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743,405 |
Salaries and retention are key alt causes- outweighs the aff
|
Washington Post 10/1
|
Washington Post 10/1/2014 (Key Homeland Security official urges passage of cybersecurity bill, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/01/key-homeland-security-official-urges-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill/)
|
A top Homeland Security official called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes often prevents it from grabbing top recruits the government can’t match higher private sector salaries. We have a difficult time competing with the private sector because of financial realities DHS has had major difficulties in not only hiring cyber officials but retaining them once they arrive. A parade of high-level cyber departures in recent years has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity initiatives
|
the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes prevents it from grabbing top recruits he government can’t match higher private sector salaries. DHS has had major difficulties retaining them high-level cyber departures has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity
|
A top Department of Homeland Security official on Wednesday called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need” to strengthen the department’s ability to defend against cyberattacks. Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said the legislation would “better equip us” to fight computer hackers and state-sponsored cyberattacks and is especially important in helping DHS compete with private industry to recruit top cyber personnel. He said the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes often prevents it from grabbing top recruits and that the government can’t match higher private sector salaries. “We have a difficult time competing with the private sector because of financial realities,’’ Mayorkas said at The Washington Post’s Cybersecurity Summitt 2014, held at the Post building in the District. “On the other hand, we are advantaged because … our mission is an extraordinary one.’’ Homeland Security logo reflected in the eyeglasses of a cybersecurity analyst at the agency’s secretive cyber defense facility in Idaho. (Mark J. Terrill/AP). Congress has been struggling for years to pass cybersecurity legislation, even as law enforcement officials have said cyberattacks increasingly pose the biggest threat to the nation’s security. A comprehensive bill to establish cybersecurity standards died in 2012, but several pieces of legislation are now pending in Congress. One bill that recently passed the House would require a DHS strategy to recruit and keep cyber personnel. Congressional aides from both parties have said in recent days that they are hoping to reach agreement on a comprehensive cyber bill to be voted on during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s midterm elections. DHS has had major difficulties in not only hiring cyber officials but retaining them once they arrive. A parade of high-level cyber departures in recent years has helped slow the rollout of key cybersecurity initiatives, including a program aimed at blocking malicious software before it can infiltrate civilian government computers, former officials have said. Mayorkas said he and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson are focused on the problem, pointing out that Johnson personally went on a trip in February to Georgia Institute of Technology and Morehouse College aimed at recruiting young cyber leaders. While Mayorkas said “attackers are in fact becoming more and more sophisticated,’’ he added that DHS and the rest of the government are up to the challenge of stopping them. “Our prevention capabilities are growing in sophistication,’’ he said.
| 2,591 |
<h4><strong>Salaries and retention are key alt causes- outweighs the aff</h4><p>Washington Post 10/1</strong>/2014 (Key Homeland Security official urges passage of cybersecurity bill, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/01/key-homeland-security-official-urges-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill/)</p><p><u>A top</u> Department of <u>Homeland Security official</u> on Wednesday <u>called on Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation, saying there is a “dire need</u>” to strengthen the department’s ability to defend against cyberattacks. Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said the legislation would “better equip us” to fight computer hackers and state-sponsored cyberattacks and is especially important in helping DHS compete with private industry to recruit top cyber personnel. He said <u><mark>the department’s “labrynthine” hiring processes</mark> often <mark>prevents it from grabbing top recruits</u></mark> and that <u><strong>t<mark>he government can’t match higher private sector salaries.</mark> </u></strong>“<u>We have a difficult time competing with the private sector</u> <u>because of financial realities</u>,’’ Mayorkas said at The Washington Post’s Cybersecurity Summitt 2014, held at the Post building in the District. “On the other hand, we are advantaged because … our mission is an extraordinary one.’’ Homeland Security logo reflected in the eyeglasses of a cybersecurity analyst at the agency’s secretive cyber defense facility in Idaho. (Mark J. Terrill/AP). Congress has been struggling for years to pass cybersecurity legislation, even as law enforcement officials have said cyberattacks increasingly pose the biggest threat to the nation’s security. A comprehensive bill to establish cybersecurity standards died in 2012, but several pieces of legislation are now pending in Congress. One bill that recently passed the House would require a DHS strategy to recruit and keep cyber personnel. Congressional aides from both parties have said in recent days that they are hoping to reach agreement on a comprehensive cyber bill to be voted on during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s midterm elections. <u><mark>DHS has had major difficulties</mark> in not only hiring cyber officials but <strong><mark>retaining them</strong></mark> once they arrive.</u> <u>A parade of <mark>high-level cyber departures</mark> in recent years <mark>has helped <strong>slow the rollout of key cybersecurity</mark> initiatives</u>, including a program aimed at blocking malicious software before it can infiltrate civilian government computers, former officials have said. Mayorkas said he and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson are focused on the problem, pointing out that Johnson personally went on a trip in February to Georgia Institute of Technology and Morehouse College aimed at recruiting young cyber leaders. While Mayorkas said “attackers are in fact becoming more and more sophisticated,’’ he added that DHS and the rest of the government are up to the challenge of stopping them. “Our prevention capabilities are growing in sophistication,’’ he said.</p></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
DA
| 430,574 | 7 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,406 |
The deal will succeed now- new sanctions are the only thing that can cause collapse- independently violates the JPOA which causes war with Iran
|
Goldenberg 12/18
|
Goldenberg 12/18/2014 (Ilan, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security. He previously served as the Iran Team Chief at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a Senior Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, No need for new sanctions on Iran, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/227466-no-need-for-new-sanctions-on-iran)
|
new sanctions would reduce the probability of a positive outcome. new sanctions at this moment are likely to lead to less flexibility from the Iranian negotiators One of the major challenges in the current negotiations is that the Iranians do not believe that even in the event of a deal the United States Congress will ever lift sanctions New sanctions now would only reconfirm worst suspicions New sanctions endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo The JPOA freeze bought the United States and its allies time, as the Iranians have made no substantive progress on their nuclear program New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation. New sanctions give Iran a way out of the negotiations in which it can blame the United States for failure and dramatically weaken the sanctions regime in the aftermath of a collapse. If Congress were to pass new legislation, Iran could walk away from the table and put the onus the United States it is unclear how implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions sanctions are not necessary at the moment as the oil market is already doing the work of increasing pressure These trends are already creating real anxiety in Tehran and are much more likely to have the desired effect on the psychology and calculus of Iran’s leaders than a new piece of Congressional legislation New sanctions reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse to walk away
|
new sanctions would be poorly timed and reduce the probability of a positive outcome likely to lead to less flexibility from the Iranian negotiators New sanctions now would only reconfirm worst suspicions. New sanctions endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo. The JPOA freez bought time, New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation. give Iran a way out of the negotiations in which it can blame the U S it is unclear how implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond, particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions
|
As the 113th Congress wraps up and the new Congress prepares for the start of 2015 it is evident that one of the central early debates on foreign policy will revolve around new sanctions on Iran. The sanctions regime imposed by Congress and implemented by the Obama administration played a significant role in bringing Iran to the table and getting an agreement on the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). However, new sanctions now would be poorly timed and reduce the probability of a positive outcome. First, new sanctions at this moment are likely to lead to less flexibility from the Iranian negotiators. Sanctions are a useful stick to bring a party to the table, but to be used effectively they must be a stick that can be credibly lifted. One of the major challenges in the current negotiations is that the Iranians do not believe that even in the event of a deal the United States Congress will ever lift sanctions. This is particularly true of the ultimate decisionmaker in Tehran –Supreme Leader Ali Khameini – who is a notoriously suspicious of the United States. New sanctions now would only reconfirm his worst suspicions. New sanctions could also endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo. The JPOA, which was signed in November of 2013, is not an ideal document that should be seen as the long-term solution. However, it did successfully freeze Iran’s enrichment program for the first time since 2005 in exchange for only very limited sanctions relief. This freeze has bought the United States and its allies time, as the Iranians have made no substantive progress on their nuclear program in the last 12 months while even rolling back some elements – most notably by making their stock of 20% enriched uranium into a product that is more difficult to enrich further. New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation. New sanctions could also inadvertently give Iran a way out of the negotiations in which it can blame the United States for failure and dramatically weaken the sanctions regime in the aftermath of a collapse. If Congress were to pass new legislation, Iran could walk away from the table and put the onus the United States for not keeping its word and violating the interim agreement. In such a scenario, it is unclear how some of the key implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond, particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions. The Chinese might choose to continue to abide by sanctions on Iran since they ultimately care more about access to the U.S. economy than Iran’s. Or they might choose to call the American bluff, restart trade with Iran and assume that the United States would not dare sanction China and cause grave damage to its own economy in the process. Finally, sanctions are not necessary at the moment as the oil market is already doing the work of increasing pressure. Prices have dropped from a high of $120 over the summer to below $60. This will have dramatic implications for the Iranian economy. Bread prices have risen 30 percent in recent weeks. And President Rouhani recently introduced an austerity budget for the next year pegging the Iranian budget to $70 oil even though Iran needs a much higher price to sustain its fiscal viability in the long run. These trends are already creating real anxiety in Tehran and are much more likely to have the desired effect on the psychology and calculus of Iran’s leaders than a new piece of Congressional legislation that would not even go into effect unless the negotiations failed. And the beauty of this type of pressure is that it cannot be seen as an act of bad faith on America’s part. Ultimately, if a deal cannot be struck by the middle of this year it might be time to revaluate and consider other options. But for the moment sanctions are unlikely to improve the chances of an agreement. Lower oil prices are already increasing the pressure on Iran. New sanctions are more likely to reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse to walk away while taking the high ground and blaming the United States.
| 4,281 |
<h4><strong>The deal will succeed now- new sanctions are the only thing that can cause collapse- independently violates the JPOA which causes war with Iran</h4><p>Goldenberg 12/18</strong>/2014 (Ilan, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security. He previously served as the Iran Team Chief at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a Senior Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, No need for new sanctions on Iran, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/227466-no-need-for-new-sanctions-on-iran)</p><p>As the 113th Congress wraps up and the new Congress prepares for the start of 2015 it is evident that one of the central early debates on foreign policy will revolve around new sanctions on Iran. The sanctions regime imposed by Congress and implemented by the Obama administration played a significant role in bringing Iran to the table and getting an agreement on the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). However, <u><mark>new sanctions</u> </mark>now<mark> <u>would</u> be</mark> <mark>poorly timed and</mark> <u><mark>reduce the probability of a positive outcome</mark>. </u>First, <u>new sanctions at this moment are <mark>likely to lead to less flexibility from the Iranian negotiators</u></mark>. Sanctions are a useful stick to bring a party to the table, but to be used effectively they must be a stick that can be credibly lifted. <u>One of the major challenges in the current negotiations is that the Iranians do not believe that even in the event of a deal the United States Congress will ever lift sanctions</u>. This is particularly true of the ultimate decisionmaker in Tehran –Supreme Leader Ali Khameini – who is a notoriously suspicious of the United States. <u><mark>New sanctions now would only reconfirm</u> </mark>his <u><mark>worst suspicions</u>. <u><strong>New sanctions</u></strong> </mark>could also <u><strong><mark>endanger a very tenuous but positive status quo</u></strong>. <u>The JPOA</u></mark>, which was signed in November of 2013, is not an ideal document that should be seen as the long-term solution. However, it did successfully freeze Iran’s enrichment program for the first time since 2005 in exchange for only very limited sanctions relief. This <u><mark>freez</mark>e</u> has <u><mark>bought </mark>the United States and its allies <mark>time, </mark>as the Iranians have made no substantive progress on their nuclear program</u> in the last 12 months while even rolling back some elements – most notably by making their stock of 20% enriched uranium into a product that is more difficult to enrich further. <u><mark>New sanctions would be a violation of the JPOA and could cause Iran to unfreeze its program <strong>increasing the likelihood of an impending confrontation</strong>.</mark> New sanctions</u> could also inadvertently <u><mark>give Iran a way out of the negotiations</u> <u>in which it can blame the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates for failure and dramatically weaken the sanctions regime in the aftermath of a collapse.</u> <u>If Congress were to pass new legislation, Iran could walk away from the table and put the onus the United States</u> for not keeping its word and violating the interim agreement. In such a scenario, <u><mark>it is unclear how</u> </mark>some of the key<mark> <u>implementors of the international sanctions regime – most notably China – would respond</u>, <u>particularly if they believe that the collapse of the talks was due to Congressional sanctions</u></mark>. The Chinese might choose to continue to abide by sanctions on Iran since they ultimately care more about access to the U.S. economy than Iran’s. Or they might choose to call the American bluff, restart trade with Iran and assume that the United States would not dare sanction China and cause grave damage to its own economy in the process. Finally, <u>sanctions are not necessary at the moment as the oil market is already doing the work of increasing pressure</u>. Prices have dropped from a high of $120 over the summer to below $60. This will have dramatic implications for the Iranian economy. Bread prices have risen 30 percent in recent weeks. And President Rouhani recently introduced an austerity budget for the next year pegging the Iranian budget to $70 oil even though Iran needs a much higher price to sustain its fiscal viability in the long run. <u>These trends are already <strong>creating real anxiety in Tehran</strong> and are much more likely to have the desired effect on the psychology and calculus of Iran’s leaders than a new piece of Congressional legislation</u> that would not even go into effect unless the negotiations failed. And the beauty of this type of pressure is that it cannot be seen as an act of bad faith on America’s part. Ultimately, if a deal cannot be struck by the middle of this year it might be time to revaluate and consider other options. But for the moment sanctions are unlikely to improve the chances of an agreement. Lower oil prices are already increasing the pressure on Iran. <u>New sanctions</u> are more likely to <u>reduce the chances of an agreement, endanger the delicate but positive status quo, and give the Iranians an excuse to walk away </u><strong>while taking the high ground and blaming the United States. </p></strong>
|
1nr
|
Strikes
|
Talks fail
| 431,030 | 2 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
|
Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,407 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,029 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,408 |
The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads anti-biotic resistant bacteria
|
Kelly 13
|
Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis
|
Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries
|
governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies transplant tourism facilitate spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across border
|
[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77
| 1,754 |
<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health—spreads <u>anti-biotic resistant </u>bacteria</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u>Because <mark>governmental disease control agencies do</mark> <mark>not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases</mark> <mark>like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms</mark> <mark>global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism</mark> and broader medical tourism <mark>facilitate</mark> the <mark>spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u>Because such <mark>bacteria are</mark> <mark>frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique</mark> <mark>strains across border</mark>s upon returning to their home countries</u>. n76<strong> As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,429 | 9 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,409 |
Unites States includes federal and state
|
Black Law 90
|
Black Law 90 Black's Law Dictionary 1990 p 695
|
In the United States, government includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.
| null |
In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.
| 286 |
<h4><strong>Unites States includes federal and state</h4><p>Black Law 90<u></strong> Black's Law Dictionary 1990 p 695</p><p>In the United States, government </u>consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, <u>includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.</p></u>
|
1nr
| null |
At: only states
| 68,862 | 75 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,410 |
Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
|
Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/
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Does the legalization of marijuana contribute to cyber crime? considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
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Does legalization contribute to cyber crime? cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent How does a drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They downsize or diversify Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream The rise of e-commerce will look like easy pickings to criminals. hacking will rise with legalization of marijuana There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites
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Does the rapid legalization of medical marijuana in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world contribute to cyber crime? This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow. A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. So what’s a drug lord to do? How does a smart (drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up? They either downsize or diversify. Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord, cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream. The rise of e-commerce and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites will look like easy pickings to forward-thinking criminals. This is why we believe that cyber crime and hacking will rise with the ongoing legalization of marijuana. E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network. There will be an increasing demand for network security professionals and services that “harden” websites to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.
| 1,935 |
<h4><strong>Legalization increases cyberterror and guts cybersecurity resources—cartels shift markets</h4><p>Executionists 2014 an innovative creative agency specializing in design, development, marketing and client services. Our Los Angeles-based team excels in executing strategic online solutions that focus on your business goals “Does Legalized Pot Equate to a Rise in Cyber Crime?” Executionists; 2014; <u>http://www.executionists.com/blog/does-legalized-pot-equate-to-a-rise-in-cyber-crime/</p><p></strong><mark>Does</mark> the </u><strong>rapid <u></strong><mark>legalization</u><strong></mark> <u></strong>of</u><strong> medical <u></strong>marijuana</u><strong> in the US, 20 states to date, and legalization by countries around the world <u></strong><mark>contribute to cyber crime?</mark> </u><strong>This is the question I asked myself when I read that Uruguay is planning to start selling marijuana legally next year for $1 a gram. Forgive me if I’m late to the party, but <u></strong>considering that the illegal traffic and sale of marijuana brings billions of dollars to drug lords, $1 a gram weed and medical marijuana laws must be putting a major crimp in their cash flow.</u><strong> A 2012 study, by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness (IMCO), found that “Mexican drug <u></strong><mark>cartels could see their revenue drop by as much as 30 percent</u><strong></mark> across the board if current ballot initiatives on marijuana legalization in three states are passed.” That’s only 3 states. <u></strong>So what’s a drug lord to do? <mark>How does a</mark> smart (<mark>drug) business maintain revenue when one source dries up?</mark> <mark>They</mark> either <mark>downsize or diversify</mark>.</u><strong> <u></strong><mark>Let’s suppose for a moment that diversifying to legitimate business is unpalatable to the average drug lord</u><strong>, <u></strong>cyber crime could be a viable revenue stream</u><strong></mark>. <u></strong><mark>The rise of e-commerce</mark> and the public’s willingness to freely provide their credit card, social security number and other financial data to websites <mark>will look like easy pickings to </mark>forward-thinking <mark>criminals</u><strong>. <u></mark>This is why we believe that cyber crime and <mark>hacking will rise with</mark> the ongoing <mark>legalization of marijuana</mark>.</u> E-commerce websites, financial websites, membership websites, mobile app companies need to take extra steps to make sure their users, clients and customer’s privacy is protected. Hackers are relentless, like the Terminator in that Terminator movie, <u></strong>they will relentlessly search for and attack any weakness in your code, servers or network.</u><strong> <u><mark>There will be an increasing demand for</mark> <mark>network security professionals and services that “harden” websites</mark> to reduce the vulnerabilities rampant in common web code, plugins and frameworks.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
DA
| 430,794 | 5 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,411 |
New sanctions destroy the deal- that’s key
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Borger 12/31
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Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, US-Cuba deal meant 2014 ended on unexpected high note for diplomacy; The agreement between Havana and Washington cut across the prevailing trend in 2014 for diplomatic failure, The Guardian, lexis)
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The Cuba deal raised hopes that Obama was in the mood for breaking diplomatic taboos burying the hatchet with Havana is a good deal easier than doing that with Tehran before the self-imposed deadline of 24 November, it was clear that the framework for a deal was in place, but crossing the finishing line still required acts of political will in Tehran and Washington they gave themselves a seven-month extension delay will strengthen hardline opposition to compromise, particularly in Washington, where a Republican-dominated Congress will convene That provides a hard political deadline A new sanctions bill could kill the negotiations, and a diplomatic window will close, perhaps for many years.
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before the self-imposed deadline of 24 November, it was clear that the framework for a deal was in place, but crossing the finishing line still required acts of political will in Tehran and Washington. they gave themselves a seven-month extension. However, delay will strengthen hardline opposition to compromise, particularly in Washington, where a Republican-dominated Congress will conven That provides a hard political deadline. A new sanctions bill could kill the negotiations, and a diplomatic window will close, perhaps for many years.
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The year ended, quite unexpectedly, on a high note for diplomacy. After 53 years of a barren freeze, the US and Cuba agreed to restore diplomatic relations in a deal secretly hammered out in Canada and the Vatican over 18 months. The agreement - which involved an exchange of imprisoned spies and the release of an American contractor, Alan Gross - came as a remarkable Christmas surprise, and not just because of the remarkably leak-free discretion of the talks. It also cut across the prevailing trend in 2014 for diplomatic failure, from the missed chance of a nuclear deal with Iran in November, to a hollow truce in Ukraine and the growing concern of a new cold war. The Cuba deal raised hopes among many Iranians (and a good number of Americans) that Barack Obama was in the mood for breaking diplomatic taboos in his last, supposedly lame, two years in office. But burying the hatchet with Havana is a good deal easier than doing that with Tehran. No one could argue the isolation of Cuba had succeeded in dislodging the communist regime. It was generally seen as a pointless policy, and it had not been a strategic or nuclear issue since 1962. On the other hand, rightly or wrongly, sanctions are widely credited for bringing Iran to the negotiating table over its nuclear programme. However, coming to the table and striking a historic bargain are quite different things. This year's talks in Vienna were a diplomatic marathon, aimed at producing an enduring settlement that would set limits on Iran's nuclear aspirations in return for relief from international sanctions. In the final week before the self-imposed deadline of 24 November, it was clear that the framework for a deal was in place, but crossing the finishing line still required acts of political will in Tehran and Washington. Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, would have to accept that his country's capacity to enrich uranium would be reduced in the short and medium term. The US would have to offer a significant lightening of the burden of the punitive measures imposed on Iran over the years. In the end, neither side blinked. Unable to agree or walk away, they gave themselves a seven-month extension. However, delay will strengthen hardline opposition to compromise, particularly in Washington, where a Republican-dominated Congress will convene on 6 January. That provides a hard political deadline. A new sanctions bill could kill the negotiations, and a diplomatic window will close, perhaps for many years.
| 2,495 |
<h4><strong>New sanctions destroy the deal- that’s key</h4><p>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, US-Cuba deal meant 2014 ended on unexpected high note for diplomacy; The agreement between Havana and Washington cut across the prevailing trend in 2014 for diplomatic failure, The Guardian, lexis)</p><p>The year ended, quite unexpectedly, on a high note for diplomacy. After 53 years of a barren freeze, the US and Cuba agreed to restore diplomatic relations in a deal secretly hammered out in Canada and the Vatican over 18 months. The agreement - which involved an exchange of imprisoned spies and the release of an American contractor, Alan Gross - came as a remarkable Christmas surprise, and not just because of the remarkably leak-free discretion of the talks. It also cut across the prevailing trend in 2014 for diplomatic failure, from the missed chance of a nuclear deal with Iran in November, to a hollow truce in Ukraine and the growing concern of a new cold war. <u>The Cuba deal raised hopes</u> among many Iranians (and a good number of Americans) <u>that</u> Barack <u>Obama was in the mood for breaking diplomatic taboos</u> in his last, supposedly lame, two years in office. But <u>burying the hatchet with Havana is a good deal easier than doing that with Tehran</u>. No one could argue the isolation of Cuba had succeeded in dislodging the communist regime. It was generally seen as a pointless policy, and it had not been a strategic or nuclear issue since 1962. On the other hand, rightly or wrongly, sanctions are widely credited for bringing Iran to the negotiating table over its nuclear programme. However, coming to the table and striking a historic bargain are quite different things. This year's talks in Vienna were a diplomatic marathon, aimed at producing an enduring settlement that would set limits on Iran's nuclear aspirations in return for relief from international sanctions. In the final week <u><mark>before the self-imposed deadline of 24 November, it was clear that the framework for a deal was in place, but crossing the finishing line still required acts of political will in Tehran and Washington</u>.</mark> Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, would have to accept that his country's capacity to enrich uranium would be reduced in the short and medium term. The US would have to offer a significant lightening of the burden of the punitive measures imposed on Iran over the years. In the end, neither side blinked. Unable to agree or walk away, <u><mark>they gave themselves a seven-month extension</u>. However, <u>delay will strengthen hardline opposition to compromise, particularly in Washington, where a Republican-dominated Congress will conven</mark>e</u> on 6 January. <u><strong><mark>That provides a hard political deadline</u></strong>. <u>A new sanctions bill could <strong>kill the negotiations</strong>, and a <strong>diplomatic window will close</strong>, perhaps for many years<strong>.</p></u></strong></mark>
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1nr
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Strikes
|
Talks fail
| 221,194 | 3 | 17,101 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| 565,268 |
N
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Navy
|
Quarters
|
Georgia Boyce-Feinberg
|
Arnett, Katsulas, Pacheco
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran (2NR)
T
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Quarters.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,412 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4>
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1nc
| null |
2
| 431,031 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,413 |
Independetly, Increasing reliance on the illegal market ly causes tropical disease
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Franco-Paredes 10
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Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045
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More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
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transplantation being performed resulting in an increase in number of immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts The reasons for the growing number include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases
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More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
| 1,559 |
<h4>Independetly, Increasing reliance on the illegal market ly causes tropical disease </h4><p><strong>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u>More <mark>transplantation </mark>procedures are <mark>being performed</mark> annually, <mark>resulting in an increase</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>number of immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been</mark> <mark>a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts</mark> in endemic and non-endemic settings</u>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The</mark> epidemiologic <mark>reasons for the</mark> <mark>growing number</mark> of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u></mark>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,431 | 5 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,414 |
They’re just factually wrong- US legalization would require changing federal law about military bases and interstate commerce- here’s a list of all the prostitution-related federal crimes- we’ll enter it into the record
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ProCon.org 2010
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ProCon.org 2010 (US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000119)
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1. Inadmissible aliens
2. Importation of alien for immoral purpose
. Prostitution near military and naval establishments
Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises
5. Transportation generally
6. Coercion and enticement
. Filing factual statement about alien individual
8. Character investigations
9. Registration determinations
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. Inadmissible aliens
Importation of alien for immoral purpose
. Prostitution near military and naval establishments
Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises
Transportation generally
Coercion and enticement
Filing factual statement about alien individual
. Character investigation
. Registration determinations
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I. Federal Law
Title Citation Excerpt Punishment
1. Inadmissible aliens Title 8 Ch. 12 Sub Ch. II Part II Sec. 1182 "Any alien who-- (i) is coming to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution, or has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status...is inadmissible." Denied admission into US
2. Importation of alien for immoral purpose Title 8 Ch. 12 Sub Ch. II Part VIII Sec. 1328 "The importation into the United States of any alien for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, is forbidden." Up to 10 yrs and/or fine
3. Prostitution near military and naval establishments Title 18 Part I Ch. 67 Sec. 1384 "Within such reasonable distance of any military or naval camp, station, fort, post, yard, base, cantonment, training or mobilization place as the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, or any two or all of them shall determine to be needful to the efficiency, health, and welfare of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, and shall designate and publish in general orders or bulletins, whoever engages in prostitution....prohibited shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Up to 1 yr and/or fine
4. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises Title 18 Part I Ch. 95 Sec. 1952 "Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to... otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity...shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." Up to 5 yrs and/or fine
5. Transportation generally Title 18 Part I Ch. 117 Sec. 2421 "Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." Up to 10 yrs and/or fine
6. Coercion and enticement Title 18 Part I Ch. 117 Sec. 2422 "Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." Up to 20 yrs and/or fine
7. Filing factual statement about alien individual Title 18 Part I Ch. 117 Sec. 2424 "Whoever... controls... house... for the purpose of prostitution knowing... that the individual is an alien, shall file with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization a statement in writing setting forth the name of such individual, the place at which that individual is kept, and all facts as to the date of that individual's entry into the United States, the port through which that individual entered, that individual's age, nationality, and parentage, and concerning that individual's procuration to come to this country within the knowledge of such person; and [w]hoever fails within five business... to file such statement concerning such alien individual with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." Up to 10 yrs and/or fine
8. Character investigations Title 25 Ch. 34 Sec. 3207 "The minimum standards of character that are to be prescribed under this section shall ensure that none of the individuals appointed to positions described in subsection (a) of this section have been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any felonious offense, or any of two or more misdemeanor offenses, under Federal, State, or tribal law involving crimes of violence; sexual assault, molestation, exploitation, contact or prostitution; crimes against persons; or offenses committed against children." Denied employment
9. Registration determinations Title 29 Ch. 20 Sub Ch. I Sec. 1813 "In accordance with regulations, the Secretary may refuse to issue or renew, or may suspend or revoke, a certificate of registration (including a certificate of registration as an employee of a farm labor contractor) if the applicant or holder--...has been convicted within the preceding five years..., prostitution..." Denied a certificate of registration
| 4,715 |
<h4><strong>They’re just factually wrong- US legalization would require changing federal law about military bases and interstate commerce- here’s a list of all the prostitution-related federal crimes- we’ll enter it into the record</h4><p>ProCon.org 2010</strong> (US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000119)</p><p>I. Federal Law</p><p> Title Citation Excerpt Punishment</p><p><u>1<mark>. Inadmissible aliens</u></mark> Title 8 Ch. 12 Sub Ch. II Part II Sec. 1182 "Any alien who-- (i) is coming to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution, or has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status...is inadmissible." Denied admission into US</p><p><u>2. <mark>Importation of alien for immoral purpose</u></mark> Title 8 Ch. 12 Sub Ch. II Part VIII Sec. 1328 "The importation into the United States of any alien for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, is forbidden." Up to 10 yrs and/or fine</p><p>3<u><mark>. Prostitution near military and naval establishments</u></mark> Title 18 Part I Ch. 67 Sec. 1384 "Within such reasonable distance of any military or naval camp, station, fort, post, yard, base, cantonment, training or mobilization place as the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, or any two or all of them shall determine to be needful to the efficiency, health, and welfare of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, and shall designate and publish in general orders or bulletins, whoever engages in prostitution....prohibited shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Up to 1 yr and/or fine</p><p>4. <u><mark>Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises</u></mark> Title 18 Part I Ch. 95 Sec. 1952 "Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to... otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity...shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." Up to 5 yrs and/or fine</p><p><u>5. <mark>Transportation generally</u></mark> Title 18 Part I Ch. 117 Sec. 2421 "Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." Up to 10 yrs and/or fine</p><p><u>6. <mark>Coercion and enticement</u></mark> Title 18 Part I Ch. 117 Sec. 2422 "Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." Up to 20 yrs and/or fine</p><p>7<u>. <mark>Filing factual statement about alien individual</u></mark> Title 18 Part I Ch. 117 Sec. 2424 "Whoever... controls... house... for the purpose of prostitution knowing... that the individual is an alien, shall file with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization a statement in writing setting forth the name of such individual, the place at which that individual is kept, and all facts as to the date of that individual's entry into the United States, the port through which that individual entered, that individual's age, nationality, and parentage, and concerning that individual's procuration to come to this country within the knowledge of such person; and [w]hoever fails within five business... to file such statement concerning such alien individual with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." Up to 10 yrs and/or fine</p><p><u>8<mark>. Character investigation</mark>s</u> Title 25 Ch. 34 Sec. 3207 "The minimum standards of character that are to be prescribed under this section shall ensure that none of the individuals appointed to positions described in subsection (a) of this section have been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any felonious offense, or any of two or more misdemeanor offenses, under Federal, State, or tribal law involving crimes of violence; sexual assault, molestation, exploitation, contact or prostitution; crimes against persons; or offenses committed against children." Denied employment</p><p><u>9<mark>. Registration determinations</u></mark> Title 29 Ch. 20 Sub Ch. I Sec. 1813 "In accordance with regulations, the Secretary may refuse to issue or renew, or may suspend or revoke, a certificate of registration (including a certificate of registration as an employee of a farm labor contractor) if the applicant or holder--...has been convicted within the preceding five years..., prostitution..." Denied a certificate of registration</p>
|
1nr
| null |
A/T “No Federal Laws”
| 431,032 | 2 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,415 |
Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev
|
Guardian 1/1
|
Guardian 1/1/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)
|
The Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold If not the possibility that Israel, led by Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order
secondary sanctions are a political house of cards .S. secondary sanctions are, in effect, an enormous bluff, leveraging the specter of legal and reputational risk in America to bully companies and banks in third countries to stop transacting with Iran, but without pulling the trigger on the threat to punish those that continue doing business in Iran. the U.S. bluff on secondary sanctions will soon be called, most likely by China. To be sure, Beijing does not seek confrontation with America over Iran, The Obama administration, for its part, continues giving China sanctions waivers But as Congress legislates more secondary sanctions, Obama’s room to maneuver is shrinking. Obama will soon be in the position of demanding that China cut Iranian oil imports in ways that would harm its economy, and that Chinese banks stop virtually all Iran-related transactions. Beijing will not be able to accommodate such radical demands; it will have to say ‘no’, putting Obama in a classic lose-lose situation. Obama could retreat. But then the world will know that secondary sanctions are a bluff, undercutting their deterrent effect. Alternatively, he could sanction major Chinese firms and banks. But that will force Beijing to respond—at least by taking America to the WTO perhaps by retaliating against U.S. companies. .S. secondary sanctions accelerate the shift of economic power from West to East As non-Western economies surpass more Western countries in their relative importance to the global economy, America has a strong interest in keeping non-Western states tied to established, U.S.-dominated mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international transactions Secondary sanctions, though, push in the opposite direction, incentivizing emerging powers to speed up development of non-Western alternatives to existing transactional platforms Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions not because of Iranian surrender but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs.” This trend will diminish Western influence in myriad ways—e.g., reducing the dollar’s role as a transactional currency, lowering the share of cross-border commodity trades on New York and London exchanges, and shrinking the global near-monopoly of Western-based reinsurance companies and P&I clubs. Add the cost of a U.S.-instigated trade dust-up with China, and the self-damaging quality of America’s dysfunctional Iran policy becomes even clearer. if America doesn’t do these things, it condemns itself to a future as an increasingly failing, and flailing, superpower—and as an obstacle, rather than a facilitator, of rules-based international order.
|
Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is Iran's nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat a deal can be reached. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order
secondary sanctions are a political house of cards an enormous bluff leveraging reputational risk in America to bully companies and banks to stop transacting with Iran the bluff will be called by China as Congress legislates secondary sanctions Obama will be in the position of demanding China cut Iranian oil imports Beijing will not be able to accommodate such demands putting Obama in a lose-lose that will force Beijing to retaliat against U.S. companies Secondary sanctions incentiviz emerging powers to speed up development of non-Western alternatives to transactional platforms delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs.” This trend will diminish the dollar , lower cross-border commodity trades if America doesn’t do these things, it condemns itself to a increasingly failing superpower and as an obstacle of rules-based international order.
|
The Middle East in 2015 features several other dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold for the first time since 1979. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real indeed.
