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3-96 | 44 | Chapter 2
externally with both coalition partners and indigenous population, to support shaping the operational
environment. Mutual trust developed through commander and staff actions, shape and set conditions that
facilitate actions consistent with the understanding of competing interest and the moral principles of the Army
Ethic.
2-33. The BCT commander and staff consider the competitive environment of the area of operations and
shape the operational environment to set conditions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Different
political entities,different personalities,tribal dynamics,religious interests,economic motivations,sources
of security, and potential havens of refuge for enemies all contribute to the competitive nature of the
operational environment. Not all of these interests are parallel and mutually supportive of the objectives and
end state for a particular region. The commander and staff develop situational understanding and influences
personalities and organizations to achieve objectives to shape the environment. Shaping the environment
includes persuading and empowering other personalities and organizations to modify behaviors and actions
consistent with the BCT commander’s intent and objectives. Setting conditions is an enduring process
throughout all phases—a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity
(ADP3-0)—of an operation.
2-34. Shaping an area of operations requires integration of a broad variety of missions across multiple
domains that can range from raids,civil reconnaissance,tactical PSYOP,and engaging with local leaders. In
order to plan and execute these missions the BCT as well as its subordinate units must understand how the
civil considerations affect the other mission variables. In particular, commanders may need to emphasize
understanding organizations and people to include the relationships between them. When conditions are not
favorable for future operations or are not aligned to the desired end state,the BCT conducts missions to shape
the area of operation, changing those conditions, and setting conditions for future operations. The BCT
establishes countermeasures to counter cross-domain threats and influencers attempting to shape the
battlefield themselves.
2-35. The BCT commander and staff understand through analysis of operational and mission variables,
enhanced and developed thorough information collection to understand the competing dynamics within the
area of operations. The commander and staff seek to understand the populations’interests and motivations
and to identify pillar organizations that provide guidance, inspiration, and strength to the population. The
BCT must understand who is influential in the area of operations to engage leaders,influence behaviors,and
persuade neutral and fringe groups to synthesize with BCT objectives, and to plan and execute limited
offensive operations that set conditions for future successes. Ultimately,greater understanding of operational
and mission variables is essential to the development, planning, and execution of information-related
capabilities that shape the operational environment.
2-36. The BCT commander seeks to understand the competitive interests within an area of operations and
how these interests influence desired outcomes and objectives. Some interests and motivations are supportive
of the BCT’s objectives and others conflict,counter,and disrupt efforts of the desired end state. The BCT’s
ability to shape and set conditions for favorable outcomes relates to the BCT’s ability to understand the
influence of different competitive interests. The commander and staff seek answers to information gaps
through the development of intelligence requirements that are satisfied through active information operations
(see ATP3-13.1) within a given area. Staffs develop options for the commander through information
collection and analysis so the commander can inform the populace and influence various actors to shape the
environments.
2-37. Analysis of the motivations and interests of personalities and organizations provide insight to future
information operations seeking to modify behaviors counter to friendly force objectives. Subordinate
commanders and staffs develop plans and operations that support the BCT commander’s intent and desired
end state. Supporting efforts empower key influencers and organizations,and persuade neutral audiences,to
bolster legitimacy and secure vital interests and objectives. Coercive efforts attack to neutralize the enemy’s
narrative. The BCT uses coercive efforts to counter enemy propaganda and isolates adversaries or enemies
from their support base to begin the psychological breakdown of adversary or enemy organizations. The BCT
shapes conditions for favorable objectives in line with the interests of the host nation contributing to the
enemy’s defeat through use of military deception,engagements,and communication mediums.
2-38. Activities that shape the operational environment derive success in how effectively they persuade the
populace and empower the host-nation government. All efforts focus on bolstering the legitimacy of the rule |
3-96 | 45 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
of law and the host nation’s ability to provide for effective governance. Persuasion and empowerment
demand the BCT use engagement strategies to make connections and form relationships with pillar
organizations and individuals who control and influence the local community. Engagements secure common
and clearly defined goals and ideals that provide a common reference point for future engagements and
activities. Engagements seek to reinforce the authority of legitimate leaders and pillars and to restore or
solidify confidence in host-nation security forces, governance, and rule of law. Persuasive efforts utilize a
compelling narrative that justifies and explains friendly actions while delegitimizing motivations and
behaviors of those who are counter to positive gains within the area of operations. Additionally,persuasive
efforts specifically target neutral or fringe entities with the goal of tipping neutrality to a favorable alliance.
2-39. Defensive operations will likely be constant during BCT operations, to include the protection of
information, friendly forces, or civil populations. Offensive operations of limited scope, duration, and
objectives targeting enemy,capabilities,groups,or individuals seize initiative and opportunities contributing
to enduring success. BCTs identify opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to destroy,
dislocate, disintegrate, or isolate enemy organizations and discredit enemy actions as trust builds and
information is collected. Offensive operations shape the operational environment within operational
frameworks and establish conditions for future operations. Effective offensive operations retain initiative
through actions and coherent andcompelling themes and messages to inform and influence audiences.
INFLUENCE AUDIENCES
2-40. The BCT commander ensures actions,themes,and messages complement and reinforce each other to
accomplish objectives. An information theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the
purpose for an action. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports an
information theme focused on an audience. A message supports a specific action or objective. Actions,
themes, and messages are inextricably linked. The commander ensures actions, themes, and messages
complement and reinforce each other and support operational objectives. The commander keeps in mind that
every action implies a message,and avoids contradictory actions,themes,or messages.
2-41. Throughout operations, the commander informs and influences audiences inside and outside of the
BCT. The commander informs and influences by conducting Soldier and leader engagements, radio
programs,command information programs,operations briefs,and unit website posts or social media. Soldiers
and leaders build trust and legitimacy by demonstrating their adherence to the moral principles of the Army
Ethic. That trust is earned by the actions of every Soldier and leader assigned or attached to the BCT.
Commanders and subordinate leaders convey the importance of that message to their subordinates at every
opportunity. The BCT staff assists the commander to create shared understanding and purpose inside and
outside of the BCT, and among all affected audiences. Shared understanding synchronizes the words and
actions of Soldiers and leader to achieved mutual trust that informs and influences audiences inside and
outside the BCT (see ADP 1).
2-42. Influence is central to shaping the operational environment. All activities conducted by the BCT
directly or indirectly contribute to or detract from the BCT’s ability to influence the populace and
environment. Information related tools, techniques, and activities are the integration of designated
information-related capabilities to synchronize themes,messages,and actions with operations to inform U.S.
and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making.
Information related capabilities clarify intentions through common narratives, counter enemy propaganda,
expose corruption within competing groups or entities,and bolster the legitimacy of host nation power and
governance. Information related capabilities modify behaviors and efforts through persuasion,cooperation,
or coercion that leads to successful operations that secure the populace and provide order to the social
structure.
2-43. Narratives provide a communication mechanism and are the unifying structures between action and
communication with the populace. Simple narratives tie together the actions of the BCT with unit objectives.
Simple narratives provide a basis for informing and influencing leaders and pillars as to the purpose behind
actions and activities conducted by host nation forces and the BCT. Compelling narratives seek to address
concerns and interests of the populace while explaining the methodologies endeavored by the host nation
government and security forces in partnership with the BCT. All BCT leaders must understand the narrative
as they play a central role in key leader engagements and all information-related capabilities. Narratives |
3-96 | 46 | Chapter 2
explain and justify friendly actions while delegitimizing enemy and adversary actions. Narratives
simultaneously serve as both communication mechanisms and counterpropaganda instruments that gain the
populaces’ favor. Narratives seek to neutralize or disable the support structures provided to adversary or
enemy groups and factions. BCTs must knowthe multiple narratives within a given information environment.
The BCT gains valuable insights from competing narratives to determine the multiple and disparate interests
and motivations of the population and its subsets. BCT leaders rely on attached PSYOP and other key
personnel to identify the actors and analyze the narratives to determine competing narratives; staffs then
articulate these competing narratives to inform the commander’s decisions. Key staff members informing the
commander’s narrative guidance and actions include the information operations officer,public affairs officer,
brigade civil affairs operations staff officer(S-9),PSYOP staff planner,and brigade judge advocate.
2-44. The BCT addresses enemy propaganda efforts by preempting and countering enemy propaganda to
neutralize their effects on friendly actions and objectives. The BCT maintains credibility with the host-nation
populace and counters enemy propaganda that seeks to delegitimize host-nation government and friendly
forces actions to maintain the initiative. Use of mainstream media,social media,community meetings,key
leader engagements,and other messaging mechanisms provide multiple means to counter enemy propaganda
and address accusations and misinformation before the local, regional, national, and global audience
perceives deceit and lies as truth and fact. The BCT must actively collect information and intelligence that
allows unhindered observation of enemy messaging and propaganda platforms to identify enemy information
campaigns that seek to degrade the effectiveness of friendly actions and activities. The BCT employs
specifically trained capabilities to construct narratives, identify enemy messaging and propaganda efforts
through information collection,and aggressively delivercountermessages that discredit enemy propaganda.
They also assess the impact of friendly and enemy influences upon the populace at the local, regional,
national,and international level to mitigate the effects ofenemy propaganda.
2-45. Networks of systematic crime and corruption that undermine progress for their own political or
economic gains require transparency, accountability, and combined oversight with host-nation partners.
Political environments and security organizations allow opportunists to infiltrate legitimate systems and
pursue agendas outside the interests,aims,and objectives that support sustainable and favorable outcomes.
Political subversion undermines legitimacy and gives enemies and adversaries insider information about
friendly motivations and operations.
2-46. The BCT commander and staff must understand the external and internal influences of corruption
within host nation political,economic,and security systems. The BCT,in partnership with the host nation,
must identify corrupt officials, discredit enemy influence in legitimate systems, and eliminate subversive
elements that promote negative influences onlegitimate governmental processes or other pillar organizations.
When the host nation denies enemy organizations sanctuary in pillar organizations,they are forced to seek
support elsewhere or retire from a given area,thereby making themselves vulnerable to friendly forces that
can identify transitions,seize initiative,exploit weakness,and neutralize or destroy enemy forces.
2-47. Above all, the BCT supports efforts designed to bolster host-nation partner legitimacy among the
populace and global audience. Legitimacy takes on varying forms depending upon the social, cultural, and
political systems of a particular society. Rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance. Partnered
security operations between the BCT and host-nation security forces are essential to gaining and maintaining
the rule of law and a sustainable security environment. The populace decides whether the governance
mechanisms within their society are legitimate, because local and cultural norms define legitimacy and
acceptance by the people. Measurable and noticeable progress, however slight, enhances legitimacy that
improves the security,law and order,economic situation,and social structure over time.
2-48. The BCT commander and staff that exhibit an understanding of the information environment are
prepared to synchronize information-related capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of operations.
Information operations communicate action and intent to the populace, encourage cooperation through
persuasion and relationships, effectively counter enemy propaganda, expose and defeat corruption, and
bolster the legitimacy of host nation partners. Effective information operations create effects in the
commander’s portion of the information environment and enable sustainable outcomes that lead to rule of
law,effective governance,address the needs of the people,and enhance mission accomplishment. |
3-96 | 47 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
INFLUENCE OUTCOMES
2-49. The BCT commander and staff employ information-related capabilities within the BCT’s area of
operations to empower the successful accomplishment of objectives. Influence alters public opinion
garnering support for military and diplomatic operations. Well planned and executed,information operations
lead to diplomatic and political conclusions that canminimize or eliminate the need for military operations.
All assets and capabilities at a commander’s disposal have the capacity to achieve objectives and inform and
influence to varying degrees. Some examples of resources the commander may use includecombat camera,
human intelligence (HUMINT), maneuver, and network operations. Objectives encapsulate the results of
activities and the expected or desired conclusion of missions and tasks. Use of information-related
capabilities nested within tactical, operational, and strategic objectives reinforce narratives that inform and
promote influence.
2-50. Culture, history, religion, politics, tradition, and needs hierarchies contribute to interpretation and
acceptance of the narratives presented to adversaries, host-nation forces, and indigenous populations.
Competing narratives clash within the operational environment concurrently with lethal, nonlethal, and
ancillary capabilities within the operational environment. The commander and staff work with
information-related capabilities such as civil affairs, public affairs, military intelligence, and other
capabilities. Capabilities such as PSYOP forces,draft,implement,distribute,and monitor the effectiveness
of narratives. Unintended or unconsidered consequences impacts from activities and actions of entities
outside of the commander’s sphere of control, and adversary or enemy competing narratives struggle for
acceptance or rejection of the narrative within the operational environment. Using environmental metrics,
civil considerations, intelligence, monitoring of media (external and social), and constant attention to all
competing narratives increases the commander’s development of influence within an area of operations.
2-51. Influence and outcomes are inextricably linked so commanders can consolidate the elements of combat
power resulting in mission success and end state accomplishment. Subsets within influence and its attainment
are concepts and actions such as conflict resolution, negotiation, accommodation, reconciliation,
compromise, and release of authority and responsibility to host-nation military and political forces and
entities. Continuous information collection and intelligence analysis of the area of operations are essential to
gain and implement influence. The BCT commander relies on organic,specifically trained staff and attached
capabilities to analyze the information environment and recommend adjustments to physical actions and the
commander’s narrative to maintain narrative dominance. The commander and staff achieve desired effects
by synchronizing operations and the narrative.
2-52. Building trust and legitimacy are key information influence objectives. As trusted Army professionals,
the BCT commander and staff conduct risk assessment and take into account ethical considerations in
planning and execution. (See ADP 1.) In population-centric operational environments, earning and
maintaining the trust of either the host nation or indigenous population are essential to mission
accomplishment.
SECTION III – CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS
2-53. The BCT consolidates gains and favorable milestones to seize and exploit weaknesses, capitalize on
opportunities, and further the allies’ interests to secure stable political settlements and objectives
complimentary to desired outcomes. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary
operational success and toset the conditions for a sustainable securityenvironment allowing for a transition
of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidate gains is an integral part of winning and
achieving success across the competition continuum and the range of military operations. It is the
follow-through to achieve the commander’s intent, and essential to retaining the initiative over determined
enemies and adversaries.
2-54. Consolidate gains is not a mission. It is an Army strategic role defined by the purpose of the tasks
necessary to achieve enduring political outcomesto military operations and,as such,represents a capability
that Army forces provide to the joint force commander. Consolidating gains enables a transition from the
occupation of a territory and control of populations by Army forces—that occurred because of military
operations—to the transfer of control to legitimate authorities. Activities to consolidate gains occur across
the range of military operations and often continue through all phases of a specific operation. |
3-96 | 48 | Chapter 2
2-55. To consolidate gains, the BCT commander reinforces and integrates the efforts of all unified action
partners within the area of operations. The BCT staff deliberately plans and prepares, in coordination with
higher headquarters,for consolidating gains to capitalize on successes beforean operationbegins. Planning
should address changes to task organization and the additional assets required in a specific situation.
Additional engineer,military police,civil affairs,and medical capabilities typically support the security and
stability of large areas. In some instances, the BCT is in charge of integrating and synchronizing their
activities,in others the BCT isina supporting role.The provision of minimum-essential stability operations
tasks (see paragraph8-48) within the BCT’s areaof operations can include providing security,food,water,
and medical treatment.
2-56. The BCT consolidates gains within its capability by seizing, retaining, and exploiting initiative and
opportunities resulting from information collection,interaction with people and organizations,offensive and
defensive operations, information-related capabilities, civil-military operations, and cyberspace
electromagnetic activities(CEMA). The BCT consolidates gains through decisive action, executing offense,
defense, and stability to defeat the enemy or adversary in detail and begin to set security conditions that
support the desired end state (see ADP 3-0).The BCT develops and reassesses the situation,perception,and
opportunities through continuous information collection to maintain positive momentum and tactical gains.
2-57. The BCT commander and staff influence host partners and populace through compelling narratives
that explain actions,discredit enemy propaganda,and highlight common goals,themes,and messages. The
BCT develops information and intelligence to understand,shape,and influence the operational environment
and consolidate positive gains leading towards desired objectives. The commander and staff analyze
operational and mission variables to provide understanding of the operational environment and to influence
the people and organizations within the BCT’s area of operations. The BCT influences, persuades, and
empowers people and organizations to shape the environment and support sustainable objectives. Setting
conditions to shape transcends phases and is continuous throughout all operations.
2-58. The BCT commander seeks opportunities to maintain pressure on enemy forces,highlight and promote
positive contributions in rule of law and governance, and exploit weaknesses in enemy narratives to
consolidate successes. Executing tasks to accomplish objectives that are consistent with the higher
commander’s intent achieves consolidation. Consolidation of gains capitalizes on the positive actions and
objectives through information collection, offensive and defensive operations, information operations,
narratives, themes, messages, and host-nation partnerships to bridge tactical success with operational and
strategic objectives. In essence, the consolidation of gains (demonstrated in the discussion below) links
positive,contributing tactical actions with operational and strategic objectives.
Necessity to Consolidate Gains and Establish Area Security
1 FM 3-0 states that consolidation of gains occurs in portions of an area of operations,
where large-scale combat operations are no longer occurring. Nevertheless, enemy forces
will likely continue to fight and exploit any kind of friendly weaknesses across all domains.
Thus, the constant awareness of the necessity to consolidate gains, to plan accordingly,
and to allocate sufficient resources must become a constant staff consideration.
Before units can appropriately consolidate gains, they must successfully establish security.
The actions of the 82d Airborne Division on 3 and 4 February 1945 provide a clear
example of how units should first establish security in an area before beginning deliberate
consolidation of gains.
[3 February 1945] The division strengthened and consolidated defensive positions;
eliminated scattered groups of enemy remaining in rear areas; repulsed strong
counterattacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. [4 February 1945] The division
maintained defensive positions and patrolled aggressively to the East. The 99th ID
commenced relief of front-line units of the division.
2Only one day after the 82d Airborne Division successfully breached the German Siegfried
Line against “insane opposition,” the division not only consolidated the newly captured
position as part of the actions on the objective, but continued clearing bypassed enemy
remnant elements by patrolling into enemy territory. This created the tactical conditions |
3-96 | 49 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
for relief-in-place by follow-on units and further offensive operations. Such successful
examples create vivid and informative lessons which sharpen and define the Army’s
understanding of how to consolidate gains on the future battlefield.
Various
2-59. Ultimately,the host nation must have the capability to ensure a safe and secure environment and must
likewise develop the capacity to maintain acceptable conditions related to good governance,the rule of law,
social well-being, and economic development. The BCT commander builds partner capacity through
collaboration and empowerment that enhances the legitimacy of host-nation forces and government (see
chapter 8,section I). Partner capacity must be sustainable and eventually independent of the BCT’s influence
to maintain legitimate authority and perception of the rule of law and governance. (See ADP 3-0forfurther
discussion.)
Note.Consolidating gains is not the same as unit consolidation. BCT subordinate units routinely
conduct consolidation upon occupying a new position on the battlefield or achieving mission
success. (See paragraph 6-30for information on unit consolidation,to include reorganization.)
SECTION IV – LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
2-60. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of
forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives
(ADP3-0). They are at the far right of the competition continuum and associated with war. Large-scale
combat operations are intense, lethal, and brutal. Conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence,
fatigue, and uncertainty. Battlefields will include operations across the entire expanse of the land, air,
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and noncombatants crowded in and around large cities. Enemies
will employ conventional military tactics, terror, criminal activity, and information warfare to complicate
operations further. Enemy activities in the information environment will be inseparable from ground
operations. As in the past,large-scale combat operations present the greatest challenge for Army forces across
the range of military operations,and asexpressed by U.S. Army LTG(retired) Michael D. Lundy:
Large-Scale Combat Operations
Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale ground combat against a
peer adversary was remote. During the years following, the U.S. Army found itself
increasingly called upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of
the range of military operations and competition continuum. The events of 11 September
2001 led to more than 15 years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
andstability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders and
Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as an Army more
capable in limited contingency operations than at any time in our nation’s history, but the
geopolitical landscape continues to shift, and the risk of great power conflict is no longer
a remote possibility.
While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the Middle East and
Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized U.S. military processes
and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and
become accessible in even the most remote corners of the world, the US military’s
competitive advantage is being challenged across all thewarfighting domains. In the last
decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive Russia, a
menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of these adversaries seeks to
change the world order in their favor and contest U.S. strategic interests abroad. The
chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased
exponentially, and we must rapidly shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains
and across the full range of military operations. |
3-96 | 50 | Chapter 2
Over the last several years, the U.S. Army has rapidly shifted the focus of its doctrine,
training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to
prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats.Our
new doctrine dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique strategic roles:
shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat
operations, and consolidating gains to make temporary success permanent. To enable this
shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change its culture shaped by over 15 years of
persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won
wisdom of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square
with the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of operations
across multiple domains when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.
U.S. Army LTG(retired) Michael D. Lundy
ARMY FORCES IN LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT
OPERATIONS
2-61. Large-scale ground combat operationsare sustained combat operations involving multiple corps and
divisions (ADP 3-0). Army forces constitute the preponderance of land combat forces,organized into corps
and divisions, during large-scale combat operations. Army forces seize the initiative, gain and exploit
positions of relative advantage in multiple domains to dominate an enemy force,and consolidate gains. Corps
and divisions execute decisive action (offense, defense, and stability), where offensive and defensive
operations make up the preponderance of activities conducted during combat operations. Corps and division
commanders must explicitly understand the lethality of large-scale combat operations to preserve combat
power and manage risk. Commanders use ground maneuver and other land-based capabilities to enable
maneuver in the air, land, cyberspace, and maritime domains. Commanders leverage operations in the
cyberspace and space domains,and the informationenvironmentto support ground maneuver.
2-62. Corps and division commanders use fires to create effects in support of Army and joint operations.
Cross-domain fires—fires executed in one domain to create effects in a different domain (ADP 3-19)—
provide commanders with the flexibility to find the best system to create the required effect and to build
redundancy into their plan. Cross-domain fires also present a more complex problem to the adversary or
enemy than fires within a single domain. Multi-domain fires—fires that converge effects from two or more
domains against a target (ADP 3-19)—converge surface-based fires with other effects across domains to
create multiple dilemmas, taxing the enemy’s ability to effectively respond. A commander may employ
offensive cyberspace operations to attack an enemy air defense network while surface-to-surface fires destroy
enemy air defense radars and air-to-surface fires destroy the air defense command and control nodes.
2-63. During large-scale combat operations, the performance of offensive operations is traditionally
associated with a favorable combat-power ratio. Combat multipliers often provide positions of relative
advantage,even when Army forces are outnumbered. A numerically superiorforce is not a precondition for
performing offensive operations. Rather, a commander must continuously seek every opportunity to seize
the initiative through offensive operations,evenwhen the force as a whole is on the defense. This requires
the commander to perform economy of force measures to adequately resource the force’s main effort. The
offensive plan allows the corps or division to shift and synchronize combat power where necessary to
reinforce the main effort. Mobility, surprise, and aggressive execution are the most effective means for
achieving tactical success when performing both offensive and defensive operations. Bold,aggressive tactics
may involve significant risk; however, greater gains normally require greater risks. A numerically inferior
force capable of bold and aggressive action can create opportunities to seize and exploit the initiative. (See
chapter 6 for additional information on the offense.)
2-64. Defending corps and division commanders seek to push the enemy off-balance in multiple domains
and the information environment when that enemy initially has the initiative. The key to a successful corps
or division defense is the orchestration and synchronization of combat power across all available domains
and the information environment to converge effects. Commanders decide where to concentrate combat
power and where to accept risk as they establish engagement areas (EAs). Corps and division defensive
planning normally calls for the decisive operation to culminate in the main battle area (MBA) with the |
3-96 | 51 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
attacking enemy’s defeat. The plan allows the corps or division to shift and synchronize combat power where
necessary to reinforce MBA units. Spoiling attacks and counterattacks designed to disrupt the enemy and to
prevent the enemy from massing or exploiting success are part of MBA operations. The headquarters future
operations and plans integrating cells conduct contingency planning to counter potential enemy penetrations
of forward defenses within the MBA. The key consideration before diverting any assets from the corps or
division’s decisive operation is if the threat to its sustainment capabilities jeopardizes mission
accomplishment. Although a corps or division may sustain the temporary loss of sustainment from its support
area,it loses the battle if defeated in the MBA. (Seechapter 7 for additional information on the defense.)
2-65. Corps and division offensive and defensive plans must address how preparations for,and the conduct
of, operations impact the civilian population of the area of operations. This includes the conduct of
noncombatant evacuation operations for U.S. civilians and other authorized groups. The BCT commander’s
legaland moralobligations to that civilian population must be met as long as meeting those obligations does
not deprive the defense of necessary resources. The commander is legally and morally responsible for the
decisions made by,and actions of the BCT and must plan and have the foresight to mitigate and reduce the
risk of unintended effects such as excessive collateral damage and negative psychological impacts on
noncombatant populace. Those effects may be positive or negative—which create or reinforce instability in
the area of operations. Improper planning could lead to severe consequences that adversely affect efforts to
gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short term and long-term goals for the U.S.
forces commander. (SeeADP 1 for additional information.)
2-66. Ideally,the host-nation government will have the capability to provide area security for its population
and conduct the sixstability operations tasks. To the extent that a host-nation government is unable to conduct
the immediately necessary minimum-essential stability operations tasks, the defending unit will perform
stability operations tasks within its capability and request further support. Corps and division commanders
analyze the situations they face to determine the minimum essential stability operations tasks and the priority
associated with each task. This analysis includes a plan to consolidate gains in operational areas once
large-scale combat operations culminate. (Seechapter 8 for additional information on stability.)
2-67. As the consolidation of gains is an integral part of all operations,corps and division commanders assign
purposefully task organized forces consolidation areas (see figure 2-2 on page 2-18) within their assigned
area of operations to begin consolidate gains activities concurrent with large-scale combat operations.
Consolidate gains activities provide freedom of action and higher tempo for those forces committed to the
close and deep support areas. Forces begin consolidate gains activities after achieving a minimum level of
control and when there are no on-going large-scale combat operations in a specific portion of their area of
operations. Designating a maneuver force responsible for consolidation areas enables freedom of action for
units in the other corps and division areas by allowing them to focus on their assigned tasks and expediting
the achievement of the overall purpose of the operation. |
3-96 | 52 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-2. Notional corps and division areas of operations
2-68. Forces assigned the mission of consolidating gains execute area security and stabilityoperations tasks.
Initially the focus is on combined arms operations against bypassed enemy forces, defeated remnants, and
irregular forces to defeat threats against friendly forces in the consolidation area(s),as well as those short of
the rear boundaries of the BCTs in the close area. Friendly forces may eventually create or reconstitute an
indigenous security force through security cooperation activities (see chapter 8) as the overall focus of
operations shifts from large-scale combat operations to consolidating gains. Optimally,a division commander
would assign a BCT to secure a consolidation area. A division is the preferred echelon for this mission in a
corps area of operations. The requirement for additional forces to consolidate gains as early aspossible should
be accounted for early during planning with appropriate force tailoring by the theater army. (SeeADP3-0,
ATP3-92,and ATP 3-91 for additional information.)
THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT
OPERATIONS
2-69. During large-scale combat operations, maneuver BCTs conduct offensive and defensive operations,
and stability operations tasks. The BCT and its subordinate echelons concentrate on performing offensive
and defensive operations and necessary tactical enabling tasks. The BCT performs only those
minimal-essential stability operations tasks—providing civil security, food, water, shelter, and emergency
medical treatment—to civilians located within their area of operations in accordance with the laws of war
and international standards. Commanders balance the provision of those minimum-essential stability tasks
with their capability to conduct the offense or defense.The BCT does not conduct operationally significant
consolidate gains activities unless tasked to do so, usually within a division consolidation area. The BCT
commander orchestrates rapid offensive maneuver to provide the commander with an opportunity to compel,
persuade,or deter an enemy decision or action. Defending headquarters develop plans to find,fix,and destroy
enemy forces conducting distributed enemy operations in, and major penetrations into support and
consolidation areas.
2-70. During the execution of close operations,the BCT commander employs the appropriate offensive form
of maneuver to close with an enemy to mitigate any disadvantage in capabilities. This typically requires rapid
movement through close or complex terrain during periods of limited visibility. Subordinate unit movement |
3-96 | 53 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
formations move in as dispersed a manner as possible while retaining the capability to mass effects against
enemy forces at opportune times and places. Joint enablers become more effective when an enemy has no
time to focus on singular friendly capabilities inthe fivedomains. Units perform attacks that penetrate enemy
defenses or attack them frontally or from a flank. Depending on the situation, they also infiltrate enemy
positions,envelop them,or turn enemy forces out of their current positions. Those units then exploit success
to render enemy forces incapable of further resistance. (See chapter 6 for additional information on the
offense.)
2-71. In the defense, the division and BCT commanders’ intent and concept of operations may be to use
available fires to defeat, deter, or delay an enemy before major enemy forces come into direct fire range
within the MBA. Corps and division commanders’concept may be for field artillery cannon and rockets,and
offensive cyberspace operations to conduct suppression of enemy air defenses to enable combat aviation
brigade attack reconnaissance assets and joint fires to delay or disrupt the approach of enemy second echelon
or reserve forces. Thus,allowing those MBA BCTs to complete their defeat of the enemy’s initial attack with
their organic assets before enemy second echelon or reserve forces join close combat operations. Defending
commanders direct the delivery of effects in multiple domains to establish positions of relative advantage
necessary for a successful counterattack. Defense plans at each echelon retain a reserve regardless of the
defensive operation assigned. The reserve must be an uncommitted force available for commitment at the
decisive moment during the operation. The division or BCT tasked to provide the defensive forward security
force (see chapter 5) might conduct either a cover or guard mission, or other offensive operation to set
conditions to regain the initiative and transition to the offense. (Seechapter 7 for additional information on
the defense.)
Note.Controllingcommander coordinates for the fire support coordination line to be closer to the
forward edge of the battle area to better facilitate the employment of joint fires. BCT commanders
establish coordinated fire lines to facilitate the employment of surface-to-surface fires.
2-72. When the stability element of decisive action currently dominates actions within a BCT’s area of
operations, the responsibility for providing for the needs of the civilian population generally rests with the
host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. The BCT performs
minimal-essential stability operationsto provide security,food,water,shelter,and medical treatment when
there is no civil authority present. Under these conditions,the BCT commander assesses available resources
against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability operations tasks and
what risks must be accepted. The priorities and effort given to stability operations tasks will vary within each
subordinate unit’s area of operations. Within this stability environment,area security may be the predominant
method of protecting the civilian population and support and consolidation areas that are necessary to
facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control
forcesand the civilian population. (Seechapter 8 for additional information on stability.)
DECISIVE ACTION
2-73. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three
elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Through decisive action, commanders seize,
retain,and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. As a
single,unifying idea,decisive action provides direction for the entire operation. Decisive action begins with
the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The commander’s intent includes the operation’s purpose,
key tasks, and the conditions that define the end state (see chapter 4). Commanders and staffs refine the
concept of operations during planning and preparation and determine the proper allocation of resources and
tasks. Throughout an operation,they may adjust the allocation of resources and tasks as conditions change.
2-74. The simultaneity—the execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across
multiple locations and domains (ADP 3-0)—of the decisive action is not absolute. The simultaneity of
decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. The higher the echelon,the greater the possibility of
simultaneous offensive,defensive,and stability operations. At lower echelons,an assigned task may require
all the echelons’combat power(see paragraph 2-77)to execute a specific task. For example,a division always
performs offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously. Subordinate BCTs perform some |
3-96 | 54 | Chapter 2
combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, but they may not perform all three
simultaneously.
2-75. While BCTs perform some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, they
generally are more focused by their immediate priorities on aspecific element,particularly during large-scale
ground combat operations. While an operation’s primary element is offense,defense,or stability, different
subordinate units involved in that operation may be conducting different types and subordinate variations of
operations. During decisive action, commanders rapidly shift emphasis from one element to another to
maintain tempo and keep enemy forces off balance. Maintaining tempo and flexibility through transitions
contributes to successful operations. Commanders perform tactical enabling operations to help in the
planning,preparation,and execution of any of the elements of decisive action. Tactical enabling operations
are never decisive operations. Commanders use tactical enabling operations to complement current
operations or to transition between phases or element of decisive action.
