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3-96 | 246 | Chapter 6
6-220. A lull in combat operations often accompanies a transition. The commander cannot forget about
stability operationsbecause the civilian populations of the unit’s area of operations tend to come outof their
hiding positions and request assistance from friendly forces during these lulls. The commander must consider
how to minimize civilian interference with the force’s combat operations while protecting civilians from
future hostile actions accordingto the law of war. The commander must also consider the threat enemy agents
or saboteurs pose when infiltrating or operating form within civilian populations. (See chapter 8.)
6-221. A commander anticipating the termination of unit offensive actions prepares orders that include the
time or circumstances under which the current offense transitions to the defense,the missions and locations
of subordinate units, and control measures. As the unit transitions from an offensive focus to a defensive
focus,the commander maintains contact with the enemy,using a combination information collectionassets
to develop the information required to plan future actions. The commander also establishes a security area
and local security measures.
TRANSITION TO THE CONDUCT OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
6-222. A transition to stability centric operations occurs for several reasons. A transition may occur from
an operation dominated by large-scale combat operations to one dominated by the consolidation of gains.
Transitions also occur with the delivery of essential services or retention of infrastructure needed for
reconstruction. An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition
between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden
changes in mission,task organization,and rules of engagement. Typically,task organization evolves to meet
changing conditions;however,transition planning must account for changes in mission,also. Commanders
continuously assess the situation,task organize,and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. Commanders
strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.
6-223. Planning for operations focused on stability begins the moment the BCT receives the mission.
Coordinated early planning between the military and the interagency for post-conflict operations is vitally
important. When coordinated planning to transition responsibility from military to civilian entities does not
occur,the result is always the development of military and civilian parallel efforts,which seek to either secure
or develop the host nation. The end state of the offense is the eventual transfer of all security operations to
host nation control. Transferring security operations does not allow the commander to abdicate the role of
providing security for the host nation,facilities,or friendly units. The commandermust work in concert with
host-nation security forces to ensure a smooth transition to host nation control.
6-224. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities,programs,
and engagements. Building partner capacity enhances security, rule of law, essential services, governance,
economic development,and other critical government functions. Army forces support host nation ownership
when planning and implementing capacity building as part of a comprehensive approach.
6-225. All actors involved in decisive action integrate with the operation from the onset of planning.
Together,they complete detailed analyses of the situation and operational environments,develop integrated
COAs, and continuously assess the situation. Integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole of
government approach has challenges. First,the efforts have differing capacities and differing perspectives.
Second,the two efforts use different approaches and decision-making processes.
6-226. A comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the
U.S. Government,other unified action partners,and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward
a shared goal. A comprehensive approach builds from the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. Successful
operations use this approach,even forthose operations involving actors participating at their own discretion
or present in the operational area but not acting as a unified action partner member. Integration and
collaboration among actors with different agendas and experience is challenging. A comprehensive approach
achieves unity of effort to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. Mandates,experiences,structures,
and bureaucratic cultures make it difficult to sustain a comprehensive approach. Commanders overcome and
mitigate this challenge with extensive cooperation and coordination.
6-227. Five broad conditions provide the underpinnings for strategic, whole-of-government planning and
serve as a focal point for integrating operational andtactical level tasks. The end state conditions are flexible |
3-96 | 247 | Offense
and adaptive to support activities across the range of military operations but rely on concrete principles and
fundamentals in application. (See chapter 8.) End state conditions are—
(cid:122) A safe and secure environment.
(cid:122) Established rule of law.
(cid:122) Social well-being.
(cid:122) Stable governance.
(cid:122) A sustainable economy. |
3-96 | 249 | Chapter 7
Defense
The brigade combat team (BCT) conducts defensive operations to defeat enemy
attacks, gain time, control key terrain, protect critical infrastructure, secure the
population, and economize forces. Most importantly, the BCT sets conditions to
transition to the offense or operations focused on stability. Defensive operations alone
are not decisive unless combined with offensive operations to surprise the enemy,
attack enemy weaknesses, and pursue or exploit enemy vulnerabilities. This chapter
addresses the characteristics of the defense, common defensive planning
considerations, forms of the defense, defensive control measures, defensive operations,
and planning considerations when transitioning to other tactical operations.
SECTION I – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE
7-1. Successful defenses share the following characteristics: disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and
concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security. Defenses are aggressive. Defending
commanders use all available means to disrupt enemy forces. Commanders disrupt attackers and isolate them
from mutual support to defeat them in detail. Defenders seek to increase their freedom of maneuver while
denying it to attackers. Defending commanders use every opportunity to transition to the offense, even if
only temporarily. As attackers’ losses increase, they falter, and the initiative shifts to the defenders. These
situations are favorable for counterattacks. Counterattack opportunities rarely last long. Defenders strike
swiftly when the attackers reach their decisive point. Surprise and speed enable counterattacking forces to
seize the initiative and overwhelm the attackers.
7-2. The Battle of Kasserine Pass,described below,is an example of neglecting the characteristics of the
defense. Prior to the Battle of Kasserine Pass,II Corps failed to adequately resource and prepare defensive
positions; ensure defensive positions could mass effects of direct and indirect fires; adequately include
flexibility,depth,and maneuver in planning,and conduct continuous reconnaissance and security operations
to provide early and accurate warning.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass
The Battle of Kasserine Pass,Tunisia in February 1943,served as a rude awakening for
the American Army in World War II. Over the course of the month,German Field Marshal
Erwin Rommel’s veteran Armeegruppe Afrika delivered a series of defeats to the relatively
inexperienced American II Corps under Major General Lloyd Fredendall. Kasserine Pass
was a tremendous blow to American pride and a loss of confidence in the eyes of II Corps’
British and French allies. However, lessons learned from the battle led to changes in
leadership,tactics,and training,resulting in a competent force in the African theater,as
well as more realistic and effective training in America. Kasserine Pass remains a bitterly
poignant example of the disasters that befall a force that neglects the characteristics of the
defense.
The Anglo-Americanadvance into Tunisia transitioned to a defense in December 1942 due
to poor weather and logistical challenges. Major General Fredendall’s II Corps was
tasked with reinforcing the French defenses around several mountain passes and a road
junction in southern Tunisia. Fredendall,headquartered some 70 miles from the forward
line of troops,personally directed the dispersion of his subordinate elements over a large
area of operations. Omar Bradleylater noted in A Soldier’s Storythat,“American Infantry
had been lumped on isolated [hills]…and mobile reserves were scattered in bits and pieces |
3-96 | 250 | Chapter 7
along the line.” Simultaneously, engineer assets needed for improving of defensive
positions were instead constructing a cavernous bunker for the corps command post.
Lack of cooperation with allied forces and inadequate reconnaissance and security
operations allowed German and Italian elements of Armeegruppe Afrika to achieve tactical
surprise at the onset and throughout the battle. During the following weeks, French and
American units routinely found themselves surprised by enemy contact,fighting from non-
mutuallysupporting positions,and unable to mass direct and indirect fires. German and
Italian forces, enjoying local air superiority as allowed by weather, rarely experienced
disruption at the hands of isolated and easily bypassed defensive positions. Retrograde
operations frequently degenerated into routes with significant losses of manpower and
equipment. Allied attempts to maneuver against Axis forces were poorly coordinated due
to failures to incorporate flexibility into the array of forces as well as command failures at
multiple echelons. Brigadier General Paul R. Robinette,commander of Combat Command
Aof the 1stArmored Division,would later record the Soldiers’observation that during this
battle “never were so few commanded by so many from so far away.”
The poor performance of the American Army left a bitter legacy for the American Soldier
that would haunt Anglo American relations in the theater. At the human level, II Corps
sustained approximately six thousand casualties during the February 1943 engagements
as well as the loss of 183 tanks,104half-tracks,208 artillery pieces,500 other vehicles,
and vast amounts of supplies. Conversely,Rommel’s forces sustained approximately 1000
casualties and a tenth of thematerial losses. (See figure 7-1.)
Various |
3-96 | 251 | Defense
Figure 7-1. Kasserine Pass and Sbiba Gap map
DISTRUPTION
7-3. The BCT must disrupt the tempo and synchronization of the enemy’s operation to counter the enemy’s
initiative,to prevent enemy from concentrating combat power against a part of the defense,and to force the
enemy to go where the commander wants the enemy to go. The commander achieves disruption by defeating
or misleading enemy reconnaissance forces, impeding maneuver, disrupting reserves, neutralizing fire
support, and interrupting command and control. Defensive techniques vary with circumstances, but all
defensive concepts of operation aimto spoil the attacker’s synchronization. Strong security forces to defeat
enemy reconnaissance,phony initial positions or dummy positions,and obstacles are some of the measures
used to increase BCT security in the defense.
7-4. The commander uses counterattack, counterbattery, and countermortar fires; spoiling attacks;
electromagnetic attacks (see chapter 4); obstacles; and retention of key or decisive terrain to prevent the
enemy from concentrating overwhelming strength against portions of the defense. Decisive terrain is key
terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment (ADP 3-90). An
analysis of friendly force networks will inform the development of critical information and provide a basis
for establishing key terrain in cyberspace. Key terrain in the defense isthose physical and logical entities in
friendly force technical networks of such extraordinary importance that any disruption in their operation
would have debilitating effects upon accomplishment of the mission. |
3-96 | 252 | Chapter 7
FLEXIBILITY
7-5. The BCT commander uses detailed planning, sound preparation, operations in depth, retaining
reserves,and command and control to maintain flexibility. Flexibility requires the commander to visualize
the battlefield to detect the enemy’s scheme of maneuver in time to direct fire and movement against it. The
commander does not limit information collection efforts only to the forces in contact. The commander also
concentrates on formations arrayed in-depth. The enemy may try to bypass areas where the defense is strong.
Hence, the BCT commander ensures detection and the defeat of the enemy along all possible avenues of
approach. The commander uses aviation reconnaissance and surveillance assets and cyberspace and
electromagnetic warfare (EW) operations to support information collection. The BCT’s plan allows the
commander to shift the decisive operation or the main effort quickly, if the situation changes, while
maintaining synchronization. Inaddition,alternate and subsequent positions provide the flexibility needed to
execute the defense,effectively. Small reserves may position near critical terrain or likely avenues of attack
to enable rapid deployment to those areas. Blocking positions can be established to deny the enemy a chance
for a rapid breakthrough.
MANEUVER
7-6. Maneuver allows the commander to take full advantage of the area of operations and to mass and
concentrate resources where required. The BCT arrays and allocates forces in relationship to likely enemy
courses of action (COAs). The BCT uses allocations based on the results of the relative combat power
analysis of the BCT and enemy forces’assigned tasks and the terrain. The commander accepts risk along less
likely avenues of approach to ensure that adequate combat power is available for more likely avenues of
approach.
7-7. Maneuver also encompasses defensive actions such as security and support area operations. In some
cases, the commander must accept gaps within the defense, but must take measures to maintain security
within these risk areas. The BCT integrates assigned or attached and echelon above brigade enablers, for
example,surveillanceassets,reconnaissance and security forces,space and cyberspace capabilities,patrols
(dismounted and mounted),combat outpost,observation posts,sensor outposts,or listening posts.Additional
enablers include engineer reconnaissance teams,orchemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear (CBRN)
reconnaissance forces, observation outposts,forward observer or spotter outposts,or other economy of force
effort for these areas.
MASS AND CONCENTRATION
7-8. The BCT masses its combat power to overwhelm the enemy and regain the initiative. The commander
must be able to concentrate forces and mass the effects of fires at the decisive point and time. To accomplish
this, the commander may economize forces in some areas, retain a reserve, shift priority of fires, and
maneuver repeatedly to concentrate combat power. Commanders accept risks in some areas to concentrate
for decisive action elsewhere. Obstacles, security forces, and fires assist in reducing these risks as forces
economize.
7-9. Dependent on the operational framework, the commander designates a main effort to achieve
concentration, and directs all other elements and assets to support and sustain this effort. The commander
may reprioritize forces,designating a new main effort as the situation changes. The commander directs the
task and purpose of supporting elements to create the conditions necessary for the main effort to accomplish
its task and purpose. The commander narrows the width of subordinate areas of operations, focusing
counterattack plans to support the main effort;assigns the main effort unit priority of obstacle preparation;
gives the unit priority of indirect fire;and positions the reserve to influence the main effort’s area.
7-10. Targets determined during the BCT’s planning process and refined during preparation is described
broadly as physical and logical entities in cyberspace consisting of one or more networked devices used by
enemy and adversary actors. These targets may be established as named area of interests (NAIs) and target
areaof interests (TAIs) as appropriate. As part of cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA),the division
staff,in coordination with the corps staff,performsa key role in target network node analysis (see chapter 2)
supporting the BCT’s cyberspace and EWeffort. |
3-96 | 253 | Defense
7-11. Concealment and deception must mask the concentrating forces since concentration increases the risk
level of large losses from enemy fires. The strategy is to concentrate the effects of the forces,not to physically
concentrate the forces themselves. Defending units use engagement areas (EAs) to concentrate combat power
from mutually supporting positions. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations, organic and
nonorganic to the BCT, are vital to gaining the information and time needed to concentrate the forces and
fires of the BCT.
OPERATIONS IN DEPTH
7-12. Operations in deptharethe simultaneous application ofcombat power throughout an area of operations
(ADP 3-90). Integration of all combat power throughout the area of operations,as well as the BCT’s area of
influence and area of interest,improves the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties. Quick,
violent,and simultaneous action throughout the depth of the BCT’s area of operations can hurt,confuse,and
even paralyze an enemy force when most exposed and vulnerable. Such actions weaken the enemy’s morale
and do not allow any early successesto build their confidence. Operations indepth prevent the enemy from
gaining momentum in the attack. Synchronization of actions within the division’s operational framework
facilitates mission success.
7-13. Alternate and supplementary positions, combat outposts,observation posts, and mutually supporting
strong points extend the depth of the defense. The commander plans fires throughout the defensive area up
to the maximum range of available weapons. Fire support units and observers move and reposition to
maintain contact with enemy forces and observe TAIsin-depth as the battle develops. The commander plans
for the emplacement of obstacles around critical locations to disrupt the enemy’s most dangerous and most
likely COAs.
PREPARATION
7-14. The commander must be familiar with the enemy’s abilities and limitations to prepare the defense
properly. The enemy’s abilities and limitations include their organization, offensive doctrine (tactics,
techniques, and procedures), weapons systems, and equipment. Collection means (reconnaissance,
surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations) inform the commander and staff to enable
understanding and multiply the effectiveness of the defense.
7-15. The commander analyzes the terrain in detail from all perspectives and then verifies on the ground to
select EAsand positions that allow for the massing of fires and the concentration of forces on likely enemy
avenues of approach. Emphasis is on preparing and concealing positions,routes,obstacles,logistical support,
and command and control facilities and networks. The commander plans,coordinates,and prepares military
deceptions and uses rehearsals to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the concept of operations and
commander’s intent.
7-16. During preparation,aerial (manned and unmanned) reconnaissance and surveillance collection efforts
(internal and external to the BCT) complement ground efforts by increasing speed and depth with which
reconnaissance can be conducted over an area. Ground reconnaissance and security forces employ, and
supplies are pre-positioned. Counterattack plans to support the defense and to place the BCT on the offense
are key to retaining the initiative. Counterattack routes must be reconnoitered, improved, secured, and
rehearsed. Defensive preparations within the main battle area (MBA) continue in-depth even as close
engagement begins.
SECURITY
7-17. The BCT commander establishes security areas forward of the MBA, on the flanks, and within the
BCT’s support area to protect the force while in the defense. Security operations forward of the MBA
normally include screen, guard, and cover. The presence of a security force forward of the MBA does not
relieve the MBA units from their own security responsibilities (area security and local security tasks). All
units must maintain security,for example civil reconnaissance and security patrolling,within assigned areas
and contribute to counterreconnaissance. |
3-96 | 254 | Chapter 7
7-18. The BCT may defend to conserve combat power for use elsewhere at a later time. The commander
secures the force through integrated security operations throughout the depth and breadth of its assigned area
of operations. Long-range reconnaissance and surveillance assets task organized at the division and corps
level conduct information collection to define and confirm the enemy at extended ranges and in time and
manner. The commander plans for and employs information-related capabilities and CEMA to confuse the
enemy as to the BCT’s manner of defense and to aid in securing the force.
SECTION II – COMMON DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
7-19. The commander in the defense exploits prepared, mutually supporting positions even though the
initiative is yielded to the enemy. The commander uses knowledge of the terrain to slow the enemy’s
momentum. The defending force maintains its security and disrupts the enemy’s attack at every opportunity.
The defending commander uses long-range fires to reduce the force of the enemy’s initial blow,hinder enemy
offensive preparations and wrest the initiative from the enemy. The commander draws the enemy into EAs
to surprise the enemy with concentrated and integrated fires from concealed and protected positions. The
commander then counterattacks the enemy, repeatedly imposing blows from unexpected directions. The
following discussion uses the warfighting functions (command and control, movement and maneuver,
intelligence,fires,sustainment,and protection) and specific operational environments as the framework for
planning considerations that apply to defensive operations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
7-20. The BCT commander understands,visualizes,and describes the anticipated enemy actions and issues
commander’s guidance to the staff. Based upon the commander’s guidance, the staff refines the higher
headquarters’ products to enable the BCT commander to visualize the operational environment. The BCT
commander and staff refine the higher headquarters’intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products
to focus on the details of the operation in the BCT’s area of operations. The higher commander normally
defines where and how the BCT defeats or destroys the enemy and the operational framework. The BCT
commander defines (envisions) the BCT’sexecutions of its portion of the higher (division and corps) echelon
fight.As each decision is made and each action is taken in the presence of risk and uncertainty,commanders
must anticipate and prevent or mitigate risk,including ethical risks,to support mission accomplishment.
DEFEAT THE ENEMY
7-21. The BCT commander and staff analyze how and where to defeat the enemy. The BCT commander
may define a defeat mechanism that includes use of single or multiple counterattacks to achieve success.
Subordinate commanders and staffs analyze their unit’s role in the fight and determine how to achieve
success. In an area defense,usually the BCT achieves success by massing the effects of obstacles and fires
to defeat the enemy forward of a designated area,often in conjunction with a higher echelon’s counterattack.
In a delay operation, the BCT achieves success by combining maneuver, fire support, obstacles, and the
avoidance of decisive engagement until conditions are right to gain time or shape the battlefield for a higher
echelon’s counterattack.
ORGANIZE THE DEFENSE
7-22. The BCT commander organizes in the defense to facilitate the execution of a defensive operation. The
commander and staff use an operational framework, and associated vocabulary, to help conceptualize and
describe the concept of operations in time,space,purpose,and resources (see figure 2-3onpage 2-24). An
operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and
describing the application of combat power in time,space,purpose,and resources in the concept of operations
(see chapter 2). An operational framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility
for the commander and provides a way to visualize how the commander will employ forces against the
enemy. To understand this framework is to understand the relationship between the area of operations and
operations in depth. Proper relationships allow for simultaneous operations and massing of effects against
the enemy. (SeeFM 3-0 for additional information.) |
3-96 | 255 | Defense
7-23. As stated in chapter 2,the operational framework has four components. First,theBCT commander is
assigned an area of operations for the conduct of operations. Second, the commander can designate deep,
close,rear,and support areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and space. Third,within
this area,the commander conducts decisive,shaping,and sustaining operations to articulate the operation in
terms of purpose. Finally,the commander designates the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting
prioritization of resources.
Note. The BCT does not conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless
tasked to do so,usually within a division consolidation area.
7-24. As an example,deep,close, and rear areas historically have been associated with terrain orientation,
but this framework can apply to temporal and organizational orientations as well. The BCT can use the deep,
close,and reararea component to engage simultaneously the enemy in three distinct areas—deep area,close
area,and reararea. (See figure 7-2.)
Figure 7-2. Deep, close, and rear areas—contiguous area of operations |
3-96 | 256 | Chapter 7
7-25. Deep area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units.
Within this area, the BCT commander conducts deep operations against uncommitted enemy forces to set
conditions for subordinate commanders conducting operations in the close area. In noncontiguous areas of
operations,the deep area is the area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous areas
of operations.
7-26. Close area is the portion of a commander’s area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces.
Operations in the close area are operations within a subordinate commander’s area of operations. In
contiguous areas of operations,a close area assigned to a maneuver force extends from its subordinates’rear
boundaries to its own forward boundary. In noncontiguous areas of operations, the close area is the area
within the subordinate commanders’areas of operations.
7-27. Rear area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the
positioning,employment,and protection of assets required to sustain,enable,and control operations. A rear
area in contiguous areasof operations is an area for any command that extends from its rear boundary forward
to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command. In noncontiguous areas of operations,the reararea
is that area defined within the higher commander’s area of operations providing a location to base sustainment
assets and provide sustainment to the force. A support area(s), generally located within the rear area,
facilitates the positioning,employment,protection,and control of base sustainment assets required to sustain
and enable combat operations (see chapter 9).
Note. Corps and division commanders may establish a consolidation area to exploit tactical
success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in the other areas. When designated,
a consolidation area refers to anarea of operations assigned to an organization,generally a BCT
or task force,where forces have established a level of control and large-scale combat operations
have ceased. Consolidation area activities require a balancing of area security and stability
operations tasks. (See chapter 2,section IVfor a detailed discussion.)
TASKSASSIGNMENT
7-28. The BCT commander assigns tasks to subordinate units through the staff. The assignment of a task
includes not only the task (what), but also the unit (who), place (where), time (when), and purpose (why).
The commander and staff develop obstacle fire support plans concurrently with the defensive force array,
again defining a task and purpose for each obstacle and target in keeping with the commander’s stated fire
support tasks and intended obstacle effects. The desired end state is a plan that defines how the commander
intends to mass the effects of direct and indirect fires with obstacles and use of terrain to shape the battlefield
and defeat or destroy the enemy.
CONTROL MEASURES
7-29. The BCT plans control measures to provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation
and allow the BCT to concentrate combat power at the decisive point. Defensive control measures within the
BCTs area of operations include designating the security area, the battle handover line, the MBA with its
associated forward edge of the battle area,and the echelon support area. The BCT and subordinate units use
battle positions (primary,alternate,supplemental,subsequent,and strong point),direct fire control,and fire
support coordination measures to conductdefensive operations. The commander designates disengagement
lines to trigger the displacement of subordinate forces when required. A disengagement lineis a phase line
located on identifiable terrain that,when crossed by the enemy,signals to defending elements that it is time
to displace to their next position (ADP 3-90). (See paragraph 7-94 for a discussion of control measures
associated with defensive operations.)
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
7-30. The BCT can conduct defensive operations with units out of range andin mutual support of each other.
Defensive operations with out of range units require a judicious effort by the BCT commander and staff to
determine the positioning and priority of support assets and capabilities. During the terrain analysis, the |
3-96 | 257 | Defense
commander and staff must look closely for key and decisive terrain,EAs,choke points,intervisibility lines,
and reverse slope opportunities to take full advantage of the BCT’s capabilities to mass firepower to support
defensive maneuvers.
7-31. The BCT commander must determine any potential gaps between units once maneuver units are
assigned area of operations. The BCT should plan to cover any gaps with reconnaissance and security forces
and surveillance assets. The BCT must plan local counterattacks to isolate and destroy any enemy that
penetrates a gap in the area of operations. The commander should alsoplan to reposition units not in contact
to mass the effects of combat power against an attacking enemy.
7-32. The BCT commander identifies EAs(see paragraph 7-130) to contain or destroy the enemy force with
the massed effect of all available weapons and supporting systems with the assignment of area of operations.
The commander determines the size and shape of the EA by the visibility of the weapons systems in their
firing positions and the maximum range of those weapons. The commander designates EAs to cover each
enemy avenue of approach into the area of operations. Elements,deliberately left behind or inserted through
infiltration or helicopter,can report and call in fires on an approaching enemy.
7-33. The BCT combines fires,defensive positions,countermobility obstacles,and counterattacks to disrupt
the enemy’s attack and break the enemy’s will. The BCT must disrupt the synchronization of the enemy’s
operation to counter the enemy’s initiative,prevent the enemy’s concentrating combat power against a part
ofthe defense,and force the enemy where the commander wants the enemy to go. The commander causes
disruption defeating or misleading the enemy’s reconnaissance forces, impeding maneuver, disrupting
reserve,neutralizing fire support,and interrupting command and control.
7-34. Defensive techniques vary with circumstances,but all defensive concepts of operation aim to spoil the
attacker’s synchronization. Strong security forces to defeat enemy reconnaissance,phony initial positions or
dummy positions, and obstacles are some of the measures used to increase security in the defense.
Repositioning forces, aggressive local protection measures, and employment of roadblocks and ambushes
combine to disrupt the threat of an attack. Counterattack,counterbattery fires,obstacles,and retention of key
or decisive terrain prevent the enemy from concentrating overwhelming strength against portions of the
defense.
7-35. The information environment supports the commander’s mission and desired end state using
information-related capabilities, techniques, or activities. These capabilities include, but are not limited to,
public affairs operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), combat camera, Soldier and leader
engagement,civil affairs operations,civil and cultural considerations,operations security,military deception,
and CEMA. CEMA (see chapter 4) at the BCT level include cyberspace operations, EW, and spectrum
management operations. (SeeFM 3-13 and FM 3-12 for additional information.)
7-36. The BCT commander considers mutual support when task organizing forces, assigning areas of
operations, and positioning units. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an
enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their
inherent capabilities. Mutual support has two aspects—supporting range and supporting distance.
7-37. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet
remain within the maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems. Mutual support exists when
positions and units are in supporting range by direct or indirect fires, thus preventing the enemy from
attacking one position without subjecting themselves to fire from one or more adjacent positions. Supporting
distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other
and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it retainscontrol of a civil situation. When friendly forces are
static,supporting range equals supporting distance.
7-38. Mutual support increases the strength of all defensive positions, prevents defeat in detail, and helps
prevent infiltration between positions. Tactical positions achieve the maximum degree of mutual support
between them when they are located to observe or monitor the ground between them or conduct patrols to
prevent any enemy infiltration. At night or during periods of limited visibility,the commander may position
small tactical units closer together to retain the advantages of mutual support. Unit leaders must coordinate
the nature and extent of their mutual support. |
3-96 | 258 | Chapter 7
7-39. Capabilities of supported and supporting units affect supporting distance. Units may be within
supporting distance,but if the supported unit cannot communicate with the supporting unit, the supporting
unit may not be able to affect the operation’s outcome. In such cases, the units are not within supporting
distance,regardless of their proximity to each other. The following factors affect supporting distance: terrain
and mobility, distance, enemy capabilities, friendly capabilities, and reaction time. (See ADP 3-0 for
additional information.)
7-40. The need for flexibility through mobility requires the use of graphic control measures to assist
command and control during counterattacks and repositioning of forces. Specified routes,phase lines(PLs),
attack-and support by fire positions, battle positions, EAs, target reference points (TRPs), and other fire
support coordinationmeasures are required to synchronize maneuver effectively.
7-41. Army aviation conducts offensive operations to support the maneuver commander’s defensive
operation. Manned and unmanned aircraft can provide reconnaissance,surveillance,and security for ground
forces. Aviation quick response force can respond to a counterattack during the maneuver commander’s
transition from offensive to defensive operations, allowing ground forces to focus on consolidation and
reorganization. Additionally, once in an established defensive position, aviation assets can conduct
information collection and delay advancing enemy forces. Aviation allows the maneuver commander to mass
reserves by air to reinforce a defensive position. Additional aviation considerations include—
(cid:122) Conduct reconnaissance to identify bypasses, adequate sites and routes, and provide overwatch
for security force operations.
(cid:122) Provide direct fires or call for fires to cover obstacles.
(cid:122) Provide security and early warning for ground movement, assembly areas, and fixed base
operations.
(cid:122) Transport air defense teams,CBRN teams,and supplies.
(cid:122) Conduct aerial surveys of known or suspected CBRN contaminated areas.
(cid:122) Provide information collection for targeting.
7-42. The speed and mobility of aviation can help maximize concentration and flexibility. Attack
reconnaissance helicopters routinely support security area operations and mass fires within the MBA.
Synchronization and integration of aviation assets into the defensive ground maneuver plan is important to
ensure engagement as a whole. If the BCT augments with aviation assets, it must involve the direct fire
planning processes of the supporting aviation unit through its aviation liaison officer,the air defense airspace
management (ADAM) element,and brigade aviation element (BAE) within the fire support cell.
7-43. Air assets provide direct fire,observation,and the rapid movement of supplies and personnel during
the conduct of the defense. Attack reconnaissance helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft can employ guided and
unguided munitions that provide Army aviation attack and close air support to ground forces in direct contact
with enemy elements. Through reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition planning
(see FM 3-09), these assets can conduct interdiction missions to destroy high-value targets (HVTs) and
high-payoff targets (HPTs) before their employment to shape the operation. Attack reconnaissance
helicopters can assist the BCT reserve in exploiting opportunities to attack an enemy weakness or to support
restructuring of friendly lines in the event of enemy penetration. Rotary and fixed-wing aircraft can provide
additional observation and control indirect fires directed at enemy formations prior to contact with the BCT
defense and enhance situational awareness for the commander and staff. Utility and cargo rotary-wing aircraft
can provide casualty evacuation (see ATP 4-25.13) and conduct emergency resupply operations depending
on the enemy’s air defense capabilities.
7-44. The ground commanderis responsible for the priority,effects,and timing of fires and maneuver within
their area of operations (see JP 3-09). Air-ground operations require detailed planning and synchronization
timelines, aviation tasks and purposes, and airspace control. Analysis of enemy COAs and timelines allow
the BCT staff to synchronize aircraft operational times to match expected enemy contact. Security forces
forward of the BCT MBAassist in synchronizing aircraft employment at the decisive point.
7-45. Development of detailed task and purpose for the supporting aviation is essential as it enables the
aviation commander andstaff to employ the right platforms and munitions. Understanding the threat and the
BCT commander’s desired aviation effects drives the aviation units’ task organization of air elements and
selection ofweapon systems. (SeeFM 3-04 for additional information.) |
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7-46. Effective division airspace control is contingent on the development of a unit airspace plan that
includes subordinate BCT airspace coordinating measures that synchronize airspace users and activities
supporting the BCT. Airspace control is essential for deconflicting manned and unmanned aircraft from
indirect fires. Properly developed airspace coordinating measures enable the BCT to mass aerial and
surface-based fires simultaneously while using unmanned assets to maintain surveillance. (See JP 3-52,
FM3-52,and ATP3-52.1for additional information on airspace control and ATP 3-91.1 for information on
thejoint air-ground integration center [JAGIC].)
7-47. During the conduct of defensive operations,situations requiring denial operations,defending encircled,
andstay-behind operations have their own unique planning,preparation,and execution considerations. In the
defense, denial operations conducted to deprive the enemy of some or all of the short-term benefits of
capturing an area may be required. Denying the enemy, the use of space, personnel, supplies, or facilities
may include destroying, removing, and contaminating those supplies and facilities or erecting obstacles.
Subordinate units of the BCT when encircled can continue to defend, conduct a breakout—an operation
conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact with friendly units (ADP 3-90)—
from encirclement,exfiltrate toward other friendly forces,or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory.