Secondary sanctions on Iran undermine US leadership-collapses global rules based international order and turns the aff
Leverett-professor at Pennsylvania State University's School of International Affairs-7/5/12
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=3490
America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order
Second, secondary sanctions are a political house of cards. American officials are well aware of their presumptive illegality. Successive U.S. administrations have been reluctant to impose them on non-U.S. entities transacting with Iran, precisely to avoid formal challenges at the WTO. U.S. secondary sanctions are, in effect, an enormous bluff, leveraging the specter of legal and reputational risk in America to bully companies and banks in third countries to stop transacting with Iran, but without pulling the trigger on the threat to punish those that continue doing business in Iran. The UK and European sanctions now facing legal challenges are a product of this bullying campaign. For over a decade, the EU has condemned America’s threatened ‘extraterritorial’ application of national trade law, warning it would go to the WTO if Washington ever sanctioned European companies over Iran-related business. Over the last several years, though, enough British and European businesses stopped transacting with Iran that the EU was no longer under pressure to defend European commercial interests and could begin subordinating its Iran policy to American preferences. By last year, it has imposed a nearly comprehensive economic embargo against the Islamic Republic. While Europe has surrendered on having an independent Iran policy, the U.S. bluff on secondary sanctions will soon be called, most likely by China. To be sure, Beijing does not seek confrontation with America over Iran, and has sought to accommodate Washington in many ways—e.g., by not developing trade and investment positions in the Islamic Republic as rapidly as it might have, and by shifting some Iran-related transactional flows into renminbi to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks. While China’s imports of Iranian oil appear, in the aggregate, to be growing, Beijing reduces them when the administration is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. The Obama administration, for its part, continues giving China sanctions waivers; the one Chinese bank barred from America for Iran-related transactions is a Chinese energy company subsidiary with no U.S. business. But as Congress legislates more secondary sanctions, Obama’s room to maneuver is shrinking. Obama will soon be in the position of demanding that China cut Iranian oil imports in ways that would harm its economy, and that Chinese banks stop virtually all Iran-related transactions. Beijing will not be able to accommodate such radical demands; it will have to say ‘no’, putting Obama in a classic lose-lose situation. “If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Hassan Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT.” Obama could retreat. But then the world will know that secondary sanctions are a bluff, undercutting their deterrent effect. Alternatively, he could sanction major Chinese firms and banks. But that will force Beijing to respond—at least by taking America to the WTO (where China will win), perhaps by retaliating against U.S. companies. At this point, Beijing has more ways to impose costs on America for violations of international economic law impinging on Chinese interests than Washington has levers to coerce Chinese compliance with U.S. policy preferences. America and its partners will not come out ahead in this scenario. Third, U.S. secondary sanctions accelerate the shift of economic power from West to East. As non-Western economies surpass more Western countries in their relative importance to the global economy, America has a strong interest in keeping non-Western states tied to established, U.S.-dominated mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international transactions. Secondary sanctions, though, push in the opposite direction, incentivizing emerging powers to speed up development of non-Western alternatives to existing transactional platforms. “Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs.” This trend will diminish Western influence in myriad ways—e.g., reducing the dollar’s role as a transactional currency, lowering the share of cross-border commodity trades on New York and London exchanges, and shrinking the global near-monopoly of Western-based reinsurance companies and P&I clubs. Add the cost of a U.S.-instigated trade dust-up with China, and the self-damaging quality of America’s dysfunctional Iran policy becomes even clearer. Finding a New Approach Putting America on a better strategic trajectory will take thoroughgoing revision of its Iran policy. In this regard, the election of Hassan Rohani—who ran the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council for sixteen years, was its chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, and holds advanced degrees in Islamic law and civil law—as Iran’s next president is an opportunity. If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT—first of all, by acknowledging Iran’s right to safeguarded enrichment. Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs. This, however, is even more difficult than revising the U.S. position on Iranian enrichment—for Congress has legislated conditions for lifting sanctions that stipulate Iran’s abandonment of all alleged WMD activities, cutting all ties to those Washington deems terrorists, and political transformation. Overcoming this will require Obama to do what President Nixon did to enable America’s historic breakthrough with China—going to Tehran, strategically if not physically, to accept a previously demonised political order as a legitimate entity representing legitimate national interests. None of this is particularly likely. But if America doesn’t do these things, it condemns itself to a future as an increasingly failing, and flailing, superpower—and as an obstacle, rather than a facilitator, of rules-based international order.
--diasd solves case—lyncghhpin for coop
| 7,444 |
<h4><strong>Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev</h4><p>Guardian 1/1</strong>/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)</p><p><u>The <mark>Middle East in 2015 features several</u></mark> other <u><mark>dangerous tripwires that could tip the region</mark> <mark>into sudden chaos</u>. <u>The most obvious is</mark> the standoff over <mark>Iran's</mark> suspect <mark>nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat</mark>.</u> Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. <u>Opinions differ whether <mark>a deal can be reached.</mark> If it is, Iran could come in from the cold </u>for the first time since 1979. <u><mark>If not</u>, <u>the possibility that Israel, led by</u></mark> prime minister <mark>Binyamin <u>Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is <strong>very real</u></mark> indeed.</p><p>Secondary sanctions on Iran undermine US leadership-collapses global rules based international order and turns the aff </p><p>Leverett-professor</strong> at <strong>Penn</strong>sylvania <strong>State</strong> University's School of <strong>International Affairs</strong>-7/5/<strong>12 </p><p></strong>http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=3490</p><p><u><strong><mark>America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order</p><p></u></strong></mark>Second, <u><mark>secondary sanctions are a political house of cards</u></mark>. American officials are well aware of their presumptive illegality. Successive U.S. administrations have been reluctant to impose them on non-U.S. entities transacting with Iran, precisely to avoid formal challenges at the WTO. U<u>.S. secondary sanctions are, in effect, <mark>an enormous bluff</mark>, <mark>leveraging</mark> the specter of legal and <mark>reputational</mark> <mark>risk</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>America</mark> <mark>to bully companies and banks</mark> in third countries <mark>to</mark> <mark>stop</mark> <mark>transacting with Iran</mark>, but without pulling the trigger on the threat to punish those that continue doing business in Iran. </u>The UK and European sanctions now facing legal challenges are a product of this bullying campaign. For over a decade, the EU has condemned America’s threatened ‘extraterritorial’ application of national trade law, warning it would go to the WTO if Washington ever sanctioned European companies over Iran-related business. Over the last several years, though, enough British and European businesses stopped transacting with Iran that the EU was no longer under pressure to defend European commercial interests and could begin subordinating its Iran policy to American preferences. By last year, it has imposed a nearly comprehensive economic embargo against the Islamic Republic. While Europe has surrendered on having an independent Iran policy, <u><mark>the</mark> U.S. <mark>bluff</mark> on secondary sanctions <mark>will</mark> soon <mark>be called</mark>, most likely <mark>by China</mark>.</u> <u>To be sure, Beijing does not seek confrontation with America over Iran,</u> and has sought to accommodate Washington in many ways—e.g., by not developing trade and investment positions in the Islamic Republic as rapidly as it might have, and by shifting some Iran-related transactional flows into renminbi to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks. While China’s imports of Iranian oil appear, in the aggregate, to be growing, Beijing reduces them when the administration is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. <u>The Obama administration, for its part, continues giving China sanctions waivers</u>; the one Chinese bank barred from America for Iran-related transactions is a Chinese energy company subsidiary with no U.S. business. <u>But <mark>as Congress legislates</mark> more <mark>secondary sanctions</mark>, Obama’s room to maneuver is shrinking. <mark>Obama will</mark> soon <mark>be in the position of demanding</mark> that <mark>China</mark> <mark>cut</mark> <mark>Iranian</mark> <mark>oil</mark> <mark>imports</mark> in ways that would harm its economy, and that Chinese banks stop virtually all Iran-related transactions. <mark>Beijing will not be able to accommodate such</mark> radical <mark>demands</mark>; it will have to say ‘no’, <mark>putting Obama in a</mark> classic <mark>lose-lose</mark> situation. </u>“If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Hassan Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT.” <u>Obama could retreat. But then the world will know that secondary sanctions are a bluff, undercutting their deterrent effect. Alternatively, he could sanction major Chinese firms and banks. But <mark>that will force</mark> <mark>Beijing</mark> <mark>to</mark> respond—at least by taking America to the WTO</u> (where China will win), <u>perhaps by <mark>retaliat</mark>ing <mark>against</mark> <mark>U.S. companies</mark>.</u> At this point, Beijing has more ways to impose costs on America for violations of international economic law impinging on Chinese interests than Washington has levers to coerce Chinese compliance with U.S. policy preferences. America and its partners will not come out ahead in this scenario. Third, U<u>.S. secondary sanctions accelerate the shift of economic power from West to East</u>. <u>As non-Western economies surpass more Western countries in their relative importance to the global economy, America has a strong interest in keeping non-Western states tied to established, U.S.-dominated mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international transactions</u>. <u><mark>Secondary sanctions</mark>, though, push in the opposite direction, <mark>incentiviz</mark>ing <mark>emerging powers to speed up development of non-Western alternatives to</mark> existing <mark>transactional platforms</u></mark>. “<u>Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions</u>—<u>not because of Iranian surrender</u> (which won’t be forthcoming), <u>but because they <strong><mark>delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs</strong>.” This trend will diminish</mark> Western influence in myriad ways—e.g., reducing <mark>the dollar</mark>’s role as a transactional currency<mark>, lower</mark>ing the share of <mark>cross-border commodity trades</mark> on New York and London exchanges, and shrinking the global near-monopoly of Western-based reinsurance companies and P&I clubs. Add the cost of a U.S.-instigated trade dust-up with China, and the self-damaging quality of America’s dysfunctional Iran policy becomes even clearer. </u>Finding a New Approach Putting America on a better strategic trajectory will take thoroughgoing revision of its Iran policy. In this regard, the election of Hassan Rohani—who ran the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council for sixteen years, was its chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, and holds advanced degrees in Islamic law and civil law—as Iran’s next president is an opportunity. If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT—first of all, by acknowledging Iran’s right to safeguarded enrichment. Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs. This, however, is even more difficult than revising the U.S. position on Iranian enrichment—for Congress has legislated conditions for lifting sanctions that stipulate Iran’s abandonment of all alleged WMD activities, cutting all ties to those Washington deems terrorists, and political transformation. Overcoming this will require Obama to do what President Nixon did to enable America’s historic breakthrough with China—going to Tehran, strategically if not physically, to accept a previously demonised political order as a legitimate entity representing legitimate national interests. None of this is particularly likely. But <u><mark>if America doesn’t do these things, it condemns itself to a</mark> future as an <mark>increasingly</mark> <mark>failing</mark>, and <strong>flailing, <mark>superpower</strong></mark>—<mark>and as an obstacle</mark>, rather than a facilitator, <mark>of <strong>rules-based international order.</p><p></u></mark>--diasd solves case—lyncghhpin for coop</p></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
ov
| 430,495 | 6 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,416 |
The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,033 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,417 |
Plan solves 2 internal links--
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 431,034 | 1 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,418 |
Assess our extinction scenarios in terms of plausibility. We have drivers and events based in evidence and empirics.
|
Tonn and McGregor 2009
|
Tonn and McGregor 2009
Bruce and Donald, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, A singular chain of events, Futures 41 (2009) 706–714
|
A true human extinction scenario ends in failure Humans are faced with a series of threats that in the end we are unable to overcome For a human extinction scenario to be of value to policy makers, it must possess verisimilitude the threats included in the scenario need to be plausible and have a ring of truth. The driving forces behind the threats need to be well explained There must be some evidence that a major event in the scenario could occur There must be some evidence or a valid model that the forces causing major events exist human extinction scenarios ought to be based on plausible events and drivers. Have we witnessed the events and drivers in the past and/or can we forecast the events using current scientific knowledge? If so, those events and drivers can be used in a human extinction scenario.
|
For a human extinction scenario to be of value to policy makers the threats included in the scenario need to be plausible and have a ring of truth. The driving forces behind the threats need to be well explained There must be some evidence that a major event in the scenario could occur There must be some evidence or a valid model that the forces causing major events exist human extinction scenarios ought to be based on plausible events and drivers can we forecast the events using current knowledge? If so, those events and drivers can be used in a human extinction scenario.
|
A true human extinction scenario ends in failure; humans are unable to prevent their own demise. Humans are faced with a series of threats that in the end we are unable to overcome. For various reasons, we may not take these threats seriously, may act on them too late, may implement poorly thought-out responses, and/or simply may not know how to properly react to the threats. Our adaptations generally are too little and too late. For a human extinction scenario to be of value to policy makers, it must possess verisimilitude. That is, the threats included in the scenario need to be plausible and have a ring of truth. The driving forces behind the threats need to be well explained. Human responses to the threats need to be probed. The path of events and adaptations must show how today’s human population that exceeds six billion people decreases over time until the last human in the universe breathes his or her last breath. Generally, then, human extinction scenarios can be constructed with these four generic elements: Events, Drivers, Adaptations, and Pathways. To keep a scenario plausible, some criteria need to be established for what each of these elements can legitimately constitute, such as: Events: There must be some evidence or a valid model to suggest that a major event in the scenario either has occurred previously in the past or could occur in the future. Drivers: There must be some evidence or a valid model that the forces causing major events exist either in society or in the natural or physical world. Adaptations: There must be some evidence that the adaptations actually do occur, could occur or have occurred in the past in response to the conditions present in the scenario. The evidence could be in the form of citations of historical adaptations or could be derived or inferred from theoretical and/or empirical research in the social or behavioral sciences. Pathways: The scenario must explicitly describe the events, drivers, and adaptations over time that leads from the current population to human extinction. Events and drivers that could lead to massive loss of human life may be quite easily imaginable, but how those last few most resilient humans perish must also be directly addressed and could be relatively more challenging to imagine. The dynamic relationship between these basic elements can be seen in Fig. 1. Population declines over period of time as a function of the impact of events and the recovery effects of adaptations. Nonetheless the net effect of events and adaptations is a continuous downward trend in population, ultimately leading to extinction. Thus, human extinction scenarios ought to be based on plausible events and drivers. Have we witnessed the events and drivers in the past and/or can we forecast the events using current scientific knowledge? If so, those events and drivers can be used in a human extinction scenario. If not, then maybe those events and drivers belong to the world of science fiction or religion and not future policy studies. Does the scenario allow for human adaptation? It should. Of course, the key characteristic of a human extinction scenario is that all adaptations eventually fail, as should be clearly explained in the scenario itself.
| 3,248 |
<h4><strong>Assess our extinction scenarios in terms of plausibility. We have drivers and events based in evidence and empirics.</h4><p>Tonn and McGregor 2009</p><p></strong>Bruce and Donald, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, A singular chain of events, Futures 41 (2009) 706–714</p><p><u>A true human extinction scenario ends in failure</u>; humans are unable to prevent their own demise. <u>Humans are faced with a series of threats that in the end we are unable to overcome</u>. For various reasons, we may not take these threats seriously, may act on them too late, may implement poorly thought-out responses, and/or simply may not know how to properly react to the threats. Our adaptations generally are too little and too late. <u><mark>For a human extinction scenario to be of value to policy makers</mark>, it must possess verisimilitude</u>. That is, <u><mark>the threats included in the scenario need to be plausible and have a ring of truth. The driving forces behind the threats need to be well explained</u></mark>. Human responses to the threats need to be probed. The path of events and adaptations must show how today’s human population that exceeds six billion people decreases over time until the last human in the universe breathes his or her last breath. Generally, then, human extinction scenarios can be constructed with these four generic elements: Events, Drivers, Adaptations, and Pathways. To keep a scenario plausible, some criteria need to be established for what each of these elements can legitimately constitute, such as: Events: <u><mark>There must be some evidence</u></mark> or a valid model to suggest <u><mark>that a major event in the scenario</u></mark> either has occurred previously in the past or <u><mark>could occur</u></mark> in the future. Drivers: <u><mark>There must be some evidence or a valid model that the forces causing major events exist</u></mark> either in society or in the natural or physical world. Adaptations: There must be some evidence that the adaptations actually do occur, could occur or have occurred in the past in response to the conditions present in the scenario. The evidence could be in the form of citations of historical adaptations or could be derived or inferred from theoretical and/or empirical research in the social or behavioral sciences. Pathways: The scenario must explicitly describe the events, drivers, and adaptations over time that leads from the current population to human extinction. Events and drivers that could lead to massive loss of human life may be quite easily imaginable, but how those last few most resilient humans perish must also be directly addressed and could be relatively more challenging to imagine. The dynamic relationship between these basic elements can be seen in Fig. 1. Population declines over period of time as a function of the impact of events and the recovery effects of adaptations. Nonetheless the net effect of events and adaptations is a continuous downward trend in population, ultimately leading to extinction. Thus, <u><mark>human extinction scenarios ought to be based on plausible events and drivers</mark>. Have we witnessed the events and drivers in the past and/or <mark>can we forecast the events using current</mark> scientific <mark>knowledge?</mark> <mark>If so, those events and drivers can be used in a human extinction scenario.</u></mark> If not, then maybe those events and drivers belong to the world of science fiction or religion and not future policy studies. Does the scenario allow for human adaptation? It should. Of course, the key characteristic of a human extinction scenario is that all adaptations eventually fail, as should be clearly explained in the scenario itself.</p>
|
1nr
| null |
AT no impact
| 139,205 | 24 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,419 |
Obama’s PC will sustain the veto now
|
Einhorn 1/14
|
Einhorn 1/14/2015 (Robert, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, while serving as the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, he was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-iran-play-ball-nuke-talks-12031?page=show)
|
If Congress passes new sanctions Obama is very likely to veto administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the veto some Democrats will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto
|
Congress passes a new sanctions Obama is very likely to veto administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the ve It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto
|
If the Congress passes a new sanctions bill that the administration considers damaging to prospects for negotiations, President Obama is very likely to veto it. Senior administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the veto, focusing heavily on Senate Democrats. Although some Democrats can be expected to vote to override the veto, a substantial number, including some who have reservations about the negotiations, will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully or as undercutting their party’s president on a matter of such high priority. It is therefore likely that the administration will have the votes to sustain the veto and prevent legislation potentially damaging to the negotiations from being enacted. So while the Republican-controlled Congress will undoubtedly give the administration a tough time, it is likely that President Obama will be able, without legislative interference, to continue negotiating an agreement that he believes is in the U.S. interest.
| 1,085 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s PC will sustain the veto now</h4><p>Einhorn 1/14</strong>/2015 (Robert, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 to 2013, while serving as the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, he was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-iran-play-ball-nuke-talks-12031?page=show)</p><p><u>If</u> the <u><mark>Congress</u> <u>passes</u> a <u>new sanctions</u></mark> bill that the administration considers damaging to prospects for negotiations, President <u><mark>Obama</u> <u>is very likely to veto</u></mark> it. Senior <u><mark>administration officials would then go into overdrive in finding the 34 Senate votes necessary to sustain the ve</mark>to</u>, focusing heavily on Senate Democrats. Although <u>some</u> <u>Democrats</u> can be expected to vote to override the veto, a substantial number, including some who have reservations about the negotiations, <u>will not want to be seen as undermining the best prospect for resolving the nuclear issue peacefully </u>or as undercutting their party’s president on a matter of such high priority. <u><mark>It is therefore likely that the administration <strong>will have the votes to sustain the veto</u></mark> and prevent legislation potentially damaging to the negotiations from being enacted. So while the Republican-controlled Congress will undoubtedly give the administration a tough time, it is likely that President Obama will be able, without legislative interference, to continue negotiating an agreement that he believes is in the U.S. interest.</p></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
Uq
| 430,686 | 4 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,420 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,421 |
First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs
|
Upchurch 12
|
Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
|
By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ, this would become much less commonplace.
|
By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.
| 2,141 |
<h4>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes<u> a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a <strong>major hit</u></strong></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like <mark>this would become much less commonplace.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,262 | 14 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,422 |
Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev
|
Guardian 1/1
|
Guardian 1/1/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)
|
The Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold If not the possibility that Israel, led by Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
|
Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is Iran's nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat a deal can be reached. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real
|
The Middle East in 2015 features several other dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold for the first time since 1979. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real indeed.
| 656 |
<h4><strong>Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev</h4><p>Guardian 1/1</strong>/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)</p><p><u>The <mark>Middle East in 2015 features several</u></mark> other <u><mark>dangerous tripwires that could tip the region</mark> <mark>into sudden chaos</u>. <u>The most obvious is</mark> the standoff over <mark>Iran's</mark> suspect <mark>nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat</mark>.</u> Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. <u>Opinions differ whether <mark>a deal can be reached.</mark> If it is, Iran could come in from the cold </u>for the first time since 1979. <u><mark>If not</u>, <u>the possibility that Israel, led by</u></mark> prime minister <mark>Binyamin <u>Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is <strong>very real</u></strong></mark> indeed.</p>
|
1nr
| null |
Strikes
| 430,495 | 6 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,423 |
Veto will be sustained now- enough Dems are on board
|
Financial Times 1/16
|
Financial Times 1/16/2015 (Obama and Cameron warn against new Iran sanctions, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44d195d0-9d9b-11e4-8ea3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P0tmmbW5)
|
Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House. With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. Corker said the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its first priorities Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather 67 votes given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats.
|
Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House . Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather the 67 votes , given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats
|
Barack Obama and David Cameron warned on Friday that new sanctions on Iran could cause the collapse of nuclear negotiations, as the new Republican-controlled Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House. Threatening to veto any sanctions bills that pass Congress, Mr Obama said that new US penalties on Iran would give Tehran an excuse to walk away from talks and to blame Washington for the failure, weakening support for the existing sanctions. With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders in the Senate have said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. The talks between Iran and the US and other major powers, which have been under way for more than a year, were extended in November for another seven months. In return for potential relief on sanctions, the US wants decisive limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Speaking at a White House press conference with Mr Cameron, Mr Obama said that “I respectfully request them [Congress] to hold off for a few months to see if we have the possibility of solving a big problem without resorting potentially to war.” He added that of the US were to impose new sanctions now, Iran “would be able to maintain that the reason that they ended negotiations was because the United States was operating in bad faith and blew up the deal. And there would be some sympathy to that view around the world.” Adopting a tactic most often used by Israel of talking directly with Congress, Mr Cameron said he had phoned two senators on Friday to express his concerns about new US sanctions on Iran. “They could fracture the international unity that there’s been which has been so valuable in presenting a united front to Iran,” he said. Senate aides said that two separate bills are presently under consideration. The first would impose a new round of sanctions on Iran if the current talks were to fail, while the second demands that Congress get to vote on any final agreement reached with Tehran. Bob Corker, the Tennessee Republican who is the new chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, said this week that the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its first priorities. A similar proposal passed the House comfortably last week. That sanctions bill is co-sponsored by Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat, who had a tense exchange with Mr Obama over the issue at a closed-door session with Senate Democrats on Thursday, according to aides. Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is unlikely to gather the 67 votes needed to override a presidential veto, given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats. Supporters of new sanctions insist that the bill would not be an act of bad faith to Iran because the penalties would only be implemented if the talks collapse without a final deal. However Tom Cotton, a new Republican senator with hawkish views on Iran, said this week that one of the objectives of the sanctions legislation was the collapse of the talks with Iran. “The end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence,” he said.
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<h4><strong>Veto will be sustained now- enough Dems are on board</h4><p>Financial Times 1/16</strong>/2015 (Obama and Cameron warn against new Iran sanctions, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44d195d0-9d9b-11e4-8ea3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3P0tmmbW5)</p><p>Barack Obama and David Cameron warned on Friday that new sanctions on Iran could cause the collapse of nuclear negotiations, as the new Republican-controlled <u><mark>Congress appeared to be shaping up for a major foreign policy fight with the White House</mark>. </u>Threatening to veto any sanctions bills that pass Congress, Mr Obama said that new US penalties on Iran would give Tehran an excuse to walk away from talks and to blame Washington for the failure, weakening support for the existing sanctions. <u>With the backing of a handful of senior Democrats, Republican leaders</u> in the Senate have <u>said they hope to bring new sanctions legislation up for debate over the next few weeks. </u>The talks between Iran and the US and other major powers, which have been under way for more than a year, were extended in November for another seven months. In return for potential relief on sanctions, the US wants decisive limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Speaking at a White House press conference with Mr Cameron, Mr Obama said that “I respectfully request them [Congress] to hold off for a few months to see if we have the possibility of solving a big problem without resorting potentially to war.” He added that of the US were to impose new sanctions now, Iran “would be able to maintain that the reason that they ended negotiations was because the United States was operating in bad faith and blew up the deal. And there would be some sympathy to that view around the world.” Adopting a tactic most often used by Israel of talking directly with Congress, Mr Cameron said he had phoned two senators on Friday to express his concerns about new US sanctions on Iran. “They could fracture the international unity that there’s been which has been so valuable in presenting a united front to Iran,” he said. Senate aides said that two separate bills are presently under consideration. The first would impose a new round of sanctions on Iran if the current talks were to fail, while the second demands that Congress get to vote on any final agreement reached with Tehran. Bob <u>Corker</u>, the Tennessee Republican who is the new chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, <u>said</u> this week that <u>the Senate would take up the Iran sanctions bill as one of its <strong>first priorities</u></strong>. A similar proposal passed the House comfortably last week. That sanctions bill is co-sponsored by Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat, who had a tense exchange with Mr Obama over the issue at a closed-door session with Senate Democrats on Thursday, according to aides<mark>. <u>Analysts believe the bill will pass the Senate but is <strong>unlikely to gather</u></strong> the <u><strong>67 votes</u></strong> </mark>needed to override a presidential veto<mark>, <u>given the strong opposition to new sanctions from a number of senior Democrats</mark>. </u><strong>Supporters of new sanctions insist that the bill would not be an act of bad faith to Iran because the penalties would only be implemented if the talks collapse without a final deal. However Tom Cotton, a new Republican senator with hawkish views on Iran, said this week that one of the objectives of the sanctions legislation was the collapse of the talks with Iran. “The end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence,” he said.</p></strong>
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Uq
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
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Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally
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Calandrillo 4
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Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.