2-76. BCTs employ mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities in multiple domains to generate
overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable freedom of movement and action. BCT
commanders and staffs use their situational understanding to choose the right combinations of combined
arms (see paragraph 2-88) to place the enemy at the maximum disadvantage. As trusted Army professionals,
commanders and staffs are expected to make decisions (for example, ethical, effective, and efficient) and
take actions consistent with the moral principles of the Army Ethic. Decisive action requires that they
implement judicious use of lethal and nonlethal force balanced with restraint, tempered by professional
judgment. (SeeADP 3-0and ADP 1 for additional information.)
COMBAT POWER
2-77. Commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power is the total means
of destructive,constructive,and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given
time (ADP 3-0). Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are
integrated, synchronized, and converged with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in
sustained operations. The eight elements of combat power are leadership,information,commandand control,
movement and maneuver,intelligence,fires,sustainment,and protection. Commanders apply leadership and
information throughout to multiply the effects of the other six elements of combat power. The other six
elements—command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and
protection—are collectively known as warfighting functions. A warfighting functionis a group of tasks and
systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives
(ADP 3-0).
2-78. Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to
accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Leaders adhere to and uphold a shared
identity as trusted Army professionals by fulfilling their sworn oaths to support and defend the US
Constitution. Trusted Army professionals,demonstrate character,competence,and commitment,by making
decisions and taking actions in adherence to the moral principles of the Army Ethic,including Army Values,
which reflect American values and the expectations of the American people. (SeeADP 6-22 and ADP 1 for
more information.)
2-79. Information alone rarely provides an adequate basis for deciding and acting. Effective command and
control require further developing information into knowledge so commanders can achieve understanding.
Information operations is the commander’s primary means to optimize the information element of combat
power and supports and enhances all other elements to gain an operational advantage over an enemy or
adversary (see ATP 3-13.1). Information operationsis the integrated employment,during military operations,
of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). (See
FM 6-0 and FM 3-13 for more information.)
2-80. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable
commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of power (ADP 3-0). (See ADP 6-0 for more
information.) |
3-96 | 55 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
2-81. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and
employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). (See
ADP 3-90 for more information.)
2-82. Theintelligence warfighting functionis the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the
enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment
(ADP 3-0). Specifically,other significant aspects of the operational environment include threats,adversaries,
the operational variables,and can include other aspects depending on the nature of operations. (SeeADP2-0
and FM 2-0 for more information.)
2-83. The fires warfighting functionis the related tasks and systems that createandconverge effects in all
domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations
(ADP3-0).(SeeADP 3-19 and FM 3-09 for more information.)
2-84. The sustainment warfighting functionis the related tasks and systems that provide support and services
to ensure freedom of action,extend operational reach,and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). (SeeADP4-0 for
more information.)
2-85. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the
commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). (See ADP 3-37 for
more information.)
2-86. Commanders employ three means to organize combat power: force tailoring, task organizing, and
mutual support,which are defined below:
(cid:122) Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in supportof a joint force commander (ADP 3-0).
(cid:122) Task-organizingis the act of designing a force,support staff,or sustainment package of specific
size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0).
(cid:122) Mutual supportis that support which units render each other against an enemy,because of their
assigned tasks,their position relative to each other and to the enemy,and their inherent capabilities
(JP 3-31).
Note. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular
mission (ADP 5-0).
2-87. Commanders consider mutual support when task organizing forces,assigning areas of operations,and
positioning units. The two aspects of mutual support are supporting range and supporting distance.
Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain
within the maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems (ADP 3-0). Supporting distance is the
distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its
defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation (ADP 3-0). (SeeADP 3-0 and ADP3-90
for additional information.)
COMBINED ARMS
2-88. Applying combat power depends on combined arms to achieve its full destructive, disruptive,
informational,and constructive potential. Combined armsis the synchronized and simultaneous application
of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADP 3-0).
Through combined arms,the BCT commander integrates leadership,information,and each of the warfighting
functions and their supporting systems. Used destructively,combined arms integratedifferent capabilities so
that counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used constructively,combined arms multiply
the effectiveness and efficiency of Army capabilities used in stabilityoperations tasks.
2-89. Combined arms useall Army,joint,and multinational capabilities (when available)—in the air,land,
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains—in complementary and reinforcing ways. Complementary
capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different
warfighting function. For example,commanders use artillery (fires) to suppress an enemy bunker complex |
3-96 | 56 | Chapter 2
pinning down an Infantry unit during tactical movement (movement). The infantry unit then closes with
(maneuver) and destroys the enemy. In this example, the fires warfighting function complements the
movement and maneuver warfightingfunction.
Notes.In the context of Army tactics,movementis the positioning of combat power to establish
the conditions for maneuver (ADP 3-90). To direct movement, BCT forces use movement
techniques, use movement formations, and conduct battle drills to mitigate the risk of making
contact with the enemy before maneuvering. Commanders and subordinate leaders must avoid
confusing tactical movement with maneuver. Tactical movement is movement in preparation for
contact;maneuver is movement while in contact. Actions on contact are the process by which a
unit transitions from tactical movement to maneuver. (See chapter 6.)
In both the offense and defense,contact occurs when a unit encounters any situation that requires
an active or passive response to a threat or potential threat. The eight forms of contact are visual;
direct; indirect; nonhostile; obstacles; aircraft; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN), and electromagnetic warfare (EW). The conduct of tactical offensive and defensive
operationsmost often involves conduct using the visual,direct,and indirect forms.
2-90. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities within the same warfighting function
to increase the function’s overall capabilities. In urban operations, for example, Infantry, aviation, Armor,
and special forces(movement and maneuver) often operate close to each other. This combination reinforces
the protection,maneuver,and direct fire capabilities of each. The Infantry protects tanks from enemy Infantry
and antitank systems; tanks provide protection and firepower for the Infantry. Army aviation attack and
reconnaissance units maneuver above buildings to observe and fire from positions of advantage,while other
aircraft may help sustain the ground elements. Special forces units enable indigenous forces, which can
provide combat information, intelligence, target locations, and provide a layer to the COP of the BCT that
cannot be realized without an indigenous view. Army space-enabled capabilities and services such as
communications and global positioning satellites enable communications,navigation,situational awareness,
protection,and sustainment of land forces.
2-91. Other capabilities—such as close air support (see ATP 3-09.32) and Army special operations forces
(see FM3-05)—can complement or reinforce the BCT’s capabilities. For example,close air support planning
and execution in support of the BCT is tightly integrated,and focused on providing timely and accurate fires
in close proximity to the enemy. Army special operations forces such as PSYOP units are attached to the
BCT and provide unique capabilities to influence populations, facilitate graduated response, and protect
noncombatants among other force multiplying effects.
2-92. Combined arms multiplyArmy forces’effectiveness in all operations. Units operating without support
of other capabilities generate less combat power and may not accomplish their mission. Employing combined
arms requires highly trained Soldiers, skilled leadership, effective staff work, and integrated information
systems. As stewards of the Army Profession, the BCT commander and staff fully leverage their military
expertise and work effectively, efficiently, and ethically to optimize the use of available resources.
Commanders synchronize combined arms operations utilizing command and control systems to apply the
effects of combat power to the best advantage. They conduct simultaneous combinations of offensive,
defensive, and stability operations to defeat an opponent on land and establish conditions that achieve the
commander’s end state.
HASTY VERSUS DELIBERATE OPERATIONS
2-93. Army forces are task organized specifically for an operation to provide a fully synchronized combined
arms team. That combined arms team conducts extensive rehearsals while also conducting shaping operations
to set the conditions for the conduct of the force’s decisive operation. Most operations lie somewhere along
a continuum between two extremes—hasty operations and deliberate operations. A hasty operation is an
operation in which a commander directs immediately available forces,using fragmentary orders,to perform
tasks with minimal preparation,trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution (ADP3-90). A
deliberate operationis an operation in which the tactical situation allows the development and coordination |
3-96 | 57 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
of detailed plans,including multiple branches and sequels (ADP 3-90). Determining the right choice involves
balancing several competing factors.
2-94. The decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate operation is based on the commander’s current knowledge
of the enemy situation and assessment of whether the assets available (including time) and the means to
coordinate and synchronize those assets are adequate to accomplish the mission. If they are not, the
commander takes additional time to plan and prepare for the operation or bring additional forces to bear on
the problem. The commander makes that choice in an environment of uncertainty,which always entails some
risk. Ongoing improvements in command and control systems continue to assist in the development of a COP
of friendly and enemy forces while facilitating decision-making and communicating decisions to friendly
forces. These improvements can help diminish the distinction between hasty and deliberate operations;they
cannot make that distinction irrelevant.
2-95. The commander may have to act based only on available combat information—unevaluated data,
gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which,due to its highly perishable nature or the
criticality of the situation,cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical
intelligence requirements (JP 2-01)—in a time-constrained environment. The commander must understand
the inherent risk of acting only on combat information,since it is vulnerable to enemy deception operations
and can be misinterpreted. The commander’s intelligence staff helps assign a level of confidence to combat
information used in decision-making.
2-96. A commander cannot be successful without the capability of acting under conditions of uncertainty
while balancing various risks and taking advantage of opportunities. Although a commander strives to
maximize knowledge of available forces,the terrain and weather,civil considerations,and the enemy,a lack
of information cannot paralyze the decision-making process. A commander who chooses to conduct hasty
operations must mentally synchronize the employment of available forces before issuing fragmentary orders.
This includes using tangible and intangible factors, such as subordinate training levels and experience, a
commander’s own experience, perception of how the enemy will react, understanding of time-distance
factors,and knowledge of the strengths of each subordinate and supporting unit to achieve the required degree
of synchronization. (SeeADP 3-90 for additional information.)
CLOSE COMBAT
2-97. Only on land do combatants routinely and in large numbers come face-to-face with one another. Close
combat is that part of warfare carried out on land in a direct fire fight,supported by direct and indirect fires
and other assets (ADP 3-0). Close combat destroys or defeats enemy forces. It encompasses all actions that
place friendly forces in immediate contact with the enemy where the commander uses fire and movement in
combination. Our forces or the enemy can initiate close combat.
2-98. The primary mission of subordinate elements of the BCT is to close with the enemy by means of fire
and movement to destroy,defeat,or capture the enemy,to repel the enemy assault by fire,close combat,and
counterattack,or all of these. Units involved in close combat may—
(cid:122) Employ direct and indirect fires.
(cid:122) Execute combined arms maneuver to obtain positions of relative advantage.
(cid:122) Receive effective enemy direct and indirect fires.
(cid:122) Have no or only a limited ability to maneuver.
(cid:122) Have a battalion/squadron or one or more of its companies/troops decisively engaged.
2-99. Close combat places a premium on leadership,positive command andcontrol,and clear and concise
orders. During close combat,leaders have to think clearly,give concise orders,and lead under great stress.
Key terms used within this section and throughout this publication include the following:
(cid:122) Defeat—to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives(ADP 3-0).
(cid:122) Destroy—a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until
it is reconstituted. Alternatively,to destroy a combat system is to damage it sobadly that it cannot
perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt
(FM3-90-1). |
3-96 | 58 | Chapter 2
(cid:122) Direct fire—fire delivered on a target using the target itself as a point of aim for either the weapon
or the director (JP 3-09.3).
(cid:122) Fires—the use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on
a target (JP 3-09).
(cid:122) Indirect fire—the fire delivered at a target not visible to the firing unit;the fire delivered to a target
that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director(see TC 3-09.81).
(cid:122) Neutralize—a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable
of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90-1).
(cid:122) Suppress—a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of
a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission (FM 3-90-1).
(cid:122) Suppression—the temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of
a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives (JP 3-01).
OPERATIONS STRUCTURE
2-100. The operations structure—the operations process, warfighting functions, and operational
framework—is the Army’s common construct for unified land operations—simultaneous execution of
offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape
operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as
part of unified action (ADP3-0). The operations structure allows Army leaders to organize the effort rapidly
and effectively and, in a manner,commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a
broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting functions provide an
intellectual organization for common critical functions (see paragraph 2-77). The operational framework
provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for visualizing and describing operations. (SeeADP3-0
for additional information.)
OPERATIONS PROCESS
2-101. The Army’s framework for exercising command and control is the operations process—the major
command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and
continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). The operations process is a commander-led activity to plan,
prepare,execute,and assess military operations (see chapter 4for details). These activities may be sequential
or simultaneous. In fact,theyare rarely discrete and often involve a great deal of overlap. The commander,
assisted by the staff,uses the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to
understand their operational environment; visualize and describe the operation’s end state and operational
approach;make and articulate decisions;and direct,lead,and assess military operations. (SeeADP 5-0 for
additional information.)
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
2-102. The commander and staff use an operational framework, and associated vocabulary, to help
conceptualize and describe the concept of operations in time,space,purpose,and resources. An operational
frameworkis a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the
application of combat power in time,space,purpose,and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01).
An operational framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the
commander and provides a way to visualize how the commander will employ forces against the enemy. To
understand this framework is to understand the relationship between the area of operations and operations in
depth—the extension of operationsin time,space,or purpose toachieve definitive results (ADP 3-0). Proper
relationships allow for simultaneous operations and massing of effects against the enemy.
2-103. The operational framework has four components. First, the commander is assigned an area of
operations for the conduct of operations. Second, the commander can designate deep, close, rear, support,
and consolidation areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and space. Third,within this
area,the commander conducts decisive,shaping,and sustaining operations to articulate the operation in terms
of purpose. Finally, the commander designates the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting
prioritization of resources. |
3-96 | 59 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
Note. The BCT does not conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless
tasked to do so,usually within a division consolidation area.
Area of Operations
2-104. Anarea of operationsis an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces
that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). In operations,the
commander uses control measures—a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0)—to
assign responsibilities,coordinate maneuver,and control combat operations. Within the area of operations,
the commander integrates and synchronizes combat power across multiple domains. To facilitate this
integration and synchronization,the commander designates targeting priorities,effects,and timing within the
assigned area of operations. The loss or severe degradation of combat power within the BCT’s area of
operations by enemy attacks in anydomain (see chapter 4) can prevent the successful execution of missions.
Responsibilities within an assigned area of operations include—
(cid:122) Terrain management.
(cid:122) Information collection, integration, and synchronization.
(cid:122) Civil-military operations.
(cid:122) Movement control.
(cid:122) Clearance of fires.
(cid:122) Security.
(cid:122) Personnel recovery.
(cid:122) Airspace managementof assigned airspaceusers.
(cid:122) Minimum-essential stability operations tasks.
2-105. The commander considers the BCT’s area of influence when assigning an area of operations to
subordinate commanders. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly
capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s
command or control (JP 3-0). Understanding the area of influence helps the commander and staff plan
branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the area of operations. An area
of operations should not be substantially larger than the unit’s area of influence. Ideally,the area of influence
would encompass the entire area of operations. An area of operations that is too large for a unit to control
can allow sanctuaries for enemy forces and may limit joint flexibility.
2-106. Anarea of interestis that area of concern to the commander,including the area of influence,areas
adjacent thereto,and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy
forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest for stability operations
tasks (see chapter 8) may be much larger than that area associated with the offense anddefense (see chapters
6 and 7, respectively). The area of interest always encompasses aspects of the air, cyberspace, and space
domains since capabilities residing in all three enable and affectsoperations on land.
2-107. Areas of operations may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When they are contiguous, a boundary
separates them. When areas of operations are noncontiguous,subordinate commands do not share a boundary.
The higher headquarters retains responsibility for the area not assigned to subordinate units. (SeeADP3-0
for additional information.)
2-108. Commanders and staff are responsible to coordinate and integrate the actions of Army airspace users
over an area of operations regardless of whether they have been assigned airspace control responsibility for
a volume of airspace (see FM 3-52 and ATP 3-52.2). Commanders exercise airspace management through
control of airspace users,which is inherent in mission command to control assigned or supporting forces in
all domains. |
3-96 | 60 | Chapter 2
Deep,Close,Rear,Support,and Consolidation Areas
2-109. Commanders can designate deep, close, rear, support, and consolidation areas to describe the
physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and focus. (See figure 2-3.) The BCT may have established
areas or may be operating ina higher headquarters designatedarea. A description of each area follows—
Figure 2-3. Deep, close, rear, support, and consolidation areas
Deep Area
2-110. Adeep areaiswherethe commandersets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0).
Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a
coherent manner. The commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to
the limits of the commander’s designated area of operations. The purpose of operations in the deep area is
frequently tied to other events distant in time,space,or both time and space. BCT operations in the deep area
might disrupt command and control systems, sustainment, and follow-on forces. While division and corps
capabilities allow for operations in the deep area to disrupt the operational movement of reserves; cannon,
rocket,or missile;and follow-on forces. In an operational environment where the enemy recruits insurgents
from a population, deep operations might focus on interfering with the recruiting process, disrupting the
training of recruits,or eliminating the underlying factors that enable the enemy to recruit.
Close Area
2-111. Theclose areais the portion of a commander’s area of operations where the majority ofsubordinate
maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). Operations in the close area are operations within a
subordinate commander’s area of operations. The BCT commander plans to conduct decisive operations
using maneuver in the close area,and positions most of the maneuver force within it. Within the close area,
one unit may conduct the decisive operation while others conduct shaping operations. A close operation
requires speedand mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place
and to exploit success.
Rear Area
2-112. The rear area is that area within a unit’s area of operations extending forward from its rear boundary
to the rear boundary of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. It is an area where most forces
and assets locate that support and sustain forces in the close area. Rear operations include— |
3-96 | 61 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
(cid:122) Security.
(cid:122) Sustainment.
(cid:122) Terrain management.
(cid:122) Movement control.
(cid:122) Protection.
(cid:122) Infrastructure development.
Support Area
2-113. In operations,the BCT commander may refer to a support area. The support areais the portion of
the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and
protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0). The
commander assigns a support area as a subordinate area of operations to support functions. It is where most
sustaining operations occur. Within a division or corps support area, a designated BCT or maneuver
enhancement brigade provides area security, terrain management, movement control, mobility support,
clearance of fires, and tactical combat forces for security. Corps and divisions may have one or multiple
support areas,located as required to best support the force. These areas may be noncontiguous to the other
areas,in the close area,or in the reararea. (Seechapter 4for additional information.)
Consolidation Area
2-114. The consolidation area is the portion of the land commander’s area of operations that may be
designated to facilitate freedom of action,consolidategains through decisive action,and set the conditions
to transition the area of operations to follow on forces or other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Corps and
division commanders may establish a consolidation area,particularly in the offense as the friendly force gains
territory,to exploit tactical success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in the other areas.
A consolidation area has all the characteristics of a close area, with the purpose to consolidate gains through
decisive action once large-scale ground combat has largely ended in that particular area of operations.
2-115. The consolidation area requires a purposefully task organized,combined arms unit to conduct area
security and stability operations tasks (see chapter 8) and employ and clear fires. (See ATP 3-21.20,chapter
4 for illustrations of area security and stability operations tasks performed by an Infantry brigade combat
team [IBCT].) For a division,the BCT assigned responsibility for the consolidation area will initially focus
primarily on security operations tasks that help maintain the tempo of operations in other areas,and it is likely
to conduct offensive operationsto defeat or destroy enemy bypassed unitsin order to protect friendly forces
positioned in or moving through the area. The division consolidation area grows as the BCTs in close
operations advance. When division boundaries shift, as is likely during the offense, the corps/division
consolidation area will grow, and the balance of security and stability operations tasks may shift towards
more of a stability focus, as conditions allow. The division responsible for the corps consolidation area
conducts tasks designed to set conditions for the handover of terrain to host-nation forces or legitimate
civilian authorities. (SeeADP3-0 for additional information.)
Decisive,Shaping,and Sustaining Operations
2-116. Decisive,shaping,and sustaining operations lend themselves to a broad conceptual orientation. The
decisive operationis the operation that directly accomplishes the mission (ADP3-0). The decisive operation
determines the outcome of a major operation,battle,or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point
around which the commander designs an entire operation. Multiple subordinate units may be engaged in the
same decisive operation across multiple domains. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment
ofthecommander’s intent. The commander typically identifies a single decisive operation (see figure 2-4on
page 2-28).
2-117. Ashaping operationis an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success
ofthe decisive operation through effects on the enemy,other actors,and the terrain (ADP 3-0). In combat,
synchronizing the effects of aircraft, artillery fires, and obscurants to delay or disrupt repositioning forces
illustrates shaping operations. Information operations, for example, may integrate Soldier and leader
engagement tasks into the operation to reduce tensions between subordinate units within the BCT and |
3-96 | 62 | Chapter 2
different ethnic groups through direct contact between subordinate leaders and local leaders. Shaping
operations may occur throughout the area of operations and involve any combination of forces and
capabilities. Shaping operations set conditions for the success of the decisive operationand may be conducted
prior to or simultaneously with the decisive operation. The commander may designate more than one shaping
operation.
Figure 2-4. Decisive and shaping operations
2-118. Asustaining operationis an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operationsor shaping
operations by generating and maintaining combat power (ADP 3-0). Sustaining operations differ from
decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on
the enemy or environment). Sustaining operations include personnel and logistics support, support area
security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. Sustaining operations
occur throughout the area of operations,not just within a support area. Failure to sustain may result in mission |
3-96 | 63 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
failure. Sustaining operations determine how quickly the force can reconstitute and how far the force can
exploit success.
2-119. Throughout decisive,shaping,and sustaining operations,the commander and staff ensure that—
(cid:122) Forces maintain positions of relative advantage.
(cid:122) Operations are integrated with unified action partners.
(cid:122) Continuity is maintained throughout operations.
Position of Relative Advantage
2-120. A position of relative advantageis a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within
the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat
power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move toa position of disadvantage (ADP3-0).
Positions of relative advantage provide the commander with an opportunity to compel,persuade,or deter an
enemy decision or action. The commander maintains the momentum through exploitation of opportunities to
consolidate gains and continually assess and reassess friendly and enemy effects for further and future
opportunities.
2-121. The commander understands that positions of advantage are temporary,andmay be planned for or
spontaneous. The commander seeks positions of relative advantage before combat begins, and exploits
success throughout operations. As the commander recognizes and gains positions of relative advantage,
enemy forces will attempt to regain a position of advantage. As such,subordinate units of the BCT leverage
terrain to their advantage and pit their strength against a critical enemy weakness. Subordinate units maneuver
to a position that provides either positional advantage over the enemy for surveillance and targeting, or a
position from which to deliver fires in support of continued movement towards an advantageous position;or
to break contact.
Integration in Operations
2-122. The commander integrates BCT operations within the larger effort. The commander,assisted by the
staff, integrates numerous processes and activities (see chapter 4) within the headquarters and across the
force. Integration involves efforts to operate with unified action partners and efforts to conform BCT
capabilities and plans to the larger concept. The commander extends the depth of operations through joint
integration across multiple domains,including air,land,maritime,space,and cyberspace.
Note.Army forces conduct operationsacross multiple domains,as part of a joint force,to seize,
retain, and exploit control over enemy forces. For example, Army forces use aviation and
unmanned aircraft systems(UASs)in the air domain,and protect vital communications networks
in cyberspace, while retaining dominance in the land domain. (See ADP 3-0 and ADP 3-19 for
additional information.)
2-123. When determining an operation’s depth, the commander considers the BCT’s own capabilities as
well as available joint capabilities and limitations. The commander sequences and synchronizes operations
in time and space to achieve simultaneous effects throughout an area of operations. The commander seeks to
use capabilities within the BCT that complement those of unified action partners. Effective integration
requires the staff to plan for creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with unified
action partners.
Maintaining Continuity in Operations
2-124. Decision-making during operations is continuous;it is not a discrete event. The commander balances
priorities carefully between current and future operations. The commander seeks to accomplish the mission
efficiently while conserving as many resources as possible for future operations. To maintain continuity of
operations,the commander and staff ensure they—
(cid:122) Make the fewest changes possible.
(cid:122) Facilitate future operations. |
3-96 | 64 | Chapter 2
2-125. The commander makes only those changes to the plan needed to correct variances. The commander
keeps as much of the current plan the same as possible. This presents subordinates with the fewest possible
changes. The fewer the changes,the less resynchronization needed,and the greater the chance changes will
be executed successfully.
2-126. When possible, the commander and staff ensure changes do not preclude options for future
operations. The staff develops options during planning, or the commander infers them based on the staff
assessment of the current situation. Developing or inferring options depends on validating earlier assumptions
and updating planning factors and staff estimates. The concept of future operations may be war-gamed using
updated planning factors,estimates,and assumptions. (See chapter 4.) The commander projects the situation
in time,visualizes the flow of battle,and projects the outcomes of future operations and consolidating gains.
Main and Supporting Efforts
2-127. The commander designates main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and
resources among subordinate units. The main effortis a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given
point in time is most criticalto overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The main effort is usually weighted with
the preponderance of combat power or the operation is designed where the effort is singularly focused. Task
centric execution may be by event or phase. Typically, the commander shifts the main effort one or more
times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When the
commander designates a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources in order to
maximize combat power. The commander establishes clear priorities of support, and shifts resources and
priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the commander’s intent require. The commander may
designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive operation commences.
However,the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation then becomes the main effort upon
the execution of the decisive operation.
2-128. Asupporting effortis a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports thesuccess of the
main effort (ADP 3-0). The commander resources supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to
accomplish the mission. The force often realizes success of the main effort through the success of the
supporting effort(s). (SeeADP 3-0 for additional information.)
FORCE PROJECTION
2-129. Force projectionis the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United
States or another theater,in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). Future conflicts will
place a premium on promptly deploying landpower and constantly adapting to each campaign’s unique
circumstances as they occur and change. Army forces combine expeditionary capability and campaign quality
to contribute crucial,sustained landpower to unified action.
2-130. Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces worldwide into any
area of operations and conduct operations upon arrival. The BCT’s ability to alert,mobilize,rapidly deploy
with little notice, and operate immediately on arrival enables it to shape conditions early within the
operational area and exploit successes while consolidating gains at the tactical level.
2-131. Campaign quality is the ability to sustain operations as long as necessary and to conclude operations
successfully. The Army’s campaign quality extends its expeditionary capability well beyond deploying
combined arms forces that are effective upon arrival. It is an ability to conduct sustained operations for as
long as necessary, adapting to unpredictable and often-profound changes in an operational environment as
the campaign unfolds. The BCT is organized,trained,and equipped for endurance with an appropriate mix
of combat forces together with maneuver support and sustainment units. (SeeADP3-0 and FM 3-0 for more
information.)
PREPARATIONS
2-132. The success of the BCT in combat operations begins with its preparations for combat. These
preparations include a mission-oriented training program, pre-mobilization and predeployment plans that
support the BCT’s specific regional contingencies. Given these contingencies,the commander and the staff |
3-96 | 65 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
derive the critical tasks and missions the BCT will most likely be called upon to execute. They express these
tasks and missions as the BCT’s mission-essential tasks. (See FM 7-0.) The commander develops and
executes a mission-oriented training program that incorporates the entiremission-essential task. This training
must be mentally challenging,physically demanding,and as realistic as common sense,safety,and resources
permit. Such training allows units to deploy rapidly in accordance with an N-hour sequence or deploy in
accordance with an X-hour sequence when not involved in a rapid,short notice deployment.
2-133. The X-hour/N-hour sequences for deployment are developed and followed to ensure all reports,
actions, and outload processes are accomplished at the proper time during marshalling. They aid in
developing air and deployment schedules and are flexible to allow for modifications based on the mission
and the unit commander’s concept of the operation.
2-134. X-hour is the unspecified time that commences unit notification for planning and deployment
preparation in support of potential contingency operations that do not involve rapid,short notice deployment.
X-hour sequence is an extended sequence of eventsinitiated by X-hour that allow a unit to focus on planning
for a potential contingency operation,to include preparation for deployment.
2-135. N-hour is the time a unit is notified to assemble its personnel and begin the deployment sequence.
The N-hour sequencestarts the reverse planning necessary after notification to have the first assault aircraft
en route to the objective area for commencement of the parachute assault or to begin movement to a port of
embarkation (POE) in accordance with the order for execution. An N-hour sequence may be employed by
any unit when it is notified for a contingency deployment and assigned a date/time for first element departures
either by wheels up by strategic airlift or a designated start time for convoy or line-haul to a POE.
2-136. In anticipation of an order for execution the BCT staff and its key leaders begin preparing or updating
an operation order or plan. The length of X-hour planning varies based on the contingency planning or crisis
action planning situation and the specific operation order or plan. It normally ceases with either the
designation of N-hour, or if political or military events warrant, no further action. Deployment planning
sequences fall into one of three scenarios:
(cid:122) Unconstrained X-hour sequence. Used primarily for deliberate planning or crisis-action planning
that is not under a time constraint.
(cid:122) Constrained X-hour sequence. Used for crisis action planning.
(cid:122) N-hour sequence. May be proceeded by an X-hour sequence.
2-137. The X-hour and N-hour sequence and deployment procedures are covered in the unit’s tactical
standard operating procedures (SOPs). Both sequences are just part of the force projection picture. (See
ATP3-35 for additional information.)
Note. ATP 3-35.1 provides the framework for commanders and their staff at all levels and
deploying units on the employment of Army pre-positioned stocks to support force projection and
the combatant commanders. It describes the missions, duties, and responsibilities of all
organizations involved in moving Army pre-positioned stocks to an operational area and handing
it off to designated Army units. It also describes planning and executing pre-positioned operations
as well as supporting the combatant commander in a theater.
PROCESS
2-138. Force projection encompasses a range of processes including mobilization, deployment,
employment, sustainment, and redeployment, and is inherently joint requiring detailed planning and
synchronization. Each force projection activity influences the other having overlapping timelines repeated
continuously throughout an operation. Deployment,employment,and sustainment are inextricably linked so
one cannot be planned successfully without the others.
2-139. The operational speed and tempo reflect the ability of the deployment pipeline to deliver combat
power where and when the joint force commander requires it. A disruption in the deployment will inevitably
affect employment. Decisions made early in the process directly affect the success of the operation. (See
ATP3-35 for additional information.) |
3-96 | 66 | Chapter 2
Mobilization
2-140. Mobilizationis the process by which Armed Forcesof the United Statesor part of them are brought
to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency (JP 4-05). Whether deploying as part of a division
or in an independent operation, the BCT will generally conduct the following sequence of activities for
mobilization: planning,alert,home station,mobilization station,and POE:
(cid:122) Planning. The BCT assists the division by maintaining and improving its combat readiness,
preparing mobilization plans and files as directed by higher headquarters (including logistics and
family support plans),providing required data to various mobilization stations (through division
headquarters) as appropriate, ensuring unit movement data accuracy, conducting required
mobilization and deployment training.
(cid:122) Alert. This phase begins when the unit receives notice of a pending order. Commanders complete
administrative and personnel processing actions begun during the planning phase. The alert phase
concludes with preparation for deployment. When directed, BCT commanders may exchange
liaison teams with the gaining command.
(cid:122) Home station. Home station activities bring the reserve units onto active status; augmentation
forces are identified and positioned. During this phase,the BCT takes the necessary steps to clear
installation accounts and hand receipts, if required. The BCT also dispatches an advance party
(and under certain conditions an early-entry CP,see chapter 4) to the mobilization station.
(cid:122) Mobilization station. In this phase,the BCT plans for and provides the specific support called for
in the applicable mobilization plan or as tasked by its parent division. Throughout this phase,the
unit continues to train to mission-essential task in preparation for deployment.
(cid:122) POE. BCT actions at the air or the sea POE include preparing and loading equipment and
manifesting and loading personnel. This phase ends when the BCT departs from the POE.
Deployment
2-141. Deploymentis the movement of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). It is composed
of activities required to prepare and move a force as it task organizes,tailors itself for movement based on
the mission,concept of operations,available lift,and other resources. The employment concept is the starting
point for deployment planning. Proper planning establishes what, where, and when forces are needed and
sets the stage for a successful deployment. Consequently, how the commander intends to employ forces is
the basis for orchestrating the deployment structure. All deployment possibilities must be examined as they
dramatically influence employment planning. Deployment directly affectsthe timing and amount of combat
power that can be delivered to achieve the desired effects.
