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3-96 | 449 | References
16 Cases of Mission Command. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2013. Available online at
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/Sixteen-
Cases-of-Mission-Command.pdf.
82d Airborne Division, After Action Report 82d Airborne, December 1944-February 1945(World War
II Operational Documents, Combined Arms Research Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth,
KS).
Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War.NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 2016.
Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951. U.S. Army History of the Korean War Series, volume 5.
Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. Available online at
https://history.army.mil/books/korea/ebb/fm.htm.
From Domination to Consolidation: at the Tactical Level in Future Large-Scale Combat Operations,
A U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press Book Published by the Army
University Press [2020] Series.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of July 27, 1929.Available online at
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/index.php.
Kasserine Pass Battles. Readings, volume I. United States Army Center of Military History, United
States Army. Available online at https://history.army.mil/books/Staff-
Rides/kasserine/kasserine.htm.
Military Review: Large-Scale Combat Operations Special Edition, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army
University Press. September –October 2018. Available online at
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-
Archives/September-October-2018/.
Operation Atlantic Resolve, Online at
https://www.eur.army.mil/Portals/19/Atlantic%20Resolve%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf?ver=jP-
mMtPdOc4kvb_8r_uGkA%3d%3d, 2 NOV 2020.
Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies of Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat
Operations, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press [2018] Series.
Strategic Landpower in Europe Special Study. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Available online at
http://call.army.mil.
The War in the Pacific, Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department
of the Army, 1948. Available online at https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-11-
1/CMH_Pub_5-11-1.pdf.
Urban Warfare-The 2008 Battle for Sadr City. Rand Research Brief, RAND Arroyo Center. Santa
Monica, CA: 2012. Available online at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2012/RAND_RB9652.pdf.
West Point Atlas of American Wars. United States Military Academy, Department of Military Art and
Engineering. New York: 1972.
UNITED STATES LAW
Most acts and public law are available at: https://uscode.house.gov/.
Title 10. United States Code. Armed Forces.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate websiteat
https://armypubs.army.mil/.DD forms are available on the Executive Services Directorate
websiteathttps://www.esd.whs.mil/dd/. |
3-96 | 450 | References
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DD Form 1380. Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card.(Available through normal supply
channels.)
DD Form 1972.Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. |
3-96 | 451 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
chemical, biological, counterattack. 6-199
A
radiological, and nuclear
countering weapons of mass
actions on contact. 5-47
defense. 7-80
destruction. 6-80
administrative movement. 6-41
chemical, biological,
counterreconnaissance. 5-4
adversary. 3-1 radiological, and nuclear
cover. 7-70, 5-84
air assault. 6-97, 4-320 environment. 7-79
covering force. 5-84
air assault operation. 6-98 civil considerations. 2-28
cross-domain fires. 2-62
air movements. 4-321 close area. 2-111
cueing. 5-65
airborne assault. 6-97 close combat. 2-97
cyberspace. 4-327
airborne operation. 6-98 collaborative planning. 4-140
cyberspace electronmagnetic
airspace management. 4-312 combat information. 2-95
activities. 4-326
all-source intelligence. 5-93 combat outpost. 7-107
cyberspace operations. 4-329
ambush. 6-198 combat power. 2-77
D
approach march. 6-44 combined arms. 2-88
data. 4-91
area defense. 7-109 command. 4-20
decision point. 4-80
area of influence. 2-105 command and control. 4-19
decision support matrix. 4-82
area of interest. 2-106 command and control system.
