19 and in his address to the United States Congress on May 20. Speaking to the Congress, he emphasized the need for comprehensive immigration reform and focused attention specifically on the Arizona law: I am convinced that comprehensive immigration reform is also crucial to secure our common border. However, I strongly disagree with the recently adopted law in Arizona. It is a law that not only ignores a reality that cannot be erased by decree but also introduces a terrible idea: using racial profiling as a basis for law enforcement. And that is why I agree with President Obama, who said the new law "carries a great amount of risk when core values that we all care about are breached." I want to bridge the gap of feelings and emotions between our countries and our peoples. I believe in this. I believe in communications, I believe in cooperation, and we together must find a better way to face and fix this common problem. 39.President CalderOn's criticisms reflect how negatively S.B. 1070 has affected public attitudes in Mexico toward the United States. <u><strong>A recent poll in Mexico</u></strong> by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, for example, indicates that <u><strong>whereas before the adoption of the Arizona law 62 percent of those polled had a favorable attitude toward the United States</u></strong> and only 27 percent had an unfavorable attitude, <u><strong>following its adoption only 44 percent had a favorable attitude</u></strong> toward the U.S., <u><strong>while 48 had an unfavorable attitude</u></strong>. See The A rizona Effect on U.S. Favorability in Mexico, available at www.pewglobal.org . The poll demonstrates that an effort to establish a <u><strong>divergent immigration policy</u></strong> <u><strong>by a single state</u></strong>, which has not yet even gone into effect, nevertheless <u><strong>can significantly harm foreign attitudes</u></strong> toward the United States as a whole. <u><strong>Such effect in turn can seriously undermine support among important Mexican constituencies for Mexico's cooperation with the United States.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
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2NC
|
Turns US-Mexico Relations
| 286,761 | 7 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,163 |
Violation- the aff doesn’t legalize nearly all marijuana-related activities- it leaves industrially and individually-grown marijuana ENTIRELY illegal
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Violation- the aff doesn’t legalize nearly all marijuana-related activities- it leaves industrially and individually-grown marijuana ENTIRELY illegal</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,946 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,164 |
The legalization of sales to the government, rather than purchases in a open market would mean equitable distribution of organs -- and avoid crowd out
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Gill 2
|
Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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/v012/12.1gill.html
it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
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are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria . Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate our proposal will not be affected either way reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one
|
Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
First, we are arguing for the claim that it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. 2 A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. As already noted in our preliminary points, our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
| 11,563 |
<h4>The legalization of sales to the government, rather than purchases in a open market would mean equitable distribution of organs -- and avoid crowd out</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p></u>First, we are arguing for the claim that<u> it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We <mark>are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation</mark>; </u>that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. <u>We <mark>assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria</mark>, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs<mark>. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market</mark>.</u> 2 <u>A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products</u>, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe <u>the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die.</u> We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. <u>Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys</u>. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. <u><mark>Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys.</u> <u>For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it</u></mark> will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it <u><mark>will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney.</u> <u>Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate</u></mark>, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. <u>The important point is that <mark>our proposal will not be affected either way</mark>.</u> As already noted in our preliminary points, <u>our proposal can be <mark>reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one</mark>. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well. </p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,594 | 8 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,165 |
Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree
|
Couch, 2012
|
Couch, 2012 (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)
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A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure a study to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either One of the principal scholars Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure
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A ‘collapsed’ state suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’ Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high predicted growth that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ . Crime and corruption tend to be symptoms demonstrating failure a study build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail
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A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.
Squo sovles—their Kotkin evidence says integration already high
| 2,439 |
<h4><strong>Zero risk of Mexican collapse---best predictive models of state failure agree </h4><p>Couch, 2012</strong> (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>A ‘collapsed’ state</u></mark>, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, <u><mark>suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’</mark>, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’</u>.16 <u><strong><mark>Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico</mark> disappearing like those earlier European states <mark>seems </strong>implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and high</mark>er <mark>predicted growth</mark> than either the UK, Germany or the USA; <mark>that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours</mark>,</u> which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; <u><mark>and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities</u>’</mark> that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse<mark>. <u>Crime and corruption tend to be</mark> described not as causes but as <mark>symptoms demonstrating failure</u></mark>. For example, <u><mark>a study</mark> </u>for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting <u>to <mark>build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either</u></mark>.19 <u>One of the principal scholars</u> on the subject, <u>Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger</u>.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. <u>This absence may reflect an assessment <mark>that<strong> numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail</u></strong></mark>. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 <u><strong>Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure</u></strong>.</p><p><strong>Squo sovles—their Kotkin evidence says integration already high </p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 1
| 45,874 | 64 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,166 |
We also solve federal enforcement- they’ll shift current resources to ONLY combat cartels (also in fed enforcement key block)
|
Schwartz 2014
|
Schwartz 2014 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, May, lexis)
|
Obama said that an Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state laws Obama followed this What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters." a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme. Obama returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 to the "recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado. the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited resources to address the most significant threats" posed by gangs or cartels while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local enforcement
|
Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state Obama returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach to the recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited resources to address the most significant threats" posed by gangs or cartels, while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local nforcement
|
2. The Obama Administration's Policy. As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama said that an Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state compassionate use laws. n102 As President, Obama followed this policy-to a degree. As a matter of constitutional law, the President's duty to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" would seem to preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand, the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute. n103 A credible [*626] argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the commerce power could not sustain the application of the CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional as applied to medical marijuana. n104 Nevertheless, even assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a politically risky move. Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions. n105 The Obama Administration's policy in this regard was initially laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, entitled "Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana." n106 While reaffirming the Justice Department's "commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all States," the Ogden memo suggested that "the Department is also committed to making [*627] efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources." n107 Noting federal prosecutors are "vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of [their authority over criminal matters]" the memo stated: The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand, prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department. n108 After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to minors, the memo backtracked a bit: Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . . This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . . Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution, [*628] even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests. Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . . n109 To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated picture due to the variation in state laws. For example, while Colorado and California laws authorized the operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office issued cease and desist letters to dispensaries in that state. n110 In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations, raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in various states, charging President Obama with backtracking on the Ogden memo and "betrayal" of his 2008 campaign promise. n111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter's near "zero tolerance" policy. n112 President Obama responded to questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling Stone magazine: [*629] Here's what's up: What I specifically said was that we were not going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say, 'Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books.' What I can say is, 'Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing folks damage.' As a consequence, there haven't been prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. The only tension that's come up-and this gets hyped up a lot-is a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, 'This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way.' That's not something we're going to do. n113 It is important, however, to see through the political rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a tightrope between courting marijuana legalization proponents and avoiding "soft-on-crime" attacks on his flank. What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters." n114 If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence [*630] signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado, n115 which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme. n116 In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the Obama Administration seems to have returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach. Most notably, the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 to the "recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado. In a Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, the Justice Department expressed its "commitment to using its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant threats" posed by distribution of marijuana by gangs or cartels, while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local law enforcement under state drug laws. n117 [*631] In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity. n118 The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit on the authority of the federal government to enforce the CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. n119
| 10,235 |
<h4>We also solve federal enforcement- they’ll shift current resources to ONLY combat cartels (also in fed enforcement key block)</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2014</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, May, lexis)</p><p>2. The Obama Administration's Policy. As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack <u>Obama said that an <mark>Obama Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of medical marijuana who were complying with state</u></mark> compassionate use <u>laws</u>. n102 As President, <u>Obama followed this</u> policy-to a degree. As a matter of constitutional law, the President's duty to "take care the laws be faithfully executed" would seem to preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand, the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute. n103 A credible [*626] argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the commerce power could not sustain the application of the CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional as applied to medical marijuana. n104 Nevertheless, even assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a politically risky move. Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions. n105 The Obama Administration's policy in this regard was initially laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, entitled "Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana." n106 While reaffirming the Justice Department's "commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all States," the Ogden memo suggested that "the Department is also committed to making [*627] efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources." n107 Noting federal prosecutors are "vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of [their authority over criminal matters]" the memo stated: The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand, prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department. n108 After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to minors, the memo backtracked a bit: Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . . This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . . Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution, [*628] even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests. Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . . n109 To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated picture due to the variation in state laws. For example, while Colorado and California laws authorized the operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office issued cease and desist letters to dispensaries in that state. n110 In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations, raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in various states, charging President Obama with backtracking on the Ogden memo and "betrayal" of his 2008 campaign promise. n111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter's near "zero tolerance" policy. n112 President Obama responded to questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling Stone magazine: [*629] Here's what's up: What I specifically said was that we were not going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say, 'Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books.' What I can say is, 'Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing folks damage.' As a consequence, there haven't been prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. The only tension that's come up-and this gets hyped up a lot-is a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, 'This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way.' That's not something we're going to do. n113 It is important, however, to see through the political rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a tightrope between courting marijuana legalization proponents and avoiding "soft-on-crime" attacks on his flank. <u>What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the subtlety of the Administration's enforcement approach that has relied heavily on "cease and desist" or "threat letters."</u> n114 If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But <u>a policy of sending a warning before making a raid has an anti-deterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence</u> [*630] <u>signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be raided if they have not received a threat letter.</u> <u>The policy allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado</u>, n115 <u>which provides the most detailed regulatory scheme.</u> n116 In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> Administration seems to have <u><mark>returned to a more overtly low-key enforcement approach</u></mark>. Most notably, <u>the policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August 2013 <mark>to the</mark> "<mark>recreational use" laws recently enacted in Washington and Colorado</mark>.</u> In a Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, <u><mark>the Justice Department expressed its "<strong>commitment to using its limited</u></strong> </mark>investigative and prosecutorial <u><strong><mark>resources to address the most significant threats" posed by</mark> </u></strong>distribution of marijuana by <u><strong><mark>gangs or cartels</u></strong>, <u>while leaving "lower-level or localized activity" to state and local</u> </mark>law <u>e<mark>nforcement</u></mark> under state drug laws. n117 [*631] In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states, prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity. n118 The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit on the authority of the federal government to enforce the CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. n119</p>
|
2nc
| null |
Solvency: Cartels
| 430,939 | 3 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,167 |
“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- they cause backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves
|
Leff 2014
|
Leff 2014 (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)
|
current law permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. a dualist model state and national is too limited it is important to recognize that localities have conflicts with states conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common in assessing the merits of any particular approach that the federal government could take it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
|
The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism a dualist model state and t national is too limited it is important to recognize that localitie ave conflicts with states, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common it makes sense to take into account local stakeholders nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict
|
The previous Part argues that current law plausibly permits marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations. If that is true, federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that the incentive created in such a strange manner is good policy. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism. Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that a dualist model of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a state government and the national government - is too limited. n196 Instead, it is important to recognize that localities may have inter-jurisdictional conflicts with their states, and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common. n198 Therefore, in assessing the merits [*566] of any particular approach that the federal government could take to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, it makes sense to take into account not just policy made at state level, but the interests of local stakeholders in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is based on local standards, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony. In effect, the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them. This type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.
| 6,802 |
<h4><strong>“Local buy-in” is a DA to the plan- they cause backlash from local governments which hurts the industry- 501c4 structure gets them on board- ONLY the CP solves</h4><p>Leff 2014</strong> (Ben, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523, lexis)</p><p>The previous Part argues that <u>current law</u> plausibly <u>permits</u> <u>marijuana sellers to avoid the impact of § 280E</u> <u>by operating as tax-exempt social welfare organizations</u>. If that is true, <u><strong>federal tax law creates a strong incentive for marijuana sellers to do just that</u></strong>. This incentive may well be no more than a historical oddity: an unintended consequence of the confluence of the creation of a type of tax-exempt organization that is unaffected by the public policy doctrine and the placement in the tax code [*564] of a penalty for selling marijuana. But it is possible that <u>the incentive created in such a strange manner <strong>is good policy</u></strong>. This Part explores that question: Does a tax incentive encouraging marijuana selling by social welfare organizations solve certain federalism issues better than other federal laws addressing the marijuana issue? The conflict between state and federal laws governing the marijuana industry presents a stark example of inter-jurisdictional conflict. The federal government has criminalized all sale and use of marijuana; a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes; and, as of this year, Washington and Colorado have legalized marijuana for any purpose. This conflict creates a potentially extreme federalism problem. n188 Robert Mikos describes a "war" between the federal government and some states over marijuana policy. n189 The most predictable outcome of the war would be a victory for the federal government, given that the Constitution permits the federal government to preempt state law when acting within its authority, and the Supreme Court has held that regulating marijuana is within the federal government's authority. n190 However, Mikos argues that "the states - and not the federal government - have already won the war over medical marijuana," n191 largely because states have continued to legalize marijuana and public opinion is strongly behind them. n192 If the President wanted to use force to fight the war, he could direct the Department of Justice to criminally prosecute marijuana users or sellers to the full extent of federal law, presumably resulting in significant prison sentences for people who are behaving in ways sanctioned by their state governments. While there are practical constraints on the federal government's ability to prosecute marijuana sellers, n193 it [*565] presumably could deter a lot of individual actors if it vigorously enforced the criminal law. Instead, the President appears to have tactically retreated from this inter-jurisdictional conflict, at least with respect to criminal enforcement of federal drug laws against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n194 As discussed above, the IRS has not participated in this retreat, and its current policy appears to be vigorous enforcement of § 280E against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. I argue that § 280E enforcement, coupled with recognition of tax-exempt status for properly operated marijuana sellers, provides the federal government with a superior resolution to its "war" with the states. Using tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is better policy than either returning to a policy of enforcing criminal penalties against state-sanctioned marijuana sellers or a policy of benign neglect of state-sanctioned marijuana sellers. n195 <u><mark>The use of federal tax law to channel marijuana sellers into social welfare organizations is superior policy because it <strong>encourages "multi-jurisdictional" federalism</mark>. </u></strong>Multiple scholars of federalism have pointed out that <u><mark>a dualist model</u></mark> of federalism, in which the goal is to allocate authority between or balance the interests of only two parties - a <u><mark>state</u></mark> government <u><mark>and</u> t</mark>he <u><mark>national</u> </mark>government - <u><mark>is too limited</u></mark>. n196 Instead, <u><mark>it is important to recognize that localitie</mark>s</u> may <u>h<mark>ave</u></mark> inter-jurisdictional <u><mark>conflicts</u> <u>with</u></mark> their <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> and the principles of federalism may apply with equal force to these sub-national, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, even if localities are not truly sovereign. n197 In the marijuana context, <u><strong><mark>conflicts between states that have liberalized marijuana laws and localities seeking to restrict or prohibit marijuana sales have become common</u></strong></mark>. n198 Therefore, <u>in assessing the merits</u> [*566] <u>of any particular approach that the federal government could take</u> to the question of how to influence national marijuana policy, <u><mark>it makes sense to take into account</u></mark> not just policy made at state level, but the interests of <u><mark>local stakeholders</u></mark> in each locality as well. How could this "multi-jurisdictional" federalism be advanced by an IRS policy of channeling marijuana sellers into nonprofit social welfare organizations? First, as discussed above, <u><mark>nonprofit social welfare organizations are more likely than for-profit operations to advance the interests of localities</u></mark> because of their commitment to social welfare purposes. To qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization would have to provide job training and employment opportunities for hard-to-employ members of the community. Providing these jobs has the potential to reduce the negative effects of illegal drug markets and thereby positively impact the neighborhood in which the organization operates. But perhaps as importantly, while I have argued that an intention to violate federal law should not prevent an organization from qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), I have also argued that an intention to violate state or local laws should. Remember, the one piece of guidance from the IRS on the relationship between illegal activities and § 501(c)(4) status involved an organization whose intention was to violate local laws and ordinances by engaging in civil disobedience. The IRS argued that an organization that intended to disrupt the peace of a community could not advance the social welfare of that community because it intended to engage in activities that "violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society." n199 <u>The IRS could make clear that this "minimum standards of acceptable conduct" standard is <strong>based on local standards</u></strong>, and could thereby refuse to recognize the tax-exempt status of a social welfare organization that intended to sell marijuana contrary to local law. If that was the IRS's standard then <u>it would be using federal law to intervene in marijuana policy, but only when state laws and local laws were in harmony</u>. In effect, <u><mark>the tax law would incentivize marijuana sales in communities that permitted such sales, and dis-incentivize such sales in communities that objected to them</u>. <u><strong>This</u></strong></mark> type of "multi-jurisdictional" approach to a key federalism issue <u><strong><mark>could mitigate inter-jurisdictional conflict</u></mark>, and would arm localities in their struggle for control over marijuana policy.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,932 | 5 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,168 |
State immigration laws kill US-Mexico relations
| null |
AP 7/29/2010 (Fed law over state law? ; Supreme Court may get final say on whether Arizona can enact, enforce immigration rules, Printed in Grand Rapid Press, lexis)
|
federal immigration law trumps state law letting the Arizona law stand would create a patchwork of immigration laws nationwide that would needlessly complicate foreign relations the law is disrupting U.S. relations with Mexico and other countries. A century ago, differing policies among states led to problems that prompted the federal government to adopt a comprehensive immigration policy for the country, Johnson said.
| null |
The core of the government's case is that federal immigration law trumps state law -- an issue known as "pre-emption" in legal circles. In her ruling, Bolton pointed out five portions of the law where she believed the federal government likely would succeed on its claims. Federal authorities have argued that letting the Arizona law stand would create a patchwork of immigration laws nationwide that would needlessly complicate foreign relations. They said the law is disrupting U.S. relations with Mexico and other countries. A century ago, differing policies among states led to problems that prompted the federal government to adopt a comprehensive immigration policy for the country, Johnson said.