2-142. The joint deployment process is divided into four phases—deployment planning; predeployment
activities;movement;and joint reception,staging,onward movement,and integration. The terminology used
to describe the Army deployment phases is in synch with the joint process. The joint process includes a
planning phase at the outset whereas the Army considers planning to be woven through all the phases. The
Army deployment process consists of four distinct but interrelated phases that are addressedin the following
paragraphs. A successful deployment requires implementation of each process with seamless transitions and
interactions among all of them. The phases are not always sequential and could overlap or occur
simultaneously. (SeeATP 3-35 for additional information.)
Deployment Planning
2-143. Deployment planning is a logical process that focuses on Soldiers,supplies,and equipment,ways to
deploy them, and the required information to track them. In particular, deployment plans require detailed
information. Knowing the right details will help to guide the unit through an effective deployment. The heart
of deployment planning is an accurate list of Soldiers and equipment that will deploy—the unit deployment
lists.
2-144. Deployment and employment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational
environment to be encountered in the operational area. Understanding the operational environment helps the
commander anticipate the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how they affect
operational depth and reach of force employment, as well as mission accomplishment. The operational |
3-96 | 67 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
environment is generally described by three conditions: permissive, uncertain, or hostile. (See JP 3-35 for
more information.)
2-145. Force employment plans and schedules drive deployment planning, and execution preparation
requirements and movement timelines. Deployment operations provide forces ready to execute the supported
commander’s orders. Deployment plans and schedules align with the operation plans/orders and support the
associated force movement requirements,allowing for predeployment preparations.
2-146. During planning, four principles apply to the broad range of activities encompassing deployment.
They are—precision,synchronization,knowledge,and speed:
(cid:122) Precision applies to every activity and piece of data.
(cid:122) Synchronization of those activities required to close the force successfully.
(cid:122) Knowledge upon which decisions are made.
(cid:122) Speed,the proper focus is on the velocity of the entire force projection process,from planning to
force closure.
2-147. The end state of the deployment plan is to synchronize deployment activities to facilitate
employment execution. The steps used in planning and preparation include analyze the mission, structure
forces,refine deployment data,prepare the force,and schedule movement. Successful deployment planning
will require knowledge of the unit’s deployment responsibilities, an understanding of the total deployment
process,and an intellectual appreciation of the link between deployment and employment.
Predeployment Activities
2-148. When ordered to deploy,the BCT task organizes,echelons,and tailors its units based on the assigned
mission and available lift and other resources. Higher echelon plans determine the command,
communications, intelligence, and logistics relationships. Some modifications to existing operations plans
will normally be necessary. These plans should also specify any joint and combined operations relationships,
if known. Within the division plan, the BCT commander prioritizes lift requirements consistent with the
mission variables of METT-TC and establishes the sequence in which the BCT’s units deploy relative to the
movement of other forces and other Services. Maximum use of in-theater intelligence sources is essential.
Sources include special operations forces area assessments,the country team,and higher headquarters.
2-149. Echeloning is organizing and prioritizing units for movement. Echelons are often divided into
elements such as advance parties,initial combat forces,follow-on forces,and closure forces. Each echelon
has a designated echelon commander. Tailoring is the adding to or subtracting from planned task
organizations based upon a mission analysis,available transportation,pre-positioned assets,and host-nation
support. Task organizing is the temporary grouping of forces to accomplish a certain mission. Task
organizing and echeloning occur during initial planning.
2-150. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in support of a joint force commander. Forcetailoring is situational dependent and occurs after
mission analysis by the higher headquarters commander and staff. The BCT commander tailors the force
after mission analysis, identifying initial strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, and host nation or contract
services or assets.
2-151. Following the receipt of a mission,the BCT prepares its personnel and equipment for deployment
through preparation for overseas movement activities. These activities ensure deploying units meet all
requirements associated withdeployment into another theater of operation as directed by Army regulations
and local authorities.
Movement
2-152. Deployment includes preparing or moving the BCT, its equipment, and supplies to the area of
operations in response to a crisis or natural disaster. The movement phase in the Army process is discussed
in two segments—fort-to-port and port-to-port. The Army relies on United StatesTransportation Command
to provide the strategic lift or surface movement to and from the POE:
(cid:122) Fort-to-port. Units deploying with the BCT complete their preparation for overseas movement
based on the mobilization plan and the joint task force’s time phased deployment list. Units update |
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their automated unit equipment lists to deployment equipment lists and submit them to the
installation transportation office for transmission to United States Transportation Command.
Based on information given to the joint operations planning and executionsystem,United States
Transportation Command provides movement guidance for the BCT’s movement to the POE
through its component command.
(cid:122) Port-to-port. This phase begins with the departure of BCT elements on strategic lift or surface
movement from the POE. It ends with the BCT’s closure in theater. The commander and staff
must be prepared to update intelligence and,as necessary,modify plans while in transit.
Reception,Staging,Onward Movement,and Integration
2-153. This process applies only to unopposed entry operations. It begins with the arrival of BCT units
(may include an early-entry CP, see chapter 3, at the port of debarkation [POD]) in the theater, and ends
when the BCT departs the POD. Except in opposed entry operations,the BCT can expect reception,staging,
onward movement,and integrationsupport,whether provided by theater support contracts,external support
contracts (primarily the Army logistics civil augmentation program [LOGCAP], see ATP 4-10.1), or
regionally available commercial host-nation support, or military assets, must be sufficient to immediately
support the arrival of deploying units. The primary requirement is coordinating the BCT’s onward movement
to its first destination.
2-154. Effective reception, staging, onward movement, and integration matches personnel with their
equipment,minimizes staging and sustainment requirements while transiting the PODs,and begins onward
movement as quickly as possible. Onward movement begins with personnel and equipment linkup,
sustainment,the receipt of pre-positioned systems or logistics stocks at designated marshaling areas,and the
reconfiguration of BCT forces. A plan to accomplish integration and maintain combat readiness must be
understood,trained,and ready to implement upon arrival.Onward movement ends when the BCT arrives at
the gaining command’s staging areas where preparations for military operations occur.
Employment
2-155. Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces (JP 5-0). Entry requirements
following deployment vary. The BCT’s entry into an area of operations can be either opposed or unopposed.
In both cases, the BCT may use an intermediate staging base (see FM 3-99) to complete preparations and
shorten lines of communications.
Unopposed Entry
2-156. Unopposed entry operations generally support host nation or forward presence forces. Hostilities
may be underway or imminent,but the POD is secure and under friendly control. The commander sequences
combat forces and supporting structure into the contingency area to gain and sustain the initiative and protect
the force. Actions include the following:
(cid:122) Link up with in-theater forces.
(cid:122) Prepare to assist the host nation or forward presence forces.
(cid:122) Protect the BCT and other collocated units,if required.
(cid:122) Build up the combat abilities through training, familiarization, and acclimatization of the troops
to the operational environment.
(cid:122) Support to humanitarian and disaster relief.
(cid:122) Facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces.
Opposed Entry
2-157. Opposed entry requires the integration and synchronization of multiservice capabilities in a
concerted military effort against a hostile force. It is an extremely complex and hazardous operation that risks
the assault force’s defeat. Natural forces such as unfavorable weather and sea states represent hazards that
are not normally such dominant factors. The assault force’s key advantages lie in its mobility, flexibility,
ability to concentrate balanced forces, and the ability to strike with great power at a selected point in the
hostile defense system. Opposed entry operations exploit the element of surprise. They also capitalize on |
3-96 | 69 | The Brigade Combat Team and the Operational Environment
enemy weaknesses by applying the required type and degree of force at the most advantageous times and
places.
2-158. The existence of a forcible entry capability induces the enemy to disperse forces, and in turn may
result in making wasteful efforts to defend everything. The typical sequence in this type operation is to gain,
secure,and expand a lodgment as part of a larger force before continuing operations. As an assault force,the
BCT deploys by various means (parachute assault [airborne Infantry BCT only], air landing force,
helicopter-borne air assault,and amphibious assault) into the objective area to seize initial assault objectives,
neutralize enemy units, prepare obstacles, and secure additional landing zones. The intent is to introduce
additional forces as quickly as possible to secure the initial lodgment area. (See FM 3-99 and JP 3-18 for
additional information.)
Sustainment
2-159. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health
services support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission accomplishment. Sustainment of
force projection operations is a complex process involving the geographic combatant commander,strategic
and joint partners such as U.S. Transportation Command,and transportationcomponent commands like Air
Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, United
States Army Material Command, Defense Logistics Agency, Service Component Commands, and Army
generating forces. The Joint Network Node system connects the BCT to support area high headquarters,other
sustainment Army forces and joint task forces during the force projection process. Sustainment of force gives
Army forces its operational reach, freedom of action and endurance. (See ADP 4-0 for additional
information.)
Redeployment
2-160. Redeployment is the transfer of forces and/or materiel to home or demobilization stations for
reintegration and/or out-processing (ATP 3-35). This process for the BCT includes two major functions:
deployment back to home station or to another theater and consolidation and reorganization as part of higher
echelon reconstitution.
2-161. Redeployment is the preparation for and movement of the BCT from a theater to its designated
follow-on continental United States or outside the continental United States base or to any other location.
Commanders must contend with the same challenges as in deployment. Protection remains critical.
Redeployment activities must be planned and executed to optimize the readiness of redeploying forces and
material to meet new contingencies or crises. Redeployment phases include reconstitution for strategic
movement,movement to the redeployment assembly areas,movement to the POE,strategic lift,reception at
the POD,and onward movement.
2-162. Reconstitutionis actions that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of
combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources (ATP 3-21.20).
Reconstitution activities include rebuilding unit integrity and accounting for Soldiers and equipment. These
activities continue after the force arrives in the continental United Statesor in the home theater. The focus is
on reconstituting units and their assigned equipment to premobilization levels of readiness, regenerating
logistic stockpiles,and accounting for mobilized equipment and supplies.
Note.In large-scale ground combat operations,reconstitution will be a task conducted in theater
by units in order to maintain lethality,freedom of action,operational reach and prolong endurance. |
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Threat
Threats are a fundamental part of an overall operational environment. A threat is any
combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0).
Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized),
paramilitary or military forces, nation states, or national alliances. When threats
execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies.
SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT
3-1. In general,the various actors in any area of operations can qualify as a threat,an enemy,an adversary,
a neutral actor,or a friend. An enemyis a party identified as hostile against which theuse of force is authorized
(ADP 3-0). An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. An adversary
is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be
envisaged (JP 3-0). A neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces.
Land operations often prove complex because a threat,an enemy,an adversary,a neutral,or a friend intermix,
often with no easy means to distinguish one from another.
Today’s operational environment presents threats to the Army and joint force that are significantly
more dangerous in terms of capability and magnitude than those faced in recent operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. FM 3-0presents a two-fold major paradigm shift: The shift from the industrial
to the information age and from non-state to peer and near peer threats leading to transitions, such
as from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations. For the first time in U.S. Army
doctrinal history, FM 3-0 names the enemies and adversaries, which possess the capabilities to
contest and degrade the battlefield across all domains as the “4+1:” Russia, China, North Korea,
and Iran as well as radical ideologues and transnational criminal organizations, such as Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant or al-Qa’ida. These threats continuously challenge the US in multiple
domains and in most cases purposefully below the threshold of open conflict.
THREAT COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, AND INTENTION
3-2. Leaders must understand that not all potential state adversaries seek to avoid U.S. forces or strengths,
particularly those state adversaries with overwhelming numbers combined with favorable ground,and those
with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capability—North Korea and Iran are examples. Today’s forces must prepare to deal with symmetrical threats
as seen in Operation Desert Storm,as well as asymmetrical threats seen during Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom.
UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
3-3. The BCT commander must understand threats,criminal networks,enemies,and adversaries,to include
both state and nonstate actors, in the context of the operational environment. When the BCT commander
understands the threat,the commander can visualize,describe,direct,and assess operations to seize,exploit,
and retain the initiative and consolidate tactical gains. The commander and staff must develop and maintain
running estimates (see chapter 4) of the situation. To develop and maintain running estimates of the situation |
3-96 | 72 | Chapter 3
as the basis for continuous adaptation, the commander and staff must consider their own forces within the
realm of emerging threats as well as the mission,terrain,friendly forces,and civilian populations.
3-4. The BCT engages in close combat while operating in complex terrain in close proximity to civilian
populations. Current and future battlefields require the BCT to fight and win in mountainous,urban,jungle,
cold weather,and desert environments and subsurface areas. The physical challenges presented by complex
terrain,and the continuous interactions of numerous actors,each with their own agendas,objectives,interests,
and allegiances,influence the operational environment and mission accomplishment.
3-5. Theimpact of operational and mission variables on the operational environment produces additional
layers of complexity to BCT operations. As a result, the BCT commander and staff must understand the
complicated relationships and the complex interactions between the various actors that produce tactical
challenges and opportunities. In the context of close combat, the BCT focuses on the assigned area of
operations and use the mission variables to conduct analyses in order to gain the required understanding.
Understanding is critical to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative over enemies and adversaries.
Understanding is equally critical to the consolidation of tactical gains to achieve sustainable political
outcomes consistent with the mission.
STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS
3-6. The BCT must be prepare to defeat determined state and nonstate actors that combine conventional
and unconventional tactics to avoid our strengths (such as mobility, long-range surveillance, and precision
fires capabilities) while attacking our perceived vulnerabilities (such as our difficulty identifying the enemy
among civilian populations). Current and future threats use a variety of means, including conventional
combined arms operations,terrorism,insurgency,political subversion,and information operations to evade
our forces and disrupt tactical and combined arms capabilities. (See FM 3-24.2.) Enemies and adversaries
will attempt to seize the initiative and dictate the terms and tempo of operations in their favor while relying
on their established sources of strength. These sources of strength include networks that facilitate the
undetected movement of logistics,finances,people,and weapons areas within complex terrain to exploit U.S.
and unified action partner military,political,social,economic,and information vulnerabilities.
3-7. The enemy employs tactical countermeasures to limit the BCT’s ability to develop the situation, to
avoid decisive engagements,and to initiate contact under advantageous conditions. The enemy also employs
technological countermeasures to reduce their signature on the battlefield and degrade our force’s ability to
detect, engage, and destroy them. Many hostile nation states continue to procure conventional capabilities
such as tanks, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), manned aircraft, and air defense systems. These
conventional weapons systems are increasingly available to nonstate enemy organizations. Enemy forces also
integrate emerging technology such as robotics, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), cyber, and
nanotechnologies. Enemies and adversaries combine conventional and unconventional tactics to counter,
evade,or disrupt the BCT’s efforts across the range of military operations.
3-8. Weapons of mass destructionare chemical,biological,radiological,or nuclear weapons capable of a
high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means of transporting or propelling the
weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon (JP 3-40). The use of WMDin
future conflict is inevitable. Many threat organizations already possess WMDand their delivery systems (for
example,rockets and artillery). Enemies employ these WMDto obtain a relative advantage over U.S. forces
to achieve their objectives. Threat organizations that do not currently possess WMD consistently seek
opportunities to acquire them. The potential catastrophic effects associated with the threat or use of WMD
adds greater uncertainty to an already complex environment. The BCT commander must anticipate and plan
for the conduct of counteringWMD (see paragraphs 60-80and8-92).
3-9. In current and future conflicts, the BCT commander and staff must rapidly develop a detailed and
adaptable understanding of the threat,as it exists within the context of local conditions. Such a contextualized
understanding allows the commander and staff to determine the nature of the conflict and to gain visibility
of the enemy’s structure and methods of operation. This determination allows commanders to identify
emerging opportunities to seize, retain and exploit the initiative, exert influence over local actors, and
consolidate tactical gains into operational and strategic successes. By understanding the internal workings of |
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current and future enemies and adversaries, the BCT commander can exploit possibilities to disrupt the
enemy and then rapidly dislocate,isolate,disintegrate,and destroy enemy forces.
NETWORKS
3-10. The BCT commander and staff must determine an enemy’s strategies, objectives, and the multiple
dimensions,(physical,psychological,informational,and political) in which the enemy operates to defeat the
enemy. The BCT identifies and depicts networks (such as criminal, financial, terrorist, security forces) as
friendly, enemy, or neutral based on how they affect the mission. The BCT supports friendly networks,
influences neutral networks, and disrupts, neutralizes, or defeats enemy networks. Network assessment is
continuous and collaborative,integrating unified action partners whenever possible. Unified action partners
supply much of the information needed for an accurate assessment. At the tactical level, units develop an
understanding of various networks through reconnaissance, intelligence operations, and surveillance (see
chapter 5) in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. Network assessment considerations
include—
(cid:122) Objectives and strategy.
(cid:122) Key individuals,groups,nodes,and their roles within a network.
(cid:122) Relationships between key individuals and networks.
(cid:122) Means and methods of communicating.
(cid:122) Resources that flow across, into, and out of networks (such as people, money, weapons, and
narcotics).
(cid:122) Network intersections where illicit networks connect to legitimate institutions and leaders.
(cid:122) Network strengths and vulnerabilities.
POTENTIAL THREAT GROUPS
3-11. Complex operational environments may include joint transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional
threats and conflicts, calling for Army operations across multiple domains, including air, land, maritime,
space,and cyberspace. Threats include nation state militaries,insurgent organizations,transnational criminal
organizations,and terrorist groups. These threat groups may align or partner with each otherbased on mutual
goals, self-interest, convenience, required capabilities, and common interests. As a result, the BCT
commander must prepare to defeat a complicated and often shifting array of enemies and threats.
Understanding threat and enemy capabilities,as well as their political,economic,or ideological aims,is an
essential element of seizing,retaining,and exploiting the initiative.
STATES
3-12. States are sovereign governments that control a defined geographic area. Although social movements
and global real time communications reduce the relative power of some states, the state remains the entity
that generates,sustains,and employs combat power. States have a number of advantages over organizations.
These advantages include the recognition and support of other states,the authority to create laws governing
the population and the authority to enforce laws through the control of institutions such as their standing
armies and internal security forces, and the ability to raise money through taxation. Using their military
forces, states have access to the institutions required to generate doctrinal, organizational, training, and
materiel components of combined arms teams and their associated combat power. As a result, the BCT
commander must understand a sovereign government’s combat capabilities to work with or fight against that
sovereign government.
NONSTATE ORGANIZATIONS
3-13. Nonstate organizations are groups that operate within states, but who act outside of the system to
support or achieve their own political goals. Such groups may vary in size and organizational structure,
changing over time and environments. Frequently, organizations consist of a predominant tribal, ethnic,
national,or religious group,but there are corporate,criminal,and transnational organizations as well. Threat
organizations may vary in capabilities and in the goals, they pursue. Often enemies and adversaries seek |
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alliances of convenience by combining criminal networks, terrorists, state and nonstate actors, insurgents,
transnational groups,proxies,and paramilitaries to attain short-or near-termobjectives. For example,during
the Iraq war, a variety of organizations operated in the country, some of whom posed threats to the U.S.
mission. Nonstateorganizations included Al Qaida,the Islamic State of Iraq,Jaysh al-Mahdi,Asaab al Haq,
Khattaib Hizballah,the Sons of Iraq,and a variety of Kurdish militia groups. Energy Logistics Iraq Ltd and
other corporations with their private security forces operated inside the country, also. At times, the United
Nations and other transnational organizations or nongovernment organizations operated within the country.
Each of the organizations that operated in Iraq had different, frequently opposing goals. Many of the
organizations were directly opposed to U.S. forces,but even the organizations that were not overt enemies
had separate goals that did not align with U.S. interests. The BCT commander, therefore, must understand
andprepare to work with and fight against a wide variety of organizations,many of which may be tied directly
to sovereign states.
CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND OPPORTUNISTS
3-14. Criminal networks are often stakeholders in state weaknesses. The government institutions’
weaknesses allow criminal networks to have freedom of movement and to divert state resources without
repercussions from law enforcement and rule of law. Criminal networks often ally other state and nonstate
organizations to engage in and facilitate a rangeof illicit activities (intimidation and coercion) to capture and
subvert critical state functions and institutions. These networks often align regionally and ethnically. The
networks build alliances with political leaders,financial institutions,law enforcement,foreign intelligence,
and security agencies to pursue political and criminal agendas. Many networks operate with impunity,
consistently avoiding meaningful investigations and prosecution, by exerting influence within law
enforcement,investigativeand judicial institutions within a nation state government.
Note.The rule of lawis a principle under which all persons,institutions,and entities,public and
private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
enforced,and independently adjudicated,and that are consistent with international human rights
principles(ADP 3-07).
3-15. Opportunists often take advantage of unstable conditions to pursue their personal goals and agendas.
Opportunists can work with,for,or against an insurgency. Their interests determine their actions,operations,
and conduct. An opportunist can work both sides to gain a positional advantage,to maximize influence,to
maximize profits,or to avoid retribution. Opportunists can facilitate movement of insurgents while providing
intelligence to counterinsurgents. Counterinsurgent or insurgent objectives do not restrict or govern
opportunists.
3-16. The BCT commander and staff must identify the presence of criminal networks and opportunists. The
commander and staff assess criminal networks and opportunists’impact on the mission and protection while
planning and executing actions to mitigate those negative impacts. The BCT works with local,federal,U.S.
Army, unified action partners, and law enforcement personnel to mitigate the threat of these groups and
individuals. The BCT integrates law enforcement personnel into their operations and synchronizes their
operations to facilitate the reduction and elimination of criminal networks and the threat posed by
opportunists, ultimately creating an environment where local law enforcement agencies can assume
responsibility in this effort.
Note. Military police possess the capabilities to identify,deter,mitigate,and defeat criminal actors
and networks, crime-conducive conditions, and other factors from within the criminal
environment that can destabilize an area or threaten short-and long-term operational success (see
FM 3-39). The BCT provost marshal is responsible for planning, coordinating, requesting, and
employing military police assets. |
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INDIVIDUALS
3-17. Identifying the threat posed by states and organizations is relatively easy when compared to the
challenge of identifying the threat posed by a single individual. Although U.S. forces have not historically
focused on neutralizing the threat of a single person,the growing interconnectivity of states,organizations,
and individuals increases the ability of an individual with sufficient computer technical skills to attack U.S.
interests and forces using an army of computers. The BCT must be prepared to defend its command and
control system against cyber-attacks,whether initiated by a state,organization,or individual. In addition to
fighting and defeating states and organizations, the BCT commander and staff must retain the ability to
identify, disrupt, and isolate individuals within the political, social, and tactical context of the operational
environment.
SECTION II – THREAT CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATION
3-18. The BCT possesses the capability to fight and win against regular and irregular forces (may involve
nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations). The term
hybrid threat captures the complexity of operational environments, the multiplicity of actors involved, and
the blurring of traditionally regulated elements of conflict.
3-19. Regular forces are part of nation states that employ military capabilities and forces in military
competition and conflict. Normally, regular forces conduct operations to accomplish the following
objectives, defeat an enemy’s armed forces, destroy an enemy’s war making capacity, and seize or retain
territory.
3-20. Regular forces often possess technologically advanced weapon systems integrated into mechanized
and motorized combined arms formations and light Infantry forces. Military equipment that the BCT may
encounter in combat include armored fighting vehicles, antiarmor systems, air defense systems, ballistic
missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, indirect-fire systems, mines, EW, and digital communications
systems. Regular force organizations are hierarchical (companies,battalions,brigades,and so forth) with a
centralized command and control structure. Regular forces can conduct long-term conventional and
unconventional operations. Examples of regular forces include—
(cid:122) Islamic Republic of Iran Army.
(cid:122) Peoples Liberation Army of China.
(cid:122) Russian Army.
(cid:122) North Korean People’s Army.
3-21. Irregular forces may be armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces,
police, or other internal security forces. Irregular forces employ unconventional, asymmetric methods to
counter U.S. advantages. Unconventional methods may include terrorism,insurgency,and guerrilla warfare.
A weaker threat or enemy often uses unconventional methods to exhaust the U.S. collective will through
protracted conflict. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually accompany and may
even be the chief means of an attack on U.S. influences. Irregular forces or complex threats include
paramilitaries,terrorists,guerillas,and criminal organizations and networks.
3-22. Irregular forces or complex threats have political, ideological, or grievance related objectives tied to
their motivation. These grievances may be real or perceived. Identifying these insurgent objectives and
motivations can be difficult for a number of reasons,such as(these same issues occur in other irregular threats
such as paramilitary,guerrillas,and criminal organizations)—
(cid:122) Multiple insurgent groups with differing goals and motivations may be present.
(cid:122) Insurgent leaders may change,and the movement’s goals change with them.
(cid:122) Organizations may fracture into two or more new entities with different or opposing goals.
(cid:122) Movement leaders may have different motivations from their followers.
(cid:122) Insurgents may hide their true motivations and make false claims.
(cid:122) Goals of the insurgency may change due to operational environment changes.
3-23. Irregular forces customarily operate in small, dispersed, decentralized formations or cells (team and
squad size) within a decentralized command and control structure. Irregular forces are often highly motivated |
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with established local,regional and worldwide support networks. Irregular forces threat capability is limited
to small arms weapons, antitank weapons, man portable air defense missiles, mortars, short-range rockets,
homemade radio frequency weapons,rudimentary robotics,counterUASs,and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). However, some irregular threats possess the financial means to acquire advanced weapon systems
and technologies. Examples of irregular forces in armed conflicts include—
(cid:122) Revolutionary Army Forces of Columbia People’s Army (1964).
(cid:122) Mujahidin in Afghanistan (1979).
(cid:122) Palestine Liberation Organization in the West Bank (2001).
(cid:122) Al Qaeda in Iraq (2007).
(cid:122) Taliban in Afghanistan (2009).
(cid:122) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (2013).
(cid:122) Iran’s Quds Force support to nonstate actors in foreign countries.
3-24. The term hybrid threat evolved to capture the seemingly increased complexity of operations, the
multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring among traditional elements of conflict. A hybrid threatis the
diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist, or criminal elements acting in
concert to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADP 3-0). Hybrid threats combine traditional forces
governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without constraints on the
use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors such as criminal and
terrorist organizations that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid
threats may include nation state actors that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces
to coerce and intimidate, or nonstate actors employing capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid
threats can operate under a centralized or decentralized command and control structure. Hybrid threats are
most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and lack of situational awareness.
3-25. Combat experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other recent conflicts in Lebanon, Mali, Syria, Gaza,
Northern Nigeria, and Southern Thailand demonstrate a migration of capabilities, tactics, and techniques
previously only associated with military forces of nation states to state sponsoredand nonstate entities. This
migration of capabilities presents friendly maneuver forces with a challenge that extends beyond defeating
an enemy’s regular force. Current and future threats do and can combine and transition between regular and
irregular forces adopting strategies, tactics, and techniques to evade and disrupt U.S. advantages and gain
tactical advantages within the physical, psychological, informational, and political dimensions of armed
conflict. As a result,the BCT must prepare to counter lethal evasion and disruption capabilities from a variety
of forces (regular,irregular,and hybrid) in current and future operational areas.
SECTION III – THREAT COUNTERMEASURES
3-26. To predict threat countermeasures in time and space, the BCT commander and staff (as conducted
during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB])must first understand threat capabilities,tactics,
and techniques. Current and future enemies employ a series of integrated tactical and technical
countermeasures to counter friendly operational and tactical advantages. Countermeasures are deception
operations, dispersion, concealment, and the intermingling with civilians in urban terrain. The enemy also
employs technological countermeasures, such as cyber-attacks and Global Positioning System (GPS)
jamming, to evade and disrupt the friendly force’s ability to develop the situation, seize the initiative, and
consolidate tactical gains into favorable outcomes.
EVASION
3-27. Enemies operate within complex terrain to evade friendly weapon systems,advanced combined arms
and air-ground capabilities. They operate in and among the population to evade detection, preserve their
combat power,and retain their freedom of movement. The enemy often establishes relationships with local,
regional, and transnational criminal organizations, and violent extremist organizations to finance their
operations and gain access to illicittrafficking networks to move illegal weapons,munitions,WMD,people,
narcotics,or money. |
3-96 | 77 | Threat
3-28. Enemy forces use deception, cover and concealment, smoke, or other obscurant when conducting
operations. They move in small,dispersed units,formations,groups,orcells to avoid detection. They conduct
short engagements with three to ten person elements that break contact before friendly forces can bring
indirect fire or airborne strike platforms to bear. The enemy creates false battlefield presentations and reduces
signatures through deliberate and expedient means of deception to frustrate friendly information collection
efforts. The enemy uses hardened and buried facilities and multispectral decoys to mask the signatures of
high-value systems (such as short-rangeballistic missiles and surface to air missiles). The enemy also exploits
safe havens within hostile states or in ungoverned areas and takes advantage of subsurface means to avoid
detection (for example, tunnels, underground facilities, sewers, drainage systems, and other subterranean
spaces). As enemies evade U.S. and coalition forces,they seek to expand their freedom of movement through
intimidation and coercion. The enemy exploits civilian populations and cultural sites to hide key weapon
systems.
DISRUPTION
3-29. Enemy forces employ combinations of lethal and other actions to disrupt BCT efforts to shape the
operational environment. Lethal actions can be offensive and defensive in nature through decisive force.
Other actions can be agitation, propaganda, and exploitation of the local population. Enemies employ
integrated and networked combined arms teams to offset friendly capabilities. They employ small,dispersed,
squad-sized teams armed with technologically advanced lethal weapons. Lethal weapons include
rocket-propelled grenades, ATGMs, and man-portable air defense systems to conduct short engagements,
and to defend against friendly armored, and counter-manned and UASs capabilities. Enemies seek
opportunities to mass fires and forces against vulnerable targets,such as small combat outposts,dismounted
patrols,and logistic convoys where they believe they can achieve quick victories with little risk of decisive
engagements. When available,enemy forces employ armored or technical vehicles to increase their tactical
mobility, protection, and firepower. Enemies integrate indirect fires such as rockets, mortars, and artillery
into their operations.
3-30. Enemies augment their small combined arms teams’ tactical capabilities by employing inexpensive
countermeasures such as IED,Molotov cocktails,suicide bombers,civilians as obstacles (demonstrators and
crowds to incite riots),CBRN weapons and materials,and fire and smoke as weapon systems. Enemies use
these countermeasures to impede friendly forces’ ability to move and maneuver, or to prevent and delay
friendly forces from conducting operations. At the same time,enemies seek to acquire technologies such as
UASs(that may be weaponized for precision strike capability),satellite imagery,forward looking infrared,
andEWsystems or platforms.
3-31. The presence of civilians in the area of operations can interfere with military operations. Capabilities
such as,engineers civil affairs,military police,and psychological operations (PSYOP)forces can plan and
perform populace control measures that ensure freedom of maneuver by mitigating civil interference,which
enables commanders to maintain tempo and preserve combat power.
3-32. The enemy is proficient at establishing and maintaining communications and at disrupting BCT
command and control systems. The enemy disrupts combined arms capabilities through combinations of
jamming electromagnetic frequencies, cyber-attacks, data pirating, and satellite neutralization. Developing
and maintaining these capabilities requires extensive recruitment, training, and outsourcing for personnel
with the required skill set to conduct such attacks.
3-33. The loss of space-basedcommunications due to enemy activity remains a major concern for friendly
forces conducting operations. Whether the enemy action against satellites or with intermittent jamming and
spoofing causes the communication interruptions, the resulting black out requires friendly forces to adapt
and adjust until the restoration of communications. Short-term losses or disruptions of satellite
communications will be mitigated through alternative communications methods, courier networks, and
complete understanding and execution of the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
3-34. Regular,irregular,and hybrid forces present formidable tactical challenges to the BCT when combined
with area denial weapons. Area denial weapons included area denial systems,artillery munitions,land mines,
and WMD. Enemy operations emphasize deception, cover, mobility, and most importantly, depth in the
defense. In the offense, enemy operations emphasize deception, cover, mobility, and most importantly, |
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infiltration techniques. Taken together, regular, irregular, and hybrid forces on the current and future
battlefield employ significant combined arms capabilities that seek to disrupt BCT operations and dislocate
BCT combined arms capabilities.