4-30 decision support template. 4-81
area of operations. 2-104
command and control decisive action. 1-1
area reconnaissance. 5-50
warfighting function. 2-80 decisive operation. 2-116
area security. 5-87
command post. 4-223 decisive point. 4-231
area support. 9-48
command post cell. 4-235 decisive terrain. 7-4
assault position. 6-123
commander's critical deep area. 2-110
assessment. 4-122 information requirement. 4-
defeat. 2-99
attack. 6-168 84
defeat mechanism. 4-50
attack position. 6-123 commander's intent. 4-66
defensive operation. 7-108
avenue of approach. 6-173 common operational picture. 2-
27 delay. 7-176
B
complex terrain. 1-1 deliberate operation. 2-93
backbrief. 4-1004-100
concealment. 7-70 demonstration. 6-200
battle drill. 4-103
concept of operations. 4-69 deployment. 2-141
battle handover line. 6-19
confirmation brief. 4-100 depth. 2-102
battle position. 7-100
consolidate gains. 2-53 destroy. 2-99
battle rhythm. 4-264
consolidation. 6-30 detachment left in contact. 7-
breakout. 7-47 187
consolidation area. 2-114
brigade support area. 9-178 direct fire. 2-99
contamination mitigation. 7-81
bypass criteria. 5-22 disengage. 5-21
contiguous area of operations.
C 7-99 disengagement line. 7-29
chemical biological, control. 4-23 disintegrate. 4-53
radiological, and nuclear control measures. 2-104 dislocate. 4-52
protection. 7-81 cordon and search. 6-167 division covering force. 5-85 |
3-96 | 452 | Index
double envelopment. 6-96 I mission. 4-65
dynamic targeting. 4-180 indicator. 4-135 mission statement. 4-65
E indirect fire. 2-99 mission variables. 2-13
echelon support. 9-146 infiltration. 6-106 mixing. 5-66
electromagnetic spectrum. 4- infiltration lane. 6-109 mobile defense. 7-174
328 information collection. 4-149 mobilization. 2-140
electromagnetic warfare. 4-335 information environment. 2-8 monitoring. 4-129
employment. 2-155 information operations. 2-79 movement. 2-89
end state. 4-67 information requirements. 1-10 movement and maneuver
warfighting function. 2-81
engagement area. 7-130 integration. 4-311
movement formation. 6-36
engagement criteria. 5-20 intelligence analysis. 4-250
movement to contact. 6-128
engagement priority. 7-135 intelligence operations. 5-90
multi-domain fires. 2-62
envelopment. 6-93 intelligence preparation of the
essential element of friendly battlefield. 4-146 mutualsupport. 2-86
information. 4-84 intelligence synchronization. 4- N
evaluating. 8-218, 4-131 250 named area of interest. 4-82
execution. 4-117 intelligence warfighting neutralize. 2-99
function. 2-82
execution matrix. 4-83 no-fire area. 6-124
interdiction. 4-319
exploitation. 6-204 noncontiguous area of
isolate. 4-54
operations. 7-99
F
K
feint. 6-201 O
key tasks. 4-67
financial management. 9-4 objective rally point. 6-123
key terrain. 1-28
fire support. 4-243 objectives. 4-64
fires. 4-107, 2-99 L offensive operations. 6-127
fires warfighting function. 2-83 large scale combat operations. operational approach. 4-49
2-60
fixing force. 7-174 operational environment. 2-7
large-scale ground combat
force projection. 2-129 operational framework. 2-102
operations. 2-61
force tailoring. 2-86 operational variables. 2-12
leadership. 2-78
foreign internal defense. 8-113 operations in depth. 7-12
Level I threat. 9-182
forward logistics element. 9- operations process. 2-101
Level II threat. 9-183
163
Level III threat. 9-184 P
forward passage of lines. 6-34
limit of advance. 6-126 parallel planning. 4-139
friendly force information
requirement. 4-84 line of contact. 6-125 passage of lines. 6-34
frontal assault. 6-113 line of departure. 6-125 penetration. 6-110
fusion. 5-95 local security. 8-126 personnel services. 9-5
logistics. 9-3 phases. 2-33
G
physical security. 6-73
governance. 8-91 M
planning. 4-46
graphic control measure. 6-115 main battle area. 7-117
planning horizon. 4-236
guard. 5-82 main command post. 4-228
position of relative advantage.