| 705 |
<h4><strong>State immigration laws kill US-Mexico relations</h4><p><u></strong>AP 7/29</u>/2010 (Fed law over state law? ; Supreme Court may get final say on whether Arizona can enact, enforce immigration rules, Printed in Grand Rapid Press, lexis)</p><p>The core of the government's case is that <u><strong>federal immigration law trumps state law</u></strong> -- an issue known as "pre-emption" in legal circles. In her ruling, Bolton pointed out five portions of the law where she believed the federal government likely would succeed on its claims. Federal authorities have argued that <u><strong>letting the Arizona law stand would create a patchwork of immigration laws nationwide that would needlessly complicate foreign relations</u></strong>. They said <u><strong>the law is disrupting U.S. relations with Mexico and other countries. A century ago, differing policies among states led to problems that prompted the federal government to adopt a comprehensive immigration policy for the country, Johnson said.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
Turns US-Mexico Relations
| 430,947 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,169 |
Government purchaser also avoids exploitation of poor donors
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
organs available for transplantation, we must give ration to any option that may make up the shortfal The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, , safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4><u>G</u>overnment purchaser also avoids exploitation of poor donors</h4><p><strong>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of <mark>organs available for transplantation, we must give</mark> urgent conside<mark>ration to any option that may make up the shortfal</mark>l. </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option.<u> <mark>The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, </mark>for example<mark>, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,170 |
Reasons to vote-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Reasons to vote-</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,948 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,171 |
Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage
|
Francis 2014
|
Francis 2014 (David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous)
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
|
decriminalization would push the price of pot down taking away a key revenue stream for cartels It’s forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests cartels are stealing from energy companies a practice common in West Africa the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May Los Zetas are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from the state oil company
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
| 3,143 |
<h4><strong>Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage</h4><p>Francis 2014 </strong>(David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous<u>)</p><p>Wider <mark>decriminalization would push the price of pot down</mark>, <mark>taking away a key revenue stream for cartels</mark> like Los Zetas and La Familia. </u>It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> also <mark>forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa</mark>, <mark>upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests</mark>.</u></strong> A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. <u>Grayson also said that the <mark>cartels are stealing from energy companies</mark>, <mark>a practice</mark> more <mark>common in West Africa</mark> than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, <mark>the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May</mark> in Veracruz alone. “<mark>Los Zetas</mark>, in particular, <mark>are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from</mark> Pemex, <mark>the state oil company<strong></mark>. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.” </p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 1
| 431,057 | 41 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,172 |
State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift
|
Jackson et al 2011
|
Jackson et al 2011 (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market If California alone legalized marijuana there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. Six states located along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated
|
A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market. If California alone legalized marijuana, and the federal government increased enforcement efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However, if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 Six states located along these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect. This is because states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated.97
| 1,148 |
<h4>State action ALONE is sufficient to shut out cartel marijuana- EVEN IF the feds don’t shift</h4><p><strong>Jackson et al 2011</strong> (Ashlee Jackson, Chad Murray, Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden, Second-year Master’s students at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>A weak federal response would be enough to shut Mexican DTOs out of the U.S. market</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If California alone legalized marijuana</mark>, and the federal government increased enforcement</u> efforts against domestic interstate trafficking, <u><mark>there is reason to believe the effects on a national level would be stunted. However</u>, <u>if other states followed suit, or the federal government maintained or decreased current enforcement levels, the effects would certainly be more widespread</u>.</mark> According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, <u>there are two primary drug transportation corridors through which Mexican marijuana enters the United States</u> and is trafficked to the rest of the country (see Corridors A and B in Figure 3). 96 <u><mark>Six states located along</mark> these corridors have already legalized medicinal marijuana; three of them are along <mark>the southwest border. Legalization of recreational marijuana in any of these states would likely have a significant effect</u></mark>. This is because <u>states along these drug corridors often contain distribution centers, and <mark>they represent the areas where Mexican DTO influence over the wholesale marijuana market is most concentrated</u></mark>.97</p>
|
2nc
| null |
Solvency: Cartels
| 430,453 | 8 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,173 |
State immigration policy causes ad hoc enforcement killing effectiveness
| null |
HUYEN PHAM, 2004, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia;, THE INHERENT FLAWS IN THE INHERENT AUTHORITY POSITION: WHY INVITING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/314/Pham_Porter.pdf
|
The nonuniform enforcement is an inevitable result of the proposed structure: in the first place, states and localities decide whether they want to enforce immigration laws, and in the second place if they do choose to en- force, they are bound by different state laws that affect their enforcement authority
mandate for uniform immi- gration laws.
| null |
The Department of Justice’s inherent authority proposal violates the constitutional mandate for uniform immigration laws because it results in the nonuniform enforcement of these laws. The nonuniform enforcement is an inevitable result of the proposed structure: in the first place, states and localities decide whether they want to enforce immigration laws, and in the second place, if they do choose to en- force, they are bound by different state laws that affect their enforcement authority. The result would be that an immigration viola- tion would be prosecuted in one jurisdiction but ignored in the neighboring jurisdiction.
mandate for uniform immi- gration laws.
| 672 |
<h4><strong>State immigration policy causes ad hoc enforcement killing effectiveness</h4><p></strong>HUYEN <u>PHAM</u>, <u>2004</u>, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia;, THE INHERENT FLAWS IN THE INHERENT AUTHORITY POSITION: WHY INVITING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/314/Pham_Porter.pdf</p><p>The Department of Justice’s inherent authority proposal violates the constitutional mandate for uniform immigration laws because it results in the nonuniform enforcement of these laws. <u><strong>The nonuniform enforcement is an inevitable result of the proposed structure: in the first place, states and localities decide whether they want to enforce immigration laws, and in the second place</u></strong>, <u><strong>if they do choose to en- force, they are bound by different state laws that affect their enforcement authority</u></strong>. The result would be that an immigration viola- tion would be prosecuted in one jurisdiction but ignored in the neighboring jurisdiction.</p><p><u><strong>mandate for uniform immi- gration laws.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
Turns Solvency
| 430,949 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,174 |
State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case
|
Kamin 2012
|
Kamin 2012 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)
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In addition to conflict between state and federal law there is conflict between state and local governments. there is often tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy.
|
there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated In Colorado a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. there will likely be many places where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy
|
V. The State-Local Junction In addition to the ambiguity and conflict between state laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) and the federal law (which continues to criminalize it), there is another level of intergovernmental conflict in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay between state and local governments. Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, there is often a tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated at the local level. In Colorado, for example, municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright. n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, there will likely be many places in the state where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased. In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so we might be concerned that localism will allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy.
| 6,885 |
<h4><strong>State-local conflict results in outright marijuana bans- turns the case</h4><p>Kamin 2012</strong> (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, THE ROAD TO LEGITIMIZING MARIJUANA: WHAT BENEFIT AT WHAT COST?: Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 147, lexis)</p><p>V. The State-Local Junction <u>In addition to</u> the ambiguity and <u>conflict between state</u> laws (some of which purport to legalize marijuana) <u>and</u> the <u>federal law</u> (which continues to criminalize it), <u>there is</u> another level of intergovernmental <u>conflict </u>in the area of marijuana regulation and reform - the interplay <u>between state and local governments.</u> Even in those states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, <u><mark>there is often</u> a <u>tension between state and municipal governments over whether and to what extent the drug may be regulated</u></mark> at the local level. <u><mark>In Colorado</u></mark>, for example, <u>municipalities and counties are free to enact zoning restrictions on the sale of marijuana - including complete bans - and <strong><mark>a number of local bodies have recently chosen to ban it outright</u></strong>.</mark> n67 Even though the Colorado Constitution prohibits the conviction of those using marijuana for medical purposes, <u><strong><mark>there will likely be many places</u></strong></mark> in the state <u><strong><mark>where marijuana cannot lawfully be manufactured or purchased</mark>. </u></strong>In California, which has delegated much of the regulation of marijuana from the state to the local level, the counties of San Diego and San Bernardino sued the state in 2006 to enjoin it from requiring them to participate in the state-mandated medical marijuana program. n68 The counties argued that the CSA [*163] preempted the state law requiring them to facilitate the applications of those seeking to register as marijuana patients under the state's medicinal marijuana provisions. The counties asked to be excused from their state obligations, arguing that participation in the state regulatory regime would make them complicit in the medical marijuana patients and care-givers' in violations of the federal law. The counties - like the sheriffs in Willis v. Winters - thus presented a non-trivial argument that they were incapable of complying with both state and federal law; the state obligated them to facilitate the very drug transactions that federal law expressly prohibits them from facilitating. n69 Although the counties lost their suit, the San Diego NORML case illustrates that, even in those states that have voted to make medical marijuana legally available, support for such policies is hardly uniform. Just as there are pockets of support and resistance to federal policy among the several states, similarly counties and towns can be expected to support state policy with varying levels of enthusiasm. For example, a number of municipalities in medical marijuana states have embraced the new industry as a boon to tax coffers. Most famously, the City of Oakland, California, has sought to establish itself as the Amsterdam of the United States. Facing fading industry and disappearing tax dollars, the city voted in 2010 to permit large-scale marijuana production, pledging to become the "Silicon Valley of Marijuana." n70 Of course, <u><mark>it is not surprising that different jurisdictions within the same state would have such disparate views</mark> </u>of medical marijuana. But it raises disconcerting questions about the ability of a city or county to opt out of a state-wide policy. The traditional understanding of the state-local dynamic is one of master and servant. n71 Generally considered the mere creations and instrumentalities of the state, local governments were seen as having essentially no power to contest state authority: Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to [*164] acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. n72 This is certainly the view underlying the California court's decision in San Diego NORML. The court held that, "as a general rule, a local governmental entity "charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute ... generally does not have the authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the [entity's] view that it is unconstitutional.'" n73 This traditional view has come under criticism in recent years, largely from legal academics. n74 These authors argue that the principle of federalism - with its embrace of a variety of approaches and views - should include support for a diversity of opinions within states as well as between them. n75 In other words, the [*165] things that we like about "Our Federalism" apply with equal or perhaps greater power to state-local (and sub-local) federalism. n76 If the states are laboratories of ideas, then surely the even more diverse collection of local entities can produce even greater innovation and insights. This argument for a "localist" parallel to federalism makes a strong case for giving the municipalities the right to contest state policies, including the choice of a state to permit marijuana for medical purposes. However, just as segregation and interposition are the dark side of the argument for state power vis-a-vis the federal government, so localism creates the opportunity for localities to subvert the will of the voters of a particular state. We would look askance, for example, at a municipality that barred churches, bookstores, or abortion clinics outright. If we mean what we say about there being a state right to use marijuana, why should we permit localities to defeat state policy through zoning and regulating marijuana businesses out of their jurisdictions? Just as we worry that the rhetoric of states' rights will allow states to undermine important federal principles, so <u><mark>we might be concerned that localism will <strong>allow municipalities to subvert state-wide policy</mark>.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
cp
| 430,935 | 4 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,175 |
Limits- giving them tiny subsets of marijuana activities lets them read things like decrim on the aff or legalizing for only certain people in certain areas- which is unpredictable and lets them spike out of links
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Limits- giving them tiny subsets of marijuana activities lets them read things like decrim on the aff or legalizing for only certain people in certain areas- which is unpredictable and lets them spike out of links</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,950 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,176 |
Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing – experience with egg donations proves
|
Sobota 4
|
Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis
|
, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns In the proposed market system for organ procurement, the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices . With only moderate prices being paid , economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections , and thus no economic coercion would occur. Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical risks involved." These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors
|
economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices With only moderate prices being paid economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections thus no economic coercion dditionally arket for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women
|
A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement
The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145 With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
| 1,526 |
<h4>Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing – experience with egg donations proves</h4><p><strong>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement</p><p>The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First<u>, the <mark>economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns</mark> </u>about becoming a donor. n144 <u>In the proposed market system for organ procurement, </u>either OPOs or<u> <mark>the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices</mark> </u>paid for organs<u>.</u> n145 <u><mark>With only moderate prices being paid</mark> </u>to organ donors<u>, <mark>economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections</mark> </u>to donation<u>, and <mark>thus no economic coercion</mark> would occur.</u> n146 <u>A<mark>dditionally</mark>, the current m<mark>arket</mark> system <mark>for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement</mark>.</u> n147 <u><strong>A <mark>majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women</strong></mark>, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical</u> [*1246] <u>risks involved." </u>n148<u> These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors</u>.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,597 | 8 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,177 |
SQ solves- collaboration with private sector overcomes any shortage and prosecutorial deterrence solves
|
Konkel 9/10
|
Konkel 9/10/2014 (Frank, writer for NextGov, IS THERE ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT THAT HASN’T BEEN HACKED YET?, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/there-any-part-government-hasnt-been-hacked-yet/93704/)
|
The way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate and share information with the private sector We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration” with industry international law organizations and other bodies, those partnerships will continue to expand. the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry. The agency is now engaging in a more back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case Anderson also vowed harsher deterrents for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking Coburn was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally
|
The way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate with the private sector We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration partnerships will continue to expand. The agency is engaging in back-and-forth dialogue . Anderson vowed harsher deterrents
|
Feds Cite ‘Unprecedented’ Collaboration with Industry The only way to stay ahead of the evolving threats is to collaborate and share information with the private sector, officials testified. “We’re engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration” with industry, international law organizations and other bodies, Anderson said, and those partnerships will continue to expand. For example, the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry. The agency is now engaging in a more back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case. Anderson also vowed harsher deterrents for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking the networks of American companies. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., said he was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence,” said Coburn, the committee’s ranking Republican. “For so long, we thought building a higher wall was [the way to protect], but people are going to climb over any war we have. We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally.”
| 1,320 |
<h4><strong>SQ solves- collaboration with private sector overcomes any shortage and prosecutorial deterrence solves</h4><p>Konkel 9/10</strong>/2014 (Frank, writer for NextGov, IS THERE ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT THAT HASN’T BEEN HACKED YET?, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/there-any-part-government-hasnt-been-hacked-yet/93704/)</p><p>Feds Cite ‘Unprecedented’ Collaboration with Industry <u><mark>The</u></mark> only <u><mark>way to stay ahead of the evolving threats</mark> <mark>is to collaborate</mark> and share information <mark>with the private sector</u></mark>, officials testified. “<u><strong><mark>We’re</mark> <mark>engaging in an unprecedented level of collaboration</mark>” with industry</u></strong>, <u>international law organizations and other bodies,</u> Anderson said, and <u>those <mark>partnerships will continue to</mark> <mark>expand.</u></mark> For example, <u>the FBI released 40 near real-time alerts on “current and emerging threat trends and technical indicators,” to the private sector – with 21 of those alerts sent to the financial industry.</u> <u><mark>The agency is</mark> now <mark>engaging in</mark> a more <strong><mark>back-and-forth dialogue</strong></mark> as opposed to the FBI listening and rarely sharing – which used to be the case</u><mark>. <u>Anderson</mark> also <mark>vowed harsher deterrents</mark> for malicious actors, referencing the recent indictments of Chinese citizens who were caught hacking</u> the networks of American companies. Sen. Tom <u>Coburn</u>, R-Okla., said he <u>was pleased with FBI’s get-tough approach. “I’m happy to see the FBI being aggressive on deterrence</u>,” said Coburn, the committee’s ranking Republican. “For so long, we thought building a higher wall was [the way to protect], but people are going to climb over any war we have. <u>We need prosecutorial deterrence. I’m thankful of that attitude from FBI both domestically and internationally</u><strong>.”</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 203,265 | 4 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,178 |
State legalization leads to small business competition which solves innovation and job growth- key to build RESILIENCY into the economy- federal legalization crushes that by causing a few MNCs to dominate
|
Breger 2014
|
Breger 2014 (Sasha, Lecturer at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and author of the recent book Derivatives and Development. Her research includes global finance, derivatives, social policy, food, and farming, Big Food, Big Pharma, Big Tobacco, Big Finance, and Little Marijuana, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/05/big-food-big-pharma-big-tobacco-big-finance-little-marijuana.html)
|
Colorado’s Amendment 64 legalized marijuana creating new jobs, boosting real estate values, and increasing state and local tax revenues the local marijuana market is recession-proof and is bolstering resilience to global crisis As I’ve watched this unfold I’ve grown increasingly concerned about legalization on the federal level state level legalization has motivated economic recovery and helped folks earn more income get better jobs and enjoy more public services federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business today, the legal marijuana market is the domain of small operations slightly larger local chains and other generally smaller businesses federal illegality prevents larger businesses from engaging I’m deeply worried about Colorado’s economic fortunes should federal legalization occur the local marketplace will be replaced by a national market governed by large multinational firms that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and stymie innovation and employment evolution of the food system is instructive Small innovative firms will be bought out by ever-larger conglomerates Mass, centralized production will displace local If the food system is any indication, federal legalization will impoverish local economies benefits will leak to MNCs markets like Colorado’s marijuana market provide a safe-haven for small businesses and a stimulus to local economies.
|
Colorado’s Amendment 64 legalized marijuana creating jobs boosting real estate values, and increasing tax revenues the local market is recession-proof and bolstering resilience to global crisis state legalization motivated economic recovery helped folks earn more income, get better jobs and enjoy more services federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business today legal market is the domain of small operations federal illegality prevents larger businesses from engaging should federal legalization occur the local marketplace will be replaced by a national market governed by large multinational firms that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and stymie innovation and employment. Small innovative firms will be bought out If the food system is any indication, federal legalization will impoverish local economies markets like Colorado’s provide a safe-haven for small businesses and stimulus to local economies
|
Passed in 2012, Colorado’s Amendment 64 legalized the growing and selling of marijuana on a recreational basis. With medical marijuana, recreational marijuana has helped lift the people of Denver out of the Great Recession by inspiring leagues of new small businesses, creating new jobs, boosting commercial real estate values, and increasing state and local tax revenues. It turns out that the local marijuana market is fairly recession-proof and is actually bolstering local resilience to global crisis. As I’ve watched this novelty unfold over the past couple of years (with considerable delight, to be frank) and witnessed first hand the important benefits for our local economy, I’ve grown increasingly concerned about the possibility of legalization on the federal level. While state level legalization has—for all of its still considerable problems—motivated economic recovery and helped working and middle class folks earn more income, get better jobs and enjoy more robust public services, federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business. As things stand today, the $2.3 billion legal U.S. marijuana market is the domain of small pot shops and grow operations, slightly larger local chains (with a handful of stores), a few inter-state mid-sized retail establishments with outlets in two or more states, and other generally smaller local businesses that provide inputs and services to the marijuana growing and retail firms. In Colorado, a few different dynamics explain the structure of this highly decentralized and relatively competitive marketplace. First, state regulations work to limit the size of growing and retailing firms by regulating the number of plants that a single firm can grow, the amount of marijuana a single person can purchase and possess, and increases/decreases in firm space and capacity, among other constraints (go to this link and this link for the most recent state laws). Because the state has established residency requirements for marijuana firm ownership and operation, out of state ownership is effectively prohibited. Second, and perhaps more importantly in the long-run, federal level illegality prevents larger businesses from outside of Colorado from engaging in growing and retailing, and even from providing certain services to Colorado marijuana firms. Federally insured banks, for example, cannot provide banking and financial services to the marijuana industry for fear of incurring federal penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Federal illegality has meant that Colorado’s pot revenues flow into local credit unions, and will soon support a network of local banking cooperatives. I’m deeply worried about Colorado’s economic fortunes should federal level legalization occur. I fear that the local and decentralized marketplace will be replaced by a national or even international market governed by large multinational firms that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and stymie innovation and employment. The evolution of the global food system is instructive in thinking about what may happen to pot in a fully legalized world. Small and innovative firms will be bought out by ever-larger conglomerates seeking to add one more brand to their portfolio. Mass, centralized, industrial pot production will displace local artisanal and craft production. Indeed, rumor has it that Marlboro already attempted to patent the name “Marley” in anticipation of federal legalization. If we’re not careful, you’ll soon be able to buy Marley’s by the case at the Wal-Mart near you. If the Waltons are smart, they’ll probably be shelved right next to the Twinkies. Multinational input providers will displace local garden and hydroponics stores, providing cheap fertilizers and grow equipment at prices with which the mom and pop stores can’t compete. Round-up Ready AK-47 clones from Monsanto, anyone? Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline will patent strains that have been pioneered by Colorado locals to treat various health problems. I can hear the drug commercials now: speak with your doctor to see if Canna is right for you! Don’t forget that the global financial system will also intervene—Visa and Mastercard will take 5% of every pot transaction, Goldman Sachs will develop an exchange-traded Global Marijuana Fund, and maybe we’ll be able to start trading “weed” futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. If the rest of the world goes the way of Uruguay and Jamaica, then we can also look forward to Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland monopolizing the global weed trade and buying up all of the world’s pot storage facilities. Who knows? Perhaps the World Bank will even incorporate weed into structural adjustment programs, and start recommending marijuana exports to developing countries as a way to finance debt repayment. If the food system is any indication, federal legalization of pot will impoverish vibrant, local marijuana economies. Local economic benefits will leak out to already wealthy and powerful MNCs. In a world where big monopolistic companies rule the formal economy, grey markets like Colorado’s marijuana market provide a safe-haven for small businesses and a stimulus to local economies.