PUBLIC PERCEPTION
3-35. Enemies recognize the importance of public perception and its impact on the conduct of operations.
The enemy attempts to influence the will of the American people, key allies, and the populations among
whom there are conflicts,through propaganda,disinformation,and attacks on U.S. and allies’assets at home
and abroad. The enemy conducts propaganda and disinformation operations to shape local and international
public opinion and perception against the U.S., host nation, or coalition forces. The enemy undermines
ongoing stabilization efforts, marginalizing successes, exploiting instances of friendly force missteps, and
fabricating or exaggerating friendly force cultural shortcomings. Enemy organizations attempt to manipulate
local,regional,and worldwide news and social media outlets to achieve their ends and solicit new recruits to
their cause. For example, mobile phones can activate IEDs with the results captured on digital cameras,
transmitted via satellite phones,and posted on internet chat rooms for a worldwide audience. Additionally,
the enemy operating within urban terrain uses tactics that increase the potential for civilian casualties and
collateral damage to undermine the resolve of both the United Statesand the local populace.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-36. Politics considerations,and in particular,competition for power,resources,and survival drive conflicts
and are key to their resolution. Understanding the political dynamics at the local level allows the BCT
commander and staff to identify the enemy’s strategy, capabilities, and potential weaknesses within the
political environment. This understanding aids in identifying targets that undermine or counter U.S. and
coalition efforts that consolidate gains and achieve a sustainable political outcome consistent with U.S. vital
interests.
3-37. The enemy exploits societal divisions along political,economic,ethnic,tribal,and religious lines. The
enemy offers benefits to favored groups and disenfranchises opposing groups within the population to exploit
societal divisions. These activities protect their sources of strength, consolidate their power, and assist in
establishing political legitimacy. The enemy also seeks opportunities to exert this legitimacy by filling
societal roles that U.S. forces or host-nation leaders have failed to address. As enemies and adversaries pursue
this strategy, they often align with criminal organizations to undermine and attack existing government
institutions. The resulting corruption,acceptance of illicit activities,and paralysis undermine political reform
and stability efforts and prevent information gathering. The enemy promotes weaknesses within political
institutions by disrupting or influencing elections at the local, provincial, and national level by conducting
attacks on voting sites,intimidating election officials,manipulating political districts,and by backing corrupt
officials. Additionally,the enemy may attempt to assassinate,abduct,or extort key civic,ethnic,or military
leaders to undermine security and good governance,degrade friendly forces’morale,garner media attention
to gain support and sway populace opinion, raise funds, and attract new recruits. Weak government
institutions allow the enemy and other in state stakeholders the freedom and ability to divert state resources
without repercussions from law enforcement and rule of law.
3-38. The enemy’s political subversion campaign seeks to exploit existing social and political weaknesses.
Degrading public opinion of U.S. and host-nation efforts,disrupting U.S. and local force’s abilities to provide
essential services and security,and alienating the populace from supporting friendly forces are efforts within
this campaign. Like the physical capabilities of the enemy,the BCT commander must recognize and counter
these efforts to maintain the initiative. The commander must visualize the threat in its political context to
understand the dynamics existing within the area of operations and to determine tactical objectives that lead
to the achievement of sustainable political outcomes consistent with U.S. vital interests. Understanding the
political dynamics of a conflict,enables the commander to reassure and protect indigenous populations while
simultaneously identifying,disrupting,and isolating the enemy to defeat the enemy. |
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SECTION IV – COUNTERING ADAPTATIONS AND RETAINING THE
INITIATIVE
3-39. Countering enemy adaptations and retaining the initiative in armed conflicts requires the BCT
commander and staff to understand the threat and the operational environment specific to its area of
operations. Accurately depicting how an enemy employs forces requires an understanding of the enemy’s
organization, the enemy’s capabilities, and the employment of enemy forces in the past. Overcoming
increasingly sophisticated area denial actions and capabilities requires an effective information collection
effort (see chapter 5) to develop the enemy situation within the BCT’s area of operations.
3-40. In armed conflict, the commander’s understanding is not limited to enemy organizations and their
capabilities. This understanding includes ethnic groups,political factions,tribes or clans,religious sects,or
ideological movements and their agendas. Identifying and distinguishing these groups and the associated
dynamics is extremely difficult and requires deliberateinformation collection and analytical effortsthrough
every phase of the operation. Using the mission variable of civil considerations and its subordinate
characteristicsidentified by the mnemonic ASCOPE,the BCT staff has a standardized baseline for analysis
to generate understanding. This baseline is augmented by analyses conducted by organic and attached forces
such as social-cultural analysis,target audience analyses,intelligence analyses,population,and area studies.
3-41. While in contact with the enemy and in close proximity to the population, the BCT fights for
information to understand and develop the situation. Complementary and integrated information collection
capabilities (reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations) assist the
commander in identifying opportunities to seize,retain,and exploit the initiative and dominate in increasingly
challenging and complex environments. |
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Mission Command
Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers
subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.
(ADP 6-0). The brigade combat team (BCT) commander uses mission command, with
its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting operational initiative, through
mission orders. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results
to be attained, not how they are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). Disciplined initiative—as
it relates to mission command describes individual initiative.
Mission command requires the BCT commander to convey a clear commander’s intent
and concept of operations. These become essential in operations where multiple
operational and mission variables interact with the lethal application of ground combat
power. Such dynamic interaction often compels subordinate commanders to make
difficult decisions in unforeseen circumstances. Based on a specific idea of how to
accomplish the mission, commander and staff refine the concept of operations during
planning and adjust the concept of operations throughout the operation as subordinates
develop the situation or conditions change. Often, subordinates acting on the higher
commander’s intent develop the situation in ways that exploit unforeseen
opportunities.
The commander uses the mission command approach to command and control to
exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. The commander, supported by the staff,
combines the art and science of command and control to understand situations, make
decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission accomplishment.
This chapter addresses the fundamentals of mission command, to include the principles
of mission command, command presence, and the Army’s approach to command and
control. It addresses the command and control warfighting function and the exercise of
command and control.
SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS OF MISSION COMMAND
4-1. Understanding the fundamentals of mission command as the Army’s approach to command and control
is essential to the effective conduct of operations. Military operations are human endeavors conducted in
complex and ever-changing operational environments. The BCT commander’s ability to visualize
relationships among opposing human wills is essential tounderstanding the fundamental nature of operations.
To account for the uncertain nature of operations,mission command (as opposed to detailed command) tends
to be decentralized and flexible. This uncertain nature requires an environment of mutual trust and shared
understanding among the commander,subordinates,and partners. This section focuses on the fundamentals
of mission command and using mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the BCT commander’s
intent, enabling subordinate commanders and leaders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat
power. (SeeADP 6-0 for additional information.) |
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PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND
4-2. The BCT commander focuses the order on the purpose of the operation through mission orders.
Mission orders allowthe commander’s subordinates the greatest possible flexibility to accomplish assigned
tasks. Mission command is enabled by the principles of—
(cid:122) Competence.
(cid:122) Mutual trust.
(cid:122) Shared understanding.
(cid:122) Commander’s intent.
(cid:122) Mission orders.
(cid:122) Disciplined initiative.
(cid:122) Risk acceptance.
Note.(See ADP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the principles of mission command.)
COMMAND PRESENCE
4-3. Command presencerequires the BCT commander to lead from a position that allows timely decisions
based on an operational environment assessment of the operational environment and application of judgment.
The commander may find it necessary to locate forward of the main command post(CP). For example,the
commander may position with the main effort to gain understanding,prioritize resources,influence others,
and mitigate risk. To do this,the commander must understand how the principles of mission command guide
and help combinethe art of command and the science of control.
4-4. The Armored Raid on Baghdad in 2003 offers an example of how the mission command approach to
command and control enabled 2dBrigade,3dInfantry Division(ID)(Mechanized) to seize,retain,and exploit
the initiative in an uncertain environment. The vignette below demonstrates how the seven principles of
mission command guided the brigadecommander during the operation. It also describes how the commander
used the principles of mission command to combinethe art and science of command and control to understand
situations,make decisions,direct actions,and lead forces toward mission accomplishment.
Armored Raid on Baghdad, 5 April 2003
On 5 April 2003, COL David Perkins’ 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized),
conducted a raid into western Baghdad as part of the division’s advance on Baghdad after
a two-week march ofover 700 kilometers from Kuwait. As part of the advance,3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) created a partial cordon around the Iraqi capital. The raid,ordered
by 3d Infantry Division commander MG Buford Blount and V Corps commander LTG
William S. Wallace, was conducted as a battalion sized reconnaissance in force into
western Baghdad to determine the composition and strength of Iraqi forces defending the
capital.
Staging out of Objective (OBJ) SAINTS, the column of M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2
Bradley Fighting Vehicles from LTC Eric Schwartz’s Task Force 1stBattalion,64th Armor
Regiment (Task Force1-64 AR),would advance north on Highway 8(the main north-south
expressway west of the Tigris River) into western Baghdad. The column then turned west
to link with troops at the airport. Since the enemy situation was unclear, the operation
required initiative and flexibility from the officers,noncommissioned officers,andSoldiers
executing the operation. Wallace judged that such a bold plan was a reasonable risk. The
raid was the first armored foray into a major city since World War II. Perkins’concept for
the raid,called a “Thunder Run”by the tankers,was for an advance up Highway 8 that
“…create[d] as much confusion… inside the city [as possible].”In mitigating the inherent
risk of the operation, the 2d Brigade commander considered “…that my Soldiers or my
units [could] react to chaos much better than the enemy [could].” Perkins’ specific |
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guidance to Schwartz was to “conduct a movement to contact north along Highway 8 to
determine the enemy’s disposition,strength,and will to fight.”
Schwartz praised the straightforward commander’s intent and purpose. “The planning was
simple,” he explained, “The Thunder Run mission was the simplest of all tasks that we
were given. There was no maneuver required. It was simply battle orders followed by battle
drills.” Based on Perkins’ intent to maintain tempo, Schwartz chose to leave all lightly
armored wheeled vehicles at SAINTS. Departing at 0630 on 5 April,Schwartz’scommand
included 731 men, 30 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 14 Bradley Infantry fighting vehicles, 14
engineer vehicles,and other tracked support vehicles.
Within minutes of moving north of SAINTS, the Americans came under sporadic small
arms, mortar and rocket-propelled grenade fire from Iraqi irregular forces firing from
hastily prepared positions adjacent to the highway. Within an hour,the small arms fire and
rocket-propelled grenade volleys had turned the operation into something akin to running
a gauntlet of fire, but they did little to slow the column. The plan prohibited slowing the
advance for specific targets, which were passed instead to follow-on vehicles by radio.
However,this concept jettisoned temporarily when,6kilometers from the line of departure,
a rocket propelled grenade round fired from an overpass exploded in the engine
compartment of SSG Jason Diaz’s C Company tank, immobilizing it. As Diaz’s crew
struggled to put out the growing fire and rig the tank for recovery, other Abrams and
Bradley vehicles formed a defensive perimeter. Using coaxial machine gun fire and main
gun rounds, the column repulsed several dismounted attacks and approaches by suicide
vehicles. Several Americans were wounded. Since Perkins’order emphasized momentum,
LTC Schwartz decided after a half hour delay,to renew the northerly advance and destroy
Diaz’s tank with incendiaries to keep it out of enemy hands. With the spearhead about
halfway to the airport, Iraqi small arms fire fatally wounded SSG Stevon Booker, an A
Company tank commander, while a nearby Bradley was disabled by rocket propelled
grenade fire that also wounded the driver. In this case, the delay was short, with the
wounded men placed in other vehicles and the Bradley rigged for towing. Soon the column
was back on the move.
Schwartz’s force turned in the direction of the airport at the intersection of Highway 8 and
the Qaddissiyah Expressway,the main east-west thoroughfare between the airport west of
the city and downtown Baghdad. Hundreds of paramilitary fighters and military personnel
continued to fire on the column from all directions, only to fall victim to the Americans’
overwhelming firepower. After a total travel time of two hours and 20 minutes,the column
arrived at the airport.
COL Perkins concluded that the reconnaissance in force had completely surprised the
enemy. “[The Iraqis] thought that they could bloody our nose enough on the outside of the
city … that we just would not push through block by block,”Perkins explained. The raid
had cost five casualties (one killed and four wounded), one Abrams tank destroyed, and
one Bradley heavily damaged. Iraqi losses were estimated to be at least 1000 fighters
killed, one T-72 tank, and 30 to 40 BMPs (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhotys) destroyed, and
the elimination of a large number of light vehicles and countless roadside bunkers.
The operation demonstrated that United States armored forces could penetrate Baghdad
at will,while suffering minimal casualties. The operation provided excellent indicators of
enemy tactics,strength,and fighting positions. LTG Wallace and MG Blount praised the 5
April“Thunder Run.”They envisioned the operation as a prelude to additional armored
missions in and around the city that would disrupt the Baghdad defenses with the ultimate
goal of regime collapse. Using the lessons learned on 5 April,Perkins launched a second,
larger operation on 7 April,which resulted in the occupation of downtown Baghdad and
the final fall of the Baathist government.
Donald P. Wright |
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ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF MISSION
COMMAND
4-5. The application of the sevenprinciples of mission command,combined with COL Perkins’use of the
art of command and science of control helped reduce uncertainty during the planning, preparation, and
execution of the 5 April 2003 movement to contact through Baghdad. Soldiers easily understood the mission
and intent,which were simple and clear. COL Perkins’command presence forward set a positive example
for Task Force1-64 Armor Regiment and allowed him to assess the situation and apply judgment.
4-6. The science of control was illustrated by the actions of the 2/3 ID. The 2/3 ID main CP facilitated
mission accomplishment by coordinating with the 3d ID main CP and with 1/3 ID, synchronizing and
integrating actions,informing COL Perkins,and providing control for the 2/3 ID units in OBJ SAINTS. The
paragraphs below described the sevenprinciples of mission command illustrated in the vignette above.
COMPETENCE
4-7. The 2d Brigade was a regular Army unit, which had stabilized both command tours and personnel
assignments during its overseas tour. While the campaign was only two weeks old,the brigade had been in
Kuwait for over six months prior to that and had trained intensively. By 5 April, two continuous weeks of
combat experience augmented the training. COL Perkins’command presence,two-way counseling sessions,
professional development sessions, and continuous assessments naturally enhanced the building of a
competent team. When leaders are open to candid subordinate feedback as well, such sessions and
assessments will yield greater results in building the team’s competency during the planning, preparation,
and execution of any operation,not just during the after-actionreview.
MUTUAL TRUST
4-8. COL Perkins trusted his commanders and Soldiers because of their high level of training and their
proven ethical and effective performance in combat. When leaders give clear expectations to subordinates
through two-way counseling sessions, professional development sessions, and continuous assessments, it
engenders trust.
SHARED UNDERSTANDING
4-9. The corps,division,and brigade commanders clearly conveyed their intents,objectives,and key tasks
to subordinate commanders. The long train up for the campaign in Kuwait and the previous two weeks of
operations facilitated shared understanding. Additionally,the raid was essentially a battle drill,whichTask
Force1-64 Armor Regiment had executed many times before,both in training and in combat. When leaders
and subordinates share personal experiences during counseling, professional development sessions, or
after-action reviews, all parties develop a shared understanding. Through shared personal experiences,
leaders and subordinates will better understand how each other think, gaining keen insight to how
commanders and staff analyze and solve problems. With this level of shared understanding,units can achieve
greater levels of synchronization and efficiency at a quicker pace during high tempo environments.
COMMANDER’SINTENT
4-10. Both LTG Wallace and MG Blount provided clear and concise commanders’ intents for the 5 April
mission. Their intent was to conduct a raid into Baghdad in an armored column to test the Iraqi military’s
urban defenses, collect information, and pressure the regime. COL Perkins added his own emphasis to
maintain momentum throughout the movement and to create as much confusion among enemy elements as
possible.
4-11. More than just stating an operations purpose,key tasks,and the desired outcome,commander’sintent
clearly articulates what criteria or metrics the commander will use define success for terrain, civilians (if
applicable),friendly forces,and the enemy. Usually no more than three to five sentences,it gives the reason
and broad purpose beyond the mission statement in a way subordinates two echelons down can easily
remember. An example of the desired outcome might be, “All friendly forces are north of X River at |
3-96 | 85 | Mission Command
80-percent combat power, with minimal loss of civilian structures, no loss of civilian life, and all enemy
forces are unable to reach bridge Y.”
MISSION ORDERS
4-12. When COL Perkins issued his order for the reconnaissance in force,he directed Task Force 1-64Armor
Regiment to attack up Highway 8 all the way to the Baghdad Airport to collect information about the
composition and disposition of the Iraqi forces that were defending the city. He provided clear intent,
objectives, and graphics and allowed LTC Schwartz to execute. The directive was unambiguous: maintain
momentum, handover targets to trailing armored vehicles, and avoid becoming tied down into a pitched
battle. The directive also maximized individual initiative.
4-13. In conjunction with graphical control measures, mission orders provide clear doctrinal language
familiar to all. Whether assigning doctrinal tasks, allocating resources, or issuing broad guidance, mission
orders tell subordinates what results to attain, without articulating exactly how to achieve such results.
Without mission orders, there exists too much room for ambiguity, misinterpretation of discussions, and
desynchronization of an operation,especially one with multiple unified action partners.
EXERCISE DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE
4-14. Commanders at all levels had confidence that their subordinates could do the job with minimal
direction because of the experience level of the unit,shared understanding,and mutual trust. This prevented
the column from bogging down at several points during the operation. When enemy disabled SSG Diaz’s
tank,for example,LTCSchwartz and COL Perkins knew the crew had done whatever they could to save the
tank and accepted its destruction and abandonment.
4-15. Leaders must continue to develop and encourage initiative in their subordinates. During assessments,
or counseling and professional development sessions, affirming and rewarding observed instances of
disciplined initiative will empower subordinates in the organization. Commanders should consider
highlighting in a positive light disciplined initiative that was not completely successful. The enemy may have
chosen a different course of action (COA), or more information may have become available after a
subordinate made a decision, and the subordinate could easily become discouraged to exercise further
disciplined initiative.
RISKACCEPTANCE
4-16. COL Perkins used armored vehicles to execute the 5 April Thunder Run. The brigade’s vulnerable
wheeled vehicles remained at OBJ SAINTS. This deprived the task force of certain logistical and sustainment
functions during the course of the operation. However,the raid’s short duration mitigated the risk.
4-17. COLPerkins used his knowledge of the art of command to position himself and his intelligence staff
officer (S-2)in an M113 into the lead task force formation to build understanding and enable timely decisions.
This position allowed him to assess the situation,apply judgment,and prioritize resources to accomplish the
mission. In addition, COL Perkins’ command presence forward gave him the ability to influence
TaskForce1-64 Armor Regiment through personal example and guidance.
4-18. Commanders define those areas where they are willing to accept risk and where they are not.
Commanders establish this in their commander’s intent for specific missions,often by phase,and based on
experience with subordinates and staffs during previous missions,and results from previous training events
and exercises. When faced with subordinates new to their command, a new or ill-structured problem,
commanders thoroughly explain these areas of accepted risk and give examples of what they consider
acceptable risk. Commanders at each echelon carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many
hazards as possible,and then accept risk to accomplish the mission.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
4-19. Command and controlis the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of mission (JP 1). Command and control is
fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single activity in operations is more important than |
3-96 | 86 | Chapter 4
command and control. Command and control by itself will not secure an objective,destroyan enemy target,
or deliver supplies. Yet none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or
synchronized to achieve maximum effect, without effective command and control. It is through command
and control that the countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction. The goal
of command and control is mission accomplishment.
COMMAND
4-20. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates
by virtue of rank or assignment (JP 1). Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively
using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and
controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for
health,welfare,morale,and discipline of assigned personnel.
4-21. As an art,command requires the use of judgment. Commanders constantly use their judgment for such
things as delegating authority, making decisions, determining the appropriate degree of control, and
allocating resources. Although certain facts like troop-to-task ratios may influence a commander,they do not
account for the human aspects of command. A commander’s character, competence, and commitment,
influenced by their experience, training, and education influence their decision-making (see ADP 1 and
ADP6-22). Proficiency in the art of command stems from years of schooling, self-development, and
operational and training experiences.
4-22. Command is a human skill sharpened by experience,study,and observation. Commanding at any level
is more than simply leading Soldiers and units and making decisions. Commanders use their authority with
firmness and care. Commanders strive to understand all aspects of their operational environment. Effective
commanders create a positive command climate that instills a sense of mutual trust throughout the command.
They use their judgment to assess situations,draw feasible conclusions, and make decisions. Commanders
guide operations without stifling individual initiative. (See ADP 6-0 for additional information.) The key
elements of command are—
(cid:122) Authority.
(cid:122) Responsibility.
(cid:122) Decision-making.
(cid:122) Leadership.
CONTROL
4-23. Controlis the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance
with the commander’s intent (ADP 6-0). Aided by staffs,commanders exercise control over assigned forces
in their area of operations. Staffs coordinate,synchronize,and integrate actions,inform the commander,and
exercise control for the commander. Control permits commanders to adjust operations to account for
changing circumstances and direct the changes necessary to address the new situation. Commanders impose
enough control to mass the effect of combat power at the decisive point in time while allowing subordinates
the maximum freedom of action to accomplish assigned tasks.
4-24. The science of control supports the art of command. In contrast to the art of command,the science of
control is based on objectivity,facts,empirical methods,and analysis. Commanders and staffs use the science
of control to overcome the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. Units are bound
by such factors as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, rules of engagement, and legal
considerations. Commanders and staffs strive to understand aspects of operations they can analyze and
measure, such as the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations. Control
requires a realistic appreciation for time and distance factors,including the time required to initiate certain
actions. The commander’s command and control system, especially the staff, assists the commander with
control (see section III). However,the commander remains the central figure.
4-25. Commanders use control to direct and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces. They communicate
information and receive feedback from subordinates to achieve greater shared understanding of the situation.
This allows commanders to update their visualization with respect to the current situation, the end state or |
3-96 | 87 | Mission Command
their operational approach, and adjust operations to reflect those changes. (See ADP 6-0 for additional
information.) The elements of control are—
(cid:122) Direction.
(cid:122) Feedback.
(cid:122) Information.
(cid:122) Communication.
4-26. Control measures provide control without requiring detailed explanations. Control measures help
commanders’direct actions by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate unit actions
from impeding one another. They foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily
restricting freedom of action. Good control measures foster freedom of action, decision-making, and
individual initiative.
4-27. Commanders use the minimum number of control measures necessary to control their forces.
Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher commander’s intent. They also
consider the mission, terrain, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. Effectively employing
control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand their purposes and ramifications,including
the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of action and initiative. Each measure
should have a specific purpose: mass the effects of combat power, synchronize subordinate forces’
operations,or minimize the possibility of fratricide,civilian casualties,and unintended excessive collateral
damage. (See chapter 6 section IV and chapter 7 section IV, respectively, for a detailed discussion and
examples of offensive and defensive control measures.)
SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
4-28. Command and control—as a warfighting function—assists the BCT commander in the exercise of
authority and direction over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. By itself,the
command and control warfighting function cannot achieve objectives or accomplish missions. Mission
accomplishment requires a common understanding of the principles of mission command and the integration
and convergence of combat power, while emphasizing command and control that empowers subordinate
decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. The command and control
warfighting function provides purpose and direction to the other warfighting functions. The command and
control warfighting function (depicted in figure 4-1 on page 4-8) consists of the command and control
warfighting function tasks and the command and control system. This section focuses on the related tasks
and a system that enable the commander to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. In
addition to the major activities of the operations process—the Army’s framework for exercising command
and control—it addresses the integrating processes used by the commander and staff to synchronize specific
functions throughout the operations process. (SeeADP 6-0 for additional information.) |
3-96 | 88 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-1. Combat power model
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS
4-29. The command and control warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other
elements of combat power to accomplish missions. Commanders,assisted by their staffs,integrate numerous
processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force through the mission command
warfighting function. These tasks are—
(cid:122) Command forces (described in paragraphs 4-20 to 4-22).
(cid:122) Control operations (described in paragraphs 4-23 to 4-27).
(cid:122) Drive the operations process (described in paragraphs 4-43to4-137).
(cid:122) Establish the command and control system (described in paragraphs 4-30 to 4-42).
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
4-30. The BCT commander cannot exercise command and control alone. The command and control
system—the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to
conduct operations (ADP 6-0)—enables the commander’s ability to lead the staff and provide direction and
motivation to subordinate commanders and Soldiers. The command and control system supports the
commander’s decision-making, disseminates the commander’s decisions to subordinates, and facilitates
controlling forces. The commander employs the command and control system to enable the people and
formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. All equipment and procedures exist
to achieve this end. The commander organizes a command and control system to—
(cid:122) Support decision-making.
(cid:122) Collect, create, and maintain relevant information and prepare products to support the
commander’s and leaders’understanding and visualization.
(cid:122) Prepare and communicate directives.
4-31. To provide these three overlapping functions, the commander must effectively locate, design, and
organize the four components of a command and control system. The four components are—
(cid:122) People.
(cid:122) Processes.
(cid:122) Networks.
(cid:122) CPs. |
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4-32. At every echelon of command,the most important of these components is people. As the commander’s
command and control system begins with people, the commander bases command and control systems on
human characteristics more than onequipment and procedures. Trained people are essential to an effective
command and control system;the best technology cannot support command and control without them. (See
ADP 6-0 for additional information.)
PEOPLE
4-33. The Army’s approach to mission command is built upon the bedrock of the Army Profession—trust.
Mutualtrust between commanders,leaders,and Soldiers in cohesive units enablescommand and control to
thrive in the ambiguity and chaos of a complex world. Trusted Army professionals are essentialto an effective
command and control system.
4-34. Soldiers and leaders exercise disciplined initiative and accomplish assigned missions according to the
commander’s intent, not technology. Therefore, the BCT commander bases command and control systems
on human skills, knowledge, and abilities more than on equipment and procedures. Trained Soldiers and
leaders form the basis of an effective command and control system;the commander must not underestimate
the importance of providing training.
4-35. Key people within the BCT dedicated to command and control include seconds in command,command
sergeants major,and staffs. The second in command is the commander’s principal assistant. The command
sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer of the command. The staff supports the commander
with understanding situations, decision-making, and implementing decisions throughout the operations
process. The commander systematically arranges the staff as part of the command and control system to
perform the following threefunctions:
(cid:122) Supporting the commander.
(cid:122) Assisting subordinate units.
(cid:122) Informing units and organizations outside the headquarters.
PROCESSES
4-36. The BCT commander establishes and uses systematic processes and procedures to organize the
activities within the headquarters and throughout the force. Processes are a series of actions directed to an
end state, such as the military decision-making process (MDMP). Procedures are standard, detailed steps,
often used by the BCT staff,which describes how to perform specific tasks to achieve the desired end state,
such as standard operating procedures (SOPs). Processes and procedures increase organizational competence
by improving the staff’s efficiency or by increasing the tempo.
4-37. The MDMP provides the commander, staffs, and subordinate commanders an orderly method for
planning. SOPs often provide detailed unit instructions on how to configure common operational picture
(COP) displays. Adhering to processes and procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and
hesitation as the commander makes frequent,rapid decisions to meet operational requirements.
NETWORKS
4-38. The network connects people and allows sharing of resources and information. The network enables
the execution of command and control and supports operations through wide dissemination of data and
relevant information. The Army’s network is the Department of Defense information network-Army
(DODIN-A). The Department of Defense information network-Army is an Army-operated enclave of the
Department of Defense information network that encompasses all Army information capabilities that collect,
process,store,display,disseminate,and protect information worldwide (ATP 6-02.71).
4-39. As networks may degrade during operations,the commander must develop methods and measures to
mitigate the impact of degraded networks. The commander may mitigate the impact of degraded networks
through exploiting the potential of technology or through establishing trust,creating shared understanding,
or providing a clear intent using mission orders. |
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COMMAND POSTS
4-40. Effective command and control requires continuous, and often immediate, close coordination,
synchronization and information-sharing across the staff. To promote this,commanders organize their staffs
and other components of the command and control system into CPs to assist them in effectively conducting
operations.
4-41. CPs are facilities that include personnel, processes and procedures, and networks that assist
commanders in command and control. Commanders employ CPs to help control operations through
continuity, planning, coordination, and synchronizing of the warfighting functions. Commanders organize
their CPs flexibly to meet changing situations and requirements of different operations.
4-42. CP functions directly relate to assisting commanders in understanding, visualizing, describing,
directing,leading,and assessing operations. Different types of CPs,such as the main CP or the tactical CP,
have specific functions by design. (CPs are discussed later in this chapter and in FM 6-0.)
OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-43. The Army’s framework for exercising command and control is the operations process. The BCT
commander,assisted by the staff,uses the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning
necessary to understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment and the operations end state;
make and articulate decisions;and direct,lead,and assess military operations as shown in figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2. The operations process
4-44. The operations process, while simple in concept (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), is dynamic in
execution. The BCT commander and staff use the operations process to integrate numerous tasks executed
throughout the headquarters and with subordinate units. The commander organizes and trains the staff and
subordinates as an integrated team to simultaneously plan,prepare,execute,and assess operations. In addition
to the principles of mission command, the commander and staff consider the following principles for the
effective employmentof the operations process:
(cid:122) Commanders drive the operation process.
(cid:122) Build and maintain situational understanding.
(cid:122) Apply critical and creative thinking. |
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4-45. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances
demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order,planning
continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and
continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains. (SeeADP 5-0 for additional information.)
PLAN
4-46. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and
determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning consists of two separate but
interrelated components, a conceptual component and a detailed component. Successful planning requires
the integration of both these components. The BCT commander and subordinate commanders ethically,
effectively, and efficiently employ three methodologies for planning operations: the Army design
methodology,the MDMP(brigade and battalion/squadron echelons),and troop leading procedures (company
and troop echelons and below). Commanders determine how much of each methodology to use based on the
scope of the problem, their familiarity with it, and the time available. Planning helps the BCT commander
create and communicate a common vision between the staff, subordinate commanders, their staffs, and
unified action partners. Planning results in an order that synchronizes the action of forces in time, space,
purpose,and resources to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.
Note.The rapid decision-making and synchronization process is a decision-making and planning
technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution when available planning
time is limited. (See paragraph 4-118.)
Army Planning Methodologies
4-47. The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to
understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design
methodology is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems and to gain a
greater understanding of the operational environment. To produce executable plans, the commander
integrates this methodology with the detailed planning typically associated with the military decision-making
process (MDMP). (See ATP 5-0.1 for additional information.)
Conceptual and Detailed Planning
4-48. The BCT commander and staff conduct conceptual and detailed planning to facilitate the activities of
the operations process. The commander personally leads the conceptual component of planning. While the
commander is engaged in parts of detailed planning,the commander often leaves the specifics to the staff.
Conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning. For example, the commander’s intent
(see paragraph 4-66) and operational approach provide the framework for the entire plan. This framework
leads to a concept of operations(see paragraph 4-69)and associated schemes of support,such as schemes of
intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, and protection. In turn, the schemes of support
lead to the specifics of execution,including tasks to subordinate units and detailed annexes to the operation
order. However, the dynamic does not operate in only one direction, conceptual planning must respond to
detailed constraints.
Operational Approach
4-49. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand,
visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. The BCT commander and staff conduct
conceptual planning (Armydesign methodology,see ATP 5-0.1) to understand,visualize,and describe the
operational environment and the operational approach—a broad description of the mission, operational
concepts,tasks,and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0)—to the problem. The commander
and staff use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an
operational environment in support of the operations process. When developing an operational approach,the
commander considers methods to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. |
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Analysis determines the appropriate combination of decisive action (offense, defense, stability) for the
operation and conceptual planning activities lead to prioritization of defeat and stability mechanisms.
Defeat Mechanism
4-50. Defeat (see paragraph 2-99) has a temporal component and is seldom permanent. A defeat mechanism
is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0).