main effort. 2-127
H 2-120
massed fire. 1-28
hasty operation. 2-93 positive control. 6-20
measure of effectiveness. 4-
hazard. 2-15 preparation. 4-97
133
health services support. 9-6 priority intelligence
measure of performance. 4-
requirement. 4-84
high-payoff targets. 4-244 134
probable line of deployment. 6-
high-value targets. 4-244 meeting engagement. 6-129
126
human intelligence. 8-164 military decision-making
procedural control. 6-20
process. 4-57 |
3-96 | 453 | Index
protection warfighting function. S sustainment warfighting
2-85 function. 2-84
screen. 5-79
pursuit. 6-209
search and attack. 6-166 T
R security area. 5-78 tactical combat force. 9-184
radio silence. 4-357 security cooperation. 8-112 tactical command post. 4-230
raid. 6-202 security force assistance. 8- tactical mobility. 1-2
rally point. 6-123 113 tactical road march. 6-42
rearward passage of lines. 6- security operations. 5-70 target area of interest. 4-82
34 security sector reform. 8-9 target reference point. 7-136
reconnaissance. 5-31 shaping operation.2-117 targeting. 4-172
reconnaissance handover. 5- simultaneity. 2-74 task. 4-72
54
single envelopment. 6-95 task organization. 4-71, 2-86
reconnaissance handover line.
situational understanding. 4-88 task-organizing. 2-86
5-54
special reconnaissance. 5-53 tempo. 5-10
reconnaissance in force. 5-52
spoiling attack. 6-203 terrain management. 8-206
reconnaissance objective. 5-16
stability mechanism. 4-55 trigger line. 7-137
reconnaissance-pull. 5-56
stability operation. 8-47 troop movement. 6-40
reconnaissance-push. 5-57
staff section. 4-192 turning movement. 6-102
reconstitution. 2-162
striking force. 7-174
redeployment. 2-160 U
strong point. 7-104
redundancy. 5-67 unified action. 8-4
supplypoint distribution. 9-81
rehearsal. 4-99 unified action partners. 8-28
supporting distance. 2-87
relevant information. 2-13 unified land operations. 2-100
supporting effort. 2-128
relief in place. 7-48 unit distribution. 9-79
supporting range. 2-87
reorganizaiton. 6-30 unity of effort. 8-4
suppress. 2-99
reserve. 6-177
suppression. 2-99 W
retirement. 7-190
surveillance. 5-59 warfighting function. 2-77
retrograde. 7-175
survivability. 7-70 weapons of mass destruction.
risk management. 4-186 3-8
survivability operations. 7-70
route reconnaissance. 5-51 withdraw. 7-181
sustaining operation. 2-118
rule of law. 3-14 working group. 4-124
sustainment. 9-1
running estimate. 4-272
sustainment preparation.9-52 Z
zone reconnaissance. 5-49 |
3-96 | 455 | FM 3-96
19 January 2021
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2101404
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in |
3-57 | 1 | FM 3-57
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
JULY 2021
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-57, dated 17 April 2019. |
3-57 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate
(APD) site (https://armypaurbms.y.mil) and the Central Army |
3-57 | 5 | *FM 3-57
Field Manual Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-57
Washington, D.C., 28 July 2021
Civil Affairs Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE..............................................................................................................iv
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................v
Chapter 1 CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH OVERVIEW ............................................................. 1-1
Role .................................................................................................................... 1-1
Authorities ........................................................................................................... 1-2
Core Competencies ............................................................................................ 1-4
Civil Affairs Missions ........................................................................................... 1-6
Branch Characteristics ....................................................................................... 1-9
Branch Principles ................................................................................................ 1-9
Chapter 2 CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 2-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 2-1
The Civil Component .......................................................................................... 2-1
Core Competencies ............................................................................................ 2-3
Transitional Governance .................................................................................... 2-3
Civil Network Development and Engagement .................................................. 2-10
Civil Knowledge Integration .............................................................................. 2-16
Civil-Military Integration .................................................................................... 2-20
Chapter 3 UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 3-1
Civil Affairs Contribution to Operations .............................................................. 3-1
Army Strategic Roles .......................................................................................... 3-2
Transition Operations ......................................................................................... 3-4
Decisive Action ................................................................................................... 3-5
Populace and Resources Control ..................................................................... 3-12
Homeland Defense ........................................................................................... 3-17
The Extended Battlefield .................................................................................. 3-17
Competition Continuum .................................................................................... 3-19
Chapter 4 OPERATIONS STRUCTURE............................................................................. 4-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1
Civil Affairs Role in the Operations Process .......................................................... 4-1
Staff Integration .................................................................................................. 4-6