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if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad
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Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.
| 1,779 |
<h4>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>
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Contention 2 Illicit market
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
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Texas
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1
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Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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| 2,014 |
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The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
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Schwartz 2013
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Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
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The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
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1nc
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| 430,417 | 18 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
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Navy
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8
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Navy Mueller-Roach
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Benedict
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,426 |
Humanitarian Justifications solve war- “pretext wars” are wrong
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Goodman 6
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By Ryan Goodman 6 * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf
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**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Second the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to conceal its ulterior motives the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would suppress the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale-possibly to the relative exclusion of other (generally less justifiable) reasons. This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction Some points discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have already embarked on different justifications preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI. First to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, the pretext objection to legalizing UHI loses its force; concerns about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception are misplaced or exaggerated if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one Second such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design Third studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. T Finally if the assertion of humanitarian claims only supplement rather than displaces- other issues, a road to war may yet be averted. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute studies of international crises suggest that issue linkage is more likely to succeed when the salience ascribed to an issue is different for the disputing parties a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights conditions in one of the countries. Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out." the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of such a reversal. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war:
[D]iplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and nego- tiate on secondary issues combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues can help leaders of attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic or international political costs of backing away from a military confrontation. Leaders can claim that defender concessions on certain issues were a major gain, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy leaders can use even limited accommodative diplomatic actions of the defender to fend off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure humanitarian issues can provide these types of opportunities for deescalation: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated so that leaders can counter charges of appeasement and capitulation if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be critical to pack- aging a politically viable agreement
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state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale- to the exclusion of other ( reasons. the pretext objection loses force concerns are misplaced or exaggerated if humanitarian claims supplement other issues, war may be averted introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities issue linkage is likely to succeed when salience is different for the disputing parties'37-a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of a reversal allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war:
policies that include willingness to compromise on secondary issues, combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues ... can help attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic costs of backing away Leaders can claim defender concessions were a major gain leaders can use even limited accommodative actions of the defender to fend off political adversaries humanitarian issues can provide opportunities for deescalation so leaders can counter charges of appeasement
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**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
Second, the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to conceal its ulterior motives. On this view, the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would suppress the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities. Similarly, state R would have difficulty in pro- claiming humanitarianism as the reason for using force if the proclamation is superficially attached to existing objectives. A meager, formal reference to humanitarianism while military efforts are obviously pursued for other reasons should not obtain the political benefits of a pub- licly legitimated use of force. The important point is that state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale-possibly to the relative exclusion of other (generally less justifiable) reasons. This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction, even though the factual predicate was potentially meritorious (an issue that I explore later with respect to the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq). Some of the points just discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have already embarked on different justifications; that is, preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI. First, to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, the pretext objection to legalizing UHI loses its force; that is, concerns about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception are misplaced or exaggerated if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one.134 Second, such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should, if anything, add support to the project of fashioning institutions to take account of empirical patterns of state practice. The prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design. Accord- ingly, in part III, I propose some institutional reforms to encourage the early and emphatic articulation of humanitarian purposes in interstate disputes. Third, recall that the studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. The question is: which issue becomes the principal claim raised by the revisionist state. A humanitarian claim need not com- pletely replace or retire an earlier claim; in such cases, it is more a matter of emphasis.135 Finally, if the assertion of humanitarian claims only supplements-rather than displaces- other issues, a road to war may yet be averted. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute.'36 More- over, studies of international crises suggest that issue linkage is more likely to succeed when the salience ascribed to an issue is different for the disputing parties'37-a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights conditions in one of the countries. Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises. As Senese and Vasquez posit, other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out." In this context, the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of such a reversal. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war:
[D]iplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and nego- tiate on secondary issues, combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues ... can help leaders of attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic or international political costs of backing away from a military confrontation. Leaders can claim that defender concessions on certain issues were a major gain, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy leaders can use even limited accommodative diplomatic actions of the defender to fend off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure.38 In Huth's own work on territorial disputes, he notes that humanitarian issues can provide these types of opportunities for deescalation: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated so that leaders can counter charges of appeasement and capitulation. Thus, if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be critical to pack- aging a politically viable agreement. 39 For such a tactic to work, however, the secondary issue would presumably need to be perceived as a genuine part of the dispute.
| 5,492 |
<h4><strong>Humanitarian Justifications solve war- “pretext wars” are wrong</h4><p></strong>By Ryan <strong>Goodman 6</strong> * ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf</p><p><u>**NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention</p><p><strong>Second</u></strong>, <u>the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to <strong>conceal</strong> its <strong>ulterior motives</u></strong>. On this view, <u>the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would <strong>suppress</strong> the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities</u>. Similarly, state R would have difficulty in pro- claiming humanitarianism as the reason for using force if the proclamation is superficially attached to existing objectives. A meager, formal reference to humanitarianism while military efforts are obviously pursued for other reasons should not obtain the political benefits of a pub- licly legitimated use of force. The important point is that <u><mark>state R will need to <strong>invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale</strong>-</mark>possibly <strong><mark>to the</strong> </mark>relative <strong><mark>exclusion of other</strong> (</mark>generally less justifiable) <strong><mark>reasons</strong>. </mark>This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction</u>, even though the factual predicate was potentially meritorious (an issue that I explore later with respect to the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq). <u>Some</u> of the <u>points</u> just <u>discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have <strong>already embarked</strong> on different justifications</u>; that is, <u>preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI.</u> <u><strong>First</u></strong>, <u>to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, <mark>the <strong>pretext</strong> objection</mark> to legalizing UHI <mark>loses</mark> its <mark>force</mark>;</u> that is, <u><mark>concerns </mark>about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception<mark> are <strong>misplaced</strong> or <strong>exaggerated</strong></mark> if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one</u>.134 <u><strong>Second</u></strong>, <u>such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should</u>, if anything, add support to the project of fashioning institutions to take account of empirical patterns of state practice. The <u>prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design</u>. Accord- ingly, in part III, I propose some institutional reforms to encourage the early and emphatic articulation of humanitarian purposes in interstate disputes. <u><strong>Third</u></strong>, recall that the <u>studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. T</u>he question is: which issue becomes the principal claim raised by the revisionist state. A humanitarian claim need not com- pletely replace or retire an earlier claim; in such cases, it is more a matter of emphasis.135 <u><strong>Finally</u></strong>, <u><mark>if</mark> the assertion of <mark>humanitarian claims</mark> only <mark>supplement</u></mark>s-<u>rather than displaces- <mark>other issues, </mark>a road to <mark>war <strong>may </mark>yet <mark>be averted</strong></mark>. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the <mark>introduction of humanitarian issues can <strong>facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities</mark> for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute</u></strong>.'36 More- over, <u>studies of international crises suggest that <mark>issue linkage is</mark> more <mark>likely to succeed when</mark> the <mark>salience</mark> ascribed to an issue <mark>is different for the disputing parties</u>'37-<u>a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights</mark> conditions in one of the countries. <mark>Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate <strong>face-saving compromises</u></strong></mark>. As Senese and Vasquez posit, <u>other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out."</u> In this context, <u><mark>the addition of humanitarian issues might <strong>reduce the political costs </strong>of </mark>such <mark>a reversal</mark>. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can <mark>allow leaders to take <strong>politically sensitive, pacifying</strong> steps that <strong>avert war:</strong></mark> </p><p>[D]iplomatic <mark>policies that include</mark> flexibility and a <mark>willingness to compromise</mark> and nego- tiate <mark>on <strong>secondary issues</u></strong>, <u>combined with a <strong>refusal to concede</strong> on vital security issues</u> ...</mark> <u><mark>can help</mark> leaders of <mark>attacker states to retreat from their threats by <strong>reducing</strong> the domestic</mark> or international political <mark>costs of backing away</mark> from a military confrontation. <mark>Leaders can claim</mark> that <mark>defender concessions</mark> on certain issues <mark>were a <strong>major gain</strong></mark>, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy <mark>leaders can use even <strong>limited accommodative </mark>diplomatic <mark>actions</strong> of the defender to fend off </mark>domestic or foreign <mark>political adversaries</mark> who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure</u>.38 In Huth's own work on territorial disputes, he notes that <u><mark>humanitarian issues can provide </mark>these types of <mark>opportunities for deescalation</mark>: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated <mark>so </mark>that <mark>leaders can counter charges of appeasement</mark> and capitulation</u>. Thus, <u>if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be <strong>critical</strong> to pack- aging a politically viable agreement</u><strong>. 39 For such a tactic to work, however, the secondary issue would presumably need to be perceived as a genuine part of the dispute. </p></strong>
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1nr
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Case
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Humanitarian Intervention Good
| 431,017 | 6 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
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Navy
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5
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James Madison Lepp-Miller
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McElhinny
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T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,427 |
PC’s key to sway Dem leadership against sanctions
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Bloomberg 1/14
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Bloomberg 1/14/2015 (Congress Moves Against Obama on New Iran Sanctions, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-14/exclusive-congress-moves-against-obama-on-new-iran-sanctions)
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Negotiations are still taking place between Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats as to how the new Iran legislation drive will play out Reid has not weighed in publicly He will have to choose between obstructing the bill’s progress, as a favor to the White House or acquiescing to the large majority of senators who want to move forward against the administration’s wishes A I P A C has been lobbying Reid to get behind the new sanctions
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Reid has not weighed in publicly He will have to choose between obstructing the bill’s progress, as a favor to the White House, or acquiescing to the large majority of senators who want to move forward against the administration’s wishes Am s u A C has been lobbying Reid to get behind the new sanctions
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Negotiations are still taking place between Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats, as well as within the Senate Republican caucus, as to how the new Iran legislation drive will play out. But several staffers said that new Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is committed to moving the Kirk-Menendez bill to the floor in late February or early March, with the exact timing depending on how things play out in the Senate overall. Minority Leader Harry Reid has not weighed in publicly on the matter. He will have to choose between obstructing the bill’s progress, as a favor to the White House, or acquiescing to the large majority of senators who want to move forward against the administration’s wishes, even inside his own party. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee has also quietly been lobbying Reid to get behind the new sanctions drive, several senior Senate staffers said. Reid's office
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<h4><strong>PC’s key to sway Dem leadership against sanctions</h4><p>Bloomberg 1/14</strong>/2015 (Congress Moves Against Obama on New Iran Sanctions, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-14/exclusive-congress-moves-against-obama-on-new-iran-sanctions)</p><p><u>Negotiations are still taking place between Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats</u>, as well as within the Senate Republican caucus, <u>as to how the new Iran legislation drive will play out</u>. But several staffers said that new Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is committed to moving the Kirk-Menendez bill to the floor in late February or early March, with the exact timing depending on how things play out in the Senate overall. Minority Leader Harry <u><mark>Reid has not weighed in publicly</u></mark> on the matter. <u><mark>He will have to choose between obstructing the bill’s progress, <strong>as a favor to the White House</u></strong>, <u>or acquiescing to the large majority of senators who want to move forward against the administration’s wishes</u></mark>, even inside his own party. The <u><mark>A</u>m</mark>erican <u>I</u><mark>s</mark>rael <u>P</u><mark>u</mark>blic <u><mark>A</u></mark>ffairs <u><mark>C</u></mark>ommittee <u><mark>has</u></mark> also quietly <u><mark>been lobbying Reid to get behind the new sanctions</u></mark> drive, several senior Senate staffers said. Reid's office</p>
| null |
1nr
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Uq
| 431,035 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
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Navy
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3
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Boston College Kenner-Carelli
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Lopez
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Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,428 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
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Taylor 2013
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Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
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without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
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Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
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The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,429 |
WHO remedies are insufficient—a government monopsony is the only way to crowd out the illicit market
|
Satel and Hakim, 08
|
Satel and Hakim, 08 – MD, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, AND MD, Transplant Surgeon, Former President, International College of Surgeons (Sally AND Nadey, June 20, 2008, “What's Wrong with Selling Kidneys?,” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/health/whats-wrong-with-selling-kidneys/,)
|
much of the world transplant establishment WHO advocate remedies that do not go far enough They insist on obliterating organ trafficking but ignore the time-tested fact that trying to stamp out underground markets either drives corruption further underground or causes it to flourish elsewhere trafficking will only recede when the crying need for organs disappears. The remedy to this corrupt and unregulated system of exchange is its mirror image: a regulated and transparent regime devoted to donor protection We suggest a system in which compensation is provided by a third party government, a charity or insurance and overseen by the government Because bidding and private buying will not be permitted, available organs will be distributed to the next in line--not just to the wealthy. we suggest that lump-sum cash payments not be offered By providing in-kind rewards the program would not be attractive to people who might otherwise rush to donate on the promise of a large sum of instant cash The only way to stop illicit markets is to create legal ones there is no better justification for testing legal modes of exchange than the very depredations of the underground market
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WHO remedies do not go far enough hey trying to stamp out underground markets either drives corruption further underground or causes it to flourish elsewhere trafficking will only recede when the crying need for organs disappears The remedy to this unregulated system is a regulated and transparent regime devoted to donor protection. We suggest a system in which compensation is provided by a nd overseen by the government. Because bidding will not be permitted, organs will be distributed to the next in line--not just to the wealthy we suggest providing in-kind rewards -the program would not be attractive to people who might otherwise rush to donate on the promise of a large sum of instant cash. The only way to stop illicit markets is to create legal ones
|
Unfortunately, much of the world transplant establishment--including the WHO, the international Transplantation Society and the World Medical Association--advocate remedies that do not go far enough. They insist on obliterating organ trafficking but ignore the time-tested fact that trying to stamp out underground markets either drives corruption further underground or causes it to flourish elsewhere. The truth is that trafficking will only recede when the crying need for organs disappears. Opponents also allege that a legal system of exchange will inevitably replicate the sins of the black market. This is utterly backward. The remedy to this corrupt and unregulated system of exchange is its mirror image: a regulated and transparent regime devoted to donor protection. We suggest a system in which compensation is provided by a third party (government, a charity or insurance) and overseen by the government. Because bidding and private buying will not be permitted, available organs will be distributed to the next in line--not just to the wealthy. Finally, we suggest that lump-sum cash payments not be offered. By providing in-kind rewards--such as a down payment on a house, a contribution to a retirement fund or lifetime health insurance--the program would not be attractive to people who might otherwise rush to donate on the promise of a large sum of instant cash. The only way to stop illicit markets is to create legal ones. Indeed, there is no better justification for testing legal modes of exchange than the very depredations of the underground market.
| 1,574 |
<h4>WHO remedies are <u>insufficient</u>—a government monopsony is the <u>only way </u> to crowd out the illicit market </h4><p><strong>Satel and Hakim, 08</strong> – MD, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, AND MD, Transplant Surgeon, Former President, International College of Surgeons (Sally AND Nadey, June 20, 2008, “What's Wrong with Selling Kidneys?,” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/health/whats-wrong-with-selling-kidneys/,)</p><p>Unfortunately, <u>much of the world transplant establishment</u>--including the <u><mark>WHO</u></mark>, the international Transplantation Society and the World Medical Association--<u>advocate <mark>remedies</mark> that <mark>do not go far enough</u></mark>. <u>T<mark>hey</mark> insist on obliterating organ trafficking but ignore the time-tested fact that <mark>trying to stamp out underground markets either <strong>drives corruption further underground</strong> or <strong>causes it to flourish elsewhere</u></strong></mark>. The truth is that <u><mark>trafficking will only recede when the crying need for organs disappears</mark>. </u>Opponents also allege that a legal system of exchange will inevitably replicate the sins of the black market. This is utterly backward. <u><mark>The remedy to this</mark> corrupt and <mark>unregulated system</mark> of exchange <mark>is</mark> its mirror image: <mark>a regulated and transparent regime devoted to donor protection</u>. <u>We suggest a system in which compensation is provided by a </mark>third party</u> (<u>government, a charity or insurance</u>) <u>a<mark>nd overseen by the government</u>. <u>Because bidding</mark> and private buying <mark>will not be permitted,</mark> available <mark>organs will be distributed to the next in line--not just to the wealthy</mark>. </u>Finally, <u><mark>we suggest</mark> that lump-sum cash payments not be offered</u>. <u>By <mark>providing in-kind rewards</u></mark>--such as a down payment on a house, a contribution to a retirement fund or lifetime health insurance-<mark>-<u>the program would not be attractive to people who might otherwise rush to donate on the promise of a large sum of instant cash</u>. <u>The only way to stop illicit markets is to create legal ones</u></mark>. Indeed, <u>there is no better justification for testing legal modes of exchange than the very depredations of the underground market</u><strong>.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,271 | 2 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,430 |
Vote in the next few weeks
|
Reuters 1/15
|
Reuters 1/15/2015 (Iran bill debate seen in Senate by early February, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO26U20150115)
|
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program to come to the Senate floor in early February, if not sooner toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something on the floor
|
The new chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program in early February, if not sooner toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something on the floor,"
|
The new chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on Thursday he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program to come to the U.S. Senate floor for debate ahead of a vote in early February, if not sooner. "I think sometime toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something being debated on the Senate floor," Republican Senator Bob Corker told reporters at a retreat for Republican lawmakers in Hershey, Pennsylvania.
| 468 |
<h4><strong>Vote in the next few weeks</h4><p>Reuters 1/15</strong>/2015 (Iran bill debate seen in Senate by early February, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-usa-congress-iran-idUSKBN0KO26U20150115)</p><p><u><mark>The</u> new <u>chairman</u> <u>of the</u> U.S. <u>Senate Foreign Relations Committee said</u></mark> on Thursday <u><mark>he expected a bill addressing Iran's nuclear program</mark> to come to the</u> U.S. <u>Senate floor</u> for debate ahead of a vote <u><mark>in early February, if not sooner</u></mark>. "I think sometime <u><mark>toward the end of January or the first part of February, you’ll see something</u></mark> being debated <u><mark>on the</u></mark> Senate <u><mark>floor</u>,"<strong></mark> Republican Senator Bob Corker told reporters at a retreat for Republican lawmakers in Hershey, Pennsylvania.</p></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
Top of Agenda
| 430,680 | 4 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,431 |
humanitarian interventions are highly effective
|
Western and Goldstein 11
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Western and Goldstein 11
|
foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet skepticism is unwarranted in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods international actors did not abandon intervention amid the violence, major intervening powers and the UN undertook systematic reviews of their earlier failures, updated their intervention strategies, and helped foster a new set of norms for civilian protection criticisms formulated in response to the botched campaigns of 1992–95 still guide the conversation about intervention today. The charges are outdated the most violent and protracted cases in recent history -- Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- have been cases in which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment with credible force a comprehensive study conducted by the political scientist Taylor Seybolt has found that aggressive operations legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions, as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, were the most successful at ending conflicts. Even when civil wars do not stop right away, external interventions often mitigate violence against civilians. because interventions force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This phenomenon, witnessed in Libya means even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians the statistical record shows Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention began, both the frequency and the intensity of attacks on civilians have declined Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed According to the most recent Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989
|
in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping remove a corrupt leader has become more the rule than the exception the international community has grown increasingly adept at using force to stop atrocities amid violence, major powers undertook systematic reviews of failures, updated strategies, and helped foster new norms for civilian protection criticisms to the campaigns of 92–95 still guide the conversation charges are outdated the most violent and protracted cases in recent history have been cases in which the international community was unwilling to intervene or commit a comprehensive study found aggressive operations were the most successful at ending conflicts interventions mitigate violence against civilians because would-be killers divert resources from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This witnessed in Libya the statistical record shows both the frequency and intensity of attacks on civilians have declined
|
JON WESTERN is Five College Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and the author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, "Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age",
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age?page=show
To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods. A TURBULENT DECADE Two decades of media exposure to genocide have altered global attitudes about intervention. Modern humanitarian intervention was first conceived in the years following the end of the Cold War. The triumph of liberal democracy over communism made Western leaders optimistic that they could solve the world’s problems as never before. Military force that had long been held in check by superpower rivalry could now be unleashed to protect poor countries from aggression, repression, and hunger. At the same time, the shifting global landscape created new problems that cried out for action. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries surged, and recurrent famines and instability hit much of Africa. A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate targeting of civilians. The emotional impact of these crises was heightened by new communications technologies that transmitted graphic images of human suffering across the world. For the first time in decades, terms such as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” appeared regularly in public discussions. Western political elites struggled to respond to these new realities. When U.S. marines arrived in Somalia in December 1992 to secure famine assistance that had been jeopardized by civil war, there were few norms or rules of engagement to govern such an intervention and no serious plans for the kinds of forces and tactics that would be needed to establish long-term stability. Indeed, the marines’ very arrival highlighted the gap between military theory and practice: the heavily armed troops stormed ashore on a beach occupied by only dozens of camera-wielding journalists. Although the Somalia mission did succeed in saving civilians, the intervention was less successful in coping with the political and strategic realities of Somali society and addressing the underlying sources of conflict. U.S. forces were drawn into a shooting war with one militia group, and in the October 1993 “Black Hawk down” incident, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu while television cameras rolled. Facing domestic pressures and lacking a strategic objective, President Bill Clinton quickly withdrew U.S. troops. The UN soon followed, and Somalia was left to suffer in a civil war that continues to this day. Meanwhile, two days after the “Black Hawk down” fiasco, the UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda, where a peace agreement held the promise of ending a civil war. The international force was notable for its small size and paltry resources. Hutu extremists there drew lessons from the faint-hearted international response in Somalia, and when the conflict reignited in April 1994, they killed ten Belgian peacekeepers to induce the Belgian-led UN force to pull out. Sure enough, most of the peacekeepers withdrew, and as more than half a million civilians were killed in a matter of months, the international community failed to act. Around the same time, a vicious war erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia, drawing a confused and ineffective response from the West. At first, in 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States did not “have a dog in that fight.” Even after the world learned of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, in May 1993, Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren Christopher, described the so-called ancient hatreds of ethnic groups there as a presumably unsolvable “problem from hell.” Unwilling to risk their soldiers’ lives or to use the word “genocide,” with all of its political, legal, and moral ramifications, the United States and European powers opted against a full-scale intervention and instead supported a UN peacekeeping force that found little peace to keep. At times, the UN force actually made things worse, promising protection that it could not provide or giving fuel and money to aggressors in exchange for the right to send humanitarian supplies to besieged victims. The UN and Western powers were humiliated in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. War criminals elsewhere appeared to conclude that the international community could be intimidated by a few casualties. And in the United States, a number of prominent critics came to feel that humanitarian intervention was an ill-conceived enterprise. The political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that it was “morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible” to put U.S. soldiers at risk in intrastate conflicts, and he argued at another point that it was “human to hate.” Henry Kissinger saw danger in the United States becoming bogged down in what he later called “the bottomless pit of Balkan passions,” and he warned against intervening when there were not vital strategic interests at stake. Other critics concluded that applying military force to protect people often prolonged civil wars and intensified the violence, killing more civilians than otherwise might have been the case. And still others argued that intervention fundamentally altered intrastate political contests, creating long-term instability or protracted dependence on the international community. Nonetheless, international actors did not abandon intervention or their efforts to protect civilians. Rather, amid the violence, major intervening powers and the UN undertook systematic reviews of their earlier failures, updated their intervention strategies, and helped foster a new set of norms for civilian protection. A key turning point came in 1995, when Bosnian Serb forces executed more than 7,000 prisoners in the UN-designated safe area of Srebrenica. The Clinton administration quickly abandoned its hesitancy and led a forceful diplomatic and military effort to end the war. The persistent diplomacy of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser, persuaded the reluctant Europeans and UN peacekeeping commanders to support Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s aggressive air campaign targeting the Bosnian Serb army. That effort brought Serbia to the negotiating table, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke crafted the Dayton agreement, which ended the war. In place of the hapless UN force, NATO sent 60,000 heavily armed troops into the “zone of separation” between the warring parties, staving off renewed fighting. The “problem from hell” stopped immediately, and the ensuing decade of U.S.-led peacekeeping saw not a single U.S. combat-related casualty in Bosnia. Unlike previous interventions, the post-Dayton international peacekeeping presence was unified, vigorous, and sustained, and it has kept a lid on ethnic violence for more than 15 years. A related innovation was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a court that has indicted 161 war criminals, including all the principal Serbian wartime leaders. Despite extensive criticism for ostensibly putting justice ahead of peace, the tribunal has produced dramatic results. Every suspected war criminal, once indicted, quickly lost political influence in postwar Bosnia, and not one of the 161 indictees remains at large today. More important than an exit strategy is a comprehensive transition strategy. Buoyed by these successes, NATO responded to an imminent Serbian attack on Kosovo in 1999 by launching a major air war. Despite initial setbacks (the operation failed to stop a Serbian ground attack that created more than a million Kosovar Albanian refugees), the international community signaled that it would not back down. Under U.S. leadership, NATO escalated the air campaign, and the ICTY indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Within three months, the combined military and diplomatic pressure compelled Serbia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. And even though many observers, including several senior Clinton administration officials, feared that the ICTY’s indictment of Milosevic in the middle of the military campaign would make it even less likely that he would capitulate in Kosovo or ever relinquish power, he was removed from office 18 months later by nonviolent civil protest and turned over to The Hague. Outside the Balkans, the international community continued to adapt its approach to conflicts with similar success. In 1999, after a referendum on East Timor’s secession from Indonesia led to Indonesian atrocities against Timorese civilians, the UN quickly authorized an 11,000-strong Australian-led military force to end the violence. The intervention eventually produced an independent East Timor at peace with Indonesia. Later missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire used a similar model of deploying a regional military force in coordination with the UN and, on occasion, European powers. CORRECTING THE RECORD Despite the international community’s impressive record of recent humanitarian missions, many of the criticisms formulated in response to the botched campaigns of 1992–95 still guide the conversation about intervention today. The charges are outdated. Contrary to the claims that interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian casualties, the most violent and protracted cases in recent history -- Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- have been cases in which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment with credible force. Conversely, a comprehensive study conducted by the political scientist Taylor Seybolt has found that aggressive operations legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions, as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, were the most successful at ending conflicts. Even when civil wars do not stop right away, external interventions often mitigate violence against civilians. This is because, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, interventions aimed at preventing mass atrocities often force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This phenomenon, witnessed in the recent Libya campaign, means that even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians. Another critique of humanitarian interventions is that they create perverse incentives for rebel groups to deliberately provoke states to commit violence against civilians in order to generate an international response. By this logic, the prospect of military intervention would generate more rebel provocations and thus more mass atrocities. Yet the statistical record shows exactly the opposite. Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention began, both the frequency and the intensity of attacks on civilians have declined. During the Arab Spring protests this year, there was no evidence that opposition figures in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or Yemen sought to trigger outside intervention. In fact, the protesters clearly stated that they would oppose such action. Even the Libyan rebels, who faced long odds against Qaddafi’s forces, refused what would have been the most effective outside help: foreign boots on the ground. Recent efforts to perfect humanitarian intervention have been fueled by deep changes in public norms about violence against civilians and advances in conflict management. Two decades of media exposure to mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have altered global -- not simply Western -- attitudes about intervention. The previously sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty has been made conditional on a state’s responsible behavior, and in 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the responsibility to protect at the UN’s World Summit. NATO’s intervention in Libya reflects how the world has become more committed to the protection of civilians. Both UN Security Council resolutions on Libya this year passed with unprecedented speed and without a single dissenting vote. In the wake of conflicts as well, the international community has shown that it can and will play a role in maintaining order and restoring justice. Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed. And because of successful postconflict tribunals and the International Criminal Court, individuals, including national leaders, can now be held liable for egregious crimes against civilians. Collectively, these new conflict management and civilian protection tools have contributed to a marked decline in violence resulting from civil war. According to the most recent Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989. Still, although international norms now enshrine civilian protection and levels of violence are down, humanitarian interventions remain constrained by political and military realities. The international community’s inaction in the face of attacks on Syrian protesters, as of this writing, demonstrates that neither the UN nor any major power is willing or prepared to intervene when abusive leaders firmly control the state’s territory and the state’s security forces and are backed by influential allies. Furthermore, the concept of civilian protection still competes with deeply held norms of sovereignty, especially in former colonies. Although humanitarian intervention can succeed in many cases, given these constraints, it is not always feasible.