All echelons within the BCT use a combination of four defeat mechanisms: destroy (see paragraph 2-99),
dislocate,disintegrate,and isolate relating to offensive and defensive operations. Commanders consider more
than one defeat mechanism simultaneously to produce complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable
with a single mechanism. Used individually,a defeat mechanism achieves results relative to how much effort
is expended. Using defeat mechanisms in combination creates enemy dilemmas that magnify their effects
significantly. Commanders describe defeat mechanisms by the three types of effects they produce:
(cid:122) Physical effects are those things that are material.
(cid:122) Temporal effects are those that occur at a specific point in time.
(cid:122) Cognitive effects those that pertain to or affect the mind.
4-51. The commander conceptualizes an operational approach to attain the end state by formulating the most
effective,efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. For example:
(cid:122) Physically defeating an enemy deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims.
(cid:122) Temporally defeating an enemy anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they can
become effective.
(cid:122) Cognitively defeating an enemy disrupts decision-making and deprives that enemy of the will to
fight.
4-52. Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s
dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant (ADP 3-0). For example, the commander can achieve
dislocation by placing forces in locations where the enemy does not expect them.
4-53. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to
conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight (ADP 3-0).
For example, the commander can achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an enemy’s command
structure and communications systems.
4-54. Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and
increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). For example, as isolation can encompass multiple domains
and can have both physical and psychological effects detrimental to accomplishing a mission,the commander
can isolate a force in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) thus exacerbate the effects of physical isolation
by reducing its situational awareness.
Stability Mechanism
4-55. The BCT’s mission,in addition to defeating an enemy,may require performing stability mechanisms
related to stability operations, security, and consolidating gains in an area of operations. A stability
mechanismis the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions
that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). (See paragraphs 8-23 and 8-24 for a detailed
discussion on the four stability mechanisms: compel,control,influence,and support.)
Conceptual Planning Outputs and Activities
4-56. Outputs of conceptual planning include a problem statement, draft mission statement, draft
commander’s intent, a broad concept sketch, initial decision points, commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs), and initial planning guidance. Conceptual planning activities should include initial
framing of branches and sequels to the plan and the ideal end state or posture. |
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Military Decision-making Process
4-57. The BCT staff uses the outputs of conceptual planning to begin detailed planning (MDMP at the BCT
level). The military decision-making processis an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The result of
detailed planning is a synchronized plan that provides mission type orders for the staff and subordinate units
(see figure 4-3on page 4-14). |
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Figure 4-3. Military decision-making process overview |
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Figure 4-3. Military decision-making process overview (continued)
4-58. Depending on the situation’s complexity, the BCT commander can initiate the Army design
methodology before or in parallel with the MDMP. If the problem is hard to identify or the operation’s end
state is unclear,the commandermay initiate Army design methodology before engaging in detailed planning.
Army design methodology can assist the commander and staff in understanding the operational environment,
framing the problem, and considering an operational approach to solve or manage the problem. The
understanding and products resulting from Army design methodology guide more detailed planning during
the MDMP.
4-59. When staff members use the Army design methodology and MDMP in parallel,the BCT commander
may direct some staff members to conduct mission analysis while engaging others in Army design
methodology activities before COA development. Results of both mission analysis and Army design
methodology inform the commander in development of the commander’s intent and planning guidance. In
time constrained conditions,or when the problem is not complex,the commander may conduct the MDMP
without incorporating formal Army design methodology efforts. During execution,the commander can use
Army design methodology to help refine understanding and visualization as well as assessing and adjusting
the plan as required. (SeeFM 6-0 for additional information.)
The Science and Art of Planning
4-60. Planning is both a science and an art. Many aspects of military operations, such as movement rates,
fuel consumption, and weapons effects, are quantifiable. They are part of the science of planning. The |
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combination of forces,choice of tactics,and arrangement of activities belong to the art of planning. Soldiers
often gain knowledge of the science of planning through institutional training and study. They gain
understanding of the art of planning primarily through operational training and experience. Effective planners
are grounded in both the science and the art of planning.
Science of Planning
4-61. The scienceof planning encompasses aspects of operations that can be measured and analyzed. These
aspects include the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations. The science of planning
includes a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors: an understanding of how long it takes to initiate
certain actions,the techniques and procedures used to accomplish planning tasks,and the terms and graphics
that compose the language of military operations. The mastery of the science of planning is necessary for
military professionals to understand key aspects of the operation to include the physical and procedural
constraints underwhich units operate. These constraints include the effects of terrain,weather,and time on
friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human activity—the solution to
problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of the art of planning.
Art of Planning
4-62. The art of planning requires understanding the dynamic relationships among friendly forces,the threat,
and other aspects of an operational environment during operations. It includes making decisions based on
skilled judgment acquired from experience,training, study,imagination, and critical and creative thinking.
Commanders apply judgment based on their knowledge and experience to select the right time and place to
act, assign tasks, prioritize actions, accept risk, and allocate resources. The art of planning involves
developing plans within the commander’s intent and planning guidance by choosing from interrelated
options,including—
(cid:122) Arrangement of activities in time,space,and purpose.
(cid:122) Assignment of tactical mission tasks and tactical enabling tasks.
(cid:122) Task organization of available forces and resource allocation.
(cid:122) Choice and arrangement of control measures.
(cid:122) Tempo.
(cid:122) The risk the commander is willing to take.
4-63. These interrelated options define a starting point from which planners create distinct solutions to
particular problems. Each solution involves a range of options. Each balance competing demands and
requires judgment. The variables of mission,enemy,terrain and weather,troops and support available,time
available,civil considerations (METT-TC) always combine to form a different set of circumstances. There
are no checklists that adequately apply to every situation.
Key Components of a Plan
4-64. The mission statement,commander’s intent,and conceptof operations are key components of a plan
that serve as the framework for an operation. The BCT commander ensures the mission and end state nest
with those of their higher headquarters. The commander’s intent focuses on the end state;and the concept of
operations focuses on the method or sequence of actions by which the force will achieve the end state. Within
the concept of operations, the commander may establish objectives—a location used to orient operations,
phase operations,facilitate changes of direction,and provide for unity of effort (ADP 3-90)—as intermediate
goals toward achieving the operation’s end state. When developing tasks for subordinate units, the
commander ensures that the purpose of each task nests with the accomplishment of another task, with the
achievement of an objective,or directly to the attainment of an end state condition. Additional components
to the plan include the BCT’s task organization, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, risk
acceptance,and control measures.
Mission Statement
4-65. The missionis the task,together with the purpose,that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (JP 3-0). The BCT commander analyzes a mission as the commander’s intent two echelons |
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above, specified tasks, and implied tasks. The commander considers the mission of adjacent units to
understand how they contribute to the decisive operation of their higher headquarters. The analysis results
yield the essential tasks that, with the purpose of the operation, clearly specify the action required. This
analysis produces the mission statement—a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s
essential task(s),purpose,and action containing the elements of who,what,when,where,and why (JP 5-0),
but seldom specifies how.
Commander’s Intent
4-66. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desired military end state that supports mission command,provides focus to the staff,and helps subordinate
and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even
when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). It is critical that staff planners receive the
commander’s intent as soon as possible after receiving the mission. The commander’s intent succinctly
describes what constitutes success for the operation. The commander conveys intent in a format determined
most suitable to the situation.
4-67. The commander’s intent may include the operation’s purpose,key tasks,and the conditions that define
the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation, the commander’s intent does not restate the
“why”of the mission statement. Rather,it describes the broader purpose of the unit’s operation in relationship
to the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations. Key tasks are those significant activities the
force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state (ADP 6-0). Key tasks are not specified tasks
for any subordinate unit;however,they may be sources of implied tasks. During execution—when significant
opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no longer fits the situation—subordinates use
key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired end state. End state is the set of required
conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0).
4-68. The commander’s intent links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A
clear commander’s intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that
represent mission accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs disciplined initiative.
The commander’s intent must be understood two echelons down.
Concept of Operations
4-69. Theconcept of operationsis a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate
to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state
(ADP 5-0). The BCT concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the
commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. The concept of operations states the principal tasks
required,the responsible subordinate unit,and how the principal tasks complement one another.
4-70. The BCT commander and staff use four components of the operational framework to help
conceptualize and describe the concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. First, the
commander is assigned an area of operations for the conduct of operations. Second, the commander can
designate deep, close, rear, and support areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and
space. Third, within this area, the commander conducts decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to
articulate the operation in terms of purpose. In the fourth and final component, the commander designates
the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting prioritization of resources. (See chapter 2 for a
detailed discussion on the operational framework.)
Note. The BCT does not conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless
tasked to do so,usually within a division consolidation area.
Task Organization
4-71. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission
(ADP5-0). The BCT commander establishes command and support relationships to task organize the force.
Command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Support relationships define the |
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purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Establishing clear command and
support relationships is fundamental to organizing any operation. The commander designates command and
support relationships to weight the decisive operation or main effort and support the concept of operations.
The commander considers two organizational principles when task organizing forces; maintain cohesive
mission teams and do not exceed subordinates’span of control capabilities.
Tasks to Subordinate Units
4-72. The BCT commander and staff assign tasks to subordinate units. The assignment of a task includes not
only the task (what), but also the unit (who), place (where), time (when), and purpose (why). A task is a
clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as
it is imposed by an appropriate authority (JP 1). Tasks are specific activities that direct friendly action and
contribute to mission accomplishment and other requirements. The purpose of each task should nest with
completing another task,achieving an objective,or attaining an end state condition.
Coordinating Instructions
4-73. Coordinating instructions pertain to the BCT as a whole. Examples include CCIRs,essential element
of friendly information(EEFI),fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures,rules
of engagement,risk reduction control measures,personnel recovery coordination measures,and the time the
operation order becomes effective or the condition of the BCT when the operation order becomes effective.
Risk Acceptance
4-74. The BCT commander uses judgment when identifying risk by deciding how much risk to accept and
by mitigating risk where possible. The commander accepts risk to create opportunities and reduces risk with
foresight and careful planning. Consideration of risk begins during planning as the commander, with the
support of the staff, complete a risk assessment for each COA and proposes control measures. They
collaborate and integrate input from higher and subordinate commanders and staffs, and unified action
partners. They determine how to manage identified risks. This includes delegating management of certain
risks to subordinate commanders who will develop appropriate mitigation measures. Commanders then
allocate the resources they deem appropriate to mitigate risks. Subordinates require commanders to
underwrite their own risk acceptance. (See paragraph 4-186 for a detailed discussion of risk management
[RM].)
Control Measures
4-75. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures can be
permissive (which allows something to happen) or restrictive (which limits how something is done) to prevent
units from impeding one another and to impose necessary coordination. Some control measures are graphic.
A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting
functions. (See ADP 1-02 for illustrations of graphic control measures and rules for their use.) Tailored to
the higher commander’s intent,the BCT commander assigns subordinate units’missions and imposes control
measures necessary to synchronize and maintain control over the operation.
4-76. The BCT commander or staff assigns graphical control measures such as boundaries and procedural
control measures such as target engagement priorities. The commander and staff must understand their
purposes and ramifications, including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of
action and initiative, to employ control measures effectively. Each control measure should have a specific
purpose and provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation. The commander uses
graphical and written control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate maneuver, and control the
airspace user.The BCT operations staff officer (S-3)nests all coordination measures to include movement
and maneuver control measures,fire support coordination measures,and airspace coordinating measures to
clarify responsibilities and tasks to reduce risk and facilitate effective military operations. (See FM3-90-1
and ADP 1-02 for additional information.) |
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Flexibility and Adaptability
4-77. The mission command approach provides flexibility and adaptability, allowing subordinates to
recognize and respond effectively to emerging conditions and to correct for the effects of fog and friction.
Control informed by a mission command approach provides information that allows commanders to base
their decisions and actions on the results of friendly and opponent actions,rather than rigid adherence to the
plan. Commanders seek to build flexibility and adaptability into their plans.
Support to Flexibility and Adaptability
4-78. Control allows organizations to respond to change, whether due to opponent or friendly actions, or
environmental conditions. Control supports flexibility and adaptability in two ways. First, it identifies the
need to change the plan. It does this through anticipating or forecasting possible opponent actions and by
identifying unexpected variances—opportunities or threats—from the plan. This occurs throughout the
operations process. Second,control helps commanders develop and implement options to respond to these
changes in a timely manner. Flexibility and adaptabilityprovided by the appropriate level of control reduces
an opposing force’s available options while maintaining or expanding friendly options. Effective control
provides for timely action before opposing forces can accomplish their objectives, allowing for the
modification of plans as the situation changes.
4-79. Instead of rigidly adhering to the plan,control focuses on information about emerging conditions. The
mission command approach to control provides flexibility by—
(cid:122) Allowing friendly forces to change theirtasks,their task organization,or their plan.
(cid:122) Producing information about options to respond to changing conditions.
(cid:122) Communicating the commander’s decisions quickly and accurately.
(cid:122) Providing for rapid reframing when the plan changes during execution.
(cid:122) Allowing collaborative planning to respond to the progress of operations.
Decisions Points
4-80. Adecision pointis a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key
decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). Decision points may be associated with the CCIRs,
the friendly force,and the status of ongoing operations that describe what information the commander needs
to make the anticipated decision. A decision point requires a decision by the commander. It does not dictate
what the decision is, only that the commander must make one, and when and where it should be made to
maximally impact friendly or enemy COAs or the accomplishment of stability operations tasks. Planners
record decision points on a decision support template(DST),decision support matrix(DSM),and execution
matrix.
4-81. Adecision support templateis a combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of
wargaming that depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the
operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action
(JP2-01.3). The DSTis refined as planning progresses and during execution. Part of the DSTis the DSM.
4-82. Thedecision support matrixis a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision
points and associated actions at those decision points (ADP 5-0). It lists decision points,locations of decision
points, criteria to be evaluated at decision points, actions that occur at decision points, and the units
responsible to act on the decision points. The DSMdescribes where and when a decision must be made if a
specific action occurs. It ties decision points to named area of interest (NAI), target area of interest(TAI),
CCIRs,collection assets,and potential friendly response options. The DSMis refined as planning progresses
and during execution:
(cid:122) Named area of interest—a geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that
will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected,usually to capture indications of
adversary courses of action (JP 2-01.3).
(cid:122) Target area of interest—the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and
engaged by friendly forces(JP 2-01.3). |
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4-83. Anexecution matrixis a visual representation of subordinatetasks in relationship to each other over
time(ADP 5-0). An execution matrix could be for the entire force,such as an air assault execution matrix,
or it may be specific to a warfighting function,such as a fire support execution matrix. The current operations
integration cell uses the execution matrix to determine which friendly actions to expect forces to execute in
the near term or,in conjunction with the DSM,which execution decisions to make.
Commander’sInformation Collection Effort
4-84. The BCT’s information collection effort answers CCIRs (specifically, priority intelligence
requirements and friendly force information requirements) and EEFI. The following key doctrinal terms and
definitions are used throughout this and other chapters. See referenced publications for additional
information:
(cid:122) Commander’s critical information requirements—an information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0).
(cid:122) Friendly force information requirement—information the commander and staff need to
understand the status of friendly and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0).
(cid:122) Priority intelligence requirement—an intelligence requirementthat the commander and staff need
to understand the threat andother aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01).
(cid:122) Essential element of friendly information—a critical aspect of a friendly operation that,if known
bya threat,would subsequently compromise,leadto failure,or limit success of the operation and
therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP6-0).
Flexible Plans
4-85. Flexible plans help the BCT adapt quickly to changing circumstances during operations. Flexible plans
provide options to the commander for addressing new or unforeseen circumstances during execution.
Ultimately,flexibility enables the commander to mitigate risk and develop options to where best to engage
the enemy. For example, the decision on where to fight the enemy is based on the commander and staff’s
clear understanding of the effects of the terrain,the enemy situation,and what the enemy is expected to do.
The commander and staff select the most advantageous location to fight the engagement and then determine
other possible locations where the engagement may occur based on a slower-or faster-than-expected enemy
advance or the enemy’s use of an unlikely avenue of approach (seefigure 4-4). The commander identifies
these areas as objectives,intermediate objectives,or engagement areas (EAs). Example EAoptions include—
(cid:122) Option EA Rain. Enemy lead elements cross phase line (PL) Nita, maneuver battalion engages
enemy in EA Rain (lead battalion elements vicinity PL Sally).
(cid:122) Option EA Hail. Enemy lead elements move east through NAI 3, maneuver battalion engages
enemy in EA Hail (lead battalion elements vicinity PL Tracy).
(cid:122) Option EA Snow. Enemy lead elements move east through NAI 4, maneuver battalion engages
enemy in EA Snow (lead battalion elements vicinity PL Tracy).
(cid:122) Option EA Sleet. Enemy lead elements cross PL Sue, maneuver battalion engages enemy in
EASleet (lead battalion elements vicinity PL Nita). |
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Figure 4-4. Decision points (planning options)
4-86. In coordination with the BCT, the battalion commander and staff in figure 4-4 develop control
measures to help coordinate actions throughout its assigned area of operation. The commander, primarily
assisted by the S-3 and S-2, develops decision points for the commitment of the battalion to each location
based on relative locations and rates of movement of the battalion and the enemy. In this example,the S-2
selected NAIs to identify the enemy’s rate and direction of movement to support the commander’s decision
of where to fight the engagement.
4-87. The commander and staff determine where andunder what conditions the reserve force is likely to be
employed in order to position it effectively. The commander provides specific planning guidance to the
reserve to include priority for planning. The reserve force commander analyzes assigned planningpriorities,
conducts the coordination with units that will be affected by maneuver and commitment, and provides
information to the commander and staff on routes and employment times to designated critical points on the
battlefield. The reserve commander should also expect to receive specific decision points and triggers for
employment on each contingency. This guidance allows the reserve commander to conduct quality rehearsals
and to anticipate commitment as the commandermonitors the fight.
Situational Understanding
4-88. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available
information and knowledge. Throughout the conduct of operations,the BCT commander (supported by the
staff and subordinate commanders and in coordination with unified action partners) seeks to build and
maintain situational understanding. Situational understanding—the product of applying analysis and
judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables
(ADP 6-0)—is used to facilitate decision-making. The BCT staff uses knowledge management and
information management to extract knowledge from the vast amount of available information. This enables
the staff to provide knowledge to the commander as recommendations and running estimates to help the
commander build and maintain situational understanding. |
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4-89. The BCT commander strives to create shared understanding of the operational environment, the
operation’s purpose, the problem, and approaches to solving the problem form the basis for unity of effort
and trust. Decentralized actions can perform in the context of shared understanding as if they were centrally
coordinated. Knowledge management helps create shared understanding through the alignment of people,
processes, and tools within the BCT’s organizational structure and culture to increase collaboration and
interaction. This results in better decisions and enables improved flexibility, adaptability, integration, and
synchronization to achieve a position of relative advantage. Knowledge management facilitates situational
understanding and acts as a catalyst for enhanced shared understanding.
4-90. Knowledge management and information management assist the commander with progressively
adding meaning at each level of processing and analyzing to help build and maintain situational
understanding. Knowledge management and information management are interrelated activities that support
the commander’s decision-making. Four levels of meaning,from the lowest level to the highest level,include
data, information, knowledge, and understanding. At the lowest level, processing transforms data into
information. Analysis then refines information into knowledge. The BCT commander and staff then apply
judgment to transform knowledge into understanding. Commanders and staffs continue a progressive
development of learning, as organizations and individuals assign meaning and value at each level. (See
figure4-5.)
Figure 4-5. Achieving understanding
4-91. In typical organizations, data often flows to CPs from subordinate units. In the context of
decision-making, data consists of unprocessed observations detected by a collector of any kind (human,
mechanical,or electronic) (ADP 6-0). Subordinate units push data to inform higher headquarters of events
that facilitate situational understanding. Data can be quantified,stored,and organized in files and databases;
however,data only becomes useful when processedinto information.
4-92. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect,
process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products (ADP 6-0). In
the context of decision-making,informationis data that has been organized and processed in order to provide
context for further analysis (ADP 6-0). Information management supports,underpins,and enables knowledge
management. Information management and knowledge management link to facilitate understanding and
decision-making. Information management is a technical discipline that involves the planning, storage,
manipulating,and controlling of information throughout its life cycle in support of the commander and staff.
Information management provides a structure so commanders and staffs can process and communicate
relevant information and make decisions. The signal staff officer (see paragraph 4-199) of the BCT enables
knowledge management by providing network architecture and the technological tools necessary to support
content management and knowledge sharing.
4-93. Knowledge managementis the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding,
learning,and decision-making (ADP 6-0). In the context of decision-making,knowledgeisinformation that
has been analyzed and evaluated for operational implications (ADP 6-0). Knowledge flow refers to the ease
of movement of knowledge within and among organizations. Knowledge must flow to be useful. Effective
and efficient use of knowledge in conducting operations and supporting organizational learning are essential
functions of knowledge management. The BCT executive officer (XO)is the senior knowledge management
officer in the BCT and advises the commander on knowledge management policy. The XO is responsible for
directing the activities of each staff section and subordinate unit to capture and disseminate organizational
knowledge. When staffed, a knowledge management officer (see paragraph 4-217 and FM 6-0), working
through the XO, is responsible for developing the knowledge management plan that integrates and
synchronizes knowledge and information management within the BCT. |
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4-94. The staff task of ‘conduct knowledge management and information management’ is essential to the
command and control warfighting function and entails the continuous application of the knowledge
management process of assess, design, develop, pilot, and implement activities designed to capture and
distribute knowledge throughout the organization. The assessment step begins with determining what
information leaders need to make decisions,and how the unit provides information for those leaders. Design
is identifying tailored frameworks for knowledge management products or services that effectively and
efficiently answer information requirements and meet the objectives established in the assessment. Develop
is the step that actually builds the solution derived fromthe assessment and design steps. Pilot is the phase
that deploys the knowledge management solution and tests and validates it with the unit. Implement is the
phase that executes the validated knowledge management plan and integrates it into the unit information
systems. (SeeATP 6-01.1 for additional information.)
Note. The design step of the knowledge management process differs from and should not be
confused with Army design methodology. (See paragraph 4-47 for information on Army design
methodology.)
4-95. The knowledge management process, used throughout the operations process, puts the knowledge
management plan into practice. Example activities involved in the conduct of knowledge management and
information management will involve assessments and preparation activities, and reporting, refinement of
communications, and collaborative processes. Assessments are critical to the conduct of knowledge
management and information management providing feedback to the organization on what is effective.
Preparation activities help the commander and staff,and subordinates understand the situation and their roles
in upcoming operations. Based on this improved situational understanding,the commander refines the plan,
as required, before execution with reporting, refinement of communications, and collaborative processes
enabling mission execution.
4-96. Understanding is judgment applied to knowledge in the context of a particular situation. In the context
of decision-making, understanding is knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to
comprehend the situation’s inner relationships, enable decision-making, and drive action (ADP 6-0).
Understanding is knowing enough about the situation to change it by applying action. Judgment is based on
experience,expertise,and intuition. Ideally,true understanding should be the basis for decisions. However,
uncertainty and time preclude achieving perfect understanding before deciding and acting. (SeeFM 6-0 and
ATP 6-01.1 for additional activities involved in the conduct of knowledge and information management.)
PREPARE
4-97. Preparationis those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an
operation (ADP 5-0). The MDMP drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, the BCT
commander and staff, as stewards of the Army Profession, conduct a time analysis early in the planning
process. This analysis helps them determine what actions they need to take and when to begin those actions
to ensure forces are ready and in position before execution. The plan may require the commander to direct
subordinates to start necessary movements; conduct task organization changes; begin reconnaissance,
surveillance,security operations,and intelligence operations (see chapter 5);and execute other preparation
activities before completing the plan. Conduct rehearsal activities are highlighted in paragraphs 4-99 to
4-104.
Preparation Activities
4-98. Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. Subordinate and supporting leaders
and units of the BCT need enough time to understand plans well enough to execute them and develop their
plans and preparations for the operation. After they fully comprehend the plan,subordinate leaders rehearse
key portions of the plan and ensure Soldiers position themselves and their equipment to execute the operation.
The BCT conducts the activities listed in table 4-1 on page 4-24 to help ensure the force is protected and
prepared for execution. (SeeADP 5-0 for additional information.) |
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Table4-1. Preparation activities
(cid:120) Coordinate and establishliaison (cid:120) Initiate sustainment preparation
(cid:120) Initiate information collection (cid:120) Initiate network preparations
(cid:120) Initiate security operations (cid:120) Manage terrain
(cid:120) Initiate troop movement (cid:120) Prepare terrain
(cid:120) Complete task organization (cid:120) Conduct confirmation briefs
(cid:120) Integrate new units and Soldiers (cid:120) Conduct rehearsals
(cid:120) Train (cid:120) Conduct plans to operations transitions
(cid:120) Conduct pre-operations checks and inspections (cid:120) Revise and refine the plan
(cid:120) Supervise
Conduct Rehearsals
4-99. The BCT conducts rehearsals to prepare for upcoming operations. A rehearsal is a session in which
the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution
(ADP5-0). Four primary types of rehearsals are the backbrief,combined arms rehearsal,support rehearsal,
and battle drill or SOP rehearsal. Methods for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the commander’s
imagination and available resources. The BCT commander uses rehearsals as a tool to ensure the staff and
subordinates understand the concept of operations and commander’s intent. The extent of rehearsals depends
on available time. In cases of short-notice requirements,a detailed rehearsal may not be possible.
4-100. The BCT commander often issues orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring quick
reactions. At battalion and higher levels, written fragmentary orders confirm verbal orders to ensure
synchronization, integration, and notification of all parts of the force. If time permits, leaders verify that
subordinates understand critical tasks. Methods for doing this include the backbrief—a briefing by
subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend toaccomplish their mission (FM 6-0) and
confirmation brief—a briefing subordinate leaders give to the higher commander immediately after the
operation order is given to confirm understanding (ADP 5-0).It is their understanding of the commander’s
intent, their specific tasks, and the relationship between their mission and the other units’ mission in the
operation. Commanders conduct backbriefs and confirmation briefs between themselves and within staff
elements to ensure mutual understanding.
4-101. A mission command or command and control rehearsal ensures that all subordinate elements main
CP and tactical CP locations,jump timelines,and battle handovers are synchronized with the maneuver plan.
Additionally, the mission command or command and control rehearsal ensures that the locations of the
commanders, succession of command, primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE)
communicationplans,and priorities of signal maintenance and signal support are understood.
4-102. Support rehearsals help synchronize each warfighting function with the BCT’s overall operation.
Throughout preparation, the BCT conducts support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited
number of warfighting functions. These rehearsals typically involve coordination and procedure drills for
sustainment, aviation, fires, engineer support, casualty evacuation, and medical evacuation. Support
rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations for the operation. Units may conduct
rehearsals separately and then combine them into full dress rehearsals. Although these rehearsals differ
slightly by warfighting function,they achieve the same result.
4-103. A battle drill—rehearsed and well understood actions made in response to common battlefield
occurrences (ADP 3-90)—orSOPrehearsal ensures that all participants understand a technique or a specific
set of procedures. A battle drill is a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate
decision-making process. All echelons use these rehearsal types; however, they are most common for
platoons, squads, sections, and teams. Units conduct rehearsals throughout preparation; rehearsals are not
limited to published battle drills. Battle drills require a “go”order instead of a plan. All echelons can rehearse
such actions as a CP shift change,an obstacle breach lane marking SOP,or a refuel on the move(known as
ROM)site operation. |
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4-104. Subordinate units conduct rehearsals after they complete their plans and issue orders, if possible.
Rehearsals allow subordinate leaders and Soldiers to practice synchronizing operations at times and places
critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals throughout the BCT imprint a mental picture of the
sequence of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding and coordination of subordinate
and supporting leaders and units. Four common rehearsals at the BCT level,although not inclusive,are the
reconnaissance and security rehearsal,the fire support rehearsal,the sustainment rehearsal and the combined
arms rehearsal addressed in paragraphs 4-105through 4-116. (SeeFM 6-0 for additional information.)
Reconnaissance and Security Rehearsal
4-105. The BCT conducts reconnaissance and security rehearsals to ensure that the correct information is
gathered;and that units and Soldiers gathering the required information have a sound plan for insertion and
extraction. Usually, the BCT commander, XO, S-2, S-3, fire support coordinator (field artillery battalion
commander) and fire support officer, brigade assistant engineer, Cavalry squadron commander, other
subordinate maneuver commanders as required, and military intelligence company commander attend the
rehearsal. Other BCT staff cells and elements should have a representative attending (for example, signal,
sustainment, information operations, protection, aviation, psychological operations (PSYOP), cyberspace
operations,and civil affairs operations).
4-106. The reconnaissance and security rehearsal should last no more than one hour. The documents needed
to run the reconnaissance and security rehearsal includes the information collection matrix,the information
collection overlay, the reconnaissance and security overlay, and the enemy situation template and event
template and its associated matrix (see chapter 5). Rehearse the most important NAI first, then those that
answer the BCT commander’s priority intelligence requirements. Continue to rehearse subsequent NAIs as
time permits. Each participating commander confirms the purpose (such as priority intelligence
requirements) and location (such as an NAI) for each of the collection assets. Commanders also confirm to
whom the information is reported and the means of communicating that information.
Note.Due to the inherent risk associated with surveillance and reconnaissanceteams/units must
rehearse withdrawal under fire and “in extremis”extraction to include supporting aviation (both
lift and attack assets).
Fire Support Rehearsal
4-107. The BCT fire support rehearsal is crucial to mission accomplishment because it ensures that fires—
the use of weapons systems or other action to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target
(JP3-09)—synchronize with the scheme of maneuver. The fire support rehearsal focuses on maximizing the
ability of fire support systems to support the maneuver plan and achieve the commander’s intent.
4-108. The fire support rehearsal (including any augmenting fire support from the division artillery or a
field artillery brigade) may be used to prepare for a combined arms rehearsal or it may be used after a
combined arms rehearsal to refine and reinforce key fire support tasks. If the fire support rehearsal is held
first,changes from the combined arms rehearsal may require a second fire support rehearsal. If a combined
arms rehearsal is not conducted,a fire support rehearsal may serve as the primary preparation for execution
of the fire support plan. The unit may conduct the field artillery tactical rehearsal either before or after the
fire support rehearsal. The field artillery technical rehearsal is always held last after the target refinement
cutoff time.
4-109. The BCT commander, XO, S-3, and subordinate units attend the fire support rehearsal. The BCT
staff officers attending include the air liaison officer,assistant brigade engineer(known as ABE),chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer, air and missile defense officer, and brigade aviation
officer. Subordinate units often bring personnel that include the S-3,the fire support officer,scout,and mortar
platoon leaders. Representatives of reinforcing fire support units should participate when possible. The BCT
field artillery battalion commander assisted by the BCT fire support officer usually supervises the rehearsal
for the BCT commander. |
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4-110. The fire support rehearsal should last no more than 90 minutes and should ensure the synchronization
of the fire support effort withthe maneuver plan. The maneuver plan includes ensuring observers are in the
proper location at the proper time to observe planned targets, commonly known as the BCT commander’s
observation plan.
4-111. Time is inevitably short, so the rehearsal focuses on the critical portions of the plan, to include
preplanned fires, and to ensure Soldiers correctly integrate and synchronize within the operational
framework. Additionally, the fire support rehearsal should address action during degraded or intermittent
communications to ensure interoperability to preserve the effectiveness of the force and maintain the
initiative over the enemy. The critical document supporting the fire support rehearsal is the fire support
execution matrix,which includes all fire support tasks.To conduct the fire support rehearsal,the BCT follows
the same procedures outlined in the combined arms rehearsal sequence of events.
Sustainment Rehearsal
4-112. The BCT sustainment rehearsal ensures the synchronization of sustainment efforts before, during,
and after combat operations. The sustainment rehearsal validates the who, what, when, where, and how of
support. The sustainment rehearsal usually occurs after the combined arms and fire support rehearsals,which
should not last more than 90 minutes.
4-113. The brigade support battalion(BSB)commander hosts the rehearsal for the BCT commander. The
support operations officer facilitates the rehearsal to ensure rehearsal of critical sustainment events. BCT
attendees include the BCT XO, personnel staff officer (S-1), surgeon, chaplain, S-2 representatives, S-3
representatives, logistics staff officer (S-4) representatives, and signal staff officer (S-6) representatives.