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-57 | 6 | Contents
Mission Variables .............................................................................................. 4-12
Operational Variables ....................................................................................... 4-12
Synthesizing Operational and Mission Variables .............................................. 4-12
Civil Information Collection Plan ....................................................................... 4-13
Area Studies ...................................................................................................... 4-13
Civil Affairs Assessments .................................................................................. 4-13
Running Estimate .............................................................................................. 4-14
Annexes ............................................................................................................ 4-16
Civil Affairs Role in Mission Command ............................................................. 4-17
Civil Affairs Role in the Warfighting Functions .................................................. 4-17
Civil Affairs Capability by Echelon .................................................................... 4-24
Chapter 5 UNIFIED ACTION ............................................................................................... 5-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 5-1
Interorganizational Cooperation .......................................................................... 5-1
Joint Operations .................................................................................................. 5-3
Civil-Military Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff ........................................... 5-4
Theater Civil Affairs Planning Team ................................................................... 5-5
Joint Task Force .................................................................................................. 5-6
Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations .............................................. 5-6
Civil-Military Operations Working Group ............................................................. 5-7
Joint Interagency Coordination Group ................................................................ 5-8
Civil-Military Engagement ................................................................................... 5-9
Interagency Coordination .................................................................................. 5-10
The Role of United States Embassies .............................................................. 5-13
Defense Support to Stabilization ....................................................................... 5-14
Appendix A HISTORY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS .......................................................................... A-1
Appendix B CIVIL AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT FUNCTION EXPERTISE ............................. B-1
Appendix C CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS ................................................... C-1
Appendix D CIVIL AFFAIRS GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES ....................................... D-1
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Introductory figure. Civil Affairs logic chart..........................................................................vi
Figure 1-1. Civil Affairs core competencies and missions ............................................... 1-5
Figure 2-1. Government function specialty areas and focus areas ................................. 2-5
Figure 2-2. Transitional governance across the competition continuum ......................... 2-6
Figure 2-3. Civil network development and engagement process ................................. 2-11
Figure 2-4. Achieving understanding ............................................................................. 2-17
Figure 2-5. Civil knowledge integration process ............................................................ 2-18
Figure 2-6. Notional Civil Affairs civil-military operations center configuration .............. 2-22 |
3-57 | 7 | Contents
Figure 3-1. Decisive action .............................................................................................. 3-6
Figure 3-2. Civil Affairs support to a corps offensive ..................................................... 3-11
Figure 4-1. Civil Affairs inputs and outputs in the military decision-making process ...... 4-2
Figure 4-2. Military decision-making process–running estimate sync chart .................. 4-15
Figure 4-3. Civil Affairs in the warfighting functions ...................................................... 4-18
Figure 4-4. Civil Affairs allocations and support functions ............................................ 4-25
Figure 4-5. Civil Affairs workload rule of allocation ....................................................... 4-27
Figure 5-1. International agreements according to
Department of Defense Issuance 5530.3 .................................................. 5-12
Figure 5-2. Components of foreign assistance .............................................................. 5-15
Figure 5-3. Security assistance and foreign internal defense ....................................... 5-19
Figure C-1. Civil Affairs operations in unconventional warfare ....................................... C-2
Figure D-1. Main and modifier icon and amplifier placement locations .......................... D-1
Figure D-2. Standard template point ............................................................................. D-17
Figure D-3. Standard area template .............................................................................. D-17
Tables
Introductory table. New and revised terms ....................................................................... viii
Table 4-1. Example of political, military, economic, social, information,
and infrastructure/areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,
people, and events analysis ....................................................................... 4-11
Table D-1. Description of main icon and amplifier fields for unit frames ......................... D-2