| 15,994 |
<h4><strong>humanitarian interventions are highly effective</h4><p>Western and Goldstein 11</p><p></strong>JON WESTERN is Five College Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and the author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, "Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age",</p><p>http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age?page=show</p><p>To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and <u>foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet</u> such <u>skepticism is unwarranted</u>. Despite the early setbacks <u><mark>in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping</mark> rebel forces <mark>remove a corrupt leader</mark> there <mark>has become more the rule </mark>of humanitarian intervention <mark>than the exception</u></mark>. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. <u>Over the last 20 years, <mark>the international community has grown <strong>increasingly adept</strong> at using</mark> military <mark>force to stop</mark> or prevent mass <mark>atrocities</u></mark>. <u>Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence</u>, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, <u>these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods</u>. A TURBULENT DECADE Two decades of media exposure to genocide have altered global attitudes about intervention. Modern humanitarian intervention was first conceived in the years following the end of the Cold War. The triumph of liberal democracy over communism made Western leaders optimistic that they could solve the world’s problems as never before. Military force that had long been held in check by superpower rivalry could now be unleashed to protect poor countries from aggression, repression, and hunger. At the same time, the shifting global landscape created new problems that cried out for action. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries surged, and recurrent famines and instability hit much of Africa. A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate targeting of civilians. The emotional impact of these crises was heightened by new communications technologies that transmitted graphic images of human suffering across the world. For the first time in decades, terms such as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” appeared regularly in public discussions. Western political elites struggled to respond to these new realities. When U.S. marines arrived in Somalia in December 1992 to secure famine assistance that had been jeopardized by civil war, there were few norms or rules of engagement to govern such an intervention and no serious plans for the kinds of forces and tactics that would be needed to establish long-term stability. Indeed, the marines’ very arrival highlighted the gap between military theory and practice: the heavily armed troops stormed ashore on a beach occupied by only dozens of camera-wielding journalists. Although the Somalia mission did succeed in saving civilians, the intervention was less successful in coping with the political and strategic realities of Somali society and addressing the underlying sources of conflict. U.S. forces were drawn into a shooting war with one militia group, and in the October 1993 “Black Hawk down” incident, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu while television cameras rolled. Facing domestic pressures and lacking a strategic objective, President Bill Clinton quickly withdrew U.S. troops. The UN soon followed, and Somalia was left to suffer in a civil war that continues to this day. Meanwhile, two days after the “Black Hawk down” fiasco, the UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda, where a peace agreement held the promise of ending a civil war. The international force was notable for its small size and paltry resources. Hutu extremists there drew lessons from the faint-hearted international response in Somalia, and when the conflict reignited in April 1994, they killed ten Belgian peacekeepers to induce the Belgian-led UN force to pull out. Sure enough, most of the peacekeepers withdrew, and as more than half a million civilians were killed in a matter of months, the international community failed to act. Around the same time, a vicious war erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia, drawing a confused and ineffective response from the West. At first, in 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States did not “have a dog in that fight.” Even after the world learned of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, in May 1993, Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren Christopher, described the so-called ancient hatreds of ethnic groups there as a presumably unsolvable “problem from hell.” Unwilling to risk their soldiers’ lives or to use the word “genocide,” with all of its political, legal, and moral ramifications, the United States and European powers opted against a full-scale intervention and instead supported a UN peacekeeping force that found little peace to keep. At times, the UN force actually made things worse, promising protection that it could not provide or giving fuel and money to aggressors in exchange for the right to send humanitarian supplies to besieged victims. The UN and Western powers were humiliated in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. War criminals elsewhere appeared to conclude that the international community could be intimidated by a few casualties. And in the United States, a number of prominent critics came to feel that humanitarian intervention was an ill-conceived enterprise. The political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that it was “morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible” to put U.S. soldiers at risk in intrastate conflicts, and he argued at another point that it was “human to hate.” Henry Kissinger saw danger in the United States becoming bogged down in what he later called “the bottomless pit of Balkan passions,” and he warned against intervening when there were not vital strategic interests at stake. Other critics concluded that applying military force to protect people often prolonged civil wars and intensified the violence, killing more civilians than otherwise might have been the case. And still others argued that intervention fundamentally altered intrastate political contests, creating long-term instability or protracted dependence on the international community. Nonetheless, <u>international actors did not abandon intervention</u> or their efforts to protect civilians. Rather, <u><mark>amid</mark> the <mark>violence, major</mark> intervening <mark>powers</mark> and the UN <mark>undertook systematic reviews of</mark> their earlier <mark>failures, updated</mark> their intervention <mark>strategies, and helped foster</mark> a <mark>new</mark> set of <mark>norms for civilian protection</u></mark>. A key turning point came in 1995, when Bosnian Serb forces executed more than 7,000 prisoners in the UN-designated safe area of Srebrenica. The Clinton administration quickly abandoned its hesitancy and led a forceful diplomatic and military effort to end the war. The persistent diplomacy of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser, persuaded the reluctant Europeans and UN peacekeeping commanders to support Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s aggressive air campaign targeting the Bosnian Serb army. That effort brought Serbia to the negotiating table, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke crafted the Dayton agreement, which ended the war. In place of the hapless UN force, NATO sent 60,000 heavily armed troops into the “zone of separation” between the warring parties, staving off renewed fighting. The “problem from hell” stopped immediately, and the ensuing decade of U.S.-led peacekeeping saw not a single U.S. combat-related casualty in Bosnia. Unlike previous interventions, the post-Dayton international peacekeeping presence was unified, vigorous, and sustained, and it has kept a lid on ethnic violence for more than 15 years. A related innovation was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a court that has indicted 161 war criminals, including all the principal Serbian wartime leaders. Despite extensive criticism for ostensibly putting justice ahead of peace, the tribunal has produced dramatic results. Every suspected war criminal, once indicted, quickly lost political influence in postwar Bosnia, and not one of the 161 indictees remains at large today. More important than an exit strategy is a comprehensive transition strategy. Buoyed by these successes, NATO responded to an imminent Serbian attack on Kosovo in 1999 by launching a major air war. Despite initial setbacks (the operation failed to stop a Serbian ground attack that created more than a million Kosovar Albanian refugees), the international community signaled that it would not back down. Under U.S. leadership, NATO escalated the air campaign, and the ICTY indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Within three months, the combined military and diplomatic pressure compelled Serbia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. And even though many observers, including several senior Clinton administration officials, feared that the ICTY’s indictment of Milosevic in the middle of the military campaign would make it even less likely that he would capitulate in Kosovo or ever relinquish power, he was removed from office 18 months later by nonviolent civil protest and turned over to The Hague. Outside the Balkans, the international community continued to adapt its approach to conflicts with similar success. In 1999, after a referendum on East Timor’s secession from Indonesia led to Indonesian atrocities against Timorese civilians, the UN quickly authorized an 11,000-strong Australian-led military force to end the violence. The intervention eventually produced an independent East Timor at peace with Indonesia. Later missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire used a similar model of deploying a regional military force in coordination with the UN and, on occasion, European powers. CORRECTING THE RECORD Despite the international community’s impressive record of recent humanitarian missions, many of the <u><mark>criticisms</mark> formulated in response <mark>to the</mark> botched <mark>campaigns of</mark> 19<mark>92–95 still guide the conversation</mark> about intervention today. The <mark>charges are outdated</u></mark>. Contrary to the claims that interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian casualties, <u><mark>the most <strong>violent</strong> and <strong>protracted</strong> cases in recent history</mark> -- Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- <mark>have been cases in which the international community was <strong>unwilling</strong></mark> either <mark>to intervene or</mark> to sustain a <mark>commit</mark>ment with credible force</u>. Conversely, <u><mark>a <strong>comprehensive study</strong></mark> conducted by the political scientist Taylor Seybolt has <mark>found</mark> that <mark>aggressive operations</mark> legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions, as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, <mark>were the most successful at ending conflicts</mark>. Even when civil wars do not stop right away, external <mark>interventions</mark> often <mark>mitigate violence against civilians</mark>.</u> This is <u><mark>because</u></mark>, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, <u>interventions</u> aimed at preventing mass atrocities often <u>force <mark>would-be killers</mark> to <mark>divert resources</mark> away <mark>from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This</mark> phenomenon, <mark>witnessed in</u></mark> the recent <u><mark>Libya</u></mark> campaign, <u>means</u> that <u>even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians</u>. Another critique of humanitarian interventions is that they create perverse incentives for rebel groups to deliberately provoke states to commit violence against civilians in order to generate an international response. By this logic, the prospect of military intervention would generate more rebel provocations and thus more mass atrocities. Yet <u><mark>the statistical record shows</u></mark> exactly the opposite. <u>Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention began, <mark>both the frequency and</mark> the <mark>intensity of attacks on civilians have declined</u></mark>. During the Arab Spring protests this year, there was no evidence that opposition figures in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or Yemen sought to trigger outside intervention. In fact, the protesters clearly stated that they would oppose such action. Even the Libyan rebels, who faced long odds against Qaddafi’s forces, refused what would have been the most effective outside help: foreign boots on the ground. Recent efforts to perfect humanitarian intervention have been fueled by deep changes in public norms about violence against civilians and advances in conflict management. Two decades of media exposure to mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have altered global -- not simply Western -- attitudes about intervention. The previously sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty has been made conditional on a state’s responsible behavior, and in 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the responsibility to protect at the UN’s World Summit. NATO’s intervention in Libya reflects how the world has become more committed to the protection of civilians. Both UN Security Council resolutions on Libya this year passed with unprecedented speed and without a single dissenting vote. In the wake of conflicts as well, the international community has shown that it can and will play a role in maintaining order and restoring justice. <u>Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed</u>. And because of successful postconflict tribunals and the International Criminal Court, individuals, including national leaders, can now be held liable for egregious crimes against civilians. Collectively, these new conflict management and civilian protection tools have contributed to a marked decline in violence resulting from civil war. <u>According to the most recent Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989</u>. Still, although international norms now enshrine civilian protection and levels of violence are down, humanitarian interventions remain constrained by political and military realities. The international community’s inaction in the face of attacks on Syrian protesters, as of this writing, demonstrates that neither the UN nor any major power is willing or prepared to intervene when abusive leaders firmly control the state’s territory and the state’s security forces and are backed by influential allies. Furthermore, the concept of civilian protection still competes with deeply held norms of sovereignty, especially in former colonies. Although humanitarian intervention can succeed in many cases, given these constraints, it is not always feasible.</p>
|
1nr
|
Case
|
Humanitarian Intervention Good
| 99,566 | 108 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,432 |
Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics
|
American Banker 2014
|
American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system
|
The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry,"
|
The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.
| 1,984 |
<h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,418 | 16 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,433 |
No Illegal market abuses under the plan – default to economics
|
Kaserman, 7
|
Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
|
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives have cited abuses and high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.
|
some opponents of the use of financial incentives ited buses to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized.
|
Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors have cited various human rights abuses and extraordinarily high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets. n32 This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized. Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.
| 2,002 |
<h4><strong>No Illegal market abuses under the plan – default to economics</h4><p>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p><u>In a truly ironic twist of logic, <mark>some opponents of the use of financial incentives</u></mark> for cadaveric organ donors <u>have c<mark>ited</mark> </u>various human rights <u>a<mark>buses</mark> and </u>extraordinarily <u>high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely <mark>to accompany legalized organ markets</u></mark>. n32 <u><mark>This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion</mark>. <mark>This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized</u>.</mark> Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. <u>Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors. </p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 430,263 | 5 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,434 |
Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
|
Allison 90
|
Allison 90, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”)
|
there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing . The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. we are likely to to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
|
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
| 1,156 |
<h4><strong>Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought</h4><p>Allison 90</strong>, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19<u>90</u> (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) </p><p>And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, <u>there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism.</u> As Raymond Frey puts it, <u><mark>utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing</mark> .</u>.. [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. <u><mark>The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people.</u></mark> <u>Without</u> a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) <u>or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason,</u> <u><mark>we are likely to</mark> </u>turn towards Bentham and <mark>to<u> judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being<strong>.</p></u></strong></mark>
|
1nr
|
Case
|
Util
| 419,694 | 10 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,435 |
Vote before State of the Union
|
Jerusalem Post 1/14
|
Jerusalem Post 1/14/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)
|
aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
|
Leadership plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
|
The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. Leadership in Congress, now under full Republican control, plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address. But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that a bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."
| 1,471 |
<h4><strong>Vote before State of the Union</h4><p>Jerusalem Post 1/14<u></strong>/2015 (Nuclear talks resume with warnings to Congress over Iran sanctions, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Nuclear-talks-resume-with-warnings-to-Congress-over-Iran-sanctions-387753)</p><p></u>The US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany seek to end international concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, which many suspect is military in nature. In Washington, however, <u>aides on Capitol Hill continue to work on the final touches of a bill that would "trigger" new sanctions on Iran</u> should talks ultimately fail, or should Tehran violate terms of an interim deal that laid the groundwork for negotiations, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action. <u><mark>Leadership</u></mark> in Congress, now under full Republican control, <u><strong><mark>plans to introduce the bill by the president's State of the Union address</mark>. </u></strong>But any bill from Congress regarding new, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during international talks over its nuclear program will be vetoed by US President Barack Obama, the State Department said this week. "Even with a trigger, if there's a bill that's signed into law, and it is US law, in our mind it is a violation of the Joint Plan of Action— which, as we've said, could encourage Iran to violate it," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Tuesday. "A sanctions bill, trigger or not, that is passed and signed into law by the president, which we've said we will not do... would be a violation of the JPOA," she continued. If a deal does not come to pass, Harf said, "we could put initial sanctions on Iran in 24 hours." Harf added on Wednesday that <u>a <strong><mark>bill from Congress could "very well lead to a breakdown in these negotiations."</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
1nr
|
Top of Agenda
| 430,683 | 5 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,436 |
TPA is passing now because of PC
|
Sen, editor with the Atlantic Council, 2-6-15
|
Sen, editor with the Atlantic Council, 2-6-15 (Ashish Kumar, “Obama ‘All In’ on Pushing Trade Promotion Authority,” http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/obama-all-in-on-pushing-trade-promotion-authority, accessed 2-6-15, CMM)
|
The passage of trade promotion authority legislation in the US Congress is critical for the administration to bring the best trade deals to Congress Obama has taken the lead in an effort to promote his trade agenda in Congress and win TPA Selig, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade in the US Department of Commerce, “It is an extraordinarily difficult endeavor, but I think we are nearing the end game Obama has taken the lead in trying to win congressional support for TPA and earlier this week met with Democrats to discuss the issue. “The administration, and the president, is all in on this topic Selig is part of the administration’s team that has been briefing members of Congress on the president’s trade agenda. He said substantial progress has been made Donnan, World Trade Editor at the Financial Times, said the full-court press by the Obama administration and the passage of TPA are key to a breakthrough on the TPP, which he described as imminent. Everyone is clearly focused on getting this done in the next couple of weeks
|
passage of t p a is critical for trade deals Obama has taken the lead in an effort to promote his trade agenda I think we are nearing the end game Obama has taken the lead in trying to win congressional support and met with Democrats to discuss the issue. “The president, is all in on this topic substantial progress has been made, the full-court press by Obama and TPA are key to the TPP Everyone is focused on getting this done in the next couple weeks
|
The passage of trade promotion authority legislation in the US Congress is critical for the administration to bring the best trade deals to Congress, a senior US official said on February 5. US President Barack Obama has taken the lead in an effort to promote his trade agenda in Congress and win trade promotion authority (TPA). “Getting TPA passed… is going to be critical to allow our negotiators to bring the best deal to Congress for a vote and maximize the chances of success,” Stefan Selig, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade in the US Department of Commerce, said at a panel discussion at the Atlantic Council. TPA is key to negotiating two important free-trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which includes the US and 11 other countries, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which includes the US and the European Union. “Negotiating bilateral deals are tough, but when you have 11 parties that you are trying to negotiate with it is extraordinarily difficult,” said Selig. He equated such negotiations to trying to put “socks on an octopus.” “It is an extraordinarily difficult endeavor, but I think we are nearing the end game,” he added. TPA would allow the president to submit trade deals to Congress for up-or-down votes without amendments. Some Democrats as well as some Republicans have been reluctant to grant the president this fast-track authority. Obama has taken the lead in trying to win congressional support for TPA, and earlier this week met with Democrats to discuss the issue. “The administration, and the president, is all in on this topic,” Selig said in the panel discussion moderated by Jason Marczak, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Selig is part of the administration’s team that has been briefing members of Congress on the president’s trade agenda. He said substantial progress has been made, but some tough issues remain. “The toughest issues to negotiate are saved for the end, and that’s where we are,” he said. Shawn Donnan, World Trade Editor at the Financial Times, said the full-court press by the Obama administration and the passage of TPA are key to a breakthrough on the TPP, which he described as imminent. “Everyone is clearly focused on getting this done in the next couple of weeks,”
| 2,341 |
<h4>TPA is passing now because of PC</h4><p><strong>Sen, editor with the Atlantic Council, 2-6-15</strong> (Ashish Kumar, “Obama ‘All In’ on Pushing Trade Promotion Authority,” http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/obama-all-in-on-pushing-trade-promotion-authority, accessed 2-6-15, CMM)</p><p><u>The <mark>passage of t</mark>rade <mark>p</mark>romotion <mark>a</mark>uthority legislation in the US Congress <mark>is critical for </mark>the administration to bring the best <mark>trade deals</mark> to Congress</u>, a senior US official said on February 5. US President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama has taken the lead in an effort </strong>to promote his trade agenda</mark> in Congress and win </u>trade promotion authority (<u>TPA</u>). “Getting TPA passed… is going to be critical to allow our negotiators to bring the best deal to Congress for a vote and maximize the chances of success,” Stefan <u>Selig, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade in the US Department of Commerce,</u> said at a panel discussion at the Atlantic Council. TPA is key to negotiating two important free-trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which includes the US and 11 other countries, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which includes the US and the European Union. “Negotiating bilateral deals are tough, but when you have 11 parties that you are trying to negotiate with it is extraordinarily difficult,” said Selig. He equated such negotiations to trying to put “socks on an octopus.” <u>“It is an extraordinarily difficult endeavor, but <mark>I think we are nearing the end game</u></mark>,” he added. TPA would allow the president to submit trade deals to Congress for up-or-down votes without amendments. Some Democrats as well as some Republicans have been reluctant to grant the president this fast-track authority. <u><strong><mark>Obama has taken the lead in trying to win</mark> <mark>congressional support</mark> for TPA</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</mark> earlier this week <mark>met with Democrats to discuss the issue. “The</mark> administration, and <strong>the <mark>president, is all in on this topic</u></strong></mark>,” Selig said in the panel discussion moderated by Jason Marczak, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. <u>Selig is part of the administration’s team that has been briefing members of Congress on the president’s trade agenda. He said <strong><mark>substantial progress has been made</u></strong>,</mark> but some tough issues remain. “The toughest issues to negotiate are saved for the end, and that’s where we are,” he said. Shawn <u>Donnan, World Trade Editor at the Financial Times, said <strong><mark>the full-court press by</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>Obama</strong></mark> administration <strong><mark>and</mark> the passage of <mark>TPA are key to</mark> a breakthrough on <mark>the TPP</mark>, which he described as imminent. </u></strong>“<u><strong><mark>Everyone is</mark> clearly <mark>focused on getting this done in the next couple</mark> of <mark>weeks</u></strong></mark>,” </p>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 431,037 | 8 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,437 |
The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.</h4>
| null | null |
Contention 2 Illicit market
| 431,036 | 1 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,438 |
Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection
|
All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.
| 1,067 |
<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,419 | 39 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,439 |
Every life is an end—the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved.
|
Cummisky 96
|
Cummisky 96
|
even if saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh killing one this still does not justify deontological constraints why would not killing one be a stronger obligation than saving two If I am concerned with priceless dignity I may still save two it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed each is priceless I have good reason to save as many as I can
|
even if saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh killing one this does not justify deontological constraints why would not killing one be a stronger obligation than saving two If I am concerned with priceless dignity I may still save two; it is just that loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed each is priceless I have good reason to save as many as I can
|
(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 130-131)
Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; this, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.
| 1,415 |
<h4><strong>Every life is an end—the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved.</h4><p>Cummisky 96 </p><p></strong>(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 130-131)</p><p>Finally, <u><strong><mark>even if</u></strong></mark> one grants that <u><strong><mark>saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh</u></strong></mark> and compensate for<u><strong> <mark>killing one</u></strong></mark>-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-<u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> point <u><strong>still <mark>does not justify deontological constraints</u></strong></mark>. On the extreme interpretation, <u><strong><mark>why would not killing one</u></strong></mark> person <u><strong><mark>be a stronger obligation than saving two</u></strong></mark> persons? <u><strong><mark>If I am concerned with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>priceless dignity</u></strong></mark> of each, it would seem that <u><strong><mark>I may still save two</u></strong>; <u><strong>it is just that </mark>my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one</u></strong>. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, <u><strong>the <mark>loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, <u><strong><mark>each is priceless</u></strong></mark>; this, <u><strong><mark>I have good reason to save as many as I can</u></strong></mark>. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.</p>
|
1nr
|
Case
|
Util
| 84,751 | 179 | 17,105 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| 565,266 |
N
|
Navy
|
5
|
James Madison Lepp-Miller
|
McElhinny
|
T 2NR
Politics DA
Decrim CP
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,440 |
Obama’s only spending PC on foreign policy issues- that means Iran- it comes first
|
VOA 1/1
|
VOA 1/1/2015 (Obama, Republican Congress Likely to Clash on Global Affairs, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-confront-republican-congress-on-global-affairs/2581620.html)
|
Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by Obama negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in makers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran There will be a desire very quickly for Congress to weigh in on the Iran deal Obama is not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world
NewsMax, 1-13-15, Obama Seizes on Sony Hack to Break Logjam on Cybersecurity Bill, p. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Obama-cybersecurity-Congress-bill/2015/01/13/id/618369/
Obama singled out cybersecurity as an area for bipartisan agreement in a polarized political climate. Republican Thune chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee said he welcomed Obama “back to the discussion on cybersecurity.”
It’s an area of coopeation
RUSSELL BERMAN JAN 16 2015, “Can Republicans Get Along?” www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/can-republicans-get-along-house-senate-retreat-hershey-gop/384564/
Republican leaders are cyber-security, as areas where they can actually work with President Obama
|
Obama. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in. lawmakers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran There will be a desire very quickly for Congress to weigh on the Iran deal the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world
It’s an area of coopeation
BERMAN JAN 16
Republican leaders are cyber-security, as areas where they can actually work with President Obama
|
The new, entirely Republican-led U.S. Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week. Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by President Barack Obama. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in. Skeptics, like Republican Senator Bob Corker, have said lawmakers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran in case negotiations fail. “There will be a desire very quickly after the first of the year for Congress to weigh in on the topic in some form or fashion. Congress will want to weigh in on the Iran deal,” he said. Congressional wariness over Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not new. What no one anticipated just weeks ago is that Congress would wrestle with President Obama’s surprise diplomatic opening with Cuba. Ending the U.S. embargo of Cuba would require an act of Congress, something Democratic Senator Ben Cardin supports. “There will be a need for Congress to take action, hopefully, as we move to a new chapter in our Cuban relations. And it is going to be an interesting debate,” said Cardin. Republican Senator Marco Rubio is ready for that debate. “This Congress is not going to lift the embargo,” he said. “The White House has conceded everything and gained little [from Havana]. They gained no commitment on the part of the Cuban regime to freedom of the press, or freedom of speech, or elections.” Republicans want to be seen as offering constructive criticism, according to political scientist William Howell. “On the one hand, they want to underscore failings on the part of the Obama administration, and on the other hand, they need to be seen as a responsible, mature party that can lead the nation,” said Howell. Majority status in both houses of Congress will give Republicans a louder megaphone to critique the president’s handling of crises from Ukraine to the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. Obama is also not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party, according to political analyst Stuart Rothenberg. “The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans. There are lots of Democrats who are more concerned about the U.S. recommitting troops,” said Rothenberg. Whatever Congress’ concerns, the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.”
Conceedes BI-Part
NewsMax, 1-13-15, Obama Seizes on Sony Hack to Break Logjam on Cybersecurity Bill, p. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Obama-cybersecurity-Congress-bill/2015/01/13/id/618369/
Obama, a Democrat, has singled out cybersecurity as an area for bipartisan agreement in a polarized political climate. “With the Sony attack that took place, with the Twitter account that was hacked by Islamist jihadist sympathizers yesterday, it just goes to show how much more work we need to do, both public and private sector, to strengthen our cybersecurity to make sure that the family bank accounts are safe, to make sure that our public infrastructure is safe,” Obama said earlier today when he met with congressional leaders. Republican Senator John Thune of South Dakota, the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee who will be critical to passing legislation, said he welcomed Obama “back to the discussion on cybersecurity.”
It’s an area of coopeation
RUSSELL BERMAN JAN 16 2015, “Can Republicans Get Along?” www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/can-republicans-get-along-house-senate-retreat-hershey-gop/384564/
Behind the closed doors of the planning sessions, party leaders impressed upon their rank-and-file the importance of patience. Representative Steve Scalise, the House GOP whip, gave a history of the 1996 welfare-reform fight between congressional Republicans and President Clinton, which took a year-and-a-half and multiple vetoes before both sides could claim a landmark victory. The point for the freshmen? Don't expect anything to happen quickly, no matter what you may have promised on the campaign trail. Republican leaders are eyeing trade, cyber-security, tax reform, and maybe infrastructure as areas where they can actually work with President Obama. But any actual laws might take months, if not longer, to enact. Can the fast-acting House be patient, a reporter asked Representative Jason Chaffetz of Utah. "No, of course not," replied Chaffetz, semi-seriously. Patience, he said, is not in the House's DNA.
| 4,690 |
<h4><strong>Obama’s only spending PC on foreign policy issues- that means Iran- it comes first</h4><p>VOA 1/1</strong>/2015 (Obama, Republican Congress Likely to Clash on Global Affairs, http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-to-confront-republican-congress-on-global-affairs/2581620.html)</p><p>The new, entirely Republican-led U.S. <u>Congress will weigh in on global hotspots and America’s response to them when lawmakers return to Washington next week</u>. <u>Conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East are on legislators’ minds - as are high-profile international initiatives undertaken by</u> President Barack <u><mark>Obama</u>. International <u>negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resume one week after Congress gavels in</u>.</mark> Skeptics, like Republican Senator Bob Corker, have said <mark>law<u>makers will consider tougher sanctions on Tehran</u></mark> in case negotiations fail. “<u><strong><mark>There will be a desire very quickly</mark> </u></strong>after the first of the year <u><strong><mark>for Congress to weigh</mark> in</u></strong> on the topic in some form or fashion. Congress will want to weigh in <u><strong><mark>on the Iran deal</u></strong></mark>,” he said. Congressional wariness over Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not new. What no one anticipated just weeks ago is that Congress would wrestle with President Obama’s surprise diplomatic opening with Cuba. Ending the U.S. embargo of Cuba would require an act of Congress, something Democratic Senator Ben Cardin supports. “There will be a need for Congress to take action, hopefully, as we move to a new chapter in our Cuban relations. And it is going to be an interesting debate,” said Cardin. Republican Senator Marco Rubio is ready for that debate. “This Congress is not going to lift the embargo,” he said. “The White House has conceded everything and gained little [from Havana]. They gained no commitment on the part of the Cuban regime to freedom of the press, or freedom of speech, or elections.” Republicans want to be seen as offering constructive criticism, according to political scientist William Howell. “On the one hand, they want to underscore failings on the part of the Obama administration, and on the other hand, they need to be seen as a responsible, mature party that can lead the nation,” said Howell. Majority status in both houses of Congress will give Republicans a louder megaphone to critique the president’s handling of crises from Ukraine to the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. <u>Obama is</u> also <u>not immune to dissent from his own Democratic Party</u>, according to political analyst Stuart Rothenberg. “<u>The president could have as many or more problems on the left, with Democrats, on international and national security issues as he could have with Republicans</u>. There are lots of Democrats who are more concerned about the U.S. recommitting troops,” said Rothenberg. Whatever Congress’ concerns, <u><strong><mark>the president appears determined to leave a stamp on America’s outreach to the world</u></mark>. In a recent interview, he said: “I believe in diplomacy. I believe in dialogue. I believe in engagement.” </p><p>Conceedes BI-Part </p><p><u>NewsMax, 1-13-15, Obama Seizes on Sony Hack to Break Logjam on Cybersecurity Bill, p. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Obama-cybersecurity-Congress-bill/2015/01/13/id/618369/</p><p></strong>Obama</u>, a Democrat, has <u>singled out cybersecurity as an area for bipartisan agreement in a polarized political climate. </u>“With the Sony attack that took place, with the Twitter account that was hacked by Islamist jihadist sympathizers yesterday, it just goes to show how much more work we need to do, both public and private sector, to strengthen our cybersecurity to make sure that the family bank accounts are safe, to make sure that our public infrastructure is safe,” Obama said earlier today when he met with congressional leaders. <u>Republican</u> Senator John <u>Thune</u> of South Dakota, the <u>chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee</u> who will be critical to passing legislation, <u><strong>said he welcomed Obama “back to the discussion on cybersecurity.”</p><p><mark>It’s an area of coopeation</mark> </p><p>RUSSELL <mark>BERMAN JAN 16</mark> 2015, “Can Republicans Get Along?” www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/can-republicans-get-along-house-senate-retreat-hershey-gop/384564/</p><p></u></strong>Behind the closed doors of the planning sessions, party leaders impressed upon their rank-and-file the importance of patience. Representative Steve Scalise, the House GOP whip, gave a history of the 1996 welfare-reform fight between congressional Republicans and President Clinton, which took a year-and-a-half and multiple vetoes before both sides could claim a landmark victory. The point for the freshmen? Don't expect anything to happen quickly, no matter what you may have promised on the campaign trail. <u><mark>Republican leaders are</mark> </u>eyeing trade, <u><mark>cyber-security,</u></mark> tax reform, and maybe infrastructure <u><mark>as areas where they can actually work with President Obama</u></mark>. But any actual laws might take months, if not longer, to enact. Can the fast-acting House be patient, a reporter asked Representative Jason Chaffetz of Utah. "No, of course not," replied Chaffetz, semi-seriously. Patience, he said, is not in the House's DNA.</p>
| null |
1nr
|
Top of Agenda
| 430,548 | 6 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,441 |
Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities
|
Downs 12
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Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
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As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
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As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities
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Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
| 563 |
<h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone<u>, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 305,170 | 62 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,442 |
Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention
|
Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
|
Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)
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marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
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marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
|
It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
| 936 |
<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong>
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1nc
| null |
3
| 430,420 | 24 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,443 |
A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"
|
Wilkinson 11
|
Wilkinson 11 Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/
|
The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual sells to another But there are other possibilities too One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris who suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices Erin and Harris suggest that a market in human organs should have a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
|
. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.
| 3,354 |
<h4>A program with a government intermediary is viable means for "organ sales"</h4><p><strong>Wilkinson 11</strong> Stephen Wilkinson, Professor of Bioethics, Lancaster University (UK) 10-17-11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Sale of Human Organs" <u><mark>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/</p><p></u></mark>. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u>The expression ‘<mark>organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual</u> (who needs or wants money) <u>sells </u>his or her kidney <u>to another</u> (who needs a kidney). <u>But there are other possibilities too</u>. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. <u>One noteworthy policy proposal comes from <mark>Erin and Harris</u></mark> (1994; 2003) <u>who <mark>suggest</mark> <mark>that a market in human organs should have</mark> </u>the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is <u><mark>a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria</mark>. </u>Direct sales are banned. <u><mark>Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market.</p></u></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 429,540 | 21 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,444 |
Court action gets tied to the president
|
Harrison 2005
|
Harrison 2005 (Lindsay, Jenner and Block Litigation associate, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?” 11-18 legaldebate.blogspot.com)
|
While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public.
|
the Court may have been able to act as cover that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is politicized and now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not be blamed or credited the President and Congress
|
While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public.