| 5,262 |
<h4>State legalization leads to small business competition which solves innovation and job growth- key to build RESILIENCY into the economy- federal legalization crushes that by causing a few MNCs to dominate</h4><p><strong>Breger 2014</strong> <u>(Sasha, Lecturer at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and author of the recent book Derivatives and Development. Her research includes global finance, derivatives, social policy, food, and farming, Big Food, Big Pharma, Big Tobacco, Big Finance, and Little Marijuana, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/05/big-food-big-pharma-big-tobacco-big-finance-little-marijuana.html)</p><p></u>Passed in 2012, <u><mark>Colorado’s Amendment 64 legalized</u></mark> the growing and selling of <u><mark>marijuana</u></mark> on a recreational basis. With medical marijuana, recreational marijuana has helped lift the people of Denver out of the Great Recession by inspiring leagues of new small businesses, <u><mark>creating</mark> new <mark>jobs</mark>, <mark>boosting</u></mark> commercial <u><mark>real estate values, and</u> <u>increasing</mark> state and local <mark>tax revenues</u></mark>. It turns out that <u><mark>the local</mark> marijuana <mark>market is</u></mark> fairly <u><strong><mark>recession-proof</u></strong> <u>and</mark> is</u> actually <u><strong><mark>bolstering</u></strong></mark> local <u><strong><mark>resilience to global crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u>As I’ve watched this</u> novelty <u>unfold</u> over the past couple of years (with considerable delight, to be frank) and witnessed first hand the important benefits for our local economy, <u><strong>I’ve grown increasingly concerned about</u></strong> the possibility of <u><strong>legalization on the federal level</u></strong>. While <u><mark>state</mark> level <mark>legalization</mark> has</u>—for all of its still considerable problems—<u><strong><mark>motivated economic recovery</u></strong></mark> <u>and <mark>helped</u></mark> working and middle class <u><mark>folks earn more income</u>, <u>get better jobs and enjoy more</u></mark> robust <u>public <mark>services</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>federal legalization risks these benefits leaking out of local economies into the pockets of Big Business</u></strong></mark>. As things stand <u><mark>today</mark>, the</u> $2.3 billion <u><mark>legal</u></mark> U.S. <u>marijuana <mark>market</mark> <mark>is the domain of small</u></mark> pot shops and grow <u><mark>operations</u></mark>, <u>slightly larger local chains</u> (with a handful of stores), a few inter-state mid-sized retail establishments with outlets in two or more states, <u>and other generally smaller</u> local <u>businesses</u> that provide inputs and services to the marijuana growing and retail firms. In Colorado, a few different dynamics explain the structure of this highly decentralized and relatively competitive marketplace. First, state regulations work to limit the size of growing and retailing firms by regulating the number of plants that a single firm can grow, the amount of marijuana a single person can purchase and possess, and increases/decreases in firm space and capacity, among other constraints (go to this link and this link for the most recent state laws). Because the state has established residency requirements for marijuana firm ownership and operation, out of state ownership is effectively prohibited. Second, and perhaps more importantly in the long-run, <u><strong><mark>federal</u></strong></mark> level <u><strong><mark>illegality prevents larger businesses</mark> </u></strong>from outside of Colorado <u><strong><mark>from engaging</u></strong></mark> in growing and retailing, and even from providing certain services to Colorado marijuana firms. Federally insured banks, for example, cannot provide banking and financial services to the marijuana industry for fear of incurring federal penalties for violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Federal illegality has meant that Colorado’s pot revenues flow into local credit unions, and will soon support a network of local banking cooperatives. <u>I’m deeply worried about Colorado’s economic fortunes <mark>should federal</mark> </u>level<u> <mark>legalization occur</u></mark>. I fear that <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>local</u></strong></mark> and decentralized <u><strong><mark>marketplace will be replaced by a national</u></strong></mark> or even international <u><strong><mark>market governed by large multinational</u></strong> <u><strong>firms</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that whisk their profits away to other places, degrade product quality, and <strong>stymie innovation and employment</u></strong>.</mark> The <u>evolution of the</u> global <u>food system is instructive</u> in thinking about what may happen to pot in a fully legalized world. <u><mark>Small</u></mark> and <u><mark>innovative firms will be bought out</mark> by</u> <u>ever-larger conglomerates</u> seeking to add one more brand to their portfolio. <u>Mass, centralized</u>, industrial pot <u>production will displace local</u> artisanal and craft production. Indeed, rumor has it that Marlboro already attempted to patent the name “Marley” in anticipation of federal legalization. If we’re not careful, you’ll soon be able to buy Marley’s by the case at the Wal-Mart near you. If the Waltons are smart, they’ll probably be shelved right next to the Twinkies. Multinational input providers will displace local garden and hydroponics stores, providing cheap fertilizers and grow equipment at prices with which the mom and pop stores can’t compete. Round-up Ready AK-47 clones from Monsanto, anyone? Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline will patent strains that have been pioneered by Colorado locals to treat various health problems. I can hear the drug commercials now: speak with your doctor to see if Canna is right for you! Don’t forget that the global financial system will also intervene—Visa and Mastercard will take 5% of every pot transaction, Goldman Sachs will develop an exchange-traded Global Marijuana Fund, and maybe we’ll be able to start trading “weed” futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. If the rest of the world goes the way of Uruguay and Jamaica, then we can also look forward to Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland monopolizing the global weed trade and buying up all of the world’s pot storage facilities. Who knows? Perhaps the World Bank will even incorporate weed into structural adjustment programs, and start recommending marijuana exports to developing countries as a way to finance debt repayment. <u><mark>If the food system is any indication, federal legalization</u></mark> of pot <u><mark>will <strong>impoverish</u></strong></mark> vibrant, <u><mark>local</u></mark> marijuana <u><mark>economies</u></mark>. Local economic <u>benefits will leak</u> out <u>to</u> already wealthy and powerful <u>MNCs</u>. In a world where big monopolistic companies rule the formal economy, grey <u><mark>markets like Colorado’s</mark> marijuana market <mark>provide a safe-haven for small businesses and</mark> a <mark>stimulus to local economies</mark>.</p></u>
|
2nc
| null |
Small Business Net Benefit*
| 430,951 | 5 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,179 |
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal – only the CP maintains compliance
|
Donohue et al 2010
|
Donohue et al 2010 (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
|
Another complication for legalization is international law the Single Convention binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically While the Single Convention requires that countries maintain prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal or revision due to the Single Convention even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged drug legalization in the Netherlands the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal
|
the Single Convention binds nations to prohibition including cannabis specifically While the Convention requires prohibition it does not require a punitive regime reforms within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require withdrawal even countries with more liberal narcotics policies lack full- fledged legalization in the Netherlands importation and commercial production remains illegal
|
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof. Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
| 1,974 |
<h4><strong>Legalization <u>in advance</u> of treaty revision causes <u>treaty withdrawal</u> – only the CP maintains compliance</h4><p>Donohue et al 2010 </strong> (C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford, John, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)</p><p>International Law. <u>Another complication for legalization is international law</u>. While many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug control policy that receives scant attention is <u><mark>the</u></mark> United Nations <u><mark>Single Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 which <u><mark>binds</mark> all UN member <mark>nations to</mark> maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> of drugs, <mark>including cannabis specifically</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). <u><mark>While the</mark> Single <mark>Convention</u></mark> on Narcotic Drugs <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> that countries maintain <mark>prohibition</mark> </u></strong>of manufacture, sales, and import, <u><strong><mark>it does not require a punitive regime</u></strong></mark> of the type currently found in the United States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s Guide” 2009). Thus, <u><mark>reforms</mark> working <strong><mark>within the framework of the existing treaty</strong> are possible, though <strong>full- scale legalization</strong> would require</mark> either a country’s <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong></mark> </u>from the treaty<u> <strong>or revision</strong> </u>thereof. Perhaps partly <u>due to the Single Convention </u>on Narcotic Drugs, <u><mark>even countries with more liberal narcotics policies</u></mark> than the United States <u><mark>lack <strong>full- fledged</mark> drug <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> and at most allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As discussed above, <u><mark>in the Netherlands</u></mark>, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana smoking, <u>the <mark>importation and commercial production</mark> of cannabis <strong><mark>remains illegal</u></mark> (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single Convention (Cato Institute 2009).</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
Treaties
| 430,457 | 62 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,180 |
Solely enforcement based laws from the states kill efforts against trafficking
| null |
Chacon 2010 (Jennifer M., Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 1998; A.B., Stanford University, 1994, ARTICLE: TENSIONS AND TRADE-OFFS: PROTECTING TRAFFICKING VICTIMS IN THE ERA OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1609, May, lexis)
|
antitrafficking efforts in the United States and elsewhere have been heavily constrained by the politics and policies of rigid immigration enforcement there is no way to eliminate trafficking on the international level as long as cross-border movement is subject to the high degree of criminalization that characterizes the contemporary global order.
| null |
This is not to suggest that the TVPA has failed. U.S. antitrafficking efforts, like the international efforts to protect trafficking victims, have been important in protecting a small number of victims, punishing a small number of traffickers, and, perhaps most importantly, raising awareness about the nature and scope of the international trafficking problem. These advances are worthy of recognition. Nevertheless, it is equally important to acknowledge that antitrafficking efforts in the United States and elsewhere have been heavily constrained by the politics and policies of rigid immigration enforcement. In the end, there is no way to eliminate the scourge of trafficking on the international level as long as cross-border movement is subject to the high degree of regulation and criminalization that characterizes the contemporary global order.
| 855 |
<h4><strong>Solely enforcement based laws from the states kill efforts against trafficking</h4><p><u></strong>Chacon 2010</u> (Jennifer M., Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 1998; A.B., Stanford University, 1994, ARTICLE: TENSIONS AND TRADE-OFFS: PROTECTING TRAFFICKING VICTIMS IN THE ERA OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1609, May, lexis)</p><p>This is not to suggest that the TVPA has failed. U.S. antitrafficking efforts, like the international efforts to protect trafficking victims, have been important in protecting a small number of victims, punishing a small number of traffickers, and, perhaps most importantly, raising awareness about the nature and scope of the international trafficking problem. These advances are worthy of recognition. Nevertheless, it is equally important to acknowledge that <u><strong>antitrafficking efforts in the United States and elsewhere have been heavily constrained by the politics and policies of rigid immigration enforcement</u></strong>. In the end, <u><strong>there is no way to eliminate</u></strong> the scourge of <u><strong>trafficking on the international level as long as cross-border movement is subject to the high degree of</u></strong> regulation and <u><strong>criminalization that characterizes the contemporary global order.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
2NC
|
Turns Trafficking
| 430,952 | 1 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,181 |
Ground- Our generics all assume a system where all adults can buy and sell marijuana in most configurations- we’re not saying they have to legalize it for kids just that it should be legal for someone other than the state government
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Ground- Our generics all assume a system where all adults can buy and sell marijuana in most configurations- we’re not saying they have to legalize it for kids just that it should be legal for someone other than the state government</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,953 | 1 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,182 |
With sales limited to government purchasing transplants under the plan would be based on medical need
|
Gill 2
|
Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
|
/v012/12.1gill.html
The international market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
|
horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program
First, in the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,
|
Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
The international black market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation, and the popular press has been right to expose it. But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international black market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
| 1,480 |
<h4>With sales limited to government purchasing transplants under the plan would be based on medical need </h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>The international</u> black <u>market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation</u>, and the popular press has been right to expose it. <u>But the <mark>horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program</mark> we propose.</p><p><mark>First, in</mark> our proposal <mark>the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated</u></mark>. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.</p><p><u><mark>Second,</mark> the domestic program we propose <mark>involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international</u></mark> black <u><mark>market.</mark> <mark>Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,</mark> as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.</p></u>
| null | null |
Advantage 1 – US transplants will be better
| 430,687 | 5 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,183 |
Salaries and retention are key alt causes- outweighs the aff
|
Washington Post 10/1
|
Washington Post 10/1/2014 (Key Homeland Security official urges passage of cybersecurity bill, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/01/key-homeland-security-official-urges-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill/)
|
A top Homeland Security official called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes often prevents it from grabbing top recruits the government can’t match higher private sector salaries. We have a difficult time competing with the private sector because of financial realities DHS has had major difficulties in not only hiring cyber officials but retaining them once they arrive. A parade of high-level cyber departures in recent years has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity initiatives
|
the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes prevents it from grabbing top recruits he government can’t match higher private sector salaries. DHS has had major difficulties retaining them high-level cyber departures has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity
|
A top Department of Homeland Security official on Wednesday called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need” to strengthen the department’s ability to defend against cyberattacks. Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said the legislation would “better equip us” to fight computer hackers and state-sponsored cyberattacks and is especially important in helping DHS compete with private industry to recruit top cyber personnel. He said the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes often prevents it from grabbing top recruits and that the government can’t match higher private sector salaries. “We have a difficult time competing with the private sector because of financial realities,’’ Mayorkas said at The Washington Post’s Cybersecurity Summitt 2014, held at the Post building in the District. “On the other hand, we are advantaged because … our mission is an extraordinary one.’’ Homeland Security logo reflected in the eyeglasses of a cybersecurity analyst at the agency’s secretive cyber defense facility in Idaho. (Mark J. Terrill/AP). Congress has been struggling for years to pass cybersecurity legislation, even as law enforcement officials have said cyberattacks increasingly pose the biggest threat to the nation’s security. A comprehensive bill to establish cybersecurity standards died in 2012, but several pieces of legislation are now pending in Congress. One bill that recently passed the House would require a DHS strategy to recruit and keep cyber personnel. Congressional aides from both parties have said in recent days that they are hoping to reach agreement on a comprehensive cyber bill to be voted on during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s midterm elections. DHS has had major difficulties in not only hiring cyber officials but retaining them once they arrive. A parade of high-level cyber departures in recent years has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity initiatives, including a program aimed at blocking malicious software before it can infiltrate civilian government computers, former officials have said. Mayorkas said he and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson are focused on the problem, pointing out that Johnson personally went on a trip in February to Georgia Institute of Technology and Morehouse College aimed at recruiting young cyber leaders. While Mayorkas said “attackers are in fact becoming more and more sophisticated,’’ he added that DHS and the rest of the government are up to the challenge of stopping them. “Our prevention capabilities are growing in sophistication,’’ he said.
| 2,591 |
<h4><strong>Salaries and retention are key alt causes- outweighs the aff</h4><p>Washington Post 10/1</strong>/2014 (Key Homeland Security official urges passage of cybersecurity bill, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/01/key-homeland-security-official-urges-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill/)</p><p><u>A top</u> Department of <u>Homeland Security official</u> on Wednesday <u>called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need</u>” to strengthen the department’s ability to defend against cyberattacks. Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said the legislation would “better equip us” to fight computer hackers and state-sponsored cyberattacks and is especially important in helping DHS compete with private industry to recruit top cyber personnel. He said <u><mark>the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes</mark> often <mark>prevents it from grabbing top recruits</u></mark> and that <u><strong>t<mark>he government can’t match higher private sector salaries.</mark> </u></strong>“<u>We have a difficult time competing with the private sector</u> <u>because of financial realities</u>,’’ Mayorkas said at The Washington Post’s Cybersecurity Summitt 2014, held at the Post building in the District. “On the other hand, we are advantaged because … our mission is an extraordinary one.’’ Homeland Security logo reflected in the eyeglasses of a cybersecurity analyst at the agency’s secretive cyber defense facility in Idaho. (Mark J. Terrill/AP). Congress has been struggling for years to pass cybersecurity legislation, even as law enforcement officials have said cyberattacks increasingly pose the biggest threat to the nation’s security. A comprehensive bill to establish cybersecurity standards died in 2012, but several pieces of legislation are now pending in Congress. One bill that recently passed the House would require a DHS strategy to recruit and keep cyber personnel. Congressional aides from both parties have said in recent days that they are hoping to reach agreement on a comprehensive cyber bill to be voted on during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s midterm elections. <u><mark>DHS has had major difficulties</mark> in not only hiring cyber officials but <strong><mark>retaining them</strong></mark> once they arrive.</u> <u>A parade of <mark>high-level cyber departures</mark> in recent years <mark>has helped <strong>slow the rollout of key cybersecurity</mark> initiatives</u>, including a program aimed at blocking malicious software before it can infiltrate civilian government computers, former officials have said. Mayorkas said he and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson are focused on the problem, pointing out that Johnson personally went on a trip in February to Georgia Institute of Technology and Morehouse College aimed at recruiting young cyber leaders. While Mayorkas said “attackers are in fact becoming more and more sophisticated,’’ he added that DHS and the rest of the government are up to the challenge of stopping them. “Our prevention capabilities are growing in sophistication,’’ he said.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,574 | 7 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,184 |
Sequencing matters – unilateral legalization wrecks the entire UN treaty system
|
Rolles 2009
|
Rolles 2009 (senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg)
|
Parties could simply ignore the treaties An individual country disregarding the treaties could institute the legalisation of cannabis Such a move however raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control if taken unilaterally unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.
|
Parties could simply ignore treaties A country disregarding the treaties could institute legalisation of cannabis Such a move however raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control if taken unilaterally unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten stability of the entire treaty system
|
Parties could simply ignore all or part of the treaties. If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. An individual country disregarding the treaties, or applying them only partially, could in this way institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including arguably the most likely example: the actual legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states). Such a move however, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug control—particularly if taken unilaterally. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten, or be perceived to threaten, the stability of the entire treaty system. The cost of such a threat and the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.
| 1,216 |
<h4><strong>Sequencing matters – <u>unilateral</u> legalization wrecks the <u>entire</u> UN treaty system</h4><p>Rolles 2009 </strong>(senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg<u>)</p><p><mark>Parties could simply ignore</u></mark> all or part of <u>the <mark>treaties</u></mark>. If multiple states engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any specific termination or reform. <u><mark>A</mark>n individual <mark>country disregarding the treaties</u></mark>, or applying them only partially, <u><mark>could</u></mark> in this way <u><mark>institute</u></mark> any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including arguably the most likely example: <u>the</u> actual <u><mark>legalisation of cannabis</u></mark> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political agenda in a number of US states). <u><mark>Such a move however</u></mark>, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, <u><mark>raises serious issues</mark> that go <strong><mark>beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong></mark>—particularly <u><strong><mark>if taken unilaterally</u></strong></mark>. The possibility of nations <u><mark>unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten</u></mark>, or be perceived to threaten, <u>the <strong><mark>stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. The cost of such a threat and <u>the benefits derived from the <strong>wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
Treaties
| 430,468 | 48 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,185 |
even if state legalization is inevitable – federal isn’t and the process will take a long time
|
The Inquisitr 11/9’
|
The Inquisitr 11/9’ (The Inquisitr, November 9 2014, “Oregon, Alaska, and D.C. Have Legalized Recreational Pot — Is Nationwide Legalization Inevitable?”, http://www.inquisitr.com/1597751/oregon-alaska-and-d-c-have-legalized-recreational-pot-is-nationwide-legalization-inevitable/)
|
So will these statewide legalization efforts bring about a change in marijuana policy at the national level? The answer is far from clear, but the path to finding an answer to the question begins at the White House. on January 20, 2017, all bets will be off. Clinton, don’t expect her to release the DEA hounds on the legal pot industry, but whether she’ll pursue nationwide legalization is anybody’s guess. If a Republican takes the Oval Office, things could be starkly different. White House could send the nation’s marijuana policy back to the Reagan Era with a single phone call. Things look far less hopeful in the Legislative Branch. With the Republicans taking over the Senate Changes in federal marijuana policy are likely not on anyone’s radar. The path to nationwide marijuana legalization is not likely to be through Washington,
No impact to failed states -- empirics,
During the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, draws on recently declassified Harmony documents original field work by CTC personnel and careful country studies to enrich understanding of the terrorist group’s early successes and failure The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. alQa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible ( clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction.