Subordinate unit representatives include the BSB commander, the support operations officer, the brigade
support medical company (known as BSMC) commander, and each maneuver battalion XO, S-1, S-4, and
medical platoon leader,as well as the forward support company (FSC) commander,mobility warrantofficer,
and distribution company commander. The primary document used at the sustainment rehearsal is the
sustainment synchronization matrix. (Seechapter 9for additional information.)
Combined Arms Rehearsal
4-114. The combined arms rehearsal ensures that subordinate plans synchronize with those of other units,
and that subordinate commanders understand the intent of the higher headquarters. Usually, the BCT
commander, XO, primary staff, and subordinate battalion commanders and their S-3s attend the rehearsal.
Based upon the type of operation,the commander can modify the audience, such as the commander of the
BCT reserve and attachments to the BCT. If invited,flank units and the higher headquarters may attend the
combined arms rehearsal if time and distances permit.The combined arms rehearsal is a critical opportunity
for enablers to synchronize activities in support of the BCT.
4-115. The execution matrix,DST,and operation order outline the rehearsal agenda. These tools,especially
the execution matrix, drive and focus the rehearsal. The commander and staff use them to control the
operation’s execution. Any templates,matrixes,or tools developed within each of the warfighting functions
should tie directly to the supported unit’s execution matrix and DST. Examples include an intelligence
synchronization matrix orfires execution matrix.
4-116. The combined arms rehearsal should last no more than two hours; however, the combined arms
rehearsal is METT-TC dependent,so if the time allotted is insufficient to rehearse the entire operation,the
staff must give priority to those critical events that demand a rehearsal. The staff rehearses the most important
events first and continues to rehearse subsequent events as time permits. Rehearsals that integrate airspace
use facilitate synchronization of operations and validate airspace user priorities and requirements. All
combined arms rehearsal participants arrive at the rehearsal prepared to talk their portion of the operation.
EXECUTE
4-117. Executionis the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission
and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation (ADP 5-0). The BCT commander positions where
best to exercise command and control by applying military expertise ensuring the ethical application of force
during execution. This may be forward of the main or tactical command post (TAC [graphic]) to provide |
3-96 | 107 | Mission Command
command presence,sense the mood of the unit,and to make personal observations. Forward presence of the
commander also serves to inspire Soldiers by personal example of the commander’s commitment to the
mission. A position forward of the CPs and near the main effort or decisive operation facilitates an assessment
of the situation and timely decision-making. Staffs synchronize actions, coordinate actions, inform the
commander, and provide control to support the commander’s ability to assess, use professional judgment,
and make decisions.
4-118. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process is a technique usedduring execution. While
the MDMP seeks the optimal solution,the rapid decision-making and synchronization process seeks a timely
and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission,and concept of operations. While identified
here with a specific name and method,the commander and staff develop this capability through training and
practice. When using this technique,the following considerations apply:
(cid:122) Rapid is often more important than process.
(cid:122) Much ofit may be mental rather than written.
(cid:122) It should become a battle drill for the current operations cell,and when established,the plans cell.
4-119. Using the rapid decision-making and synchronization process lets leaders avoid the time-consuming
requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing COAs. As operational and mission variables
change during execution, this often invalidates or weakens COAs and decision criteria before leaders can
make a decision. Under the rapid decision-making and synchronization process, leaders combine their
experience and intuition to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine
workableCOAs.
4-120. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process facilitates continuously integrating and
synchronizing the warfighting functions to address ever-changing situations. This process meets the
following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:
(cid:122) It is comprehensive,integrating all warfighting functions. It is not limited to any one-warfighting
function.
(cid:122) It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander’s intent
and concept of operations.
(cid:122) It allows rapid changes to the order or mission.
(cid:122) It is continuous,allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.
4-121. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process is based on an existing order and the
commander’s priorities as expressed in the order. The most important of these control measures are the
commander’s intent, concept of operations, and CCIRs. The rapid decision-making and synchronization
process includes five steps (see figure 4-6). The first two may be performed in any order, including
concurrently. The last three are performed interactively until commanders identify an acceptable COA. (See
FM 6-0 for additional information.)
Figure 4-6. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process |
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ASSESS
4-122. Assessmentis the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task,creating a condition,
or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment is continuous;it precedes and guides every operationsprocess
activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. The BCT commander and staff conduct
assessments by monitoring the current situation to collect information;evaluating progress towards attaining
end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks; and recommending or directing action to
modify or improve the existing COA. The commander establishes priorities for assessment in planning
guidance, CCIRs, EEFI, and decision points. By prioritizing the effort, the commander avoids excessive
analyses when assessing operations.
4-123. Throughout the operations process, the BCT commander’s personal assessment is integrated with
those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. Primary tools for assessing
progress of the operation include the operation order,the COP,personal observations,running estimates,and
the assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance
(MOPs), and reframing criteria. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for the commander’s
personal assessment of progress. Running estimates provide information,conclusions,and recommendations
from the perspective of each staff section. (See ADP 5-0 for the assessment process during the operations
process.)
Assessment Plan Development
4-124. Critical to the assessment process (see paragraph 4-128) is developing an assessment plan. The BCT
uses an assessment working group (when established) to develop assessment plans when appropriate. A
working groupis a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis,coordinate,
and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function (FM 6-0). A critical element of the
commander’s planning guidance is determining which assessment plan to develop. An assessment plan
focused on attainment of end state conditions often works well. It is also possible,and may be desirable,to
develop an entire formal assessment plan for an intermediate objective,a named operation subordinate to the
base operation plan,or a named operation focused solely on a single line of operations or geographic area.
The time, resources, and added complexity involved in generating an assessment plan strictly limit the
number of such efforts.
4-125. The BCT commander and staff integrate and develop an assessment plan within the MDMP. As the
commander and staff begin mission analysis,they also need to determine how to measure progress towards
the operation’s end state.
4-126. In order to measure progress towards an objective,criteria are established which provide measurable
points from which analysis can be conducted. The staff then determines the method to collect on these criteria.
The criteria or individual criterion may require specific means of measurement. These types of measurement
fall under the categories of quantitative measurement and qualitative measurement. Quantitative
measurement is observations that are based on measurements and numbers. For example, the number of
violent incidents per day in a city block. Qualitative measurements are observations that are not based on
measurements and numbers. They typically involve using the senses,knowledge,or insights. For example,
the reason why there has been an increase or decrease in violent incidents in a city block. In regard to human
behavior, analysis of quantitative measurements should be tempered with qualitative analysis whenever
possible.
4-127. During planning, the commander and staff or assessment working group (when established)
develops an assessment plan using six steps. FM 6-0 provides a detailed discussion on each step during
assessment plan development. The six steps are—
(cid:122) Step 1—Gather tools and assessment data.
(cid:122) Step 2—Understand current and desired conditions.
(cid:122) Step 3—Develop an assessment framework.
(cid:122) Step 4—Develop the collection plan.
(cid:122) Step 5—Assign responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations.
(cid:122) Step 6—Identify feedback mechanisms. |
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Assessment Process
4-128. Once the commander and staff or assessment working group (when established) develops the
assessment plan, it applies the assessment process of monitor, evaluate, and recommend or direct
continuously throughout preparation and execution. (See ADP 5-0 for the assessment process during the
operations process in detail.)Broadly,assessment consists of,butis not limited to,the following activities—
Monitoring
4-129. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation
(ADP5-0). Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information,
specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation
described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective
decisions made,without an accurate understanding of the current situation.
4-130. Staff elements record relevant information in running estimates. Staff elements maintain a
continuous assessment of current operations to determine if they are proceeding according to the
commander’s intent, mission,and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff elements use this
new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.
Evaluating
4-131. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s
progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Evaluating is
using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of
progress exists (ADP 5-0). Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis
occurs. Evaluation helps the commander determine what is working,what is not working,and insights into
how to better accomplish the mission.
4-132. Criteria in the form of MOE and MOP aid in evaluating progress. MOEs help determine if a task is
achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are
simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information
asindicators for evaluation.
4-133. A measure of effectiveness is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change
indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0).MOEs help measure changes in conditions,
both positive and negative.MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans. MOEs help
to answer the question,“Are we doing the right things?”
4-134. Ameasure of performanceis an indicatorused to assess afriendly action that is tied to measuring
task accomplishment (JP 5-0). MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?”or“Were the
tasks completed to standard?”A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are
commonly found and tracked at all echelons in execution matrixes. MOPs are also commonly used to evaluate
training. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things, right?” There is no direct hierarchical
relationship among MOPs to MOEs. MOPsdo not feed MOEs or combine in any way to produce MOEs—
MOPs simply measure the performance of a task.
4-135. Anindicator,in the context of assessment,is a specific piece of information that infers the condition,
state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness
(JP5-0). Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and information
requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?”A
single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs.
Recommending or Directing Action
4-136. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without
recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems,but unless it results in recommended
adjustments,its use to the commander is limited. |
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4-137. When developing recommendations, staffs draw from many sources and consider their
recommendations within the larger context of the operation. While several ways to improve a particular
aspect of the operation might exist,some recommendations could impact other aspects of the operation. As
with all recommendations,staffs should address any future implications.
PARALLEL, COLLABORATIVE, AND DISTRIBUTED PLANNING
4-138. Whether planning deliberately or rapidly,all planning requires the skillful use of available time to
optimize planning and preparation throughout the BCT. Taking more time to plan often results in greater
synchronization;however,any delay in execution risks yielding the initiative-with more time to prepare and
act-to the enemy. When allocating planning time to subordinate unit commanders,the BCT commander must
ensure subordinates have enough time to plan and prepare their own actions beforeexecution. Both parallel,
collaborative,and distributed planning help optimize available planning time. Parallel planning allows each
echelon to make maximum use of time available. Collaborative planning is the real-time interaction of
commanders and staffs. Distributed planning allows the commander and staff members to execute planning
from different locations.
PARALLEL PLANNING
4-139. Parallel planningis two or more echelons planning for the same operations nearly simultaneously
facilitated by the use of warning orders by the higher headquarters (ADP 5-0). Parallel planning requires
significant interaction between echelons. Parallel planning can happen only when higher headquarters
produces timely warning orders and shares information with subordinate headquarters as it becomes available
(seefigure 4-7).
Figure 4-7. Parallel planning |
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COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
4-140. Collaborative planningistwo or more echelons planning together in real time,sharing information,
perceptions,and ideasto develop their respective plans simultaneously (ADP 5-0). Collaborative planning is
the real-time interaction among commanders and staffs at two or more echelons developing plans for a single
operation. It must be used judiciously.
4-141. Collaborative planning is most appropriate when time is scarce,and a limited number of options are
being considered. It is particularly useful when the commander and staff can benefit from the input of
subordinate commanders and staffs.
4-142. Collaborative planning is not appropriate when the staff is working a large number of COAs or
branches and sequels,many of which will be discarded. In this case,involving subordinates wastes precious
time working options that are later discarded. Collaborative planning also is often not appropriate during
ongoing operations in which extended planning sessions take commanders and staffs away from conducting
current operations.
4-143. As a rule of thumb,if the commander is directly involved in time-sensitive planning,some level of
collaborative planning probably is needed. The commander,not the staff,must make the decision to conduct
collaborative planning. Only the commander can commit subordinate commanders to using their time for
collaborative planning.
DISTRIBUTED PLANNING
4-144. Digital communications and information systems enable members of the same staff to execute the
MDMP without being collocated. Distributed planning saves time and increases the accuracy of available
information in that it allows for the rapid transmission of voice and data information,which can be used by
staffs over a wide geographical area. (See ATP 3-12.3 for information on appropriate electromagnetic
protection[EP]active and passive measures.)
INTEGRATING PROCESSES
4-145. Throughout the operations process, the BCT commander and staff integrate warfighting functions
to synchronize the force according to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The commander
and staff use integrating processes (see ADP 5-0)to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations
process in addition to the major activities. The integrating processes are intelligence preparation of the
battlefield(IPB)(see ATP 2-01.3),information collection (see FM 3-55),targeting (see ATP 3-60),RM(see
ATP 5-19),and knowledge management (see ATP 6-01.1).
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
4-146. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission
variables of enemy,terrain,weather,and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect
on operations (ATP 2-01.3). Led by the BCT S-2, the entire staff participates in the IPB to develop and
sustain an understanding of the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify
options available to friendly and threat forces.
4-147. During planning, the commander focuses activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing,
while directing and assessing. The IPB is one of the processes the commander uses to aid in planning (see
ATP 2-01.3). The IPB consists of four steps. Each step is performed or assessed and refined to ensure that
IPB products remain complete and relevant. Figure 4-8 on page 4-32 shows the relationship between IPB
and the steps of the MDMP along with key inputs and outputs during the process. The four IPB steps are—
(cid:122) Define the operational environment.
(cid:122) Describe environmental effects on operations.
(cid:122) Evaluate the threat.
(cid:122) Determine threat COAs. |
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Figure 4-8. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the military decision-making process
4-148. IPB supports all activities of the operations processandidentifies gaps in current intelligence. IPB
results in intelligence products that are used during the MDMP to assist in developing friendly COAs and
decision points for the commander. IPB products help the commander and staff,and subordinate commanders
and leaders understand the threat,physical environment,and civil considerations throughout the operations
process. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products (which are included in the intelligence
estimate) developed during IPB are critical to planning information collection and targeting operations. (See
ATP 2-01.3 for additional information.) IPB products include—
(cid:122) Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and high-value target (HVT) lists.
(cid:122) Event templates and associated event matrices.
(cid:122) Modified combined obstacle overlays,terrain effects matrices,and terrain assessments.
(cid:122) Weather effects work aids—weather forecast charts, weather effects matrices, light and
illumination tables,and weather estimates.
(cid:122) Civil considerations overlays and assessments. |
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INFORMATION COLLECTION
4-149. Information collectionis an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment
of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of
current and future operations (FM 3-55). Information collection integrates intelligence and operations staff
functions, specifically information collection capabilities, focused on answering information requirements.
FM 3-55 describes an information collection capability as any human or automated sensor, asset, or
processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities that can be directed to collect information that
enables better decision-making, expands understanding of the operational environment, and supports
warfighting functions in decisive action. Key aspects of information collection, addressed below, influence
how the BCT operates as a ground force in close and continuous contact with the environment, including the
enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations.
Commander and Staff Input
4-150. The BCT commander is the most important participant in collection management. The initial
commander’s intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs form the foundation of the information collection plan
and the basis for assessing its execution. The brigade operations staff officer (S-3) is responsible for the
information collection plan and is the tasking authority for collection assets within the BCT. It is important
that the entire staff (led by the S-3) collaborate closely to ensure information collection activities are fully
synchronized and integrated into the overall operation order.
4-151. Effective planning requirements and assessing collection focuses information collection activities
on obtaining the information required by commanders and staffs to influence decisions and operations.
Planning requirements and assessing collection—
(cid:122) Includes commander and staff efforts to synchronize and integrate information collection tasks
throughout the operations process.
(cid:122) Supports the commander’s situational understanding and visualization of the operation by—
(cid:131) Identifying information gaps.
(cid:131) Coordinating assets and resources against requirements for information to fill these gaps.
(cid:131) Assessing the collected information and intelligence to inform the commander’s decisions.
(cid:122) Supports the staff during all operations process activities, and integrating processes, for example,
during IPB and the MDMP, as well as the RM, targeting, and operations and intelligence processes
(see chapter 3).
4-152. During planning and preparation, the operations and intelligence staffs, or the operations and
intelligence working group (if formed), work to develop the information collection plan and the staff products
required to execute it. During execution, they oversee execution of the plan, keeping the staff products current
and using them to keep information collection efforts synchronized with the overall operation. The staff
updates planning requirements as operations unfold and modify the plan as necessary to satisfy new
information requirements that emerge. (See ATP 2-01 for additional information.)
Note. Depending on the availability of personnel, the BCT commander may designate an
operations and intelligence-working group. The S-3 and intelligence staff officer (S-2) direct and
manage the efforts of this working group to achieve a fully synchronized and integrated
information collection plan.
Develop Understanding
4-153. The integration and synchronization of knowledge and information facilitates the BCT commander’s
situational understanding for any problem set and the staff’s shared understanding. Knowledge is the
precursor to effective action (especially within large-scale combat operations) across physical domains and
the dimensions of the information environment. Acquiring information about an operational environment
requires aggressive and continuous information collection operations. The BCT commander uses information |
3-96 | 114 | Chapter 4
collection to plan, organize, and execute shaping operations that answer the CCIRs no matter what element
of decisive action currently dominates. (See figure 4-9.)
Figure 4-9. Development of understanding
Develop and Manage Requirements
4-154. Developing requirements is the continuous process of identifying, prioritizing, and refining gaps in
data, relevant information, and knowledge concerning relevant aspects of the operational environment. The
BCT staff must resolve these gaps in order for the commander to achieve situational understanding. Constant
collaboration among all staff sections helps in redefining information requirements as the situation develops.
Requirements are generally captured as information requirements; the two types of information requirements
are CCIRs and EEFI (see figure 5-5 on page 5-17). Identifying information requirements assists the BCT
commander and staff in filtering available information by defining what is important to mission
accomplishment.
4-155. For requirements management, there are two types of requirements that result from planning
requirements and assessing collection: priority intelligence requirements that are part of the CCIRs, and
information requirements. (See figure 4-10.) Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements
may focus on threat units or on capabilities the threat requires to complete missions and tasks. Each
requirement is further refined into discrete pieces of information that together answer that requirement. These
pieces are referred to as indicators and specific information requirements. Use the indicators and to develop
the information collection plan. (See ATP 2-01 and ATP 2-19.4 foradditional information.) |
3-96 | 115 | Mission Command
Figure 4-10. Relationship between priority intelligence requirements, indicators, and specific
information requirements
Information Collection Planning
4-156. The information collection plan sets information collection in motion. The primary information
collection planning objective is tasking subordinate units (all possible assets for example—military
intelligence, maneuver, military police, fires, signal, engineer, sustainment, and aviation) to cover NAIs
important to the BCT mission or directed by higher headquarters. (See ATP 2-19.4,appendix C and ATP2-01
for specific information on the information collection plan.) The information collection plan is based on—
(cid:122) The commander’s initial information collection guidance.
(cid:122) Key information gaps identified by the staff during mission analysis.
(cid:122) The enemy situation template, event template, and event matrix developed during IPB.
Information Collection Tasks
4-157. During planning, information collection tasks are specified or implied. Subordinate units plan the
use of available information collection assets to satisfy BCT taskings as well as their own requirements. Units
strive to complete their plans quickly,so these assets have time to prepare and execute the plan. Collection
involves the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements and
consists of the following tasks:
(cid:122) Plan requirements and assess collection.
(cid:122) Task and direct collection.
(cid:122) Execute collection.
4-158. Information collection requires a continuous, collaborative, and parallel planning process involving
the BCT, its higher headquarters, and subordinate battalion staffs. Subordinate battalion and separate
company plans are consolidated and included in the BCT information collection plan. The commander at
each echelon must be intimately involved in the information collection planning process and must quickly
and clearly articulate priority intelligence requirements to the staff. |
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4-159. Plan requirements and assess collection is a commander-driven, coordinated staff effort led by BCT
S-2, in coordination with the BCT S-3. The continuous functions of planning requirements and assessing
collection identify the best way to satisfy a requirement. These functions are not necessarily sequential.
4-160. The BCT S-3 (based on recommendations from the staff, specifically the S-2) tasks, directs, and,
when necessary, retasks the information collection assets. Tasking and directing of limited information
collection assets are vital to their control and effective use. The staff accomplishes tasking information
collection by issuing warning orders, fragmentary orders, and operation orders. The staff accomplishes
directing information collection assets by continuously monitoring the operation. The staff conducts
retasking to refine, update, or create new requirements.
4-161. Executing collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical missions (normally
reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations). Information acquired during
collection activities about the threat and the area of interest is provided to intelligence processing and
exploitation elements. Typically, collection activities begin soon after receipt of mission and continue
throughout preparation for and execution of the operation. They do not cease at the conclusion of the mission
but continue as required. This allows the commander to focus combat power, execute current operations, and
prepare for future operations simultaneously.
Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection Functions
4-162. Collection management is the task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets (internal
and external), recommending taskings to the operations staff for information collection assets, submitting
requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the
information collection plan. The continuous functions of collection management identify the best way to
satisfy the requirements of the supported commander and staff. These functions are not necessarily
sequential. Collection management inherently requires an understanding of the relative priority of incoming
requests for collection and processing, exploitation, and dissemination. Additionally, collection management
includes the staff vetting requirements against current intelligence holdings to ensure resources are not wasted
collecting information that is already available. (See figure 4-11.) |
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Figure 4-11. Planning requirements and assessing collection functions
4-163. After receiving inputs from the BCT commander and staff—intent, planning guidance, and
requirements—the intelligence staff, in close coordination with the operations staff, performs the planning
requirements and assessing collection functions. (See ATP 2-01, chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the
planning requirements and assessing collection functions.) The planning requirements and assessing |
3-96 | 118 | Chapter 4
collection functions are the basis for creating an information collection plan that synchronizes activities of
the information collection effort to enable the commander’s visualization and situational understanding. The
intelligence staff, in coordination with the operations staff, monitors available collection assets and assesses
their ability to provide the required information. They also recommend adjustments to new requirements or
locations of information collection assets, if required.
4-164. The initial information collection plan is crucial to begin or adjust the information collection effort.
The initial information collection plan sets reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence
operations in motion, and may be issued as part of a warning order or fragmentary order. As more information
becomes available, the initial information collection plan is updated and issued as a part of the operation
order.
4-165. During this process, it is important for the S-3 and S-2 to collaborate closely in order to ensure
information collection activities are fully synchronized and integrated into the BCT’s, to include higher and
subordinate unit, plan(s). The intelligence staff creates initial planning requirements tools (information
collection matrix, information collection synchronization matrix, and information collection overlay) before
the S-3 can develop the completed information collectionplan. Figure 4-12is an example of an information
collection overlay used in the development of the information collection plan. (See ATP2-19.4 and ATP2-01
for additional information.) |
3-96 | 119 | Mission Command
Figure 4-12. Notional information collection overlay
Collector and Processor Availability, Capability, and Limitation
4-166. The BCT intelligence cell must know collectors and processors available within the BCT and
echelons above and below. The cell must know how to access those assets and resources to support the
collection plan. Theater and joint echelons apportion information collection resources to subordinate
echelons. Corps and divisions allocate support and intelligence capabilities to the BCT. The intelligence cell |
3-96 | 120 | Chapter 4
must understand the system of apportionment and allocation to determine what is available and what can be
requested by analyzing the higher headquarters order, reviewing the various scheduling or tracking
mechanisms, and collaborating across echelons.
4-167. Soldiers within the intelligence cell must know and addressthe practical capabilities and limitations
of BCT (and available external to the BCT) information collection assets and the capability of subordinates
to provide information. Capability and limitation issues (although not inclusive) include—
(cid:122) Range (duration and distance) to provide require target coverage.
(cid:122) Day and night effectiveness through available optic and thermal crossover.
(cid:122) Technical characteristics to see/operate through fog or other obscurant/hostile electromagnetic
warfare (EW).
(cid:122) Reporting timeliness regarding established reporting criteria for each collection asset.
(cid:122) Geolocation accuracy (reliability and precision).
(cid:122) Durability to move across restricted terrain, launch in high winds or limited visibility.
(cid:122) Ability to obtain and report required enemy activity.
(cid:122) Sustainability requirements for extended duration operations (fuel capacity/maintenance issues).
(cid:122) Vulnerability to enemy in route and in the target area.
(cid:122) Performance history to meet the commander’s requirements (responsiveness/reliability/accuracy).
4-168. The intelligence cell must know the collection capabilities requiring confirmation, especially if
targeting is an issue. For example, target selection standards may require reliance on sensors capable of
providing targeting accuracy, such as the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System, Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), or an unmanned aircraft system (UAS). If experience shows that the
collection capability is often unavailable because of local weather patterns, the intelligence cell considers this
in evaluating the information collection asset’s performance history, perhaps leading to the selection of an
alternate information collection asset.
Information Collection and the Targeting Process
4-169. The information collection plan guides reconnaissance and security forces to answer the CCIRs, to
include those high-payoff targets (HPTs) designated as priority intelligence requirements. Effective planning
requirements and assessing collection focuses information collection activities on obtaining the information
required by the BCT commander and staff to influence targeting decisions and the scheme of fires.
Determining information requirements is necessary for the early identification of information gaps.
4-170. The targeting process is comprised of four basic steps: decide, detect, deliver, and assess. The decide
step sets priorities for information collection and scheme of fires during detect and deliver steps (see
chapter4). The decide step draws heavily on thecommander’s intent and concept of operations and a detailed
IPB with continuous assessment. Targeting, nested within the operations process, is an effective method for
matching friendly force capabilities against enemy targets.
4-171. Information collection priorities must be set for each phase or critical event of an operation. Priorities
depicted during targeting value analysis using visual products and matrixes communicate the importance of
specific targets to the enemy’s COA and those targets that, if destroyed, would contribute favorably to the
friendly COA. (See FM 3-09 and ATP 2-19.4 for additional information.)
TARGETING
4-172. Targetingis the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response
to them,considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting personnel within the BCT
identify critical target subsets that, when successfully acquired and attacked, significantly diminish enemy
capabilities. The commander synchronizes combat power to attack and eliminate critical target(s) using the
most effective system in the right time and place.
4-173. Targeting is a complex and multidiscipline effort that requires coordinated interaction among many
command and staff elements within and external to the BCT. The functional and integrating cell members
(see paragraph 4-235) within theBCT necessary for effective collaboration are represented in the targeting |
3-96 | 121 | Mission Command
working group. Close coordination among all cells is crucial for a successful targeting effort. Sensors and
collection capabilities under the control of external agencies must be closely coordinated and carefully
integrated into the execution of attacks especially those involving rapidly moving, fleeting, or dangerous
targets. In addition,the appropriate means and munitions must attack the vulnerabilities of different types of
targets.
Note.The targeting of fires in decisive action requires the judicious use of lethal force balanced
with restraint, tempered by professional judgment. The BCT commander works with BCT fire
support coordinator and planners,taking into consideration the civilian populace,noncombatants,
friendly forces,and collateral damage when planning fire support. As with the BCT commander,
they have the legal and moral obligation to challenge a proposed fire mission if they believe it will
violate the Law of War or the moral principles of the Army Ethic. Together,the BCT commander
and the fire support coordinator and planners,must plan ahead and have the foresight to mitigate
and reduce the risk of unintended effects such as excessive collateral damage and negative
psychological impacts on the civilian populace,whichcreate or reinforce instability in the area of
operations. Improper planning could lead to severe consequences that adversely affect efforts to
gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short term and long-termgoals for
the BCT commander. To mitigate this risk, they plan and prepare fire support coordination
measures to minimize noncombatant casualties and excessive collateral damage.
Commander’s Targeting Guidance
4-174. The commander’s targeting guidance must be articulated clearly and simply to enhance
understanding. Targeting guidance must focus on essential threat capabilities and functions that could
interfere with the achievement of the BCT’s objectives. The commander’s targeting guidance describes the
desired effects to be generated by fires,physical attack,cyberspace electromagnetic activities(CEMA),and
other information-related capabilities against threat operations. Targeting enables the commander through
various lethal andnonlethal capabilities and restrictions and constraints (fire control measures) the ability to
produce the desired effects. Capabilities associated with one desired effect may also contribute to other
desired effects. For example,delay can result from disrupting,diverting,or destroying enemy capabilities or
targets. (See ATP 3-60 for a complete listing of desired effects.)
4-175. The commander can direct a variety of nonlethal actions or effects separately or in conjunction with
lethal actions or effects. These actions or effects are framed by the disciplined,ethical application of force.
Commanders and subordinate leaders,in formulating plans and orders,consider choices of nonlethal versus
lethal means for executing operations in accomplishment of the mission by exercising restraint. Commanders
and subordinate leaders using lethal force, exercise restraint tempered by professional judgment when
conducting operations.
4-176. The commander provides restrictions as part of their targeting guidance. Targeting restrictions fall
into two categories—the no-strike list and the restricted target list.
4-177. The no-strike list consists of objects or entities protected by—
(cid:122) Law of war.
(cid:122) International laws.
(cid:122) Rules of engagement.
(cid:122) Other considerations.
4-178. A restricted target list is a validtarget with specific restrictions such as—
(cid:122) Limit collateral damage.
(cid:122) Preserve select ammo for final protective fires.
(cid:122) Do not strike during daytime.
(cid:122) Strike only with a certain weapon.
(cid:122) Proximity to protected facilities and locations. |
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4-179. The targeting process supports the commander’s decision-making with a comprehensive,iterative,
and logical methodology for employing the ways and means to create desired effects that support
achievement of objectives. Once actions are taken against targets, the commander and staff assess the
effectiveness of the actions. If there is no evidence that the desired effects were created,reengagement of the
target may be necessary,or another method selected to create the desired effects.
Targeting Categories
4-180. The targeting process can be generally grouped into two categories: deliberate and dynamic.
Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the area of operations and
have actions scheduled against them. Examples range from targets on target lists in the applicable plan or
order, targets detected in sufficient time to place in the joint air tasking cycle, mission-type orders, or fire
support plans. Dynamic targeting is targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late, or not selected for
action in time to be included in deliberate targeting (JP 3-60). Dynamic targeting (see ATP 3-60.1) prosecutes
targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives. Targets of opportunity are targets
identified too late,or not selected for action in time,to be included in deliberate targeting. Targets engaged
as part of dynamic targeting are previously unanticipated,unplanned,or newly detected.
4-181. The two types of planned targets are scheduled and on-call:
(cid:122) Scheduled targets exist in the area of operation and are located in sufficient time so that fires or
other actions upon them are identified for engagement at a specific,planned time.
(cid:122) On-call targets have actions planned,but not for a specific delivery time. The commander expects
to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions.
4-182. The two types of targets of opportunity are unplanned and unanticipated:
(cid:122) Unplanned targets are known to exist in the area of operations, but no action has been planned
against them. The target may not have been detected or located in sufficient time to meet planning
deadlines. Alternatively, the target may have been located, but not previously considered of
sufficient importance to engage.
(cid:122) Unanticipated targets are unknown ornot expected to exist in the area of operation.
Targeting Methodology
4-183. Targeting methodology is an integral part of the MDMP. Targeting begins with the receipt of the
mission and continues through operations process’s execution and assessment phases. Like the MDMP,
targeting is a commander-driven process. As the MDMP is conducted,targeting becomes more focused based
on the commander’s guidance and intent. Figure 4-13 illustrates the relationship between the targeting
methodology (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) and the MDMP along with products generated during
targeting. (SeeATP 3-60 for additional information.) |
3-96 | 123 | Mission Command
Figure 4-13. Targeting methodology and the military decision-making process
Targeting Working Group
4-184. The BCT targeting working group is used as a vehicle to focus the targeting process within a
specified time. The commander is responsible for the targeting effort,with the intelligence,operations,and
fire support staff officers forming the core of the targeting working group within the BCT staff. The targeting
working group can vary in make-up and size as determined by the commander and SOPs of the BCT. The
decide, detect, deliver, and assess process assists the targeting working group determine requirements for
combat assessment to assess targeting and attack effectiveness. The targeting working group has three
primary functions in assisting the commander:
(cid:122) Helps in synchronizing operations.
(cid:122) Recommends targets to acquire and engage. The team also recommends the most efficient and
available assets to detect and engage these targets.
(cid:122) Identifies the level of combat assessment required. Combat assessment can provide crucial and
timely information to allow analysis of the success of the plan or to initiate revision of the plan.
4-185. The targeting effortis continuous at all levels of command. Continuity is achieved through parallel
planning by targeting working groups from corps through battalion task force. Targeting is not just a wartime
function. This process must be exercised before battle if it is to operate effectively. The members of the
targeting working group must be familiar with their roles and the roles of the other team members. That
familiarity can only be gained through staff training.