| 1,061 |
<h4><strong>Court action gets tied to the president</h4><p>Harrison 2005 <u></strong>(Lindsay, Jenner and Block Litigation associate, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?” 11-18 legaldebate.blogspot.com)</p><p>While <mark>the</mark> Supreme <mark>Court</mark> <mark>may have</mark> historically <mark>been able to act as</mark> political <mark>cover</mark> for the President and/or Congress, <mark>that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore.</mark> <mark>The</mark> <mark>Court</mark> <mark>is</mark> seen today as a <mark>politicized</mark> body, <mark>and </mark>especially <mark>now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court,</mark> with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, <mark>it is highly unlikely that Court action will not</mark>, at least to some extent, <mark>be</mark> <mark>blamed</mark> on and/<mark>or credited</mark> to <mark>the President and Congress</u></mark>. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, <u><strong>it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public. </p></u></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
At: no link
| 36,501 | 70 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,445 |
Key to trade
|
Suominen, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8-4-14
|
Suominen, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8-4-14 (Kati, Adjunct Professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management, “Coming Apart: WTO fiasco highlights urgency for the U.S. to lead the global trading system,”
|
India’s torpedoing last week the WTO’s trade facilitation agreement, struck at the last minute between the U S and India in Bali, is a death blow to the world body and adds to growing disarray in the global trading system. Two threats are emerging. The first is disintegration of the trading system the WTO is utterly dysfunctional: deals require unanimity among 160 members, making any cantankerous player like India a veto Aligning interests has been impossible, turning all action in global trade policymaking to FTAs FTAs have been good cholesterol for trade, but the overlapping deals and rules also complicate life for U.S. companies doing global business. One single deal among all countries would be much preferable to the “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs, but it is but a pie in the sky. So is deeper liberalization by protectionist countries like India. The U.S.-led talks for “mega-regional” agreements are the best solution yet to these problems. They free trade and create uniform rules among countries making up two-thirds of the world economy they would create a million jobs in America. Yet both hang in balance thanks to inaction on Capitol Hill to pass TPA), the key piece of legislation for approving the mega-deals, TPA is key for the Obama administration to conclude TPP and TTIP talks: Europeans and Asians are unwilling to negotiate the thorniest topics before they know TPA is in place to constrain U.S. Congress to voting up or down on these deals, rather than amending freshly negotiated texts. Disintegration of trade policies risk disintegrating world markets. Just as after World War II, the global trading system rests in America’s hands TPA unshackles U.S. negotiators to finalize TPP and TTIP. Most interesting for U.S. exporters, TPP and TTIP almost de facto merge into a superdeal: the United States and EU already have bilateral FTAs with several common partners belonging in TPP gatekeepers to markets with two-thirds of global spending power, TPP and TTIP will be giant magnetic docking stations to outsiders; China and Brazil, aiming to revive sagging growth, are interested. Once this happens, the TTIP-TPP superdeal will cover 80 percent of world’s output and approximate a multilateral agreement – and have cutting-edge common trade rules that could never be agreed in one Big Bang at the WTO. U.S. leadership is urgently needed to integrate the rapidly changing global trading system. It is time for Congress to step up to the plate.
|
India’s torpedoing is a death blow to the WTO FTAs have been good cholesterol for trade The U.S.-led talks for “mega-regional” agreements are the best solution Yet hang in balance thanks to inaction on TPA TPA is key to conclude TPP and TTIP talks Disintegration of trade policies risk disintegrating world markets the global trading system rests in America’s hands TPA unshackles U.S. negotiators to finalize TPP and TTIP TPP and TTIP will have cutting-edge common trade rules U.S. leadership is urgently needed
|
India’s torpedoing last week the WTO’s trade facilitation agreement, struck at the last minute between the United States and India in the December 2013 WTO Ministerial in Bali, is a death blow to the world body and adds to growing disarray in the global trading system. Two threats are emerging. The first is disintegration of the trading system. The core of the system until the mid-1990s, the WTO is utterly dysfunctional: deals require unanimity among 160 members, making any cantankerous player like India a veto. Aligning interests has been impossible, turning all action in global trade policymaking to free trade agreements (FTAs), first kicked off by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. By now, 400 FTAs are in place or under negotiation. FTAs have been good cholesterol for trade, but the overlapping deals and rules also complicate life for U.S. companies doing global business. One single deal among all countries would be much preferable to the “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs, but it is but a pie in the sky. So is deeper liberalization by protectionist countries like India. The U.S.-led talks for “mega-regional” agreements with Europe and Asia-Pacific nations, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), are the best solution yet to these problems. They free trade and create uniform rules among countries making up two-thirds of the world economy. Incidentally, they would create a million jobs in America. Yet both hang in balance thanks to inaction on Capitol Hill to pass the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the key piece of legislation for approving the mega-deals, now stuck in a bitter political fight as several Democrats and Tea Party line up in opposition. TPA is key for the Obama administration to conclude TPP and TTIP talks: Europeans and Asians are unwilling to negotiate the thorniest topics before they know TPA is in place to constrain U.S. Congress to voting up or down on these deals, rather than amending freshly negotiated texts. The second threat in world trade is the absence of common rules of the game for the 21st century global digital economy. As 3D printing, Internet of Things, and cross-border ecommerce, and other disruptive technologies expand trade in digital goods and services, intellectual property will be fair game – why couldn’t a company around the world simply replicate 3D printable products and designs Made in the USA? Another problem is data protectionism – rules on access and transport of data across borders. Europeans are imposing limits on companies’ access to consumer data, complicating U.S. businesses’ customer service and marketing; emerging markets such as Brazil and Vietnam are forcing foreign IT companies to locate servers and build data centers as a condition for market access, measure that costs companies millions in inefficiencies. A growing number of countries claim limits on access to data on the grounds of “national security” and “public safety”, familiar code words for protectionism. Digital protectionism risks balkanizing the global virtual economy just as tariffs siloed national markets in the 19th century when countries set out to collect revenue and promote infant industries – a self-defeating approach that took well over a century to undo, and is still alive and well in countries like India. The biggest losers of digital protectionism are American small businesses and consumers leveraging their laptops, iPads and smart phones to buy and sell goods and services around the planet. Trade policymakers however lag far behind today’s trade, which requires sophisticated rules on IP, piracy, copyrights, patents and trademarks, ecommerce, data flows, virtual currencies, and dispute settlement. The mega-regionals, especially the TTIP, are a perfect venue to start this process. Disintegration of trade policies risk disintegrating world markets. Just as after World War II, the global trading system rests in America’s hands. Three things are needed. The first is the approval of TPA, which unshackles U.S. negotiators to finalize TPP and TTIP. Most interesting for U.S. exporters, TPP and TTIP almost de facto merge into a superdeal: the United States and EU already have bilateral FTAs with several common partners belonging in TPP – Peru, Colombia, Chile, Australia, Singapore, Canada, and Mexico to name a few. What’s more, gatekeepers to markets with two-thirds of global spending power, TPP and TTIP will be giant magnetic docking stations to outsiders; China and Brazil, aiming to revive sagging growth, are interested. Once this happens, the TTIP-TPP superdeal will cover 80 percent of world’s output and approximate a multilateral agreement – and have cutting-edge common trade rules that could never be agreed in one Big Bang at the WTO. Second, also needed is a shift negotiation of plurilateral agreements – broad-based agreements among sub-sets of WTO members now negotiated in trade in services and in environmental goods and services, and proposed for investment and data security, and now also for trade facilitation sans India. The coalitions of the willing driving plurilaterals include the United States, EU, Japan, and many Latin American and Asian emerging markets disillusioned by India and its accomplices, Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela. A pivot in trade politics, China is looking to join the services plurilateral. Plurilaterals not only help American companies to export more; they enable Washington and its friends and allies to call the shots in global trade rulemaking – and isolate India, proving its policies self-defeating. The third deal that is needed is Washington Consensus II, for the global digital economy. In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus set off a wave of deep trade and investment liberalization across the developing and post-communist world, paving the way for a tidal wave of globalization. The digital economy has no equivalent. A broad group of stakeholders and thought-leaders – governments, international organizations, companies, and think-tanks – need to come together to articulate guidelines for nations’ behavior in the global digital economy. Given its infamous connotations, the digital deal could be called “Seoul Consensus”, highlighting Korea’s leap to a leader in digitization from a rural economy just a couple of decades ago. U.S. leadership is urgently needed to integrate the rapidly changing global trading system. It is time for Congress to step up to the plate.
| 6,501 |
<h4><strong>Key to trade</h4><p>Suominen, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8-4-14<u></strong> (Kati, Adjunct Professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management, “Coming Apart: WTO fiasco highlights urgency for the U.S. to lead the global trading system,” </p><p><mark>India’s torpedoing</mark> last week the WTO’s trade facilitation agreement, struck at the last minute between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and India</u> in the December 2013 WTO Ministerial <u>in Bali, <mark>is a death blow to the</mark> world body and adds to growing disarray in the global trading system. Two threats are emerging. The first is disintegration of the trading system</u>. The core of the system until the mid-1990s, <u>the <mark>WTO</mark> is utterly dysfunctional: deals require unanimity among 160 members, making any cantankerous player like India a veto</u>. <u>Aligning interests has been impossible, turning all action in global trade policymaking to</u> free trade agreements (<u>FTAs</u>), first kicked off by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. By now, 400 FTAs are in place or under negotiation. <u><mark>FTAs have been good cholesterol for trade</mark>, but the overlapping deals and rules also complicate life for U.S. companies doing global business. One single deal among all countries would be much preferable to the “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs, but it is but a pie in the sky. So is deeper liberalization by protectionist countries like India. <mark>The U.S.-led talks for “mega-regional” agreements</u></mark> with Europe and Asia-Pacific nations, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), <u><mark>are the best solution</mark> yet to these problems. They free trade and create uniform rules among countries making up two-thirds of the world economy</u>. Incidentally, <u>they would create a million jobs in America. <mark>Yet</mark> both <mark>hang in balance thanks to inaction on</mark> Capitol Hill to pass</u> the Trade Promotion Authority (<u><mark>TPA</mark>), the key piece of legislation for approving the mega-deals,</u> now stuck in a bitter political fight as several Democrats and Tea Party line up in opposition. <u><mark>TPA is key</mark> for the Obama administration <mark>to conclude TPP and TTIP talks</mark>: Europeans and Asians are unwilling to negotiate the thorniest topics before they know TPA is in place to constrain U.S. Congress to voting up or down on these deals, rather than amending freshly negotiated texts. </u>The second threat in world trade is the absence of common rules of the game for the 21st century global digital economy. As 3D printing, Internet of Things, and cross-border ecommerce, and other disruptive technologies expand trade in digital goods and services, intellectual property will be fair game – why couldn’t a company around the world simply replicate 3D printable products and designs Made in the USA? Another problem is data protectionism – rules on access and transport of data across borders. Europeans are imposing limits on companies’ access to consumer data, complicating U.S. businesses’ customer service and marketing; emerging markets such as Brazil and Vietnam are forcing foreign IT companies to locate servers and build data centers as a condition for market access, measure that costs companies millions in inefficiencies. A growing number of countries claim limits on access to data on the grounds of “national security” and “public safety”, familiar code words for protectionism. Digital protectionism risks balkanizing the global virtual economy just as tariffs siloed national markets in the 19th century when countries set out to collect revenue and promote infant industries – a self-defeating approach that took well over a century to undo, and is still alive and well in countries like India. The biggest losers of digital protectionism are American small businesses and consumers leveraging their laptops, iPads and smart phones to buy and sell goods and services around the planet. Trade policymakers however lag far behind today’s trade, which requires sophisticated rules on IP, piracy, copyrights, patents and trademarks, ecommerce, data flows, virtual currencies, and dispute settlement. The mega-regionals, especially the TTIP, are a perfect venue to start this process. <u><mark>Disintegration of trade policies risk disintegrating world markets</mark>. Just as after World War II, <mark>the global trading system rests in America’s hands</u></mark>. Three things are needed. The first is the approval of <u><mark>TPA</u></mark>, which <u><mark>unshackles U.S. negotiators to finalize TPP and TTIP</mark>. Most interesting for U.S. exporters, TPP and TTIP almost de facto merge into a superdeal: the United States and EU already have bilateral FTAs with several common partners belonging in TPP</u> – Peru, Colombia, Chile, Australia, Singapore, Canada, and Mexico to name a few. What’s more, <u>gatekeepers to markets with two-thirds of global spending power, <mark>TPP and TTIP will</mark> be giant magnetic docking stations to outsiders; China and Brazil, aiming to revive sagging growth, are interested. Once this happens, the TTIP-TPP superdeal will cover 80 percent of world’s output and approximate a multilateral agreement – and <mark>have cutting-edge common trade rules</mark> that could never be agreed in one Big Bang at the WTO. </u>Second, also needed is a shift negotiation of plurilateral agreements – broad-based agreements among sub-sets of WTO members now negotiated in trade in services and in environmental goods and services, and proposed for investment and data security, and now also for trade facilitation sans India. The coalitions of the willing driving plurilaterals include the United States, EU, Japan, and many Latin American and Asian emerging markets disillusioned by India and its accomplices, Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela. A pivot in trade politics, China is looking to join the services plurilateral. Plurilaterals not only help American companies to export more; they enable Washington and its friends and allies to call the shots in global trade rulemaking – and isolate India, proving its policies self-defeating. The third deal that is needed is Washington Consensus II, for the global digital economy. In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus set off a wave of deep trade and investment liberalization across the developing and post-communist world, paving the way for a tidal wave of globalization. The digital economy has no equivalent. A broad group of stakeholders and thought-leaders – governments, international organizations, companies, and think-tanks – need to come together to articulate guidelines for nations’ behavior in the global digital economy. Given its infamous connotations, the digital deal could be called “Seoul Consensus”, highlighting Korea’s leap to a leader in digitization from a rural economy just a couple of decades ago. <u><mark>U.S. leadership is urgently needed</mark> to integrate the rapidly changing global trading system. It is time for Congress to step up to the plate.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
1
| 179,394 | 57 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,446 |
Plan destroys the treaty regime
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014
|
Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)
|
The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops
|
If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up
|
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.
| 4,540 |
<h4>Plan destroys the treaty regime</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong>still <mark>criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></mark> for considerable <u><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,422 | 43 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,447 |
that maximizes sales
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141 Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest proposal
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html
|
We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts.
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2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts
|
Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. 2 We have proposed a scheme that would maximise organ sales by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts. In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.
| 1,450 |
<h4>that<strong> maximizes sales</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3 </strong>Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester J Med Ethics 2003; 29 :141<strong> </strong>Janet Radcliffe Richards on our modest<strong> </strong>proposal</p><p>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/138.full.pdf+html</p><p>Thus when Radcliffe Richards says: “Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; but that is not enough to settle the all things considered question of whether it should be allowed” she is again right. It is not enough to settle that question. Our paper was not trying to settle that question. <mark>2 <u>We have proposed a scheme that would <strong>maximise organ sales</strong> by meeting the most common and persistent objections to commerce in body parts</mark>.</u> In our paper we note that:“In 1994, we made a proposal in which we outlined possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically, and in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme” and this is the proposal that we repeat in abbreviated form. The claim we make, which it seems Radcliffe Richards judges tobe too strong, is that our proposal outlines “possibly the only circumstances in which a market in donor organs could be achieved ethically”; but note that there is a qualification to this claim, namely that if the first part of our claim is true it is so because it defends organ sales “in a way that minimises the dangers normally envisaged for such a scheme”. It may be that organ sales could be defended (possibly by Janet Radcliffe Richards and for that matter by the present authors) in a way that does not minimise such dangers. But that is not what we were trying to do in our paper.</p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,338 | 11 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,448 |
CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS EMBOLDEN CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA.
|
Greenwald 6 http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_glenngreenwald_archive.html)
|
Greenwald 6 (Glenn, Civil Rights Lawyer and Author “How would a Patriot Act?”, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_glenngreenwald_archive.html)
|
court opinions have a political impact as well as legal effects It is likely to further galvanize those in Congress and the media who have been gradually taking a stand A Supreme Court ruling is virtually never confined to the legal realm, but almost always has profound impact, in the political realm as well.
| null |
Additionally, court opinions historically have a political impact as well as legal effects. Despite the concerted, destructive attacks on the credibility of the Supreme Court by the likes of Mark Levin and Rush Limbaugh, who hate and wage war on any institution (such as the media) which dares to challenge the Powers of the President, Americans still retain a respect for the Supreme Court as an important and credible institution. The Court's proclamation that the President has been acting beyond his legal and constitutional authority strengthens that argument as a political matter. It is also likely to further galvanize those in Congress and the media who have been gradually taking a stand against the Administration. A Supreme Court ruling that is this decisive, on an issue this significant, is virtually never confined to the legal realm, but almost always has impact, often profound impact, in the political realm as well.
| 934 |
<h4><strong>CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS EMBOLDEN CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA.</h4><p>Greenwald 6 </strong>(Glenn, Civil Rights Lawyer and Author “How would a Patriot Act?”,<u><strong> http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_glenngreenwald_archive.html)</p><p></u></strong> Additionally, <u><strong>court opinions</u></strong> historically <u><strong>have a political impact as well as legal effects</u></strong>. Despite the concerted, destructive attacks on the credibility of the Supreme Court by the likes of Mark Levin and Rush Limbaugh, who hate and wage war on any institution (such as the media) which dares to challenge the Powers of the President, Americans still retain a respect for the Supreme Court as an important and credible institution. The Court's proclamation that the President has been acting beyond his legal and constitutional authority strengthens that argument as a political matter. <u><strong>It is </u></strong>also <u><strong>likely to further galvanize those in Congress and the media who have been gradually taking a stand </u></strong>against the Administration. <u><strong>A Supreme Court ruling </u></strong>that is this decisive, on an issue this significant, <u><strong>is virtually never confined to the legal realm, but almost always has </u></strong>impact, often <u><strong>profound impact, in the political realm as well.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
At: no link
| 139,310 | 9 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
| 2 |
743,449 |
Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law
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Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
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Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)
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Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
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Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
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Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.
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<h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u><strong>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark>
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1nc
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3
| 193,806 | 47 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
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Navy
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8
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Navy Mueller-Roach
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Benedict
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Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,450 |
Solves every war
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Sapiro 2014
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Sapiro 2014 Miriam, Visiting Fellow in the Global Economy and Development program, former Deputy US Trade Representative, Why Trade Matters, September 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/why%20trade%20matters/trade%20global%20views_final.pdf
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This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and global trade agenda it is im- portant to consider also the impact that increased trade has on global security this paper assesses the implications of the Asia-Pacific and European trade negotiations underway, including for countries that are not participating but aspire to join In the Middle East, significant areas of Iraq have been overrun by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil war in Syria rages and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters. Nuclear negotiations with Iran have run into trouble In Asia, historic rivalries and disputes over territory have heightened tensions across the region, most acutely by China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea Nuclear-armed North Korea remains isolated, reckless and unpredictable Russia continues to foment instability and destruction in eastern Ukraine A key motivation in building greater domestic and international consensus for advanc- ing trade liberalization now is precisely the role that greater economic integration can play in opening up new avenues of opportunity for promoting development Such initiatives can help stabilize key regions and strengthen the security of the United States and its partners. The last century provides a powerful example of how expanding trade relations can help reduce global tensions Following World War II, building stronger economic cooperation was a centerpiece of allied efforts to erase battle scars and embrace former enemies impor- tant lessons have been learned about the valuable role economic development can play in defusing tensions economic security and national security are two sides of the same coin security and stability in many ways depends a lot more on economic growth and oppor- tunity than it does on military strength more than ever foreign policy is economic policy," particularly in light of increasing competition for global resources and markets. Every day, that goes by where America is uncertain about engaging in that arena is a day in which we weaken our nation Strengthening America's economic security by cementing its economic alliances is an imperative This is true, of course, not only for the United States but also for its key partners and the rest of the global trading system. Much as the United States led the way in forging strong military alliances after World War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism now is the time to place equal emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security. A failure to act now could undermine international security and place stability in key regions in further jeopardy
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. In the Middle East areas of Iraq have been overrun war in Syria rages Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters Nuclear negotiations with Iran have trouble In Asia, disputes heightened tensions in the S C S Nuclear-armed Korea remains , reckless and unpredictable Russia continues to foment instability A key in building consensus for trade liberalization now is the role that greater economic integration can play Such initiatives stabilize key regions economic cooperation was a centerpiece of efforts to erase battle scars economic alliances is an imperative Much as the U S led the way in forging s military alliances after World War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism now is the time to place emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security A failure to act now could place stability in key regions in jeopardy
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This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and global trade agenda from the perspective of the United States. International trade is often viewed through the relatively narrow prism of trade-offs that might be made among domestic sectors or between trading partners, but it is im- portant to consider also the impact that increased trade has on global growth, development and security. With that context in mind, this paper assesses the implications of the Asia-Pacific and European trade negotiations underway, including for countries that are not participating but aspire to join. It outlines some of the challenges that stand in the way of completion and ways in which they can be addressed. It examines whether the focus on "mega-regional" trade agreements comes at the expense of broader liberalization or acts as a catalyst to develop higher standards than might otherwise be possible. It concludes with policy recommendations for action by governments, legislators and stakeholders to address concerns that have been raised and create greater domestic support. It is fair to ask whether we should be concerned about the future of international trade policy when dire develop- ments are threatening the security interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe. In the Middle East, significant areas of Iraq have been overrun by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil war in Syria rages with no end in sight, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters. Nuclear negotiations with Iran have run into trouble, while Libya and Egypt face continuing instability and domestic challenges. In Asia, historic rivalries and disputes over territory have heightened tensions across the region, most acutely by China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea towards Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. Nuclear-armed North Korea remains isolated, reckless and unpredictable. In Africa, countries are struggling with rising terrorism, violence and corruption. In Europe, Russia continues to foment instability and destruction in eastern Ukraine. And within the European Union, lagging economic recovery and the surge in support for extremist parties have left people fearful of increasing violence against immigrants and minority groups and skeptical of further integration. It is tempting to focus solely on these pressing problems and defer less urgent issues—such as forging new dis- ciplines for international trade to another day, especially when such issues pose challenges of their own. But that would be a mistake. A key motivation in building greater domestic and international consensus for advanc- ing trade liberalization now is precisely the role that greater economic integration can play in opening up new avenues of opportunity for promoting development and increasing economic prosperity. Such initiatives can help stabilize key regions and strengthen the security of the United States and its partners. The last century provides a powerful example of how expanding trade relations can help reduce global tensions and raise living standards. Following World War II, building stronger economic cooperation was a centerpiece of allied efforts to erase battle scars and embrace former enemies. In defeat, the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan faced ruin and people were on the verge of starvation. The United States led efforts to rebuild Europe and to repair Japan's economy. A key element of the Marshall Plan, which established the foundation for unprecedented growth and the level of European integration that exists today, was to revive trade by reducing tariffs.1 Russia, and the eastern part of Europe that it controlled, refused to participate or receive such assistance. De- cades later, as the Cold War ended, the United States and Western Europe sought to make up for lost time by providing significant technical and financial assistance to help integrate central and eastern European countries with the rest of Europe and the global economy. "There have been subsequent calls for a "Marshall Plan" for other parts of the world,' although the confluence of dedicated resources, coordinated support and existing capacity has been difficult to replicate. Nonetheless, impor- tant lessons have been learned about the valuable role economic development can play in defusing tensions, and how opening markets can hasten growth. There is again a growing recognition that economic security and national security are two sides of the same coin. General Carter Ham, who stepped down is head of U.S. Africa Command last year, observed the close connection between increasing prosperity and bolstering stability. During his time in Africa he had seen that "security and stability in many ways depends a lot more on economic growth and oppor- tunity than it does on military strength."1 Where people have opportunities for themselves and their children, he found, the result was better governance, increased respect for human rights and lower levels of conflict. During his confirmation hearing last year, Secretary John Kerry stressed the link between economic and national security in the context of the competitiveness of the United States but the point also has broader application. Our nation cannot be strong abroad, he argued, if it is not strong at home, including by putting its own fiscal house in order. He asserted—rightly so—that "more than ever foreign policy is economic policy," particularly in light of increasing competition for global resources and markets. Every day, he said, "that goes by where America is uncertain about engaging in that arena, or unwilling to put our best foot forward and win, unwilling to dem- onstrate our resolve to lead, is a day in which we weaken our nation itself."4 Strengthening America's economic security by cementing its economic alliances is not simply an option, but an imperative. A strong nation needs a strong economy that can generate growth, spur innovation and create jobs. This is true, of course, not only for the United States but also for its key partners and the rest of the global trading system. Much as the United States led the way in forging strong military alliances after World War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism in Europe or Asia, now is the time to place equal emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security. A failure to act now could undermine international security and place stability in key regions in further jeopardy.
| 6,551 |
<h4><strong>Solves every war</h4><p>Sapiro 2014 </strong>Miriam, Visiting Fellow in the Global Economy and Development program, former Deputy US Trade Representative, Why Trade Matters, September 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/why%20trade%20matters/trade%20global%20views_final.pdf</p><p><u>This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and global trade agenda</u> from the perspective of the United States. International trade is often viewed through the relatively narrow prism of trade-offs that might be made among domestic sectors or between trading partners, but <u>it is im- portant to consider also the impact that increased trade has on global</u> growth, development and <u>security</u>. With that context in mind, <u>this paper assesses the implications of the Asia-Pacific and European trade negotiations underway, including for countries that are not participating but aspire to join</u>. It outlines some of the challenges that stand in the way of completion and ways in which they can be addressed. It examines whether the focus on "mega-regional" trade agreements comes at the expense of broader liberalization or acts as a catalyst to develop higher standards than might otherwise be possible. It concludes with policy recommendations for action by governments, legislators and stakeholders to address concerns that have been raised and create greater domestic support. It is fair to ask whether we should be concerned about the future of international trade policy when dire develop- ments are threatening the security interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe<mark>. <u>In the Middle East</mark>, significant <mark>areas of Iraq have been overrun</mark> by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil <mark>war in Syria rages</u></mark> with no end in sight, <u>and the <mark>Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters</mark>. <mark>Nuclear negotiations</mark> <mark>with Iran have</mark> run into <mark>trouble</u></mark>, while Libya and Egypt face continuing instability and domestic challenges. <u><mark>In Asia,</mark> historic rivalries and <mark>disputes</mark> over territory have <mark>heightened tensions</mark> across the region, most acutely by China's aggressive moves <mark>in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea</u> towards Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. <u><mark>Nuclear-armed</mark> North <mark>Korea remains</mark> isolated<mark>, reckless</mark> <mark>and unpredictable</u></mark>. In Africa, countries are struggling with rising terrorism, violence and corruption. In Europe, <u><mark>Russia continues to foment</mark> <mark>instability</mark> and destruction in eastern Ukraine</u>. And within the European Union, lagging economic recovery and the surge in support for extremist parties have left people fearful of increasing violence against immigrants and minority groups and skeptical of further integration. It is tempting to focus solely on these pressing problems and defer less urgent issues—such as forging new dis- ciplines for international trade to another day, especially when such issues pose challenges of their own. But that would be a mistake. <u><mark>A key</mark> motivation <mark>in building</mark> greater domestic and international <mark>consensus for</mark> advanc- ing <mark>trade liberalization now is</mark> precisely <mark>the role that greater</mark> <mark>economic integration can play</mark> in opening up new avenues of opportunity for promoting development</u> and increasing economic prosperity. <u><mark>Such</mark> <mark>initiatives</mark> can help <mark>stabilize key regions</mark> and strengthen the security of the United States and its partners. The last century provides a powerful example of how expanding trade relations can help reduce global tensions</u> and raise living standards. <u>Following World War II, building stronger <mark>economic cooperation was a centerpiece of</mark> allied <mark>efforts to erase battle scars</mark> and embrace former enemies</u>. In defeat, the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan faced ruin and people were on the verge of starvation. The United States led efforts to rebuild Europe and to repair Japan's economy. A key element of the Marshall Plan, which established the foundation for unprecedented growth and the level of European integration that exists today, was to revive trade by reducing tariffs.1 Russia, and the eastern part of Europe that it controlled, refused to participate or receive such assistance. De- cades later, as the Cold War ended, the United States and Western Europe sought to make up for lost time by providing significant technical and financial assistance to help integrate central and eastern European countries with the rest of Europe and the global economy. "There have been subsequent calls for a "Marshall Plan" for other parts of the world,' although the confluence of dedicated resources, coordinated support and existing capacity has been difficult to replicate. Nonetheless, <u>impor- tant lessons have been learned about the valuable role economic development can play in defusing tensions</u>, and how opening markets can hasten growth. There is again a growing recognition that <u>economic security and national security are two sides of the same coin</u>. General Carter Ham, who stepped down is head of U.S. Africa Command last year, observed the close connection between increasing prosperity and bolstering stability. During his time in Africa he had seen that "<u>security and stability in many ways depends a lot more on economic growth and oppor- tunity than it does on military strength</u>."1 Where people have opportunities for themselves and their children, he found, the result was better governance, increased respect for human rights and lower levels of conflict. During his confirmation hearing last year, Secretary John Kerry stressed the link between economic and national security in the context of the competitiveness of the United States but the point also has broader application. Our nation cannot be strong abroad, he argued, if it is not strong at home, including by putting its own fiscal house in order. He asserted—rightly so—that "<u>more than ever foreign policy is economic policy," particularly in light of increasing competition for global resources and markets. Every day,</u> he said, "<u>that goes by where America is uncertain about engaging in that arena</u>, or unwilling to put our best foot forward and win, unwilling to dem- onstrate our resolve to lead, <u>is a day in which we weaken our nation</u> itself."4 <u>Strengthening America's economic security by cementing its <mark>economic alliances is</u></mark> not simply an option, but <u><mark>an imperative</u></mark>. A strong nation needs a strong economy that can generate growth, spur innovation and create jobs. <u>This is true, of course, not only for the United States but also for its key partners and the rest of the global trading system. <mark>Much as the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>led the way in forging s</mark>trong <mark>military alliances after World War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism</u> </mark>in Europe or Asia, <u><mark>now is the time to place </mark>equal <mark>emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security</mark>. <mark>A failure to act now could</mark> undermine international security and <mark>place stability in key regions in</mark> further <mark>jeopardy</u></mark>.</p>
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1nc
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1
| 76,311 | 305 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
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Texas
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2
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Northwestern Esman-McCue
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Moss
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Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
743,451 |
The legalization of sales, rather than purchases avoids problems with the unregulated market
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Gill 2
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Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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/v012/12.1gill.html
it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
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are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria . Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate our proposal will not be affected either way reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one
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Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
First, we are arguing for the claim that it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. 2 A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. As already noted in our preliminary points, our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.