In other defensive situations,subordinate units may be directed to conduct operations as a stay behind force.
These actions may be planned or forced by the enemy.
7-48. A common additional action planned or forced by the enemy can include a relief in place. A relief in
placeis an operation in which,by direction of higher authority,all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by
the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of
operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3).
Note.The Army uses an area of operations instead of a zone of operations.
7-49. The BCT normally conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the
combat effectiveness of committed forces. The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the
relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. Normally,during the conduct of combat operations,
the unit relieved is defending. However,a relief in place may set the stage for resuming offensive operations
or serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks.
7-50. There are three types of relief in place operations:
(cid:122) A sequential relief in place occurs when each element within the relieved unit is relieved in
succession,from right to left or left to right,depending on how it is deployed (ADP 3-90).
(cid:122) Asimultaneous relief in placeoccurs when all elements are relieved at the same time (ADP 3-90).
(cid:122) A staggered relief in place occurs when a commander relieves each element in a sequence
determined by the tactical situation,not its geographical orientation (ADP 3-90).
INTELLIGENCE
7-51. IPB helps the BCT commander determine where to concentrate combat power,where to accept risk,
and where to plan the potential decisive operation. The staff integrates intelligence from the higher echelon’s
collection efforts (see chapter 5,section I) and from units operating forward of the BCT’s area of operations.
Information collection includes collection from spot reports, tactical unmanned aircraft systems (known as
TUASs),and other higher-levelcollection assets. Early warning of enemy air attack,airborne or helicopter
assault or insertion, and dismounted infiltration are vitally important to provide adequate reaction time to
counter these threats as far forward as possible. The essential areas of focus are terrain analysis,determination
of enemy force size and likely COAs with associated decision points, and determination of enemy
vulnerabilities.
7-52. Intelligence operations,conducted by the military intelligence company,collect information about the
intent, activities, and capabilities of threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment to support
commanders’ decision-making (see chapter 5, section IV). The commander uses intelligence products to
identify probable enemy objectives and approaches and develops NAIs and TAIs from probable objectives
and approaches. The commander studies the enemy operation patterns and the enemy’s vulnerability to |
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counterattack, interdiction, EW, air attacks, and canalization by obstacles. The commander examines the
enemy’s ability to conduct air attacks, insert forces behind friendly units,and employs nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons and determines how soon follow-on or reaction enemy forces can influence the
operation.
7-53. The commander and staff use available reconnaissance and engineer assets to study the terrain. By
studying the terrain,the commander tries to determine the principal enemy and friendly heavy,light,and air
avenues of approach. The commander assesses the most advantageous area for the enemy’s main attack,as
well as other military aspects of terrain to include observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key
terrain,obstacles,and cover and concealment (OAKOC). The BCT commander and staff assess ground and
air mobility corridors and avenues of approach to determine where the enemy can maneuver to reach likely
objectives and to identify limitations on friendly maneuver and positioning. Identification of terrain,such as
chokepoints that create potential enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities for friendly attack,is critical. (See
ATP 2-01.3 and ATP 3-34.80 for additional information.)
7-54. The BCT S-2, with the BCT geospatial engineer uses the Geospatial Intelligence Workstation to
provide terrain analysis. The Geospatial Intelligence Workstation can identify critical terrain and position
weapons systems and intelligence assets (see ATP 3-34.80). Once subordinate units know the area of
operations,BCT units conduct their own terrain analysis using physical reconnaissance and the lineofsight
analysis function in Joint Capabilities Release(known as JCR). Terrain analysis must achieve a fidelity that
allows for effective positioning of direct fire weapons systems and observers. The analysis must identify
intervisibility lines,fields of fire,deadspaces,and integrate the effects of weather.
7-55. The staff weather officer, or higher headquarters staff if a staff weather officer is not assigned, can
assist the BCT staff by supplying predictive and descriptive weather information for specific time periods
and locations within the BCT’s area of operations. In addition,the weather program of record (for example,
the Distributed Common Ground System-Army [DCGS-A]) can provide weather predictions and weather
effects for a specific mission,desired area of operations,or particular weapons system.
7-56. The result of the terrain analysis is a modified, combined obstacle overlay and identification of
defensible areas. The BCT staff should transmit results of the analysis by any available meansto subordinate
units. When the staff has analyzed the BCT’s assigned area of operations,the staff should expand its analysis
to adjacent area of operations and areas forward and to the rear of the BCT.
7-57. The staff determines enemy force sizes,likely COAs,and decision points through analysis. The staff
determines the size of the enemy force that each avenue of approach and mobility corridor can support. The
expected size of the enemy force drives the determination of friendly force allocation, fires, and obstacle
efforts. The commander and staff use the enemy force’s size to understand how the enemy intends to utilize
its forces and the terrain. The enemy COAs developed must be feasible and must reflect the enemy’s
flexibility and true potential. All COAs,at a minimum,should analyze the following:
(cid:122) Likely enemy objectives.
(cid:122) Enemy composition,disposition,and strength.
(cid:122) Schemes of maneuver including—
(cid:131) Routes.
(cid:131) Formations.
(cid:131) Locations and times the enemy may change formations.
(cid:131) Possible maneuver options available to the enemy.
(cid:131) Key decision points.
(cid:122) Time and distance factors for the enemy’s maneuver through the area of operations.
(cid:122) Likely employment of all enemy combat multipliers including—
(cid:131) Artillery.
(cid:131) Air defense.
(cid:131) Obstacles.
(cid:131) CBRNstrikes.
(cid:131) Dynamic obstacles. |
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(cid:131) Attack aircraft.
(cid:122) Likely use of all enemy reconnaissance assets and organizations including likely reconnaissance
objectives,reconnaissance avenues of approach,and times to expect enemy reconnaissance,based
on doctrinal rates of march.
(cid:122) Likely use of all reconnaissance assets to locate observer locations and observation posts.
(cid:122) Likely locations and identification of enemy HVTs—such as artillery formations, reserves, and
command and control.
(cid:122) Likely locations, compositions, strength, employment options, and time and distance factors for
enemy reserves and follow-on forces.
(cid:122) Locations of enemy decision points that determine selection of a specific COA.
(cid:122) Likely breach sites,strike areas,and points of penetration.
7-58. The intelligence staff develops the enemy COAstatement and sketch. The staff graphically depicts the
enemy on a situation template based upon the results of the IPB. The intelligence staff officer (S-2)and staff
use these items to develop the initial information collection plan. The intelligence staff should distribute all
products by any available means to the entire staff and subordinate units to support parallel planning. (See
ATP 2-01.3 for additional information.)
7-59. The intelligence staff observes the enemy’s tactics, the terrain, the weather, and friendly and enemy
capabilities to identify potential enemy vulnerabilities. To engage the enemy where the terrain puts the enemy
at a disadvantage,the staff identifies restrictive terrain that may slow the enemy’s attack,cause a separation
of forces,create difficulties in command and control,or force the enemy to conduct defile drills;for example,
narrow valleys,passes,or urban areas. The intelligence staff also identifies chokepoints or natural obstacles
that may cause a loss of momentum,a potential fragmenting of forces,or a vulnerable concentration of forces
(rivers and canals). The staff identifies terrain that canalizes enemy formations into areas that provide
defending forces with good fields of fire,observation,and flanking fires. The intelligence staff also identifies
areas dominated by key or defensible terrain that allows massing of fires.
7-60. The entire BCT staff must participate for IPB to develop successfully for the commander and
subordinate units. Each staff member is responsible for analyzing the enemy based upon their warfighting
function. Each staff member must be knowledgeable in friendly and enemy capabilities and terrain analysis.
Each staff member must execute the process rapidly. The staff must ensure the results are detailed,legible,
and disseminated quickly to support planning at all echelons.
7-61. The intelligence officer, supported by the entire BCT staff, provides the fire support officer and
information operations officer information and intelligence for targeting and information capabilities. The
intelligence officer supports targeting by providing accurate,current intelligence and information to the staff
and ensures the information collection plan supports the finalized targeting plan. Intelligence support to
targeting includes two tasks—providing intelligence support to target development and providing
intelligence support to target detection. Intelligence support to information capabilities provides the
commander with information and intelligence support for information tasks and targeting through nonlethal
actions. It includes intelligence support to the planning,preparation,and execution of the information related
activities, as well as assessing the effects of those activities. (See FM 2-0 and FM 3-13 for additional
information.)
FIRES
7-62. Supporting the BCT commander’s concept of operations during the defense involves attacking and
engaging targets throughout the area of operations with massed or precision indirect fires, air and missile
defense fires, defensive counterair, air support, and EW assets. As planning progresses, artillery
counterbattery radar and counterfire radar employment is continually updated. Fire support planners must
make maximum use of any preparation time available to plan and coordinate supporting fires. Planners must
ensure fire support complements and supports all security forces and unit protection plans.
7-63. Fire support plays a key role in disrupting the attacker’s tempo and synchronization during the defense.
When required, massing overwhelming fires at critical places and times gains maximum efficiency and
effectiveness in suppressing direct and indirect-fire systems and repelling an assault. Fire support planning |
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and execution must address flexibility through operations in depth and support to defensive maneuver.
Additional fire support considerations for supporting the commander’s concept of operations include—
(cid:122) Weight the main effort.
(cid:122) Provide 360-degree air and missile defense coverage.
(cid:122) Provide and disseminate early warning.
(cid:122) Contribute targeting information.
(cid:122) Engage critical enemy assets with fires before the attack.
(cid:122) Plan counterfire against enemy indirect-fire systems attacking critical friendly elements.
(cid:122) Use lethal and nonlethal means to apply constant pressure to the enemy’s command and control
structure.
(cid:122) Provide fires to support defensive counterair operations to defeat enemy attacks.
(cid:122) Plan the acquisition and attack of HPTsthroughout the area of operations.
(cid:122) Employ electromagneticattack to degrade,neutralize,or destroy enemy combat capability.
(cid:122) Concentrate fires to support decisive action.
(cid:122) Provide fires to support counterattacks.
(cid:122) Plan fires to support the barrier and obstacle plan.
(cid:122) Planfor target acquisition and sensors to provide coverage of NAIs,TAIs,and critical assets.
(cid:122) Plan for friendly force and allied force fratricide prevention measures.
(cid:122) Plan for civilian noncombatant casualty prevention measures.
(cid:122) Plan for un-intended collateral damage prevention measures.
(cid:122) Request munitions authorities to ensure appropriate units on the ground have the operational and
legal authority to employ munitions such as scatterable mine systems (air and ground volcanos).
7-64. The BCT may utilize unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), remote sensors, and reconnaissance and
security forces to call for fire on the enemy throughout the area of operations. Quick, violent, and
simultaneous action throughout the depth of the defender’s area of operations can degrade, confuse, and
paralyze an enemy force just as that enemy force is most exposed and vulnerable. (See FM 3-09 and
FM3-90-1 for additional information.)
SUSTAINMENT
7-65. Typically, sustaining operations in support of the defense requires more centralized control. Clear
priorities of support, transportation, and maintenance are required. The BCT closely and continuously
coordinates, controls, and monitors the movement of materiel and personnel within the operational
environment based on the BCT’s priorities and ensures their dissemination and enforcement. (See FM4-0
for additional information.)
7-66. The routing function of movement control becomes an essential process for coordinating and directing
movements on main supply routes or alternate supply routes and regulating movement on lines of
communications to prevent conflict and congestion. Movement priorities must include throughput of
echelons above brigade assets transporting additional engineer assets in preparation for the defense. Supply
ofclass IV (construction and barrier materials) and class V (ammunition) normally have higher movement
priorities during the defense. Planners may consider nighttime resupply operations to minimize enemy
interference. (SeeATP 4-16 for additional information.)
7-67. TheBCT logistics staff officer (S-4) must ensure that the sustainment plan is coordinated fully with
the rest of the staff. The S-4 coordinates with the brigade operations staff officer (S-3) to ensure that supply
routes do not interfere with maneuver or obstacle plans but still support the full depth of the defense.
Sustainment planners must consider prepositioning class IV,class V,and class III (bulk) far forward initially
to support the security area during the counterreconnaissance fight,followed by the MBA so that the BCT
can rapidly transition from defense to offense. Planning for sustainment operations throughout the security
area is critical to sustaining reconnaissance and security operations to prevent enemy forces from determining
friendly force disposition. Forces within the security area are configured prior to line of departure with a
minimum of 72 hour logistics package (LOGPAC) of class I (subsistence), class III (petroleum, oils, and |
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lubricants [POL]), and class V. Sustainment support to the security area must include planning for both
ground and aerial medical evacuation of long duration observation posts. BCT sustainment planners also
consider cross leveling classes of supply and sustainment assets upon transition from the offense to the
defense.
7-68. Enemy actions and the maneuver of combat forces complicate forward area medical operations.
Defensive operations must include health service support to medical personnel who have much less time to
reach a patient,apply tactical combat casualty care (TCCC),and remove the patient from the battlefield. The
enemy’s initial attack and the BCT’s counterattack produce the heaviest patient workload. These are also the
most likely times for enemy use of artillery and CBRN weapons. The enemy attack can disrupt ground and
air routes and delay evacuation of patients to and from treatment elements. The depth and dispersion of the
defense create significant time distance problems for medical evacuation assets. (For additional information
on the tactics,techniques,and procedures associated with health service support,see FM 4-02,ATP 4-02.2,
and ATP 4-02.3.)
PROTECTION
7-69. The BCT must take measures to protect against all acts designed to impair its effectiveness and prevent
the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage. Because a force defends to conserve combat power for
use elsewhere or later, the commander must secure the force. The BCT ensures security by employing
security forces and surveillance assets throughout the depth and breadth of its assigned area of operations.
The BCT may employ counterreconnaissance,combat outposts,a screen or guard force,and other security
operations tasks to provide this security. Information related capabilities and CEMA aid in securing the force
and confuse the enemy as to the manner of defense.
7-70. As discussed in chapter 6, personnel and physical assets have inherent survivability—a quality or
capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental
conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATP 3-37.34),which can be enhanced
through various means and methods. One way to enhance survivability when existing terrain features offer
insufficient cover—protection from the effects of fires and concealment—protection from observation
or surveillance is to alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover and concealment. Similarly,
natural or artificial materials may be used as camouflage to confuse,mislead,or evade the enemy. Together,
these are called survivability operations—those protectionactivities that alter the physical environment by
providingor improvingcover,camouflage, and concealment (ATP 3-37.34).
7-71. All BCT units conduct survivability operations within the limits of their capabilities. Engineer and fire
support assets have additional capabilities to support survivability operations. Engineer support to
survivability operations is a major portion of the enhance protection line of engineer support (see FM 3-34).
Fire support to survivability operations includes the employment of obscurants, which forces can use to
enable survivability operations by concealing friendly positions and screening maneuvering forces from
enemy observation and support to disengagement or movement of forces. (See ATP 3-11.50.)
7-72. CBRN support to survivability operations includes the ability to assess,protect and mitigate the effects
of contamination. CBRN reconnaissance provides support by locating and marking contaminated areas and
routes,allowing maneuver forces to avoid unnecessary exposure. Reconnaissance teams are focused on the
collection of tactical and technical information to support survivability of friendly forces and facilities.
7-73. Although survivability encompasses capabilities of military forces both while on the move and when
stationary, survivability operations focus more on stationary capabilities—constructing fighting and
protective positions and hardening facilities. In the case of camouflage and concealment, however,
survivability operations include both stationary and on-the-move capabilities. Conducting survivability
operations is one of the tasks of the protection warfighting function, but forces can also use survivability
operations to enable other warfighting functions. For example,military deception,part of the command and
control warfighting function,can be enabled by the use of survivability operations intended to help mislead
enemy decision makers. This may include the use of dummy or decoy positions or devices. (SeeFM3-13 for
additional information.)
7-74. Ground-based air defense artillery units execute most Army air and missile defense operations though
air and missile defense support to the BCT may be limited. Subordinate units of the BCT should expect to |
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use their organic weapons systems for self-defenseagainst enemy air threats. When available air and missile
defense protects the BCT from missile attack,air attack,and aerial surveillance by ballistic missiles,cruise
missiles,conventional fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft,and UASs. Air and missile defense preventthe enemy
from interdicting friendly forces,while freeing the commander to synchronize movementand firepower. (See
ATP 3-01.8 for additional information.)
7-75. Indirect-fire protection systems protect the BCT from threats that are largely immune to air defense
artillery systems. The indirect-fire protection intercept capability is designed to detect and destroy incoming
rocket, artillery, and mortar fires. This capability assesses the threat to maintain friendly protection and
destroys the incoming projectile at a safe distance from the intended target. The air and missile defense task
consistof active and passive measures that protect the BCT from an air or missile attack. Passive measures
include camouflage, cover, concealment, hardening, and operations security. Active measures are taken to
destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats. The early warning of
in-bound missile threats is provided in theater by the globally located, joint tactical ground stations. (See
ADP 3-37 and ATP 3-09.42 for additional information.)
7-76. As stated in chapter 3, protection cell planners coordinate with the ADAM cell for air and missile
defense for the protection of the critical asset list and defended asset list and for other air and missile defense
protection as required. There is continuous coordination to refine the critical asset list and defended asset list
throughout defensive and offensive operations,ensuring the protection of critical assets and forces from air
and missile attack and surveillance. Air and missile defense assets integrate protective systems by using the
six employment guidelines—mutual support, overlapping fires, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early
engagement,and defense in-depth—and additional considerations necessary to mass and mix air and missile
defense capabilities. (SeeATP 3-01.50 for additional information.)
7-77. Military police planners, based upon the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC),identify requirements for
military police support and augmentation. The BCT provost marshal and military police staff planners at
division level coordinate military police activities and provide for the integration of military police focused
considerations throughout the operations process. Military police operations require the use of military police
specific technical skill sets to plan, manage, and execute the military police-specific disciplines. Liaisons
may be needed in certain situations to ensure proper and completestaff planning. (SeeFM3-39 for additional
information.) During the defense,military police planners must—
(cid:122) Understand the IPB, commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), and priority
intelligence requirements to facilitate the integration of police intelligence activities within all
military police operations to support those requirements.
(cid:122) Consider the type and size of the area of responsibility(AOR),line of communications security,
and the threat and plan for detainee operations and dislocated civilians to determine how their
presence may affect maneuver forces.
(cid:122) Anticipate operational changes or transitions and prepare the military police effort toward that
action.
7-78. In the defense,attached military police forces ensure movement of repositioning or counterattacking
forces and provide and support the evacuation of captured or detained individuals. Military police missions
provide freedom of movement for repositioning BCT forces and the reserve when it is committed. The
mission variables of METT-TC determine priority of movement along main supply routes. Additional
military police force activities include protection support tocommand posts (CPs),communications facilities,
convoys,supply sites,support areas,and consolidation areas. Examples of expected missions include—
(cid:122) Conduct detention operations.
(cid:122) Establish a movement corridor.
(cid:122) Conduct convoy escorts.
(cid:122) Conduct response force operations.
(cid:122) Conduct lines of communications security.
(cid:122) Provide military working dog support (see ATP 3-39.34).
(cid:122) Support to support area (see FM 3-81) and consolidation area (see chapter 2) operations. |
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7-79. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment is an operational environment that
includes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards and their potential resulting
effects (JP 3-11). Within the BCT area of operations, CBRN environment conditions can be the result of
deliberate enemy or terrorist actions or the result of an industrial accident. Possible CBRN threats include
the intentional employment of, or intent to employ, weapons or improvised devices to produce CBRN
hazards. CBRN hazards include those created from accidental or intentional releases of toxic industrial
materials,biological pathogens,or radioactive matter. Toxic industrial material is a generic term for toxic or
radioactive substances in solid,liquid,aerosolized,or gaseous form that may be used or stored for industrial,
commercial,medical,military,or domestic purposes. Toxic industrial material may be chemical,biological,
or radiological. (SeeFM 3-11 for more information on CBRN hazards.)
7-80. Chemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear defenseare measures taken to minimize or negate the
vulnerabilities to, and/or effects of, a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazard or incident
(JP3-11). The BCT commander integrates CBRN defense considerations into mission planning depending
on the CBRN threat. (SeeFM 3-11 and ATP3-11.37for additional information.)Commanders at all echelons
maintain the effectiveness of their force in CBRN environments by establishing CBRN defense plans that—
(cid:122) Estimate enemy intent,capabilities,and effects for CBRN.
(cid:122) Provide guidance to the force on necessary protective measures.
(cid:122) Apply the IPB output to develop CBRN reconnaissance plans to answer priority intelligence
requirements.
(cid:122) Establish the employment criteria of CBRN enablers to counter CBRN threats.
(cid:122) Establish a logistic support plan for long-term CBRN operations.
(cid:122) Establish CBRN warning and reporting requirements.
7-81. Operationally, CBRN passive defense maintains the commander’s ability to continue military
operations in a CBRN environment while minimizing or eliminating the vulnerability of the force to the
degrading effects of those CBRN threats and hazards. Tactical-level doctrine has traditionally segregated
CBRN passive defense into the distinct principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and
decontamination. While these principles remain valid,they are now recognized to be components of the more
expansive concepts of hazard awareness and understanding and contamination mitigation. Since hazard
awareness and understanding largely focuses strategic aspects of operations in a CBRN environment,tactical
level doctrine is organized around the key activities (seefigure 7-3on page 7-18) of CBRN protection and
contamination mitigation.
(cid:122) Chemical biological, radiological, and nuclear protection consists of measures taken to keep
chemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear threats and hazards from having an adverse effect
on personnel, equipment, and facilities (ATP 3-11.32). CBRN protection encompasses the
following activities: protect personnel,equipment,and facilities.
(cid:122) Contamination mitigationis the planning and actions taken to prepare for,respond to,and recover
from contamination associated with all chemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear threats and
hazards to continue military operations (JP 3-11). The two subsets of contamination mitigation are
contamination control and decontamination. (SeeATP3-11.32for a detailed discussion of CBRN
passive defense activities.) |
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Figure 7-3. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear passive defense architecture
7-82. When established, the CBRN working group led by the CBRN officer includes members from the
protection-working group, subordinate commands, host-nation agencies, and other unified action partners.
The CBRN working group—disseminates CBRN operations information,including trend analysis,defense
best practices and mitigating measures, operations, the status of equipment and training issues, CBRN
logistics, and contamination mitigation and remediation efforts and refines the CBRN threat, hazard, and
vulnerability assessments. The working group helps to develop,train,and rehearse a CBRN defense plan to
protect personnel and equipment from an attack or incident involving CBRN threats or hazards. CBRN threat
and hazard assessments made by the working group help determine initial,individual protective equipment
levels and the positioning of decontaminants. Force health personnel maintain the medical surveillance of
personnel strength information for indications of force contamination,epidemic,or other anomalies apparent
in force health trend data. (SeeFM 3-11 and ADP 3-37 for additional information.)
Note. (See chapter 6 for information on countering weapons of mass destruction [CWMD] and
the explosive ordnance disposal company when supporting the BCT.)
7-83. Force health protection (see ATP 4-02.8), measures to promote, improve, conserve or restore the
mental or physical well-being of Soldiers, enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and
protect the force from health hazards. Defensive actions can result in prolonged occupation of static positions
and corresponding exposure of personnel to diseases, weather and other health hazards and environmental
affects that can quickly degrade readiness. The commander enforces environmental disciplines, such as
hydration, sanitation, hygiene, protective clothing, and inspection of potable water supplies. Defensive
actions also may entail sustained enemy bombardments or attacks resulting in dramatic effects on the mental
and behavioral health of unit personnel. Soldiers can become combat ineffective from heavy indirect fire
even if exposure is for short durations. Commanders deliberately emplace systems for combat stress
identification and treatment to reduce the return to duty time of affected personnel. (See FM 4-02 and
ATP4-02.3 for additional information.)
7-84. When planning for base camp security and defense it is critical to remember that a properly designed
perimeter security system should be an integrated, layered, defense in-depth that takes advantage of the
security area. BCT commanders,supported by their staff,evaluate mission variablesfocusing on the threat
to establish a viable perimeter defense plan. Planning for perimeter security and defense,like all protection
measures integrates fires and obstacles,within the context of mission and operational variables and associated |
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constraints,throughout the depth of the base camp area of operations to meet security and defense objectives.
Commanders and staff with base camp security and defense responsibilities plan,coordinate,and synchronize
actions using integrating processes to ensure full integration of their area security and base defense plans.
(SeeATP 3-37.10for additional information.)
7-85. Refer to chapter 6 for a discussion of the following supporting tasks of the protection warfighting
function:
(cid:122) Implement physical security procedures.
(cid:122) Apply antiterrorism measures.
(cid:122) Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
(cid:122) Conduct personnel recovery.
(cid:122) Conduct populace and resource control.
(cid:122) Conduct risk management(RM).
SECTION III – FORMS OF THE DEFENSE
7-86. The three forms of the defense (defense of a linear obstacle, perimeter defense, and reverse-slope
defense) have special purposes and require special planning and execution. The three forms of the defense
provide distinct advantages for the BCT and its subordinate units and apply to the area defense and the
operations of the fixing force during amobile defense. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE
7-87. The defense of a linear obstacle usually forces the enemy to deploy,concentrate forces,and conduct
breaching operations. A defense of a linear obstacle generally favors the use of a forward defense (see
paragraph 7-128). The defending unit constructs obstacles to stop the enemy forces and channel them into
planned EAs. Maintaining the integrity of the linear obstacle is the key to this type of defense. When attacked,
the defending force isolates the enemy, conducts counterattacks, and delivers fires onto the concentrated
force to defeat attempts to breach the obstacle.
7-88. A defense of a linear obstacle often is used as part of an economy of force measure. In this situation,
the defending force cannot allow the enemy to build up its forces on the friendly side of the obstacle because
it may lack the required combat power to defeat the enemy forces. As forces to counterattack and destroy the
enemy may not be available immediately;defending forces must be able to—
(cid:122) Detect enemy penetrations early enough so that local counterattacks can defeat them.
(cid:122) Defend after being isolated.
(cid:122) Use reconnaissance elements,sniper teams,and other elements to detect enemy forces andcall in
fires.
(cid:122) Bring the fight to the enemy side of the obstacle to destroy its forces and disrupt enemy
preparations.
(cid:122) Use fires to their maximum effect.
(cid:122) Use its mobility to concentrate combat power.
Defense of a Linear Obstacle: Fredericksburg,VA 1862
By December 13,1862,Confederate General Robert E. Lee established a strong defensive
position behind the Rappahannock River in Northern Virginia against Union forces (see
figure 7-4on page7-20). He only lightly defended the actual river line because theUnion
army artillery dominated both sides of the river. His main defensive position was directly
west along a line of hills. The area between the river and the hills was generally open with
scattered woods and streams or canals. The most concealed area was the town of
Fredericksburg.
Early on December 13, the Union army crossed the river and formed for the attack. The
plan was to conduct the main attack to the south with a supporting attack to the north.
Despite repeated attacks, the Union forces were repulsed everywhere. Union casualties |
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were approximately 10,000 while the confederate forces suffered approximately 5,000
casualties.
Vincent Esposito
Figure 7-4. Historical example, defense of a linear obstacle, Fredericksburg, 1862
PERIMETER DEFENSE
7-89. The BCT and its subordinate units often use a perimeter defense when conducting airborne and air
assault operations, as well as when conducting operations in noncontiguous areas of operations. The BCT
presents no assailable flanks to the enemy and allows the defender to reinforce a threatened area rapidly.
Some disadvantages of a perimeter defense include its isolation and the vulnerability of its concentrated units
to enemy fires.
7-90. Acommander establishes a perimeter defense when the unit must hold criticalterrain,such as a strong
point,or when it must defend itself in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units. Depending
on the situation, the commander maximizes the use of class IV barrier material, utilize engineer assets to
create vehicle and crew served fighting positions, and manpower to emplace obstacles of many types |
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(including wire, abates trees,antitank ditches). Additionally, spider mine obstacle groups can be emplaced
and grouped under one or several system operators with appropriate triggers and rehearsals.
7-91. Commanderscan organize a perimeter defense to accomplish a specific mission,such as protecting a
base or to provideimmediate self-protection,such as during resupply operations when all-around security is
required. Duringa perimeter defense,leaders at all levels ensure that—
(cid:122) Units physically tie into each other.
(cid:122) Direct fire weapons use flanking fire to protect the perimeter.
(cid:122) Field artillery and mortars are protected.
(cid:122) Communications are secure and redundant systems in place.
(cid:122) Obstacles are employed.
(cid:122) Final protective fires are established.
7-92. After committing the reserve, the commander must reconstitute the reserve to meet other possible
threats. This reconstitution force normally comes from an unengaged unit in another portion of the perimeter.
Perimeter Defense:Chip’yong Ni, Republic of Korea 1951
During the Chinese Fourth Phase offensive, the 23d Infantry Regimental Combat Team,
reinforced,used a perimeter defense to defeat elements of three People’s Republic of China
armies,about 25,000 soldiers at Chip’yong Ni,Republic of Korea (seefigure 7-5on page
7-22). From 13 to 14 February 1951,the 23d established a perimeter defense around the
town of Chip’yong-Ni and blunted a major People’s Republic of China offensive. After a
bitter fight,the Chinese forces withdrew at the cost of 51 United Nation’s Soldiers and an
estimated 2000 Peoples Republic of China soldiers killed. The battle was a major defeat
for the Chinese forces and led to subsequent United Nation offensives that forced the
Chinese back into the North.
Billy C. Mossman |
3-96 | 270 | Chapter 7
Figure 7-5. Historical example of a perimeter defense, Chip’yong Ni, 1951
REVERSE-SLOPE DEFENSE
7-93. The reverse-slope defense allows units to concentrate their direct fires into a relatively small area while
being protected from the enemy’s direct observation and supporting fires. The defender can destroy the
enemy’s isolated forward units through surprise and concentrated fires. The control of the forward slope is
essential for success. Gaining control of the forward slope can be done by using dominating terrain behind
the defenders or with the use of stay behind forces,such as reconnaissance and sniper teams,that can observe
and call in fires on the attackers. Generally, a unit at battalion level and below conducts a reverse-slope
defense even though the BCT may have areas within its area of operations that are conducive to the useof a
reverse-slope defense.
Reverse-Slope Defense:Kakazu Ridge 1945
During the Okinawa campaign, Imperial Japanese forces conducted reverse-slope
defenses along a series of ridges (seefigure 7-6). This tactic was devastating and cost many
American lives. The Japanese,dug in on the reverse slope,and able to maneuver through
tunnels would immediately counterattack American forces that reached the crest of the
defended ridge. The Japanese held their positions for many days against heavy American
firepower and repeated American attacks. Some of the positions, such as Kakazu Ridge,
were taken,lost,and retaken repeatedly until finally falling to American forces.
Various |
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Figure 7-6. Historical example of a reverse slope defense, Kakazu Ridge, 1945
SECTION IV – DEFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
7-94. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures provide
control without requiring detailed explanations. Control measures can be permissive (which allows
something to happen) or restrictive (which limits how something is done). Some control measures are
graphic. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting
functions. (See ADP 1-02 for illustrations of graphic control measures and rules for their use.)