RISKMANAGEMENT
4-186. Risk managementis the process to identify,assess,and control risks and make decisionsthat balance
risk cost with mission benefits (JP3-0). RMhelps organizations and individuals make informed decisions to
reduce or offset risk. Using this process increases the force’s operational effectiveness and the probability of
mission accomplishment. This systematic approach identifies hazards, assesses them, and manages |
3-96 | 124 | Chapter 4
associated risks. RMoutlines a disciplined approach to express a risk level in terms readily understood at all
echelons. For example, the commander may adjust the level of body armor protection during dismounted
movement balancing an increased risk level to individual Soldiers to improve the likelihood of mission
accomplishment.
Note.Soldier load is an area of concern for commanders and subordinate leaders. How much is
carried, how far, and in what configuration are critical mission considerations. The commander
balances the risk to Soldiers from the enemy against the risk to mission accomplishment due to
excessive loads and Soldier exhaustion and injury. Soldier load is limited to mission-essential
equipment to sustain continuous operations. The commander accepts risks to reduce Soldier load
based on a through mission analysis. (See ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.18 for additional
information on Soldier load.)
Principles of Risk Management
4-187. The principles of RM(see ATP 5-19) are—
(cid:122) Integrate RMinto all phases of missions and operations.
(cid:122) Make risk decisions at the appropriate level.
(cid:122) Accept no unnecessary risk.
(cid:122) ApplyRMcyclically and continuously.
Five-Step Process
4-188. RMis a cyclical and continuous five-step process to identify and assess hazards;develop,choose,
implement,and supervise controls;and evaluate outcomes as conditions change. Except in time-constrained
situations, planners complete the process in a deliberate manner-systematically applying all the steps and
recording the results. In time constrained conditions,the commander,staff,subordinate leaders,and Soldiers
use judgment to apply RMprinciples and steps. The five steps of RMare—
(cid:122) Step 1—Identify the hazards.
(cid:122) Step 2—Assess the hazards.
(cid:122) Step 3—Develop controls and make risk decisions.
(cid:122) Step 4—Implement controls.
(cid:122) Step 5—Supervise and evaluate.
Risk Management and the Military Decision-making Process
4-189. The BCT commander and staff use RMto identify,assess,and control hazards,reducing their effect
on operations and readiness. The five steps of RM tend to require emphasis at different times during the
MDMP (seetable 4-2). While planning doctrine places the beginning of formal RMin mission analysis,the
commander and staff can begin identifying hazards upon receipt of the warning order or operation order. For
example,when conducting unilateral and partnered operations and training it is important for the commander
to assess early in the process the potential risk for an insider attack (see chapter8 for additional information
oninsider attacks).
Note. The representation in table 4-2 is not intended to be prescriptive. RM is an adaptable
integrating process. The five steps are dynamic and cyclical. |
3-96 | 125 | Mission Command
Table4-2. Risk management and the military decision-makingprocess
Risk Management Steps
Develop
Steps in the Military Identify
Assess the Controls and Implement Supervise
Decision-making the
Hazards Make Risk Controls and Evaluate
Process Hazards
Decisions
RECEIPT OF MISSION X
MISSION ANALYSIS X X
COURSE OF ACTION
X X X
DEVELOPMENT
COURSE OF ACTION
X X X
ANALYSIS
COURSE OF ACTION
X
COMPARISON
COURSE OF ACTION
X
APPROVAL
ORDERS,PRODUCTION,
DISSEMINATION,AND X X X X X
TRANSITION
Knowledge Management
4-190. Knowledge management facilitates the transfer of knowledge among commanders,staffs,and forces
to build and maintain situational understanding. Knowledge management helps get the right information to
the right person at the right time to facilitate decision-making. Knowledge management uses a five-step
process to create a shared understanding. (See paragraphs 4-88to 4-96for a further discussion.) The steps of
knowledge management include—
(cid:122) Assess.
(cid:122) Design.
(cid:122) Develop.
(cid:122) Pilot.
(cid:122) Implement.
SECTION III – THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
4-191. The BCT commander organizes the headquarters into CPs and by staff sections,cells,elements,and
teams to assist in the exercise of command and control. This section addresses BCT staff organization,CP
organization and operation,cells,staff elements and teams,and staff processes and procedures.
STAFF ORGANIZATION
4-192. The BCT staff supports the commander, assists subordinate units, and informs units and
organizations outside the headquarters. The staff supports the BCT commander’s understanding,making and
implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress. The staff makes recommendations
and prepares plans and orders for the commander. The staff establishes and maintains a high degree of
coordination and cooperation with staffs of higher,lower,supporting,supported,and adjacent units. The staff
does this by actively collaborating and communicating with commanders and staffs of subordinate and other
units to solve problemsethically,effectively,and efficiently to accomplish the mission—consistent with the
moral principles of the Army Ethic (see ADP 1). The staff keeps civilian organizations informed with relevant
information according to their security classification as well as their need to know. (See figure 4-14 on
page4-46.) The basic BCT staff structure includes an XO and various staff sections. A staff section is a
grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer
(FM6-0). |
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Figure 4-14. Brigade combat team command and staff organization
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
4-193. The XO is the commander’s principal assistant and directs staff tasks, manages and oversees staff
coordination,and special staff officers. The commander normally delegates executive management authority
to the XO. The XO provides oversight of sustainment planning (see chapter 9) and operations for the BCT
commander. As the key staff integrator,the XO frees the commander from routine details of staff operations
and the management of the headquarters and ensures efficient and prompt staff actions. The XO may be
second in command. The XO leans heavily on recommendations of the staff in each member’s area of
expertise,while at the same time balancing competing priorities for the overall situation. This delicate balance
assists the commander as the XO anticipates the decision-making cycle and commander’s intent,helping the
commander to make informed decisions,while empowering the staff and guiding them. For example,the S-6
may recommend an optimal location for the BCT’s main CP based on atmospherics,but the S-2 knows how
easily the adversary will identify such a location. TheXO might direct them to evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages to such a location,along with two additional possible locations,determining which best meets
the commander’s intent,or presenting the accumulated analysis with a recommendation to the commander.
(SeeFM 6-0 for additional information.)
COORDINATING STAFFOFFICERS
4-194. Coordinating staff officers are the commander’s principal staff assistants. Coordinating staff
functionalities are organized and described in the paragraphs 4-195through 4-201.
Personnel Staff Officer
4-195. The S-1 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning human resources support (military
and civilian). (See chapter 9.) Specific responsibilities include manning, personnel services, personnel
support, and headquarters management. The S-1 has coordinating staff responsibility for the civilian
personnel officer and the equal opportunity advisor and prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the
operation order. When planning an operation,the S-1 provides accurate information regarding replacement |
3-96 | 127 | Mission Command
personnel and ensures the rest of the staff includesall attachments or other assets into any plan or operation.
For example,have staff sections’adjustments for personnel and manning of vehicles accounted for leave and
other absences,or has the staff erroneously assumed 100-percent personnel? (SeeFM 1-0 and ATP1-0.1 for
additional information.)
Intelligence Staff Officer
4-196. The S-2 is chief of the intelligence warfighting function. The intelligence staff officer is the principal
staff officer responsible for providing intelligence to support current operations and plans. The S-2 gives the
commander and the S-3 the initial information collection plan, which facilitates integration of
reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, and security operations. The S-2 helps the S-3 to
develop the initial information collection plan. The S-2 is responsible for the preparation of Annex B
(Intelligence) and assists the S-3 in the preparation of Annex L (Information Collection). The S-2 sees into
the mind of the enemy commander and forces. The S-2 helps the staff, XO, and commander see multiple
COAs,to determine why the enemy might choose one or the other. If the S-2 and S-3 synchronize well,the
information collection plan will solve gaps in intelligence,further shaping the planned friendly COA,such
as the enemy’s ability and intent to use a certain piece of terrain, and will they use that piece of terrain.
Identifying particular tactics,the enemy will use based upon their disposition and friendly actions. (SeeFM
2-0 for additional information.)
Operations Staff Officer
4-197. The S-3 is responsible for coordinating the activities of the movement and maneuver warfighting
function. The S-3is the primary staff officer for integrating and synchronizing the operation as a whole for
the commander. The S-3 integrates information collection assets during plans and operations. The S-3
synchronizes information collection with the overall operation throughout the operations process (with the
rest of the staff). The S-3 develops plans and orders and determines potential branches and sequels. The S-3
coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions in all plans and orders. Additionally, the S-3 is
responsible for and prepares Annex L (Information Collection) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination).
The S-3 prepares Annex A (Task Organization),Annex C (Operations),and Annex M (Assessment) to the
operation order. In conjunction with the knowledge management officer,the S-3 preparesAnnex R (Reports)
and Annex Z (Distribution). The S-3 ensures proper dissemination of the plan,as one unsynchronized staff
section or functional cell can quickly unravel accomplishment of the mission and commander’sintent. The
S-3 examines closely and identifies the best spots on the battlefield for the commander’s locations to lead the
fight. (The S-3 generally collocates with the commander.) In addition,the S-3 identifies key intersections in
canalizing terrain, and timed events for key transitions in phases or decision points. (See FM 6-0 for
additional information.)
Logistics Staff Officer
4-198. The S-4 is the principal staff officer for sustainment planning and operations,supply,maintenance,
transportation,services,field services,distribution,and operational contract support (see chapter 9). The S-4
prepares Annex F (Sustainment), Annex P (Host-Nation Support) and Annex W (Operational Contract
Support) to the operation order. The S-4 works closely with the BSB support operations officer to ensure
successful planning and execution of the sustainment plan. The S-4 identifies requirements for external and
higher echelon support requirements. The S-4’s concept of support for logistics encompasses multiple
considerations. For example, identifying locations for key facilities and services, determining how long it
will take assets to reach each node (time-distance analysis),and by what routes,determining what capacity
each node can provide,and anticipating times units will require more logistics and when delivery will be a
higher risk. (SeeFM 6-0 for additional information.)
Signal Staff Officer
4-199. The S-6 is the principal staff officer who advises the commander on all matters related to
communications in the brigade. The signal staff officer providesnetwork transport and information services,
network sustainment,conducts Department of Defense information network (DODIN)operations,conducts
information dissemination management and content staging to enable knowledge management,manages the |
3-96 | 128 | Chapter 4
BCT’s portion of the network and combat net radios assets in the area of operations,and performs spectrum
management operations. The S-6 prepares Annex H (Signal) and participates in preparation of Appendix 12
(CEMA) to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order,with input from the S-2 and in coordination with
the S-3. Organizing what systems,the unit uses,prioritizing them for various communications is essential as
well, not only for redundancies sake, but also for the quick and efficient flow of information. The S-6 is
critical to ensure planning includes all considerations for maintaining communications throughout an
operation. For example, ensuring the planning accounts for terrain and enemy disruption where certain
communications systems will be degraded orinoperative. Including appropriate security measures for signal
teams. (SeeFM 6-02,ATP 6-02.70,and ATP 6-02.71 for additional information.)
Financial Management Staff Officer
4-200. The brigade financial management staff officer (S-8) is the principal staff officer singularly
responsible for all financial management (see chapter 9) within the BCT. The S-8 is the focal point in
planning financial management support that allows the BCT to accomplish its mission. The S-8 prepares a
portion of Annex F (Sustainment). (SeeFM 1-06 for additional information.)
Civil Affairs Operations Staff Officer
4-201. Thebrigade civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9) is the dedicated principal staff officer position
responsible for all matters concerning civil affairs. The S-9 evaluates civil considerations during mission
analysis, recommends the establishment of the civil-military operations center in conjunction with the
supporting civil affairs unit commander,and prepares the groundwork for transitioning the area of operations
from military to civilian control. The S-9 advises the commander on the military’s effect on civilians in the
area of operations relative to the complex relationship of these people with the terrain and institutions over
time. TheS-9 is responsible for enhancing the relationship between Army forces and the civil authorities and
people in the area of operations. A supportive civilian population can provide freedom of maneuver,
resources, and information that facilitate friendly operations and preserve combat power and lethality, by
mitigating the effects of the civil considerations on combat operations. The S-9 is required at all echelons
from a BCT through theater Army and in special operations forces formations at battalion and group. The
S-9 prepares Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to the operation order or operation plan.
PERSONAL STAFFOFFICERS
4-202. The personal staff officers work under the immediate control of,and have direct access to,the BCT
commander. They advise the commander, provide input to orders and plans, and interface and coordinate
with entities external to the BCT headquarters. Examples of personal staff officers to the BCT commander
include the command sergeant major,the brigade judge advocate,the surgeon,the public affairs officer,and
the chaplain. Personal staff responsibilities are described below.
Command Sergeant Major
4-203. The command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer within the BCT who advises
the commander on issues related to the enlisted ranks. The command sergeant major carries out policies and
enforces standards for the performance, training, and conduct of enlisted Soldiers. In operations, a
commander employs the command sergeant major throughout the area of operations to extend command
influence,assess the morale of the force,and assist during critical events.
Brigade Judge Advocate
4-204. The brigade judge advocate is the senior legal advisor to the BCT commander. The brigade judge
advocate advises the commander and staff on operationallaw,military justice,administrative law,fiscal law,
and other areas of the law as required and ensures the delivery of legal services to the brigade across the core
legal functions of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. The brigade judge advocate prepares a portion of
Annex C (Operations) and Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. (See AR 27-1 and FM 1-04 for
additional information.) |
3-96 | 129 | Mission Command
Surgeon
4-205. The surgeon is responsible for coordinating Army Health System (AHS) support (see chapter 9) and
operations within the command. The surgeon provides and oversees medical care to Soldiers,civilians,and
detainees. (See ATP 4-02.3.) The surgeon prepares a portion of Annex E (Protection) and Annex F
(Sustainment) of the operation order. When preparing a portion of these annexes, the surgeon additionally
provides the BCT S-4 with recommendations on the BCT plan, and subordinate unit plans (with battalion
medical officers) for air and ground medical evacuations,medical facility locations,and other considerations
regarding heath service support. (SeeFM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.55 for additional information.)
Public Affairs Officer
4-206. The public affairs officer develops strategies, leads, and supervises the conduct of public
information,community engagements,and command information. The public affairs officer’s principal role
is to provide advice and counsel to the commander and the staff on how affected external and internal publics
will accept and understand the BCT’s operations. The BCT public affairs officer understands and coordinates
the flow of information to Soldiers, the Army community, and the public and prepares Annex J (Public
Affairs) to the operation order. (SeeFM 3-61 for additional information.)
Chaplain
4-207. The chaplain is responsible for religious support operations; advises the commander and staff on
religion,morale,moral,and ethical issues,within both the command and area of operations. Chaplains and
religious affairs specialists are assigned at brigade and battalion echelons. (See chapter 9.) The chaplain
prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. (SeeFM 1-05 for additional information.)
SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS
4-208. Every staff organization has special staff officers. The number of special staff officers and their
responsibilities vary with authorizations,the desires of the commander,and the size of the command. Special
staff officers, common to the BCT, include the fire support officer, the ABE, the air liaison officer,the air
and missile defense coordination officer, the brigade aviation officer, the CBRN officer, the PSYOP staff
planner, the knowledge management officer, the electromagnetic warfare officer (EWO), the information
operations officer, the staff weather officer, and the provost marshal. Paragraphs 3-187 through 3-199
describe the responsibilities for each. (SeeFM 6-0 for additional information.)
Fire Support Officer
4-209. The fire support officer serves as the special staff officer for fires and integrates fires into the scheme
of maneuver for the commander. The fire support officer leads the targeting process and fire support planning
for the delivery of fires to include preparation fires, harassing fires, interdiction fires, suppressive fires,
destruction fires,and deception fires. The fire support officer leads the fire support cell and prepares AnnexD
(Fires) of the operation order. The fires support officer also coordinates with the EWO and the air liaison
officer. The BCT S-3 coordinates this position. Key to success is continual communication between the fire
support officer and maneuver commander. The BCT commander provides a clear intent for fires,to include
guidance for selection of high-payoff targets (HPTs), priority of fires, any special fires or munitions, and
recommended fire control measures,such as no fire areas and final protective fires. The fire support officer
identifies targeting capabilities, all fire support assets available, nominating HPTs and evaluating them for
the commander. (SeeADP 3-19 for additional information.)
Note. The BCT’s organic field artillery battalion commander, as the fire support coordinator, is
the BCT commander’s primary advisor for the planning, coordination, and integration of field
artillery and fire support to execute assigned tasks. (SeeFM 3-09 for additional information.) |
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Assistant Brigade Engineer
4-210. TheABEis the senior engineer on staff responsible for coordinating engineer support to combined
arms operations. The ABEintegrates specified and implied engineer tasks into the maneuver force plan. The
ABE ensures that mission planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities integrate supporting
engineer units. The ABE oversees any contract construction activity planning,preparation,and execution in
support of the S-4 contracting support plan. TheABEprepares Annex G (Engineer) to the operation order.
(SeeFM 3-34 for additional information.)
4-211. The ABE,with the BCT S-2,oversees a geospatial engineering team (located in the S-2 section) that
performs the analysis, management, and dissemination of geospatial data and products in support of BCT
planning,preparation,execution,and assessment. This team maintains the BCT COP on the BCT server and
provides updates to the brigade portion of the theater geospatial database. The team primarily supports the
S-2 and S-3 sections,and as directed other staff sections and subordinate units of the BCT. The team works
to fuse intelligence and geospatial information into a COP for the commander. This BCT level team is too
small to provide continuous support, but it forms improvised geospatial intelligence cells as necessary to
support operations. The geospatial engineering team requires access to the classified tactical local area
network and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network to update and disseminate geospatial information and
products. The ABE also supports with integrating geospatial products into the planning process by
coordinating with the geospatial team. (SeeATP 3-34.80 for additional information.)
Note. The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) commander is the senior engineer in the BCT and
advises the BCT commander on how best toemploy combat,general,and geospatial engineering
capabilities to conduct combined arms integration in support of decisive action. (SeeATP3-34.22
for additional information.)
Air Liaison Officer
4-212. The air liaison officer is the senior United StatesAir Force officer with each tactical air control party
(TACP). The air liaison officer plans close air support, in direct support of the BCT commander, in
accordance with the joint force air component commander’s guidance and intent. The air liaison officer is
responsible for coordinating aerospace assets and operations such as close air support, air interdiction, air
reconnaissance,airlift,and joint suppression of enemy air defenses. At battalion or squadron level,the senior
member of the TACP is called a battalion air liaison officer—a specially trained and experienced
noncommissioned officer or officer. (SeeJP 3-09.3,FM 3-52,and ATP 3-52.1for additional information.)
Air and Missile Defense Coordination Officer
4-213. The air and missile defense coordination officer leads the air defense airspace management (ADAM)
cell,responsible for planning,coordinating,integrating,and controlling air defense and airspace management
for the BCT. This includes providing the capability to integrate command and control systems to provide the
brigade aviation element (BAE) with the COP, developing air defense plans, air defense artillery task
organization, scheme of air defense operations, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning. In addition, the
air and missile defense coordination officer integrates and coordinates tasks between the BCT and any
augmented air and missile defense assets and units not directly task organized to BCT subordinate units. The
coordination officer within the ADAM element prepares a portion of Annex D (Fires) to the operation order.
(SeeATP 3-01.50,FM 3-52,andATP 3-52.1for additional information.)
Brigade Aviation Officer
4-214. The brigade aviation officer leads the BAE and assists the BCT S-3 with the planning and
synchronization of Army aviation and other airspace usersto support the BCT commander’s ground scheme
of maneuver. The brigade aviation officer standardizes unmanned aircraft systems (UASs)employment for
the BCT, advises and plans the use of reconnaissance, surveillance, attack, air assault, air movement,
sustainment, and medical evacuation. As the BCT’s aviation subject matter expert, the brigade aviation
officer is responsible for advising the BCT commander and staff on the status and availability of aviation |
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assets, their capabilities and limitations. The brigade aviation officer recommends priorities for and
allocations of Army aviation assets, coordinates the employment of those air assets, and assists with the
synchronization of airspace coordinating measures with fire support coordination measures and movement
and maneuver control measures within the BCT area of operations.The brigade aviation officer participates
in the operations process,targeting and the development of the BCT unit airspace plan. The brigade aviation
officer helps prepare portions of Annex C (Operations) to include Appendix 10 (Airspace Control) along
with portions of Annex D (Fires) of the operation order. (See FM 3-52 and ATP3-52.1 for additional
information.)
Chemical,Biological,Radiological,and Nuclear Officer
4-215. The CBRN officer is the principle advisor to the commander on CBRN hazard awareness and
understanding and is responsible for CBRN operations and CBRN asset use. The CBRN officer leads the
CBRN working group. When established,the CBRN working group includes members from the protection
working group, subordinate commands, host-nation agencies, and other unified action partners (see
paragraph 7-82). The CBRN officer prepares a portion of Annex E (Protection) and a portion of Annex C
(Operations) of the operation order. (SeeATP 3-11.36for additional information.)
PsychologicalOperations Staff Planner
4-216. The PSYOP staff planner, a noncommissioned officer authorized at the BCT level, is responsible
for synchronizing and coordinating information activities with information-related capabilities. If no PSYOP
noncommissioned officer is assigned, the commander of an attached PSYOP unit may assume those
responsibilities. The PSYOP staff planner prepares Appendix 13 (PSYOP) and a portion of Appendix 14
(Military Deception) and Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the operation
order. (SeeFM 3-53 for additional information.)
Knowledge Management Officer
4-217. Working through the BCT XO,the knowledge management officer is responsible for developing the
knowledge management plan that integrates and synchronizes knowledge and information management. (The
BCT XO is responsible for the organization’s knowledge management program.) The knowledge
management officer synchronizes knowledge and information management to facilitate the BCT
commander’s situational understanding for any problem set and to provide the staff shared understanding.
The knowledge management officer accomplishes this by using the tools,processes,and people available to
facilitate an environment of shared understanding. When required, the knowledge management officer is
responsible for Annex Q (Knowledge Management) to the operation order. (SeeFM 6-0 and ATP 6-01.1 for
additional information.)
ElectromagneticWarfare Officer
4-218. The EWO serves as the BCT commander’s designated staff officer for the planning, integration,
synchronization,and assessment of electromagneticwarfare (EW)(see ATP 3-12.3),to include CEMA (see
FM3-12). The EWO coordinates through other staff members to integrate EW or/and CEMA into the
commander’s concept of operations. The EWO prepares Appendix 12 (CEMA) to Annex C (Operations) to
the operation order and contributes to any section that has a CEMA subparagraph such as Annex N (Space
Operations) in the operation order (see FM 3-14). As the cyberspace planner, the EWO is responsible for
understanding policies relating to cyberspace operations, EW, and spectrum management operations to
provide accurate information to the commander for proper planning, coordination, and synchronization of
cyberspace operations,EW,and spectrum management operations into all operations (see paragraph 4-335).
Information Operations Officer
4-219. The information operations officer, authorized at the BCT level, is responsible for synchronizing
and deconflicting information-related capabilities employed in support of BCT operations. An
information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the
information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desired conditions (JP 3-13).
Led by the information operations officer, the BCT staff synchronizes capabilities that communicate |
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information to audiences and affect information content and flow of enemy or adversary decision-making
while protecting friendly information flow. The information operations staff planner prepares appendix 15
and a portion of appendixes 12,13,and 14 to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order. (SeeFM3-13 for
additional information.)
Staff Weather Officer
4-220. The staff weather officer is a U.S. Air Force officer or noncommissioned officer who coordinates
operational weather support and weather service matters through the S-2 and other staff members. The staff
weather officer collects environmental information and uses this information to produce and disseminate an
environmental running estimate,mission execution forecast,and watches warnings and advisories. The staff
weather officer integrates weathereffects into planning and execution and responds to weather requests for
information. The staff weather officer prepares Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to
Annex B (Intelligence) to the operation order. (SeeFM 2-0 for additional information.)
Provost Marshal
4-221. The provost marshal is responsible for planning, coordinating, requesting, and employing all
assigned or attached military police assets. Usually,the provost marshal is the senior military police officer
in the command. The provost marshal augments the staff with a small planning cell that works within the S-3
typically. The provost marshal prepares a portion of Annex C (Operations) and a portion of Annex E
(Protection) to the operation order. (SeeFM 3-39 for additional information.)
AUGMENTATION
4-222. Often,the BCT and its subordinate units receive support from (or attached) augmentation teams to
assist in the exercise of commandand control. Commanders within the BCT integrate this support or attached
teams or detachments into their CPs and operations. For example, a division may receive an Army space
support team when deployed. An Army space support team within a division can provide the BCT with space
related planning that may directly affect BCT operations. Critical space related information provided to BCT
operations includes navigation accuracy forecasts for planning and conducting mission and maneuver
operations in support of fires and targeting effects. Space operations identify deliberate enemy interference
activities such as attempts to jam friendly communications systems and navigation warfare that directly
impacts targeting and maneuver forces. The BCT commander may request staff augmentation. Augmentation
teams include but are not limited to—
(cid:122) Army space support team. (See FM 3-14.)
(cid:122) Army cyberspace operations support team. (See FM 3-12.)
(cid:122) Civil affairs company. (See FM 3-57.)
(cid:122) Combat camera team. (See FM 3-61.)
(cid:122) Legal support teams. (See FM 1-04.)
(cid:122) Mobile public affairs detachment. (See FM 3-61.)
(cid:122) Military history detachment. (See ATP 1-20.)
(cid:122) PSYOPunits. (See FM 3-53.)
(cid:122) Army information operations field support team. (See FM 3-13.)
(cid:122) Individual augmentation by specialty (assessment or economic development).
COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
4-223. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities
(FM6-0). The BCT commander balances the need to create a capable CP organization(s) to support the
capacity to plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess operations with the resulting diversion of
capabilities to fight the enemy due to the size of the CP itself. Larger CPs ease face-to-face coordination:
however, they are vulnerable to multiple acquisitions and means of attack. Smaller CPs can be hidden and
protected more easily,but they may not exercise the degree of command and control necessary to control all
BCT subordinate units. Striking the right balance provides a responsive yet agile organization. This section |
3-96 | 133 | Mission Command
provides guidelines for CP organization and operations to include the importance of establishing running
estimates, SOPs and a battle rhythm. In addition, this section considers various factors that degrade the
efficiency of command and control systems within organizations and considerations for digital and analog
commandand controlsystems techniques. (SeeFM 6-0 and ATP 6-0.5 for additional information.)
COMMON COMMAND POSTCONSIDERATIONS
4-224. The BCT commander organizes CPs by staff sections or staff cells. Organizing the staff among CPs,
and into cells within CPs,expands the commander’s ability to exercise command and control and makes the
system survivable. The commander assigns functions and tasks to each CP. The commander determines the
sequence,timing of the deployment or movement,initial locations,and exact organization of CPs.
4-225. CP survivability is vital to the success of the BCT mission. CPs often gain survivability at the price
of effectiveness. When concentrated, the enemy can easily acquire and target most CPs. However, when
elements of a CP disperse,they often have difficulty maintaining a coordinated staff effort. When developing
CP SOPs and organizing the headquarters into CPs for operations,the BCT commander uses dispersion,size,
redundancy,and mobility to increase survivability.
4-226. Echelons within the BCT man,equip,and organize CPs to control operations for extended periods.
CP personnel maintain communication with all subordinate units and higher and adjacent units. The
commander arranges CP personnel and equipment to facilitate internal coordination, information-sharing,
and rapid decision-making. The BCT commander and staff use SOPs,battle rhythms,and meetings to assist
with CP operations. The commander positions CPs within areas of operation to maintain flexibility,
redundancy,survivability,and mobility. Activities common in all CPs include but are not limited to—
(cid:122) Maintaining running estimates.
(cid:122) Controlling operations.
(cid:122) Assessing operations.
(cid:122) Developing and disseminating orders.
(cid:122) Coordinating with higher,lower,and adjacent units.
(cid:122) Conducting knowledge management and information management.
(cid:122) Conducting DODINoperations.
(cid:122) Providing a facility for the commander to control operations,issue orders,and conduct rehearsals.
(cid:122) Maintaining the COP.
(cid:122) Performing CP administration (includes sleep plans,security,and feeding schedules).
(cid:122) Supporting the commander’s decision-making process.
COMMAND POSTCONFIGURATION
4-227. The BCT design,combined with robust communications,gives the commander two CPs,the main
CP and theTAC,and a command group. The BCT commander may designate the main CP of a subordinate
battalion,normally the BEB,field artillery battalion,orBSBas the BCT alternate CP. Either,the BSBor the
BEBmain CP may be assigned responsibility for the brigade support area(BSA)(see chapter 9).
Main Command Post
4-228. Themain command postis a facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current
operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations (FM 6-0). The main CP (graphically
depicted as the MAIN) is the BCT’s principal CP. The main CP includes representatives of all staff sections
and a full suite of information systems to plan,prepare,execute,and assess operations. The main CP is larger,
more staffing and less mobile than the TAC. Normally, the BCT XO leads and supervises the staff of the
main CP. Functions of the main CP include the following:
(cid:122) Planning current operations including branches and sequels.
(cid:122) Developing contingency plans from identified branches to the plan.
(cid:122) Developing plans from information from higher headquarters.
(cid:122) Developing plans from sequels identified during the planning process. |
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(cid:122) Controlling and synchronizing current operations.
(cid:122) Synchronizing all aspects of the operational framework (see ADP 3-0) such as—
(cid:131) Area of operations.
(cid:131) Deep,close,rear,andsupport areas.
(cid:131) Decisive,shaping,and sustaining operations.
(cid:131) Main and supporting efforts.
(cid:122) Monitoring and assessing current operations for their impact on future operations.
(cid:122) Coordinating fires and effects.
(cid:122) Synchronizing information-related capabilities; capabilities complemented by capabilities such
as—
(cid:131) Operations security.
(cid:131) Information assurance.
(cid:131) Counterdeception.
(cid:131) Physical security.
(cid:131) Electromagneticsupport.
(cid:131) EP.
(cid:122) Coordinating CEMA including—
(cid:131) EW operations.
(cid:131) Cyberspace operations.
(cid:131) Spectrum management operations.
(cid:122) Planning for future operations.
(cid:122) Employing information collection.
(cid:122) Anticipating and monitoring the commander’s decision points and critical information
requirements.
(cid:122) Coordinating with higher headquarters and adjacent or lateral units.
(cid:122) Informing higher headquarters and units of ongoing missions.
(cid:122) Supporting the commander’s situational understanding through information and knowledge
management.
(cid:122) Defense Information Systems Network services and DODIN operations. (See ATP 6-02.71.)
(cid:122) Planning,monitoring,and integrating airspace users.
(cid:122) Synchronizing sustainment including—
(cid:131) COP across all echelons of support.
(cid:131) Synchronization with the operations process;plan,prepare,execute,and assess.
(cid:131) Alignment with military actions in time and space,prioritization,and purpose.
(cid:131) Material readiness reports of combat power platforms.
(cid:131) Coordinationof echelons above brigade sustainment support.
(cid:122) Developing and implementing—
(cid:131) Safety and occupational health. (See AR 385-10.)
(cid:131) RM. (See ATP 5-19.)
(cid:131) Accident prevention requirements,policies,and measures.
(cid:122) Coordinating air-ground operations.
(cid:122) Coordinating personnelrecovery operations. (See FM 3-50.)
4-229. Positioning the main CP includes the following considerations:
(cid:122) Where the enemy can least affect main CP operations.
(cid:122) Where the main CP can achieve the best communications (digital and voice).
(cid:122) Where the main CP can control operations best. |
3-96 | 135 | Mission Command
Note. In contiguous areas of operation, the BCT main CP locates behind the battalion TACand
main CP,the BCT TAC,and out of enemy medium artillery range,if practical. In noncontiguous
areas of operation, the BCT main CP usually locates within a subordinate battalion’s area of
operations.
Tactical Command Post
4-230. Atactical command postis a facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to
control portions of an operation for a limited time (FM 6-0). The BCT commander employs the TAC as an
extension of the main CP to help control the execution of an operation or task. The BCT commander can
employ the TAC to direct the operations of units close to each other when direct command is necessary. The
commander can use the TACto control a special task force or to control complex tasks such as reception,
staging,onward movement,and integration. When the TACis not used,the staff assigned to it reinforces the
main CP. BCT SOPs should address procedures to detach the TACfrom the main CP.