| 11,563 |
<h4>The legalization of sales, rather than purchases avoids problems with the unregulated market </h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p></u>First, we are arguing for the claim that<u> it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We <mark>are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation</mark>; </u>that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. <u>We <mark>assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria</mark>, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs<mark>. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market</mark>.</u> 2 <u>A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products</u>, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe <u>the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die.</u> We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. <u>Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys</u>. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. <u><mark>Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys.</u> <u>For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it</u></mark> will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it <u><mark>will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney.</u> <u>Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate</u></mark>, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. <u>The important point is that <mark>our proposal will not be affected either way</mark>.</u> As already noted in our preliminary points, <u>our proposal can be <mark>reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one<strong></mark>. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well. </p></u></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,594 | 8 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,452 |
UNPOPULAR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SPUR BACKLASH.
|
CANON AND JOHNSON 00
|
CANON AND JOHNSON 00. [Brad, Prof of Law @ Kentucky, Charles, Prof of Law @ Texas A&M, Judical Policies]
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More than any other agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for reaction to judicial policies Congress cannot ignore any group of constituents groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision and they make their dissatisfaction known to Congress Congress will take action Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups Clashes between Congress and the courts are virtually as old as the two branches almost every year Congress reacts to judicial decisions.
| null |
More than any other public agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial policies. As a political body, Congress cannot ignore any sizable or prominent group of constituents. Some groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision or doctrine, and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress. If that pressure is great enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, Congress will, if feasible, take action. At the very least, numerous members of Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups. Clashes between Congress and the courts are virtually as old as the two branches. Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a political finesse of a hostile Congress by the Supreme Court. Constitutional crises have provoked such decisions as Dred Scott (Scott v. Sandford, 1857) and several anti-New Deal decisions in the 1930s. Strained relationships just short of crises have developed from numerous other decisions. Of course, no all differences between the courts and Congress are emotionally charged. Many of the differences arise over mundane issues such as pension or admiralty law. Either way, almost every year Congress reacts to judicial decisions.
| 1,325 |
<h4><strong>UNPOPULAR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SPUR BACKLASH. </h4><p>CANON AND JOHNSON 00</strong>. [Brad, Prof of Law @ Kentucky, Charles, Prof of Law @ Texas A&M, <u>Judical Policies</u>]<u><strong> </p><p>More than any other </u></strong>public <u><strong>agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for </u></strong>public <u><strong>reaction to judicial policies</u></strong>. As a political body, <u><strong>Congress cannot ignore any </u></strong>sizable or prominent <u><strong>group of constituents</u></strong>. Some <u><strong>groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision </u></strong>or doctrine, <u><strong>and they make their dissatisfaction known to </u></strong>members of <u><strong>Congress</u></strong>. If that pressure is great enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, <u><strong>Congress will</u></strong>, if feasible, <u><strong>take action</u></strong>. At the very least, numerous members of <u><strong>Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups</u></strong>. <u><strong>Clashes between Congress and the courts are virtually as old as the two branches</u></strong>. Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a political finesse of a hostile Congress by the Supreme Court. Constitutional crises have provoked such decisions as Dred Scott (Scott v. Sandford, 1857) and several anti-New Deal decisions in the 1930s. Strained relationships just short of crises have developed from numerous other decisions. Of course, no all differences between the courts and Congress are emotionally charged. Many of the differences arise over mundane issues such as pension or admiralty law. Either way, <u><strong>almost every year Congress reacts to judicial decisions. </p></u></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
At: no link
| 32,309 | 16 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,453 |
The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana in the United States.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should legalize marijuana in the United States.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,038 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,454 |
International treaty system solves great power war
|
Muller 2000
|
Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)
|
As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance
|
In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.
| 3,802 |
<h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</u></strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 65,123 | 59 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,455 |
government purchaser avoids exploitation
|
Erin and Harris 3
|
Erin and Harris 3 Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs
http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
organs available for transplantation, we must give ration to any option that may make up the shortfal The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, , safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
|
While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.
| 461 |
<h4><strong>government purchaser avoids exploitation</h4><p>Erin and Harris 3</strong> Charles A Erin and John Harris, Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics, School of Law, University of Manchester, <strong> </strong>J Med Ethics 2003;29:137-138 An ethical market in human organs</p><p><u>http://jme.bmj.com/content/29/3/137.full</p><p>While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of <mark>organs available for transplantation, we must give</mark> urgent conside<mark>ration to any option that may make up the shortfal</mark>l. </u>A market in organs from living donors is one such option.<u> <mark>The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, </mark>for example<strong><mark>, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.</p></u></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,342 | 13 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,456 |
POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COURTS AND CONGRESS SUCK IN THE PRESIDENT AND SAP POLITICAL CAPITAL.
|
]
|
TURNER 95. [Ronald, Prof of Law @ Alabama, Alabama Law Review, Winter]
|
Resolution of the Congress versus Court debate and the sequential trumping involved illustrates the stakes at issue where the legislative, executive and judicial branches differ on public policy issues. Much political capital was spent in the effort to amend Title VII and reverse the Court’s interpretations of Congress’s work.
| null |
Resolution of the Congress versus Words Cove Court debate, see supra notes 367-74 and accompanying text, and the sequential trumping involved therein, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 244, at 30-31, illustrates the stakes at issue where the legislative, executive and judicial branches differ on public policy issues. Much political capital was spent in the effort to amend Title VII and reverse the Court’s interpretations of Congress’s work.
| 445 |
<h4><strong>POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COURTS AND CONGRESS SUCK IN THE PRESIDENT AND SAP POLITICAL CAPITAL. </h4><p></strong>TURNER 95. [Ronald, Prof of Law @ Alabama, Alabama Law Review, Winter<u><strong>] </p><p>Resolution of the Congress versus </u></strong>Words Cove <u><strong>Court debate</u></strong>, see supra notes 367-74 and accompanying text, <u><strong>and the sequential trumping involved </u></strong>therein, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 244, at 30-31, <u><strong>illustrates the stakes at issue where the legislative, executive and judicial branches differ on public policy issues. Much political capital was spent in the effort to amend Title VII and reverse the Court’s interpretations of Congress’s work. </p></u></strong>
| null |
1nr
|
At: no link
| 431,040 | 1 | 17,104 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| 565,265 |
N
|
Navy
|
3
|
Boston College Kenner-Carelli
|
Lopez
|
Fed CP
Politics Iran DA (2NR)
Tobacco DA lol
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,457 |
The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,039 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,458 |
Leadership is inevitable --- their internal link doesn’t affect the structural reasons heg solves war
|
Maher 11
|
Maher 11 – Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1
|
presence in Europe and Asia will persist disparity in military power will not close in decades the IMF), World Bank, and WTO), have overwhelming legitimacy these institutions will benefit the U S after the demise of its position the U S will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable order
|
presence in Europe and Asia will persist disparity in military power will not close in decades the IMF), World Bank, and WTO), have overwhelming legitimacy these institutions will benefit the U S after the demise of its position the U S will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable order
|
The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values.
| 2,567 |
<h4>Leadership is inevitable --- their internal link doesn’t affect the structural reasons heg solves war</h4><p><strong>Maher 11</strong> – Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1</p><p>The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its<u> </u>forward <u><mark>presence</u> <u>in Europe and</mark> </u>East<u> <mark>Asia will</u></mark> likely <u><mark>persist</mark> </u>for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The<u> <mark>disparity in military power</mark> </u>between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap<u><strong> <mark>will not close in</mark> </u></strong>the next several<u><strong> <mark>decades</mark> </u></strong>at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as<u> <mark>the</u></mark> International Monetary Fund (<u><mark>IMF), World Bank, and</u></mark> World Trade Organization (<u><mark>WTO), </u></mark>all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, <u><mark>have</mark> </u>near-universal membership and<u> <strong><mark>overwhelming legitimacy</u></strong></mark>. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet<u> <mark>these institutions</u></mark>, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, <u><mark>will</mark> </u>disproportionately<u> <mark>benefit the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates long<u> <mark>after the demise of its</u></mark> unparalleled<u> <mark>position</mark> </u>in world politics. In this sense,<u> <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable </u></mark>international<u> <mark>order</mark> </u>that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 185,034 | 5 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,459 |
Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98
|
Radcliffe-Richards et al 98 J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;
|
case for allowing kidney sales
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution
|
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
|
Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The case for allowing kidney sales
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf
Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor. This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, all purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution. [12]
| 727 |
<h4><strong>Inequality in ability to purchase is avoided with central purchasing</h4><p>Radcliffe-Richards et al 98</strong> J. Radcliffe-Richards, Department of Philosophy, the Open University, Milton Keynes et al J; Daar, A S; Guttmann, R D; Hoffenberg, R; Kennedy, I; Lock, M; Sells, R A;</p><p>Tilney, N The Lancet Volume 351(9120) 27 June 1998 pp 1950-1952 The<u> case for allowing kidney sales</p><p></u>http://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/users/webfac/held/157_VIII.pdf</p><p><u><mark>Another familiar objection is that it is unfair for the rich to have privileges not available to the poor.</mark> </u>This argument, however, is irrelevant to the issue of organ selling as such. If organ selling is wrong for this reason, so are all benefits available to the rich, including all private medicine, and, for that matter, all public provision of medicine in rich countries (including transplantation of donated organs) that is unavailable in poor ones. Furthermore, <u>all <mark>purchasing could be done by a central organization responsible for fair distribution</u><strong>. [12]</p></strong></mark>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,346 | 7 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,460 |
The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 431,041 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,461 |
Not all will use
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Not all will use</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 431,042 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,462 |
Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing –egg donations proves
|
Sobota 4
|
Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis
|
, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns In the proposed market system for organ procurement, the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices . With only moderate prices being paid , economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections , and thus no economic coercion would occur. Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical risks involved." These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors
|
economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices With only moderate prices being paid economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections thus no economic coercion dditionally arket for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women
|
A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement
The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145 With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.
| 1,526 |
<h4><strong>Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing –egg donations proves</h4><p>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement</p><p>The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First<u>, the <mark>economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns</mark> </u>about becoming a donor. n144 <u>In the proposed market system for organ procurement, </u>either OPOs or<u> <mark>the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices</mark> </u>paid for organs<u>.</u> n145 <u><mark>With only moderate prices being paid</mark> </u>to organ donors<u>, <mark>economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections</mark> </u>to donation<u>, and <mark>thus no economic coercion</mark> would occur.</u> n146 <u>A<mark>dditionally</mark>, the current m<mark>arket</mark> system <mark>for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement</mark>.</u> n147 <u><strong>A <mark>majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women</strong></mark>, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical</u> [*1246] <u>risks involved." </u>n148<u> These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors</u><strong>.</p></strong>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,597 | 8 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,463 |
Our interpretation is that an affirmative should defend a topical action by the United States federal government.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Our interpretation is that an affirmative should defend a topical action by the United States federal government. </h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,043 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,464 |
CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly
|
Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly.
| 2,875 |
<h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,416 | 19 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,465 |
under the plan transplants would be based on medical need
|
Gill 2
|
Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45
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/v012/12.1gill.html
The international market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
|
horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program
First, in the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated
Second, involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,
|
Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html
The international black market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation, and the popular press has been right to expose it. But the horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program we propose.
First, in our proposal the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.
Second, the domestic program we propose involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international black market. Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria, as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.
| 1,480 |
<h4><strong>under the plan transplants would be based on medical need </h4><p>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>The international</u> black <u>market in kidneys is worthy of moral condemnation</u>, and the popular press has been right to expose it. <u>But the <mark>horrible stories do not constitute justification for a blanket rejection of payment for kidneys in this country because there are two crucial differences between the international black market and the legal domestic program</mark> we propose.</p><p><mark>First, in</mark> our proposal <mark>the medical setting in which legal kidney transfer would take place is that of contemporary transplantation, safe and medically sophisticated</u></mark>. Screening would select only potential kidney sellers whose kidneys are suitable for transfer and whose medical condition predicts minimal risk. Follow-up care would be scrupulous. Sellers would receive exactly the same medical attention and treatment that living kidney donors now receive in this country. The people to whom the kidneys are transferred will also receive the same medical attention and treatment that kidney recipients currently receive.</p><p><u><mark>Second,</mark> the domestic program we propose <mark>involves money only in the acquisition of kidneys, unlike the international</u></mark> black <u><mark>market.</mark> <mark>Allocation of kidneys would be based on medical criteria,</mark> as it is today. No private individual would be able to buy a kidney outside the system. Poor individuals will have just as much chance of receiving one of the kidneys.</p></u>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,687 | 5 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,466 |
NO Correlation between heg and peace—default ot empiric evidence
|
Fettweis, 11
|
Fettweis, 11 – Department of Political Science, Tulane University (Christopher J, 9/26/11, “Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)
|
there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between U.S. activism and international stability the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true . By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990 if trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U S military none took any action that would suggest such a belief No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished even if it is true that either U.S. commitments account for global trends there is in fact a level of engagement below which the U S cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined Grand strategic decisions are never final adjustments can be made . If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should pose a problem the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending the rest of the world can operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
|
there is no relationship between activism and international stability By 98, the U S was spending $100 billion less The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe its security was endangered No militaries were enhanced no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred Grand strategic decisions are never final adjustments can be made only evidence regarding systemic reaction to a trained U S suggests peaceful trends are unrelated to military spending the world can operate without a global policeman
|
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
| 4,559 |
<h4>NO Correlation between heg and peace—default ot empiric evidence </h4><p><strong>Fettweis, 11<u></strong> – Department of Political Science, Tulane University (Christopher J, 9/26/11, “Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)</p><p></u>It is perhaps worth noting that <u><mark>there is no</mark> evidence to support a direct <mark>relationship between</u></mark> the relative level of <u>U.S. <mark>activism and international stability</u></mark>. In fact, <u>the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true</u>. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially<u>. <mark>By</mark> 19<mark>98, the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>was spending $100 billion less</mark> on defense in real terms than it had in 1990</u>.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, <u>if</u> the pacific <u>trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but</u> <u>a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. </u>The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: <u><mark>The world grew more peaceful while the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>cut its forces. No state seemed to believe</mark> that <mark>its security was endangered</mark> by a less-capable U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>military</u>, or at least <u>none took any action that would suggest</u> <u>such a belief</u>. <u><mark>No militaries were enhanced</mark> to address power vacuums, <mark>no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred</mark> once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished</u>. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, <u>even if it is true that either U.S. commitments</u> or relative spending <u>account for global</u> pacific <u>trends</u>, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that <u>there is in fact a level of engagement below which the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined</u>. <u><mark>Grand strategic decisions are never final</u></mark>; continual <u><mark>adjustments can</u></mark> and must <u><mark>be made</u></mark> as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled<u>. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should</u> at least <u>pose a problem</u>. As it stands, <u>the <mark>only evidence</mark> we have <mark>regarding</mark> the likely <mark>systemic reaction to a</mark> more res<mark>trained U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>suggests</mark> that the current <mark>peaceful trends are unrelated to</mark> U.S. <mark>military spending</u></mark>. Evidently <u><mark>the</mark> rest of the <mark>world can operate</u></mark> quite <u>effectively <mark>without</mark> the presence of <mark>a global policeman</mark>. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.</p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 42,650 | 583 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,467 |
They don’t meet—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>They don’t meet—</h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,044 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,468 |
Your usa today ev says pot won’t solve
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Your usa<u> today ev says pot won’t solve </h4></u>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 431,045 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,469 |
The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism
|
Schwartz 2013
|
Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is
|
The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is.
|
B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.
| 8,598 |
<h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 430,417 | 18 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,470 |
commodification is nonunique- Organs are already paid for by others in the transplant process
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
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Commoditization Has Already Happened the current system, , in fact quantifies the value of the human body. while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ to say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality. organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ. Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient
|
Commoditization Has Already Happened while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality . Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companie each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions
|
B. Commoditization Has Already Happened The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad. n137 However, the current system, to which no ethical qualms are raised, in fact quantifies the value of the human body. n138 As such, an analysis of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation. On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human corpse now has a substantial economic value. n139 And while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ. n140 Simply put, to say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality. n141 The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs for large profits. n142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are [*334] so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative methods of procurement. n143 Further, organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." n144 At each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ. n145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in each transaction - again with the exception of the first - and has validated sales contracts for human tissue. n146 Thus, both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions from donor to recipient.
| 2,129 |
<h4>commodification is nonunique- Organs are already paid for by others in the transplant process</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>B. <u><mark>Commoditization Has Already Happened</mark> </u>The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad. n137 However,<u> the current system, </u>to which no ethical qualms are raised<u>, in fact quantifies the value of the human body. </u>n138 As such, an analysis of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation. On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human corpse now has a substantial economic value. n139 And <u><mark>while the law has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited the purchase of an organ</u></mark>. n140 Simply put,<u> to <mark>say that the law prohibits attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality</mark>.</u> n141 The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs for large profits. n142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are [*334] so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative methods of procurement. n143 Further,<u> organs are often subject to a string of transactions in which they are appraised and exchanged for money<mark>. Organs are first donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then sold by tissue banks to biotech companie</mark>s, then processed and refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally implanted into the "end-consumer." </u>n144 <u>At <mark>each of these transfers - with the exception of the very first - money is exchanged for the organ</mark>. </u>n145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in each transaction - again with the exception of the first - and has validated sales contracts for human tissue. n146 <u>Thus, <mark>both markets and the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series of transactions</mark> from donor to recipient</u>. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,691 | 6 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
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Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,471 |
Legalize requires action by public authority
|
US Legal 14
|
US Legal 14 US Legal 2014 http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legalization/
|
Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful.
| null |
Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful. It may also be called legitimation. For example, legalization of casino gambling refers to making casino gambling lawful; or legalization of assisted suicide refers to making assisted suicide lawful and legitimate, and legal consequences shall not follow a legitimate act.
| 402 |
<h4><strong>Legalize requires action by public authority</h4><p>US Legal 14</strong> US Legal 2014 http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legalization/</p><p><u>Legalization refers to authentication or certification by an appropriate public authority. It is an act to make something lawful.</u><strong> It may also be called legitimation. For example, legalization of casino gambling refers to making casino gambling lawful; or legalization of assisted suicide refers to making assisted suicide lawful and legitimate, and legal consequences shall not follow a legitimate act.</p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 430,479 | 4 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
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Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,472 |
Dowd ev also says USA so far ahead an one one else can catch up
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Dowd ev also says USA so far ahead an one one else can catch up </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 431,046 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,473 |
Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations
|
Taylor 2013
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Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)
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without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos
|
Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,
|
The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos.
| 5,417 |
<h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
2
| 56,721 | 34 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,474 |
The ban is limited to organs. Tissue can be sold.
|
Calandrillo 4
|
Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis
|
Morality concerns opposing commodification of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general,
|
commodification we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. n177 We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general
|
The objections to human organ sales detailed above all contain some merit, but lose some of their force upon closer analysis and further ignore the reality that markets in human body parts and products are, for all practical purposes, unavoidable. n176 Morality concerns opposing commodification of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when one considers that we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. n177 We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general, without which their health and lives can be expected to suffer. The argument regarding the distributive justice impact of allowing sales (i.e., that the poor would be sellers, and only the rich could be buyers) ignores the fact that organ transplants are still rationed on the basis of ability to pay today. n178 Further, distributive inequity could be partially cured by providing government subsidies to enable the poor to have equal access to available organs. n179 [*106]
| 1,016 |
<h4>The ban is limited to organs. Tissue can be sold.</h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p>The objections to human organ sales detailed above all contain some merit, but lose some of their force upon closer analysis and further ignore the reality that markets in human body parts and products are, for all practical purposes, unavoidable. n176 <u>Morality concerns opposing <mark>commodification</mark> of the human body are somewhat hypocritical when </u>one considers that<u> <mark>we allow the explicit payment of cash for human tissues, blood, semen and ova. </u>n177 <u>We also have no moral qualms about requiring individuals to pay for medical care in general</mark>, </u>without which their health and lives can be expected to suffer. The argument regarding the distributive justice impact of allowing sales (i.e., that the poor would be sellers, and only the rich could be buyers) ignores the fact that organ transplants are still rationed on the basis of ability to pay today. n178 Further, distributive inequity could be partially cured by providing government subsidies to enable the poor to have equal access to available organs. n179 [*106] </p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,777 | 3 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,475 |
Not government action—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action—
|
Ericson 3
|
Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4
|
each topic contains certain key elements An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy the agent is the subject of the sentence The verb should urges action should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur
|
each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S in “The U S should adopt a policy the agent is the subject . The verb should urges action should adopt means to put a policy into action through governmental means A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur
|
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.
| 1,288 |
<h4><strong>Not government action—the <u>agent and verb</u> indicate a debate about <u>hypothetical government action</u>—</h4><p></strong>Jon M <strong>Ericson 3</strong>, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. <u><mark>An agent</mark> <mark>doing the acting</mark> ---“<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates” <mark>in “The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should</mark> <mark>adopt a policy</u></mark> of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u><strong><mark>the agent is the subject </strong></mark>of the sentence</u>. 2<mark>. <u>The verb should</u></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase that <u><mark>urges action</u></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, <u><mark>should adopt</mark> here <mark>means to put a</mark> program or <mark>policy into action <strong>through governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. <u><mark>A specification of <strong>directions or a limitation</strong> of the action desired</u></mark>. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><strong><mark>The entire debate is about whether something ought</mark> <mark>to occur</u></mark>. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 1,149 | 3,809 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,476 |
“Legalize” must make an activity lawful--- doesn’t allow discretion to prohibit
|
Quinn 92
|
Quinn 92 – Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis
|
we are satisfied the term "legalize" correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity see also Black's Law legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. we do not construe the word "legalize" as suggesting that the cities retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. Nothing persuades us that the choice of language is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent
|
"legalize correctly expresses true intent and meaning to make legal or lawful legalize" expresses required to legislate to make legal we do not construe legalize" as suggesting cities retain discretion to legalize or prohibit
|
Turning to Verlo's claim, we are satisfied that the Board's use of the term "legalize" in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause correctly and fairly expresses the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. The word "legalize" means "to make legal" or "to give legal validity or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); see also Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (legalize means "to make legal or lawful" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful"). In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," the word "legalize" expresses the sense that these cities will be required to legislate so as to make limited gaming legal within their respective municipalities. Contrary to Verlo's argument, we do not construe the word "legalize" as somehow suggesting that the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will retain the discretion either to legalize or to prohibit limited gaming as they see fit. The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." Nothing in the record persuades us that the Board's choice of language in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.
| 1,748 |
<h4>“Legalize” must make an activity lawful--- doesn’t allow <u>discretion</u> to prohibit </h4><p><strong>Quinn 92</strong> – Judge Quinn, Supreme Court of Colorado, 826 P.2d 1241; 1992 Colo. LEXIS 53; 16 BTR 133, 1-27, Lexis</p><p>Turning to Verlo's claim, <u>we are satisfied</u> that the Board's use of <u>the term <mark>"legalize</mark>"</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u><mark>correctly</mark> and fairly <mark>expresses</mark> the <strong><mark>true intent and meaning</strong></mark> </u>of the proposed constitutional amendment. <u>The word "legalize" means "<strong>to make legal" or "to give legal validity</strong> </u>or sanction to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1290 (1986); <u>see also Black's Law</u> Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (<u>legalize means "<strong><mark>to make legal or lawful</strong></mark>" or "to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful</u>"). <u>In the context of the phrase "to legalize limited gaming</u> in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay," <u>the word "<mark>legalize" expresses</mark> the sense that these cities will be <strong><mark>required </strong>to legislate</mark> so as <mark>to make</mark> limited gaming <mark>legal</mark> within their respective municipalities. </u>Contrary to Verlo's argument, <u><mark>we <strong>do not construe</mark> the word "<mark>legalize" as</u></strong></mark> somehow <u><strong><mark>suggesting</mark> that the <mark>cities</u></strong></mark> of Manitou Springs and Fairplay [**11] will <u><strong><mark>retain</mark> the <mark>discretion</strong></mark> either <mark>to legalize or</mark> to <mark>prohibit</mark> limited gaming</u> <u>as they see fit.</u> The Board's decision to add a sentence to the summary stating that under the proposed constitutional amendment the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay would be "required to enact certain ordinances to implement limited gaming" merely expands upon what is conveyed in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause by the phrase "to legalize limited gaming in the cities of Manitou Springs and Fairplay." <u>Nothing</u> in the record <u>persuades us that the</u> Board's <u>choice of language</u> in the title and in the ballot title and submission clause <u>is in any way misrepresentative of the true intent</u> and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment. We accordingly affirm the ruling of the Board.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 430,284 | 78 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,477 |
Heg doesn’t solve war – the international community is resilient and disruptions are temporary
|
Preble, 10
|
Preble, 10 – Christopher A. Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a Ph.D in History from Temple University (Christopher A., “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” The Cato Institute, 8/3/10, http://www.cato.org/blog/us-military-power-preeminence-what-purpose)
|
scholars questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory A number continue to do so Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power the international economy is complex and resilient disruptions are likely to be temporary and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose – or gain – the most Islamic extremists are hardly comparable to the threat posed by nuclear weapons it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to refocus its efforts draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense
|
scholars questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory Trade routes need not be policed by a power the economy is complex and resilient disruptions are temporary costs of mitigating effects should be borne by those who stand to lose the most it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the U S were to refocus draw down military power, and call on countries to play a larger role
|
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose – or gain – the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.
| 1,292 |
<h4>Heg doesn’t solve war – the international community is resilient and disruptions are temporary</h4><p><strong>Preble, 10</strong> – Christopher A. Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a Ph.D in History from Temple University (Christopher A., “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” The Cato Institute, 8/3/10, http://www.cato.org/blog/us-military-power-preeminence-what-purpose)</p><p>Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some <u><mark>scholars</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory</u></mark> from the very beginning. <u>A number continue to do so</u> today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. <u><mark>Trade routes need not be policed by a</mark> single dominant <mark>power</u></mark>; <u><mark>the</mark> international <mark>economy is complex and resilient</u></mark>. Supply <u><mark>disruptions are</mark> likely to be <mark>temporary</u></mark>, <u>and the <mark>costs of mitigating</mark> their <mark>effects should be borne by those who stand to lose</mark> – or gain – <mark>the most</u></mark>. <u>Islamic extremists</u> <u>are</u> scary, but <u>hardly</u> <u>comparable to the threat posed by</u> a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of <u>nuclear weapons</u>. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; <u><strong><mark>it</strong> <strong>is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>were to</u></strong></mark> modestly <u><strong><mark>refocus</mark> its efforts</u></strong>, <u><mark>draw down</mark> its <mark>military</mark> <mark>power,</u> <u>and call on</mark> other <mark>countries to play a larger role</mark> in their own defense</u>, and in the security of their respective regions.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 97,647 | 81 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,478 |
Squo Sales for research are not prohibited.
|
Boyer 12
|
Boyer 12 J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis
|
research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her death
|
, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her deat
|
n150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $ 90,000. Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. Further, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof. Cheney, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Also, one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her death. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, Cadaver Calculator, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
| 763 |
<h4>Squo Sales for research are not prohibited.</h4><p><strong>Boyer 12</strong> J. Randall Boyer, J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 2012 Brigham Young University Law Review 2012 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 313 COMMENT: Gifts of the Heart ... and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues lexis</p><p>n150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $ 90,000. Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. Further<mark>, <u>research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and frozen cadavers or parts thereof</u></mark>. Cheney, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Also, <u><mark>one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the event of her deat</mark>h</u>. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, Cadaver Calculator, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). </p>
| null | null |
Contention 3 Solvency
| 430,775 | 3 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
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Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,479 |
Lynch will be confirmed now but it will be a fight
|
The Hill 11/11
|
The Hill 11/11/2014 (Dems unlikely to ram through Obama’s attorney general pick, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/223598-dems-unlikely-to-ram-through-obamas-attorney-general-pick)
|
Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate the time crunch and growing GOP opposition to Lynch make it exceedingly unlikely that the replacement for will be confirmed in December the task of approving a new attorney general will fall to the new Republican majority Leahy predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan support this nominee is extremely well qualified There may be some who feel they have to vote no because it's a nominee by Obama but the majority will vote for her
Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR
The very idea of legalization sound gruesome to most Many protest an organ market will lead to unfair advantages for the rich Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. In Japan, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, this has become a matter of life and death.
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Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate time crunch make i e the task of approving a new attorney general fall to the new Republican majority predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan suppor this nominee is extremely well qualified. There may be some who feel they have to vote no because it's a nominee by Obama, but the major will vote for her
legalization sound gruesome to most Many protes an organ market will lead to unfair advantages In Japan you can buy livers from executed prisoners itnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down The case for legalizing organ sales has proven highly controversial. this has become a matter of life and death.
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President Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate, Democratic and Republican aides say. A packed schedule after the election is almost certain to push the vetting process for Loretta Lynch into January, when Republicans are set to take power in the upper chamber. “It seems likely [the Lynch vote] would be in the next Congress. It’s difficult to process an [attorney general] that quickly,” said a Democratic aide. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has not yet made a decision on whether to move Lynch’s nomination in the lame-duck session, according to spokesman Adam Jentleson. But aides say the time crunch and growing GOP opposition to Lynch make it exceedingly unlikely that the replacement for Eric Holder will be confirmed in December. That means the task of approving a new attorney general — a position that is a lightning rod for controversy — will fall to the new Republican majority of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “Ms. Lynch will receive fair consideration by the Senate. And her nomination should be considered in the new Congress through regular order,” McConnell said in a statement. Senate Republicans are unified against Lynch’s nomination moving through the lame-duck session, giving Reid another incentive to postpone it. Reid needs Republican cooperation to pass other priorities in December, including an omnibus spending bill, a package extending a variety of expired tax cuts, the Defense Department authorization bill and dozens of lower-profile nominees. In addition to that legislative to-do list, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is insisting on passing an overhaul of the National Security Agency (NSA) before the clock runs out on the Democratic majority. Leahy’s committee is tasked with vetting Lynch’s nomination. “Leahy says he wants to do the NSA reform bill before doing anything else in committee so it bottles that up,” the Democratic aide said. “Lynch is a very qualified nominee and should be confirmed no matter who is in charge.” If confirmed, Lynch would be the first African-American woman to serve as attorney general. The Senate has already confirmed her twice to serve as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, the post she holds currently. Leahy on Monday predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan support, regardless of when the confirmation vote occurs. “I think most people would agree that this nominee is extremely well qualified. There may be some who feel they have to vote no simply because it's a nominee by President Obama, but the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats will vote for her,” Leahy said on MSNBC. “She's superbly qualified.”