COMMON DEFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
7-95. Control measures provide the ability to respond to changes in the situation. They allow the defending
commander to concentrate combat power at the decisive point. Commanders use the minimum number to
control their units and tailor their use to the higher commander’s intent. Figure 7-7onpage 7-25illustrates a
BCT’s use of the following control measures:
(cid:122) Assembly area. |
3-96 | 272 | Chapter 7
(cid:122) Attackbyfire position.
(cid:122) Axis of advance.
(cid:122) Battle handover line.
(cid:122) Battle position (occupied and planed).
(cid:122) Boundaries.
(cid:122) Brigade support area.
(cid:122) Contact point.
(cid:122) EA.
(cid:122) Coordinate fireline.
(cid:122) Forward edge of the battle area.
(cid:122) Lane.
(cid:122) NAI.
(cid:122) Observation post.
(cid:122) Passage point.
(cid:122) PL.
(cid:122) Strong point battle position.
(cid:122) TAI.
(cid:122) TRP.
(cid:122) Turning obstacle. |
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Figure 7-7. Common defensive control measures
EMPLOYING CONTROL MEASURES
7-96. Effectively employing control measures requires the BCT commander and staff to understand their
purposes and ramifications, including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of
action and initiative. Each measure should have a specific purpose. Control measures include designating the
security area,the MBAwith its associated battle positions,the forward edge of the battle area,and the echelon
support area. Commanders use graphic control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and
maneuver,and control the use of airspace. Well-planned measures permit the proper distribution of fires and |
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prevent multiple weapons from firing upon prominent targets while less prominent targets escape destruction.
The BCT properly uses fire support coordination measures, direct fire control measures, maneuver control
measures,and airspace coordinating measures to synchronize operations in the land and air domains.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
7-97. An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime
forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. An area of operations
is a basic tactical concept and the basic control measure for all types of operations. An area of operations
gives the responsible unit freedom of maneuver and enables fire support planning within a specific area.
Commanders employ control measures to avoid fratricide against forward deployed security forces in the
security area and engineer assets constructing countermobility obstacles in EAs. All units assigned an area
of operations have the following additional responsibilities within the boundaries of that area of operations:
(cid:122) Terrain management.
(cid:122) Information collection.
(cid:122) Civil-military operations.
(cid:122) Movement control.
(cid:122) Clearance of fires.
(cid:122) Security.
(cid:122) Personnel recovery.
(cid:122) Airspace management.
(cid:122) Minimum-essential stability operations tasks.
7-98. A unit’s area of operations should provide adequate depth based on its assigned tasks,the terrain,and
the anticipated size of the attacking enemy force. To maintain security and a coherent defense, an area of
operations generally requires continuous coordination with flank units. The BCT assigns control measures,
such as PLs, coordinating points, EAs, obstacle belts, and battle positions, to coordinate subordinate unit
defenses within the MBA. The BCT commander and staff use briefings, inspections, rehearsals, and
supervision to ensure coordination among subordinate units, to eliminate any gaps, and to ensure a clear
understanding of the defensive plan.
7-99. Subordinate unit area of operations may be contiguous or noncontiguous. A contiguous area of
operations (see figure 7-2onpage 7-7) is where all a commander’s subordinate forces’areas of operations
share one or more common boundary(FM 3-90-1). A noncontiguous area of operations(see figure 7-8) is
where one or more of the commander’s subordinate force’s areas of operation do not share a common
boundary (FM3-90-1). The higher headquarters is responsible for controlling the areas not assigned to
subordinate forces within noncontiguous areas of operations. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.) |
3-96 | 275 | Defense
Figure 7-8. Area defense, noncontiguous area of operations
BATTLE POSITION
7-100. Abattle positionis a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach (ADP 3-90).
The BCT commander assigns a battle position to a battalion to control the battalion’s fires, maneuver, and
positioning. Usually,the commander assigns boundaries to provide space for the battalion security,support,
and sustainment elements that operate outside a battle position. When the commander does not establish unit
boundaries,the BCT is responsible for fires,security,terrain management,and maneuver between positions
of adjacent battalions. The battle position prescribes a primary direction of fire by the orientation of the
position. The commander defines when and under what conditions the battalion can displace from the battle
position or maneuver outside it. The use of prepared or planned battle positions,with the associated tasks of
prepare or reconnoiter,provides flexibility to rapidly concentrate forces and adds depth to the defense.
7-101. There are five types of battle positions: primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strong
point. The commander always designates the primary battle position. The commander designates and
prepares alternate,supplementary,and subsequent positions as required.
7-102. Aprimary positionis the position that covers the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach into the
area of operations (ADP 3-90). Always designate this position.Analternate positionis a defensive position
that the commander assigns to a unit or weapon system for occupation when the primary position becomes
untenable or unsuitable for carrying outthe assigned task (ADP 3-90). The alternate position covers the same
area as the primary position. A supplementary positionis a defensive position located within a unit’s assigned
area of operations that provides the best sectors of fire and defensive terrain along an avenue of approach |
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that is not the primary avenue where the enemy is expected to attack (ADP 3-90). Assigned when more than
one avenue of approach into a unit’s area of operations. A subsequent positionis a position that a unit expects
to move to during the course of battle (ADP 3-90). Subsequent positions can have primary, alternate, and
supplementary positions associated with them.
7-103. In accordance with the mission variables, units can conduct survivability moves between their
primary, alternate, and supplementary positions. A survivability move is a move that involves rapidly
displacing a unit, CP, or facility in response to direct and indirect fires, the approach of a threat or as a
proactive measure based on intelligence,meteorological data,and risk assessment of enemy capabilities and
intentions (ADP 3-90). A survivability move includes those based on the impending employment of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).
7-104. Astrong pointis a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create
an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain (ADP 3-90). A strong point implies
retention of terrain to control key terrain and blocking,fixing,or canalizing enemy forces. Defending units
require permission from the higher headquarters to withdraw from a strong point. All combat, maneuver
enhancement,and sustainment assets within the strong point require fortified positions. In addition,extensive
protective and tactical obstacles are required to provide an all-around defense. (See figure 7-9.)
Figure 7-9. Strong point placement
7-105. As a rule of thumb, a minimally effective strong point requires a one-day effort from an engineer
unit the same size as the unit defending the strong point. Organic BCT engineers lack sufficient capacity to
create a strong point within a reasonable amount of time;additional engineer assets from echelons above the
BCT are required. Once the strong point is occupied,all units and equipment not essential to the defense are
displaced from the strong point. This includes nonessential staff and elements from the forward support
company(FSC). (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.) |
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7-106. Planning considerations for a strong point,although not inclusive,may include—
(cid:122) Establishment of outposts and observation posts.
(cid:122) Development of integrated fires plans that include final protective fires.
(cid:122) Priorities of work.
(cid:122) Counterattack plans.
(cid:122) Stockage of supplies.
(cid:122) Integration and support of subordinate forces outside the strong point.
(cid:122) Actions of adjacent units.
COMBAT OUTPOST
7-107. Acombat outpostis a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations
(FM 3-90-2). Using combat outposts is a technique for employing security forces in restrictive terrain that
precludes mounted security forces from covering the area. While the mission variables of METT-TC
determine the size, location, and number of combat outposts established by a unit, a reinforced platoon
typically occupies a combat outpost. Combat outposts normally are located far enough in front of the
protected force to prevent enemy ground reconnaissance elements from directly observing the protected
force. (SeeFM 3-90-2 and ATP 3-21.8 for additional information.)
SECTION V – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-108. Adefensiveoperationis an operationto defeat an enemy attack,gain time,economize forces,and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). The three defensive operations
are area defense,mobile defense,and retrograde. Planning and preparing an effective defense takes time. The
commander uses security elements to provide early warning, reaction time, and maneuver space. Units
establish a defense immediately upon occupation. Commanders refine the initial defense through planning
and preparation and may require units to shift and adjust their positions after the plan is final. Defensive
preparations and refinement are never complete. As required, defending units conduct consolidation and
reorganization activities after each enemy engagement (see paragraph 6-30 for a discussion of these
activities).
AREA DEFENSE
7-109. Anarea defenseis a type of defensive operationthat concentrates on denying enemy forces access
to designated terrainfor a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). The defender
limits the enemy’s freedom of maneuver and channels them into designated EAs. The focus of the area
defense is to retain terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting,
prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The
decisive operation focuses on fires into EAs possibly supplemented by a counterattack. The commander can
use the reserve to reinforce fires;add depth,block,or restore the position by counterattack;seize the initiative;
or destroy enemy forces. The BCT conducts an area defense under the following conditions:
(cid:122) When directed to defend or retain specified terrain.
(cid:122) When forces available have less mobility than the enemy does.
(cid:122) When the terrain affords natural lines of resistance.
(cid:122) When the terrainlimits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach.
(cid:122) When there is time to organize the position.
(cid:122) When conditions require the preservation of forces.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
7-110. The BCT commander organizes an area defense around the static framework of the defensive
positions seeking to destroy enemy forces by interlocking fire or local counterattacks. The commander has
the option of defending forward or defending in-depth. The depth of the force positioning depends on the
threat,task organization of the BCT,and nature of the terrain. When the commander defends forward within |
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an area of operations,the force is organized sothat most of the available combat power is committed early
in the defensive effort. To accomplish this,the commander may deploy forces forward or plan counterattacks
well forward in the MBAor even beyond the MBA. If the commander has the option of conducting a defense
in-depth,security forces and forward MBAelements identify,define,and control the depth of the enemy’s
main effort while holding off secondary thrusts. Doing so allows the commander to conserve combat power,
strengthen the reserve, and better resource the counterattack. In an area defense, the commander organizes
the defending force to accomplish information collection,security,MBA,reserve,and sustainmentmissions.
(See figure 7-10.)
Figure 7-10. Area defense, organization of forces
Information Collection
7-111. The commander directs information collection assets to determine the locations, strengths, and
probable intentions of the attacking enemy force. The commander places a high priority on early
identification of the enemy’s main effort.The commander ensures that the mission of reconnaissance forces
and surveillance assets are coordinated with those of higher headquarters. In the defense, reconnaissance,
surveillance,and securityoperations overlap the unit’s planning and preparing phases. |
3-96 | 279 | Defense
7-112. BCT subordinate commanders and leaders performing reconnaissance, surveillance, and security
missions understand that these missions often start before the commander fully develops the plan.
Commanders and leaders have to be responsive to changes in orientation and mission. The commander
ensures that the staff plans,prepares,and assesses the execution of the information collection portion of the
overall plan. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on reconnaissance operations.)
Security
7-113. The higher commander defines the depth of the BCT’s security area. The BCT’s security area
extends from the forward edge of the battle area to the BCT’s forward boundary. Depth in the security area
gives the forces within the MBAmore reaction time. Depth allows the security force more area to conduct
security missions. A very shallow security area may require more forces and assets to provide the needed
reaction time.
7-114. The BCT commander must clearly define the objective of the security area. The commander states
the tasks of the security force in terms of time required or expected to maintain security, expected results,
disengagement and withdrawal criteria,and follow-on tasks. The commander identifies specific avenues of
approach and NAI on which the security force must focus. The BCT assists in the rearward passage of lines
and movement through the BCT area of operations of any division and corps security force deployed beyond
the BCT’s forward boundary.
7-115. The BCT commander balances the need for a strong security force to shape the battle with the
resulting diversion of combat power from the decisive operation in the MBA. The BCT frequently executes
the forward security mission as a guard or screen. Typically,there are two options for organizing the security
force. The BCT forward defending maneuver battalions establish their own security areas or the maneuver
battalions provide security forces that operate with the Cavalry squadron under the BCT’s direct control.
7-116. The BCT conducts counterreconnaissance and area security operations (see chapter 8), and
implements local security measures, operations security, and information protection activities to deny the
enemy information about friendly dispositions. BCT reconnaissance and security forces seek to confuse the
enemy about the location of the BCT’s main battle positions,to prevent enemy observation of preparations
and positions, and to keep the enemy from delivering observed fire on the positions. The BCT conducts
reconnaissance and security operations to gain and maintain contact with the enemy,develop the situation,
answer CCIRs, retain freedom of maneuver, consolidate gains, secure the force, and protect the local
population. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on security force operations.)
Main Battle Area
7-117. The main battle areais the area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of the unit’s combat
power and conduct decisive operations to defeat an attacking enemy (ADP 3-90). The BCT’sMBAextends
from the forward edge of the battle area to the unit’s rear boundary. The commander selects the MBAbased
on the higher commander’s concept of operations, IPB, results of initial information collection plan
(reconnaissance, security operations, surveillance, and intelligence operations), and the commander’s own
assessment of the situation.
7-118. The BCT commander delegates responsibilities within the MBA by assigning areas of operations
and establishing boundaries to and for subordinate battalions. The commander locates subordinate unit
boundaries along identifiable terrain features and extends them beyond the forward line of own troops by
establishing forward boundaries. Unit boundaries should not split avenues of approach or key terrain. The
BCT is responsible for terrain management,security,clearance of fires,and coordination of maneuver among
other doctrinal responsibilities within the entire area of operations if the commander does not assign area of
operations to subordinate battalions. (See ADP 3-90 for additional information.)
Reserve
7-119. The reserve is not a committed force. The BCT commander can assign it a wide variety of tasks on
its commitment,and it must be prepared to perform other missions. The reserve may be committed to restore
the defense’s integrity by blocking an enemy penetration, reinforcing fires into an EA, or conducting a |
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counterattack against the flank or rear of an attacking enemy. The reserve gives the commander the flexibility
to exploit success or to deal with a tactical setback.
7-120. The commander positions the reserve to respond quickly to unanticipated missions. The commander
determines the reserve’s size and position based on accurate knowledge about the enemy and whether the
terrain can accommodate multiple enemy COAs. When the BCT has accurate knowledge about the enemy
and the enemy’s maneuver options are limited,the BCT can maintain a smaller reserve. If knowledge about
theenemy is limited and the terrain allows the enemy multiple COAs,then the BCT needs a larger reserve
positioned deeper into the area of operations. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
Sustainment
7-121. The sustainment mission in an area defense requires a balance among establishing forward supply
stocks of ammunition, barrier material, and other supplies in sufficient amounts, and having the ability to
move the supplies in conjunction with enemy advances. Proper forecasting of supply and support
requirements is important to the success of the area defense. The location of sustainment units within the
support area is METT-TC dependent. (See chapter 9.)
PLANNING AN AREA DEFENSE
7-122. An area defense requires detailed planning and extensive coordination. In the defense,synchronizing
and integrating the BCTs combat and supporting capabilities enables a commander to apply overwhelming
combat power against selected advancing enemy forces. A successful defense depends on knowing and
understanding the enemy and its capabilities. The commander’s situational understanding is critical in
establishing the conditions that initiate the defensive action. As the situation develops, the commander
reassesses the plan based on a revised situational understanding that results from an updated common
operational picture (COP) as new intelligence and combat information becomes available. In planning an
area defense,the commander may choose between two forms of defensive maneuver—a defense in-depth or
a forward defense.
Understanding
7-123. The BCT commander considers the mission variables of METT-TC to determine how to concentrate
efforts and economize forcesin order to accomplish the mission. A detailed terrain analysis may be the most
important process the BCT commander and staff complete. A successful defense relies on a complete
understanding of terrain to determine likely enemy COAsand the best positioning of BCT assets to counter
them.
7-124. The commander must understand the situation in-depth, develop the situation through action, and
constantly reassess the situation to keep pace with the engagement. Defending forces must gain and maintain
contact with the enemy to observe, assess, and interpret enemy reactions and the ensuing opportunities or
threats to friendly forces, populations, or the mission. The commander must establish priority intelligence
requirements to enable information collection through reconnaissance,surveillance,intelligence operations,
and security operations to develop situational understanding.
7-125. Enemy forces counter friendly information collection efforts to prevent the BCT from gaining
information. Enemy forces use other countermeasures such as dispersion, concealment, deception, and
intermingling with the population to limit the BCT’s ability to develop the situation out of contact.
Reconnaissance and security forces (see chapter 5) fill in the gaps in commanders’ understanding of the
situation. Fighting for understanding and identifying opportunities to seize,retain,and exploit the initiative
requires combined arms capabilities, access to joint capabilities, specialized training, and employing
combinations of manned and unmanned air and ground systems.
Forms of Defensive Maneuver
7-126. The BCT commander may choose between two defensive maneuver forms when planning an area
defense, a defense in-depth, or a forward defense. The commander usually selects the form of defensive
maneuver,but the higher headquarters’commander may define the general defensive scheme for the BCT.
These two deployment choices are not totally exclusionary. Part of a defending commander’s unit can |
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conduct a forward defense,while the other part conducts a defense in-depth. The specific mission may also
impose constraints such as time, security, and retention of certain areas, which are significant factors in
determining how the BCT defends.
Defense In-Depth
7-127. A defense in-depth (see figure 7-11) reduces the risk of a quick penetration by the attacking enemy
force. Even if initially successful, the enemy has to continue to attack through the depth of the defense to
achieve a penetration. The defense in-depth provides more space and time to defeat the enemy attack.
Dependent on the mission variables of METT-TC, it may require forces with at least the same mobility as
the enemy to maneuver to alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions. The mobility of the enemy
force can determine the disengagement criteria of the defending forces as they seek to maintain depth. The
BCT commander considers using a defense in-depth when—
(cid:122) The mission allows the BCT to fight throughout the depth of the area of operations.
(cid:122) The terrain does not favor a forward defense and there is better defensible terrain deeper in the
area of operations.
(cid:122) Sufficient depth is available in the area of operations.
(cid:122) Cover and concealment forward in the area of operations is limited.
(cid:122) CBRN weapons may be used.
(cid:122) The terrain is restrictive and limits the enemy’s maneuver and size of attack.
Figure 7-11. Defense in-depth |
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Forward Defense
7-128. The intentof a forward defense (seefigure 7-12) isto prevent enemy penetration of the defense. A
forward defense is the least preferred form of the area defense due to its lack of depth. The BCT commander
deploys the majority of combat power into defensive positions near the forward edge of the battle area. The
commander fights to retain the forward position and may conduct spoiling attacks or counterattacks against
enemy penetrations,or destroys enemy forces in forward EAs. Often,counterattacks are planned forward of
the forward edge of the battle areato defeat the enemy. Commanders may use reconnaissance and security
forces to find the enemy in vulnerable situations and exploit the opportunity to conduct a spoiling attack to
weaken the enemy’s main attacking force and to disrupt the enemy operation.
7-129. The BCT commander uses a forward defense when a higher commander directs the commander to
retain forward terrain for political,military,economic,and other reasons. Alternatively,a commander may
choose to conduct a forward defense when the terrain in that part of the area of operations—including natural
obstacles—favors the defending force because—
(cid:122) Terrain forward in the area of operations favors the defense.
(cid:122) Strong,existing natural or manmadeobstacles,such as a river or a canal,are located forward in
the area of operations.
(cid:122) Assigned area of operations lacks depth due to the location of the protected area.
(cid:122) Natural EAs occur near the forward edge of the battle area.
(cid:122) Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the area of operations is limited.
(cid:122) Directedby higher headquarters to retain or initially control forward terrain. |
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Figure 7-12. Forward defense
Engagement Area
7-130. Anengagement areais an area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy force
with the massed effects of all available weapons and supporting systems (ADP 3-90). The success of any
engagement depends on how effectively the BCT commander integrates the direct fire plan,the indirect-fire
plan,the obstacle plan(see ATP 3-90.8),Army aviation fires,close air support,and the terrain within the EA
to achieve the BCT’s tactical purpose.
7-131. Effective use of terrain reduces the effects of enemy fires,increases the effects of friendly fires,and
facilitates surprise. Terrain appreciation—the ability to predict its impact on operations—is an important skill
for every leader. For tactical operations,commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain, |
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expressed asOAKOC. (See ATP 2-01.3 and ATP 3-34.80 for information on analyzing the military aspects
of terrain.)
Engagement Area Development
7-132. The BCT commander and staff develop EAs,to include engagement criteria and priority,to cover
each enemy avenue of approach. Within the BCT’sMBA,the commander determines the size and shape of
the EAs by the relatively unobstructed line of sight from the weapon systems firing positions and the
maximum range of those weapon systems.Once the commander and staff select EAs,the commander arrays
available forces and weapon systems in positions to concentrate overwhelming effects into these areas. The
commander routinely subdivides EAs into smaller EAs for subordinates using one or moreTRPsor by key
terrain or prominent terrain feature. The commander assigns sector of fires to subordinates to ensure complete
coverage of EAs and to prevent fratricide and friendly fire incidents. Never split the responsibility for an
avenue of approach or key terrain.
7-133. Security area forces, to include field artillery fire support teams and observers, employ fires to
support operations forward of the BCT’s MBA using precision and other munitions to destroy enemy
reconnaissance and security forces and identified HPTs, and to attrit enemy forces as they approach the
BCT’s MBA. The employment of fires within the security area also helps to deceive the enemy about the
location of the BCT’s MBA. The BCT fire support officer plans the delivery of fires at appropriate times and
places throughout the area of operations to slow and canalize the enemy force as the enemy approaches. The
employment of fires allows security area forces to engage the enemy without becoming decisively engaged.
To prevent fratricide,alliedcasualties,civilian noncombatant casualties,and excessive unintended collateral
damage,the commander designates fire support coordination measures (such as no-fire areas,restrictive fire
areas, restrictive fire lines, fire support coordination lines, and restricted target lines) where security area
forces are positioned. The commander establishes these measures in order to exercise restraint and balance
the need for combat action and that of maintaining the legitimacy of the mission and to prevent unintended
negative effects. The commander uses fires to support the withdrawal of security forces once shaping
operations are completed within the security area and the defending unit is prepared to conduct MBA
operations.
7-134. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with
an enemy force. Engagement criteria may be restrictive or permissive in nature. For example, the BCT
commander may instruct a subordinate battalion commander not to engage an approaching enemy unit until
the enemy commits to an avenue of approach. The commander establishes engagement criteria in the direct
fire plan in conjunction with engagement priorities and other direct fire control measures to mass fires and
control fire distribution.
7-135. Engagement priority specifies the order in which the unit engages enemy systems or functions
(FM3-90-1). The commander assigns engagement priorities based on the type or level of threat at different
ranges to match organic weapon systems capabilities against enemy vulnerabilities. Engagement priorities
are situationally dependent and used to distribute fires rapidly and effectively. Subordinate elements can have
different engagement priorities but will normally engage the most dangerous targets first,followed by targets
in-depth or specialized systems,such as engineer vehicles.
7-136. A target reference point is a predetermined point of reference, normally a permanent structure or
terrain feature that can be used when describing a target location(JP 3-09.3). The BCT and subordinate units
may designate TRPsto define unit or individual sectors of fire and observation,usually within the EA.TRPs,
along with trigger lines,designate the center of an area where the commander plans to distribute or converge
the fires of all weapons rapidly to further delineate sectors of fire within an EA. Once designated, target
reference points may also constitute indirect-fire targets.
7-137. Atrigger lineis a phase line located on identifiable terrain that crosses the engagement area—used
to initiate and mass fires into an engagement area at a predetermined range for all or like weapon systems
(ATP3-21.20). The BCT commander can designate one trigger line for all weapon systems or separate trigger
lines for each weapon or type of weapon system. The commander specifies the engagement criteria for a
specific situation. The criteria may be either time-or event-driven,such as a certain number or certain types
of vehicles to cross the trigger line before initiating engagement. The commander can use a time-based fires
delivery methodology or a geography-basedfires delivery. |
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Note.The example below addresses the general steps to EAdevelopment for the area defense. In
this example, a battalion task force within the BCT conducts an area defense (defense in-depth)
against a motorized infantryand armor threat. The fictional scenario within this example,used for
discussion purposes, is not the only way to develop an EA. For clarity, many graphic control
measures,such as PLs,are not shown.
Engagement Area Development (Motorized Infantry/Armor Threat),Example
7-138. Although often identified as a method to defeat enemy armor,EAs are an effective method to defeat
any enemy attack whether the attack is primarily an armor, Infantry, or a mixed armor and Infantry force.
The key is the identification of the likely enemy avenues of approach and actions, and the placement of
adequate friendly forces,obstacles,and fires to defeat the enemy. The following seven-step EAdevelopment
process, used for discussion purposes,represents one way a BCT builds an EA. The BCT commander and
staff (specifically the S-3) integrate these steps within the military decision-makingprocess(MDMP)and the
IPB. Steps (asterisks denote steps that occur simultaneously) include the following:
(cid:122) Identify likely enemy avenues of approach.
(cid:122) Identify most likely enemy COA.
(cid:122) Determine where to kill the enemy.
(cid:122) Position subordinate forces and weapons systems. *
(cid:122) Plan and integrate obstacles. *
(cid:122) Plan and integrate fires. *
(cid:122) Rehearse the execution of operations within the EA.
Note.Within the scenario below,the BCT commander focuses the IPB effort on the characteristics
of the operational environment that can influence enemy and friendly operations and how the
operational environment influences friendly and enemy COAs. The BCT staff (specifically the
S-2 and S-3) identified three likely enemy avenues of approach to and through the BCT’s area of
operations. Two enemy avenues of approach were identified within the Blue River Valley,Avenue
of Approach 1 and Avenue of Approach 2 (area of operations assigned to Battalion 2). A third
enemy Avenue of Approach (A and B) was identified north of the Blue River Valley, area of
operations assigned to Battalion 1. Success, against these likely enemy avenues of approach,
results in allowing the commander to quickly choose and exploit terrain, weather, and civil
considerations to best support the mission. (See ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of the IPB.)
7-139. Step 1. Identify likely enemy avenues of approach. The brigade and battalion staffs identified
significant characteristics of the operational environment to determine the effects of the terrain,weather,and
civil considerations on enemy and friendly operations. The primary analytic tools used to aid in determining
this effect, specific to terrain, are the modified combined obstacle overlay, and the terrain effects matrix.
Figure 7-13on page 7-38,identifies the three enemy avenues of approach and the terrain within the BCT’s
area of operations that impedes friendly and enemy movement (severelyrestricted and restricted areas) and
the terrain where enemy and friendly forces can move unimpeded (unrestricted areas). Key terrain forward
of the Green and Red Rivers is critical to the BCT’s defense because occupying these position will allow the
engagement of enemy forces forward of the river,preventing the establishment of an enemy force on the east
bank and the use of crossing sites to support movement into less restrictive terrain west of the Green and Red
Rivers. |
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Figure 7-13. Identify likely enemy avenues of approach, example
7-140. Enemy Avenue of Approach 1 and Avenue of Approach 2, within the scenario though restricted,
support mounted movement though the terrain forward (east) of the Green and Red Rivers, thus hindering
enemy movement to some degree. The terrain typically consists of moderate-to-steep slopes or
moderate-to-densely spaced obstacles, such as trees or rocks. Enemy forces within this restricted area will
have difficulty maintaining preferred speeds, moving in movement formations, and transitioning from one
formation to another. Enemy movement will require zigzagging or frequent detours. A poorly developed road
system will hinder the enemy’s ability to sustain its attack along both enemy avenues of approach. The
unrestricted terrain further west from Green and Red Rivers will allow the enemy to move unimpeded along
enemy Avenue of Approach 1 and Avenue of Approach 2 once clear of the two rivers.
7-141. The terrain along enemy Avenue of Approach 3 (A and B),identified to the north of the Blue River
valley,is severely restricted. Steep slopes and large or densely spaced obstacles with little or no supporting
roads characterize the terrain. Though suitable for dismounted movement and infiltration,the terrain within
Avenue of Approach 3 (A and B) impedes motorized Infantry and armored movement. Swamps and the
rugged terrain within this area are examples of restricted areas for dismounted Infantry forces. The road
system utilized to sustain the enemy’s attack is very limited along Avenue of Approach 3 (A and B). Due to
the terrain, security patrols between battle positions will be key to impeding enemy infiltration efforts to
division support and consolidation areas. (See ATP 2-01.3 for additional information on determining terrain
characteristics and the terrain’s effect on operations.) |
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Note.The BCT commander and staff,during step 4 of the IPB process (determine threat COAs),
identify and develop possible enemy COAs that can affect the BCT’s mission. (See chapter 4.)
Enemy COA development requires identifying and understanding the significant characteristics
related to enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations of the operational environment and
how these characteristics affect friendly and enemy operations. Steps 1 and 2 of the IPB process
are, respectively, define the operations environment and describe environmental effects on
operations. The purpose of evaluating the enemy,step 3 of the IPB process (evaluate the threat),
is to understand how an enemy can affect friendly operations. The commander, in order to plan
for all possible contingencies,understands all COAsan enemy commander can use to accomplish
the enemy objective(s). To aid in this understanding,the staff determines all valid enemy COAs
and prioritizes them from most to least likely. The staff also determines which enemy COAis the
most dangerous to friendly forces. To be valid, enemy COAs should be feasible, acceptable,
suitable, distinguishable, and complete-the same criteria used to validate friendly COAs. (See
ATP2-01.3 for a detailed discussion.)
7-142. Step 2. Identify most likely enemy COA. The commander and staff (specifically the S-2 and S-3)
determine the enemy’s most likely COA, within the scenario, is to attack with two battalions (motorized
Infantry battalion task forces) abreast,one along Avenue of Approach 1 and one along Avenue of Approach
2 (seefigure 7-13onpage 7-38). The enemy’s approach,compartmentalized forward of the Green and Red
Rivers, restricts movement and prevents the attacking enemy force from fully exploiting its combat
superiority. The terrain forward of the Green and Red Rivers allows for the massing of friendly fires with the
enemy piecemeal commitment into friendly EAs. The terrain requires the enemy to zigzag and commit to
frequent detours (due to the compartmentalization during movement),exposing portions of the enemy force
for destruction without giving up the advantage of friendly forces fighting from protected positions.
7-143. The enemy’s main effort, predicted to move along Avenue of Approach 2, requires crossing one
river,the Green River. A secondary effort of the enemy,predicted to move along enemy Avenue of Approach
1, requires crossing both the Red and Blue Rivers. The least likely enemy avenue of approach, Avenue of
Approach 3 (A and B) to the north, though the largest area of operations to defend requires the enemy to
move through severely restricted terrain to the east and west of the Green River. The enemy, predicted to
establish multiple infiltration lanes (company and platoon size elements) along this approach, infiltrates
forces to the rear to disrupt friendly operations. Enemy follow-on forces, anticipated armor battalion task
force,will attempt to exploit enemy successes along enemy Avenues of Approach 1 and 2 (seefigure 7-13
onpage 7-38).
Note. The desired end state of step 4 of the IPB process, determine threat COAs, is the
development of graphic overlays (enemy situation templates) and narratives (enemy COA
statements) for each possible enemy COA identified. Generally, there will not be enough time
during the MDMP (see chapter 4) to develop enemy situation overlays for all COAs. A good
technique is to develop alternate or secondary COAs,write a COAstatement,and produce a list
of HVTs to use during the mission analysis briefing and COA development during the MDMP.
Once these tools and products are complete, the staff constructs overlays depicting the enemy’s
most likely and most dangerous COAto use during the friendly COAdevelopment and friendly
COAanalysis steps of the MDMP. (SeeATP 2-01.3 and FM 6-0 for additional information.)