)
Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules for what continue to be fierce political battles The disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now tend to spark bitter legislative maneuvers punctuated with street protests that sometimes turn violent, but eventually die off. Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment within democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula to concoct.
Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars post-World War II Latin America has endured some extremely destabilizing conflicts The region's experiences may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage.
(Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09 http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
The suggestion that Mexico is a failed state or is heading in that direction is analytically flawed and wrong Sarukhan, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, said Mexico is today a country with solid institutions, a consolidating and pluralistic democracy, a vibrant civil society, and, despite the global recession, strong economic fundamentals the heavy toll from the armed confrontations in Mexico is a sign of his government’s strength and determination to confront the cartels which have grown increasingly desperate under the army’s assault “The violence is an indication that they’re feeling the pressure and against the ropes.”¶ ¶ Many U.S. experts on Mexico also reject what George W. Grayson, a Mexico scholar at The army is still loyal to the regime Most workers get up and go to their jobs every day, and the major production facilities around the country continue to turn out goods and services Allyson Benton, a Mexico City-based analyst for an international risk analysis firm Mexico is not a failed state and will not become one.”
never always
these six variables have defined the nature of the bilateral relationship and its impact on Mexican domestic policy They explain why Mexico almost always bends to U.S. demands related to national security its narcotics control policies have been subject to significant U.S. influence One of the most important sources of Mexico’s historic vulnerability to U.S. power is its geographic position the overriding U.S. interest in Mexico is ultimately to have a stable ally on its frontier Mexico was the “last domino” in Latin America The U S tolerated opposition only as long as Mexican action did not pose a real obstacle to the U.S. capacity to protect its strategic interests Yet when the U S perceives a threat to its national security emanating from Mexico or when Mexican stability appears to be at risk Mexico’s autonomy narrows Following September 11 Mexican policy autonomy evaporated leading to a series of actions that responded perfectly to U.S. national interests Mexico’s difficulties with drug trafficking have hampered its policy freedom. The strategic factor in the bilateral relationship trumps other policy concerns When this involves the possibility of an attack on the U.S. homeland or political instability in Mexico it sharply increases U.S. influence in Mexican affairs, but when it involves protecting an established, stable ally in Mexico, U.S. influence declines sharply.
|
2017, all bets will be off Clinton, whether she’ll pursue nationwide legalization is anybody’s guess. If a Republican takes the Oval Office, things could be starkly different White House could send the nation’s marijuana policy back to the Reagan Era with a single phone call. Things look far less hopeful in the Legislative Branch. With the Republicans taking over the Senate The path to nationwide marijuana legalization is not likely to be through Washington
Combating Terrorism Center draws on recently declassified Harmony documents original field work and careful studies alQa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region were largely a failure In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to challenges They were prone to extortion and betrayal trapped in the middle of incomprehensible clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcom logistical constraints and were subject to the risk of Western military interdiction.
Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now spark legislative maneuvers, protests die off. democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum
Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars post-World War II , Latin America has endured some extremely destabilizing conflicts. (2)
suggestion that Mexico is a failed state or is heading in that direction is wrong Mexico is a country with solid institutions consolidating democracy and, despite recession, strong economic fundamentals heavy toll from armed confrontations is , a sign of government’s strength and determination to confront the cartels, which have grown increasingly desperate under the army’s assault. army is still loyal
Mexico always bends to U.S. demands related to national security overriding U.S. interest in Mexico i to have a stable ally U S tolerated opposition as long as Mexican action did not pose a real obstacle when the U S perceives Mexican stability at risk, Mexico’s autonomy narrows Following September 11 Mexican policy autonomy evaporated leading to actions that responded perfectly to U.S. national interests strategic factor trumps other policy concerns. When this involves political instability in Mexico, it sharply increases U.S. influence
|
So will these statewide legalization efforts bring about a change in marijuana policy at the national level? The answer is far from clear, but the path to finding an answer to the question begins at the White House. At the federal level, drug policy is carried out by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which is itself a part of the Justice Department. The Justice Department is part of the Executive Branch, which means that the DEA, at least indirectly, answers to the president. What that means on a practical level is that one phone call from the Oval Office could send a van full of DEA agents in SWAT gear to every medical and recreational pot dispensary in the country before the day is out. Fortunately, the Obama Administration’s approach to statewide marijuana legalization has been one of “See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil.” But on January 20, 2017, all bets will be off. Of the possible Democrat contenders for 2016, Hillary Clinton seems the most likely. Since she spent eight years as First Lady to Bill “I Didn’t Inhale” Clinton, don’t expect her to release the DEA hounds on the legal pot industry, but whether she’ll pursue nationwide legalization is anybody’s guess. If a Republican takes the Oval Office, things could be starkly different. Although Republicans, in the main, support states’ rights, an ardent social conservative such as Rick Santorum in the White House could send the nation’s marijuana policy back to the Reagan Era with a single phone call. Things look far less hopeful in the Legislative Branch. With the Republicans taking over the Senate, and maintaining their majority in the House, it appears as if the GOP’s main goals for the remainder of Obama’s lame-duck administration seem to focus on taxes, energy, and dismantling Obamacare. Changes in federal marijuana policy are likely not on anyone’s radar. There is, however, a possibility of marijuana legalization coming from, of all places, the judiciary. Late last month, United States District Judge Kimberly Mueller heard arguments in favor of re-classifying marijuana, which is currently a Schedule I narcotic (“no medical use”) as far as the federal government is concerned. However, if Mueller rules in favor of re-classifying pot, essentially the nation’s pot laws would be changed with a stroke of a judge’s pen. At this point, it’s probably a long shot, but a ruling may come after the first of the year, according to The Weed Blog. Regardless of how things play out over the next few years, one thing seems to be obvious: The path to nationwide marijuana legalization is not likely to be through Washington, but through the individual state capitals.
No impact to failed states -- empirics,
CTC 10 (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Al-Qaidas-MisAdventures-in-the-Horn-of-Africa.pdf, “Al Qaeda’s misadventures in the Horn of Africa”)//trepkaDuring the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization, honing its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, draws on recently declassified Harmony documents, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, original field work by CTC personnel and careful country studies to enrich our understanding of the terrorist group’s early successes and failures in the Horn of Africa. The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. As recounted by its leaders and operatives, alQa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests that Somalia, a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. Our analysis, however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qa’ida’s activities. In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible (to them) clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction.
No Latin American conflict – democracy checks and empirically denied
Ghitis, 12 - an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida, World Politics Review, “Latin America, the World's Democracy Lab” 7/5, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12127/world-citizen-latin-america-the-worlds-democracy-lab)
Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules for what continue to be fierce political battles. The disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now tend to spark bitter legislative maneuvers, even thinly disguised coups, punctuated with street protests that sometimes turn violent, but eventually die off. Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment within the elusive parameters of democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum. It has meant that even when the system disappoints, there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula to concoct.
b. it’s empirically denied --- bunch of previous uprisings prove no spillover --- 14 other incidents also prove
Hartzell 2000 (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-28765765_ITM)
Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?
Mexico stable now – institutions, democracy, economics, and successful anti-drug policies – answers all their warrants
Broder, 9 senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked as an editor at National Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at Harvard University. (Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09 http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
¶ Mexican officials bristle at the dire forecasts for their country. “The suggestion that Mexico is remotely close to a failed state or is heading in that direction is analytically flawed and therefore simply wrong,” Arturo Sarukhan, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, said in a statement. “Mexico is today a country with solid institutions, a consolidating and pluralistic democracy, a vibrant civil society, and, despite the global recession, strong economic fundamentals.”¶ ¶ In a separate interview, Sarukhan argued that the heavy toll from the armed confrontations in Mexico is, if anything, a sign of his government’s strength and determination to confront the cartels, which, he adds, have grown increasingly desperate under the army’s assault. “The violence,” Sarukhan said, “is an indication that they’re feeling the pressure and against the ropes.”¶ ¶ Many U.S. experts on Mexico also reject what George W. Grayson, a Mexico scholar at the College of William & Mary, called the “overstated” tone of the recent warnings about Mexico.¶ ¶ “The army is still loyal to the regime,” said Grayson. “Most workers get up and go to their jobs every day, and the major production facilities around the country continue to turn out goods and services.”¶ ¶ Allyson Benton, a Mexico City-based analyst for the Eurasia Group, an international risk analysis firm, said flatly, “Mexico is not a failed state and will not become one.”
The U.S. will never let Mexican instability threaten strategic interests---they always comply with pressure on security issues
Starr, 2010 (Pamela K., Director, U.S.-Mexico Network, Associate Professor (NTT), University Fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, October 2010, http://college.usc.edu/usmexnet/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Camp-Oxford-paper-final.doc)
This chapter will illuminate how these six variables have defined the nature of the bilateral relationship and its consequent impact on Mexican domestic policy and politics. These drivers explain Mexico’s impressive degree of political autonomy during much of the twentieth century despite sharing a 2,000-mile border with a superpower; the narrowing of this autonomy in the last quarter century; and the still significant freedom of action the bilateral relationship affords Mexico. They explain why Mexico almost always bends to U.S. demands related to national security and follows the U.S. lead on economic policy, why Mexican vulnerability to U.S. pressure varies depending on the issue at hand and thus why Mexico’s democratic transition has thus been a largely Mexican affair while its narcotics control policies have been subject to significant U.S. influence. The chapter concludes with an analysis of how these variables are apt to mold the future of the bilateral relationship and its likely impact on Mexican domestic affairs. The Drivers Power and geography One of the most important sources of Mexico’s historic vulnerability to U.S. power is its geographic position on the southern (and previously western) border of the United States. In the years after Mexico’s 1821 independence, an insecure and expansionist United States facing the intrigues of European powers on its borders was an active player in Mexican domestic affairs to counter British influence in a country characterized by persistent political instability. Twenty-five years later, the United States initiated a war that deprived Mexico of half of its territory and transformed the United States into a continental power. For most of the remainder of the nineteenth century, U.S. intervention in Mexican affairs declined markedly owing to internal U.S. challenges (the Civil War and Reconstruction) and the rise of a stable, relatively pro-U.S. government in Mexico. During the early twentieth century, however, Mexican political instability again invited U.S. intervention in a failed attempt to steer the Mexican Revolution in a direction amenable to U.S. interests. Failing that, the United States repeatedly exploited its military and economic power to force Mexico to adopt policies more “acceptable” to the United States. The oft-quoted aphorism attributed to former Mexican President Porfirio Diaz, “Poor Mexico, so far from God and close to the United States,” conveys these real historic limits to Mexico’s sovereign autonomy created by a border shared with a great power. Yet geography has also constrained the freedom of U.S. policy action. Mexico’s position on the U.S. southern border means that the overriding U.S. interest in Mexico is ultimately to have a stable ally on its frontier. The importance of this fact was evident during the early nineteenth century and was forcefully underlined during World War I when Mexican political instability and flirtation with U.S. adversaries created the threat of a possible attack on the United States through Mexican territory. In the aftermath of that war, concerns about foreign adversaries attacking the United States through Mexico declined, but the approach of a second world war rekindled U.S. strategic concerns about Mexico. In this circumstance the United States acquiesced to the 1938 nationalization of the Mexican petroleum industry, a clear violation of the sanctity of private property rights for which the United States had intervened in the past. Put simply, having an ally in such a strategically important country trumped the rights of U.S. property owners. During the Cold War when the United States feared that developing nations might fall like dominos to communist influence, Mexico was the “last domino” in Latin America. This strategic reality motivated a U.S. willingness to accept Mexico’s authoritarian politics and closed economy for forty years, practices that had previously motivated U.S. involvement in Mexican affairs, in exchange for a stable, anti-communist ally to the south. Mexico repeatedly exploited this consequence of geography to carve out an autonomous policy-making space. Throughout the Cold War, this enabled an independent foreign policy that was regularly at odds with U.S. preferences. For a revolutionary regime following increasingly conservative economic and social policies at home, a foreign policy motivated by the revolutionary principles of anti-imperialism, social welfare, and non-intervention was an effective tool for legitimating the regime. This inspired a series of international positions in direct opposition to United States policy. Most notably, Mexico sustained diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union when that was frowned upon in Washington; it recognized the Castro regime in Cuba and persistently opposed its political and economic isolation; it vocally opposed U.S.-sponsored coups and other forms of intervention in Latin America; and it actively supported the 1970s socialist government in Chile. The United States tolerated this opposition with an eye to strengthening a stable, essentially pro-U.S. regime on the U.S. frontier, but only as long as Mexican action did not pose a real obstacle to the U.S. capacity to protect its strategic interests. The lone exception to this Cold War rule occurred during the 1980s in Central America when the United States concluded that Mexican involvement directly impeded the promotion of U.S. strategic aims in the region. This circumstance provoked two years of very tense bilateral relations, but the United States ultimately concluded that a strategy designed to outmaneuver Mexico was more likely to produce a positive outcome than further pressure on Mexico to abandon its independent and domestically popular policy stance. Yet when the United States perceives a threat to its national security emanating from Mexico or when Mexican stability appears to be at risk, Mexico’s autonomy narrows once again. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Mexican policy autonomy evaporated leading to a series of actions that responded perfectly to U.S. national interests. Mexico’s current difficulties with drug trafficking organizations and the threat they represent to stability in Mexico have also hampered its policy freedom. The strategic factor in the bilateral relationship thus trumps other policy concerns. When this involves the possibility of an attack on the U.S. homeland or political instability in Mexico, it sharply increases U.S. influence in Mexican affairs, but when it involves protecting an established, stable ally in Mexico, U.S. influence declines sharply.