Table D-2. Civil Affairs command framed symbols ......................................................... D-4
Table D-3. Civil Affairs brigade framed symbols ............................................................. D-5
Table D-4. Civil Affairs battalion framed symbols ............................................................ D-6
Table D-5. Civil Affairs company framed symbols ........................................................... D-7
Table D-6. Civil Affairs headquarters elements framed symbols .................................... D-7
Table D-7. Civil Affairs team framed symbols ................................................................. D-8
Table D-8. Civil Affairs elements ..................................................................................... D-9
Table D-9. Organizations and individuals ...................................................................... D-12
Table D-10. Modifiers for individuals and organizations ............................................... D-13
Table D-11. Civilian installations ................................................................................... D-14
Table D-12. Civilian activities ........................................................................................ D-15
Table D-13. Amplifier descriptions for control measure symbols .................................. D-18
Table D-14. Civil network development symbols .......................................................... D-19
Table D-15. Civil reconnaissance symbols .................................................................... D-20
Table D-16. Civil engagement symbols ......................................................................... D-21 |
3-57 | 8 | Preface
FM 3-57 provides Army commanders with the information necessary for the integration of Civil Affairs forces
and capabilities, by echelon, in support of unified land operations. It also provides the doctrinal basis for the
conduct of Civil Affairs operations in support of unified action.
FM 3-57 clarifies the role of Civil Affairs forces in the execution of Civil Affairs operations with regard to the
missions, employment, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations of these forces. Civil Affairs forces
execute Civil Affairs operations in support of unified land operations in all theaters, at all echelons, across the
competition continuum to achieve unity of effort. A force multiplier for every commander, Civil Affairs forces are
one of the primary resources a commander has to assist in understanding and managing the complex and ever-
changing civil component of the operational environment. Civil Affairs forces are trained, organized, and equipped
to plan, execute, and assess Civil Affairs operations in support of Army and joint operations. Cultural orientation,
regional expertise, linguistic capabilities, advisory skills, civil network development expertise, and civilian-acquired
professional experience in common government functions distinguish Civil Affairs forces from other enablers.
This makes Civil Affairs forces essential to the success of all missions that occur near, among, or with civilian
populations, governments, or interorganizational partners.
The principal audience for FM 3-57 is the leadership of the Army, officers, and senior noncommissioned officers
who command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders of operations across the conflict
continuum. It is also an applicable reference for the civilian leadership of partner United States departments and
agencies.
This manual is written primarily to assist the Army component commands, Army corps, Army divisions, brigade
combat teams, maneuver enhancement brigades, theater special operations commands, and special operations task
forces with the integration of Civil Affairs operations in planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing unified
land operations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers
operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)
FM 3-57 uses joint terms, where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-57 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which FM 3-57 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text.
For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows
the definition.
FM 3-57 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (or Army National Guard of the United States),
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-57 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence,
USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610; by email to
[email protected]; or by submitting an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-57 | 9 | Introduction
The Army executes operations across multiple domains and in complex environments. One of the most
complex environments is the land domain—partially due to the societal systems (detailed in JP 3-57) woven
into the operational environment. The Army refers to these societal systems as operational variables. These
operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time. Disagreements, perceived grievances, and divergent cultural and political views
within these systems may contribute to instability and conflict among the indigenous populations and
institutions that can be exploited by our adversaries, or otherwise interfere with military operations.
Commanders require situational understanding that is as complete as possible to achieve their desired end
states. Propaganda, deception, disinformation, misinformation, and the ability of individuals and groups to
influence populations through technologies reflect the increasing speed of interaction. Leaders must consider
all factors that make up their operational environment—such as social factors that initiate and sustain conflict
and those existing capabilities within the resident population that can be leveraged or enhanced to create
stability and reduce conflict. Failure to consider these factors may lead to misunderstandings,
miscalculations, and faulty plans that do not address the desired end state and ultimately lead to strategic
failure. FM 3-57 describes the history, authorities, role, core competencies, missions, characteristics,
principles, and limitations of Army Civil Affairs forces in support of unified land operations.