7-144. Step 3. Determine where to kill the enemy. Whether planning deliberately or rapidly when
determining where to kill enemy, the BCT commander, subordinate commanders, and staffs maintain a
shared understanding of the steps within the IPB process and the MDMP. Within the scenario that follows
this paragraph,the BCT commander focuses this effort to determine the effects of the terrain,weather,and
civil considerations on the enemy avenues of approach identified within and north of the Blue River Valley.
During step 4 of the IPB, the BCT and battalion staffs (specifically the S-2 and S-3) identify and develop
possible enemy COAsthat can affect the BCT mission. Based on the results of this analysis,the commander
concentrates efforts and economizes forces to kill the enemy east of the Green and Red Rivers along three |
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enemy avenues of approach to best utilize the restricted and severely restricted areas forward in the BCT’s
area of operations.
EXAMPLE BCTAREA DEFENSESCENARIO
This fictional scenario for steps 4,5,and 6 of the EAdevelopment process,used for discussion purposes,is
an example of how a BCT commander might build EAs within an area defense. In this scenario,an IBCT
conducts an area defense against a motorized Infantry and armor threat. Army aviation attack and
reconnaissance units,initially control by division and higher echelon,conducted attacks against enemy forces
not in direct contact with the ground maneuver forces of the IBCT. As the enemy advanced,aviation attacks
continued in close proximity or in direct support of IBCT and battalion security forces and main battle area
forces. Artillery and mortar fire support plans were integrated into forward security area actions and the direct
fire plans of maneuver companies in the main battle area. Engineer priorities of work were initially to
countermobility,then to survivability. As the IBCT prepared for the defense,the brigade support battalion
established the brigade support area (BSA) just forward of the division support area to support the BCT area
defense.
The IBCT is task organized with two Infantry battalions,a combined arms battalion,aCavalry squadron,a
field artillery battalion, a brigade engineer battalion, and a brigade support battalion. Infantry Battalion 2
(main effort) is task organized with two Infantry rifle companies,a mechanized Infantrycompany team (two
mechanized Infantry platoons and one tank platoon),and a weapons company. Company C,the third Infantry
rifle company (mounted) from Infantry Battalion 2, was placed under IBCT control as the reserve for the
BCT. Infantry Battalion 1 istask organized with its three Infantry rifle companies and weapons company.
The combined arms battalion is task organized with two armor company teams,each with two tank platoons
and one mechanized Infantry platoon. The commander weighted the main effort by attaching the mechanized
Infantry company team from the combined arms battalion to Infantry Battalion 2,as stated above. No change
in task organization for the IBCT Cavalry squadron,field artillery battalion,and brigade engineer battalion.
The brigade support battalion is task organized with the logistical elements required to support the combined
arms battalion. Subordinate unit task organization and scheme of maneuver are as follows:
(cid:122) Infantry Battalion 2,main effort,conducts an area defense. The battalion defends in-depth with
two Infantry rifle companies,with one assault platoon each attached,forward,and a mechanized
Infantry company team (two mechanized Infantry platoons) and weapons company (two assault
platoons) back. The tank platoon from the mechanized Infantry company team is the battalion
reserve. (Illustrated within EAdevelopment example,see figure 7-14 on page 7-42.)
(cid:122) Infantry Battalion 1, supporting effort, conducts an area defense to the north of Infantry
Battalion2. The battalion defends in-depth with two Infantry rifle companies forward,and one
Infantry rifle company back. The weapons company (two assault platoons) is the battalion reserve.
(Not illustrated.)
(cid:122) The combined arms battalion,two armor company teams,is the counterattack force for the BCT.
(Not illustrated.)
(cid:122) Infantry rifle company C from Infantry Battalion 2 is the reserve for the BCT. Company C is
mounted and has two attached assault platoons from Infantry Battalion 1. (Not illustrated.)
(cid:122) The Cavalry squadron establishes the security area forward of the BCT main battle area. (Not
illustrated.)
(cid:122) The brigade engineer battalion priorities of work, countermobility, survivability, and then
mobility. Priority of engineer effort initially to Infantry Battalion 2, then to the mobility of the
BCT counterattack force.
(cid:122) The field artillery battalion provides priority of fires initially to security area forces, then to
Infantry Battalion 2,on order to the BCT counterattack force. (Not illustrated.)
(cid:122) The brigade support battalion establishes the BSA just forward of the division support area.
Priority of support initially to security area forces,then to Infantry Battalion 2,finally to the BCT
counterattack force. (Not illustrated.)
7-145. Step 4. Position subordinate forces and weapons systems. Within the above scenario, the Infantry
brigade combat team (IBCT) commander’s concept for the area defense required the positioning of
subordinate forces and weapon systems to accomplish their mission independently and in combination by
means of fires,the employment of obstacles,and absorbing the strength of the attack within defensive battle |
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positions. The commander assigned subordinate maneuver units an area of operations,based on the mission
variables of METT-TC, to maximize decentralized execution empowering subordinate commanders to
position battle positions within their assigned area of operations. At the same time, each subordinate
commander addressed security requirements for the flanks of assigned area of operations by assigning
responsibility to a subordinate element or organizing a security force or observation post(s) to accomplish
that mission. The commander and subordinate commanders retained reserves to contain enemy penetrations
between units and positions,to reinforce fires into an EA,or to help a portion of the security force or main
body disengage from the enemy if required.
7-146. Step 5. Plan and integrate obstacles. During the conduct of the area defense, countermobility (see
ATP 3-90.8) planning is the primary concern of the assistant brigade engineer (known as ABE) under the
supervision of the brigade engineer battalion commander and battalion and squadron engineer staff
noncommissioned officers, in coordination with the BCT and battalion and squadron S-3, S-2, and fire
support officers. (External to the BCT,engineer planners [division and corps] coordinate with the BCT ABE
and brigade engineer battalion).The plan addresses how security area and MBAforces reinforce the natural
defensive characteristics of the terrain with the employment of obstacles to block, disrupt, fix, and turn
attacking enemy forces into planned EAs. Countermobility planning also includes the positioning of
protective obstacles to prevent the enemy from closing with defensive battle positons within subordinate unit
area defenses.
7-147. Within the scenario, the IBCT commander’s concept for the employment of obstacles within the
area defense (Infantry Battalion 2) forces the enemy to enter established EAs positioned where the
commander intends to kill the enemy. To succeed,the battalion through the employment of obstacles and the
static positioning of company and platoon battle positions control,stop,or canalize attacking enemy forces
to counteract the enemy’s initiative. The commander,through dynamic actions of the battalion reserve,covers
gaps between positions and takes advantage of available offensive opportunities such as a local attack or
counterattack that do not risk the integrity of the defense (see figure 7-14on page 7-42). |
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Figure 7-14. Engagement areas (motorized Infantry/Armor threat), example
7-148. Step 6. Plan and integrate fires. During the conduct of the area defense,fire support planning is the
primary concern of the BCT fire support officer (under the supervision of the BCT field artillery battalion |
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commander) and battalion and squadron fire support officers,in coordination with the BCT and battalion and
squadron S-3,S-2,and engineer staff officers. (External to the BCT,fire support planners [division and corps]
coordinate with the BCT fire support officer and field artillery battalion.) Within the scenario,the IBCT and
division higher area of interest and area of operations extend far enough beyond forward battalions’forward
line of own troops that the BCT commander has the time and resources to identify approaching enemy forces,
assess options,and recommend targets for attack to enable the mission. Fires conducted byjoint fire assets
or through the provision of mission orders to the division’s attached combat aviation brigade and field
artillery units at the BCT and division echelons further enable the ability to seize the initiative before the
advancing enemy makes contact with forward defensive positions. The division JAGIC,in coordination with
the BCT fire support cell, plans and coordinates joint fires, suppression of enemy air defenses, airspace
coordination areas, ingress and egress routes, and other airspace requirements to deliver aerial and
surface-delivered fires simultaneously into a given EAor target area.
7-149. Before the enemy closes into direct fire EAs,in either the security area or the MBA,the BCT and
subordinate units direct the initiation of fires. The commander and staff plan to provide the most effective
fires resources and mitigate the risk of fratricide as the attacking enemy nears the designated EA while
supporting air conducts army aviation and close air support attacks. During EA development, fire support
coordination measures, such as TRPs, trigger lines, and final protective fires enable observed fires (see
ATP3-09.30) and the obstacle plan (see ATP 3-90.8) to force the enemy to use avenues of approach covered
by friendly EAs. These shaping operations typically focus on enemy HPTs, such as command and control
nodes,engineer,fire support,and air defense assets and follow-on forces for destruction or disruption.
7-150. Step 7. Rehearse the execution of operations within the EA. The BCT and subordinate units
coordinate and rehearse EA actions on the ground, gaining intimate familiarity with the terrain. The
commander, the S-2, the S-3, engineer planner, and the fire support officer, at a minimum, rehearse the
sequence of events with the subordinate commanders and separate element leaders for each EA.
7-151. During rehearsals, the BCT commander confirms designated TRPs, trigger lines, final protective
fires, EAs, and other direct- and indirect-fire control measures in each EA within the BCT’s area of
operations. Once in position,the commander may modify subordinate unit positions and preplanned control
measures during rehearsals to improve defensive capabilities as required. The commander ensures the
integration of fires by adjusting the planned positions of weapon systems to obtain maximum effectiveness
against targets in the planned EA. The commander coordinates all fires,including those of supporting Army
aviation and close air support,used to isolate the targeted enemy force in theplanned EAwhile preventing
the target’s escape or reinforcement. The BCT and subordinate headquarters rehearse the confliction of fires
to ensure maximum damage before the enemy can respond. The commander rehearses the actions of the
reserve and counterattack forces to reinforce fires,add depth,or block,to restore a position by counterattack,
or to reinforce the destruction of enemy forces within planned EAs.
7-152. Commanders at each echelon rehearse their planned actions within EAs. Subordinate commanders
and leaders reconnoiter and identify positions and identify movement or withdrawal routes and revisethem
as required. Subordinate units rehearse assigned weapon system primary sectors of fire and secondary sectors
of fire to increase the capability of concentrating fire in certain areas in accordance with established criteria
and priorities for engagement. Secondary sectors of fire,when there are no targets in the primary sector or
when commanders need to cover the movement of another friendly element,correspond to another element’s
primary sector of fire to obtain mutual support. Secondary sectors of fire are rehearsed and confirmed
depending on the availability of time before execution. Subordinate commanders may impose and rehearse
additional fire supportcoordinationmeasures as required and as time permits.
PREPARING AN AREA DEFENSE
7-153. The BCT uses time available to build the defense and to refine counterattack plans. The commander
and staff assess unit preparations while maintaining situational awareness of developments in the BCT’s
areas of interest. Collection activities (see chapter 5) begin soon after receipt of the mission and continue
throughout preparation and execution. Security operations are conducted aggressively while units occupy
and prepare assigned positions and rehearse defensive actions. During preparation, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and intelligence operations help improve understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil
considerations. |
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7-154. Revising and refining the plan is a key activity of preparation. The commander’s situational
understanding may change over the course of operations,enemy actions may require revision of the plan,or
unforeseen opportunities may arise. During preparation,assumptions made during planning may be proven
true or false. Intelligence analysis may confirm or deny enemy actions or show changed conditions in the
area of operations because of shaping operations.
Establish Security
7-155. The first priority in the defense is to establish security. During the defense,effective security requires
the establishment of the security area (forward of the MBA), the employment of patrols and observation
posts,the use of manned and UASsand sensors,and the use of the terrain (cover and concealment). Security
operations, counterreconnaissance, survivability operations, military deception, information-related
capabilities, and CEMAs (specifically EW) counter enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
from determining friendly locations,strengths,and weaknesses.
7-156. Potential threats to the defense may include noncombatant access to communications, digital
cameras, and similar devices. Security measures, such as shutting down telephone exchanges and cell
telephone towers and preventing unauthorized personnel from moving in the BCT’s area of operations may
be required. The BCT should request guidance from higher headquarters before implementing any security
measures that could affect the civilian population.
7-157. As part of the defense, higher headquarters may have created a military deception operation and
associated information operations to protect the force, cause early committal of the enemy, or mislead the
enemy as to the defender’strue intentions,composition,and disposition of friendly forces. The BCT aids in
the preparation and execution of the military deception plan to—
(cid:122) Exploit enemy prebattle force allocation and sustainment decisions.
(cid:122) Exploit the potential for favorable outcomes of protracted minor engagements and battles.
(cid:122) Lure the enemy into friendly territory exposing the enemy’s flanks and rear to attacks.
(cid:122) Mask the level of the sustaining and operational forces committed to the defense.
7-158. A defense containing branches and sequels gives the commander preplanned opportunities to exploit
the situation and around these branches and sequels that deception potentials exist. Specific deceptive actions
the BCT commander can take to hasten exhaustion of the enemy offensive include but are not limited to—
(cid:122) Masking the conditions under which the enemy will accept decisive engagement.
(cid:122) Luring the enemy into a decisive engagement that facilitates the transition sequence.
(cid:122) Employing camouflage,decoys,false radio traffic,movement of forces,and the digging of false
positions and obstacles.
Occupation of Positions
7-159. The BCT commander and staff monitor and deconflict any positioning problems with BCT or higher
headquarters’ reconnaissance and security efforts as units move into their assigned areas of operation and
occupy positions. The BCT may have to make minor adjustments to areas of operation,EAs,battle positions,
and other defensive control measures based on unanticipated conditions the occupying units encountered as
they begin preparing the defense.
7-160. TheABEmonitors units assigned to close gaps or to execute directed obstacles such as demolition
of bridges or dams to assure the units are ready to execute their mission. The ABEalso ensures the units site
and complete all obstacle emplacements within the BCT according to the obstacle plan.
Rehearsals
7-161. The BCT conducts defensive rehearsals as time permits. The commander uses any,or combinations
of, the four types of rehearsals: backbrief, combined arms rehearsal, support rehearsal, and battle drill or
standard operating procedures (SOPs) rehearsal. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a
specific place in the preparation timeline. The commander’s imagination and available resources are the only
limits restricting methods of conducting rehearsals. The BCT commander ensures the integration of attached |
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enabling forces into the defensive scheme of maneuver through rehearsals. (Seechapter 4,section II of this
manual and FM 6-0 for additional information.)
EXECUTING AN AREA DEFENSE
7-162. In an area defense, the BCT concentrates combat power effects against attempted enemy
breakthroughs and flanking movements from prepared and protected positions. The commander uses the
reserve to cover gaps between defensive positions, to reinforce those positions as necessary, and to
counterattack to seal penetrations or block enemy attempts at flanking movements. For discussion purposes,
the following paragraphs divide execution of an area defense into a five-step sequence:
Step 1,Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact
7-163. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is vital to the success of the defense. As the enemy’s
attack begins, the BCT’s initial goals are to identify committed enemy units’ positions and capabilities,
determine the enemy’s intent and direction of attack, and gain time to react. Initially, the commander
accomplishes these goals in the security area. The sources of this type of information include reconnaissance
and security forces,surveillance assets,intelligence operations,and supporting echelons above the BCT. The
commander ensures the distribution of a COP throughout the BCT during the battle to form a shared basis
for subordinate commanders’ actions. The commander uses available information, in conjunction with
judgment,to determine the point at which the enemy is committed to a COA.
Step 2,Disrupt the Enemy
7-164. The commander executes shaping operations to disrupt the enemy. After making contact with the
enemy, the commander seeks to disrupt the enemy’s plan and ability to control its forces. Ideally, the
commander’s shaping operations result in a disorganized enemy force conducting a movement to contact
against a prepared defense. Once the process of disrupting the enemy begins, it continues throughout the
defense. An enemy airborne assault or air assaultin the BCT area of operations must be attacked immediately
with available ground forces and fires before the enemy airhead can be organized and reinforced. The BCT
uses indirect fires, close air support, Army aviation attacks, and other available fires and nonlethal effects
during this phase of the battle to—
(cid:122) Support the security force.
(cid:122) Disrupt or limit the momentum of the enemy’s attack.
(cid:122) Destroy HPTs.
(cid:122) Divert the enemy’s attack.
(cid:122) Deceive the enemy’s knowledge of the BCT’sMBA.
(cid:122) Reduce the enemy’s combat power.
(cid:122) Separate enemy formations.
Step 3,Fix the Enemy
7-165. The commander has several options to fix an attacking enemy force. The commander can design
shaping operations,such as securing the flanks and point of penetration,to fix the enemy and allow friendly
forces to execute decisive maneuver elsewhere. Combat outposts and strong points can deny enemy
movement to or through a given location and as to the exact location of the BCT’sMBA. A properly executed
deception operation can constrain the enemy to a given COA.
Step 4,Maneuver
7-166. The decisive operation occurs in the MBA. This is where the effects of shaping operations,coupled
with sustaining operations, combine with the decisive operation of the MBA force defeat the enemy. The
commander’s goal is to prevent the enemy’s further advance using a combination of fires from prepared
positions,obstacles and reserve forces. To accomplish this,the commander masses effects by maneuvering
forces to focus direct and indirect fires at a critical point to counter the enemy’s attack. |
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7-167. In an area defense, the need for flexibility through movement and maneuver requires the use of
graphic control measures to assist commandand controlduring the repositioning forces and counterattacks.
Specified routes,PLs,attack andsupport by fire positions,battle positions,EAs,TRPs,and other fire support
coordinationmeasures are required to synchronize movement and maneuver.
7-168. During the defense, the BCT commander must prepare to quickly take advantage of fleeting
opportunities, seize the initiative, and assume the offense. Although the BCT commander plans for the
counterattack,the plan may not correspond exactly with the existing situation when the commander launches
the counterattack. As the situation develops,the commander reassesses the plan based on a revised situational
understanding that results from an updated COP.
7-169. Ideally,the commander has a counterattack plan appropriate to the existing situation. When this is
not the case,the commander must rapidly reorganize and refit selected units,move them to attack positions,
and attack or the commander must conduct an attack using those units already in contact with the enemy,
which is normally the least favorable COA.
Step5,Follow Through
7-170. Three conditions may result from the initial enemy attack: friendly forces achieve their objectives,
friendly forces do not achieve their objectives,or both forces are in a stalemate with neither side gaining a
decisive advantage over the other. A successful area defense allows the commander to transition to an attack.
An area defense resulting in the defender being overcome by the enemy attack and needing to transition to a
retrograde operation must consider the current situation in adjacent defensive areas. Only the commander
who ordered the defense can designate a new forward edge of the battle area or authorize a retrograde
operation.
7-171. As the purpose of a defensive action is to retain terrain and create conditions for a counteroffensive
that regains the initiative. A successful area defense causes the enemy to sustain unacceptable losses short of
any decisive objectives. During follow through, time is critical. Unless the commander has a large,
uncommitted reserve prepared to quickly exploit or reverse the situation, the commander must reset the
defense as well as maintain contact with the enemy. Time is also critical to the enemy to reorganize,establish
a security area,and fortify positions.
7-172. The BCT commander plans and conducts a counterattack to attack the enemy when and where the
enemy is most vulnerable. There is a difference between local counterattacks designed to restore the defense
and a decisive operation designed to wrest the initiative from the enemy force and then defeat it. To conduct
a decisive counterattack, the defending force must bring the enemy attack to or past its culminating point
before it results in an unacceptable level of degradation to the defending force. To do this, the defending
force must disrupt the enemy’s ability to mass, causing the enemy to disperse its combat power into small
groups or attrit enemy forces to gain a favorable combat power ratio. The defending force must continue to
disrupt the enemy’s ability to introduce follow-on forces and attack the defender’s sustainment system. (See
figure 7-15.) As the objective of the counterattack is reached, the BCT consolidates and continues
reorganization that is more extensive and begins preparation to resume the offense. |
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Figure 7-15. Counterattack
7-173. In a successful defense,the enemy’s attack is defeated,and the defensive plan must address missions
following successful operations. The division’s follow-on missions for the BCT governsthis plan. The staff
must begin planning for future offensive operations as they develop defensive plans. The commander and
staff must develop maneuver plans,control measures,obstacle restrictions,and sustainment plans that enable
the BCT to quickly transition to follow-on offensive missions or to pass follow-on forces.
MOBILE DEFENSE
7-174. Themobile defenseis a type of defensive operationthat concentrates on the destruction or defeat of
the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). The mobile defense focuses on defeating
or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a position that exposes them to a decisive
counterattack by the striking force—a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the
bulk of available combat power (ADP 3-90). The commander uses the fixing force—a force designated to
supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from moving from a specific area for a specific time
(ADP 3-90)—to help channel attacking enemy forces into EAs and to retain areas from which to launch the
striking force. (See figure 7-16on page 7-48.) A mobile defense requires an area of operations of considerable
depth. The commander must be able to shape the battlefield,causing an enemy force to overextend its lines
of communication,expose its flanks,and risk its combat power. Likewise,the commander must be able to
move friendly forces around and behind the enemy force,cut them off,and destroy them. (See figure 7-17 |
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on page 7-49.) Divisions and larger formations normally execute mobile defenses. However, BCTs and
maneuver battalions may participate in a mobile defense as part of the fixing force or thestriking force. (See
FM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
Figure 7-16. Mobile defense, fixing force |
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Figure 7-17. Mobile defense, committed striking force
RETROGRADE
7-175. A retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the
enemy (ADP3-90). The enemy may force the retrograde or a commander may execute it voluntarily. The
three variations of the retrograde are: delay,withdraw,and retirement.
DELAY
7-176. A delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s
momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged
(ADP3-90). Delays allow units to yield ground to gain time while retaining flexibility and freedom of action
to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy. The methods are delay from successive positions and delay
from alternate positions. The BCT conducts the delay by using one or a combination of the two methods. The
method selected depends on the width of the front,the terrain,the forces available,the enemy,and the amount
of time required of the delay. In either method,a mobility advantage over the enemy is required.
Delay from Successive Positions
7-177. A delay from successive positions involves fighting rearward from one position to the next,holding
each as long as possible orfor a specified time (figure 7-18on page 7-50). In this type of delay,all maneuver
battalions are committed on each of the BCT delay positions or across the area of operations on the same PL.
The BCT commander uses a delay from successive positions when an area of operations is so wide that
available forces cannot occupy more than a single line of positions. The disadvantages of this delay are lack
of depth,less time to prepare successive positions,and the possibility of gaps between units. |
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7-178. When ordered to move,the BCT disengages,then moves and occupies the next designated position.
A part of the unit displaces directly to the rear when the order to begin the delay is received and occupies the
next designated position. The rest of the unit maintains contact with the enemy between the first and second
delay positions. As these elements pass through the second position,the forces on that position engage the
enemy at the greatest effective range. When the BCT can no longer hold the position without becoming
decisively engaged, it moves to the next successive position. When conducting a delay from successive
positions, the BCT may retain a reserve if the division has none. The reserve will frequently be small and
employed as a counterattacking force. It protects a threatened flank, secures vital rear areas, or provides
overwatch fires to a withdrawing unit.
Figure 7-18. Delay from successive positions |
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Delay from Alternate Positions
7-179. Delay from alternate positions can be used when a force has a narrow area of operations or has been
reinforced to allowpositioning in-depth (see figure 7-19). This is the preferred method of delay. One or more
maneuver units employ this method to occupy the initial delay position and engage the enemy. Other
maneuver units occupy a prepared second delay position. These elements alternate movement in the delay.
While one element is fighting, the other occupies the next position in-depth and prepares to assume
responsibility for the fight.
7-180. Units occupying the initial delay position can delay between it and the second position. When the
delaying units arrive at the second delay position, they move through or around the units that occupy the
second delay position. The units on the second delay position assume responsibility for delaying the enemy;
the delaying procedure is then repeated. Moving around theunit on the next delay is preferred because this
simplifies passage of lines. The alternate method provides greater security to the delay force and more time
to prepare and improve delay positions. Normally, when delaying from alternate positions, the BCT
commander does not maintain a reserve. The forces not in contact with the enemy are available to function
in the role of a reserve if needed.
Figure 7-19. Delay from alternate positions |
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WITHDRAW
7-181. Withdraw is to disengage from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy
(ADP3-90). Withdrawing units, whether all or part of a committed force, voluntarily disengage from the
enemy to preserve the force or release it for a new mission. The purpose of a withdrawal is to remove a unit
from combat,adjust defensive positions,or relocate forces. A withdrawal may free a unit for a new mission.
A unitmay execute a withdrawal at any time and during any type of operation.
7-182. BCTs normally withdraw using a security force,a main body,and a reserve. There are two types of
withdrawals, assisted and unassisted. In an assisted withdrawal, the next higher headquarters provides the
security forces that facilitate the move away from the enemy. In an unassisted withdrawal,the BCT provides
its own security force. Withdrawals are generally conducted under one of two conditions, under enemy
pressure and not under enemy pressure. Regardless of the type or condition under which it is conducted,all
withdrawals share the following planning considerations:
(cid:122) Keep enemy pressure off the withdrawing force. Position security elements to delay the enemy.
Emplace obstacles andcover by fire to slow its advance.
(cid:122) Maintain security. Know the enemy’s location and its possible COAs. Observe possible enemy
avenues of approach.
(cid:122) Gain a mobility advantage. Gain the advantage by increasing the mobility of the BCT,reducing
the mobility of the enemy,or both.
(cid:122) Reconnoiter and prepare routes. Each unit must know the routes or lanes of withdrawal. Establish
priority of movement and traffic control if two or more units move on the same route.
(cid:122) Withdraw nonessential elements early. Withdrawing nonessential elements early may include
some command and control and sustainment elements.
(cid:122) Move during limited visibility. Movement under limited visibility provides concealment for the
moving units and reduces the effectiveness of enemy fires.
(cid:122) Concentrate all available fires on the enemy. Alternate movement between elements so some of
the force can always place direct or indirect fires on the enemy.
7-183. Withdrawing under enemy pressure demands superior maneuver,firepower,and control. The BCT
executes a withdrawal in the same manner as a delay,although its ultimate purpose is to break contact with
the enemy rather than maintain it as in the delay. When conducting a withdrawal under enemy pressure,the
commander organizes the BCT into a security force and a main body. Use control measures that facilitate the
accomplishment of the commander’s intent. These control measures may include areas of operations,battle
positions,PLs,routes,passage points and lanes,contact points,checkpoints,and battle handover lines.
7-184. Success depends on facilitating the disengagement of the main body by massing its own fires and
the overwatch fires provided by the security element. The division commander may place adjacent units in
overwatch or require them to conduct security operations or limited counterattacks to support the
withdrawing BCT. To assist withdrawing elements, the security force must be strong enough to detect and
engage the enemy on all avenues of approach. The BCT may form its own security force from forward
maneuver battalion elements or the Cavalry squadron. The security force must:
(cid:122) Stop,disrupt,disengage,or reduce the enemy’s ability to pursue.
(cid:122) Reduce,through smoke and suppressive fires,the enemy’s capability to observe the movementof
the main body.
(cid:122) Rapidly concentrate additional combat power in critical areas.
7-185. As the commander gives the order to withdraw,the BCT must engage the enemy with concentrated
direct and indirect fire to enable the withdrawing force to disengage,conduct a rearward passage through the
security force, assemble, and move to their next position. The security force assumes the fight from the
forward elements. This includes delaying the enemy advance while the bulk of the BCT conducts movement
to the rear. On order,or when the BCT meets other predetermined criteria,the security force disengages itself
and moves to the rear as a rear guard. Depending on the BCT’s next mission, the security force may be
required to maintain contact with the enemy throughout the operation.
7-186. When the BCT conducts a withdrawal not under enemy pressure, it must plan as though enemy
pressure is expected,and then plan for a withdrawal without pressure. Withdrawal not under enemy pressure |
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requires the formation of a detachment left in contact (DLIC). Reconnaissance, security,and deception are
critical to conducting a withdrawal not under enemy pressure. The commander must knowthe activities and
movements of any enemy in the area that could influence the operation. The commander ensuresthe security
of the force against surprise and projects the impression of conducting operations other than a withdrawal. If
the enemy becomes aware that the BCT is withdrawing,the enemy may choose to exploit the BCT’s relative
vulnerability by attacking or employing indirect fires against elements in movement. Therefore, deception
and operations security measures are essential to the success of a withdrawal not under enemy pressure.
These measures include—
(cid:122) Maintaining the same level of communications.
(cid:122) Continuing the use of patrols.
(cid:122) Moving during limited visibility.
(cid:122) Maintaining the same level of indirect fires.
(cid:122) Avoiding compromise of the operation by radio.
(cid:122) Maintaining noise and light discipline.
(cid:122) Using the DLIC to simulate or continue normal activities.
7-187. Adetachment left in contactis an element left in contact as part of the previously designated (usually
rear) security force while the main body conducts its withdrawal (FM 3-90-1). The DLIC is a force organized
from within the BCT that maintains contact with the enemy while the majority of the BCT withdraws. The
DLIC usually comprises one third of the available combat power. A BCT may direct that three maneuver
companies, augmented with the necessary combat power and increased mobility and firepower, form the
DLIC.
7-188. Two techniques for organizing the DLIC are designating one maneuver battalion as the DLIC or
forming a new organization under the BCT S-3. When one maneuver battalion forms the DLIC,it repositions
its forcethrough a series of company-sizedrelief in place operations with companies in the other maneuver
battalion’s areas of operations. The advantages of this technique arethat command and control is facilitated
by the organic nature of the units involved and the focus of the force as a whole is dedicated toward one
mission maintaining contact and preparing to fight a delay, if necessary. The disadvantages are the time
needed to reposition and the increased amount of movement in the area of operations that may signal a
vulnerability to the enemy.
7-189. Forming a new organization under a new controlling headquarters also has advantages and
disadvantages. The advantages are that the units of the DLIC may have to do less repositioning and some
may not have to move at all. This advantage helps to deceive the enemy as to the intentions of the BCT. The
disadvantage is that the unit’s ability to fight as a team decreases if the organization is ad hoc in nature. This
organization must train together to avoid this disadvantage.
RETIREMENT
7-190. Aretirementiswhena force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). A retirement
is conducted as a tactical movement to the rear. The brigade may move on one or more routes depending on
the routes available. Security for the main body is similar to that for a movement to contact using advance,
flank,and rear guards. As in all tactical movements,all round security must be maintained. In all retrograde
operations,control of friendly maneuver elements is a prerequisite for success. A withdrawal may become a
retirement once forces have disengaged from the enemy,and the main body forms march columns.
7-191. The BCT conducts retrograde operations to improve a tactical situation or to prevent defeat.
Retrograde operations accomplish the following:
(cid:122) Resist,exhaust,and defeat enemy forces.
(cid:122) Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
(cid:122) Avoid contact in undesirable conditions.
(cid:122) Gain time.
(cid:122) Disengage a force from battle for use elsewhere in other missions. |
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(cid:122) Reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements of other friendly
units.
(cid:122) Secure terrain that is more favorable.
SECTION VI – TRANSITION
7-192. Transitions between tasks during decisive action whether anticipated or unanticipated require
adaptability as the BCT commander copes with changes in the operational environment. During transition
and operating with mission orders, subordinate leaders take disciplined initiative within the commander’s
intent, bounded by the Army Ethic. The commander considers the concurrent conduct of each task—
offensive,defensive,and stability—in every phase and ongoing operation. Transition between tasks during
decisive action require careful assessment,prior planning,and unit preparation as the commander shifts the
combinations of offensive,defensive,and stability operations.