Organ sales would become a wedge issue – partisan.
Gregory, ’11 Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR
The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. Many protest that an organ market will lead to unfair advantages for the rich, but this is a characteristic of the current trade. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that this has become a matter of life and death.
| 6,722 |
<h4>Lynch will be confirmed now but it will be a fight</h4><p><strong>The Hill 11/11</strong>/2014 (Dems unlikely to ram through Obama’s attorney general pick, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/223598-dems-unlikely-to-ram-through-obamas-attorney-general-pick)</p><p>President <u><mark>Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate</u></mark>, Democratic and Republican aides say. A packed schedule after the election is almost certain to push the vetting process for Loretta Lynch into January, when Republicans are set to take power in the upper chamber. “It seems likely [the Lynch vote] would be in the next Congress. It’s difficult to process an [attorney general] that quickly,” said a Democratic aide. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has not yet made a decision on whether to move Lynch’s nomination in the lame-duck session, according to spokesman Adam Jentleson. But aides say <u>the <mark>time crunch </mark>and growing GOP opposition to Lynch <mark>make i</mark>t <mark>e</mark>xceedingly unlikely that the replacement for</u> Eric Holder <u>will be confirmed in December</u>. That means <u><mark>the task of approving a new attorney general</u></mark> — a position that is a lightning rod for controversy — <u>will <mark>fall to the new Republican majority</u></mark> of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “Ms. Lynch will receive fair consideration by the Senate. And her nomination should be considered in the new Congress through regular order,” McConnell said in a statement. Senate Republicans are unified against Lynch’s nomination moving through the lame-duck session, giving Reid another incentive to postpone it. Reid needs Republican cooperation to pass other priorities in December, including an omnibus spending bill, a package extending a variety of expired tax cuts, the Defense Department authorization bill and dozens of lower-profile nominees. In addition to that legislative to-do list, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is insisting on passing an overhaul of the National Security Agency (NSA) before the clock runs out on the Democratic majority. Leahy’s committee is tasked with vetting Lynch’s nomination. “Leahy says he wants to do the NSA reform bill before doing anything else in committee so it bottles that up,” the Democratic aide said. “Lynch is a very qualified nominee and should be confirmed no matter who is in charge.” If confirmed, Lynch would be the first African-American woman to serve as attorney general. The Senate has already confirmed her twice to serve as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, the post she holds currently. <u>Leahy</u> on Monday <u><mark>predicted Lynch would ultimately win <strong>broad bipartisan suppor</mark>t</u></strong>, regardless of when the confirmation vote occurs. “I think most people would agree that <u><mark>this nominee is extremely well qualified</u>. <u>There may be some who feel they have to vote no</u></mark> simply <u><mark>because it's a nominee by</u></mark> President <u><mark>Obama</u>, <u>but the</u></mark> vast <u><mark>major</mark>ity</u> of Republicans and Democrats <u><mark>will vote for her</u><strong></mark>,” Leahy said on MSNBC. “She's superbly qualified.”</p><p>Organ sales would become a wedge issue – partisan.</p><p>Gregory, ’11<u></strong> Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR</p><p>The very idea of <mark>legalization</mark> </u>might<u> <mark>sound gruesome to most</mark> </u>people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. <u><mark>Many</mark> <mark>protes</mark>t</u> that <u><mark>an organ market will lead to unfair advantages</mark> for the rich</u>, but this is a characteristic of the current trade. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. <u>Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful.</u> But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. <u><mark>In</mark> <mark>Japan</mark>,</u> for the right price, <u><mark>you can buy livers</mark> and kidneys harvested <mark>from executed</mark> Chinese <mark>prisoners</u></mark>. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. <u>W<mark>itnessing the horror stories,</u> <u>many are calling on governments to crack down</mark> even more severely.</u> Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. <u><mark>The</mark> most fundamental <mark>case for legalizing organ sales</mark> -- an appeal to civil liberty -- <mark>has proven <strong>highly controversial</strong>.</u></mark> <u>Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets,</u> but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that <u><mark>this has become a matter of life and death.</p></u></mark>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 109,344 | 24 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,480 |
They aren’t any of the five topic areas – they must use one of them as a starting point for discussion and advocacy.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>They aren’t any of the five topic areas – they must use one of them as a starting point for discussion and advocacy.</h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,047 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,481 |
Status quo solve—medical majahuana
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Status quo solve—medical majahuana </h4>
|
1nc
| null |
heg
| 431,048 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,482 |
They “constrain the United States Congress’ constitutional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit marihuana.” This leaves the CSA prohibition on the books- the plan is an example of conditional non-enforcement pending a different legal justification in the courts
|
Treanor and Sperling 1993
|
Treanor and Sperling 1993 (William and Gene, Prof Law @ Fordham, Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy, Columbia LR, Dec)
|
courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is unenforceable but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished the statute is dormant but not dead if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date. jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law the court's view was that since the law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it. Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue have reached the same result It is a law that gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court
|
courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the books if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid Enforcement followed without congressional action a statute declared unconstitutional is unenforceable but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished the court's view was that since the law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it It is law that gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court.
|
Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. 42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable. The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. 43 Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. 44 When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet 45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date. 46 The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " HYPERLINK "http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=3bf07731ebc1d1672618b35147d355ac&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAk&_md5=e96fb34a0874701e21aee98a47093285&focBudTerms=%28abortion%29%20w/20%20%28casey%29%20w/30%20%28state%20court%20o 47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " 48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it. 49 Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [*1914] analysis. 50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, 51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. 52 The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. 53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.
| 6,179 |
<h4>They “constrain the United States Congress’ constitutional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit marihuana.” This leaves the CSA prohibition on the books- the plan is an example of conditional non-enforcement pending a different legal justification in the courts</h4><p><strong>Treanor and Sperling 1993 </strong>(William and Gene, Prof Law @ Fordham, Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy, Columbia LR, Dec)</p><p>Unlike the Supreme Court, several state <u>courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue</u>. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. 42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable. The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, <u>The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the <mark>courts have <strong>no power to repeal or abolish a statute</strong></mark>, and that <mark>notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute <strong>continues to remain on the</mark> statute <mark>books</strong></mark>; and that <mark>if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid</u></mark> from the date it became effective. <strong>43</strong> <u><mark>Enforcement</mark> of the statute <mark>followed without congressional action</u></mark>. <strong>44</strong> When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet <strong>45</strong> held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that <u><mark>a statute</mark> <mark>declared unconstitutional</mark> is void in the sense that it <mark>is</u></mark> inoperative or <u><mark>unenforceable</u></mark>, <u><mark>but <strong>not void in the sense that it is repealed</u></strong> <u><strong>or abolished</u></strong></mark>; that so long as the decision stands <u><strong>the statute is dormant but not dead</u></strong>; and that <u>if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date.</u> <strong>46</strong> The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate <u>jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law</u>.' " HYPERLINK "http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=3bf07731ebc1d1672618b35147d355ac&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAk&_md5=e96fb34a0874701e21aee98a47093285&focBudTerms=%28abortion%29%20w/20%20%28casey%29%20w/30%20%28state%20court%20o <strong>47</strong> Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " <strong>48</strong> Nonetheless, <u><mark>the court's view was that</u> <u>since the</u></mark> minimum wage <u><mark>law had <strong>always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable</strong>, there was no need to reenact it</mark>. </u><strong>49<u></strong> Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue </u>of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived<u> have reached the same result</u> as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [*1914] analysis. <strong>50</strong> The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, <strong>51</strong> a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. <strong>52</strong> The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. <u><mark>It is</u></mark>, instead, <u>a <mark>law</mark> <mark>that</u></mark> once <u><mark>gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed</mark>. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization</u>. Moreover, <u><mark>the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed</u></mark> may have had some support in the early case law, but it <u><mark>has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court</u>.</mark> Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. <strong>53</strong> In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 82,361 | 64 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,483 |
Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction
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Meskill 09
|
Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)
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Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs Why not also choose between them and other, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
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Friedman's piece applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" to the environmental armageddon this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential scenarios warming asteroid terrorists nuclear-weapons pandemic each risk on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different We get into our cars to buy coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed We are constantly risking death Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would neither act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety Many movements exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action
|
Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.
| 2,774 |
<h4>Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life impossible – everything could theoretically cause extinction</h4><p><strong>Meskill 09<u></strong> (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)</p><p></u>Tom <u><mark>Friedman's piece</u> </mark>today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He <u><mark>applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine"</u> </mark>(which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") <u><mark>to the </mark>risk of <mark>environmental armageddon</mark>. <strong>But <mark>this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant</strong></mark>.</u> It is intellectually incoherent because <u><mark>it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential </mark>disaster <mark>scenarios</mark>. In addition to the global-<mark>warming </mark>risk, there's also the <mark>asteroid</mark>-hitting-the-earth risk, the <mark>terrorists</mark>-with-<mark>nuclear-weapons </mark>risk</u> (Cheney's original scenario), <u>the super-duper-<mark>pandemic </mark>risk, etc. Since <mark>each </mark>of these <mark>risk</mark>s, <strong><mark>on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention</strong>, we cannot address all of them simultaneously</mark>. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs</u>. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? <u>Why not also choose between them and other,</u> much more cotidien, <u>things we value? <mark>Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different</u></mark>, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, <u>this is how we behave all the time. <mark>We get into our cars </mark>in order <mark>to buy </mark>a cup of <mark>coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed </mark>on the way to the coffee shop. <mark>We are constantly risking death</mark>, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. <mark>Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would</u> </mark>sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would <u><mark>neither </mark>be able to <mark>act, nor not act, <strong>since it would nowhere discover perfect safety</u></strong></mark>. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, <u>it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. <mark>Many </mark>religious <mark>movements</u> </mark>- for example the early Jesus movement - <u>have <mark>exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action</u></mark>. </p>
| null | null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
| 46,317 | 378 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,484 |
<<<YOU SHOULD READ A LINK>>>
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><<<YOU SHOULD READ A LINK>>></h4>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,049 | 1 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,485 |
Reasons to vote-
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Reasons to vote-</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 431,050 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,486 |
A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference
|
Steinberg & Freeley 8
|
Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-
|
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest If everyone is in agreement there is no need for debate the matter can be settled by unanimous consent it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," Controversy is an essential prerequisite Where there is no clash of ideas there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration How many are in the United States? Do they take job Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy controversies must be stated clearly Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007 Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! We ought to do something about this Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations but without a focus for their discussions they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow But if a precise question is posed then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation Although we now have a general subject It is still too broad What sort of writing are we concerned with What does "effectiveness" mean The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
|
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest If everyone is in agreement there is no need for debate Controversy is essential Where there is no clash there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question general argument may occur about the broad topic of immigration How many Do they take jobs Surely you can think of many concerns this "debate" is not likely to be productive without focus on a particular question demarcating sides controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions evidenced by the failure of Congress to make progress on immigration Someone disturbed might observe, "Public schools are terrible We ought to do something about this Groups could express frustrations but without a focus for their discussions, they could agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed a more profitable discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "crime' " we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not profitable argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide basis for clear argumentation Although we now have a general subject It is still too broad The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition This is not to say debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by focus on a particular point of difference
|
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
| 6,345 |
<h4><strong>A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a <u>specific point of difference</h4><p></u>Steinberg & Freeley 8<u></strong> *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-</p><p><mark>Debate is a <strong>means of settling differences</strong>,</u> <u>so there <strong>must be a</u></strong></mark> difference of opinion or a <u><strong><mark>conflict of interest</u></strong></mark> before there can be a debate. <u><strong><mark>If everyone is in agreement</u></strong></mark> on a tact or value or policy, <u><mark>there is <strong>no need for debate</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong>the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, <u>it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"</u> because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (<u><mark>Controversy is</mark> an <mark>essential</mark> prerequisite</u> of debate. <u><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas</u>, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <u><strong><mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><mark>debate <strong>cannot produce effective decisions</u></strong> <u>without <strong>clear identification of a question</mark> or questions to be answered</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong><mark>general argument may occur about the broad topic of</mark> illegal <mark>immigration</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>How many</u></mark> illegal immigrants <u>are in the United States?</u> What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? <u><mark>Do they take job</u>s</mark> from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? <u>Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration</u> by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? <u>Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?</u> Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? <u>Should we build a wall on the Mexican border</u>, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? <u><mark>Surely you can think of many</mark> more <mark>concerns</mark> to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in <mark>this "debate"</mark> is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it <mark>is <strong>not likely to be productive</mark> or useful <mark>without focus on a particular question</u></strong></mark> <u>and identification of a line <strong><mark>demarcating sides</mark> in the controversy</u></strong>. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <u><strong><mark>controversies must be stated clearly</u></strong>. <u><strong>Vague understanding</u></strong> <u>results in <strong>unfocused deliberation</strong> and <strong>poor decisions</u></strong></mark>, frustration, and emotional distress, as <u><strong><mark>evidenced by the failure of</mark> the United States <mark>Congress to make progress on </mark>the <mark>immigration </mark>debate during the summer of 2007</u></strong>.¶ <u><mark>Someone disturbed</mark> by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths <mark>might observe, "Public schools</mark> <mark>are</mark> doing a <mark>terrible</mark> job!</u> They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "<u><strong><mark>We ought to do something about this</u></strong></mark>" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u><mark>Groups</mark> of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education <mark>could</mark> join together to <mark>express</mark> their <mark>frustrations</u></mark>, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, <u><strong><mark>but without a focus for their discussions</u></strong>, <u>they could</mark> easily <mark>agree about the sorry state of education <strong>without finding points of clarity or</mark> potential <mark>solutions.</u></strong> <u><strong>A gripe session would follow</u></strong>. <u>But if a <strong>precise question</strong> is posed</u></mark>—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—<u>then <mark>a more <strong>profitable </mark>area of <mark>discussion</strong> is opened up</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>simply by placing a focus on the search</strong> for a concrete solution</mark> step</u>. <u>One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.</u> The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. <u>They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ <mark>To have a <strong>productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making</u></strong> <u>by</u></mark> directing and <u><strong><mark>placing limits on the decision</u></strong></mark> to be made, <u><strong><mark>the basis for argument should be clearly defined</u></strong>. <u>If we merely talk about "homelessness" </mark>or "abortion" <mark>or "crime'</mark>* or "global warming<mark>" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not </mark>to establish <mark>profitable</mark> basis for <mark>argument</u></mark>. For example, <u><strong><mark>the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide</mark> much <mark>basis for clear argumentation</u></strong></mark>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ <u><mark>Although we now have a <strong>general subject</u></strong></mark>, we have not yet stated a problem. <u><strong><mark>It is still too broad</u></strong></mark>, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. <u>What sort of writing are we concerned with</u>—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u>What does "effectiveness" mean</u> in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" <u><mark>The basis for argument could be phrased in a <strong>debate proposition</u></strong></mark> such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <u><strong><mark>This is not to say</mark> that <mark>debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</u></strong></mark> of the controversy by advocates, <u><mark>or</u> <u><strong>that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy</strong>; in fact, <strong>these sorts of debates may be very engaging</strong>. The point is that debate is best facilitated by </mark>the guidance provided by <strong><mark>focus on a particular point of difference</mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 51,689 | 1,023 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,487 |
Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets
|
Krache-Morris 2013
|
Krache-Morris 2013 (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)
|
Legalization has become an increasingly popular proposal But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed In marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial
|
DTOs are in far more than illegal drugs, one revenue stream would not erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent it is unlikely the U.S. would remove restrictions on ecstasy or heroin, leaving business intact even legitimate drugs spur illicit trade if supply is controlled Licit drugs can also create arbitrage opportunities if the laws differ state to state, as would be the case opportunity for profit is substantial
|
Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
| 2,110 |
<h4><strong>Can’t solve- shift and profits in legal economy and gray markets</h4><p>Krache-Morris 2013</strong> (Evelyn, International Secretary Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International affairs at Harvard University, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels)</p><p>Hardly. <u>Legalization has become an increasingly popular</u>, if still controversial, <u>proposal</u> among those who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. <u>But because <mark>DTOs are </mark>dealing <mark>in far more than </mark>just <mark>illegal drugs, </mark>the disappearance of <strong><mark>one revenue stream</strong> would not </mark>eradicate the cartels or decisively <mark>erode their power.</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>Even if</strong> the cartels were dependent </mark>on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed</u>. <u>In</u> the context of drugs like <u>marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but <mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>unlikely </mark>that <mark>the U.S.</mark> government <mark>would remove</u></mark> all, or even many, <u><mark>restrictions on </mark>drugs like <mark>ecstasy or heroin, leaving </mark>the cartels' <mark>business </mark>in those narcotics <mark>intact</u></mark>. What's more, <u><strong><mark>even legitimate drugs</strong> </mark>can <mark>spur illicit trade if </mark>they are in high demand but the <mark>supply is </mark>tightly <mark>controlled</u></mark>. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those <u>restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market</u> in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill. <u><mark>Licit drugs can also create </mark>highly profitable <mark>arbitrage opportunities</mark> for enterprising criminals <mark>if the laws </mark>that govern their distribution <mark>differ </mark>from <mark>state to state, as would </mark>likely <mark>be the case </mark>if marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized</u>. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a great deal of money for organized crime; <u>because of differing state tax rates, <strong>the <mark>opportunity for profit is substantial</u></mark>. Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 45,890 | 62 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,488 |
Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is
|
Yudkowsky 06
|
Yudkowsky 06 [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.
|
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
Overly detailed reassurances can create false perceptions of safety Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people tend to overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
conjunction fallacy applies to futurological forecasts
According to probability theory, adding additional detail must render the story less probable Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible
specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates as well as misdirecting investments into implausibly detailed risk scenarios
people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities people overestimate the probability that seven events of 90% probability will all occur people underestimate the probability that one of seven events of 10% probability will occur
|
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)
In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively.
According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.
People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)
Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios.
More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.)
| 4,274 |
<h4>Prefer the affirmative’s impacts to highly specific long term disadvantages – cognitive bias means you will think their impact is better than it really is</h4><p><strong>Yudkowsky</strong> <strong>06</strong> [Eliezer, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.</p><p><u>The <mark>conjunction fallacy</mark> similarly <mark>applies to futurological forecasts</u></mark>. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.)</p><p>In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. </p><p><u><mark>According to probability theory, adding additional detail</mark> onto a story <mark>must render the story less probable</u></mark>. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. <u><mark>Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible</mark>.</u> </p><p>People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) </p><p><u>Overly detailed reassurances can</u> also <u>create false perceptions of safety</u>: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." <u>Vivid, <mark>specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates</mark> of security, <mark>as well as misdirecting</mark> defensive <mark>investments into</mark> needlessly narrow or <mark>implausibly detailed risk scenarios</u></mark>. </p><p><u>More generally, <mark>people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and</mark> <mark>underestimate disjunctive probabilities</u></mark>. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>overestimate the probability that</u></mark>, e.g., <u><mark>seven events of 90% probability will all occur</u></mark>. Conversely, <u><mark>people</mark> tend to <mark>underestimate the probability that</mark> at least <mark>one of seven events of 10% probability will occur</u></mark>. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) </p>
| null | null |
Contention 4 is risk calculus
| 11,979 | 232 | 17,107 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| 565,251 |
A
|
Texas
|
1
|
Kentucky Hampton-Roman
|
Paul
| null |
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Aff-Texas-Round1.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,489 |
Switch side debate solves their offense—can K topic areas and the government on the negative
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Switch side debate solves their offense—can K topic areas and the government<u> on the negative</h4></u></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,051 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,490 |
Ground- the only predictable mechanism the neg can prepare for is removal of the law, giving us non-enforcement and states-only CPs which compete on leaving the law on the books- they give the aff too many mechanism options and ways to spike out of DA links
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Ground- the only predictable mechanism the neg can prepare for is removal of the law, giving us non-enforcement and states-only CPs which compete on leaving the law on the books- they give the aff too many mechanism options and ways to spike out of DA links</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 431,052 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,491 |
PC’s key- overcomes GOP opposition
|
National Journal 11/8
|
National Journal 11/8/2014 (In Loretta Lynch, Obama Hopes to Find a Less Polarizing Attorney General, http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/obama-to-reportedly-nominate-loretta-lynch-to-replace-eric-holder-as-attorney-general-20141107)
|
In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure Obama's appointment of Lynch will pass to the incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nomination Her nomination could give the administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republicans.
|
incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nominatio Her nomination could give the Obama administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republican
|
In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure. On Saturday, the president was quick to note that during her tenure as a U.S. attorney, Lynch has brought charges against public officials "in both parties." That comment may have been a subtle rebuke of Republicans' criticism of the Justice Department under Holder, who has suffered blows from the Right over Operation Fast and Furious and an Internal Revenue Service scandal. She has served under Obama and President Clinton, and won a high-profile case in 2000 against New York police officers who viciously assaulted immigrant Abner Louima. "It's pretty hard to be more qualified for this job than Loretta," Obama said. "Loretta doesn't look to make headlines. She looks to make a difference." Obama's appointment of Lynch adds another item to an already packed lame-duck session. If the confirmation gets sidelined in the current Congress, it will pass to the incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination. At least one lawmaker says that leaving the decision up to the next Congress is the right way to go. "Democrat senators who just lost their seats shouldn't confirm new attorney general," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, tweeted on Friday. "Should be vetted by new Congress." In the announcement on Saturday, Obama called on the Senate to confirm Lynch "without delay," but it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nomination. In 2010, Lynch was easily confirmed to her current post on a voice vote. Her nomination could give the Obama administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republicans. "The DOJ is the only Cabinet department named for an ideal. And this is actually appropriate, because our work is both aspirational and grounded in gritty reality," Lynch said. "I will wake up every morning with the protection of the American people my first thought." "I have had the good fortune of working closely with Loretta on a range of important issues over the years," Holder said in a statement on Saturday. "I am confident that Loretta will lead the Department of Justice with integrity, honor, and distinction. I congratulate her, once again, on her appointment. And I wish her the best of luck."
| 2,228 |
<h4>PC’s key- overcomes GOP opposition</h4><p><strong>National Journal 11/8</strong>/2014 (In Loretta Lynch, Obama Hopes to Find a Less Polarizing Attorney General, http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/obama-to-reportedly-nominate-loretta-lynch-to-replace-eric-holder-as-attorney-general-20141107)</p><p><u>In Lynch, Obama may hope to find a less polarizing figure</u>. On Saturday, the president was quick to note that during her tenure as a U.S. attorney, Lynch has brought charges against public officials "in both parties." That comment may have been a subtle rebuke of Republicans' criticism of the Justice Department under Holder, who has suffered blows from the Right over Operation Fast and Furious and an Internal Revenue Service scandal. She has served under Obama and President Clinton, and won a high-profile case in 2000 against New York police officers who viciously assaulted immigrant Abner Louima. "It's pretty hard to be more qualified for this job than Loretta," Obama said. "Loretta doesn't look to make headlines. She looks to make a difference." <u>Obama's appointment of Lynch</u> adds another item to an already packed lame-duck session. If the confirmation gets sidelined in the current Congress, it <u>will pass to the <mark>incoming Republican Congress, which could potentially derail the nomination</u></mark>. At least one lawmaker says that leaving the decision up to the next Congress is the right way to go. "Democrat senators who just lost their seats shouldn't confirm new attorney general," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, tweeted on Friday. "Should be vetted by new Congress." In the announcement on Saturday, Obama called on the Senate to confirm Lynch "without delay," but <u><mark>it is unclear how Republicans will view Lynch's nominatio</mark>n</u>. In 2010, Lynch was easily confirmed to her current post on a voice vote. <u><strong><mark>Her nomination could give the</u></strong> Obama <u><strong>administration a chance to reset its relationship with some Capitol Hill Republican</mark>s.</u></strong> "The DOJ is the only Cabinet department named for an ideal. And this is actually appropriate, because our work is both aspirational and grounded in gritty reality," Lynch said. "I will wake up every morning with the protection of the American people my first thought." "I have had the good fortune of working closely with Loretta on a range of important issues over the years," Holder said in a statement on Saturday. "I am confident that Loretta will lead the Department of Justice with integrity, honor, and distinction. I congratulate her, once again, on her appointment. And I wish her the best of luck."</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,053 | 4 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,492 |
Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage
|
Francis 2014
|
Francis 2014 (David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous)
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
|
decriminalization would push the price of pot down taking away a key revenue stream for cartels It’s forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests cartels are stealing from energy companies a practice common in West Africa the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May Los Zetas are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from the state oil company
|
Wider decriminalization would push the price of pot down, taking away a key revenue stream for cartels like Los Zetas and La Familia. It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. It’s also forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa, upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests. A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
| 3,143 |
<h4><strong>Plan forces a shift to PEMEX sabotage</h4><p>Francis 2014 </strong>(David, , Fiscal Times editor-at-large, “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous”, 1-7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous<u>)</p><p>Wider <mark>decriminalization would push the price of pot down</mark>, <mark>taking away a key revenue stream for cartels</mark> like Los Zetas and La Familia. </u>It’s pushing them to dive deeper into illegal markets for other drugs. <u><strong><mark>It’s</mark> also <mark>forcing them to adopt tactics used by militant groups in Africa</mark>, <mark>upping the ante with the Mexican government and putting them at odds with powerful energy interests</mark>.</u></strong> A 2012 study by the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness says legalization in Colorado will cost cartels $1.425 billion annually, while Washington State’s legalization would cost cartels $1.372 billion. The study also found that legalization in these two states would push the cartels’ annual revenues down 20 to 30 percent, and cut revenue to the Sinaloa cartel by 50 percent. In two separate reports — one in 2010 and one from last September — Rand Corp. dismissed these numbers as overstated. These reports found that the biggest domino to fall would be California, a state where one-seventh of all pot in the United States is consumed. Reuter said he expects California to decriminalize pot in the coming years. He said the only reason a 2010 referendum to legalize marijuana failed was because it was poorly worded. “These two states account for 5 percent of U.S. pot consumption. It’s not a big deal. If California legalizes, that changes things,” he said. Reuter added that the lack of pushback from conservative interest groups also makes wider decriminalization more likely. Just one group — Smart Approaches to Marijuana, headed by former Rep. Patrick Kennedy, who has struggled with substance abuse — is vocally opposed to decriminalization. Other conservative groups have been oddly quiet, Reuter said. “One of the fascinating things is how little real criticism there’s been from the right,” he said. “Social conservatives have not made much of this.” That could change since a new study from Northwestern University shows teenagers who smoke marijuana daily may suffer changes in brain structure that resemble schizophrenia. George W. Grayson, an expert on Mexican cartels at The College of William & Mary in Virginia, said, “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. <u>Grayson also said that the <mark>cartels are stealing from energy companies</mark>, <mark>a practice</mark> more <mark>common in West Africa</mark> than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, <mark>the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May</mark> in Veracruz alone. “<mark>Los Zetas</mark>, in particular, <mark>are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from</mark> Pemex, <mark>the state oil company</mark>. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.” </p></u>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 431,057 | 41 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,493 |
Vote neg—they undermine debate’s transformative potential—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Vote neg—they undermine debate’s transformative potential— </h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,054 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,494 |
Bidirectionality- their plan in particular doesn’t even find the CSA unconstitutional- it just says that one justification no longer works- this would let them read advantages like “the law would be reasserted under the treaty power- treaty power good” and spike all our legalization bad arguments
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>Bidirectionality- their plan in particular doesn’t even find the CSA unconstitutional- it just says that one justification no longer works- this would let them read advantages like “the law would be reasserted under the treaty power- treaty power good” and spike all our legalization bad arguments</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 431,055 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,495 |
Lynch is key to continuing Holder’s civil rights agenda- specifically on sentencing reform and voter suppression
|
AP 11/9
|
AP 11/9/2014 (Loretta Lynch Seen As Strong Civil Rights Defender, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/09/loretta-lynch-seen-as-str_n_6128466.html)
|
Obama's nomination of Lynch seems intended to convey the message that civil rights will remain a principal focus after Holder Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct, that suggests police misconduct will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Department just as they were with Holder She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights there's no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal Lynch would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the Ferguson Police Department Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences likely to help shape Holder's legacy Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work
|
Lynch to civil rights will remain a principal focus Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor suggests that police misconduct will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Departmen She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences — likely to help shape Holder's legacy
|
Loretta Lynch was a federal prosecutor in New York when she encountered an astonishing case of police brutality: the broomstick sodomy of a Haitian immigrant in a precinct bathroom. The 1997 assault on Abner Louima set off street protests, frayed race relations and led to one of the most important federal civil rights cases of the past two decades — with Lynch a key part of the team that prosecuted officers accused in the beating or of covering it up. President Barack Obama's nomination of Lynch to be attorney general comes as the department she would take over continues to investigate the police shooting of an unarmed black 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri and seems partly intended to convey the message that police misconduct and civil rights will remain a principal focus even after the departure of Eric Holder. If confirmed by the Senate, Lynch would be the first black woman in the job and would follow the first black attorney general. Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor. But it's her involvement some 15 years ago in the Louima prosecution that gave her high-profile experience in step with a core priority of the Justice Department. "It is certainly significant that she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct," said Samuel Bagenstos, the former No. 2 official in the department's civil rights division. "Obviously that will be helpful, and probably suggests that police misconduct cases will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Department just as they were with the Holder Justice Department. Lawyers say Obama likely selected Lynch, 55, the current U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the strength of a varied career and stature within the department. "She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights," Obama said in introducing Lynch at the White House ceremony Saturday. He said her prosecution of the officers in the Louima case was "one of her proudest achievements." But there's also no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause. That figures to be an especially important signal to send as community members in Ferguson brace for the real prospect that state and federal investigations into the shooting death of Michael Brown will close without criminal charges, outcomes that could disillusion civil rights activists and community members. Holder has said he expects the federal investigation to conclude before he resigns, but Lynch still would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the entire Ferguson Police Department. That investigation is one of roughly 20 that the Justice Department has initiated into troubled police departments in the past five years, more than twice the number undertaken in the five years before that. Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences — likely to help shape Holder's legacy. Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work, though her experience in two different stints as U.S. attorney goes well beyond that.