Understanding the operational variables of the operational environment provides the basis for Civil Affairs
operations. The operational variables provide a means to develop a comprehensive understanding of an
operational environment, independent of threat or enemy activity. Information collection against each of the
operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment,
and time) inherently calls for collectors grounded in understanding the dynamics of civilian populations,
government institutions, and civil society organizations in the context of history, geography, and available
resources. Military operations require formations that—
* Understand baseline conditions in each of the operational variables.
* Engage the right sources of leadership and influence.
* Take actions to counter or change human perceptions and activities that do not align with mission
objectives.
* Influence and create changes in the operational variables that support operational end states and
goals.
Commanders engage with key leaders to mobilize populations to regain control of the civil component of the
operational environment. This facilitates a return to or achievement of a safe, secure, and stable environment.
Civil Affairs forces, under the authority of these commanders, provide a conditions-based capability that
focuses on the civil component to enhance situational understanding, address civil factors that empower
achievement of the military objective, and support unified action.
The Civil Affairs logic chart (introductory figure) depicts how Civil Affairs forces support the Army strategic
goals through the conduct of Civil Affairs operations. Through the engagement and development of civil
networks, Civil Affairs forces enable the operational goals of shape, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale
combat operations, and consolidate gains.
Civil Affairs operations are nested in unified land operations and executed through decisive action. The logic
chart shows how the developed civil knowledge is integrated into the operations processes to—
* Enable mission command.
* Increase situational understanding.
* Refine targeting and effects.
* Enable effective information operations.
* Enhance freedom of maneuver and preserve combat power.
* Achieve increased stability through consolidation of gains. |
3-57 | 10 | Introducti
Introductory figure. Civil Affairs logic chart |
3-57 | 11 | Introduction
This enhances Army commanders’ abilities to reach the ultimate goals of—
* Enabling mission command.
* Shaping the operational environment.
* Maintaining operating tempo.
* Preserving combat power.
* Consolidating gains.
* Creating effects in the civil component to support the four strategic roles of the Army, which are—
Shape operational environments.
Prevent conflict.
Prevail in large-scale combat operations.
Consolidate gains.
FM 3-57 provides Army Civil Affairs capstone doctrine as a foundation for employment of the force during
all phases of operations. FM 3-57 contains five chapters and four appendixes.
Chapter 1 highlights the roles, authorities core competencies, missions, characteristics, and principles of the
Civil Affairs branch.
Chapter 2 describes Civil Affairs operations, which establish and enhance shared understanding of the civil
component of the operational environment and create effects in military operations. The discussion details
the core competencies and missions executed within Civil Affairs operations that enable success across the
competition continuum.
Chapter 3 focuses on the four Army strategic roles and describes the contribution of Civil Affairs operations
to unified land operations within the framework of the four tasks of decisive action. This chapter also
describes the interactions between Civil Affairs forces and other organizations and operations in the multi-
domain extended battlefield. Finally, this chapter describes the Civil Affairs contribution to achieving
enduring objectives during competition through civil network development and enhanced governance.
Chapter 4 details the integration of Civil Affairs forces into the Army operations structure, the capabilities
of Civil Affairs forces by echelon, and the role of Civil Affairs task forces.
Chapter 5 outlines the role of Civil Affairs forces in integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing partners
and interorganizational elements to ensure unity of effort in support of joint forces in unified action.
Appendix A is a brief history of United States Army Civil Affairs forces, highlighting some critical events
during its continuous evolution.
Appendix B provides a description of the role Civil Affairs government function specialists and the
capabilities they provide in the provision of governmental sector expertise.
Appendix C describes the role of Civil Affairs forces in special operations and highlights the role of Civil
Affairs forces in unconventional warfare, direct action, counterterrorism, and countering weapons of mass
destruction.