7-193. The BCT commander halts the defense only when the operation accomplishes the desired end state,
reaches a culminating point or receives a change of mission from higher headquarters. Transitions mark a
change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. In
the defense, the BCT and subordinate units often transition from one phase of the operation to another
sequentially or simultaneously. In decisive action,it is common for subordinate units of the BCT to transition
to the offense and operations focused on stability,while maintaining the defense with other subordinate units.
7-194. The commander deliberately plans for sequential operations, assisting the transition process and
allowing the setting of the conditions necessary for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need
to control the tempo of operations,maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces,and keep the enemy
off balance. The BCT establishes the required organization of forces and control measures based on the
mission variables of METT-TC.
7-195. Prior contingency planning decreases the time needed to adjust the tempo of combat operations when
a unit transitions from the defense to the offense or operations focused on stability. It does this by allowing
subordinate units to simultaneously plan and prepare for subsequentoperations.
TRANSITION TO THE CONDUCT OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-196. The BCT or higher commander may order an attack, a movement to contact, or participate in an
exploitation and subsequent pursuit if conditions are suitable. The commander transitions to the offense as
soon as possible to attack the enemy when it is most vulnerable. The commander does not want to give the
enemy time to prepare.
7-197. A defending commander transitioning to the offense anticipates when and where the enemy force
will reach its culminating point or when it will require an operational pause before it can continue. At those
moments,the combat power ratios most likely favor the defending force. The actions which may indicate the
enemy has reached its culminating point include transitioning to the defense, heavy losses, lack of
sustainment to continue the mission,unexpected success of friendly operations,increased enemy prisoners
of war,and a lack of coherence and reduced combat power in the enemy’s attacks.
7-198. The BCT commander must be careful not to be the target of enemy information activities designed
to encourage the commander to abandon the advantages of fighting from prepared defensive positions. The
commander ensures the force has the assets necessary to complete its assigned offensive mission. The
commander should not wait too long to transition from the defense to the offense as the enemy force
approaches its culminating point. The BCT must disperse, extend in-depth, and weaken enemy forces. At
that time,any enemy defensive preparations will be hasty and enemy forces will not be adequately disposed
to defend. The BCT commander wants the enemy in this posture when the force transitions to the offense.
The commander does not want to give the enemy force time to prepare the defense. Additionally, the
psychological shock on enemy soldiers will be greater if they suddenly find themselves desperately defending
on new and often unfavorable terms,while the commander’s own Soldiers will enjoy a psychological boost
by going on the offense. |
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7-199. A commander can use two basic methods when transitioning to the offense. The first,and generally
preferred, method is to attack using forces not previously committed to the defense. This method has the
advantage of using rested units at a high operational strength. A drawback to this method is the requirement
to conduct a forward passage of lines. Additionally,enemy intelligence assets are likely to detect the arrival
of significant reinforcements. Another consideration of using units not in contact occurs when they are
operating in noncontiguous areas of operations. The commander rapidly masses overwhelming combat power
in the decisive operation. This might require the commander to adopt economy of force measures in some
areas of operations while temporarily abandoning others to generate sufficient combat power.
7-200. The other method is to conduct offensive actions using the currently defending forces. This method
has the advantage of being more rapidly executed and thus more likely to catch the enemy by surprise. Speed
of execution in this method results from not having to conduct an approach or tactical road march from
reserve assembly areas or,in the case of reinforcements,move from other area of operations and reception,
staging, organization, and integration locations. Speed also results from not having to conduct a forward
passage of lines and perform the liaison necessary to establish a COP that includes knowledge of the enemy
force’s patterns of operation. The primary disadvantage of this method is that the attacking force generally
lacks stamina and must be quickly replaced if friendly offensive actions are not to culminate quickly.
7-201. If units in contact participate in the attack,the commander must retain sufficient forces in contact to
fix the enemy. The commander concentrates the attack by reinforcing select subordinate units so they can
execute the attack and, if necessary, maintain the existing defense. The commander can also adjust the
defensive boundaries of subordinate units so entire units can withdraw and concentrate for the attack.
7-202. The commander conducts any required reorganization and resupply concurrently with transition
activities. This requires a transition in the sustainment effort, with a shift in emphasis from ensuring a
capability to defend from a chosen location to an emphasis on ensuring the force’s ability to advance and
maneuver. For example,in the defense,the sustainment effort may have focused on the forward stockage of
class IV (construction and barrier materials) and class V (ammunition) items and the rapid evacuation of
combat damaged systems. In the offense, the sustainment effort may need to focus on providing POL and
forward repair of maintenance and combat losses. Transition is often a time in which forces perform deferred
equipment maintenance. Additional assets may also be available on a temporary basis for casualty evacuation
and medical treatment because of a reduction in the tempo of operations.
TRANSITION TO THE CONDUCT OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
7-203. During the transition to operations focused on stability,the role of the BCT varies greatly depending
upon the security environment,the authority and responsibility of the BCT,and the presence and capacities
of other nonmilitary actors. When transitioning from the defense, these other actors will normally be less
established before stability operations tasks begin. The BCT in this casewill operate before other actors have
a significant presence. Generally, the BCT will focus on meeting the immediate essential service and civil
security needs of the civilian inhabitants of the area of operations in coordination with any existing
host-nation government and nongovernmental organizations before addressing the other stability operations
tasks. (See chapter 8.) Support requirements may change dramatically. During transition, the commander
may adjust rules of engagement or their implementation. The commander must effectively convey these
changes to the lowest level.
7-204. The BCT must remain versatile and retain flexibility when transitioning from the defense to
operations focused on stability. The commander may plan on order transition to a stability-focusedmission
when certain conditions are met. These conditions may include a sharp reduction of the enemy’s offensive
capabilities or deterioration in civilian governance and security. These conditions may require the rapid
occupation and security of civilian areas. The commander must make every attempt to begin transition
operations as soon as subordinate units of the BCT arrive within an assigned area of operations.
7-205. BCT subordinate units and Soldiers must be aware that during the transition to operations focused
on stability,there may be events that escalate to combat. The BCT must always retain the ability to conduct
offense and defense during transition. Preserving the ability to transition allows the commander to maintain
initiative while providing security. The commander should consider planning an on-order offensive and |
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defensive contingency in case the transition to operations focused on stability deteriorates. Subordinate
commanders and leaders must be well-rehearsed to recognize activities that would initiate these contingences. |
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Stability
The requirement for military formations to conduct operations focused on stability is
not new. Our involvement in military conflict from the Revolutionary War to Operation
Enduring Freedom consists of only eleven conventional military operations.
Conversely, that same history reveals hundreds of operations focused on stability with
recent history proving no different. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States
led or participated in over fifteen operations in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia,
the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While the magnitude of violence may not match
conventional operations, history often measures the duration of stability operations in
decades. This fact combines with the disturbing spread of international terrorism,
fragile states allowing safe haven to terrorist organizations and or possessing weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), along with an endless array of humanitarian and natural
disasters illustrates the increasing requirement for operations focused on stability.
Military formations conduct operations focused on stability to transition the security
and governance of populations to legitimate civilian authorities. The brigade combat
team (BCT) lacks the organic capability to stabilize an assigned area of operations
independently. The BCT’s central role in operations focused on stability is to establish
and maintain unity of effort towards achieving the political objectives of the operation.
To do this the BCT employs combined arms formations that execute offensive and
defensive operations, and stability operations tasks to identify and mitigate critical
sources of instability. Essentially, the BCT unifies governmental, nongovernmental,
and elements of the private sector activities with military operations to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains.
The first three sections of this chapter discuss the doctrinal foundation, stability
environment, and the Army’s six stability operations tasks for operations focus on the
stability element of decisive action. Sections IV and V focus on the challenges
confronting the BCT commander and staff and subordinate commanders and leaders
in accomplishing stability-focused missions or tasks, specifically area security
operations and security force assistance (SFA). The final section addresses transition
to offensive or defensive operations if the focus of the operation changes from stability.
This section concludes with a discussion of transitions during SFA.
SECTION I – FOUNDATION FOR OPERATIONS FOCUSED ON STABILITY
8-1. Stability ultimately aims to establish conditions the local populace regards as legitimate, acceptable,
and predictable. Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of
instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. Stability operations tasks focus on identifying
and targeting the root causes of instability and building the capacity of local institutions. Army forces
accomplish stability missions and perform tasks across the range of military operations and in coordination
with other instruments of national power. Stability missions and tasks are part of broader efforts to establish
and maintain the conditions for stability in an unstable area before or during hostilities, or to re-establish
enduring peace and stability after open hostilities cease. |
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FUNDAMENTALS OF STABILIZATION
8-2. The BCT applies the fundamentals of stabilization to the offense, defense, and operations focused on
stability to achieve political and military objectives. (See ADP 3-07 for additional information.) The
following fundamentals of stabilization lay the foundation for long-term stability:
(cid:122) Conflict transformation.
(cid:122) Unity of effort.
(cid:122) Build host-nation capacity and capabilities.
(cid:122) Host-nation ownership and legitimacy.
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
8-3. Conflict transformation is the process of converting the actors and conditions that motivate violent
conflict into the governmental process to address the causes of instability. Conflict transformation sets the
host nation on a sustainable, positive trajectory in which transformational processes directly address the
dynamics causing instability. The use of the BCT in a combat role serves as a temporary solution until the
situation is stabilized and host-nation forces are able to provide security for the populace. In all cases, the
combat role supports the host nation’s ability to provide for its internal security and external defense.
UNITY OF EFFORT
8-4. Military operations typically demand unity of command. The challenge for military and civilian leaders
is to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in an operation
focused on stability. This is the essence of unified action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or
integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve
unity of effort (JP 1). Unity of effortis the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if
the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of
successful unified action (JP 1). Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the
instruments of national power in a collaborative approach when conducting stability operations tasks during
military operations.
8-5. When countering insurgency an example of unity of effort could be a military commander and a
civilian leader ensuring that governance and economic lines of effort are fully coordinated with military
operations. Unity of effort among nationally, culturally, and organizationally distinct partners is difficult to
maintain, given their different layers of command.Achieving unity of effort requires participants to overcome
cultural barriers and set aside parochial agendas. It also requires that each organization understand the
capabilities and limitations of the others.
BUILDING HOST-NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES
8-6. Building host-nation capacity and capabilities is the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational
activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish
security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government
functions. The Army integrates capabilities of operating forces and the institutional force to support
interorganizational capacity and capabilities-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation
interactions. The institutional force advises and trains partner army activities to build institutional capacity
for professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. Army integrates capabilities of operating
forces and the institutional force to support interorganizational capacity and capabilities-building efforts,
primarily through security cooperation interactions. BCTs apply a comprehensive approach to sustained
engagement with foreign and domestic partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capacities and capabilities
to address shared interests.
8-7. Unified action is an indispensable feature of building host-nation capacity and capabilities. In
operations characterized by stability operations tasks, unified action to enhance the ability of partners for
security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government
functions exemplifies building host-nation capacity and capabilities. Building the capacity and capability,
during SFA, of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions is normally the primary focus |
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of security force assistance brigades (known as SFABs). On occasion, the BCT as a whole or selected unit(s)
of the BCT may support SFA activities. SFA will encompass various activities related to the organizing,
equipping, training, advising, and assessing of FSF and their supporting institutions. SFA activities conducted
by SFABs and BCTs build host nation capacity and capabilities to defend against internal, external, and
transnational threats to stability. (See FM 3-22 for additional information.)
HOST-NATION OWNERSHIP AND LEGITIMACY
8-8. Ownership and legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the
legality, morality, or rightness of aset of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or
organizations in taking them. Legitimacy enables host nation ownership by building trust and confidence
among the people. The foundation of ownership and legitimacy affects every aspect of operations from every
conceivable perspective. Ownership of the mission and legitimacy of the host-nation government enables
successful operations characterized by stability operations tasks.
8-9. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by way a host
nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07).
Note. Security sector reform can be an activity conducted during security cooperation (see
paragraph 8-112).
8-10. The BCT’s primary role in security sector reform is to support the reform, restructuring, or
re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations. The
overall objective is to support in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate host-nation government and
its ownership of the mission that is transparent, accountable, and responsive to civilian authority. (See
ADP3-07 for additional information.)
STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK
8-11. A stabilization framework based on conditions within the area of operations of initial response,
transformation, and fostering sustainability, helps the BCT determine the required training and task
organization of forces before initial deployment, and serves as a guide to actions in an operation focused on
stability operations tasks. A BCT deployed into an area of operations where the local government is
nonexistent may conduct a set of tasks while another BCT may conduct another set of tasks in an area of
operations with a functioning local government. The phases described in the following paragraphs facilitate
identifying lead responsibilities and determining priorities. (See FM 3-07 for additional information.)
INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE
8-12. Initial response actions generally reflect activity executed to stabilize a crisis state in the area of
operations. The BCT typically performs initial response actions during, or directly after, a conflict or disaster
in which the security situation prohibits the introduction of civilian personnel. Initial response actions aim to
provide a secure environment that allows relief forces to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the
local population. They reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable
other actors to participate safely in relief efforts.
TRANSFORMATION PHASE
8-13. Stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity building are transformation actions performed in a relatively
secure environment. Transformation actions occur in either crisis or vulnerable states. These actions aim to
build host nation capacity across multiple sectors. Transformation actions are essential to the continuing
stability of the environment and foster sustainability within the BCT’s area of operations. |
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FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY PHASE
8-14. Fostering sustainability actions are those activities that encompass long-term efforts, which capitalize
on capacity building and reconstruction. Successful accomplishment of these actions establishes conditions
that enable sustainable development. Usually military forces perform fostering sustainability phase actions
only when the security environment is stable enough to support efforts to implement the long-term programs
that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation. Often military forces conduct
these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian led efforts.
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
8-15. A comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort during stability operations tasks requires
contributions from a variety of partners outside the United Statesand the U.S. Government. These partners
include foreign military and police forces, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations,
host-nation organizations, news media, and businesses. Many partners have no formal relationship with Army
units but are, nevertheless, instrumental in achieving the desired outcomes. Army units must interact
effectively with these partners to exchange information and strive for unified action. Army units demonstrate
to the host nation and international community through action its character, competence, and commitment to
adhere to and uphold the Army Ethic.
8-16. When developing an operational approach, commanders consider methods to employ a combination
of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive
operations (see chapters 6 and 7). Stability mechanisms relate to stability operations tasks, security, and
consolidating gains in an area of operations. Planning operations related to stability mechanisms employed
by the BCT requires a comprehensive approach, as well as an in-depth understanding of the stability
environment (see paragraph 8-18). Planning must be nested within policy, internal defense and development
(IDAD) strategy, the campaign plan, and any other higher-echelon plans. Continuous and open to change,
planning includes identifying how to best assist the FSF and developing a sequence of actions to change the
situation. Planning involves anticipating consequences of actions and developing ways to mitigate them to
attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.
Note. IDAD focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that
respond to the needs of society. Ideally, IDAD is a preemptive strategy. However, if an insurgency
or other threat develops, it becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. To support the host
nation effectively, U.S. forces, especially planners, consider the host-nation’s IDAD strategy.
8-17. Considering the elements of operational art (the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—
supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgement, see ADP 3-0) provides the BCT
commander and staff with a combination of conventional forces while leveraging the unique capabilities of
special operations forces, to assist in achieving operations focused on stability. The planning for and selection
of the appropriate mix of military forces, civilian expeditionary workforce, or civilian personnel and
contractors should be a deliberate decision based on thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available
capabilities to requirements. Important factors to consider in these decisions include the nature of the
host-nation force, the nature of the skills or competencies required by the host-nation force, and the nature of
the situation and environment into which the BCT will deploy.
SECTION II – STABILITY ENVIRONMENT
8-18. Operations focused on stability, range across all military operations and offer perhaps the most diverse
set of circumstances the BCT faces. The objective of operations focused on stability is to create conditions
that the local populaceregards as acceptable in terms of violence; the functioning of governmental, economic,
and societal institutions; and adhere to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. During unified land
operations, the BCT provides the means for seizing and retaining initiative through partnership with
associated enabling organizations that are better suited to bring stability to the operational environment. To
successfully seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains in operations focused on stability: |
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the BCT must identify and mitigate sources of instability, understand and nest operations within political
objectives, and achieve unity of effort across diverse organizations.
SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
8-19. The BCT conducts information collection to gain a detailed understanding of the sources of instability,
and the capability and intentions of key actors within its area of operations. Sources of instability are actors,
actions, or conditions that exceed the legitimate authority’s capacity to exercise effective governance,
maintain civil control, and ensure economic development. Enemy forces leverage sources of instability to
create conflict, exacerbate existing conditions, or threaten to collapse failing or recovering states. Examples
of sources of instability include but are not limited to—
(cid:122) Ungoverned areas.
(cid:122) Religious, ethnic, economic, political differences among the local population.
(cid:122) Natural disasters.
(cid:122) Resource scarcity.
(cid:122) Individual disrupting legitimate governance.
(cid:122) Degraded infrastructure.
(cid:122) Economic strife.
(cid:122) Immature, undeveloped or atrophied systems.
(cid:122) Ineffective or corrupt host-nation security forces.
8-20. The BCT commander and staff must apply the same fundamental planning processes in the military
decision-making process (MDMP) and the intelligence preparationof the battlefield (IPB) process to identify
the tactical problem, and conduct information collection to fulfill priority intelligence requirements or
identified information gaps. Critical thinking, innovative problem solving, and leveraging different tools to
address these tactical problems assists the BCT commander and staff in identifying sources of instability.
Thorough analysis, engaging with local leaders and populations, leveraging unified action partners, and
research are standard methods used to identify sources of instability. The commander and staff consider
operational variables (in coordination with division and corps staffs) and mission variables, with emphasis
on civil considerations, to gain an understanding of the interests and motivations particular to different groups
and individuals to enhance situational understanding.
8-21. Interactions of various actors affect the BCT’s operational environment in terms of operational and
mission variables. Some of these actors include the following:
(cid:122) Unified action partners.
(cid:122) Nongovernmental organizations.
(cid:122) Private volunteer organizations.
(cid:122) International and private security organizations.
(cid:122) Media.
(cid:122) Multinational corporations.
(cid:122) Transnational criminal organizations.
(cid:122) Insurgents.
(cid:122) Violent extremist organizations.
(cid:122) Tribes,clans, and ethnic groups indigenous to the area of operations.
(cid:122) Regional influences such as other nation states.
8-22. The commander and staff consider alternative perspectives and approaches to the ones used in offense
and defense. The BCT analyzes sources of instability from both the local, indigenous perspective and the
U.S. military perspective to understand the differences between viewpoints. During the IPB, the BCT
identifies key actors and their interests or agendas. Additionally, the BCT analyzes how these key actors
influence the local civil capacity; this analysis drives the BCT’s planning effort that addresses
accomplishment of stability operations tasks. Staffs conduct preparation to understand unique aspects of
operations focused on stability. For example, the brigade assistant engineer might conduct an assessment on
the local electrical grid system of an assigned area of operations or the brigade surgeon or medical planner |
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may conduct an assessment on host-nation medical facilities and their capacity before employment to an
assigned area of operations. This staff specific assessment further enables the conduct of the six stability
operations tasks (see section III) and makes the BCT’s planning effort during operations focused on stability
more informedand efficient.
8-23. Once the commander and staff possess an understanding of the operational environment, the BCT
applies a mixture of stability mechanisms to set conditions to retain and exploit stabilizing factors. A stability
mechanismis the primary methodthrough which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions
that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. Stability mechanisms relate to stability operations, security,
and consolidating gains in an area of operations. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control,
influence, and support. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing
outcomes that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.
8-24. The BCT simultaneously uses stability mechanisms such as compel and control to assist with seizing
initiative. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect
behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control means to
impose civil order. Offensive operations reveal and exploit enemy weaknesses by defeating, destroying, or
neutralizing threat forces. These actions disrupt threat forces, prevent them from negatively influencing
populations, and provide opportunities to continue exploiting weaknesses—but they are not decisive by
themselves. The design of these actions should consider how and what they compel the population to do and
whether or not the action will result in positive, neutral or negative support by the population in the long-and
short-term. (See ADP 3-0 for additional information.)
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
8-25. Understanding political objectives frames the unique operations required to conduct stability
operations.General political objectives are broad and conceptual in nature, but they give contextual guidance
that informs the expanded purpose of the echelons above the BCT commander’s intent. Political objectives
may shift and change as the operational environment changes. That same guidance unifies or alienates
partners that may fall outside of the military chain of command.
8-26. Given the inherently complex and uncertain nature of political objectives, the BCT commander and
staff use the Army design methodology (see chapter 4) to help understand the root cause of instability and
approaches to solve problems. The Army design methodology entails framing an operational environment,
framing the problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. The Army design
methodology results in an improved understanding of an operational environment. Based on this improved
understanding, the commander issues planning guidance, to include an operational approach, to guide more
detailed planning using the MDMP (see chapter4).
8-27. Incorporating political objectives into the planning process (see chapter 4) is a shared task amongst the
BCT staff. Each staff officer understands the general and specific political objectives and the commander’s
intent two levels up of an assigned operation focused on stability and considers the implications and effects
of the political objectives when presenting the commander with running estimates, courses of action (COAs)
and other decision support staff products. The BCT staff must understandhow to communicate general and
specific political objectives into the themes and messages delivered in the operation order and fragmentary
orders that Soldiers display through their actions. These political objectives must translate across the entirety
of the operational environment yet be understood by subordinate units allowing them to affect the local
population’s perception.
ACHIEVE UNITY OF EFFORT ACROSS DIVERSE ORGANIZATIONS
8-28. BCT commanders and staffs must understand how to build relationships with many diverse
organizations within an area of operations. These relationships allow the BCT to nest operations with both
their higher headquarters and with the overall U.S. effort within the joint operational area. A
whole-of-government approach, along with collaboration and cooperation with unified action partners—
those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector
with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations |
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(ADP3-0)—are key components of operations focused on stability. The BCT staff incorporates personnel
from these organizations into the operations process as soon as possible.
8-29. By building relationships, the BCT reinforces the legitimacy of the BCT operation. Legitimacy is of
great importance with stability operations. Military activities must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and
of the local emerging or host government. Having a just cause, and establishing and sustaining trust affects
several relationships: trust with the American people; trust within the unified force; trust with allies,
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and coalition partners; trust with the host nation
government; and trust with the indigenous population. Restraint in the disciplined and ethical application of
lethal force has a significant influence on those relationships of trust and legitimacy of the operation. There
is a direct relationship between restraint, protection of noncombatant civilians and legitimacy in any military
operation, but especially in stability operations.
MILITARYPOLICE
8-30. Mission tailored military police support to the BCT integrates police intelligence operations (see
ATP3-39.20) throughout the offense, the defense, and operations focused on stability. Police intelligence
operations address the reality that, in some operational environments, the threat is more criminal than
conventional in nature. In those environments, it is not uncommon for members of armed groups, insurgents,
and other belligerents to use or mimic established criminal networks, activities, and practices to move
contraband, raise funds, or generally or specifically further their goals and objectives. Police intelligence can
provide relevant, actionable police information or police intelligence to the BCT through integration into the
operations process and fusion with other intelligence data. U.S. Army criminal investigations division and
provost marshal staffs provide police intelligence analysis to the commander that identifies indicators of
potential crimes and criminal threats against facilities or personnel.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
8-31. BCT will typically coordinate with a Special Operations Task Force or a Joint Special Operations Task
Force. Army special operations forces operating in a BCT’s area of operations must coordinate their activities
with the BCT regardless of command or supporting relationships. To best support integration efforts, and
generate and sustain interdependence, the BCT and the special operations units should exchange a variety of
liaison and coordination elements. This is especially important for the intelligence and fires warfighting
functions. They range in size from individual liaisons to small coordination elements. Whatever their size or
location, these elements coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict missions in the other unit’s area of operation.
By exchanging liaisons, conditions are created that foster interdependence. The exercise of interdependence
facilitates shared understanding between the BCT and special operations forces and provides a conduit by
which the two units can provide each other relevant, useful and timely information during the operations
processes. Liaisons should attend and participate in all planning efforts, update briefs, and working groups.
(See ADP 3-05 for additional information.)
8-32. Civil affairs operations are essential to the conduct of operations focused on stability. The full
capability of the civil affairs force manifests itself in the conduct of stability operations tasks in every
environment across the range of military operations. Civil affairs support to stabilityoperations tasks include
the execution of all five civil affairs core tasks, employment of civil affairs functional specialists, and
continuous analysis of the civil component of the operational environment in terms of both operational and
mission variables by civil affairs staff elements. Civil affairs activities are civil reconnaissance, civil
engagement, civil-military operations center, civil information management and civil affairs operation staff
support. Civil affairs forces also conduct military government operations that include transitional military
authority and support to civil administration and provide support to civil affairs supported activities such as
populace and resources control, foreign humanitarian assistance, and civil foreign assistance
8-33. Civil affairs support to operations focused on stability depends on the nature of the operation and the
condition of the affected indigenous population and institutions. The civil affairs staff continually monitors
the condition of the host nation throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian
component, and recommends functional skills required to support this critical phase of the operation. Civil
affairs support the BCT, U.S. Government agencies, and the host-nation civil administration in transitioning
power back to the local government. During the transition from offense or defense to operations focused on |
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stability, civil affairs units place greater emphasis on infrastructure, economic stability, and governance
expertise. (See FM 3-57 for additional information.)
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
8-34. A provincial reconstruction team, when established, can be part of a long-term strategy to transition
the functions of security, governance, and economics to provincial governments. It is a potential combat
multiplier for maneuver commanders performing governance and economics functions and providing
expertise to programs designed to strengthen infrastructure and the institutions of local governments. The
provincial reconstruction team leverages the principles of reconstruction and development to build host
nation capacity while speeding the transition of security, justice, and economic development to the control
of the host nation. Depending on the situation, a provincial reconstruction team is manned between 60 to 90
personnel. A provincial reconstruction team may have the following complement of personnel:
(cid:122) Provincial reconstruction team leader.
(cid:122) Deputy team leader.
(cid:122) Multinational force liaison officer.
(cid:122) Rule of law coordinator.
(cid:122) Provincial action officer.
(cid:122) Public diplomacy officer.
(cid:122) Agricultural advisor.
(cid:122) Engineer.
(cid:122) Development officer.
(cid:122) Governance team.
(cid:122) Civil affairs team.
(cid:122) Bilingual cultural advisor.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ANDNONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
8-35. BCTs also must recognize the value of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and
build effective relationships with these actors. These organizations may have the most extensive amounts of
resources to conduct stability operations tasks within the BCT’s area of operations. Intergovernmental
organizations and nongovernmental organizations are the primary sources of subject matter expertise in many
essential services and governance topics. They also are the primary provider of humanitarian, infrastructure
and essential services in immature operational environments. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations potentially have experienced and detailed knowledge of the civil environment. Usually the
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations will have a better understanding of the civil
considerations than any other actors other than host-nation personnel will. This insight can assist the BCT in
the continual process to understand and shape the environment.
8-36. Building relationships with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations is unique, as
opposed to host-nation forces and interagency actors, who often have different mandates and alternative
perspectives to operations, focused on stability. The BCT commander and staff utilize these differences to
see the operational environment and tactical problems from different perspectives. Additionally,
understanding where intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are in the area of operations and
the nature of their activitieshelps develop a common operational picture (COP). This COP enables the BCT
to anticipate changes to the operational environment, the effects of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations on stability operations tasks and BCT operations, and future friction points between the
organization’s interests and the BCT’s interests.
8-37. Building relationships with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations might also be
difficult because these organizations are reluctant to establish associations with U.S. forces. The BCT must
be cognizant of this and establish these relationships on terms beneficial to all parties involved.
Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations can bring valuable resources, information regarding
the civil populace and the operational environment, and alternative perspectives to the BCT’s operation.
Examples of interagency personnel that can provide the BCT valuable information are members of a United |
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StatesDepartment of State Embassy or Consulate country team, chiefs ofstations or bases, defense attaches,
and subject matter expertise from other governmental departments (Departments of Agriculture, Justice,
Treasury, and so forth).
8-38. Humanitarian organizations avoid any blurring of the distinction between neutral, independent, and
impartial humanitarian action and development aid derived from political engagement, as the latter is
potentially linked to security concerns or support to one side. The BCT often works through civilian
representatives from United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations, or the host
nation when coordinating with nongovernmental organizations. The BCT avoids publicly citing
nongovernmental organizations as information sources, as that might jeopardize their neutrality and invite
retaliation by adversaries. The BCT primarily uses civil-military operations centers operated by civil affairs
units to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations. (See ATP 3-07.5 for additional information.) BCTs
operating with nongovernmental organizations follow these guidelines:
(cid:122) Military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities.
(cid:122) Military personnel make prior arrangements before visiting nongovernmental organizations.
(cid:122) Military personnel do not refer to nongovernmental organizations as force multipliers or partners
or other similar terms.
(cid:122) U.S. forces respect a nongovernmental organization’s decision not to serve as an implementing
partner.
SEIZING THE INITIATIVE
8-39. The enduring theme of seizing the initiative is as applicable in operations focused on stability as in the
offense and defense. What is significantly different is the context in which the operational framework occurs.
Operations focused on stability have fewer specified applications of tactics and procedures. The BCT
commander must study and use critical thinking and creativity to address the tactical problems in this
complex environment. Operations focused on stability have broader temporal considerations; this operational
framework occurs before, during and after conflict as well as simultaneous to offensive and defensive
operations. The BCT commander must consider the effects of this temporal aspect and manage it
appropriately.
8-40. Operations focused on stability are by nature conceptual. The BCT commander must understand how
each action affects the other elements in the complex system of host-nation governmental institutions, civil
society and local economies. Success in seizing the initiative from a stability-focused perspective is critical
to preventing conflict, setting conditions for success during the offense and defense and securing hard won
successes in a post conflict environment.
RETAINING THE INITIATIVE
8-41. Retaining initiative gained through the offense and operations focused on stability requires the BCT to
anticipate and act on civil requirements while actively averting threat actions. Influencing the population
towards the legitimacy of the civil authority is critical to retaining initiative. In many circumstances, security
is the most influential element affecting thepopulation beyond their basic needs of food, water, and shelter.
A secure environment fosters a functioning economy, which provides employment and gradually transfers
the population’s dependence from military to civilian authorities and host-nation governments.
8-42. The BCT executes defensive operations and operations focused on stability to retain key terrain, guard
populations, and protect critical capabilities that inhibit threat actions while fostering conditions to increase
the impact of stabilizing efforts. Often the BCT assigns these tasks as an economy of force to conduct
offensive operations and operations focused on stability operations tasks. These tasks take form in such as
actions as partnership with other indigenous security forces but must be executed to prevent instability. The
objective is that the population feels that the level of security promotes evolving and often sequential growth
and stabilization. Host nation actors are often the best and most informed sources on the local environment. |
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EXPLOITING THE INITIATIVE
8-43. A secure operational environment enables unified action partners to capitalize on their unique
capabilities—thus exploiting the initiative gained in earlier operations. Governmental, nongovernmental, and
other actors must be unified in purpose for this to be effective. Effective civilian-military teaming starts with
the development of shared goals, aims, and objectives and a unity of purpose, which leads to a relationship
of shared trust and a unity of effort. The BCT commander’s responsibilities include creating and fostering
this dynamic and culture among organizations.