| 16,322 |
<h4><strong>even if state legalization is inevitable – federal isn’t and the process will take a long time</h4><p>The Inquisitr 11/9’</strong> (The Inquisitr, November 9 2014, “Oregon, Alaska, and D.C. Have Legalized Recreational Pot — Is Nationwide Legalization Inevitable?”, http://www.inquisitr.com/1597751/oregon-alaska-and-d-c-have-legalized-recreational-pot-is-nationwide-legalization-inevitable/)</p><p><u>So will these statewide legalization efforts bring about a change in marijuana policy at the national level? The answer is far from clear, but the path to finding an answer to the question begins at the White House.</u> At the federal level, drug policy is carried out by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which is itself a part of the Justice Department. The Justice Department is part of the Executive Branch, which means that the DEA, at least indirectly, answers to the president. What that means on a practical level is that one phone call from the Oval Office could send a van full of DEA agents in SWAT gear to every medical and recreational pot dispensary in the country before the day is out. Fortunately, the Obama Administration’s approach to statewide marijuana legalization has been one of “See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil.” But <u>on January 20, <mark>2017, all bets will be off</mark>.</u> Of the possible Democrat contenders for 2016, Hillary Clinton seems the most likely. Since she spent eight years as First Lady to Bill “I Didn’t Inhale” <u><mark>Clinton,</mark> don’t expect her to release the DEA hounds on the legal pot industry, but <mark>whether she’ll pursue nationwide legalization is anybody’s guess. If a Republican takes the Oval Office, things could be starkly different</mark>.</u> Although Republicans, in the main, support states’ rights, an ardent social conservative such as Rick Santorum in the <u><mark>White House could send the nation’s marijuana policy back to the Reagan Era with a single phone call. Things look far less hopeful in the Legislative Branch. With the Republicans taking over the Senate</u></mark>, and maintaining their majority in the House, it appears as if the GOP’s main goals for the remainder of Obama’s lame-duck administration seem to focus on taxes, energy, and dismantling Obamacare. <u>Changes in federal marijuana policy are likely not on anyone’s radar.</u> There is, however, a possibility of marijuana legalization coming from, of all places, the judiciary. Late last month, United States District Judge Kimberly Mueller heard arguments in favor of re-classifying marijuana, which is currently a Schedule I narcotic (“no medical use”) as far as the federal government is concerned. However, if Mueller rules in favor of re-classifying pot, essentially the nation’s pot laws would be changed with a stroke of a judge’s pen. At this point, it’s probably a long shot, but a ruling may come after the first of the year, according to The Weed Blog. Regardless of how things play out over the next few years, one thing seems to be obvious: <u><mark>The path to nationwide marijuana legalization is not likely to be through Washington</mark>, </u><strong>but through the individual state capitals.</p><p><u></strong>No impact to failed states -- empirics, </p><p></u><strong>CTC 10 </strong>(Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Al-Qaidas-MisAdventures-in-the-Horn-of-Africa.pdf, “Al Qaeda’s misadventures in the Horn of Africa”)//trepka<u>During the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization</u>, honing its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database. <u>Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, by the <mark>Combating Terrorism Center</mark> (CTC) at West Point, <mark>draws on recently declassified Harmony documents</u></mark>, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, <u><mark>original field work</mark> by CTC personnel <mark>and careful</mark> country <mark>studies</mark> to enrich</u> our <u>understanding of the terrorist group’s early successes and failure</u>s in the Horn of Africa. <u>The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan.</u> As recounted by its leaders and operatives, <u><mark>alQa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region</mark> and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere <mark>were largely a failure</mark>. Conventional wisdom suggests </u>that Somalia, <u>a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. </u>Our analysis, however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qa’ida’s activities. <u><mark>In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to</mark> many of the same <mark>challenges</mark> that plague Western interventions in the Horn. <mark>They were prone to extortion and betrayal</mark>, found themselves <mark>trapped in the middle of incomprehensible</mark> (</u>to them)<u> <mark>clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcom</mark>e significant <mark>logistical constraints and were subject to the</mark> constant <strong><mark>risk of Western military interdiction.</p><p></u></mark>No Latin American conflict – democracy checks and empirically denied </p><p>Ghitis, 12 - </strong>an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida, World Politics Review, “Latin America, the World's Democracy Lab” 7/5, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12127/world-citizen-latin-america-the-worlds-democracy-lab<u>)</p><p><mark>Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules</mark> for what continue to be fierce political battles</u>. <u>The <mark>disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now</mark> tend to <mark>spark</mark> bitter <mark>legislative maneuvers</u>,</mark> even thinly disguised coups, <u>punctuated with street <mark>protests</mark> that sometimes turn violent, but eventually <mark>die off.</u></mark> <u>Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment within</u> the elusive parameters of <u><mark>democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum</u></mark>. It has meant that even when the system disappoints, <u><strong>there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula to concoct. </p><p></u>b. it’s empirically denied --- bunch of previous uprisings prove no spillover --- 14 other incidents also prove</p><p>Hartzell 2000 </strong>(Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-28765765_ITM)</p><p><u><mark>Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars</u></mark> during the <u><mark>post-World War II</u></mark> era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world<mark>, <u>Latin America has endured some extremely</u></mark> violent and <u><mark>destabilizing</mark> </u>intrastate <u><mark>conflicts</u>. (2) <u></mark>The region's experiences</u> with civil wars and their resolution thus <u>may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage.</u><strong> By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?</p><p>Mexico stable now – institutions, democracy, economics, and successful anti-drug policies – answers all their warrants</p><p>Broder, 9 </strong>senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked as an editor at National Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at Harvard University.<strong> <u></strong>(Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09 http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang</p><p></u>¶ Mexican officials bristle at the dire forecasts for their country. “<u>The <mark>suggestion that Mexico is</u></mark> remotely close to <u><mark>a failed state or is heading in that direction is</mark> analytically flawed and </u>therefore simply <u><mark>wrong</u></mark>,” Arturo <u>Sarukhan, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, said </u>in a statement. “<u><mark>Mexico is</mark> today <mark>a country with solid institutions</mark>, a <mark>consolidating</mark> and pluralistic <mark>democracy</mark>, a vibrant civil society, <mark>and, despite</mark> the global <mark>recession, strong economic fundamentals</u></mark>.”¶ ¶ In a separate interview, Sarukhan argued that <u>the <mark>heavy toll from</mark> the <mark>armed confrontations</mark> in Mexico <mark>is</u></mark>, if anything<mark>, <u>a sign of</mark> his <mark>government’s strength and determination to confront the cartels</u>, <u>which</u></mark>, he adds, <u><mark>have grown increasingly desperate under the army’s assault</u>.</mark> <u>“The violence</u>,” Sarukhan said, “<u>is an indication that they’re feeling the pressure and against the ropes.”¶ ¶ Many U.S. experts on Mexico also reject what George W. Grayson, a Mexico scholar at</u> the College of William & Mary, called the “overstated” tone of the recent warnings about Mexico.¶ ¶ “<u>The <mark>army is still loyal</mark> to the regime</u>,” said Grayson. “<u>Most workers get up and go to their jobs every day, and the major production facilities around the country continue to turn out goods and services</u>.”¶ ¶ <u>Allyson Benton, a Mexico City-based analyst for</u> the Eurasia Group, <u>an international risk analysis firm</u>, said flatly, “<u><strong>Mexico is not a failed state and will not become one.”</p><p></u>The U.S. will <u>never</u> let Mexican instability threaten strategic interests---they <u>always</u> comply with pressure on security issues </p><p>Starr, 2010</strong> (Pamela K., Director, U.S.-Mexico Network, Associate Professor (NTT), University Fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, October 2010, http://college.usc.edu/usmexnet/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Camp-Oxford-paper-final.doc)</p><p>This chapter will illuminate how <u>these six variables have defined the nature of the bilateral relationship and its</u> consequent <u>impact on Mexican domestic policy</u> and politics. These drivers explain Mexico’s impressive degree of political autonomy during much of the twentieth century despite sharing a 2,000-mile border with a superpower; the narrowing of this autonomy in the last quarter century; and the still significant freedom of action the bilateral relationship affords Mexico. <u>They explain why</u> <u><mark>Mexico</mark> almost <mark>always bends to U.S. demands related to national security</u></mark> and follows the U.S. lead on economic policy, why Mexican vulnerability to U.S. pressure varies depending on the issue at hand and thus why Mexico’s democratic transition has thus been a largely Mexican affair while <u>its narcotics control policies have been subject to significant U.S. influence</u>. The chapter concludes with an analysis of how these variables are apt to mold the future of the bilateral relationship and its likely impact on Mexican domestic affairs. The Drivers Power and geography <u>One of the most important sources of Mexico’s historic vulnerability to U.S. power is its geographic position</u> on the southern (and previously western) border of the United States. In the years after Mexico’s 1821 independence, an insecure and expansionist United States facing the intrigues of European powers on its borders was an active player in Mexican domestic affairs to counter British influence in a country characterized by persistent political instability. Twenty-five years later, the United States initiated a war that deprived Mexico of half of its territory and transformed the United States into a continental power. For most of the remainder of the nineteenth century, U.S. intervention in Mexican affairs declined markedly owing to internal U.S. challenges (the Civil War and Reconstruction) and the rise of a stable, relatively pro-U.S. government in Mexico. During the early twentieth century, however, Mexican political instability again invited U.S. intervention in a failed attempt to steer the Mexican Revolution in a direction amenable to U.S. interests. Failing that, the United States repeatedly exploited its military and economic power to force Mexico to adopt policies more “acceptable” to the United States. The oft-quoted aphorism attributed to former Mexican President Porfirio Diaz, “Poor Mexico, so far from God and close to the United States,” conveys these real historic limits to Mexico’s sovereign autonomy created by a border shared with a great power. Yet geography has also constrained the freedom of U.S. policy action. Mexico’s position on the U.S. southern border means that <u>the <mark>overriding U.S. interest in Mexico i</mark>s ultimately <mark>to have a stable ally</mark> on its frontier</u>. The importance of this fact was evident during the early nineteenth century and was forcefully underlined during World War I when Mexican political instability and flirtation with U.S. adversaries created the threat of a possible attack on the United States through Mexican territory. In the aftermath of that war, concerns about foreign adversaries attacking the United States through Mexico declined, but the approach of a second world war rekindled U.S. strategic concerns about Mexico. In this circumstance the United States acquiesced to the 1938 nationalization of the Mexican petroleum industry, a clear violation of the sanctity of private property rights for which the United States had intervened in the past. Put simply, having an ally in such a strategically important country trumped the rights of U.S. property owners. During the Cold War when the United States feared that developing nations might fall like dominos to communist influence, <u>Mexico was the “last domino” in Latin America</u>. This strategic reality motivated a U.S. willingness to accept Mexico’s authoritarian politics and closed economy for forty years, practices that had previously motivated U.S. involvement in Mexican affairs, in exchange for a stable, anti-communist ally to the south. Mexico repeatedly exploited this consequence of geography to carve out an autonomous policy-making space. Throughout the Cold War, this enabled an independent foreign policy that was regularly at odds with U.S. preferences. For a revolutionary regime following increasingly conservative economic and social policies at home, a foreign policy motivated by the revolutionary principles of anti-imperialism, social welfare, and non-intervention was an effective tool for legitimating the regime. This inspired a series of international positions in direct opposition to United States policy. Most notably, Mexico sustained diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union when that was frowned upon in Washington; it recognized the Castro regime in Cuba and persistently opposed its political and economic isolation; it vocally opposed U.S.-sponsored coups and other forms of intervention in Latin America; and it actively supported the 1970s socialist government in Chile. <u>The <mark>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>tolerated</u></mark> this <u><mark>opposition</u></mark> with an eye to strengthening a stable, essentially pro-U.S. regime on the U.S. frontier, but <u>only <mark>as long as Mexican action did not pose a real obstacle</mark> to the U.S. capacity to protect its strategic interests</u>. The lone exception to this Cold War rule occurred during the 1980s in Central America when the United States concluded that Mexican involvement directly impeded the promotion of U.S. strategic aims in the region. This circumstance provoked two years of very tense bilateral relations, but the United States ultimately concluded that a strategy designed to outmaneuver Mexico was more likely to produce a positive outcome than further pressure on Mexico to abandon its independent and domestically popular policy stance. <u>Yet <mark>when the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>perceives</mark> a threat to its national security emanating from Mexico or when <mark>Mexican stability</mark> appears to be <mark>at risk</u>, <u>Mexico’s autonomy narrows</u></mark> once again. <u><mark>Following</u></mark> the <u><mark>September 11</u></mark>, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, <u><mark>Mexican policy autonomy evaporated</u> <u>leading to</mark> a series of <mark>actions that</u> <u>responded perfectly to U.S. national interests</u></mark>. <u>Mexico’s</u> current <u>difficulties with drug trafficking</u> organizations and the threat they represent to stability in Mexico <u>have</u> also <u>hampered its policy freedom.</u> <u>The <mark>strategic factor</mark> in the bilateral relationship</u> thus <u><mark>trumps other policy concerns</u>.</mark> <u><mark>When this involves</mark> the possibility of an attack on the U.S. homeland or <mark>political instability in Mexico</u>, <u>it sharply increases U.S. influence</mark> in Mexican affairs<strong>, but when it involves protecting an established, stable ally in Mexico, U.S. influence declines sharply. </p></u></strong>
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2nc
| null |
A/T Legalization Inevitable
| 65,229 | 8 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,186 |
Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff
|
Lopez 9/25
|
Lopez 9/25/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder)
|
Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana The question enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
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Holder said it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interferenc the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule the process involves significant bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
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On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric Holder said in an interview with Yahoo News that it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuana in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." The question, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs. Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interference — arguably the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970. Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule, as I explained before. But the process also involves significant scientific and bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.
| 1,886 |
<h4><strong>Liberal AG leads to descheduling of marijuana- solves the aff</h4><p>Lopez 9/25<u></strong>/2014 (German [his name, not necessarily nationality], writer for Vox, covers criminal justice, the war on drugs, health, and LGBT issues, Eric Holder questions marijuana's legal status as he prepares to leave Justice Department, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/US-drug-schedule-marijuana-Justice-Department-Eric-Holder) </p><p></u>On the eve of his reported resignation, US Attorney General Eric <u><mark>Holder said</u></mark> in an interview with Yahoo News that <u><mark>it's time to reconsider marijuana's legal classification</u></mark> in the federal government's scheduling system. Under the current classification, marijuana is placed in the same category as heroin, which severely limits how researchers and doctors can use the drug. <u><strong><mark>A reclassification could dramatically shift how the federal government handles marijuan</mark>a </u></strong>in the war on drugs and provide some legal legitimacy to medical marijuana at the federal level. "I think it's certainly a question that we need to ask ourselves — whether or not marijuana is as serious a drug as is heroin," Holder said. "[T]he question of whether or not they should be in the same category is something that I think we need to ask ourselves, and use science as the basis for making that determination." <u>The question</u>, which goes at the heart of US drug policy, <u>enshrines Holder's openness to drawing down the war on drugs.</u> <u><mark>Holder's office had already allowed Colorado and Washington to carry out their own experiments in legalization without federal interferenc</mark>e</u> — arguably <u><mark>the most significant steps in dismantling the war on drugs since its beginnings in the 1970.</mark> Holder also supported reforms that will pull back prison sentences for nonviolent drug offenders. </u>Holder clarified that he's still unsure about where he stands on the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana, but he said legalization efforts at the state level should provide a lesson for federal policymakers. While decriminalization and legalization are largely up to an act of Congress, <u><mark>the US attorney general holds a lot of power in deciding when to review a drug's schedule</u></mark>, as I explained before. But <u><mark>the process</u></mark> also <u><mark>involves</u> <u>significant</u></mark> scientific and <u><strong><mark>bureaucratic processes, some of which are already underway for marijuana.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
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1NR
|
Turns Trafficking
| 430,915 | 4 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,187 |
The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market
|
Hughes 9
|
Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.
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U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid
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A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences
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Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92
| 2,620 |
<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,256 | 14 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
|
Navy
|
9
|
George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
|
Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,188 |
Small farms Worse for the environment – land costs are offset by emissions. Their authors do not have science supporting them
|
Wilcox 12
|
Wilcox 12 Christie Wilcox, a Ph.D. student in cellular and molecular biology at the University of Hawaii, is the author of the Science Sushi blog at Scientific American. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/10/is-organic-food-worth-the-expense/the-ecological-case-against-organic-farming?pagewanted=all
|
While it sounds like the perfect solution, the fact is our notion of organic farming is an idyllic fallacy organic farms use pesticides While "natural" sounds better, it’s not synonymous with safe natural ones aren’t in any way less dangerous organic farms are only about 80 percent as productive as conventional ones Already, we have cleared more than a third of the Earth’s ice-free land for agriculture. To farm entirely organically, we’d need more. Decreased productivity has real environmental consequences benefits come at a high cost, as organic varieties actually produce more carbon emissions per unit of food, contributing to the devastating effects of climate change Until organic farming can rival the production output of conventional farming, its ecological cost is devastating science has been unable to support claims that organic foods are safer or healthier
|
While it sounds like the perfect solution organic farming is an idyllic fallacy organic farms use pesticides natural ones aren’t less dangerous organic farms are only 80 percent as productive Already, we have cleared more than a third of the Earth’s ice-free land for ag Decreased productivity has real environmental consequences efits come at a high cost, as organic varieties actually produce more carbon emissions per unit of food, contributing to the devastating effects of climate change Until organic farming can rival conventional farming its ecological cost is devastating science has been unable to support claims that organic foods are safer
|
Organic farming tugs at our heartstrings, harkening back to a simpler time when life was rugged and man lived off the land. We’re told organic farming is not only better for us, but also better for the environment. While it sounds like the perfect solution, the fact is our notion of organic farming is an idyllic fallacy. Most people say they buy organic food to avoid pesticides, but organic farms (especially those with products found in grocery stores) use natural pesticides like rotenone and copper sulfate. While "natural" sounds better, it’s not synonymous with safe. There are plenty of naturally occurring things that are bad for us -- after all, anthrax and botulinum toxin are 100 percent natural. Organic pesticides have been linked to a wide variety of diseases -- some at lower doses than synthetic ones. Fact is, all pesticides are designed to kill, and natural ones aren’t in any way less dangerous. But perhaps the crux of the organic argument is the idea that natural methods are better for the environment. The trouble is, organic farms are only about 80 percent as productive as conventional ones. Already, we have cleared more than a third of the Earth’s ice-free land for agriculture. To farm entirely organically, we’d need more. Decreased productivity isn’t just a space issue; it has real environmental consequences. While organic farming can be better for wildlife, a systematic review by Oxford University scientists found these benefits come at a high cost, as organic varieties actually produce more carbon emissions per unit of food, contributing to the devastating effects of climate change. Until organic farming can rival the production output of conventional farming, its ecological cost is devastating, and so far, science has been unable to support claims that organic foods are safer or healthier. Organic farming does have many potential upsides, but it isn’t a panacea. Instead, its methods need to be considered alongside conventional ones to create the best balance of productivity and sustainability.
| 2,043 |
<h4>Small farms Worse for the environment – land costs are offset by emissions. Their authors do not have science supporting them</h4><p><strong>Wilcox 12 </strong>Christie Wilcox, a Ph.D. student in cellular and molecular biology at the University of Hawaii, is the author of the Science Sushi blog at Scientific American. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/10/is-organic-food-worth-the-expense/the-ecological-case-against-organic-farming?pagewanted=all</p><p>Organic farming tugs at our heartstrings, harkening back to a simpler time when life was rugged and man lived off the land. We’re told organic farming is not only better for us, but also better for the environment. <u><mark>While it sounds like the perfect solution</mark>, the fact is our notion of <mark>organic farming is an idyllic fallacy</u></mark>. Most people say they buy organic food to avoid pesticides, but <u><mark>organic farms</u></mark> (especially those with products found in grocery stores) <u><mark>use</u></mark> natural <u><mark>pesticides</u></mark> like rotenone and copper sulfate. <u>While "natural" sounds better, it’s not synonymous with safe</u>. There are plenty of naturally occurring things that are bad for us -- after all, anthrax and botulinum toxin are 100 percent natural. Organic pesticides have been linked to a wide variety of diseases -- some at lower doses than synthetic ones. Fact is, all pesticides are designed to kill, and <u><mark>natural ones aren’t</mark> in any way <mark>less dangerous</u></mark>. But perhaps the crux of the organic argument is the idea that natural methods are better for the environment. The trouble is, <u><mark>organic farms are only</mark> about <mark>80 percent as productive</mark> as conventional ones</u>. <u><mark>Already, we have cleared more than a third of the Earth’s ice-free land for ag</mark>riculture. To farm entirely organically, we’d need more.</u> <u><mark>Decreased productivity</u></mark> isn’t just a space issue; it <u><mark>has real environmental consequences</u></mark>. While organic farming can be better for wildlife, a systematic review by Oxford University scientists found these <u>ben<mark>efits come at a high cost, as organic varieties actually produce more carbon emissions per unit of food, contributing to the devastating effects of climate change</u></mark>. <u><mark>Until organic farming can rival</mark> the production output of <mark>conventional farming</mark>, <mark>its ecological cost is devastating</u></mark>, and so far, <u><mark>science has been unable to support claims that organic foods are safer</mark> or healthier</u>. Organic farming does have many potential upsides, but it isn’t a panacea. Instead, its methods need to be considered alongside conventional ones to create the best balance of productivity and sustainability.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
A1
| 430,280 | 2 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,189 |
Status quo solves grid cyber vulnerability
|
Clark 12
|
Paul Clark 12, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf
|
An attack against the grid is a reasonable threat scenario Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been "honed over many years of practical application now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary applications and components The security of the electrical grid is enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of Stuxnet the public and private sector are working together in an "unprecedented effort to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures
|
grid vulnerabilities are mitigated by increased detection and deterrent capability "honed over years security is enhanced by awareness the public and private are working together in an "unprecedented effort" to establish robust cyber measures
|
An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are "a high priority target for military and insurgents" and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has "increased vulnerability across the board" (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been "honed over many years of practical application" now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010: as a result the public and private sector are working together in an "unprecedented effort" to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).