4-231. TheTACis fully mobile and is usually located near the decisive point of the operation. The decisive
point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows
commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success
(JP5-0). As a rule,the post includes the personnel and equipment essential to the tasks assigned;however,
sometimes the TACrequires augmentation for security. The TACrelies on the main CP for planning,detailed
analysis,and coordination. Usually the BCT S-3 leads the tactical CP. TACfunctions include the following
when employed:
(cid:122) Control current operations.
(cid:122) Provide information to the COP.
(cid:122) Assess the progress of operations.
(cid:122) Assess the progress of higher and adjacent units.
(cid:122) Perform short-range planning.
(cid:122) Provide input to targeting and future operations planning.
(cid:122) Provide a facility for the commander to control operations,issue orders,and conduct rehearsals.
4-232. Airborne command and control support often requireindependent operations by aircrews and aircraft
under operational control(OPCON)to commanders and staffs down to the BCT and battalion level. An Army
airborne command and control platform provides the maneuver commander with a highly mobile,
self-contained,and reliable airborne digital CP. The CP is equipped with the command and control systems
needed to operate with joint forces and components,multinational forces,and U.S. Government agencies and
departments. The airborne command and control platform allows the commander and staff to maintain voice
and digital connectivity with required elements,roughly replicating the systems and capabilities of a digitized
maneuver BCT commander’s TAC. The commander and staff can perform all command and control and
coordination functions from the airborne platform. The airborne platform provides tactical internet access to
manipulate,store,manage,and analyzedata,information,intelligence,mission plans,and mission progress.
The size and functions required of an airborne TAC is mission dependent and within the capabilities and
limitations of the aircraft. Ideally, as a minimum the S-3, S-2, fire support officer, and air liaison officer
accompany the commander. (See FM 3-99 for information on airborne TACoperations.)
CommandGroup
4-233. While not part of the BCT’s table of organization and equipment,the commander can establish the
command group (see ATP 6-0.5) from the main or TAC (personnel and equipment). The command group,
led by the BCT commander, consists of whomever the commander designates. The command group can
include the command sergeant major and representatives from the S-2, S-3, and the fire support cell. The
command group gives the commander the mobility and protection to move throughout the area of operations
and to observe and direct BCT operations from forward positions. Normally, the command group is task
organized with a security element whenever it departs the main or TACs. For example,a maneuver platoon
from one of the BCTs maneuver battalions may be tasked toprovide that element. The commander positions |
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the command group near the most critical event,usually with or near the main effort or decisive operation.
The BCT XOmay establish a second command group when required.
Early-Entry Command Post
4-234. While not a separate section of the unit’s table of organization and equipment,the commander can
establish an early-entry CP to assist in controlling operations during the deployment phase of an operation.
An early-entry command post is a lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the
remaining portions of the headquarters aredeployed and operational (FM 6-0). The early-entry CP normally
consists of personnel and equipment from the TACwith additional intelligence analysts,planners,and other
staff officers from the main CP based on the situation. The early-entry CP performs the functions of the main
andTACsuntil they are deployed and operational. The BCT XOorS-3normally leads the early entry CP,
when established.
Note. (See FM 3-99, for information on airborne assault and air assault CP organization and
operation.)
COMMAND POSTCELLS
4-235. The situation determines CP cell organization. A command post cellis a grouping of personnel and
equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of mission
command (FM 6-0). Staff elements, consisting of personnel and equipment from staff sections, form CP
cells. Typically,a BCT organizes into two types of CP cells: integrating cells (current operations and plans)
and functional cells (intelligence,movement and maneuver,fire support,protection,sustainment). Integrating
and functional cells provide staff expertise,communications,and information systems that work in concert
to aid the commander in planning and controlling operations. (See figure 4-15.)
Figure 4-15. Integrating and functional cells |
3-96 | 137 | Mission Command
Integrating Cells
4-236. Cross functional by design, integrating cells coordinate and synchronize forces and warfighting
functions within a specified planning horizon. A planning horizonis a point in time that commanders use to
focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events (ADP 5-0). The three planning horizons are
short,mid,and long. These planning horizons correspond to the integrating cells within a headquarters,which
are the current operations cell, future operations cell (typically division and above level, see FM 6-0 for
discussion),and the plans cell. The BCT has a current operations cell and a small,dedicated planning cell.
The BCT is not resourced for a future operations cell. Planning horizons are situation dependent; they can
range from hours and days to weeks and months. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the more distant the
planning horizon with which it is concerned.
Current Operations Cell
4-237. The current operations cell is the focal point for all operational matters. The cell oversees execution
of the current operation. The current operations cell assesses the current situation while regulating forces and
warfighting functionsaccording to the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
4-238. The current operations cell displays the COP and conducts shift change, battle updates, and other
briefings as required. The cell provides information on the status of operations to all staff members and to
higher,lower,and adjacent units. The movement and maneuver cell forms the core of the current operations
cell. Typically,a BCT designates a chief of operations to lead the current operations cell from the main CP.
The current operations cell has representatives from all staff sections,who are either permanent or on-call as
well as attached or supporting subordinate units,special operations forces,unified action partners,and liaison
officers.
Plans Cell
4-239. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the mid-to long-range planning horizons.
The plans cell develops plans, orders, branches, and sequels using the MDMP to prepare for operations
beyond the scope of the current order. The plans cell oversees military deception planning.
4-240. The plans cell consists of a core group of planners and analysts led by the plans officer. All staff
sections assist as required. While the BCT has a small, dedicated plans element, the majority of its staff
sections balance their efforts between the current operations and plans cells. Upon completion of the initial
operation order,the plans cell normally develops plans for the next operation or the next phase of the current
operation. In addition, the plans cell develops solutions to complex problems resulting in orders, policies,
and other coordinating or directive products such as memorandums of agreement. In some situations,
planning teams form to solve specific problems,such as redeployment within the theater of operations. These
planning teams dissolve when planning is complete.
Functional Cells
4-241. Functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function. The
functional cells within a CP are movement and maneuver, fire support, intelligence, protection, and
sustainment.
Movement and Maneuver Cell
4-242. The movement and maneuver cell coordinates activities and systems that move forces to achieve an
advantageous position in relation to the enemy. Activities include tasks that employ forces in combination
with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection (movement) related to gaining a positional
advantage over an enemy, and mobility and countermobility. Elements of the operation, airspace
management,aviation,and engineer staff sections form this cell. The S-3 leads this cell. Staff elements in the
movement and maneuver cell form the core of the current operations cell,also. Additional staff officers and
elements residing in the movement and maneuver cell may include information operations officer,PSYOP
officer,EWO,and brigade judge advocate. |
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Fire Support Cell
4-243. Fire support are fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, space, cyberspace, and
special operations forces to engage enemy forces,combat formations,and facilities in pursuit of tacticaland
operational objectives (JP3-09). The fire support cell and its elements integrate the fires warfighting function
within the BCT. The BCT fire support officer leads this cell. Soldiers who have expertise integral to the fires
warfighting function staff the fire support cell. The cell has resources to plan for future operations from the
main CP and to support current operations from the TAC when deployed. Additionally, the cell has the
limited capability to provide coverage to the command group when deployed.
4-244. The fire support cell plans,prepares,executes,and assesses fires. The cell synchronizes the effects
of fires with other elements of combat power to accomplish the commander’s intent. During the targeting
process,the fire support cell develops high-payoff targets—a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly
contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60)—and, prioritizes targets for attack.
High-value targets—a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission
(JP 3-60)—are developed such as enemy artillery formations,reserves,and command and control. The cell
matches a wide range of targeting and delivering systems and integrates air defense and airspace
management. The fire support cell coordinates with the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC), in the
division’s current operations integrating cell, for the execution of fires in support of current and future
operations (see ATP 3-91.1). The JAGIC ensures the fire support cellhas current fire support coordination
measures and airspace coordinating measures and that all BCT fires are executed within BCT airspace
parameters. The JAGIC may also execute fires,through the BCT fire support cell,in specific situations.
4-245. The ADAM element and the BAE collocate within the fire support cell (see ATP 3-01.50 and
FM3-04,respectively). The ADAM/BAE cell composed of Army air and missile defense and aviation staff
supports the BCT commander and staff by providing situational understanding of the airspace and early
warning via connectivity with airspace users and with multinational partner’s sensors and command
networks. The ADAM/BAE cell coordinates closely with the BCT TACP to identify close air support
airspace requirements and facilitate air-ground integration. The cell coordinates airspace and aviation support
issues with other BCT cells,participates directly in the targeting process,airspace management,air defense,
and may be a part of most working groups and meetings. The ADAM/BAE is responsible for integrating
airspace requirements in the BCT unit airspace plan and submits airspace requirements to the division
airspace element.
4-246. The TACP is the principal air liaison unit collocated with the fire support cell in the main CP.
Selected portions of the cell can deploy with the TACwhen used. The air liaison officer is the senior TACP
member attached to the BCT who functions as the primary advisor to the BCT commander on air operations.
The TACP has two primary missions: advise the BCT commander and staff on the capabilities and limitations
of air operations and provide the primary terminal attack control of close air support. TACPs may employ
joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) at any echelon. The JTAC is a qualified and certified Service
member,whodirects the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other air operations. The
JTAC provides the ground commander recommendations on the use of close air support and its integration
with ground maneuver. (SeeJP 3-09.3and ATP 3-04.1 for additional information.)
4-247. The brigade judge advocate participates in the planning and targeting processes. Additionally, the
trial counsel assists the brigade judge advocate on nationallaw matters and is a standing member of working
groups, targeting boards, and the fire support cell. The brigade legal section’s inclusion in planning,
on-boarding,and working groups helps the legal section to have a full awareness of all the issues. The legal
section should advise the command about matters such as rules of engagement. The legal section also should
review any output for legal sufficiency and provide responsive advice for proposed follow-on operations.
(SeeFM 1-04 for additional information.)
4-248. The EWO leads the EW andthe CEMA working groups. The determination of which working group
is appropriate is situation dependent based on which portion of the information environment desired effects
occur. The EWO plans,coordinates,assesses,and supports the execution of EW and other CEMA,supports
the BCT S-2 during IPB and the fire support officer to ensure electromagneticattack fires are prioritized and
integrated with all other effects. The EWO plans, assesses, and implements friendly electronic security
measures,serves as EW subject matter expert on existing EW rules of engagement,and maintains a current |
3-96 | 139 | Mission Command
assessment of available EW resources. (SeeFM 3-12 and ATP 3-12.3 for additional information.)Tasks of
the BCT CEMA working group include—
(cid:122) Develop and integrate cyberspace and EW actions into operation plans and exercises.
(cid:122) Support CEMA policies.
(cid:122) Plan,prepare,execute,and assess cyberspace and EW operations.
(cid:122) Integrate intelligence preparation of the battlefield into the operations process.
(cid:122) Identify and coordinate intelligence support requirements for BCT and subordinate units’
cyberspace and EW operations.
(cid:122) Assess offensive and defensive requirements for cyberspace and EW operations.
(cid:122) Maintain current assessment of cyberspace and EW resources available to the unit.
(cid:122) Nominate and submitapproved targets within cyberspace to division.
(cid:122) Prioritize BCT targets within cyberspace and the EMS.
(cid:122) Plan,coordinate,and assess friendly CEMA.
(cid:122) Implement friendly electronic and network security measures (for example,EMS mitigation and
network protection).
(cid:122) Ensure cyberspace and EW operations actions comply with applicable policy and laws.
(cid:122) Identify civilian and commercial cyberspace and EMS-related capacity and infrastructure within
the area of operations.
Note. Within the BCT, subordinate maneuver battalions and squadron rely on the BCT for core
services, network accessibility, and network defense. The battalion/squadron S-6 performs the
planning and operations associated with the main and tactical command posts, including
establishing connectivity with adjacent, subordinate, and higher elements. Currently,
battalions/squadron do not have organic capabilities to plan and integrate all aspects of cyberspace
operations. They do have capabilities to support cybersecurity policies and request for information
regarding cyberspace and the EMS. Companies/troops rely on their battalion/squadronfor network
service, access, and network defense. The company/troop performs the planning and operations
associated with the command post,including establishing connectivity with adjacent,subordinate,
and higher elements. Commanders at this echelon are responsible for applicable cybersecurity
measures.
4-249. The Army and Air Force can augment the main CP’s fire support cell as the mission variables of
METT-TC dictate. Various capabilitiessuch as PSYOP,civil affairs,and cyberspace operations can augment
the cell as needed. Additional functions within the fire support cell include—
(cid:122) Targeting working group. (See ATP 3-60.)
(cid:122) Preparing fires portion of operation order including scheme of fires. (See FM 3-09.)
(cid:122) Managing changes to fire support coordination measures. (See ATP 3-09.32.)
(cid:122) Coordinating clearance for attacks against targets (clearance of fires). (See FM 3-09.)
(cid:122) Preparing products for targeting working group and targeting board. (See ATP 3-60.)
(cid:122) Implementing, updating, managing, and disseminating all targeting guidance in the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems. (See FM 3-09.)
(cid:122) Recommending radar employment and functional dissemination of rocket, artillery, and mortar
warnings. (See ATP 3-01.60.)
Intelligence Cell
4-250. Intelligence core competencies within the intelligence cell are intelligence synchronization,
intelligence operations, intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination and intelligence analysis.
Processing,exploitation,and disseminationis the execution of the related functions that converts and refines
collected data into usable information,distributes the information for further analysis,and,when appropriate,
provides combat information to commanders and staffs (ADP 2-0). Processing, exploitation, and
dissemination conducted by intelligence personnel or units are called intelligence processing, exploitation, |
3-96 | 140 | Chapter 4
and dissemination. Intelligence synchronizationis the art of integrating information collection;intelligence
processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and
efficiently fight for intelligence in support of decision making (ADP 2-0). Intelligence operations (see
chapter5) are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy
validated requirements. Intelligence analysisis the process by which collected information is evaluated and
integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production (ADP 2-0). Intelligence core
competencies are the basic activities and tasks used to describe and drive the intelligence warfighting function
and leverage national to tactical intelligence. (SeeADP 2-0 for additional information.)
4-251. The BCT intelligence officer leads the intelligence cell. The BCT intelligence staff section is the
core around which the intelligence officer forms the BCT intelligence cell along with designated Soldiers
from the BCT military intelligence company and an assigned U.S. Air Force weather team. Higher
headquarters may augment this cell with additional capabilities to meet mission requirements. The BCT
intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources to produce and distribute
intelligence products. Although there are intelligence staff elements in other CP cells,most of the intelligence
staff section resides in the intelligence cell. (SeeFM 2-0 for additional information.) The BCT intelligence
cell performs the following functions:
Facilitate Commander’s Visualization and Understanding
4-252. The BCT intelligence cell facilitates the commander’s visualization and understanding of the threat,
terrain and weather,and civil considerations as well as other relevant aspects of the operational environment
within the BCT area of interest. The intelligence cell provides information and intelligence to support the
commander’s visualization and understanding (see ADP 5-0). The cell performs IPB (see ATP 2-01.3),
indications and warning (see FM 2-0),and situation development tasks (see FM 2-0) to provide information
and intelligence.
Support Targeting and Protection
4-253. The intelligence cell provides the commander and staff with information and intelligence to target
threat forces, organizations, units, and systems through lethal and nonlethal effects. The BCT intelligence
cell conducts tasks to deny or degrade the threat’s effort to access and gain intelligence about friendlyforces.
The intelligence cell develops target systems, locates targets, and performs battle damage assessment to
support targeting (see ATP 3-60). The intelligence cell performs counterintelligence by reporting the
capabilities and limitations of threat intelligence services to the commander. (See ATP 2-22.2-1 and
ATP2-22.2-2 for additional information.)
Assisting in Information Collection Planning
4-254. The BCT intelligence cell integrates military intelligence collection assets so the commander can
gain situational understanding to produce intelligence. Information collection (see chapter 5) is the activity
within the BCT that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well
as intelligence processing,exploitation,and dissemination capabilities in direct support of current and future
operations. The intelligence cell identifies, prioritizes, and validates information collection tasks. The
information collection plan is developed and synchronized with the concept of operations. The BCT
intelligence cell performs the collection management tasks to support information collection planning. (See
ADP 2-0,FM 2-0,and ATP 2-01 for additional information.)
Produce Intelligence Products
4-255. Intelligence informs the commander and staff of where and when to look. Reconnaissance,
surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations are the collection means (see chapter 5). The
collection means range from national and joint collection capabilities to individual Soldier observations and
reports. The result or product is intelligence that supports the commander’s decision-making. (SeeATP2-01
for additional information.) |
3-96 | 141 | Mission Command
Dissiminating and Integrating Intelligence
4-256. The cell uses various command and control networks to disseminate and integrate within the BCT
area of operations. The cell uses verbal reports, documents, textual reports, graphic products, softcopy
products, and automated databases to disseminate intelligence. The commander and staff integrate the
intelligence to assist them in maintaining situational awareness. Establishing communications networks and
knowledge and information management procedures accomplishes this function.
Protection Cell
4-257. The protection cell synchronizes, integrates and organizes protection capabilities and resources to
preserve combat power and identify and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection is
not a linear activity—planning,preparing,executing,and assessing protection is a continuous and enduring
activity. Protection integrates all protection capabilities, to include those of united action partners, to
safeguard the force,personnel (combatants and noncombatants),systems,and physical assets of the United
States and its mission partners. Primary protection tasks and systems include coordinate air and missile
defense, personnel recovery, explosive ordnance disposal, antiterrorism, survivability, force health
protection,CBRN operations,detention operations,RM,physical security,police operations,and populace
and resources control. Additional protection tasks to protect the force,critical assets,and information,and to
preserves combat power include area and local security activities, operations security, and cyberspace and
EWoperations.
4-258. The S-3 supervises the protection cell within the BCT. Protection synchronization,integration,and
organization in the BCT may require the commander to designate a staff lead as the protection officer. The
protection officer understands how threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality assessments are used to
prioritize and determine which assets should be protected given no constraints and which assets can be
protected with available resources. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all assets
the same level of protection. For this reason, the commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and
provides guidance to the staff so that they can employ protection capabilities based on protection priorities.
Commanders place high priority sites on the critical asset list. With finite resources,those sites that require
additional force protection, security, and survivability are prioritized on the defended asset list. Managed
resources include horizontal engineer platoons,Infantry platoons,and air defense artillery platoons.
4-259. Working groups established within the protection cell may include CEMA (see FM 3-12), CBRN
(see ADP3-37), antiterrorism (see ATP 3-37.2), and personnel recovery (see FM 3-50). For example,
protection requires the integration and coordination of tasks to defend the network, as well as protect
individuals and platforms. Thus, the S-3 designates and relies on the CEMA working group, when
established. The EWO, with representation from the S-2, S-6 and other staff elements, leads the CEMA
working group to achieve the level of protection required. In all cases,protection officers and coordinators
work with higher and lower echelons to nest protection activities with complementary and reinforcing
capabilities. (SeeADP 3-37 for additional information.)
Sustainment Cell
4-260. The sustainment cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support and services to ensure
freedom of action and to prolong endurance. The sustainment cell includes tasks associated with logistics,
financial management,personnel services,and health service support. The following staff section elements
work in the sustainment cell, logistics, human resources, and the surgeon. The BCT sustainment cell may
collocate with the BSB within the brigade support area. The BCT S-4 leads this cell. (See chapter 9 for
additional information.)
STAFFPROCESSES AND PROCEDURES
4-261. A BCT must man, equip, and organize CPs to control operations for extended periods. The BCT
commander, assisted by the staff, arranges CP personnel and equipment to facilitate 24-hour operations,
internal coordination,information-sharing,and rapid decision-making. The commander ensures procedures
to execute the operations process within the headquarters enable mission command. The staff uses SOPs, |
3-96 | 142 | Chapter 4
battle rhythm,meetings,running estimates,information,battle captains,and command and control systems
and techniques to assist in CP operations.
Standard Operating Procedures
4-262. SOPs that assist with effective command and control serve two purposes. Internal SOPs standardize
each CP’s internal operations and administration. External SOPs,developed for the entire force,standardize
interactions among CPs and between subordinate units and CPs. CPs are organized to permitcontinuous and
rapid execution of operations. SOPs for each CP should be established,known to all,and rehearsed. These
SOPs should include at a minimum the following:
(cid:122) Organization and setup.
(cid:122) Plans for teardown and displacement.
(cid:122) Eating and sleeping plans.
(cid:122) Shift manning,shift changes and operation guidelines.
(cid:122) Physical security plans.
(cid:122) Priorities of work.
(cid:122) Loading plans and checklists.
(cid:122) Orders production.
(cid:122) Techniques for monitoring enemy and friendly situations.
(cid:122) Posting of map boards.
(cid:122) Maintenance of journals and logs.
4-263. Effective SOPs require all Soldiers to know their provisions and to train to their standards. (See
ADRP 1-03for additional information on tasks for CP operations.) Critical BCTSOPs include tactical SOPs
(seeATP 3-90.90),targeting SOPs (seeATP3-60),and CP battle drill SOPs (seeADRP 1-03).
Battle Rhythm
4-264. Battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to
synchronize current and future operations (FM 6-0). Within the operations process,the BCT commander and
staff integrates and synchronizes numerous activities, meetings, and reports with their headquarters and
higher headquarters and with subordinate units. The BCT’s battle rhythm sequences the actions and events
within a headquarters that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information that supports decision-making.
The establishment of a battle rhythm is always dependent on the availability of time (including speed of
decision-making, speed of action, and operational tempo). For example, time considerations (especially
within large-scale combat operations) across physical domains and the dimensions of the information
environment help the commander determine the correct battle rhythm in regards to the type and number of
activities and events relevant to operational tempo. An effective battle rhythm—
(cid:122) Establishes a routine (dependent upon the availability of time) for staff interaction and
coordination.
(cid:122) Facilitates interaction (dependent upon mission constraints) among the commander, staff, and
subordinate units.
(cid:122) Facilitates (dependent upon planning horizon) staff planning and the commander’s
decision-making.
4-265. As a practical matter, a BCT’s battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings,report requirements,
and other activities synchronized by time and purpose. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or
quarterly depending on the planning horizon.
4-266. The BCT commander adjusts the unit’s battle rhythm as operations progress. For example,early in
the operation,a commander may require a commander’s update every several hours. As the situation changes,
the commander may require only a daily commander’s update. Some factors that help determine a unit’s
battle rhythm include the staff’s proficiency, higher headquarters’ battle rhythm, and current mission. The
BCT commander andXOconsider the following when developing the unit’s battle rhythm:
(cid:122) Higher headquarters’battle rhythm and report requirements. |
3-96 | 143 | Mission Command
(cid:122) Duration and intensity of the operation.
(cid:122) Planning requirements of the integrating cells (current operations and plans).
Meetings
4-267. Meetings (including working groups and boards) take up a large amount of a BCT’s battle rhythm.
Meetings are gatherings to present and exchange information,solve problems,coordinate action,and make
decisions. Meetings may involve the staff; the commander and staff; or the commander, subordinate
commanders,staff,and other partners. Who attends a meeting depends on the issue. The BCT commander
establishes meetings to integrate the staff and enhance planning and decision-making within the headquarters.
Two critical meetings that happen as a part of the BCT battle rhythm are the operations update and assessment
briefing and the operations synchronization meeting.
Operation Update and Assessment Briefing
4-268. An operation update and assessment briefing may occur daily or anytime the commander calls for
one. The content is similar to the shift change briefing but has a different audience. The staff presents the
briefing to the commander and subordinate commanders. The briefing provides all key personnel with
common situational awareness. Often the commander requires this briefing shortly before an operation begins
to summarize changes made during preparation, including changes resulting from information collection
efforts.
4-269. Staff sections present their running estimates during the briefing. Subordinate commanders brief
their current situation and planned activities. Rarely do all members conduct this briefing face-to-face. All
CPs and subordinate commanders participate using available communications, including radio, conference
calls, and video teleconference. The briefing follows a sequence and format specified by SOPs that keeps
transmissions short,ensures completeness,and eases note taking. The briefing normally has a format similar
to a shift-change briefing. However, this briefing omits CP administrative information and includes
presentations by subordinate commanders in an established sequence.
Operations Synchronization Meeting
4-270. The key event in the battle rhythm is the operations synchronization meeting, which supports the
current operation. The primary purpose of the meeting is to synchronize all warfighting functions and other
activities in the short-term planning horizon. The meeting ensures that all staff members have a common
understanding of current operations including upcoming and projected actions at decision points.
4-271. The operations synchronization meeting does not replace the shift change briefing or operation
update and assessment briefing. The S-3 or XO chairs the meeting. Representatives of each CP cell and
separate staff section attend the meeting. The operations synchronization meeting includes a fragmentary
order addressing any required changes to maintain synchronization of current operations, and any updated
planning guidance for upcoming working groups and boards. All warfighting functions are synchronized,
and appropriate fragmentary orders are issued to subordinates based on the commander’s intent for current
operations.
Running Estimate
4-272. Effective plans and successful executions hinge on accurate and current running estimates. A
running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable
(ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may cause errors or omissions resulting in flawed
plans or bad decisions during execution.
4-273. Running estimates are principal knowledge management tools the BCT commander and staff use
throughout the operations process. In their running estimates,the commander and each staff section member
continuously considerthe effect of new information and update the following:
(cid:122) Facts.
(cid:122) Assumptions. |
3-96 | 144 | Chapter 4
(cid:122) Friendly force status.
(cid:122) Enemy activities and capabilities.
(cid:122) Civil considerations.
(cid:122) Conclusions and recommendations.
4-274. Running estimates always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning,the
BCT commander uses these recommendations to select feasible,acceptable,and suitable COAsfor further
analysis. The commander uses recommendations from running estimates in decision-making during
preparation and execution.
4-275. The BCT staff maintains formal running estimates while the commander’s estimate is a mental
process directly tied to the commander’s vision. The commander integrates personal knowledge of the
situation with analysis of the operational and mission variables, with subordinate commanders and other
organizations assessments, and with relevant details gained from running estimates. The BCT commander
uses a running estimate to crosscheck and supplement the staff’s running estimates. A running estimate
format is included in FM 6-0.
Information
4-276. CPs within the BCT monitor communications nets, receive reports, and process information to
satisfy commander needs or critical information requirements. This information is maintained,in addition to
digital systems,on maps,charts,and logs. Each section or cell maintains daily journals to log messages and
radio traffic. CPs maintain information as easily understood map graphics and charts. Status charts can be
combined with situation maps to give the commander and staff friendly and enemy situation snapshots for
the planning process. This information is updated continuously. For simplicity,all map boards should be the
same size and scale and overlay mounting holes should be standard on all map boards. This allows easy
transfer of overlays from one board to another. The following procedures for posting friendly and enemy
information on the map aid the commander and staff in following the flow of battle:
(cid:122) Friendly and enemy unit symbols are displayed on clear acetate placed on the operations overlay.
These symbols can be marked with regular stick cellophane tape or with marking pen.
(cid:122) Units normally keep track of subordinate units, two levels down. This may be difficult during
offensive operations. It may be necessary to track locations of immediate subordinate units instead.
Battle Captain
4-277. Battle captain positions are habitually filled,and found in most,if not all CPs. They coordinate the
day-to-day staff activities,in effect acting as an assistant XO,and provide continuity for the staff’s actions.
The battle captain’s informal role is to plan, coordinate, supervise, and maintain communication flow
throughout the CP to ensure the successful accomplishment of all assigned missions. The battle captain assists
the commander, XO, and S-3 by being the focal point in the CP for communications, coordination, and
knowledge and information management. The battle captain is also the CP officer in charge in the absence
of the commander,XO,and S-3. To function effectively,the battle captain must have a working knowledge
of all elements in the CP,understand unit SOPs,and ensure CP personnel use them. The battle captain must
know the current plan and task organization of the unit and understand the commander’s intent.
4-278. Battle captains integrate into the decision-making process and know why certain key decisions were
made. Battle captains must know the technical aspects of the battle plan and understand the time-space
relationship to execute any specific support task. Battle captains must understand and enforce the battle
rhythm, the standard events or actions that happen during a normal 24-hour period and ensure that the CP
staff is effective throughout the period. Understanding their assigned authorities,battle captains use judgment
to adjust activities and events to accomplish the mission across different shifts, varying tactical
circumstances,and changes in the CP location. Battle captains have the overall responsibility for the smooth
functioning of the facility and its staff elements. This range of responsibility includes—
(cid:122) Maintaining continuous operations (while static and mobile).
(cid:122) Tracking the current situation.
(cid:122) Ensuring communications are maintained and all messages and reports are logged. |
3-96 | 145 | Mission Command
(cid:122) Assisting the XO in ensuring a smooth and continuous information flow.
(cid:122) Processing essential data to ensure tactical and logistical information is gathered and provided to
staff members on a regular basis.
(cid:122) Tracking CCIRs and providing recommendations.
(cid:122) Approving fabrication and propagation of manual unit icons.
(cid:122) Sending reports to higher and ensuring relevant information passes to subordinate units.
(cid:122) Monitoring security within and around the CP.
(cid:122) Organizing the CP to displace rapidly.
(cid:122) Conducting battle drills and enforcing the SOP.
4-279. The battle captain ensures allstaff elements in the CP understand their actions in accordance with
the SOP and operation order,and provides coordination for message flow,staff briefings,updates to charts,
and other coordinated staff actions. As the focal point in the CP, the battle captain processes essential
information from incoming data, assesses it, ensures dissemination, and makes recommendations to the
commander,XO,and S-3. The battle captain ensures the consistency,accuracy,and timeliness of information
leaving the CP, including preparing and issuing fragmentary orders and warning orders. The battle captain
monitors and enforces the updating of charts and status boards necessary for battle management and ensures
this posted information is timely,accurate,and accessible.
Digital and Analog Command and Control Systems and Techniques
4-280. Digital command and control systems within a CP bring a dramatic increase in the level of
informational dominance units may achieve. Techniques for digital procedures and for integrating analog
and digital units contribute to battlefield lethality and tempo, and the ability to maintain information
dominance. These techniques can significantly speed the process of creating and disseminating orders,allow
for extensive collection of information, and increase the speed and fidelity of coordination and
synchronization of battlefield activities. At the same time,achieving the potential of these systems requires
extensive training,a high level of technical proficiency by both operators and supervisors,and the disciplined
use of detailed SOPs. Communications planning and execution to support the digital systems is significantly
more demanding and arduous than is required for units primarily relying on Combat Net Radio
communication and Joint Capabilities Release(known as JCR)/Joint Battle Command-Platform (known as
JBC-P). (See ATP6-02.53 for additional information on CP tactical radio operations.)
4-281. Whether to use Combat Net Radioor digital means for communication is a function of the situation
and SOPs. Some general considerations can help guide the understanding of when to use which mechanism
at what time. Frequency modulation communication is normally the initial method of communications when
elements are in contact. Before and following an engagement,the staff and commanders use digital systems
for disseminating orders and graphics and conducting routine reporting. During operations,however,the staff
uses a combination of systems to report and coordinate with higher and adjacent units.
4-282. The BCT staff must remain sensitive to the difficulty and danger of using digital systems when
moving or in contact. The staff should not expect digital reports from subordinate units under such conditions.
Other general guidelines include the following:
(cid:122) Initial contact at any echelon within the BCT should be reported on frequency modulation voice;
digital enemy spot reports should follow as soon as possible to generate the enemy COP.
(cid:122) Elements moving about the battlefield (not in CPs) use frequency modulation voice unless they
can stop and generate a digital message or report.
(cid:122) Emergency logistical requests,especially casualty evacuation (see ATP 4-25.13) requests,should
be initiated on frequency modulation voice with a follow-up digital report,if possible.
(cid:122) Combat elements moving or in contact should transmit enemy spot reports on frequency
modulation voice; their higher headquarters should convert frequency modulation reports into
digital spot reports to generate the COP.
(cid:122) Calls for fire on targets of opportunity should be sent on frequency modulation voice;fire support
teams submit digitally to advanced field artillery tactical data system.
(cid:122) Plan calls for fire digitally and execute them by voice with digital back up. |
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