8-44. Unity of effort is more than working with other U.S. Governmental agencies. Political leaders,
governmental agencies, security forces, and local businesses are examples of host-nation actors that a BCT
works with during operations focused on stability. The BCT also leverages relationships with host-nation
actors to develop their understanding of the information environment and to answer information
requirements.
8-45. Actors that encompass unified action partners are not limited to host nation and interagency personnel.
The BCT’s area of operations may include allied and multi-national forces. Understanding capabilities,
constraints and limitations, and command relationships amongst the allied and multi-national forces facilitate
the mission preparation and execution of operations in a constantly changing operational environment. The
BCT cannot conduct successful operations focused on stability without building relationships. Each actor
brings expertise, perspective, resources and capabilities that are necessary to ensure stability operations tasks
are accomplished and that they achieve the end state for the operation.
STABILIZING THE ENVIRONMENT
8-46. Operations focused on stability seek to stabilize the environment enough so that the host nation can
begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. During consolidation of gains, these operations
will focus on security and stability operations tasks to establish conditions that support the transition to
legitimate authorities. Initially, this is accomplished by performing the minimum essential stability operations
tasks of providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Once conditions allow, these tasks
are a legal responsibility of U.S. Army forces. However, the BCT commander may not need to have the BCT
conduct all of these essential tasks. Other military units or appropriate civilian organizations may be available
to adequately perform these tasks. As the operational environment and time allow, the effort will transition
to the more deliberate of execution of the six stability operations tasks.
SECTION III – STABILITY OPERATIONS
8-47. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to establish or maintain secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP3-0). The
BCT executes operations focused on stability operations tasks against destabilizing factors by establishing
unity of effort among diverse organizations, and then task organizing and partnering with other elements to
mitigate sources of instability. (See ADP 3-0, ADP 3-07, FM 3-07, ADRP 1-03, and ATP3-07.5 for
additional information.)
SIX STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS
8-48. U.S. Army forces often seek to stabilize an area of operations by performing stability operations tasks.
A single action taken by a BCT or partnered element can support multiple stability operations tasks because
they are interrelated and interdependent. Each stability operations task carries unique considerations, but
actions taken affect each differently. The BCT plans, prepares, executes, and assesses operations to determine
impacts on the area of operations as positively, negatively or neutral considering long-term and short-term
effects. In operations focused on stability, planning and assessing require significant analysis supported
through information collection activities (see chapter 5) focused on identifiable indicators within and external
to the BCT’s area of operations. As the commander considers each stability operations task within the context
of the stability principles, the BCT staff analyzes measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of |
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effectiveness (MOEs) during assessment to plan for the next operation asking, “What is needed to accomplish
the intended outcome?” The Army’s six stability operations tasks are—
(cid:122) Establish civil security.
(cid:122) Support to civil control.
(cid:122) Restore essential services.
(cid:122) Support to governance.
(cid:122) Support to economic and infrastructure development.
(cid:122) Conduct security cooperation.
8-49. The combination of stability operations tasks conducted during operations depends on the situation. In
some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population’s requirements. In those cases, Army
forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate
how the military presence affects the population and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a
failed state may need to support the well-being of the local population. That situation requires Army forces
to work with civilian organizations to restore basic capabilities. Civil affairs operations prove essential in
establishing the trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective, working
relationships.
8-50. Six Army stability operations tasks (see figure 8-1 on page 8-12) correspond directly to the five
stability sectors, used by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, and directly support the broader efforts within the stability sectors. Together these six stability
operations tasks and the U.S. Department of State stability sectors provide a mechanism for interagency
tactical integration, linking the execution of discreet tasks among the instruments of national power required
to establish end state conditions that define success. Tasks performed in one sector inevitably create related
effects in another sector; planned and performed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement
and reinforce these effects. The subordinate tasks performed by the BCT under the six stability operations
tasks directly support broader efforts within stability executed as part of unified action. |
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Figure 8-1. Mechanism for interagency tactical integration
8-51. Over time, to ensure safety and security are sustained, unified action partners perform numerous tasks
across all stability sectors. As part of a joint team working with unified action partners, achieving a specific
objective or setting certain conditions often requires the BCT to perform a number of related tasks among
the six stability operations tasks. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure
environment for the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local
populace, safety and security are broad effects. The BCT can help achieve safety and security by performing
a number of related tasks to assist in ending hostilities, isolating belligerents and criminal elements,
demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order and safety.
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY
8-52. Civil security provides for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from
internal and externalthreats. The BCT coordinates operations to restore order, halt violence and to support,
reinstate, or create civil authority by establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment for the local populace
supporting the overall stability operation. (See ATP 3-07.5 for additional information.) Establishing civil
security subtasks include the following:
(cid:122) Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
(cid:122) Determine disposition and composition of host nation armed and intelligence services.
(cid:122) Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
(cid:122) Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
(cid:122) Support identification programs. |
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(cid:122) Protect key personnel and facilities.
(cid:122) Clear explosive and other hazards.
8-53. The BCT conducts operations that directly support subtasks: enforce cessation of hostilities, peace
agreements, and other arrangements; conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement;
support identification; protect key personnel, and facilities. The BCT has limited capability to support,
determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services; conduct disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration; and to clear explosives and other hazards.
INITIAL RESPONSE
8-54. During the initial response phase, the BCT often executes subordinate tasks because the host nation
lacks the capability. BCT subordinate units occupy areas of operation in accordance with geographical,
political, socioeconomic, task, or supported actor boundary considerations. Information collection activities
will develop further understanding of boundaries requiring the BCT to shift unit assets and resources to better
align with unified action partners to mitigate sources of instability. BCTs may be required to identify and
segregate combatants and noncombatants, search them, safeguard them, and move them out of the immediate
area of operations. The BCT commander establishes priorities for protection of civil and military personnel,
facilities, installations, and key terrain within the area of operations and initiates the stability principles of
conflict transformation, unity of effort, and building partner capacity during the initial response.
8-55. The BCT conducts operations that safeguard the local population and prevent factions or actors
contributing to sources of instability. Ultimately, these operations convince rival factions and actors to secure
their interests through negotiation and peaceful political processes rather than violence, intimidation,
coercion, or corruption. BCT units must remain neutral during this period. Supporting one of more factions
or leveraging one faction against another may contribute to instability. Perception from the local population
must be that the U.S. forces are neutral and have the best interests of the population and are providing security
to the area allowing further development to occur.
8-56. Identifying actors and their intentions during this phase through information collection allows the BCT
to seize the initiative. The BCT commander and subordinate leaders must reach, through engagements,
binding agreements or understandings with unified action partners to determine the best way to divide labor
and deconflict efforts so that partners are not working at cross-purposes. Actor agendas or intents are not
known or understood in their entirety during this phase. Psychological operations (PSYOP) staff planners
and intelligence staff sections develop indicators that commanders and leaders can clearly understand and
identify to reveal actor agendas or intents. Information collection, with and without unified action partners,
along with continuous assessment enables the commander’s understanding of unity of effort and unity of
purpose.
TRANSFORMATION
8-57. In the transformation phase, host-nation security forces and, potentially, intergovernmental
organization peacekeepers begin to contribute. The BCT focuses more on SFA, particularly on the systems
required to professionalize the host-nation security forces. The BCT continues in partnership with unified
action partners according to the legitimate government binding agreements. Information collection will
develop further understanding of boundaries requiring the BCT to shift unit assets and resources to better
align with unified action partners to mitigate sources of instability. The BCT advises and assists the security
force leadership empowering them to assume as much of the security effort as possible.
8-58. Host-nation security forces prominently work on security efforts so local populations do not perceive
theBCT as an invading force, to resist. Host-nation security forces stay involved to promote the legitimacy
of their government and progress with unified action partners. The BCT will assist host-nation security force
information operations, sustainment in support of the host nation, protection and area security operations as
needed.
8-59. As soon as possible, the BCT transfers host nation infrastructure security to host-nation organizations.
Host-nation military units may temporarily be committed to securing public infrastructure, but eventually
police forces or dedicated security organizations conduct this function. The BCT continues coordination
between unified action partners to help mediate any disagreements among them. |
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8-60. The BCT ensures host-nation forces act in accordance with respect to human rights; failure to do so
undermines popular support for the host-nation government and can quickly revert conditions back to those
experienced during the initial response phase. Partnered security operations that place thehost-nation forces
in the lead or independent of the BCT that result in combating instability are the most credible to the
population and build legitimacy of government through ownership.
8-61. Initially the BCT may simply be a support apparatus or, contrastingly, may make most security related
decisions and perform most tasks. Nevertheless, host-nation actors support and increasingly take ownership
in such matters. The BCT develops clear MOPs and MOEs leading to the security efforts shifting from the
BCT as the lead to the host-nation forces in the lead. The BCT develops indicators of the host-nation unit’s
actions and conduct as well as the local population sentiment that their units can identify while conducting
partnered actions.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
8-62. Inthe fostering sustainability phase, the BCT transitions to a steady state posture focused on advisory
duties and security cooperation. The BCT commander implements additional peace measures depending
upon further negotiations. During this phase, the BCT enables the host nation to sustain the peace.
SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL
8-63. Civil control centers on rule of law by promoting efforts to rebuild host nation judiciary and corrections
systems by providing training and support to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Civil control tasks
focus on building temporary or interim capabilities to pave the way for the host nation or international
organizations to implement permanent capabilities. (See ATP 3-07.5 for additional information.) Support to
civil control subtasks include—
(cid:122) Establish public order and safety.
(cid:122) Establish an interim criminal justice system.
(cid:122) Support law enforcement and police reform.
(cid:122) Support judicial reform.
(cid:122) Support a civil property dispute resolution process.
(cid:122) Support criminal justice system reform.
(cid:122) Support corrections reform.
(cid:122) Support war crimes courts and tribunals.
(cid:122) Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.
8-64. Establishing security and rebuilding justice institutions can help to develop the necessary climate for
reconciliation, public confidence, and subsequent economic growth. The BCT supports civil control tasks
directly by conducting operations that support subtasks establishing public order and safety and supporting
public outreach and community rebuilding efforts. The BCT supports the remaining civil control subtasks
indirectly.
INITIAL RESPONSE
8-65. During initial response, the BCT conducts area security to protect the population, facilitate access to
critical resources for endangered populations, and secure vital resources and infrastructure for the interim
and future criminal justice institutions to strengthen the legitimacy of the operation and maintain the trust of
the host nation. The BCT initiates the principles of conflict transformation and unity of effort to begin
establishment of civil control.
8-66. The BCT conducts operations that safeguard the local population and prevent factions or actors from
contributing to sources of instability, in this case actors or groups enacting their form of justice. The legal
and justice system will be in disarray during the initial response from the interim and host-nation government.
The BCT respects and implements laws established by the host nation in support of political objectives and
directly addresses sources of instability. The BCT staff analyzes these laws to recommend COAs and develop
rules of engagement or other mission parameters. |
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8-67. The BCT conducts information operations related to the development of judicial systems that are
outside of the interim or established government and disrupt the organizations that control them. Ultimately,
these operations convince rival factions and actors to secure their interests through negotiation and peaceful
political processes rather than violence, intimidation, coercion, or corruption.
8-68. The BCT develops plans for coordinating the security, safety, and care for displaced communities in
camps and settlements. This includes the movement of displaced people, the screening of returnees at
checkpoints, the protection of relief convoys, and public safety in returnee communities that lack local law
and order.
8-69. The BCT requests partnerships with U.S. Army and other unified action partners to assist in the initial
establishment of civil control. For example, the BCT request military police forces with the technical skills
to conduct investigations, collect and handle evidence, and undertake correction reform (see ATP3-39.12).
The BCT seeks additional judge advocates since the BCT lacks the legal manpower to assist the host nation
in judicial reform,as well as support to war crime courts and tribunals.
TRANSFORMATION
8-70. During transformation, the BCT continues to conduct operations with unified action partners, however,
shifts efforts to legitimacy and host-nation ownership, and building partner capacity. In the transformation
phase of the stabilization framework, host-nation police forces and inter organizational entities take the lead
with Army units focusing on SFA, particularly the professionalization of host-nation security forces.
8-71. Legitimate political authorities pass laws and orders that are binding to the local population during this
phase. The BCT continues its operations and partnership but must know the laws and orders to properly
mentor and guide its partner to support legitimacy. These laws and orders may also cause an adjustment to
rules of engagement and the conduct of operations.
8-72. Building partner capacity to protect military and public infrastructure and facilitate emergency
response is the primary goal during transformation phase for civil control. Security measures should be
integrated into broader programs that foster good order and discipline, including personnel accountability,
property accountability, and maintenance. The BCT continues its engagements with unified action partners
toestablish timelines and measurable standards as capacity develops for conditions improving or regressing.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
8-73. In fostering sustainability, the BCT transfers all public security responsibilities to host-nation forces
while monitoring and reporting on progress as well as identifying modernization needs and the means to
achieve them. Through engagements, the BCT ensures political authorities do not abuse their institutions and
maintain civil control.
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
8-74. Restoring essential services addresses the fundamental needs of the populace, beyond the provision of
security. The BCT normally supports subtasks of restore essential services, for example, conducting tasks
related to civilian dislocation and support to food relief and public health programs within its area of
operations. (See ATP 3-07.5 for additional information.) Restore essential services subtasks include—
(cid:122) Provide essential civil services.
(cid:122) Perform tasks related to civilian dislocation.
(cid:122) Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
(cid:122) Support nonfood relief programs.
(cid:122) Support humanitarian demining.
(cid:122) Support human rights initiatives.
(cid:122) Support public health programs.
(cid:122) Support education programs. |
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8-75. The BCT works to transfer responsibility to a transitional intergovernmental, nongovernmental
organization, or host-nation authority as quickly as possible. However, maintains responsibility for security
in the area of operations so that the transitional authority can best meet the needs of the population. The BCT
prioritizes restoration of essential services based solely on need and mitigate unnecessary suffering. The BCT
commander and staff consider location, security, and quantity of distribution of humanitarian aid, as well as
who and how the aid is distributed. The BCT staff must determine the perception of the local population,
mitigate corruption of a partnered element, and ensure these actions mitigate instability for theshort and long
term.
8-76. The BCT continuously coordinates with unified action partners assigned by the joint task force
headquarters and may be partnered with the civil-military operations center, host-nation ministry of health
and agriculture, and relief organizations such as U.S. Agency for International Development and the United
Nations World Food Program to ensure the population has access to food and water. Partnership with special
operations forces may also augment the BCT by providing additional geographic and cultural knowledge and
sharing intelligence to address potential sources of instability.
INITIAL RESPONSE
8-77. The BCT’s primarily focus on essential services is to alleviate unnecessary suffering among the
population. This includes providing basic humanitarian needs such as food, water, and shelter, along with
providing support for displaced civilians and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. Efforts to restore
essential services in any operation contribute to the social well-being of the population. The BCT supports
government efforts to establish or restore basic civil services, including food, water, shelter, and medical
support with such actions as:
(cid:122) Conducting area and zone reconnaissance to identify areas that require immediate assistance.
(cid:122) Conducting area security to ensure those affected receive the goods, services, and protection.
(cid:122) Sustainingoperations to deliver class I; water, food, and emergency shelter (tents).
(cid:122) Engineeringoperations to assess and repair infrastructure within capabilities.
(cid:122) Providingmedical treatment to civilians that are at immediate risk of losing life, limb, or eyesight.
(cid:122) Identifying requirements and request enablers, augmentation or integration of theater assets for
specified requirements (for example, repair or rebuild infrastructure, task organization, request for
forces, project request, or operational needs statement processes).
8-78. A BCT may provide for immediate humanitarian needs of the population within its organic capabilities
to restore essential services following the conduct of offensive or defensive operations or in response to
disaster as part of a humanitarian relief effort. The BCT applies the principles of conflict transformation and
unity of effort and sets the conditions to build partner capacity when restoring essential services in the initial
response phase.
8-79. Beyond security considerations, the BCT relies on its information collection and sustainment capability
to apply conflict transformation. This includes operations that identify the sources of instability and support
the restoration of essential civil service as defined in terms of immediate humanitarian needs (such as
providing food, water, shelter, and medical support) necessary to sustain the population until local civil
services are restored. Contracted services are often a viable option to fulfill essential civil services, therefore,
trained contracting officer representatives (CORs) and pay agents are critical enablers at the battalion and
company level that can ensure that contracted support meets its intended purpose in the manner as agreed to
in contracts or other binding agreements. (See chapter 9.)
8-80. Operations focused on stability require unique sustainment considerations. The brigade support
battalion (BSB) must always plan to support the BCT, but also may be required to plan sustainment beyond
the BCT when supporting stability operations tasks. The BCT logistics staff officer (S-4), during the
development of the BCT’s concept of support, must remember that the design of the BSB is only to support
the BCT’s assigned Soldiers and equipment. Prior to the execution of the sustainment plan, the BSB
commander must ensure that sustainment estimates differentiate what is supporting internal BCT
requirements and what is supporting external support mission requirements. Sustainment during operations
focused on stability often involves supporting U.S. forces, multinational forces, and other contributing
partners in a wide range of missions and tasks. |
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8-81. The BCT remains responsible for achieving unity of effort in all subtasks, but other agencies, including
host nation, U.S. Department of State, or nongovernment organizations will most often assume responsibility
for execution. Credibility of the legitimate authority or illegitimate actors is not the primary consideration
during the initial response phase of restoring essential services. Credibility will become vital later in the
initial response phase, as actors will seize the initiative to influence their political position when an interim
authority is established and as the host nation begins the transformation phase. The BCT monitors and keeps
a record of actions taken by actors to influence the population perception of legitimacy. This allows the BCT
to credit and discredit legitimate and illegitimate actors through factual information.
8-82. BCTs also focus on maintaining civil security to allow other agency and host nation entities to meet
these needs, thus ensuring the BCT builds capacity to transition this responsibility quickly. The activities
associated with this stability operations task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and
addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center efforts on immediate
needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and
social well-being.
8-83. The presence of dislocated civilians can threaten success in any operation. A number of factors may
displace civilians, which will prompt the BCT to assist meeting the immediate needs of the displaced civilians
until other better-equipped organizations establish control in the BCT area of operations. Dislocated civilians
may indicate symptoms of broader issues such as conflict, insecurity, and disparities among the population.
The BCT must address and assess the impact of displaced civilians immediately to establish conditions for
stabilization and reconstruction of a traumatized population. Local and international aid organizations are
most often best equipped to handle the needs of the local populace but require a secure environment in which
to operate. Through close cooperation, military forces can enable the success of these organizations by
providing critical assistance to the populace.
8-84. Understanding the location, disposition, and composition of displaced civilians must remain a high
priority and consideration throughout operations focused on stability. A large number of all dislocated
civilians are women and children. Most suffer from some form of posttraumatic stress disorder, and all
require food, shelter, and medical care. External groups may target the displaced civilians as a continuation
of earlier conflict, thus escalating the conflict and destabilizing the environment. Internal unrest within the
displaced civilian population can create de-stabilizing actors as well. Thus, the BCT coordinates with unified
action partners and augments with available assets from a higher headquarters, such as medical support,
security, establishing secure facilities and possibly evacuation to maintain initiative over potential
destabilizing factors.
8-85. The BCT plans for health threats and diseases prevalent in the regionto provide support for deployed
forces and affected civilians within the BCT’s area of operations. Roles 1 and 2 medical assets support force
health protection (see ATP 4-02.8) measures to mitigate the adverse effects of disease and nonbattle injuries
and promote the health of deployed forces. The BCT conducts area and zone reconnaissance to gain
information on public health hazards by collecting information on sewage, water, electricity, academics,
trash, medical, safety, and other considerations. If necessary, the BCT assesses existing medical infrastructure
including preventative health services and may temporarily operate or augment operations of existing
medical facilities in extreme circumstances. (See FM 4-02 and ATP4-02.3 for additional information.)
TRANSFORMATION
8-86. Operations conducted during the transformation phase establish the foundation for long-term
development, resolving the root causes of conflict that lead to events such as famine, dislocated civilians,
and human trafficking. The BCT primarily conducts operations that secure the environment to enable other
agencies and host nation to meet the needs of the populace. The BCT commander and staff assess related
activities and missions to achieve unity of effort within the operational environment and continually identify
potential sources of instability. The commander and staff apply the principles of unity of effort, legitimacy
and host nation ownership, and building partner capacity during transformation that enables a combined
effort toward sustained social well-being for the population and achieving progress towards fostering
sustainability. |
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8-87. As other organizations, nongovernmental organizations, U.S. Agency for International Development,
and other interagency partners and the host nation assume responsibilities for restoring essential services, the
BCT continues its partnership with those organizations. The BCT supports the efforts by ensuring that
security exists, identifying needs that have been overlooked, facilitating the activities of these other partners,
and continuing to provide critically needed humanitarian assistance.
8-88. To achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the population host-nation authorities must demonstrate the ability
to restore essential services. The BCT includes host nation legitimate authorities in assessments and in
establishing priorities. The BCT transitions its relationship from direct support and coordination to coaching,
teaching, mentoring, and facilitating unified action partners so they can continue to make progress toward
essential services.
8-89. The BCT scales activities to local capacity for sustainment. Proper scaling also creates opportunity for
the local populace to generate small-scale enterprise to provide for services as much as possible. The BCT
must not initiate large-scale projects until the necessary infrastructure is in place to support such efforts.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
8-90. Fostering sustainability tasks ensures the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive
change in society. Conditions for sustained social well-being depend on the ability of the legitimate authority
to meet basic needs of the population, ensure right of return, address instances of civilian harm, promote
transitional justice, and support peaceful coexistence.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
8-91. Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by
which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (JP 3-24). Support
to governance subtasks include—
(cid:122) Support transitional administrations.
(cid:122) Support development of local governance.
(cid:122) Support anticorruption initiatives.
(cid:122) Support elections.
8-92. The BCT’s support to governance varies over the range of military operations and area of operations.
Support to transitional authorities and development of local governance can be supported by the BCT as a
primary or subordinate role with the partnering entities. The BCT’s support to anticorruption and elections
does not change its role throughout the area of operations; instead, it varies depending on how it may be
conducted when considering the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, civil considerations (METT-TC). The establishment of civil security and civil control provide a
foundation for transitioning authority to civilian agencies and eventually to the host nation. (See ATP3-07.5
for additionalinformation.)
INITIAL RESPONSE
8-93. The initial response phase sets the conditions on how governance can be supported. Information
collection during this phase must be continuous and leveraged through Soldier and leader engagements to
identify sources of instability, understanding of unified action partners motivations and agendas, and
identification of local civic leaders. The BCT commander and subordinate commanders and leaders apply
adroit diplomatic and communications skills to build constructive relationships during this phase. The BCT
focuses on providing a secure environment allowing relief forces to focus on the immediate local population
humanitarian needs.
8-94. The BCT sets the conditions for civic leaders and factions to address grievances and sources of
instability peacefully and openly. The BCT can set conditions regarding:
(cid:122) Identification of leaders of factions, legitimate authority, popular and minority support, or aligned
with coalition forces political interests.
(cid:122) Provide a safe and secure environment for these leaders to meet and communicate. |
3-96 | 323 | Stability
(cid:122) Influence leaders to participate in political system and not through violence.
(cid:122) Influence local population to participate in elections.
(cid:122) Remain actively neutral but keeping the local populations interests in mind, allowing leaders to
communicate, but not tolerating intimidation, violence, corruption, or sources of instability to
escalate.
8-95. A thorough information collection plan provides the commander and subordinates units with an
understanding of the area of operations allowing them to engage unified action partners from a position of
advantage. The commander must reach clear communication, agreements, understandings, or accords to
conduct operations for laying the foundation of governance during the initial response phase. Conducting
operations after Soldier and leader engagements confirm or deny unified action partners motivations and
agendas. Assessing the outcomes of unified action partners’ operations and actions reveal their relationship
to the BCT and provide direction on how to support governance further.
8-96. The initial response phase normally ends with the election of officials and the establishment of a safe
and secure environment capable of mitigating sources of instability for a longer period time. Elections may
require an increased presence by BCT and host-nation security forces, and additional information-related
capabilities to encourage participation and responsible behavior. BCT and host-nation forces may conduct
security and area security for polling sites, political rallies, media centers, international observers, and
candidates.
TRANSFORMATION
8-97. The transformation phase begins after establishment of some form of a government becomes
operational. This may include oversight by the transitional military authority but must include a relatively
safe environment in which a tolerable level of instability can be mitigated. Transformation ends with the host
nation capable of conducting good governance with minimal assistance, acceptance by the local population,
and prepared for long-term development.
8-98. The BCT supports governance during transformation by advising, assisting, supporting, and
monitoring other actors. During this phase, BCT commanders and subordinate commanders and leaders
continue to build constructive relationships even through changes in unit or organizational leaderships in
efforts to progress the stability principles of unity of effort, legitimate and host nation ownership, and building
partner capacity.
8-99. The BCT commander, subordinate leaders, and unified action partners advise civil servants during
administrative actions. They continue to conduct engagements within their area of operations and assess
actors’ agendas or intentions through operations ensuringunity of effort. BCT subordinate units interact with
multiple host-nation actors helping them coordinate efforts more effectively.
8-100. Legitimate and host nation ownership must retain support of the local population. The BCT conducts
operations to build the local population’s perception that the local government and unified action partners
are capable, willing, and progressing towards mitigating sources of instability with little assistance if not
independently. The local population must be convinced that the BCT and host nation can sustain this
achievement for the duration and not become unstable or corrupt.
8-101. The BCT commander builds partner capacity by leveraging unified action partners providing for
government needs and demonstrating the host-nation’s government legitimacy and capability. The BCT
commander and staff identify gaps in capability to address sources of instability gained through information
collection and engagements with the local government. The BCT shares this information between the local
population and government leveraging unified action partners resources to build capacity mitigating
instability where capability did not previously exist. See an example of building partner capacity on
page8-20. |
3-96 | 324 | Chapter 8
A patrol identifies two villages that are in contention with one another because of a lack of water.
One has an abundance of water due to building a levee and the other does not. The patrol shares
this information to the company commander. The company commander engages the local
government leader about the issue and the local leader does not have the capability to solve the
problem. The company commander engages the battalion commander and staff who arranges an
engagement with the provincial reconstruction team and unified action partners. An engineer from
the provincial reconstruction team coordinates with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and local
regional development planners discover that they can provide water to the other village by digging
wells that access underground water sources. The provincial reconstruction team provides a
proposal for a contract to the company commander and local government leaders. The local
government leader reaches a decision to commission a contract to build wells. While the wells are
being built, the levee must be lowered to allow some water to flow downstream for certain periods
of time. In return, both villages provide labor to the project equally. The company commander
coordinates with the provincial reconstruction team, sends patrols with a qualified COR and
ensures fulfillment of the contract terms. The BCT commander and staff, and subordinate units
conduct information operations to show a partnership with the host nation.
8-102. The BCT supports good governance by ensuring that local governments adhere to the rule of law
and to the law established by the higher level of government. The incoming legitimate authority, with the
population’s support, establishes (or re-establishes) and supports the rule of law during the transformation
phase. The BCT commander and subordinate leaders must be familiar with the current state of the rule of
law to ensure their partnered elements support the rule of law and act accordingly. Operations conducted
during this phase support the messages and themes that support the rule of law as well as reports of violations
of the law by actors and how the government acts consistently with the rule of law in addressing violations
of the law.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
8-103. The fostering sustainability phase begins with the host nation capable of conducting good
governance with minimal assistance, accepted by the local population, and prepared for long-term
development. This phase ends with the complete withdrawal of BCTs interacting with local government on
a routine basis. The BCT support to governance during fostering sustainability oversees transfer
responsibility of governance to an enduring host nation authority.
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT
8-104. The BCT assists host-nation actors to begin the process of achieving sustainable economic
development by establishing a safe and secure environment. Other U.S. Government agencies,
intergovernmental organizations, and civilian relief agencies often have the best qualifications to lead efforts
to restore and help develop host-nation economic capabilities. Ultimately, the goal is to establish conditions
so that the host nation can generate its own revenues and not rely upon outside aid. The desired end state is
for the host nation to achieve a robust, entrepreneurial, and sustainable economy. All economic development
actions build upon and enhance host nation economic and management capacity. (See ATP 3-07.5 for
additional information.) Support to economic and infrastructure development subtasks include—
(cid:122) Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
(cid:122) Support monetary institutions and programs.
(cid:122) Support national treasury operations.
(cid:122) Support public sector investment programs.
(cid:122) Support private sector development.
(cid:122) Protect natural resources and environment.
(cid:122) Support agricultural development programs.
(cid:122) Restoretransportation infrastructure. |
3-96 | 325 | Stability
(cid:122) Restore telecommunications infrastructure.
(cid:122) Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
8-105. The BCT’s support to economic and infrastructure development varies over the range of military
operations and area of operations but the principles of conflict transformation, unity of effort, legitimacy and
host nation ownership, and building partner capacity are enduring throughout all phases.
INITIAL RESPONSE
8-106. The BCT supports economic and infrastructure development at the local level during the initial
response phase by establishing areas of operation, and task organizing and empowering its subordinate units
by allowing them to coordinate with unified action partners. The BCT synchronizes efforts regionally and
shifts assets and resources as main efforts change or as opportunity to exploit the initiative arise. The building
blocks for broad national recovery and development are set at the local-level and the BCT’s information
collection effort should focus on identifying microeconomic information such as changes in cost of a
commodity, number of unemployed males 15 to 45 years of age, changes in costs of services such as medical
treatment, and so forth. Although the BCT maintains responsibility for security, secondary efforts will include
facilitating the emergence of employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy,
stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through microeconomics, and supporting the restoration of
physical infrastructure to help retain and exploit the initiative.
8-107. The BCT may have to take the lead in responding to immediate economic needs, including assessing
the critical micro-and macro-economic conditions, during the initial response phase. These economic needs
include ensuring host-nation civilians can bring agricultural products and other goods to safe and secure
marketplaces, generating jobs that can be filled with qualified laborers, and others. Unity of effort is essential
for the BCT to identify and engage all relevant actors from the host nation, U.S. civil agencies, and
international organizations. These evolving partnerships and assessments will significantly enhance the
economic development management transition tasks from the BCT to the U.S. Government civil agencies
and host-nation actors. Hostile individuals and groups can take advantage of gaps if the actors do not engage,
and exploit opportunities for profit, contributing to long-term instability.
8-108. Infrastructure reconnaissance is a multidiscipline variant of reconnaissance to collect detailed
technical information on various categories of the public systems, services, and facilities of a country or
region. The infrastructure reconnaissance develops the situational understanding of the local capability to
support the infrastructure requirements of the local populace or military operations within a specific area.
Infrastructure reconnaissance is accomplished in stages: the infrastructure assessment and the infrastructure
survey. (See ATP 3-34.81 for additional information.)
8-109. Coordinating with the combat engineer units for an on-site visit, an engineer reconnaissance team
can be expected to conduct the initial assessment with available expertise from the supported unit. The initial
assessment provides information to confirm or deny planning assumptions, update running estimates/staff
estimates, determine immediate needs, develop priorities, obtain resources, and refine a plan. As operations
continue, general engineer and other supporting technical support elements provide teams that are qualified
to perform an infrastructure survey. These infrastructure survey teams use the infrastructure assessments
from the engineer reconnaissance teams to prioritize categories and identify those parts of the infrastructure
to be reassessed in more detail. Technical capabilities required to perform a comprehensive reconnaissance
include robust support from joint Service, multiagency, contractor, host nation, multinational, and reachback
elements.