Appendix D focuses on a variety of symbols and graphic control measures related to Civil Affairs and Civil
Affairs missions. |
3-57 | 12 | Introduction
FM 3-57 adds or revises the terms listed in the introductory table.
Introductory table. New and revised terms
Term Acronym Remarks
civil engagement CE Revised Army definition
civil knowledge integration CKI New Army term, definition, and acronym
civil-military integration CMI New Army term, definition, and acronym
civil network -- New Army term and definition
civil network analysis CNA New Army term, definition, and acronym
civil network development CND New Army term, definition, and acronym
civil network development and engagement CNDE New Army term, definition, and acronym
civil preparation of the battlefield CPB New Army term, definition, and acronym
support to civil administration SCA Revised Army definition
transitional governance TG New Army term, definition, and acronym |
3-57 | 13 | Chapter 1
Civil Affairs Branch Overview
…you will take every step in your power to preserve tranquility and order in the city and
give security to individuals of every class and description-restraining as far as possible,
till the restoration of civil government, every species of persecution, insult, or abuse, either
from the soldiery to the inhabitants or among each other.
General George Washington
19 June 1778
United States (U.S.) forces operate in all domains. The diversity of populations makes
the land domain most complex because of its intricate design, which includes cultures,
ethnicities, religion, and varied political settings. This complex design is described as
the civil component of the operational environment (OE). Civil Affairs (CA) forces are
the Army capability responsible for the analysis and evaluation and integration of all
civil considerations.
War is, and has always been, fought among populations. As such, no military efforts can
be divorced from those populations and the effects on those populations. From the early
days of U.S. military operations—beginning with the American Revolution and continuing
to present day—U.S. Soldiers have been charged with understanding, assisting, or
providing governance over indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) in peacetime, war,
and post-conflict environments. Following World War II, the U.S. military established
military governments in Korea, Japan, and Germany. More recently, CA forces supported
civil administrations in Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria by conducting a broad range
of Civil Affairs operations (CAO), supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) mission,
and meeting DOD component responsibilities to the civilian sector.
This chapter highlights the policy and directive authorities for CA. This chapter also
introduces new taxonomy to describe the role, core competencies, missions,
characteristics, and principles of the CA branch.
ROLE
1-1. The role of CA is to engage and leverage the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or
providing governance. CA forces accomplish this through the execution of the CA core competencies
throughout the range of military operations and across the competition continuum. These CA missions are
designed to provide and enable commanders with the capabilities to find, disrupt, and defeat threats within
the civil component. Threats in the civil component could be ineffective government, infrastructure
degradation, criminal threats, asymmetric threats, and other factors that lead to unstable environments.
Through CAO, CA forces enable mission command, increase situational understanding, preserve combat
power, and consolidate gains in support of the strategic objective of establishing a secure and stable OE that
is consistent with U.S. interests. CA forces are specifically organized, trained, and resourced to address the
civil environment and to integrate civil knowledge, resources, and considerations into decision making during
activities that span the competition continuum. |
3-57 | 14 | Chapter 1
AUTHORITIES
1-2. U.S. Army CA forces provide the only CAO capability to the Army and joint force. The following
policy directives establish the basis for the capabilities required of CA forces.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5100.01
1-3. DODD 5100.01 provides authority and guidance to the U.S. Army to “develop concepts, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, equip, and provide forces with expeditionary and
campaign qualities.” DODD 5100.01 also specifically states the following requirements for the Army:
* Organize, train, and equip forces to conduct support to civil authorities in the U.S. and abroad,
to include support for disaster relief, consequence management, mass migration, disease
eradication, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, critical infrastructure protection, and response to
terrorist attacks. The Army does this in coordination with the other military Services, combatant
commands, the National Guard, and United States government (USG) departments and agencies.
* Conduct CAO.
* Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government
pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.
1-4. DODD 5100.01 specifies that the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—in
coordination with the military Service chiefs—organize, train, equip, and provide special operations forces
(SOF), doctrine, procedures, and equipment for CAO.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 2000.13
1-5. DODD 2000.13 states that CAO includes DOD actions that—
* Coordinate military activities with other USG departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other
governments, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).