| 993 |
<h4><strong>Status quo solves grid cyber vulnerability </h4><p></strong>Paul <strong>Clark 12</strong>, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf</p><p><u>An attack against the</u> electrical <u><mark>grid</mark> is a reasonable threat scenario</u> since power systems are "a high priority target for military and insurgents" and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has "increased vulnerability across the board" (Lewis 2010). <u>Yet the</u> <u>increased <mark>vulnerabilities are</u> <u>mitigated</u> <u>by</mark> an</u> <u><mark>increased detection and deterrent capability</u> <u></mark>that has been <mark>"honed over </mark>many <mark>years</mark> of practical application</u>" <u>now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary</u> and specialized, <u>applications and components</u> (Leita and Dacier 2012). <u>The</u> <u><mark>security </mark>of the electrical grid <mark>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>enhanced by </mark>increased <mark>awareness</mark> after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of</u> the <u>Stuxnet</u> malware in 2010: as a result <u><mark>the public and private </mark>sector <mark>are</u> <u>working together</u> <u>in an</u> <u>"unprecedented effort</u>" <u>to establish robust </mark>security guidelines and <mark>cyber </mark>security <mark>measures</u><strong></mark> (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).</p></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 185,508 | 18 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,190 |
And yes escalation and nuclear war
|
Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12
|
Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)
|
historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," A recent statistical analysis by Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident, or an unauthorized use a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. , the residual risk of inadvertent escalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would be nontrivial and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating.
|
inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be crisis-prone Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage adventurism leading to frequent and intense Such crises would entail risk of a nuclear exchange from miscalculation accident the risk of inadvertent escalation would be nontrivial
|
Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. A recent statistical analysis by the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident, or an unauthorized use -- a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control, the residual risk of inadvertent escalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would be nontrivial -- and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating.
| 2,921 |
<h4>And yes escalation and nuclear war </h4><p><strong>Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12<u></strong> (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)</p><p></u>Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the <u>historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox,"</u> in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. <u>A recent statistical analysis by</u> the political scientist Michael <u>Horowitz demonstrated that <mark>inexperienced nuclear powers tend to</mark> <mark>be</mark> more <mark>crisis-prone</mark> than other types of states, </u>and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But <u>history suggests that <mark>Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would</mark> <mark>encourage</mark> Iranian <mark>adventurism</mark>, <mark>leading to</mark> <strong>more <mark>frequent and intense</mark> crises</strong> in the Middle East. <mark>Such crises would entail</mark> some <strong>inherent <mark>risk of a nuclear exchange</strong></mark> resulting <mark>from</mark> a <mark>miscalculation</mark>,</u> <u>an <mark>accident</mark>, or an unauthorized use</u> -- <u>a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. </u>Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control<u>, <mark>the</mark> residual <mark>risk of inadvertent</mark> <mark>escalation</mark> stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes <mark>would be nontrivial</u></mark> -- <u>and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating.</p></u>
|
1nr
|
ov
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 47,404 | 18 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,191 |
Regulations aren’t allowed- distribution and cultivation must be prohibited by federal law
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition are often misinterpreted by cannabis-reform advocates arguing that they allow licit cultivation if requirements for governmental control are met the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. in the case of cannabis, as per its inclusion in Schedule IV, the Single Convention clearly recommends that it should be limited to small amounts for research only Legal regulation of the cannabis market cannot be justified within the existing limits of latitude of the UN drug control treaty regime
|
treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition are often misinterpreted the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes Legal regulation of the cannabis market cannot be justified within the existing limits of the UN drug control treaty regime
|
These treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition, leaving open options for licit cannabis cultivation, are often misinterpreted by cannabis-reform advocates, arguing that they also allow for licit cultivation for non-medical purposes if the strict requirements for governmental control are met. They argue that if a party does not “render the prohibition of the cultivation [...] the most suitable measure [...] for protecting the public health and welfare,” that party is not required to prohibit it and thus can allow cannabis cultivation under state control. However, the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. And in the case of cannabis, as per its inclusion in Schedule IV, the Single Convention clearly recommends that it should be limited to small amounts for research only. Legal regulation of the cannabis market for recreational purposes, therefore, cannot be justified within the existing limits of latitude of the UN drug control treaty regime. It is within this context that we must view recent policy shifts in two U.S. states and in Uruguay.
| 1,155 |
<h4><strong>Regulations aren’t allowed- distribution and cultivation must be prohibited by federal law</h4><p>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p>These <u><mark>treaty articles about the optional character of prohibition</u></mark>, leaving open options for licit cannabis cultivation, <u><mark>are often misinterpreted</mark> by cannabis-reform advocates</u>, <u>arguing that they</u> also <u>allow</u> for <u>licit cultivation</u> for non-medical purposes <u>if</u> the strict <u>requirements for governmental control are met</u>. They argue that if a party does not “render the prohibition of the cultivation [...] the most suitable measure [...] for protecting the public health and welfare,” that party is not required to prohibit it and thus can allow cannabis cultivation under state control. However, <u><mark>the object and purpose of the conventions limits the non-prohibition option exclusively to medical and scientific purposes</mark>.</u> And <u>in the case of cannabis, as per its inclusion in Schedule IV, the Single Convention clearly recommends that it should be limited to small amounts for research only</u>. <u><mark>Legal regulation of the cannabis market</u></mark> for recreational purposes, therefore, <u><strong><mark>cannot be justified</strong> within the existing limits</mark> of latitude <mark>of the UN drug control treaty regime</u><strong></mark>. It is within this context that we must view recent policy shifts in two U.S. states and in Uruguay.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
Treaties
| 430,954 | 16 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,192 |
A new, progressive AG is key- solves prisons and civil rights and prevents backsliding
|
Butler 9/30
|
Butler 9/30/2014 (Paul, professor at Georgetown University Law Center. A former trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, he is the author of "Let's Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice,” Obama struggles to set his racial legacy, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-eric-holder-legacy-perspec-1001-20140930-story.html)
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Holder is leaving with much unfinished business His civil rights record is extraordinary No government official has done more to reform criminal justice than Holder Holder explained the devastating impact of mass incarceration on our economy and democracy He ratcheted down the war on drugs spoke against prison for minor, nonviolent offenses; and offered the opportunity for clemency to people imprisoned under draconian sentencing laws in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime. Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they need him or her now
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Holder is leaving with much unfinished business in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done. Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime. Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they sure do need him or her now.
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Attorney General Eric Holder's resignation is bad news for President Barack Obama's racial justice legacy. Obama has done little to address race during his presidency, beyond the actions of his Justice Department. With Holder's exit, that track record suggests the president is now done with race. And that's a shame, because Holder is leaving with much unfinished business. Holder is not an attorney general who happens to be black. He is, proudly, the first black attorney general. His civil rights record, including suing states on voting rights, strengthening the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division and bringing cases against police departments for excessive force, is extraordinary. Holder will be remembered alongside his hero, Robert Kennedy, as well as Ramsey Clark and Nicholas Katzenbach, as the attorneys general who did the most to uphold "equal justice under law." No government official has done more to reform criminal justice than Holder. The United States locks up more people than any other country in the world. For most prosecutors, that's been the source of bragging rights. Holder, on the other hand, explained the devastating impact of mass incarceration on our families, economy and democracy. He ratcheted down the war on drugs; spoke against prison for minor, nonviolent offenses; and offered the opportunity for clemency to people imprisoned under draconian sentencing laws. In other words, for black Americans, Holder has been everything that Obama has not. The African-Americans who danced in the streets of Harlem when Obama was first elected did not expect that the president would, in four or eight years, reverse centuries of entrenched subjugation. But they did assume he would make racial justice a significant part of his platform. They were sadly mistaken. For all of Holder's focus on structural discrimination in the criminal and civil justice systems, the president has tended to blame black culture. Early in his presidency, he told a church audience, "Too many fathers . . . have abandoned their responsibilities, acting like boys instead of men . . . You and I know how true this is in the African-American community." Obama's scolding has sometimes seemed misplaced, as when he told members of the Congressional Black Caucus to "quit whining, quit complaining," and the graduates of Morehouse that there is no room for excuses: "Nobody cares if you suffered some discrimination." From his early years on the national stage, Obama has aimed his cultural critiques at the most dispossessed African-Americans. Campaigning in 2007, Obama mocked the work ethic of "gang bangers," saying, "Why I gotta do it? Why you didn't ask Pookie to do it?" What Pookie needed from the president was a job. Yet black unemployment has remained at least twice the level of white unemployment throughout the Obama administration. Pookie's sister needs some help too. But on the president's watch, the percentage of black women living under the poverty line has risen. In short, the two most powerful African-Americans in the country think about race in fundamentally different ways. Holder is not as much the president's alter ego on race as he is the brother from another planet. The attorney general has forcefully advocated for race-based remedies, including affirmative action in college admissions and drawing voting districts to enhance minority voting power. While Obama also supports these programs, he has said, "I think it's a mistake to start thinking in terms of particular ethnic segments of the United States rather than to think that we are all in this together." The concern that the president simply doesn't get race is why some African-Americans are worried now that Holder is on the way out. Holder's frank talk is unlikely to be matched by the president. Holder famously called us a "nation of cowards" when it comes to talking about race. Obama pushed back, explaining, "I'm not somebody who believes that constantly talking about race somehow solves racial tensions." That's a problem because in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done. Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime. Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught. Last November, Holder said the Justice Department would soon announce its decision on bringing federal civil rights charges against George Zimmerman, Trayvon Martin's killer. Almost a year later, there has been no announcement. And this summer appeared to be open season on police shootings of unarmed blacks (we don't know if the number actually increased because no federal agency is required to keep records of police shootings). So if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they sure do need him or her now.
| 4,876 |
<h4><strong>A new, progressive AG is key- solves prisons and civil rights and prevents backsliding</h4><p>Butler 9/30</strong>/2014 (Paul, professor at Georgetown University Law Center. A former trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, he is the author of "Let's Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice,” Obama struggles to set his racial legacy, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-eric-holder-legacy-perspec-1001-20140930-story.html)</p><p>Attorney General Eric Holder's resignation is bad news for President Barack Obama's racial justice legacy. Obama has done little to address race during his presidency, beyond the actions of his Justice Department. With Holder's exit, that track record suggests the president is now done with race. And that's a shame, because <u><mark>Holder is leaving with much unfinished business</u></mark>. Holder is not an attorney general who happens to be black. He is, proudly, the first black attorney general. <u>His civil rights record</u>, including suing states on voting rights, strengthening the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division and bringing cases against police departments for excessive force, <u>is extraordinary</u>. Holder will be remembered alongside his hero, Robert Kennedy, as well as Ramsey Clark and Nicholas Katzenbach, as the attorneys general who did the most to uphold "equal justice under law." <u>No government official has done more to reform criminal justice than Holder</u>. The United States locks up more people than any other country in the world. For most prosecutors, that's been the source of bragging rights. <u>Holder</u>, on the other hand, <u>explained the devastating impact of mass incarceration on our</u> families, <u>economy and democracy</u>. <u>He ratcheted down the war on drugs</u>; <u>spoke against prison for minor, nonviolent offenses; and offered the opportunity for clemency to people imprisoned under draconian sentencing laws</u>. In other words, for black Americans, Holder has been everything that Obama has not. The African-Americans who danced in the streets of Harlem when Obama was first elected did not expect that the president would, in four or eight years, reverse centuries of entrenched subjugation. But they did assume he would make racial justice a significant part of his platform. They were sadly mistaken. For all of Holder's focus on structural discrimination in the criminal and civil justice systems, the president has tended to blame black culture. Early in his presidency, he told a church audience, "Too many fathers . . . have abandoned their responsibilities, acting like boys instead of men . . . You and I know how true this is in the African-American community." Obama's scolding has sometimes seemed misplaced, as when he told members of the Congressional Black Caucus to "quit whining, quit complaining," and the graduates of Morehouse that there is no room for excuses: "Nobody cares if you suffered some discrimination." From his early years on the national stage, Obama has aimed his cultural critiques at the most dispossessed African-Americans. Campaigning in 2007, Obama mocked the work ethic of "gang bangers," saying, "Why I gotta do it? Why you didn't ask Pookie to do it?" What Pookie needed from the president was a job. Yet black unemployment has remained at least twice the level of white unemployment throughout the Obama administration. Pookie's sister needs some help too. But on the president's watch, the percentage of black women living under the poverty line has risen. In short, the two most powerful African-Americans in the country think about race in fundamentally different ways. Holder is not as much the president's alter ego on race as he is the brother from another planet. The attorney general has forcefully advocated for race-based remedies, including affirmative action in college admissions and drawing voting districts to enhance minority voting power. While Obama also supports these programs, he has said, "I think it's a mistake to start thinking in terms of particular ethnic segments of the United States rather than to think that we are all in this together." The concern that the president simply doesn't get race is why some African-Americans are worried now that Holder is on the way out. Holder's frank talk is unlikely to be matched by the president. Holder famously called us a "nation of cowards" when it comes to talking about race. Obama pushed back, explaining, "I'm not somebody who believes that constantly talking about race somehow solves racial tensions." That's a problem because <u><mark>in the Justice Department, there is still work to be done</u>. <u>Officials are expecting thousands of petitions for clemency for drug offenders incarcerated under the harsh old sentencing regime.</u> <u><strong>Unless the next attorney general shares Holder's compassion, his efforts will be for naught</u></strong></mark>. Last November, Holder said the Justice Department would soon announce its decision on bringing federal civil rights charges against George Zimmerman, Trayvon Martin's killer. Almost a year later, there has been no announcement. And this summer appeared to be open season on police shootings of unarmed blacks (we don't know if the number actually increased because no federal agency is required to keep records of police shootings). So <u><mark>if ever people of color needed an attorney general committed to civil rights, they</u> sure do <u>need him or her now</u><strong>.</p></strong></mark>
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Neg vs MSU BP
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1NR
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Turns Trafficking
| 430,955 | 2 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
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Kentucky
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4
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Michigan State Brill-Prete
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Justice
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T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,193 |
Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.
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Jaycox 12
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Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
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Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
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Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:
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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.
| 2,479 |
<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>
| null | null |
Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
| 430,255 | 14 | 17,103 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
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Navy
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9
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George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
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Allen, Steiner, Taylor
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,194 |
Industrial model is good and sustainable – AFF causes widespread environmental damage and crushes GMO’s
| null |
-lower yields: 20-50%
|
Worldwatch goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security while reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity evidence argues otherwise organic ag resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit of land and water than conventional ones The low yields of organic ag typically 20%-50% less than conventional ag ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and tech If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, serious environmental issues Another limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality namely minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with cover crops Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides Organic growers in the absence of effective herbicides rely on tillage for weed control prevalent myth is organic ag does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to animals, and rotenone, so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of fish populations the least sustainable aspect of organic farming is the exclusion of "g m o s but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing virtually all fruits, vegetables and grains have been genetically improved by one technique or another, the exclusion from organic ag of organisms makes no sense In recent decades, we have seen advances in ag that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever they have resulted from science-based research and tech ingenuity by agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern industrial agriculture
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Organic might work for local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food than conventional ones typically 20%-50% less ammonia nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions were higher than conventional farming as were "land use and acidification Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic 's systematic rejection of advanced methods and tech organic production significantly increased would increase the pressure for conversion of land and more water serious environmental issues organic production disfavors the best approach to soil quality namely tilling combined with cover crops Organic farming use rotenone widely used for mass poisoning of fish populations the least sustainable aspect is exclusion of "g m o s modified with precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing advances in ag that have been more sustainable have resulted from science-based research and tech ingenuity b agribusiness companies, not from elites opposed to modern industrial agriculture
|
-land use
-acidification
-soil erosion/tillage
-rotenone x fish
-zero-sum: aff model T/O
Miller 14 (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)
You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The Worldwatch Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, while simultaneously reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity." The evidence argues otherwise. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive organic agriculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit of land and water than conventional ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than conventional agriculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "ammonia emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication potential and acidification potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and technologies. If the scale of organic production were significantly increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for the conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation, both of which are serious environmental issues. Another limitation of organic production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil quality—namely, the minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling, combined with the use of cover crops. Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides. Organic growers do frequently plant cover crops, but in the absence of effective herbicides, often they rely on tillage (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) for weed control. One prevalent myth is that organic agriculture does not employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals (mostly containing copper and sulfur) are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to warm-blooded animals, and rotenone, which is moderately toxic to most mammals but so toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of unwanted fish populations during restocking projects. Perhaps the most illogical and least sustainable aspect of organic farming in the long term is the exclusion of "genetically modified organisms," but only those that were modified with the most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, virtually all the fruits, vegetables and grains in our diet have been genetically improved by one technique or another, often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, the exclusion from organic agriculture of organisms simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques makes no sense. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. In recent decades, we have seen advances in agriculture that have been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever before. But they have resulted from science-based research and technological ingenuity by farmers, plant breeders and agribusiness companies, not from social elites opposed to modern insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "industrial agriculture."