TRANSFORMATION
8-110. The goal of the transformation phase is to establish firmly the foundation for sustainable economic
development and to begin to transition control of economic development to U.S. Government civil agencies,
international civil agencies, and host nation economic officials and entrepreneurs. The collective emphasis is
on establishing host nation institutions providing sustainable economic growth during this phase. Once a
civilian administration assumes control, the primary economic development role of the BCT is to advise and
assist local leaders. |
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FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
8-111. In fostering sustainability, the goal is to institutionalize a long-term sustainable economic
development program and to transition control of the economy completely to host-nation officials,
entrepreneurs, and civil society. This phase also includes steps that build on and reinforce the successes of
the initial response and transformation phases. Steps taken during this phase support sustainable economic
growth based on a healthy society supported by healthy communities and neighborhoods. The primary
economic development role for the BCT is to continue to advise and assist host-nation civilian economic
officials.
CONDUCT SECURITY COOPERATION
8-112. Security cooperationis all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments
to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner
nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United
States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). Security
cooperation provides the means to build partner capacity and achieve strategic objectives. These objectives
include—
(cid:122) Building defensive and security relationships that promotes specific U.S. security interests.
(cid:122) Developing capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
(cid:122) Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to increase situational
understanding of an operational environment.
8-113. Army forces support the objectives of the combatant commander’s campaign plan in accordance
with appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities. The plan supports those objectives through
security cooperation, specifically those involving SFA (see FM 3-22) and foreign internal defense (see
ATP3-05.2). Security force assistanceis the Department of Defense activities that support the development
of the capacity and capabilityof foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20).Foreign
internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action
programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats toits security (JP 3-22).
8-114. SFA and foreign internal defense professionalize and develop security partner capacity to enable
synchronized sustaining operations. Army security cooperation interactions enable other interorganizational
efforts to build partnercapacity. Army forces—including special operations forces—advise, assist, train, and
equip partner units to develop unit and individual proficiency in security operations. The institutional Army
advises and trains partner Army activities to build institutional capacity for professional education, force
generation, and force sustainment. (See FM 3-22 for additional information on support to security
cooperation.)
Notes. SFABs provide SFA to host-nation FSF. The SFAB provides organic forces to form the
basisfor the SFAB mission to support FSF. Within the SFAB, the company team is the foundation
for the SFAB’s mission and augmented with additional personnel and assets to accomplish the
mission. (See ATP 3-96.1 for information on the SFAB.)
On occasion, the BCT as a whole or selected unit(s) of the BCT may support SFA activities,
including potentially supporting multiple FSF organizations in or external to the BCT’s area of
operations. Additionally, these FSF organizations may each report through different host-nation
government channels and even to different ministries. To synchronize efforts in this case, U.S.
forces must achieve unity of effort. Similarly, each of the FSF organizational commanders should
synchronize their efforts with the host-nation government representatives, as appropriate. (See
ATP3-21.20 for an example task organization, used for discussion purposes, for an Infantry
battalion supporting multiple SFA activities.) |
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8-115. The stability operations task of establishing security cooperation may include the BCT or selected
subordinate unit(s), depending on the missions assigned, conducting SFA as a subset of security cooperation.
SFA offers a means of support for security cooperation activities in support of building capacity of an FSF.
As soon as the FSF can perform this task, the BCT or selected unit transitions this task within civil security
to the host nation.
INITIAL RESPONSE
8-116. As the initial response phase normally occurs during or immediately after a conflict where the
operational environment prevents civilian personnel from operating effectively. The operational environment
is typified as nonpermissive. The objective of this phase is to improve the security situation, reducing the
threat to the populace and creating the conditions that allow civilian personnel to safely operate. SFA in the
initial response phase is normally required when FSF lack the capability or capacity to provide the required
level of security. This phase often requires SFA efforts to help generate and train or assist new and existing
FSF. This phase may require a combination of the types of SFA and considerable support, sustainment, and
medical resources. BCT activities during the initial response may have to be conducted with multinational
combat operations to consolidate gains, to include providing a safe, secure environment for the local
populace. SFA efforts during this phase focus on improving the FSF capability and capacity so all security
forces—U.S., other, and FSF—provide a secure environment and reduce the threat. Assecurity conditions
improve, transition to the transformation phase begins.
TRANSFORMATION
8-117. In the transformation phase, SFA activities seek to assist FSF to stabilize the operational
environment in a crisis or vulnerable state. The operational environment in this phase is more permissive
than the initial response phase; however, military forces will often be required to provide security to some
actors. Activities in this phase normally include a broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization,
and capacity-building efforts, which the embedded provincial reconstruction team is essential for long-term
success. Objectives in this phase include continuing efforts to improve the security situation, reducing the
threat to the populace, building host-nation capacity across the stability sectors, and facilitating the
comprehensive approach to assist FSF.
8-118. The transformation phase represents a broad range of SFA activities to support FSF. The initial
response phase differs from the transformation phase in the FSF capability to provide for a safe and secure
environment. More specifically, FSF may have a level of proficiency to no longer need a permanent United
States and FSF relationship for tactical operations. However, they may still need full-time advisors and
support, sustainment, and medical assistance. Embedded provincial reconstruction team members will
continue to play a vital role in assisting governance and development efforts throughout this phase. SFA end
state for this phase seeks to establish conditions so the host nation’s security sector can provide a secure
environment with its own security forces.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY
8-119. In this phase, the focus of SFA continues to shift toward assisting institutions required to sustain
FSF. This phase encompasses long-term efforts to assist FSF. FSF conduct independent operations and can
provide a safe, secure internal environment. While SFA activities may be initially required during this phase,
activities reduce as FSF become more capable and viable. The determination for the BCT to receive a change
of mission from SFA is based on the policy and conditions of the operational environment. Provincial
reconstruction teams and other forces may remain to support a theater security cooperation plan.
SECTION IV – AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS
8-120. The BCT engaged in area security operations is typically organized in a manner that emphasizes its
mobility, lethality, and communications capability. Population-centric area security operations, for example
to consolidate gains, are common across the range of military operations, but is almost a fixture during the
conduct of stability-focused operations. Population-centric operational area security operations typically
combine aspects of the area defense and offensive operations (for example, search and attack, cordon and |
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search, raid, and ambush) to eliminate the efficacy of internal defense threats. During the conduct of area
security operations, the BCT commander and staff must understand the relationship with host-nation
authorities and the civilian population. A clear understanding of the commander’s authority is essential in
exercising that degree of control necessary to ensure security and safety to all military forces and the civilian
population located within the BCT’s areaof operations.
OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW
8-121. Area security operations protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within an area of
operations. During the conduct of stability-focused operations, area security operations establish and
maintain the conditions for stability in an unstable area before or during hostilities, or enduring peace and
stability after open hostilities cease. Area security operations are often an effective method of providing civil
security and civil control and supporting security cooperation during operations focused on stability. For
example, an area security operation may have to be designed around numerous political constraints. This
may include aligning unit areas of operation with the host nation’s existing political boundaries. Security
objectives, regardless of which element of decisive action (offense, defense, or stability) currently dominates,
ensure freedom of action over a prolonged period in consonance with the BCT commander’s concepts of
operations and intent. (See ATP 3-91 for additional information.)
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
8-122. Civil considerations reflect the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and
attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within the operational
environment on the conduct of military operations. Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations
within thecharacteristicsof areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events(ASCOPE). (See
ATP 2-01.3 for additional information on these characteristics.)
8-123. Since civilians are normally present in operations with a dominant stability component, the BCT
normally restrains its use of force when conducting area security operations. However, the commander
remains responsible for protecting the force and considers this responsibility when considering rules of
engagement. Restrictions on conducting operations and using force must be clearly explained and understood
by everyone. Subordinate commanders and leaders, and Soldiers must understand that their actions, no matter
how minor, may have far-reaching positive or negative effects. Subordinate commanders and leaders, and
Soldiers must realize that media (either hostile or neutral) and adversaries can quickly exploit their actions,
especially the way they treat the civilian population.
AREA SECURITY
8-124. Area security, a security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and
actions within a specific area, takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units,
regardless of their location in the area of operations. Local security includes any local measure taken by units
against enemy actions. Local security, dependent upon the situation, may involve avoiding enemy detection
or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. Local security may include finding any enemy
forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible. Local
security prevents a unit from being surprised and is an important part of maintaining the initiative during area
security.
8-125. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of any area security mission. Units
use both passive and active measures to provide local security. Passive local security measures include using
camouflage, movement control, noise and light discipline, operations security, and proper communications
procedures. Measures also include employing available sensors, night-vision devices, and daylight sights to
maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit. Active measures, dependent upon the
situation, may include—
(cid:122) Using observation posts, combat outposts, combat patrols, and reconnaissance and surveillance
patrols.
(cid:122) Establishing specific levels of alert based on the mission variables of METT-TC. |
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(cid:122) Establishing stand-to times. (Unit standard operating procedures [SOPs] detail activities during
the conduct of stand-to.)
LOCAL SECURITY
8-126. Local security is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the
enemy (ADP 3-90). Area security activities take advantage of the local security measures performed by all
units (regardless of their location) in an area of operations, and all local security activities should be linked
to the broader area security activities. Local security is closely associated with unit protection efforts (see
ADP 3-37). Local securityincludes local measures that prevent or interdict enemy efforts. Local security is
an enduring priority of work, is essential to maintaining initiative, and prevents units from being surprised.
Local security involves avoiding detection and deceiving the enemy about friendly actions, positions, and
intentions. Local security includes finding any enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much
about their positions and intentions as possible.
8-127. Local security can be part of the sustaining base or part of the area infrastructure. Local security
protection ranges from echelon headquarters to reserve and sustainment forces using active and passive
measures to provide local security. Active patrolling, unit SOPs, and continuous reconnaissance are active
measures that help provide local security. Passive measures include using camouflage, movement control,
noise and light discipline, proper communications procedures, ground sensors, night vision devices, and
daylight sights.
ECONOMY-OF-FORCEMISSIONS
8-128. The BCT, charged with execution, conducts an area security operation as an economy-of-force
mission. Area security missions are numerous, complex, and generally never ending. For this reason, the
commander and staff synchronize and integrate security efforts, focusing on protected forces, installations,
routes, and actions within the BCT’s assigned area of operations. Protected forces within the BCT range from
subordinate units and elements, echeloned command posts (CPs), and sustainment elements within the BCT’s
support area or consolidation area (when established). Protected installations can be part of the sustainment
base, or they can constitute part of the area’s civilian infrastructure within a consolidation area. Protected
ground lines of communication include the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of
tactical and support area movement within the BCT’s area of operations, for example a consolidation area.
Actions range from securing key points (bridges and defiles) and terrain features (ridgelines and hills) to
large civilian population centers and their adjacent areas.
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES
8-129. During the conduct of stability-focused tasks, area security missions are a mixture of offensive and
defensive activities involving not only subordinate battalions, companies, and platoons, but also those
host-nation security forces over which the BCT has a command relationship such as operational control
(OPCON), or can otherwise influence. Offensive area security activities include subordinate tasks of
movement to contact [search and attack (see ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.10) or cordon and search (see
ATP3-21.20 and ATP3-21.10) missions] and combat patrols (see ATP 3-21.8), when required, designed to
ambush detected enemy forces or to conduct raids within the BCT’s area of operations. Defensive area
security activities include the establishment of base perimeter security (see ATP 3-21.20, appendix I); combat
outposts and observation posts (see ATP 3-21.20); moving and stationary screen and guard missions, and
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance missions (see ATP 3-20.96 and ATP 3-20.97).
8-130. During offensive or defensive-focused tasks, area security operations are often designed to ensure
the continued conduct of sustainment operations to support decisive and shaping operations by generating
and maintaining combat power. Area security operations may be the predominant method of protecting
support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources
required to sustain, enable, and control forces. (See chapter 9for additional information.) |
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READINESS
8-131. During area security operations, forces must retain readiness over longer periods without contact
with the enemy. This occurs most often when the enemy commander knows that enemy forces or insurgents
are seriously overmatched in available combat power. In this situation, the enemy commander normally tries
to avoid engaging friendly forces unless it is on terms favorable to the enemy. Favorable terms include the
use of mines and booby traps. Area security forces must not develop a false sense of security, even if the
enemy appears to have ceased operations in the secured area. The commander must assume that the enemy
is observing friendly operations and is seeking routines, weak points, and lax security for the opportunity to
strike with minimum risk. This requires commanders at each echelon to influence subordinate small-unit
leaders to maintain the vigilance and discipline of their Soldiers to preclude this opportunity from developing.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8-132. During area security operations planning, the commander apportions combat power and dedicates
assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the operational environment, the likelihood of
threat action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on an initial assessment of
the operational environment, the commander task organizes subordinate units and elements and assigns
security areas within the BCT’s area of operations. Although all resources have value, the mission variables
of METT-TC make some resources, assets, or locations more significant to successful mission
accomplishment from enemy or adversary and friendly perspectives. Throughout the operations process the
commander relies on the risk management (RM) process and other specific assessmentmethods to facilitate
decision-making, issue guidance, and allocate resources (see chapter 4). Criticality, vulnerability, and
recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that
become the subject of the commander’s guidance and the focus of area security operations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
8-133. During area security operations, the BCT commander devotes considerable time and energy to the
problems of coordination and cooperation due to the joint, interagency, and multinational nature of
stability-focused tasks. The BCT plans and conducts area security operations in concert with partner
participants towards a unified effort, often as a supporting organization rather than the lead organization. The
commander uses liaisons to enable unity of effort between partner elements and the coordination centers
established by the division or higher commander.
Interagency and Multinational Organizations
8-134. One factor that distinguishes the conduct of stability-focused tasks from the conduct of
offensive-and defensive-focused tasks is the requirement for interagency coordination at battalion level and
below. During area security operations with interagency partners, the commander has inherent
responsibilities. These responsibilities include the requirement to clarify the mission; to determine the
controlling legal and policy authorities; and to task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations
and individuals for whom the BCT provides the interagency effort. The commander also ensures seamless
termination of the mission under conditions that ensure the identified objectives are met and can be sustained
after the operation.
8-135. When operating inside or with multinational organizations, the BCT commander and subordinate
commanders and leaders should expect to integrate foreign units down to the company level. SFA activities
within an area security mission require carefully selected and properly trained and experienced personnel (as
trainers or advisors) who are not only subject matter experts, but also have the sociocultural understanding,
language skills, and seasoned maturity to more effectively relate to and train FSF. Additionally, commanders
and subordinate leaders within the brigade support area (BSA) and battalion trains with the fact that they will
routinely interact with multinational partners during other area security missions. SOPs at subordinate
echelons will require modification to incorporate multinational small units that do not have compatible
communications and information systems. |
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Desired End State
8-136. The BCT commander’s definition of the desired end state is a required input to area security
operations. While end state is normally described as a stable, safe, and secure environment during
stability-focused operations, this description is not sufficient. Initial MOEs and MOPs quantifying that
environment are determined during the planning process. (See chapter 3 for additional information.)
Measures of effectiveness and performance are important in stability-focused area security operations since
traditional combat measures, such as territory gained, enemy personnel killed or captured, and enemy combat
vehicles destroyed or captured do not apply. The commander also ensures the desired end state reflects the
prolonged time-period associated with many stability-focused area security operations.
8-137. Achieving the desired end state requires a knowledge of operational design (see chapter 4), the
ability to achieve unity of effort, and a thorough depth of cultural awareness (see chapter 2) relating to the
BCT’s area of operations. Through economy of forces, the commander identifies a finite amount of available
combat powerto apply against the essential tasks associated with a given area security operation. Identifying
essential tasks lays the foundation for the success of area security operations that represent the future stability
of a state. Decisions about use of combatpower are more than a factor of the size of the force deployed, its
relative composition, and the anticipated nature and duration of the mission. Assuring the long-term stability
depends on applying unity of effort to the tasks that are, in fact, essential.
Information Operations
8-138. The final success or failure of the BCT’s area security operation rests with the perceptions of the
inhabitants within and external to the BCT’s area of operations and goes beyond defeating the enemy.
Securing the trust and confidence of the civilian population is the chief aim of information operations, which
integrates and synchronizes information-related capabilities to generate effects in the information
environment necessary to influence enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly audiences.
8-139. Information operations synchronization of information-related capabilities promotes the legitimacy
of the mission and reduces bias, ignorance, and confusion by persuading, educating, coordinating, or
influencing targeted audiences. Further, it promotes—through Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs
operations, and PSYOP, among other information-related capabilities—interaction at all echelons with these
audiences so these target audiences understand the objectives and motives of BCT and that of higher
headquarters, and the scope and duration of area security actions. Combined with broad efforts to build
partner capacity, for example, SFA (see section V). Information operations are essential to achieving decisive
results: a stable host-nation government and peaceful civilian population.
8-140. The BCT information operations officer or noncommissioned officer coordinates with the division
(or higher) information operations officer to synchronize information-related capabilities into the BCT’s
information operations planning. Synchronization requires the BCT information operations officer (in
coordination with the electromagnetic warfare officer [EWO]) to participate in targeting within the fire
support cell as well as the various working groups and meetings chaired by the current and future operations
and other integrating cells within the BCT. Participation allows for the development of a holistic
understanding of the information environment within the problem sets facing the BCT staff. A staff-wide
understanding helps synchronize the information-operations related planning and targeting and allows for
shifts in priorities. This synchronization, in coordination with the information operations and civil-military
operations managed at the BCT or division enables united action partners to be incorporated into planning.
Note. Within the BCT, the information operations officer is responsible for synchronizing and
deconflicting information-related capabilities employed in support of BCT operations. The BCT
information operations officer synchronizes capabilities within subordinate maneuver battalions
and squadron, and subordinate companies and troops that communicate information to audiences
and affect information content and flow of enemy or adversary decision-making while protecting
friendly information flow. The information operations officer prepares appendix 15 and a portion
of appendixes 12, 13, and 14 to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order. (See chapter 3 and
FM 3-13 for additional information.) |
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8-141. Within the security environment, enemies, adversaries, and other organizations use propaganda and
disinformation against the commander’s efforts to influence various civilian populations within and external
(area of interest) to the BCT’s area of operations. The BCT’s public affairs staff officer, in coordination with
the division public affairs officer works closely with the intelligence staff officer to be proactive, rather than
reactive, to such attacks. A coordinated information operations plan informs and counters the effects of
propaganda and misinformation. The plan (generally developed at BCT level in coordination with the
division information operations officer and public affairs officer) establishes mechanisms, such as a media
center or editorial board, to educate and inform local and international media, which in turn, informs the
public, with accurate and timely information. Additionally, civil affairs operations and PSYOPare integrated
into counterpropaganda efforts at the BCT level through the division, or higher headquarters’ information
operations working group.
8-142. When needed, the BCT chaplain can play an important role in bridging gaps with religious leaders
that set conditions for future successful key leader engagements and civil affairs operations. During planning,
the chaplain advises the commander concerning matters of religion, culture, and religious key leaders in the
area of operations and area of interest. The chaplain and religious affairs noncommissioned officer provide
important,up-to-date perspectives concerning local, provincial, and national atmospherics not often included
or clear in other sources. Their efforts should always be coordinated with the BCT information operations
officer and BCT information operations working group (see FM 3-13), when established.
8-143. Without a detailed Soldier and leader engagement plan, different units and staff elements meet with
and engage local leadership with different desired end states thereby undermining the ability of any or all
forces to build capacity and work towards transition to host nation lead. Coordination between staff elements
or units within the BCT, when working with the same host nation individual or office, enables unity of effort
and the desired end state for the BCT’s area security operation. The creation of a detailed engagement plan
includes identifying differences between provinces or localities within the province and sets out the
objectives to reach the desired end state. Host nation leaders in a city, district or provincehave face-to-face
meetings with these leaders to advance the creation and building of host nation capacities.
8-144. Soldier and leader engagements have a significant impact on the human component during all
operations that occur among the people. Human beings capture information and form perceptions based on
inputs received through all the senses. Humans see actions and hear words. Humans compare gestures and
expressions with the spoken word. Humans weigh the messages presented to them by the Soldiers and leaders
of the BCT, and other sources with the conditions that surround them. When the local and national news
media are unavailable or unreliable, people turn to alternative sources, such as the internet—where
information flows freely at unimaginable speeds—or rumor and gossip. Perception equals truth to people
lacking objective sources of information. Altering perceptions requires shaping information through
engagements according to how people absorb and interpret information, molding the message for broad
appeal and acceptance.
8-145. Operations security is as important during the conduct of stability-focused operations as it is during
the conduct of offensive- and defensive-focused operations. Operations security contributes to the BCT’s
ability to achieve surprise during area security missions, thus enabling its chances for success. Within the
BCT area of operations, human adversaries/enemies monitor the BCT’s normal activities to detect variations
in activity patterns that forecast future operations. They monitor the conversations of Soldiers both on duty
and off duty to gain information and intelligence. Adversaries/enemies monitor commercial internet activity
and phone calls from BCT operational and recreation facilities. They will look at trash created by BCT
activities. The absence of operations security about BCT activities contributes to excessive friendly casualties
and possible mission failure in area security operations just like it does in combat operations. The BCT’s
information superiority hinges in no small part on effective operations security; therefore, measures to protect
essential element of friendly information (EEFI) cannot be an afterthought. (See FM 3-13 and ATP3-13.1
for additional information.) |
3-96 | 333 | Stability
Note. The need to maintain transparency of the BCT’s intentions during area security operations
is a factor when balancing operations security with information release. Release authority for
information—to include foreign disclosure rules—must be fully understood by commanders and
staffs within the BCT. The public affairs and information operations officers (see FM 3-61 and
FM 3-13, respectively) lead the coordination and synchronization processes within the BCT.
Release authority for information rests with the commander at the appropriate level.
8-146. Multinational staffs result in additional security problems. Each nation has different access to U.S.
information systems. Maintaining operations security with multinational staff members is difficult and
sometimes the security rules restrict the ability of multinational partner staff officers to contribute. The chief
of staff and foreign disclosure officer at division level develop workarounds when required. One such
workaround is to provide the multinational staff officer a U.S. assistant to get on a U.S. securedinformation
system to ensure the multinational staff officer has the information needed to contribute. The division
assistant chief of staff, signal establishes and maintains two separate sets of different information systems
when this occurs. (See ATP 3-91 and ATP 6-02.75 for additional information.)
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
8-147. During the conduct of stability-focused operations, the BCT plans its area security movement and
maneuver simultaneously with offensive and defensive movement and maneuver, though with an extensive
emphasis on security and engagement skills (negotiation, rapport building, cultural awareness, and critical
language phrases). Movement and maneuver within the BCT area of operations is normally decentralized to
the battalion and company. Through economy of force, the BCT commander determines the right mix of
forces to quickly transition between operations as the situation requires. During area security operations, the
commander plans for future movement within the BCT’s area of operations and as required, in adjacent areas
of operation. The BCT’s lethal capabilities make the execution of area security operations possible even if
the probability of combat is remote. When new requirements develop the BCT commander plans for the
shifting of priorities when the need arises.
Fire and Movement
8-148. The application of fire and movement lends itself to several offensive and defensive operations (for
example,search and attack, cordon and search, and area defense) within the civil security and civil control
stability operations tasks. Across the range of military operations, the BCT and its subordinate units play a
major role in ensuring the outcome of these stability operations tasks. The BCT and its subordinate units are
useful in the conduct of other stability operations tasks (for example,security cooperation) because of their
deterrence value and the flexibility and labor the BCT provides to the division or higher-level commander.
Mobility and Countermobility
8-149. Mobility (see chapter 6) and countermobility (see chapter 7) operations are key enablers to area
security operations. In stability focused area security operations, mobility operations allow civilian traffic
and commerce to continue or resume. Resuming normal civilian activities in the BCT’s area of operations is
an important objective within stability focused area security operations. Countermobility operations
indirectly support stability focused area security operations in regard to offensive and defensive operations.
8-150. Mobility operations focus on keeping ground lines of communications open for both civilian and
military activities and on reducing the threat of mines and other unexploded ordnance to the same. During
area security operations, the commander and staff develop the countermobility plan concurrently with the
fire support plan and defensive scheme of maneuver, guided by the commander’s intent. When combat
engineer support falls under the mobility and countermobility tasks, it can include—
(cid:122) Constructing combat roads and trails.
(cid:122) Breaching existing obstacles (including minefields).
(cid:122) Marking minefields, including minefield fence maintenance.
(cid:122) Clearing mines and debris from roads. |
3-96 | 334 | Chapter 8
(cid:122) Conducting route reconnaissance to support the main supply routes and civilian lines of
communications.
(cid:122) Creating obstacles between opposing factions to prevent easy movement between their positions.
8-151. The BCT employs roadblocks not only to restrict traffic for security purposes, but also to control the
movement of critical cargo. Cargo could be generators designed to restore electric power in a large area or
items that support the population and resources within the BCT’s area of operations.
Occupy an Area
8-152. Planning for the occupation of an area or relief in place begins before the BCT deploys or when
being relieved, redeploys. Planning includes not only BCT forces and their activities, but also other
governmental agencies, multinational partners, host-nation agencies, and potential international
organizations. The mission variables of METT-TC determine the occupation or relief in place that occurs.
Sometimes occupation, much like occupying an initial area of operations,is appropriate. This can occur when
the BCT’s stability-focused area security operation occurs within limited intervention or peace operations. A
relief in place may be appropriate during the conduct of an area defense (see chapter 7). However, a
stability-focused area security transition by function may be more effective if the relief in place takes place
withhost-nation military forces and civil authorities within the range of military operations. Some of these
functions include medical and engineer services, local security, communications, and sustainment. BCT plans
do not remove a provided capability from the area of operations until the replacement capability is operating.
Surveillance Systems and Reconnaissance and Security Forces
8-153. In restrictive (as well as unrestrictive) terrain, the commander relies on manned and unmanned
surveillance systems and reconnaissance and security forces to collect information within the BCT’s area of
operations. Operation of ground and aerial surveillance systems in restricted terrain is often affected by
interrupted line-of-sight, and extreme climate and weather variations. In restrictive terrain, reconnaissance
and security forces within the BCT’s area of operations focus on these areas to assist in collection when
manned and unmanned surveillance capabilities are degraded. Using a combat outpost, a reinforced
observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations, is a technique for employing
reconnaissance and security forces in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted reconnaissance and security
forces from covering the assigned area. While the mission variables of METT-TC determine the size,
location, and number of combat outposts a unit establishes, a reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat
outpost. (See chapter 7 and ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.) A combat outpost must have sufficient
resources to accomplish its designated missions, such as conducting aggressive combat patrolling and
reconnaissance patrolling. Combat outposts are established when observation posts (see chapter 5 for
information on observation post activities) are threatened by insurgency or in danger of being attacked by
enemy forces infiltrating into and through the BCT’s assignedarea of operations.
Note. During the conduct of defensive-focused operations, the commander uses a combat outpost
to extend the depth of the security area, to keep friendly forward observation posts in place until
they can observe the enemy’s main body, or to secure friendly forward observation posts that will
be encircled by enemy forces. Mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts. (See
chapter 7 for additional information.)
Army Aviation
8-154. Army aviation attack and reconnaissance units with manned and unmanned systems—when
deployed early with initial response forces—can be a significant deterrent on the indigenous combatants,
particularly if factions or insurgences are not yet organized during the initial response phase. Attack and
reconnaissance helicopters may be employed to act as a response force against enemy threats. Along with
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), attack and reconnaissance helicopters may conduct reconnaissance,
surveillance, or security over wide areas and provide the BCT a means for visual route reconnaissance and
early warning. Utility helicopters provide an excellent command and control capability to support stability
focused area security operations and to transport patrols or security elements throughout the BCT’s area of |
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operations. Cargo helicopters provide the capable to move large numbers of military and civilian security
force personnel and to conduct resupply when surface transportation is unavailable, or routes become
impassable.
Note. BCT plans include measures for the effective use of all resources, to include, exploiting
airpower for transportation and resupply over extended distances and, where appropriate, tightly
controlled close air support.
Reserve and Response Force Operations
8-155. Maintaining a reserve during any operation is difficult. Often, the commander finds that the BCT
has more tasks than units to do, and stability focused area security operations are no exception. Nonetheless,
contingencies or missions may arise that require establishing a reserve. Maintaining a reserve allows the
establishing commander to plan for worst-case scenarios and to exploit opportunities, provide flexibility, and
conserve the force during long-term operations.
8-156. The response force differs from a reserve in that it is not in support of a particular engagement. A
response force is a dedicated force on a base with adequate tactical mobility and fire support designated to
defeat Level I and Level II threats and shape Level III threats until a tactical combat force can defeat them
or other available response forces. The response force answers to the establishing headquarters. (See
ATP3-91.) Considerations when establishing a response force include—
(cid:122) Threats.
(cid:122) Communication equipment and procedures.
(cid:122) Alert procedures.
(cid:122) Transportation.
(cid:122) Training priorities.
8-157. To counter an indirect fire threat, the commander employs counterfire radars throughout and area of
operations to locate hostile indirect fire systems. The use of quick reactionary forces, attack helicopter, or
local friendly forces are ideal for response to counterfire radar acquisitions as clearance of fire procedures
are often time-consuming and not necessarily reliable when determining locations for host-nation forces.
Additionally, indiscriminate use of indirect fire on counterfire radar acquisitions can lead to unwanted
collateral damage.
INTELLIGENCE
8-158. The conduct of stability focused tasks demands greater attention to civilian considerations—the
political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an assigned area of operations—than does the conduct of
conventional offensive and defensive focused tasks. Using the mission variable of civil considerations and
its subordinate characteristics identified by the mnemonic ASCOPE, the BCT staff has a standardized
baseline for analysis to generate understanding. This baseline is augmented by analyses conducted byorganic
and attached forces such as social-cultural analysis, target audience analyses, intelligence analyses,
population, and area studies. During area security operations, the commander expands the IPB process
beyond geographical and force capability considerations. (See ATP 2-01.3 for additional information on IPB
for stability missions.)
Information Collection
8-159. Information collection, specifically plan requirements and assess collection, enables relevant,
predictive, and tailored intelligence within an area of operations. (See ATP 2-01 for additional information
on the specific functions for stability missions.) Intelligence cells and knowledge management elements
within the BCT and division (or higher) headquarters and battalion and squadron headquarters develop
procedures to share collected intelligence data and products, both vertically and horizontally, throughout the
force. (See ATP 2-19.4 for additional information on intelligence techniques for stability missions.) |
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Understanding
8-160. Area security operations require the integration of the division and BCT’s information collection
effort to develop a clear understanding of all potential threats and the populace. Success in the stability
environment requires a cultural understanding to gauge the reaction of the civilian population within and
external to the BCT’s area of operations to a particular COA conducted, to avoid misunderstandings, and to
improve the effectiveness of the execution of that COA by the BCT or division. Changes in the behavior of
the populace may suggest needed change in tactics, techniques, or procedures or even strategy. Biographic
information, leadership analysis, and methods of operation within the existing cultural matrix are keys to
understanding the attitudes and ability of positional and reference civilian leaders to favorably or unfavorably
influence the outcome of BCT area security operations.