| 3,342 |
<h4>Lynch is key to continuing Holder’s civil rights agenda- specifically on sentencing reform and voter suppression</h4><p><strong>AP 11/9</strong>/2014 (Loretta Lynch Seen As Strong Civil Rights Defender, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/09/loretta-lynch-seen-as-str_n_6128466.html)</p><p>Loretta Lynch was a federal prosecutor in New York when she encountered an astonishing case of police brutality: the broomstick sodomy of a Haitian immigrant in a precinct bathroom. The 1997 assault on Abner Louima set off street protests, frayed race relations and led to one of the most important federal civil rights cases of the past two decades — with Lynch a key part of the team that prosecuted officers accused in the beating or of covering it up. President Barack <u>Obama's nomination of <mark>Lynch</u> to</mark> be attorney general comes as the department she would take over continues to investigate the police shooting of an unarmed black 18-year-old in Ferguson, Missouri and <u>seems</u> partly <u>intended to convey the message that</u> police misconduct and <u><strong><mark>civil rights will remain a principal focus</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong>after</u></strong> the departure of Eric <u><strong>Holder</u></strong>. If confirmed by the Senate, Lynch would be the first black woman in the job and would follow the first black attorney general. <u><mark>Lynch has overseen corruption, terrorism and gang cases in her years as a federal prosecutor</u></mark>. But it's her involvement some 15 years ago in the Louima prosecution that gave her high-profile experience in step with a core priority of the Justice Department. "It is certainly significant that <u>she has a personal history of involvement in prosecuting police misconduct,</u>" said Samuel Bagenstos, the former No. 2 official in the department's civil rights division. "Obviously <u>that</u> will be helpful, and probably <u><mark>suggests</u> that <u>police misconduct</u></mark> cases <u><mark>will continue to be a priority of the Lynch Justice Departmen</mark>t just as they were with</u> the <u>Holder</u> Justice Department. Lawyers say Obama likely selected Lynch, 55, the current U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the strength of a varied career and stature within the department. "<u><mark>She has spent years in the trenches as a prosecutor, aggressively fighting terrorism, financial fraud, cybercrime, all while vigorously defending civil rights</u></mark>," Obama said in introducing Lynch at the White House ceremony Saturday. He said her prosecution of the officers in the Louima case was "one of her proudest achievements." But <u>there's</u> also <u><mark>no doubt that selecting someone with civil rights experience could reaffirm the government's commitment to that cause.</u> <u><strong>That figures to be an especially important signal</u></strong></mark> to send as community members in Ferguson brace for the real prospect that state and federal investigations into the shooting death of Michael Brown will close without criminal charges, outcomes that could disillusion civil rights activists and community members. Holder has said he expects the federal investigation to conclude before he resigns, but <u>Lynch</u> still <u>would inherit a civil rights probe into the practices of the</u> entire <u>Ferguson Police Department</u>. That investigation is one of roughly 20 that the Justice Department has initiated into troubled police departments in the past five years, more than twice the number undertaken in the five years before that. <u>Those cases are part of a broader civil rights push — <mark>including challenging strict state voter identification laws and promoting changes in how federal prosecutors negotiate sentences</u> — <u>likely to help shape Holder's legacy</u></mark>. <u>Holder's supporters expect Lynch to continue that work</u>, though her experience in two different stints as U.S. attorney goes well beyond that.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,058 | 4 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,496 |
No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>No terrorism on the US-Mexico border—</h4>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 431,056 | 1 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,497 |
Preparation and clash—including all vague forms of topic discussion undermines limits on topic action and makes substantive debate impossible. Changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
<h4><strong>Preparation and clash—including all vague forms of topic discussion undermines limits on topic action and makes substantive debate impossible. Changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which <u>structurally favors the aff</u> because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent. </h4></strong>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 431,059 | 1 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,498 |
Sentencing reform key to US credibility
|
CGS 2013
|
CGS 2013 (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare
|
The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform, and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society. As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare.
| 569 |
<h4>Sentencing reform key to US credibility</h4><p><strong>CGS 2013</strong> (Citizens for Global Solutions is a groundbreaking national online movement for Americans who want the United States to take a responsible and cooperative role in the world, 5 Disturbing Facts About the U.S. Prison Industry, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/10/5-Disturbing-Facts-About-U.S.-Prison-Industry)</p><p><u>The United States holds five percent of the world's population, but 25 percent of the world's inmates</u>. This is not a reflection of crime rates so much as incarceration policy. <u><mark>The American criminal justice system is in dire need of reform</u>,</mark> and first thing to go should be the private prison model. For-profit <u><mark>prisons are keeping incarceration levels at a record high and holding us back from creating a healthier society</u>. <u><strong>As a supposed champion of global human rights, it is ill-advised for the U.S. to permit its own system to clash so strongly with social welfare</u></strong></mark>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 430,865 | 7 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,499 |
FX- even if the effect of the plan would be a removal of the law- it is not a mandate of the plan- effects T is an independent voter because it allows too many unpredictable steps between plan action and the topic which explodes limits
Vaugeness is an independent voting issue—1ac cx proves—they don’t specificy the legalization process—means it gets void for vagueness and makes it impossible to come up with an 1nc strategy because they can spike out of any link
|
Vaugeness is an independent voting issue—1ac cx proves—they don’t specificy the legalization process—means it gets void for vagueness and makes it impossible to come up with an 1nc strategy because they can spike out of any link
| null | null | null | null | null |
<h4>FX- even if the effect of the plan would be a removal of the law- it is not a mandate<strong> of the plan- effects T is an independent voter because it allows too many unpredictable steps between plan action and the topic which explodes limits</h4><p>Vaugeness is an independent voting issue—1ac cx proves—they don’t specificy the legalization process—means it gets void for vagueness and makes it impossible to come up with an 1nc strategy because they can spike out of any link</p></strong>
|
1nc
| null |
3
| 431,060 | 1 | 17,108 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
|
Texas
|
2
|
Northwestern Esman-McCue
|
Moss
|
Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,500 |
Their impact ev is all political hype
|
Stewart 2014
|
Stewart 2014 (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004 the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010 This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism other analysts believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in the media hype over this “border crisis is the fact that 2013 immigration was down significantly from historical levels This hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border has surfaced at intervals for years along with the boogeyman of terrorism an analysis of the history of plots and the changes in transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded
|
Lost in all the media hype over this “border crisis” is the fact that in 2013 overall immigration was down significantly from historical levels. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010.¶ This type of hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border is not new. It is something that has surfaced at irregular intervals for years now, along with scaremongering using the boogeyman of terrorism, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While other border security analysts have told reporters that they believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that an analysis of the history of plots directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas and an examination of the changes in the dynamics of transnational terrorism show such claims to be unfounded.
| 2,127 |
<h4>Their impact ev is all political hype</h4><p><strong>Stewart 2014</strong> (Scott Stewart 14, supervises Stratfor's analysis of terrorism and security issues, former special agent with the US State Department involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations, “Examining The Terrorist Threat From America’s Southern Border”, 7/24/14, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-border/)</p><p><u><mark>Lost in</mark> all <mark>the</mark> <mark>media hype over this “border crisis</u></mark>” <u><mark>is the fact that</mark> in <mark>2013</mark> overall <mark>immigration was down significantly from historical</u></mark> <u><mark>levels</u></mark>. According to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics, <u>there were only 420,789 apprehensions in 2013 compared to 1,160,395 in 2004</u>. In fact, from fiscal 1976 to 2010, apprehensions never dropped below 500,000. During that same period, the Border Patrol averaged 1,083,495 apprehensions per year compared to just 420,789 last year.¶ Of course, apprehension statistics are not an accurate count of total immigration and do not account for those who cross without being caught, and the statistics are also slightly skewed by the fact that Unaccompanied Alien Minors are far more likely to surrender to authorities rather than attempt to avoid them. In 2011, the Border Patrol apprehended 4,059 unaccompanied children; by 2013 that number had reached 38,759. Year to date, the Border Patrol has apprehended more than 46,000 unaccompanied children and estimates it will apprehend around 60,000 total in 2014. Still, overall, <u>the Border Patrol will apprehend and process hundreds of thousands fewer people this year than it did each fiscal year from 1976 until 2010</u>.¶ <u><mark>This</mark> type of <strong><mark>hype and politicization of the U.S.-Mexico border</u></strong></mark> is not new. It is something that <u><mark>has surfaced at</mark> irregular <mark>intervals</mark> <mark>for years</mark> now</u>, <u><mark>along with</mark> scaremongering using <mark>the boogeyman of terrorism</u></mark>, and it appears to be happening again.¶ I’ve recently done a number of media interviews regarding immigration, and during several of these interviews, reporters have asked me the question: “Does the crisis on the border give terrorists an opportunity to sneak into the country?” While <u>other</u> border security <u>analysts</u> have told reporters that they <u>believe terrorists would take advantage of the border crisis</u> and that the cartels would be willing to work with terrorists for the right price, I disagree. I believe that <u><mark>an analysis of the history of</mark> <mark>plots</mark> directed against the U.S. homeland from overseas <mark>and</mark> an examination of <mark>the changes in</mark> the dynamics of <mark>transnational terrorism</mark> <mark>show such claims to be unfounded</u></mark>.</p>
|
1nc
| null |
cartels
| 220,701 | 15 | 17,106 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| 565,267 |
N
|
Navy
|
8
|
Navy Mueller-Roach
|
Benedict
|
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics - Iran DA (2NR)
T - nearly all
Treaties DA
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,501 |
Lynch will be confirmed now but it will be a fight
|
The Hill 11/11
|
The Hill 11/11/2014 (Dems unlikely to ram through Obama’s attorney general pick, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/223598-dems-unlikely-to-ram-through-obamas-attorney-general-pick)
|
Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate the time crunch and growing GOP opposition to Lynch make it exceedingly unlikely that the replacement for will be confirmed in December the task of approving a new attorney general will fall to the new Republican majority Leahy predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan support this nominee is extremely well qualified There may be some who feel they have to vote no because it's a nominee by Obama but the majority will vote for her
|
Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate time crunch make i e the task of approving a new attorney general fall to the new Republican majority predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan suppor this nominee is extremely well qualified. There may be some who feel they have to vote no because it's a nominee by Obama, but the major will vote for her
|
President Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate, Democratic and Republican aides say. A packed schedule after the election is almost certain to push the vetting process for Loretta Lynch into January, when Republicans are set to take power in the upper chamber. “It seems likely [the Lynch vote] would be in the next Congress. It’s difficult to process an [attorney general] that quickly,” said a Democratic aide. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has not yet made a decision on whether to move Lynch’s nomination in the lame-duck session, according to spokesman Adam Jentleson. But aides say the time crunch and growing GOP opposition to Lynch make it exceedingly unlikely that the replacement for Eric Holder will be confirmed in December. That means the task of approving a new attorney general — a position that is a lightning rod for controversy — will fall to the new Republican majority of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “Ms. Lynch will receive fair consideration by the Senate. And her nomination should be considered in the new Congress through regular order,” McConnell said in a statement. Senate Republicans are unified against Lynch’s nomination moving through the lame-duck session, giving Reid another incentive to postpone it. Reid needs Republican cooperation to pass other priorities in December, including an omnibus spending bill, a package extending a variety of expired tax cuts, the Defense Department authorization bill and dozens of lower-profile nominees. In addition to that legislative to-do list, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is insisting on passing an overhaul of the National Security Agency (NSA) before the clock runs out on the Democratic majority. Leahy’s committee is tasked with vetting Lynch’s nomination. “Leahy says he wants to do the NSA reform bill before doing anything else in committee so it bottles that up,” the Democratic aide said. “Lynch is a very qualified nominee and should be confirmed no matter who is in charge.” If confirmed, Lynch would be the first African-American woman to serve as attorney general. The Senate has already confirmed her twice to serve as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, the post she holds currently. Leahy on Monday predicted Lynch would ultimately win broad bipartisan support, regardless of when the confirmation vote occurs. “I think most people would agree that this nominee is extremely well qualified. There may be some who feel they have to vote no simply because it's a nominee by President Obama, but the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats will vote for her,” Leahy said on MSNBC. “She's superbly qualified.”
| 2,714 |
<h4>Lynch will be confirmed now but it will be a fight</h4><p><strong>The Hill 11/11</strong>/2014 (Dems unlikely to ram through Obama’s attorney general pick, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/223598-dems-unlikely-to-ram-through-obamas-attorney-general-pick)</p><p>President <u><mark>Obama will have to get his nominee for attorney general past a Republican-controlled Senate</u></mark>, Democratic and Republican aides say. A packed schedule after the election is almost certain to push the vetting process for Loretta Lynch into January, when Republicans are set to take power in the upper chamber. “It seems likely [the Lynch vote] would be in the next Congress. It’s difficult to process an [attorney general] that quickly,” said a Democratic aide. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has not yet made a decision on whether to move Lynch’s nomination in the lame-duck session, according to spokesman Adam Jentleson. But aides say <u>the <mark>time crunch </mark>and growing GOP opposition to Lynch <mark>make i</mark>t <mark>e</mark>xceedingly unlikely that the replacement for</u> Eric Holder <u>will be confirmed in December</u>. That means <u><mark>the task of approving a new attorney general</u></mark> — a position that is a lightning rod for controversy — <u>will <mark>fall to the new Republican majority</u></mark> of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “Ms. Lynch will receive fair consideration by the Senate. And her nomination should be considered in the new Congress through regular order,” McConnell said in a statement. Senate Republicans are unified against Lynch’s nomination moving through the lame-duck session, giving Reid another incentive to postpone it. Reid needs Republican cooperation to pass other priorities in December, including an omnibus spending bill, a package extending a variety of expired tax cuts, the Defense Department authorization bill and dozens of lower-profile nominees. In addition to that legislative to-do list, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) is insisting on passing an overhaul of the National Security Agency (NSA) before the clock runs out on the Democratic majority. Leahy’s committee is tasked with vetting Lynch’s nomination. “Leahy says he wants to do the NSA reform bill before doing anything else in committee so it bottles that up,” the Democratic aide said. “Lynch is a very qualified nominee and should be confirmed no matter who is in charge.” If confirmed, Lynch would be the first African-American woman to serve as attorney general. The Senate has already confirmed her twice to serve as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, the post she holds currently. <u>Leahy</u> on Monday <u><mark>predicted Lynch would ultimately win <strong>broad bipartisan suppor</mark>t</u></strong>, regardless of when the confirmation vote occurs. “I think most people would agree that <u><mark>this nominee is extremely well qualified</u>. <u>There may be some who feel they have to vote no</u></mark> simply <u><mark>because it's a nominee by</u></mark> President <u><mark>Obama</u>, <u>but the</u></mark> vast <u><mark>major</mark>ity</u> of Republicans and Democrats <u><mark>will vote for her</u></mark>,” Leahy said on MSNBC. “She's superbly qualified.”</p>
| null |
1nc
| null | 109,344 | 24 | 17,110 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| 565,262 |
N
|
Wake
|
5
|
NYU Itliong-Zhan
|
McCleary
|
Fed CP (2NR)
AG Politics (2NR
Cede the Political DA
T - USFG
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,502 |
Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions
|
Koh 2007 )
|
Koh 2007 (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/)
|
the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, anti- Americanism is becoming entrenched America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is a core challenge for the global rule of law
|
America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power U S must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, , a core challenge for global rule of law
|
The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11, and that anti- Americanism increasingly is becoming entrenched in the twenty-first century. 3 4 America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that the United States must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. Protecting our human rights system and reputation is, and must remain, a core challenge for all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are the guardians of tomorrow's global rule of law
| 2,254 |
<h4>Credibility on human rights issues is key to soft power and international institutions</h4><p><strong>Koh 2007</strong> (Harold, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001; Attorney-Adviser at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, 1983-85., Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1684/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>The Pew Global Attitudes Project recently found, based on in-depth interviews with about 110,000 people in fifty countries, that <u>the United States' image has plummeted abroad since September 11,</u> and that <u>anti- Americanism</u> increasingly <u>is becoming entrenched</u> in the twenty-first century. 3 4 <u><strong><mark>America's perceived commitment to human rights principles has significantly declined as a source of our soft power</u></strong></mark>. As the director of the survey stated in congressional testimony, "favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from seventy-eight percent in 2000 to thirtyseven percent currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only twenty-three percent have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is twelve percent. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade."'1 35 Four years ago, I testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: [I]n its single-minded pursuit of the war against terrorism, the Administration has permitted some human rights concerns to fall by the wayside and has consciously sacrificed others .... But democracy and human rights cannot be pursued in a selective or piecemeal fashion. [Rather, t]he events of September 11th make clear that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>must work to achieve its global objectives within a framework of international law and multilateral cooperation, <strong>holding ourselves to the same standards to which we hold others</u></strong></mark> .... [W]e have the tools to make the world safer and more democratic, [but] if only we use them fairly and consistently. 13 6 If anything, I believe those words even more strongly today. In sum, <u><mark>America's human rights reputation defines who we are as a Nation</u></mark> and a People. What the last six years have taught us is that restoring that human rights reputation is simply too important a task to be left to politicians. Civil society has defended core principles of human rights and humanitarian law throughout the post-World War II Age of Human Rights. <u><mark>Protecting our human rights system and reputation is</u>, </mark>and must remain<mark>, <u><strong>a core challenge</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> all thinking twenty-first-century citizens, especially those lawyers, educators, and law students, who are <u>the</u> guardians of tomorrow's <u><strong><mark>global rule of law</p></u></strong></mark>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 430,866 | 7 | 17,109 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| 565,261 |
N
|
Wake
|
3
|
Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell
|
Watson
|
AG Politics (2NR)
Narrow Ruling CP (2NR)
Organ Shortage Advantage CP (2NR)
T - nearly all
Test Case Fiat
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
|
college
| 2 |
743,503 |
Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role
|
Galloway 7
|
Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)
|
Debate as a dialogue The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative When competitive equity suffers However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue Far from a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation a case might defend neither state nor action yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy
|
Debate as a dialogue is set by topic requirements When competitive equity suffers it denies the personhood of the other participant this is a fundamental condition of dialogue Far from a banal request for links fairness is a demand for respect that months of preparation not be silenced. cases that suspend fairness exclude strategies one side comes unable to participate Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation a case might defend neither state nor action yet claim to be germane to the topic the aff subverts any meaningful role to the neg undermining the value of exchange Germaneness and substitutes for topical action do not accrue dialogical benefits
|
Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
| 3,503 |
<h4><strong>Topical fairness requirements are key to <u>effective</u> dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and <u>subverts any meaningful neg role</h4><p></u>Galloway 7</strong>—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)</p><p><u><mark>Debate as a dialogue </u></mark>sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. <u>The affirmative side <mark>is set by </mark>the <mark>topic </mark>and fairness <mark>requirements</u></mark>. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ <u>Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative</u>. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ <u><mark>When </u></mark>one side takes more than its share,<u> <mark>competitive equity suffers</u></mark>. <u>However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, <mark>it </mark>fundamentally <strong><mark>denies the personhood of the other participant</u></strong></mark> (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). <u>A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes <mark>this</mark> respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair<mark> is a fundamental condition of </mark>a <mark>dialogue</mark> </u>that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. <u><strong><mark>Far from</strong> </u></mark>being<u> <strong><mark>a banal request for links</strong> </mark>to a disadvantage, <mark>fairness is a demand for respect</mark>, a demand to be heard, a demand <mark>that</mark> a voice backed by literally months upon <strong><mark>months of preparation</strong></mark>, research, and critical thinking<mark> not be silenced</u>.</mark>¶ <u>Affirmative <mark>cases that suspend </mark>basic <mark>fairness</mark> norms <strong>operate to <mark>exclude</strong> </mark>particular negative <mark>strategies</mark>. Unprepared, <mark>one side comes</mark> to the argumentative table <mark>unable to </mark>meaningfully <mark>participate </mark>in a dialogue.</u> <u>They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power</u> (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ <u>Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions</u>. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because <u>it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions</u> (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ <u><strong><mark>Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation</strong></mark> </u>(Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, <u><mark>a</u></mark>n affirmative<u> <mark>case</u></mark> on the 2007-2008 college topic <u><mark>might defend neither state nor</mark> </u>international <u><mark>action </u></mark>in the Middle East, and<u><mark> <strong>yet claim to be germane to the topic</strong></mark> in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions </u>in the international arena <u>are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response,<mark> the aff</mark>irmative <strong><mark>subverts any meaningful role to the neg</strong></mark>ative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and <mark>undermining the value of </mark>a meaningful <mark>exchange</mark> of speech acts. <strong><mark>Germaneness and</mark> other <mark>substitutes for topical action do not accrue </mark>the <mark>dialogical benefits</strong></mark> of topical advocacy</u>.</p>
| null |
1nc
|
1
| 90,248 | 398 | 17,111 |
./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| 565,271 |
N
|
Texas
|
5
|
Binghamton Herrera-Smith
|
Garrett
|
Framework (2NR)
cap good
|
ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx
| null | 48,454 |
YaAh
|
Dartmouth YaAh
| null |
Ka.....
|
Ya.....
|
Pi.....
|
Ah.....
| 18,764 |
Dartmouth
|
Dartmouth
| null | null | 1,004 |
ndtceda14
|
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
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college
| 2 |
743,504 |
*The Brownfield doctrine of flexible treaty interpretation will be accepted internationally and solves the war on drugs- staying within the treaty is the ONLY way to achieve reform- leaving the ban on the books is enough compliance
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Collins 12/1
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Collins 12/1/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
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The Brownfield Doctrine is based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of the international drug conventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations viewing the treaties as ‘living documents’ Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects the O A S invoked principles derived from the doctrine the approach is sensible and allows breathing room for innovation and changes which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. altering international agreements is so minimal that greater flexibility is often required in their implementation. Some argue it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’ around cannabis these arguments miss the point the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, then it can be extremely positive, the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana the Brownfield Doctrine says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable there needs to be a sequential action process
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Brownfield Doctrine is flexible interpretation Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects. allows breathing room for innovation and change altering international agreements greater flexibility is often required in their implementation the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties. The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged. The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approac the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementatio evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, there needs to be a sequential action proces
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The Brownfield Doctrine is a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term. It’s based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of certain antiquated provisions of the international drug conventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as viewing the treaties as ‘living breathing documents’ which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed. Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects. For example the recent Organization of American States Special General Assembly on Drugs invoked principles derived from the doctrine. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy – the United States. Regardless of who authored it, the four-point approach is on balance a sensible path forward for the immediate future and allows breathing room for innovation and changes in policy, which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US. Many are justifiably wary of allowing states to redraw international agreements, seeing such a process as a slippery slope that might result in undermining other treaties such as human rights conventions. However, I think some realism is justified here. Empirically, the level of adherence to international agreements varies drastically. In the field of drug control this has been a consistent theme. As the UK acknowledged as early as 1951, drug conventions had ‘frequently been more honoured in the breach than in the observance’. Whether states were called out on the inadequacies of their compliance had little to do with legal reasoning and everything to do with realpolitik. Turkey, for example, was publicly praised as a model licit (legal) opium cultivator, whilst being quietly criticized for allowing frequent leakages into the illicit market. Iran was either loudly condemned or quietly ignored for flouting the conventions, depending on its utility to the leading powers at the time. Afghanistan was frequently overlooked out of a recognition that enforcing the treaties was, as the Ministry of the Economy pointed out in 1950, ‘impossible’. Meanwhile, altering international agreements, even if they prove misguided, is so minimal that greater flexibility is often required in their implementation. One of the key architects of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Herbert May, argued in 1955 that a central goal of the Convention was to provide ‘greater flexibility’ to the international system due to the likelihood of changed circumstances as well as medical-scientific innovations and research. The fact that the Single Convention took fourteen years, three drafts and an extremely rancorous plenipotentiary conference to negotiate should give pause to those who think redrafting is an immediate goal. The outcome of the Single Convention process was a breakdown in international drug diplomacy as the US set about torpedoing the document, viewing it as too weak relative to predecessor treaties. Thereafter member states struggled to agree on its interpretation, and it took two separate drafts to produce the Commentary which purports to explain it. The downsides to the State Department’s policy I have already discussed the human rights aspects. Some argue that the Doctrine doesn’t go far enough and allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’ of treaties around cannabis, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates. I think these arguments miss the point. Firstly the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, then I think it can be extremely positive, especially if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and reform-minded states to hold other member states’ feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers. Secondly, it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties. The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged. The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana. They could use federal resources to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but the Brownfield Doctrine essentially says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question. Thirdly, there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach. There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model. In the future, increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable. Fourthly, no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems to me one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but there needs to be a sequential action process here.
| 7,536 |
<h4>*The Brownfield doctrine of flexible treaty interpretation will be accepted internationally and solves the war on drugs- staying within the treaty is the ONLY way to achieve reform- leaving the ban on the books is enough compliance</h4><p><strong>Collins 12/1</strong>/2014 (Jonathan, International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics. He served as Coordinator of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy and Editor of the 2014 report 'Ending the Drug Wars.', The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)</p><p><u>The <mark>Brownfield Doctrine</u> <u>is</u></mark> a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term. It’s <u>based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via <mark>flexible interpretation</u></mark> of certain antiquated provisions <u>of the international drug conventions.</u> <u>It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations</u> of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as <u>viewing the treaties as ‘living</u> breathing <u>documents’</u> which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed. <u><mark>Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects</u>.</mark> For example <u>the</u> recent <u>O</u>rganization of <u>A</u>merican <u>S</u>tates Special General Assembly on Drugs <u>invoked principles derived from the doctrine</u>. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy – the United States. Regardless of who authored it, <u>the</u> four-point <u>approach</u> <u>is</u> on balance a <u>sensible</u> path forward for the immediate future <u>and <mark>allows breathing room for innovation and change</mark>s</u> in policy, <u>which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform.</u> If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US. Many are justifiably wary of allowing states to redraw international agreements, seeing such a process as a slippery slope that might result in undermining other treaties such as human rights conventions. However, I think some realism is justified here. Empirically, the level of adherence to international agreements varies drastically. In the field of drug control this has been a consistent theme. As the UK acknowledged as early as 1951, drug conventions had ‘frequently been more honoured in the breach than in the observance’. Whether states were called out on the inadequacies of their compliance had little to do with legal reasoning and everything to do with realpolitik. Turkey, for example, was publicly praised as a model licit (legal) opium cultivator, whilst being quietly criticized for allowing frequent leakages into the illicit market. Iran was either loudly condemned or quietly ignored for flouting the conventions, depending on its utility to the leading powers at the time. Afghanistan was frequently overlooked out of a recognition that enforcing the treaties was, as the Ministry of the Economy pointed out in 1950, ‘impossible’. Meanwhile, <u><mark>altering international agreements</u></mark>, even if they prove misguided, <u>is so minimal that <strong><mark>greater flexibility is often required in their implementation</strong></mark>.</u> One of the key architects of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Herbert May, argued in 1955 that a central goal of the Convention was to provide ‘greater flexibility’ to the international system due to the likelihood of changed circumstances as well as medical-scientific innovations and research. The fact that the Single Convention took fourteen years, three drafts and an extremely rancorous plenipotentiary conference to negotiate should give pause to those who think redrafting is an immediate goal. The outcome of the Single Convention process was a breakdown in international drug diplomacy as the US set about torpedoing the document, viewing it as too weak relative to predecessor treaties. Thereafter member states struggled to agree on its interpretation, and it took two separate drafts to produce the Commentary which purports to explain it. The downsides to the State Department’s policy I have already discussed the human rights aspects. <u>Some argue</u> that the Doctrine doesn’t go far enough and allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that <u>it’s a tool to hide US ‘violation’</u> of treaties <u>around cannabis</u>, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates. I think <u><strong>these arguments miss the point</u></strong>. Firstly <u><mark>the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of it.</u> <u>If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable,</mark> then</u> I think <u>it can be extremely positive,</u> especially if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and reform-minded states to hold other member states’ feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think <u>the opportunities drastically outweigh the dangers</u>. Secondly, <u><strong><mark>it’s very hard to argue that the US is flat-out ‘breaching’ the treaties</u></strong>. <u>The Federal Government is the executor of the treaties and <strong>national legislation is unchanged</u></strong>. <u>The Federal Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana</u></mark>. They could use federal resources to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but <u>the Brownfield Doctrine</u> essentially <u>says that the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty reform play out</u>. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question. Thirdly, <u><mark>there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approac</mark>h</u>. <u>There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties require, but</u> <u><strong><mark>the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementatio</mark>n</u></strong>. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, <u><strong><mark>evidence of efficacy around alternative policies</strong> is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model</u></mark>. In the future, <u>increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable</u>. Fourthly, <u><strong><mark>no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents</u></strong>. <u>Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, </mark>even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation.</u> <u>The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy.</u> <u>The most rational reform strategy</u> <u>seems</u> to me <u>one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable</u> and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but <u><strong><mark>there needs to be a sequential action proces</mark>s</u></strong> here.</p>
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1nc
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a1
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./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
| 565,269 |
N
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Texas
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2
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Northwestern Esman-McCue
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Moss
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Fed CP (2NR)
TPA
T - Legalize
State Immigration Impact Turn (2NR)
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ndtceda14/Dartmouth/YaAh/Dartmouth-Yan-Ahmad-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx
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YaAh
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Dartmouth YaAh
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Ka.....
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Ya.....
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Pi.....
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Ah.....
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Dartmouth
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Dartmouth
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ndtceda14
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
| 2,014 |
cx
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college
| 2 |
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