| 5,241 |
<h4>Industrial model is good and sustainable – AFF causes <u>widespread environmental damage </u>and <u>crushes GMO’s</u> </h4><p>-lower yields: 20-50%</p><p>-land use</p><p>-acidification </p><p>-soil erosion/tillage </p><p>-rotenone x fish</p><p>-zero-sum: aff model T/O </p><p><strong>Miller 14</strong> (Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432, Groot)</p><p>You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing. Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The <u><strong>Worldwatch </u></strong>Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, <u><strong>goes so far as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to sustainable food security </u></strong>by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in rural areas, <u><strong>while </u></strong>simultaneously <u><strong>reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing biodiversity</u></strong>." The <u><strong>evidence argues otherwise</u></strong>. A study by the Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil prior to planting as the sole fertilizer, <u><strong>resulted in significant down-leaching of nitrate" into groundwater</u></strong>. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S. and elsewhere. <u><strong><mark>Organic</mark> farming <mark>might work</mark> well <mark>for</mark> certain <mark>local environments on a small scale, but its farms produce far less food</mark> per unit of land and water <mark>than conventional ones</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The low yields of organic ag</u></strong>riculture—<u><strong><mark>typically 20%-50% less</mark> than conventional ag</u></strong>riculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found that "<u><strong><mark>ammonia </mark>emissions, <mark>nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide emissions </mark>per product unit <mark>were higher </mark>from organic systems" <mark>than conventional farming </mark>systems, <mark>as were "land use</mark>, eutrophication potential <mark>and acidification</u></strong> </mark>potential per product unit." <u><strong><mark>Lower crop yields are inevitable given organic</mark> farming<mark>'s</mark> <mark>systematic rejection of </mark>many <mark>advanced methods and tech</u></strong></mark>nologies. <u><strong>If the scale of <mark>organic production </mark>were <mark>significantly increased</mark>, the lower yields <mark>would increase the pressure for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>conversion of </mark>more <mark>land </mark>to farming <mark>and more water </mark>for irrigation,</u></strong> both of which are <u><strong><mark>serious environmental issues</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Another limitation of <mark>organic production </mark>is that it <mark>disfavors the best approach to </mark>enhancing <mark>soil quality</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>namely</u></strong></mark>, the <u><strong>minimization of soil disturbances such as <mark>tilling</mark>, <mark>combined with</u></strong> </mark>the use of <u><strong><mark>cover crops</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Both approaches help to limit soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides</u></strong>. <u><strong>Organic growers</u></strong> do frequently plant cover crops, but <u><strong>in the absence of effective herbicides</u></strong>, often they <u><strong>rely on tillage</u></strong> (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) <u><strong>for weed control</u></strong>. One <u><strong>prevalent myth is</u></strong> that <u><strong>organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>does not employ pesticides. <mark>Organic farming </mark>does <mark>use </mark>insecticides and fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals</u></strong> (mostly containing copper and sulfur) <u><strong>are commonly used in the growing and processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to</u></strong> warm-blooded <u><strong>animals, and <mark>rotenone</mark>,</u></strong> which is moderately toxic to most mammals but <u><strong>so toxic to fish that it's <mark>widely used for </mark>the <mark>mass poisoning of </u></strong></mark>unwanted<u><strong><mark> fish populations</u></strong> </mark>during restocking projects. Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the </u></strong></mark>most illogical and <u><strong><mark>least sustainable aspect </mark>of organic farming</u></strong> in the long term <u><strong><mark>is </mark>the <mark>exclusion of "g</u></strong></mark>enetically <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>odified <u><strong><mark>o</u></strong></mark>rganism<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>but only those that were <mark>modified with </mark>the most <mark>precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing</u></strong></mark>. Except for wild berries and wild mushrooms, <u><strong>virtually all</u></strong> the <u><strong>fruits, vegetables and grains</u></strong> in our diet <u><strong>have been genetically improved by one technique or another,</u></strong> often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, <u><strong>the exclusion from organic ag</u></strong>riculture <u><strong>of organisms</u></strong> simply because they were crafted with modern, superior techniques <u><strong>makes no sense</u></strong>. It also denies consumers of organic goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty acids. <u><strong>In recent decades, we have seen <mark>advances in ag</u></strong></mark>riculture <u><strong><mark>that have been more </mark>environmentally friendly and <mark>sustainable </mark>than ever</u></strong> before. But <u><strong>they <mark>have resulted from science-based research and tech</u></strong></mark>nological <u><strong><mark>ingenuity b</mark>y </u></strong>farmers, plant breeders and<u><strong> <mark>agribusiness companies, not from </mark>social <mark>elites opposed to modern</u></strong> </mark>insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "<u><strong><mark>industrial agriculture</u></strong></mark>." </p>
|
1nc
| null |
A1
| 27,650 | 27 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,195 |
Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Does the legalization of marijuana contribute to cyber crime? considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
|
Does legalization contribute to cyber crime? cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent How does a drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They downsize or diversify Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce will look like easy pickings to criminals. hacking will rise with legalization of marijuana There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites
|
Does the rapid legalization of medical marijuana in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world contribute to cyber crime? This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream. The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals. This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
| 1,935 |
<h4><strong>Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets</h4><p>Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; <u>http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/</p><p></strong><mark>Does</mark> the </u><strong>rapid <u></strong><mark>legalization</u><strong></mark> <u></strong>of</u><strong> medical <u></strong>marijuana</u><strong> in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world <u></strong><mark>contribute to cyber crime?</mark> </u><strong>This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but <u></strong>considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow.</u><strong> A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug <u></strong><mark>cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent</u><strong></mark> across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. <u></strong>So what’s a drug lord to do? <mark>How does a</mark> smart (<mark>drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up?</mark> <mark>They</mark> either <mark>downsize or diversify</mark>.</u><strong> <u></strong><mark>Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord</u><strong>, <u></strong>cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream</u><strong></mark>. <u></strong><mark>The rise of e-commerce</mark> and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites <mark>will look like easy pickings to </mark>forward-thinking <mark>criminals</u><strong>. <u></mark>This is why we believe that cyber crime and <mark>hacking will rise with</mark> the ongoing <mark>legalization of marijuana</mark>.</u> E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, <u></strong>they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network.</u><strong> <u><mark>There will be an increasing demand for</mark> <mark>network security professionals and services that “harden” websites</mark> to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.</p></u></strong>
|
Neg vs gmu cm
|
1NC
|
A 2
| 430,794 | 5 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
5
|
George Mason Call-Mohney
|
Miller
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,196 |
--Turns failed states
|
Brookes 07,
|
Brookes 07, National security affairs senior fellow, 07
(Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics, llc)
|
According to the State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Revolutionary Guard Corps support terrorist groups with funding, training and weapons. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to 100 million per year Hezbollah fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles Hezbollah is threatening to topple Lebanon's government Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S This is likely not an idle threat It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.
|
Iran continues to be the world's sponsor of terrorism Iran's Ministry of Intelligence support terrorist groups Tehran fund Hezbollah to topple Lebanon This is not an idle threat Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe as leverage against American action Iran could transfer nuclear capability use of chlorine is evidence of willingness to employ WMD
|
According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.
| 2,813 |
<h4>--Turns failed states </h4><p><strong>Brookes 07,</strong> National security affairs senior fellow, 07</p><p>(Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics, llc)</p><p><u>According to the</u> U.S. <u>State Department, <strong><mark>Iran continues to be the world's</mark> most active state <mark>sponsor of terrorism</u></strong></mark>. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, <u><mark>Iran's Ministry of Intelligence</mark> and Security</u> (MOIS) <u>and</u> Islamic <u>Revolutionary Guard Corps</u> (IRGC) <u><mark>support</u></mark> Palestinian <u><mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command <u>with funding, training and weapons.</u> Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. <u><mark>Tehran</mark> may <mark>fund Hezbollah</mark> to</u> the tune of $<u>100 million per year</u>. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, <u>Hezbollah</u> indiscriminately <u>fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles</u> into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, <u>Hezbollah</u>, with Iranian and Syrian support, <u>is threatening <mark>to topple Lebanon</mark>'s </u>democratically elected <u>government</u> unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. <u>Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S</u>. and American interests, if necessary. <u><mark>This is</mark> likely <mark>not an idle threat</u></mark>. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. <u>It is almost without question that <mark>Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe</u></mark> - including in the U.S. - <u><mark>as leverage against American </mark>military <mark>action</mark> over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq</u>. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. <u><mark>Iran could transfer nuclear capability</mark> to a Hezbollah-dominated government</u> in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. <u>The insurgency's recent <mark>use of chlorine</mark> gas</u> in Iraq <u><mark>is evidence of</mark> a terrorist group's <mark>willingness to employ WMD</mark>.</u> </p>
|
1nr
|
ov
|
Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 171,452 | 7 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
|
Navy
|
2
|
Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
|
Watson
|
Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,197 |
A new liberal is key- Holder’s actions weren’t enough
|
Reuters 9/26
|
Reuters 9/26/2014 (For Obama, Eric Holder's Exit Leaves A Void On Civil Rights Issues, reprinted in the Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/obama-eric-holder_n_5886950.html)
|
The departure of Holder deprives the administration of a powerful voice on civil rights advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole on Obama's team They are worried that his work on voting rights, sentencing reform, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside We've always seen him as an important spokesperson for the administration and that role should not go unfulfilled." Holder acknowledged that "work remains to be done Holder has asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug cases Holder announced earlier this year that the department would review applications for executive clemency - another project that is under way but unfinished
|
advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole They are worried that his work on voting rights, sentencing reform, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside important spokesperson for the administration and that role should not go unfulfilled work remains to be done asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug case executive clemency - another project that is under way but unfinished
|
The departure of U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder deprives the Obama administration of a powerful voice on civil rights at a time when riots in Ferguson, Missouri, have thrust the issue into the spotlight. Civil rights advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole on Obama's team when it comes to events such as in Ferguson - where days of protests followed the fatal police shooting of an unarmed black teenager - and challenging laws in some states requiring voters to show photo identification, measures that Holder has said would prevent black and Latino voters from going to the polls. They are worried that his work on voting rights, sentencing reform, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside when his yet-to-be-determined successor sets a new set of priorities - particularly as the administration focuses on counterterrorism and the threat posed by Islamic State militants. "We always thought that he was able to say the things that Obama could not say," said Barbara Arnwine, president of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. "We've always seen him as an important spokesperson for the administration and that role should not go unfulfilled." BONDS THAT GO 'MUCH DEEPER' In a speech choked with emotion on Thursday, Holder recounted how he had been part of Team Obama since his friend was a "young senator from Illinois" making "an improbable, idealistic effort" to become president. Obama stuck with Holder even as he became a lightning rod for Republican criticism of his administration. "We have been great colleagues, but the bonds between us are much deeper than that. In good times and in bad, in things personal and in things professional, you have been there for me," Holder said to Obama. Over the years, both men have spoken about racism they have experienced in their own lives. Before he became the nation's first black president, Obama wrote "Dreams from My Father," a memoir on racial identity. But since taking office, he has often shied away from talking publicly about race. By contrast, Holder - who worked for the NAACP legal defense fund early in his career - has been more outspoken. His sister-in-law, Vivian Malone Jones, became a hero in the desegregation movement of the 1960s after she was blocked from entering the University of Alabama when she arrived for classes. "I think in his own way, using his role as Attorney General, Holder has addressed issues that remain off-limits," said Wade Henderson, president of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. Holder talked openly about his own experiences with racial profiling after Trayvon Martin, a black teenager in Florida, was shot last year - days before Obama spoke out. Holder talked about the humiliation of being pulled over and searched on the New Jersey turnpike when he was not speeding, and about being stopped by police while running in Washington's tony Georgetown neighborhood. In August, after unarmed black teenager Michael Brown was shot and killed by a white policeman in Ferguson - sparking nights of riots - Obama sent Holder to meet with community members. Holder vowed the Justice Department would investigate whether criminal and civil charges are warranted, but the probe is unlikely to be complete before his departure. THINGS LEFT UNDONE As he listed his accomplishments, Holder acknowledged that "work remains to be done." On his to-do list in the weeks before he leaves, Holder hopes to announce new guidelines to curb racial profiling in federal law enforcement investigations, the Justice Department said. Holder has asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug cases. But more sweeping proposals to abolish mandatory minimum sentences have failed to get traction in Congress. Holder announced earlier this year that the department would review potentially hundreds of applications for executive clemency - another project that is under way but unfinished.
| 4,013 |
<h4><strong>A new liberal is key- Holder’s actions weren’t enough</h4><p>Reuters 9/26</strong>/2014 (For Obama, Eric Holder's Exit Leaves A Void On Civil Rights Issues, reprinted in the Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/obama-eric-holder_n_5886950.html)</p><p><u>The departure of</u> U.S. Attorney General Eric <u>Holder</u> <u>deprives</u> <u>the</u> Obama <u>administration</u> <u>of a powerful voice on civil rights</u> at a time when riots in Ferguson, Missouri, have thrust the issue into the spotlight. Civil rights <u><mark>advocates fear his exit leaves a hard-to-fill hole</mark> on Obama's team</u> when it comes to events such as in Ferguson - where days of protests followed the fatal police shooting of an unarmed black teenager - and challenging laws in some states requiring voters to show photo identification, measures that Holder has said would prevent black and Latino voters from going to the polls. <u><mark>They are worried that his work on voting rights, <strong>sentencing reform</strong>, and addressing racial profiling measures used by police could fall by the wayside</u></mark> when his yet-to-be-determined successor sets a new set of priorities - particularly as the administration focuses on counterterrorism and the threat posed by Islamic State militants. "We always thought that he was able to say the things that Obama could not say," said Barbara Arnwine, president of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. "<u>We've always seen him as an <strong><mark>important spokesperson for the administration</strong> and that role should not go unfulfilled</mark>."</u> BONDS THAT GO 'MUCH DEEPER' In a speech choked with emotion on Thursday, Holder recounted how he had been part of Team Obama since his friend was a "young senator from Illinois" making "an improbable, idealistic effort" to become president. Obama stuck with Holder even as he became a lightning rod for Republican criticism of his administration. "We have been great colleagues, but the bonds between us are much deeper than that. In good times and in bad, in things personal and in things professional, you have been there for me," Holder said to Obama. Over the years, both men have spoken about racism they have experienced in their own lives. Before he became the nation's first black president, Obama wrote "Dreams from My Father," a memoir on racial identity. But since taking office, he has often shied away from talking publicly about race. By contrast, Holder - who worked for the NAACP legal defense fund early in his career - has been more outspoken. His sister-in-law, Vivian Malone Jones, became a hero in the desegregation movement of the 1960s after she was blocked from entering the University of Alabama when she arrived for classes. "I think in his own way, using his role as Attorney General, Holder has addressed issues that remain off-limits," said Wade Henderson, president of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. Holder talked openly about his own experiences with racial profiling after Trayvon Martin, a black teenager in Florida, was shot last year - days before Obama spoke out. Holder talked about the humiliation of being pulled over and searched on the New Jersey turnpike when he was not speeding, and about being stopped by police while running in Washington's tony Georgetown neighborhood. In August, after unarmed black teenager Michael Brown was shot and killed by a white policeman in Ferguson - sparking nights of riots - Obama sent Holder to meet with community members. Holder vowed the Justice Department would investigate whether criminal and civil charges are warranted, but the probe is unlikely to be complete before his departure. THINGS LEFT UNDONE As he listed his accomplishments, <u>Holder acknowledged that "<mark>work remains to be done</u></mark>." On his to-do list in the weeks before he leaves, Holder hopes to announce new guidelines to curb racial profiling in federal law enforcement investigations, the Justice Department said. <u>Holder has <mark>asked federal prosecutors not to seek mandatory minimum sentences to be used when charging defendants in low-level drug case</mark>s</u>. But more sweeping proposals to abolish mandatory minimum sentences have failed to get traction in Congress. <u>Holder announced earlier this year that the department would review</u> potentially hundreds of <u>applications for <mark>executive clemency - another project that is under way but <strong>unfinished</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
Neg vs MSU BP
|
1NR
|
Turns Trafficking
| 430,956 | 2 | 17,098 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| 565,254 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
4
|
Michigan State Brill-Prete
|
Justice
|
T-Legalize
AG Politics (2NR)
Treaties DA
Fed CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,198 |
There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay
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Youngers 2014
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Youngers 2014 (Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)
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SINCE NIXON DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs the U.S. used its muscle to dictate policies throughout the region the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this The surge in left-leaning governments The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies Washington is suffering from a credibility problem Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws The irony is not lost on Latin American officials the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path
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Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality Despite arduous negotiations the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies the 'war on drugs' The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
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SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON FIRST DECLARED THE WAR on Drugs over 40 years ago, the U.S. government has used its political and economic muscle to dictate policies throughout the region. Now the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force. Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this and other policies. The surge in left-leaning governments in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend. Interestingly, the reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds, with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. Washington is suffering from a credibility problem. Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets. The irony is not lost on Latin American officials; for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team, Luis Videgaray, said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status." Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. Perhaps the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." THE APRIL 2012 CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point. For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington, the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment with policies appropriate to their reality. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. Despite arduous negotiations-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda. Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered, leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to overcome the 'war on drugs' approach." The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canada. Interestingly, Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them. This has emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path.
| 8,683 |
<h4><strong>There is pressure on the treaty system in the squo- but the SUCCESSFUL push will be for FLEXIBILITY not ABANDONMENT- our ev ASSUMES Uruguay</h4><p>Youngers 2014</strong> <mark>(Colletta, Senior Fellow with WOLA, the Washington Office on Latin America, an associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and a member of the research team, Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), based in Aguascalientes, Mexico, A Turning Point for Drug Policy, NACLA Report on the Americas47.2 (Summer 2014): 21-27, proquest)</p><p><u></mark>SINCE</u> PRESIDENT <u>NIXON</u> FIRST <u>DECLARED</u> <u>THE WAR on Drugs</u> over 40 years ago, <u>the U.S.</u> government has <u>used its</u> political and economic <u>muscle to dictate policies throughout the region</u>. Now <u>the tables have turned as Latin American countries have emerged as a driving force</u>. <u>Numerous factors have contributed to the waning influence of Washington on this</u> and other policies. <u>The surge in left-leaning governments</u> in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia has challenged Washington's historic patterns of unilateralism and interventionism. <u>The growing economic influence of Brazil, the economic recession in the United States, and the decline of U.S. foreign assistance have all contributed to this trend</u>. Interestingly, the <u><strong>reformist leanings on drug policy do not break down on ideological grounds</u></strong>, <u>with Guatemala's right-wing president joining left-wing presidents in Uruguay and Ecuador</u> <u>to advocate for an end to prohibitionist drug policies</u>, while left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua strongly support the status quo. <u><strong><mark>Washington is suffering from a credibility problem</u></strong>. <u>Even as the United States continues to advocate a "tough on drugs" approach overseas, at home state after state is relaxing marijuana laws</u></mark>. To date, 21 states and the District of Colombia have decriminalized it, 20 states have adopted medical marijuana laws (these states often overlap with those that have decriminalized), and two states-Washington and Colorado-are in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis <mark>markets. <u>The irony is not lost on Latin American officials</u>;</mark> for example, after the November 2012 U.S. elections when voters in Washington and Colorado approved the legalization initiatives (indeed, in Colorado marijuana got more votes than President Obama), <u>the head of the incoming Mexican government's transition team</u>, Luis Videgaray, <u>said, "Obviously, we can't handle a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop its transfer to the United States, when in the United States, at least part of the United States, it has a different status</u>." <u>Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate on cannabis policy is now underway in Mexico. </u>Perhaps <u>the most significant factor driving the debate in Latin America is the growing sentiment that it is their own people and governments that are paying the price for policies primarily designed to curb drug use in consumer countries like the United States</u>, and that have made no dent in the drug trade or consumption. On the contrary, organized crime has spread, fueling violence, extortion, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. As Argentinian sociologist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian points out, "the old balloon effect...is being superseded by a kind of Zeppelin effect by which transnational organizationsbasically intertwining local narcowarlords, national drug barons and global money laundering tycoonsare reaching a point of generating a pax mafiosa in certain urban and rural areas." Shifts in trafficking have led to the proliferation of routes and increased local consumption. As the U.S. appetite for cocaine has abated (and other drugs such as illegal prescription painkillers have become more popular), use in Europe and parts of Asia has risen, generating new transportation routes from the Andean region-particularly Peru and Bolivia-through Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, often via West Africa. While still well below that of the United States, drug consumption in Latin America is steadily on the rise. In particular, use of paco, an addictive form of cocaine paste, has surged in those countries. Meanwhile, approximately 80% of the Colombian cocaine still headed for U.S. city streets now transits through Central American countries that have little capacity to resist the drug trade's corrupting influence. As Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina notes, "We have seen that prohibitionism and the war against drugs have not given the results hoped for. Quite the opposite. The cartels have grown in strength, the flow of arms towards Central America from the north has grown and deaths in our country have grown." <u>THE APRIL 2012 <mark>CARTAGENA SUMMIT MARKED A historic turning point</u>. <u>For the first time, most of the region's presidents met in private with one item on the agenda: the analysis of drug policy and the exploration of alternatives</u></mark>. Reports circulated that the United States would only agree if a study was done under the auspices of the OAS, where it has considerable influence over the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as Washington traditionally names its director and provides a significant chunk of its budget. But skepticism about what the OAS would produce (shared by this author) has proven wrong. The vast OAS report, "The Drug Problem in the Americas," and a "scenario planning" exercise were released in May 2013. Numerous points are groundbreaking for an initiative by a multilateral organization. For example, the study recognizes the harm caused by present policies and calls for drug use to be treated as a public health issue (that is not to criminalize and incarcerate users). <u><strong><mark>In stark contrast to the "one size fits all" approach long advocated by Washington</u></strong>, <u><strong>the report asks that countries be granted the flexibility to experiment</strong> with policies appropriate to their reality</u></mark>. Significantly, it allows for the possibility that such flexibility could result in changes to domestic and international laws, opening the door for discussion of international convention reform, a topic long considered taboo. Also one of the four possible scenarios, Pathways, is based on the premise that prohibitionist policies cause too much harm, and that regulatory frameworks should be explored, beginning with cannabis. For the first time, in June 2013, drug policy was the thematic focus of the OAS General Assembly (GA) meeting, which brings together the region's foreign ministers. <u><mark>Despite arduous negotiations</u></mark>-which revealed the extent of disagreement among countries on specific reforms-<u><mark>the final declaration calls for a multi-layered consultation process including a special session of the OAS General Assembly in 2014 devoted to drug policy, ensuring that the issue stays at the top of the hemispheric agenda</mark>. </u>Whether or not the meeting will have any impact on UNGASS preparations remains to be seen, as countries such as Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others, remain staunchly wedded to present policies, and the region's powerhouse, Brazil, has taken a back seat, neither supporting nor opposing reforms. Such divisions were also evident at the March 2014 CND. This year's meeting included a high-level segment where intensive and conflictive negotiations revealed the deep schisms between those countries supporting reforms and those opposing any change at all. While some European and Latin American countries emerged as important advocates for reform-oriented language, countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia argued fiercely in support of the status quo. In the end, agreement could not be reached on a myriad of issues, resulting in a meaningless declaration. The exercise clearly showed, however, that <u><mark>the "Vienna consensus" on a uniform approach to drug control has been shattered</u>,</mark> leaving in its place polarization and near stagnation, given that the CND operates by consensus. Yet a significant change emerged: <u><strong><mark>for the first time a group of key Latin American countries worked together to promote a reform-oriented agenda</u></strong></mark>. Though Mexican President Peña Nieto has taken a cautious approach, <u><mark>the Mexican delegation in Vienna embraced a leadership role, bringing together Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Uruguay in pushing a joint strategy for open and transparent discussion at the 2016 UNGASS</u></mark>. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani Gerner, noted in an interview, <u><mark>what was achieved was "a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies</mark> to</u> overcome <u><mark>the 'war on drugs'</u></mark> approach." <u><mark>The resolution eventually adopted on the UNGASS included much of the language that these five countries insisted on-no small feat given the formidable opposition by countries such as Russia and Canad</mark>a</u>. Interestingly, <u>Latin American officials supporting the drug policy status quo did not publicly oppose their colleagues' efforts on the UNGASS resolution</u> (perhaps because there was plenty of opposition from other countries). <u>And the final declaration by the group of Latin American and Caribbean countries</u> (GRULAC), <u>underscored the need to take into account the specific circumstances of each of them</u>. <u>This has <mark>emerged as the one point of regional consensus: the need for tolerance in allowing countries to forge a different path</u><strong>.</p></strong></mark>
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Neg vs NW OW
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2NC
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Treaties
| 430,470 | 17 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
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Kentucky
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1
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Northwestern OBrien-Worku
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Gannon
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Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,199 |
Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran
|
CNN 1/9
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CNN 1/9/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)
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Iranian and American negotiators will be eying another showdown in Washington GOP lawmakers are poised to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions the majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap With fewer than two months until agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors supporters know the clock is ticking the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 needed to override a veto A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
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, GOP poised t push a bill authorizing additional sanctions majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need fight is already underway f With fewer than two months expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House the four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push . A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue
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Iranian and American negotiators preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions will also be eying another showdown brewing in Washington. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, GOP lawmakers are poised to wield their new power in the Senate to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions against Iran. But the new 54-member majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need to override a presidential veto, and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap. With fewer than two months until diplomats' March 1 framework agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors, supporters know the clock is ticking to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though Kirk said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican expects a high-profile challenge from the White House and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the four Democrats who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House and allies made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 Democrats needed to override a presidential veto. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."