Indicators of Change
8-161. During area security operations, the commander and staff tie priority intelligence requirements to
identifiable indicators of change within the operational environment, to include, civil inhabitants and their
cultures, politics, crime, religion, economics, and related factors and any variances within affected groups of
people. The commander often focuses on named areasof interest in an effort to answer critical information
requirements to aid in tactical decision-making and to confirm or deny threat intentions regardless of which
element of decisive action currently dominates. During area security operations, priority intelligence
requirements related to identifying enemy and adversary activities are tracked,where appropriate.
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
8-162. Due to the increased reliance on human intelligence (HUMINT), when conducting area security
operations, the commander emphasizes the importance of commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs) to all personnel within the BCT. CCIRs are information requirements identified by the commander
as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making, and answers to CCIRs can come from staff at all
levels. All personnel must be given appropriate guidance to improve information-gathering capabilities
throughout the BCT. Interpreters, speaking to local civilian personnel, security operations, and patrolling
(combat and reconnaissance) are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military
capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance who or are otherwise a party to the area security
operation. (See ADP 5-0 and ATP 3-55.4 for additional information.)
8-163. Planners at the division and BCT ensure that any HUMINT assets assigned from outside the BCT
are employed effectively, which is typically accomplished by integrating HUMINT collectors at the lowest
level possible. The gaining unit accounts for HUMINT asset security and establishes tasking priorities and
command relationships for temporary and long-term commitments. (See FM 2-22.3 for additional
information.)
Note. Medical personnel must know the Geneva Convention restrictions against medical personnel
collecting information of intelligence value except that observed incidentally while accomplishing
their humanitarian duties.
Employment and Control of Human Intelligence Collection Teams
8-164. Human intelligenceis the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information
from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics,
equipment, and capabilities (ADP 2-0). Commanders consider security when planning for the employment
of HUMINT collection teams. (See FM 2-0.) Generally, three security conditions exist: permissive, uncertain,
and hostile. |
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Note. The success of the HUMINT collection effort depends on a complex interrelationship
between command and control elements, requirements, technical control, technical support, and
collection assets. Each echelon of command has its supporting HUMINT elements to conduct
sustained HUMINT operations under all operational environments using only its organic
HUMINT assets. HUMINT units have specific support requirements to each echelon’s
commander though HUMINT units must be flexible, versatile, and prepared to conduct HUMINT
collection and analysis operations in support of any echelon of command. A coherent command
and control structure within these HUMINT organizations is necessary in order to ensure
successful, disciplined, and legal HUMINT operations. This structure is part of a coherent
architecture that includes organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national (for
example, the Defense Intelligence Agency), theater, and non-Department of Defense HUMINT
organizations. The corps, joint, division, and brigade and below intelligence staff officer is the
primary advisor on HUMINT and counterintelligence within this structure, and is the focal point
for all HUMINT and counterintelligence activities within a joint task force, an Army component
task force or a BCT. The intelligence staff officer can be organic to the unit staff or can be attached
or under OPCON to the staff from another organization such as the theater military intelligence
brigade. (See FM 2-22.3 for additional information.)
Permissive Environment
8-165. In a permissive environment, HUMINT collection teams normally travel throughout the area of
operations without escorts or a security element. HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct contact
with overt sources, view the activity, or visit the area that is the subject of the information collection effort.
They normally use debriefing and elicitation as their primary collection techniques to obtain firsthand
information from local civilians and officials.
Uncertain Environment
8-166. In an uncertain environment, security considerations increase, but risk to the collector is weighed
against the potential intelligence gain. An uncertainenvironment limits use of controlled sources and requires
additional resources. HUMINT collection teams should still be used throughout the area of operations but
normally are integrated into other ground reconnaissance or other missions. For example, a HUMINT
collector may accompany a patrol visiting a village. Security for the team and their sources is a prime
consideration. HUMINT collection teams are careful not to establish a fixed pattern of activity or arrange
contacts in a manner that could compromise the source or the collector. Debriefing and elicitation are still
the primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct collection at checkpoints,
dislocated civilian collection points, and detainee collection points. They may conduct interrogations of
detainees within the limits of applicable laws and policies.
Note.The word “detainee” includes any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control
of Department of Defense personnel. This does not include Department of Defense personnel or
Department of Defense contractor personnel or other persons being held primarily for law
enforcement purposes except where the United States is the occupying power. As a matter of
policy, all detainees will be treated as an enemy prisonerof war until the appropriate legal status
is determined and granted by competent authority in accordance with the criteria enumerated in
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). Detainees include
enemy prisoners of war, retained persons, civilian internees, and detained persons. Detaining
officials must recognize that detainees to include those who have not satisfied the applicable
criteria in the GPW are still entitled to humane treatment. The inhumane treatment of detainees is
prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or deep provocation (see JP 3-63). |
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Hostile Environment
8-167. In a hostile environment, three concerns for HUMINT collection are access to the sources of
information, timeliness of reporting, and security for the HUMINT collectors. A hostile environment requires
significant resource commitments to conduct controlled source operations. Prior to the entry of a force into
a hostile area, HUMINT collectors may be used to debrief civilians, particularly dislocated civilians, and to
interrogate other detainees who have been in the area. HUMINT collection teams are normally located with
the friendly units to facilitate timely collection and reporting. HUMINT collectors accompany the BCT lead
elements or ground reconnaissance and security forces during operations. They interrogate detainees and
debrief dislocated civilians and friendly force patrols.
Security Missions
8-168. Due to the possibility of tying forces to fixed installations or sites, security missions may become
defensive in nature. When this occurs the BCT commander carefully balances with the need for offensive
action. Early warning of enemy activity through information collection is paramount in the conduct of area
security missions to provide the commander with time to react to any threat or other type change identified
within the stability environment. The BCT’s IPB identifies the factors effecting security missions within the
assigned area of operations. Factors, although not inclusive, include—
(cid:122) The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
(cid:122) The existing roads and waterways for military lines of communication and civilian commerce.
(cid:122) The control of land and water areas and avenues of approach surrounding the area security.
(cid:122) The airspace management.
(cid:122) The proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power generation plants, and civic buildings.
FIRES
8-169. The conduct of fires in support of stability-focused tasks is essentially the same as for offensive-and
defensive-focused tasks. However, constraint is vital in the conduct of fires during stability-focused tasks.
Such constraint typically concerns the munitions employed and the targets engaged to obtain desired effects.
Constraint increases the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially damaging the legitimacy
of an opponent.
Employment of Fires
8-170. Employment of fires provides continuous deterrents to hostile action and are a destructive force
multiplier for the commander, regardless of which element of decisive action currently dominates. Within
stability-focused tasks, the planning and delivering of fires precludes fires on protected targets, unwanted
collateral damage, and the political ramifications of perceived excessive fire. In addition to lethal effects, the
targeting functions ofthe BCT fire support cell includes nonlethal effects input to the information collection
plan and the targeting working groups at the division and BCT headquarters (see chapter 4 for targeting
functions within the BCT fire support cell).
8-171. During the employment of fires, the commander having the ability to employ a weapon does not
mean it should be employed. In addition to collateral damage considerations, the employment of fires could
have second and third order negative effects. Collateral damage could adversely affect efforts to gain or
maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-and long-term goals. For example, excessive
force can antagonize those friendly and neutral parties involved. The use of nonlethal capabilities should be
considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force to avoid unnecessarily raising the level
of conflict. Key considerations for employment of fires in support of stability-focused tasks include—
(cid:122) Stability-focused tasks conducted in noncontiguous areas of operation complicate the use of fire
support coordination measures, the ability to mass and shift fires, and clearance of fires
procedures.
(cid:122) Key terrain may be based more on political, cultural or social considerations than physical features
of the landscape; fires may be used more frequently to defend key sites than to seize them. |
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(cid:122) Rules of engagement are often more restrictive than in combat operations; commander’s guidance
for fires requires careful consideration during development and wide dissemination to all levels.
(cid:122) Precision-guided munitions or employment of nonlethal capabilities may be necessary to limit
collateral damage.
(cid:122) Fires that may be used to demonstrate capabilities, as a demonstration (see chapter 6), or during a
denial operation (see chapter 7).
Note. Mortars at the BCT and below, due to their smaller bursting radius, reduce collateral
damage. Mortars are generally more responsive to the small-unit operations common to area
security missions. In addition to lethal fires, mortars may provide illumination to demonstrate
deterrent capability, observe contested areas, or support area security missions (including
patrolling [reconnaissance and combat]).
Application of Lethal and Nonlethal Capabilities
8-172. Though highly effective for their intended purpose, lethal capabilities may not always be suitable.
For example, during stability-focused tasks, the application of lethal fires is normally greatly restricted,
making the use of nonlethal capabilities the dominant feasible option. The considerations for use of nonlethal
capabilities in targeting should not pertain to only specific phases or missions but should be integrated
throughout the area of operations. Escalation of force measures can be established in order to identify hostile
intent and deter potential threats at checkpoints, entry control points and in convoys. Such measures remain
distinct from other use of force guidance such as fire support coordination measures and are intended to
protect the force, minimize the use of force against civilians while not interfering with self-defense if attacked
by adversaries. One of the primary mechanisms for employing nonlethal capabilities and generating nonlethal
effects is information operations. Participating in the targeting process, information operations synchronizes
a range of nonlethal capabilities to produce nonlethal effects that advance the desired end state. Thus,
information operations participate in the targeting process.
Fire Support Coordination Measures
8-173. As during offensive-and defensive-focused tasks, fire support coordination measures are established
for stability-focused tasks to facilitate the attack of high-payoff targets (HPTs) throughout the area of
operations. Restrictive fire support coordination measures are those that provide safeguards for friendly
forces and noncombatants, facilities, or terrain. For example, no-fire area, restrictive fire areas, restricted
target lists, restrictive fire lines, and fire support coordination lines may be used not only to protect forces,
but also to protect populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance.
Regardless of which element of decisive action currently dominates, coordination measures are required to
coordinate ongoing activities to create desiredeffects and avoid undesired effects.
Note.Fire support coordination, planning, and clearance demands special arrangements with joint
and multinational forces and local authorities. These arrangements include communications and
language requirements, liaison personnel, and procedures focused on interoperability. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreements provide excellent examples of
coordinated fire support arrangements. These arrangements provide participants with common
terminology and procedures.
SUSTAINMENT
8-174. The BCT commander’s responsibilities during area security include support areas and extend to
self-protection of BCT assets operating outside of the BCT echelon support areas. Forces engaged in area
security operations protect the force, installation, route, area, or asset. Area security operations are often
designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations to support decisive and shaping
operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Area security operations may be the predominant
method of protecting echelon support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and |
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protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. (See chapter 4 for additional
information.)
PROTECTION
8-175. BCT activities associated with executing security operations (see FM 3-90-2), physical security (see
ATP3-39.32), antiterrorism (see ATP 3-37.2), and operations security (see FM 3-13) tasks enhance the
security of the command within an areaof operations. In large part, the measures within these four tasks are
the same or complementary. Stability-focused operations closely resemble BCT activities for these tasks
during the conduct of offensive- and defensive-focused operations though the BCT generally works closer
with civilian inhabitants. (See ATP 3-91 for additional information.)
Establish and Maintain Security
8-176. The BCT conducts security operations to ensure freedom of movement and action and to deny the
enemy the ability to disrupt operations. Commanders combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations
tasks, and information collection means to protect friendly forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities
critical to mission accomplishment. The BCT integrates with partner military, law enforcement, and civil
capabilities to establish and maintain security. The ability to establish control is critical to consolidating gains
in the wake of successful military operations.
8-177. Security operations prevent surprise, reduce uncertainty, and provide early warning of enemy
operations. Warning of enemy operations provides forces with time and maneuver space with which to react
and develop the situation. Security operations prevent enemies from discovering the friendly plan and protect
the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security elements focus on preventing the enemy from gathering
EEFI. Security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts. When successful,
security operations allow the BCT to maintain the initiative within the stability environment.
8-178. Protection is a continuous activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure
routes, and protect forces. Effective physical security and antiterrorism measures, like any stability measure,
overlap and are employ in-depth. For example, planners determine how military police support enhances unit
physical security and antiterrorism capabilities by performing area security operations inside and outside an
echelon support area or consolidation area. Military police also conduct response force operations to defeat
LevelII threats against bases or critical assets and delay Level III threats in an echelon support area until a
tactical combat force can respond. (See ATP 3-39.11 for information on military police special reaction
teams.)
8-179. The BCT commander pays attention to physical security and antiterrorism operations throughout the
stability environment. This is especially true when subordinate units conduct noncontiguous operations, as
the success of the BCT mission may depend on protecting support areas from enemy attacks. The
commanders must address the early detection and immediate destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack
support or consolidation areas. Enemy attacks against sustainment and other facilities can range in size from
individual saboteurs to enemy airborne or air assault insertions targeted against key military and civilian
facilities and capabilities. These enemy activities, especially at smaller unit levels, may even precede the
onset of large-scale combat and be almost indistinguishable from terrorist acts. The BCT implements
operations security and other information protection measures to deny the enemy force information about
friendly dispositions.
Note. Within the stability environment, deploying battalions and higher echelons should have a
trained Level II antiterrorism officer assigned. An assigned antiterrorism officer works to ensure
that security considerations are integrated in base designs and unit operations. These individuals
guide their units in conducting threat assessment, criticality assessments, and vulnerability
analysis to determine each unit’s vulnerability to terrorism. (See ATP 3-91 and ATP3-37.2 for
additional information.) |
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Assessments to Support Protection Prioritization
8-180. Initial protection planning by the BCT commander and staff requires various assessments to
establish protection priorities. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These
assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected given no constraints and which assets can
be protected with available resources. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all
assets the same level of protection. For this reason, the commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and
provides guidance to the staff so that they can employ protection capabilities based on protection priorities.
8-181. Protection planning is a continuous process that includes an understanding of the threats and hazards
that may impact operations throughout the BCT’s area of operations. Protection capabilities are aligned to
protect critical assets and mitigate effects from threats and hazards. The protection cell prioritizes the
protection of critical assets that best supports the commander’s end state. Protection prioritization lists are
organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The commander’s priorities and intent and the
impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. Critical assets can be people, property, equipment,
activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities
and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while
reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might
be identified as critical to the execution of BCT operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The
lack of a replacement may cause a critical asset to become a top priority for protection.
Protection Template
8-182. The protection template lists and integrates all protection tasks in an appropriate way for use by
subordinate units, and any base and base cluster operations envisioned to be established during the BCT’s or
subordinate battalion or squadron’s area security operation. The protection cell when established within the
BCT operations staff officer (S-3) section augments the staff with a small protection planning cell that
maintains and publishes the template in coordination with the division protection cell. The template is used
as a reference before or during employment. Battalion/squadron and base/base cluster situational
modifications to this template, and their regular rehearsal of all parts of protection plans are inspected
periodically by the BCT protection working group. During inspections, the protection working group
identifies weak areas in subordinate protection plans, ensures that area of operations protection best practices
are incorporated into the plans of the BCT, and provides protection-related observations, insights, and lessons
learned to subordinate units, and any unit relieving the BCT or subordinate unit within its area of operations.
Note. When a protection cell officer or noncommissioned officer is not designated within or
attached to a battalion/squadron, protection cell functions and tasks are the responsibility of the
battalion/squadron operations officer or noncommissioned officer. Key protection tasks conducted
within the BCT’s area security operation include area security, chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) operations, coordinating air and missile defense, personnel recovery,
explosive ordnance disposal, and detainee operations. (See ATP 3-91 for additional information
on integrating and synchronizing protection tasks.)
Protective Services
8-183. The commander may determine that it is necessary (or be required) to provide protective services
from within the BCT to protect high-value host nation civil and military authorities or other selected
individual(s). This requirement usually occurs when host-nation security forces have been so extensively
penetrated by hostile elements that they cannot be trusted to provide protective services or when host-nation
security forces lack the technical skills and capabilities to provide the desired degree of protection. The
element(s) tasked to perform protective services for designated personnel receives as much training and
specialized equipment as is possible before the mission. (See ATP 3-39.35 for additional information.) |
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Allocation of Combat Power
8-184. Protection of installations or areas of operation (including route and convoy security) by the BCT
require significant allocation of combat power when a threat beyond organized crime exists. Conducting
resupply from one base to another is treated as a tactical action and tracked in the BCT main CP current
operations cell. When the BCT establishes a response force(s), care is taken so that the response force does
not establish patterns when responding to incidents. Establishment of patterns-same route, same movement
formation, configuration and order of vehicles, and same response force responding from the same
base-allows an enemy to ambush the response force at a point of its choosing.
Note. Dependent on the situation, host-nation security forces are involved as much as possible in
the performance of the above protection tasks. Host-nation support is important in the variety of
services and facilities that can support security and protection assets within the BCT’s area of
operations. Services provided by the host nation can relieve the BCT of the need to provide
equivalent capabilities thereby reducing the BCT’s sustainment and protection footprint. Key
criteria in the decision-making process to utilize host-nation support is the trust in host-nation to
provide the support and that host-nation forces have the technical skills and capabilities to provide
the desired degree of protection.
Threat Levels
8-185. Threats within the BCT’s area security operation are categorized by the three levels of defense
required to counter them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the BCT’s area of operations.
Emphasis on base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. Within the
BCT’s area of operations all elements protect themselves from Level I threats. This includes medical
elements although they have reduced defensive capabilities since they can only use their nonmedical
personnel to provide their own local security. Locating medical elements and other support elements on bases
with other units mitigate this factor.
8-186. The BCT commander positions response forces to respond to a Level II threat (enemy force or
activities that can be defeated when augmented by a response force) in appreciation of time-distance factors
so that no element is left outside supporting distance from a response force. The commander integrates fire
support assets into the composition of the response because of the speed at which these assets can react over
the extensive distances involved in area security operations. Where possible, host-nation security assets
constitute part of the response to smooth the interactions of these forces with the civilian population.
Note. A Level III threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of any
local reserve or response force. The response to a Level III threat is a tactical combat force,
generally established no lower than division level due to the inability to resource at lower echelons.
(See chapter 9for additional information on threat levels.)
Survivability
8-187. Precautions should be taken to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities, and
accommodations including the construction of obstacles, protective bunkers, fighting positions, and shelters.
BCT subordinate units practice alert procedures and develop drills to occupy positions. Engineer forces
enable, when available, survivability needs. Units maintain proper camouflage and concealment based on the
mission variables of METT-TC. Area security forces are vulnerable to personnel security risks from local
employees and other personnel subject to bribes, threats, or compromise. The threat from local criminal
elements is a constant threat and protection consideration. The most proactive measure for survivability is
individual awareness by Soldiers in all circumstances. Soldiers look for things out of place and patterns
preceding aggression. Commanders and subordinate leaders ensure Soldiers remain alert, do not establish
routines, and maintain appearance and bearing. (See chapter 7 and ATP 3-37.34 for additional information.) |
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Notes.In stability-focused operations, the enemy sniper poses a significant threat to dismounted
(or mounted) movement and marches. Counter-sniper drills should include rehearsed responses,
reconnaissance and security operations, and the incorporation of cover and concealment. The
BCT’s rules of engagement provide instructions on how to react to sniper fire, including
restrictions on weapons used dependingon the circumstances. For example, rules of engagement
may allow units to use weapon systems, such as a sniper rifle team, to eliminate a positively
identified sniper even in a crowded urban setting because of the reduce possibility for collateral
damage.(See ATP 3-21.20, appendixE and ATP 3-21.18 for additional information.)
An enemy improvised explosive device (IED) attack is another major threat to dismounted (or
mounted) movement and marches. Prior to the conduct of any area security mission, commanders
and subordinate leaders’ brief personnel on the latest IED threat types, usage, and previous
emplacements within an area of operations or along mounted and dismounted movement or march
routes. All Soldiers maintain situational awareness by looking for IEDs and IED hiding places.
Units vary routes and times, enter overpasses on one side of the road and exit out the other, train
weapons on overpasses as the movement passes under, and avoid chokepoints to reduce risk. Units
should expect an IED attack at any time during movements and expect an ambush immediately
after an IED detonation. Early mornings and periods of reduced visibility are especially dangerous
since the enemy has better opportunities to emplace IEDs without detection. (See ATP3-21.18
and ATP 3-21.8 for additional information.)
Air and Missile Defense
8-188. Offensive and defensive air defense planning considerations continue to apply when the BCT
conducts stability-focused operations. However, the air threat trends toward Group 1 and 2 UASs (see
ATP3-04.64) employed by enemy forces opposing the BCT’s effort to provide a stable, safe, and secure
environment. Air and missile defense sensors and command and control elements external to the BCT provide
early warning against aerial attack, and populatethe BCT’s COP. Soldiers train in aircraft recognition and
on rules of engagement due to multiple factions using the same or similar aircraft, to include international
and private organizations employing their own or charter civilian aircraft. (See ATP 3-01.8 for additional
information.)
Note.See ATP 3-01.15 for information on the tactics, techniques, and procedures for an integrated
air defense system. See ATP 3-01.50 for information on the operations of the air defense and
airspace management cell established within the BCT fire support cell. (See chapter 4 for
additional information.)
8-189. Counterrocket, artillery, and mortar batteries may be located in or near the BCT’s area of operations
to support its area security mission. Battery sensors detect incoming rockets, artillery, and mortar shells and
may be used to detect Group 1 and 2 UASs. The battery’s fire control system predicts the flight path of
incoming rockets and shells, prioritizes targets, and activates the supported area of operations’ warning
system according to established rules of engagement. Exposed elements within the area of operations then
can take cover and provide cueing data that allows the battery’s weapon system to defeat the target before
the target can impact the area. The commander clearly defines command and support relationships between
counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar elements and the BCT during planning. (See ATP 3-01.60 for additional
information.)
8-190. The BCT commander and subordinate commanders and leaders ensure all passive and active air
defense measures (see chapter 6) are well planned and implemented. Passive measures include use of
concealed routes and assembly areas, movement on secure routes, marches at night, increased intervals
between elements of the columns, and dispersion. Active measures include use of organic and attached
weapons according to the operation order and unit SOP. Air guard duties assigned to specific Soldiers during
dismounted (or mounted) movements and marches give each a specific search area. For movements and
marches, seeing the enemy first gives the unit time to react. Leaders understand that scanning for long periods |
3-96 | 344 | Chapter 8
decreases the Soldier’s ability to identify enemy aircraft. During extended or long movements and marches,
Soldiers are assigned air guard duties in shifts. (See ATP 3-21.18 and ATP 3-21.8 for additional information.)
Force Health Protection
8-191. The nature of area security in support of stability-focused tasks requires the BCT surgeon to stress
planning for the provision of preventive medicine, veterinary services, and combat and operational stress
control over that inherent in supporting offensive- and defensive-focused tasks. The BCT’s area security
mission focused within the conduct of stability-focused tasks interacts with the civilian population of its area
of operations to a far greater degree. Under these conditions, the probability of Soldiers exposure to zoonotic
diseases, toxic industrial chemicals and other pollutants, and bad food and water increases. The prolonged
tours of duty typically associated with these operations and the enemy’s use of unconventional weapons,
such as mines and suicide bombers, tends to increase psychiatric casualties. The BCT surgeon coordinates
the employment of combat stress teams with the chaplain to best meet the needs of BCT Soldiers for stress
control. (See ATP 3-91 and ATP 4-02.8 for additional information.)
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations
8-192. CBRN operations are the employment of capabilities that assess, protect against, and mitigate the
entire range of CBRN incidents to enable freedom of action. CBRN operations support operational and
strategic objectives to counter WMD and operate safely in a CBRN environment. An effective CBRN defense
by the BCT counters enemy threats and attacks and the presence of toxic industrial materials in its area of
operations by minimizing vulnerabilities, protecting friendly forces, and maintaining an operational tempo
that complicates enemy or terrorist targeting.
8-193. The BCT employs key CBRN passive defense activities organized within two overarching CBRN
principles (protection and contamination mitigation, see figure 7-3 on page 7-18) to survive and sustain area
security operations in a CBRN environment. The BCT commander and staff, in coordination with the division
or higher headquarters, integrate these principles regardless of the mission type.
8-194. The commander considersthe requirement for CBRN support if evidence exists that enemy forces
or terrorists have employed CBRN agents or have the potential for doing so. A mix of different CBRN units—
such as decontamination, hazard response, reconnaissance, and surveillance—are necessary to balance
capabilities. The CBRN staff officer at the BCT and battalion/squadron participates in the intelligence process
to advise the commander of commercial and toxic industrial materials in the local area. (See ATP 3-91 and
FM 3-11 for additional information.)
Convoy Security
8-195. Convoy security is a specialized kind of area security operations conducted to protect convoys. Units
conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to secure routes
continuously in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy or adversary ground action
directed against the convoy. The BCT may conduct convoy security operations in conjunction with route
security operations within its area of operations. Planning includes designating units for convoy security;
providing guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for units to provide for their own security during
convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Local or
theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive security and protection. (See ATP4-01.45
for additional information.)
PREPARATION
8-196. During preparation activities, the BCT continues to plan, train, organize, and equip for area security
missions within its area of operations. The conduct of preparation activities in support of stability-focused
tasks is essentially the same as for offensive- and defensive-focused tasks. (See ADP 5-0 for a complete
discussion.) However, factors that distinguish stability-focused tasks are the increased requirement for
interagency coordination at BCT level and below and the demands on the BCT and subordinate staffs to
perform tasks or functions outside their traditional scope of duties. The commander’s realignment of |
3-96 | 345 | Stability
organizations and functions during area security operations reflect carefully weighing and accepting risk (for
example,economy of force) to reflect the demands of the BCT’s area security mission.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
8-197. Stability-focused tasks within area security operations are more complex because they involve to a
greater extent unified action partners, sister services, and host-nation forces. BCT preparatory activities stress
clarity and transparency about the command relationship between the BCT and the other military service
components or agencies that operate in assigned or projected areas of operations. Though difficult, the BCT
commander strives to achieve unity of effort with unified action partners, spending a great deal of effort
during preparations to clarify the roles and functions of the various, often competing agencies.
Inherent Responsibilities
8-198. The BCT commander has inherent responsibilities—including the requirements to clarify the
mission; to determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; and to organize, direct, sustain, and care
for the organizations and individuals for whom they provide the effort in interagency and multinational
operations. The commander serves as the unit’s chief engager, responsible for informing and influencing
audiences inside and outside the organization. For example, the commander often integrates host-nation
security forces and interagency activities with subordinate battalion, companies and platoons and down to
the individual Soldier level forsupport units. With this in mind, obtaining the necessary numbers of scalable
communications packages and linguist to support the BCT’s planned operations and training are important
preparatory activities.
Continue to Coordinate and Conduct Liaison
8-199. Coordinating and conducting liaison ensures that subordinate commanders and leaders internal and
external to the BCT understand their unit’s role in upcoming operations, and that they are prepared to perform
that role. In addition to military forces, many civilian organizations may operate in the same area of
operations. Their presence can both affect and be affected by BCT operations. Continuous coordination and
liaison between the command and unified action partners helps to build unity of effort, especially with civilian
organizations because of the variety of external organizations and the inherent coordination challenges.
8-200. Available resources and the need for direct contact between sending and receiving headquarters
determine when to establish liaison. Establishing and maintaining liaison enables direct communications
between the sending and receiving units or headquarters beginning with planning and continue through
preparing and executing, or it may start (although not preferred) as late as execution. The BCT commander
and staff coordinate with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported units and civilian organizations.
Coordination includes but is not limited to the following:
(cid:122) Sending and receiving liaison teams.
(cid:122) Establishing communication links that ensure continuous contact during execution.
(cid:122) Exchanging SOPs.
(cid:122) Synchronizing security operations with reconnaissance plans to prevent breaks in coverage.
(cid:122) Facilitating civil-military coordination among those involved.
Continue to Build Partnerships andTeams
8-201. As part of the BCT’s coordination efforts, the commander may establish or utilize (from higher
echelon) special negotiation elements that move wherever they are needed to build partnerships or teams and
diffuse or negotiate confrontations within the BCT area of operations. Echeloned elements partner with
linguist support and personnel with the authority to negotiate on behalf of the appropriate level chain of
command. As the BCT and these elements conduct preparatory activities, subordinate units of the BCT
rehearse activities supporting these operations and when required ensures that these elements have access to
required transportation and communications assets. |
3-96 | 346 | Chapter 8
Initiate the Information Network
8-202. During preparation, the information network is tailored and engineered to meet the specific needs of
each operation and partnered participant. This includes not only communications, but also how the
commander expects information to move between and be available for subordinate commanders and leaders
and their units within an area of operations. During preparation, the staff and subordinate units prepare and
rehearse the information network supporting the plan. Network considerations include the following:
(cid:122) Management of available bandwidth.
(cid:122) Availability and location of data and information.
(cid:122) Positioning and structure of network assets.
(cid:122) Tracking status of key network systems.
(cid:122) Arraying sensors, weapons, and the information network to support the concept of operations.
Note. Defining the ground rules for sharing unclassified information between the BCT, other
military forces and foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and international
agencies according to higher commander policy is an important function of the division and BCT
knowledge management and foreign disclosure officers. The division assistant chief of staff, signal
and BCT signal staff officer (S-6) staff sections are responsible for disseminating and
implementing those ground rules to subordinate units of the BCT.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
8-203. Success in area security operations hinge on protecting the BCT forces within the area of operations
and their ability to act in support stability-focused tasks. The positioning and repositioning of forces address
the early detection and defeat of enemy forces attempting to operate within the BCT’s area of operations.
Enemy attacks within the BCT’s area security range from individual saboteurs and terrorist acts to enemy
insurgent operations.
Assign and Define Responsibility
8-204. During preparation activities, the commander assigns and defines responsibilities for the security of
units within the BCT’s area of operations or respective base or base cluster. Subordinate areas of operation
or base and base cluster commanders are responsible for the local security of their respective area or base
and base cluster. Individual area of operations and base commanders’ designate protection standards and
defensive readiness conditions (in coordination with the BCT’s security plan) for tenant units and units
transiting through their area or base. Commanders coordinate with the BCT main CP to mitigate the effects
of security operations on the primary functions of units located within the area of operations.
Degree of Risk
8-205. The degree of risk the BCT commander accepts within an area security operation, regarding the
enemy threat, invariably passes to the subordinate unit commander assigned the area security mission. For
example, the subordinate unit commander moves security forces to decrease the threat’s impact on logistics
and medical units to support the BCT’s continued operations at the anticipated level. When available and to
not divert any BCT assets from their primary area security missions, military police (see ATP 3-39.30) or
other available security force (possibly host nation) screen or guard friendly CP facilities and critical sites
from enemy observation or attack. Subordinate unit security plans, to protect CPs, critical sites, base, base
clusters, and security corridors, are rehearsed and inspectedby the commander. These plans address support
unit, site, and base and convoy defense against Level I threats. Plans also address response force operations
directed against Level II and Level III threats (see chapter 9 and ATP 3-91 for additional information on
threat levels). |
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