| 7,128 |
<h4>Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran</h4><p><strong>CNN 1/9</strong>/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)</p><p><u>Iranian and American negotiators</u> preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions <u>will</u> also <u>be eying</u> <u>another showdown</u> brewing <u>in Washington</u>. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal<mark>, <u>GOP</mark> lawmakers are <mark>poised t</mark>o</u> wield their new power in the Senate to <u><mark>push a bill authorizing additional sanctions</mark> </u>against Iran. But <u>the</u> new 54-member <u><mark>majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need</u></mark> to override a presidential veto, <u>and the <strong><mark>fight is already underway</strong> f</mark>or the votes that could fill the gap</u>. <u><mark>With fewer than two months</mark> until</u> diplomats' March 1 framework <u>agreement deadline, and <mark>expecting the <strong>White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors</u></strong></mark>, <u>supporters know the clock is ticking</u> to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, <u><strong><mark>the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran</u></strong></mark>, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though <u><mark>Kirk</u></mark> said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican <u><mark>expects a <strong>high-profile challenge from the White House</u></strong></mark> and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back <mark>the <u>four Democrats</u></mark> who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware <u><mark>rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations <strong>after the White House</strong></mark> </u>and allies<u> <strong><mark>made its push</strong></mark> on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote</u>. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even <u>if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15</u> Democrats <u>needed to override a</u> presidential <u>veto</u><mark>.</mark> And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. <u><mark>A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the <strong>toughest battle yet on this issue</u></strong></mark>, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."</p>
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1
| 220,775 | 10 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,200 |
For many, the coercion is more violent
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Bowden 13
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Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis
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Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.
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Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking
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[*452] Introduction
[*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10
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<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction</p><p>[*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p><strong> </p></strong>
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Advantage 2 Worldwide transplants will be better
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
| 565,250 |
A
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Navy
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9
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George Mason Jalbuena-Thomas
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Allen, Steiner, Taylor
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Navy-Round9.docx
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
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743,201 |
Legalizing marijuana doesn’t change drug requirements in the FBI- they haven’t read a solvency card yet- we get new answers if they do
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<h4><strong>Legalizing marijuana doesn’t change drug requirements in the FBI- they haven’t read a solvency card yet- we get new answers if they do</h4></strong>
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Neg vs gmu cm
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1NC
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A 2
| 430,957 | 1 | 17,102 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
| 565,255 |
N
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Kentucky
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5
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George Mason Call-Mohney
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Miller
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AG Politics (2NR)
Fed CP
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
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743,202 |
--diasd solves case—iran only scenario for nuclear conflict—cooperation is able to solve any reason why they claim heg is good
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<h4>--diasd solves case—iran only scenario for nuclear conflict—cooperation is able to solve any reason why they claim heg is good </h4>
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1nr
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ov
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Nuclear, biological and chemical war
| 430,958 | 1 | 17,099 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
| 565,264 |
N
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Navy
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2
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Liberty Jackson-Bordelon
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Watson
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Fed CP
Treaties DA
Politics - Iran DA
Pharma Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
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743,203 |
GMO’s key to avert extinction
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Trewavas 2K
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Trewavas 2K [Anthony, Professor at the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh, “GM IS the Best Option We Have”, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html]
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summer turned to winter and crops failed completely There are 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great even smaller explosions threaten the security of our food supply Only those with technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival technological advance may be the only buffer between annihilation
food shortages
Thought,” Wall Street Journal, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/topics/borlaug/WSJ-2005-Foodthought.html)
he past 50 years have been the most productive period in global agricultural history, leading to the greatest reduction in hunger the world has ever seen The Green Revolution, kept more than one billion from death the Green Revolution But at the core was the development and application of new high-yielding, disease- and insect-resistant seeds new products to restore soil fertility and control pests, and a succession of agricultural machines to ease drudgery It took 10,000 years for the world's farmers to reach their current production Within 50 years, we will have to increase this amount by at least another 50% However, agricultural science is increasingly under attack by groups and individuals who, for political rather than scientific reasons, are campaigning to limit advances, especially in new fields such as genetic modification (GM) through biotechnolog Most of this acreage is in the industrialized worl More than half of the world's 800 million hungry people are small-scale farmers who cultivate marginal lands. New science and biotechnology have the power to address the agro-climatic extremes Because there are so many hungry and suffering people, particularly in Africa, attacks on science and biotechnology are especially pernicious. Africa is facing a pandemic scourge of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, aR 30-year period of continuous degradation in soil fertility, frequent droughts and a burgeoning population. This set of converging circumstances can lead to a human catastrophe in Africa on a scale the world has never seen. We know it is coming. We -- and even death -- of millions of innocents who could have been spared such a tragedy.
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summer turned to winter and crops failed completely There are 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. even smaller explosions threaten the security of our food supply. Only those with technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. technological advance may be the only buffer between annihilation
past 50 years have been the most productive period in ag history, leading to the greatest reduction in hunger The Green Revolution, kept more than one billio from death at the core was the development of new high-yielding, disease- and insect-resistant seeds new products to restore soil fertility and control pests It took 10,000 years for the world's farmers to reach their current production Within 50 years, we will have to increase this amount by at least another 50% ag is increasingly under especially in new fields such as GM biotech Most of this acreage is in the industrialized world, biotechnology have the power to address the agro-climatic extremes there are many hungry people, particularly in Africa, attacks on biotechnology are especially pernicious. Africa is facing andemi degradation in soil fertility droughts and a burgeoning population. This set of converging circumstances can lead to a human catastrophe in Africa on a scale the world has never seen.
a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars and domestic instability turn into a really nasty stew Africa is open range. an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration,
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In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation.
Industrial ag solves inevitable food shortages—specifically turns Affrican war
Borlaug and Carter 05
Borlaug, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and Distinguished Professor of Science at Texas A&M, and Carter, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and former President of the United States of America, 9/14/2005
(Norman and Jimmy, “Food for Thought,” Wall Street Journal, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/topics/borlaug/WSJ-2005-Foodthought.html)
The past 50 years have been the most productive period in global agricultural history, leading to the greatest reduction in hunger the world has ever seen. The Green Revolution, as this period came to be known in the developing world, has kept more than one billion people from hunger, starvation, and even death. Many factors contributed to the Green Revolution. The doubling of the global area under irrigation was certainly important. But at the core was the development and application of new high-yielding, disease- and insect-resistant seeds, new products to restore soil fertility and control pests, and a succession of agricultural machines to ease drudgery and speed everything from planting to harvesting. It took around 10,000 years for the world's farmers to reach their current production of nearly six billion gross tons of food, consumed virtually in its entirety by 6.4 billion people annually. Within 50 years, we will have to increase this amount by at least another 50% -- to nine billion tons. Most likely we will have to achieve this feat on a shrinking agricultural land base, and with most of the production increases occurring in those countries where it is to be consumed. However, agricultural science is increasingly under attack by groups and individuals who, for political rather than scientific reasons, are campaigning to limit advances, especially in new fields such as genetic modification (GM) through biotechnology. Despite this opposition, it is likely that 250 million acres will be planted to GM crops in 2005. Most of this acreage is in the industrialized world, although the area in middle-income developing countries is expanding rapidly. However, the debate over biotechnology in the industrialized countries continues to impede its acceptance in most poor, food-insecure countries. More than half of the world's 800 million hungry people are small-scale farmers who cultivate marginal lands. New science and biotechnology have the power to address the agro-climatic extremes. Their use lies at the core of extending the Green Revolution to these difficult farming areas. Because there are so many hungry and suffering people, particularly in Africa, attacks on science and biotechnology are especially pernicious. Africa is facing a pandemic scourge of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, aR 30-year period of continuous degradation in soil fertility, frequent droughts and a burgeoning population. This set of converging circumstances can lead to a human catastrophe in Africa on a scale the world has never seen. We know it is coming. We have the knowledge to avert it. If we put it off, solving it later will mean the acute suffering -- and even death -- of millions of innocents who could have been spared such a tragedy.
B. African instability goes nuclear
Deutsch, 02 (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html)
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
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<h4><strong>GMO’s key to avert extinction </h4><p>Trewavas 2K </strong>[Anthony, Professor at the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh, “GM IS the Best Option We Have”, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html]</p><p>In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, <u><strong><mark>summer turned to winter and crops</u></strong></mark> here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere <u><strong><mark>failed completely</u></strong></mark>. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. <u><strong><mark>There are</u></strong> </mark>apparently <u><strong><mark>100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great</u></strong>.</mark> And <u><strong><mark>even smaller</u></strong></mark> volcanic <u><strong><mark>explosions</u></strong></mark> change our climate and can easily <u><strong><mark>threaten the security of our food supply</u></strong>.</mark> Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. <u><strong><mark>Only those with</u></strong></mark> agricultural <u><strong><mark>technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival</u></strong>.</mark> Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that <u><strong><mark>technological advance may be the only buffer between</u></strong></mark> us and <u><strong><mark>annihilation</u></mark>. </p><p>Industrial ag solves inevitable <u>food shortages</u>—specifically turns Affrican war </p><p>Borlaug and Carter 05 </p><p></strong>Borlaug, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and Distinguished Professor of Science at Texas A&M, and Carter, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and former President of the United States of America, 9/14/2005</p><p>(Norman and Jimmy, “Food for <u>Thought,” Wall Street Journal, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/topics/borlaug/WSJ-2005-Foodthought.html)</p><p></u>T<u>he <mark>past 50 years have been the <strong>most productive period</strong> in</mark> global <mark>ag</mark>ricultural <mark>history,</mark> <mark>leading to the <strong>greatest reduction in hunger</strong></mark> the world has ever seen</u>. <u><mark>The Green Revolution,</u></mark> as this period came to be known in the developing world, has <u><mark>kept more than one billio</mark>n</u> people <u><mark>from</u></mark> hunger, starvation, and even <u><mark>death</u></mark>. Many factors contributed to <u>the Green Revolution</u>. The doubling of the global area under irrigation was certainly important. <u>But <mark>at the core was the development</mark> and application <mark>of new high-yielding, disease- and insect-resistant seeds</u></mark>, <u><mark>new products to restore soil fertility and control pests</mark>, and a succession of agricultural machines to ease drudgery</u> and speed everything from planting to harvesting. <u><mark>It took</u></mark> around <u><mark>10,000 years for the world's farmers to reach their current production</u></mark> of nearly six billion gross tons of food, consumed virtually in its entirety by 6.4 billion people annually. <u><mark>Within 50 years, we will have to increase this amount by at least another 50%</u></mark> -- to nine billion tons. Most likely we will have to achieve this feat on a shrinking agricultural land base, and with most of the production increases occurring in those countries where it is to be consumed. <u>However, <mark>ag</mark>ricultural science <mark>is increasingly under</mark> attack by groups and individuals who, for political rather than scientific reasons, are campaigning to limit advances, <mark>especially in new fields such as</mark> genetic modification (<mark>GM</mark>) through <mark>biotech</mark>nolog</u>y. Despite this opposition, it is likely that 250 million acres will be planted to GM crops in 2005. <u><mark>Most of this acreage is in the industrialized worl</u>d,</mark> although the area in middle-income developing countries is expanding rapidly. However, the debate over biotechnology in the industrialized countries continues to impede its acceptance in most poor, food-insecure countries. <u>More than half of the world's 800 million hungry people are small-scale farmers who cultivate marginal lands.</u> <u>New science and <mark>biotechnology have the power to address the agro-climatic extremes</u></mark>. Their use lies at the core of extending the Green Revolution to these difficult farming areas. <u>Because <mark>there are</mark> so <mark>many hungry</mark> and suffering <mark>people, particularly in Africa, attacks on</mark> science and <mark>biotechnology are especially pernicious. Africa is facing</mark> a p<mark>andemi</mark>c scourge of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, aR 30-year period of continuous <mark>degradation in soil fertility</mark>, frequent <mark>droughts and a burgeoning population. This set of converging circumstances can lead to a human catastrophe in Africa on a scale the world has never seen.</mark> We know it is coming. We </u>have the knowledge to avert it. If we put it off, solving it later will mean the acute suffering <u><strong>-- and even death -- of millions of innocents who could have been spared such a tragedy.</p><p></u>B. African instability goes nuclear</p><p>Deutsch, 02</strong> (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html)</p><p>The Rabid Tiger Project believes that <strong><mark>a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars</mark> </strong>in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, <strong><mark>and domestic instability</strong></mark> in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as <strong>occasional brushfire and other wars</strong> (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) <strong><mark>turn into a really nasty stew</strong></mark>. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. <strong>Geopolitically speaking, <mark>Africa is open range.</strong></mark> Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. <strong>Thus, <mark>an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly</strong></mark>. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But <strong><mark>an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration,</mark> if the other powers are interested in a fight.</strong> Certainly, <strong>such a strike would</strong> in the first place <strong>have been facilitated by outside help</strong> - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. <strong>Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing</strong>. </p>
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1nc
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
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Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,204 |
That push will be accepted and is key to 2016 reform
|
Oakford 2014
|
Oakford 2014 (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)
|
Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Uruguay's Ambassador told We have an interpretation to the side of liberty and rights
|
Russia's meddling in Ukraine could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions
|
But Russia's meddling in Ukraine has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy. There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But as more countries test their legal limits, a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. "We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions," Milton Romani Gerner, Uruguay's Ambassador to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, told VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. We have an interpretation to the other side, to the side of liberty and rights."
| 892 |
<h4><strong>That push will be accepted and is key to 2016 reform</h4><p>Oakford 2014</strong> (Samuel, writer for VICE News, Global Drug Policy Is Still Deadly and Ineffective, https://news.vice.com/article/global-drug-policy-is-still-deadly-and-ineffective)</p><p>But <u><mark>Russia's meddling in Ukraine</mark> has forced them to temporarily set aside their prohibitionist grandstanding, and <mark>could open a window as the UN General Assembly prepares to meet in 2016 for a special session on drug policy</mark>. </u>There's little hope or wish of overhauling the conventions. But <u><mark>as more countries test their legal limits, <strong>a critical mass could lead to a General Assembly resolution redefining their meaning and intent. </u></strong>"<u>We are proposing a flexible interpretation of the conventions</mark>,"</u> Milton Romani Gerner, <u>Uruguay's</u> <u>Ambassador</u> to the Organization of American States and the country's former Secretary General for Drugs, <u>told</u> VICE News. "There are countries that interpret the conventions by imposing the death penalty and there are countries in Vienna that defend its use on minors involved with drugs. <u>We have an interpretation</u> to the other side, <u>to the side of liberty and rights</u><strong>."</p></strong>
|
Neg vs NW OW
|
2NC
|
Treaties
| 430,783 | 8 | 17,100 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| 565,253 |
N
|
Kentucky
|
1
|
Northwestern OBrien-Worku
|
Gannon
|
Attorney general politics (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
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