* Support stability operations (including activities that establish civil security), provide support to
governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and
establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can
be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.
* Provide assistance outside the range of military operations, when directed, to meet the life-
sustaining needs of the civilian population.
* Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian
authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DOD policies to advise or assist in
rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
* Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.
Note: DODD 2000.13 provides additional information on the DOD-directed requirements.
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
1-6. Title 10, United States Code (10 USC) directs Army forces to conduct prompt and sustained land
combat, combined with the Army’s operating concept, and unified land operations requirements.
Land operations, particularly large-scale combat operations, focus on destroying or dislocating enemy forces
or securing key land objectives that reduce the enemy’s ability to conduct operations. Five characteristics
distinguish land operations—
* Scope.
* Duration.
* Terrain.
* Permanence.
* Civilian presence. |
3-57 | 15 | Civil Affairs Branch Overview
1-7. Acknowledging civilian presence underscores the criticality of and the dynamic relationship between
friendly forces, adversaries, and populations. These relationships affect and are affected by daily changes in
the area of operations (AO). Several factors impact each AO, such as competing global and regional
influences; urbanization; failed, failing, or recovering governance apparatus; non-state actors; other state
actors; degraded economic conditions; pandemics; and other health crises. CA forces enable focused insights
and understanding of the complex relationships and influences affecting civil societies, institutions, and
populations within the AO. This enables commanders and their forces to have a clear understanding of the
common operational picture. CA forces provide unique capabilities to engage the civil component, enabling
consolidation activities that are fundamental to the stability of the affected population and civic institutions.
TITLE 22, UNITED STATES CODE
1-8. Most CAO will be conducted under the authority of 10 USC. However, there are some circumstances
in which CAO will be conducted under 22 USC. 22 USC 2292 through 2292b address the international
disaster assistance funds. The President may direct the DOD through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to
respond to human-made or natural disasters. The President delegates disaster relief authority to the SecDef
with concurrence of the Department of State (DOS) (except in emergencies). The DOD has limited authority
to engage in disaster assistance. Through 22 USC 2292, Congress and the President provide the authorization
for the U.S. to provide assistance to certain countries. Generally, each section after 2292b indicates particular
countries that will be the intended recipient of this aid and additional countries will undoubtedly be added to
the list as the magnitude of the disaster is known. In addition to funds mentioned in 10 USC, the bulk of
foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations will be funded in accordance with 22 USC 2292.
1-9. 22 USC 2151 is the Foreign Assistance Act. This act is designed to focus on developing countries. It
supports military assistance programs, foreign military financing programs, and international military education
training programs. The Foreign Assistance Act also supports economic support funds; peacekeeping operations;
international narcotics control and law enforcement programs; and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining,
and related programs. The act contains provisions to assist foreign countries in fighting internal and external
aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (contingent upon Congressional
approval). Despite a large DOD role in providing defense-related articles and services, the DOS controls the
Foreign Assistance Act. This act also mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S.
civilian agencies at all levels of the security assistance (SA) process.
1-10. SA is a group of programs implemented by DOD in accordance with policies established by the DOS,
through which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign
nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. These programs
are governed by 22 USC. CA forces enable, synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil information and
knowledge into the planning and development of the common operational picture for these missions. CA forces
can also provide civil measures of performance or measures of effectiveness to determine the impact on the IPI.
1-11. CA forces in support of SA programs are able to—
* Identify host-nation requirements.
* Develop civil networks to enable mission requirements.
* Develop or review the nomination list of programs or projects to support the mission.
* Make a determination of the feasibility of each program.
1-12. The five principal components of SA are—
* Foreign military sales.
* Foreign military financing.
* International military education and training.
* Peace operations.
* Excess defense articles. |
3-57 | 16 | Chapter 1
CORE COMPETENCIES
1-13. CA forces focus on the interests; functions; capabilities; and vulnerabilities of populations, institutions,
government apparatus, and unified action partners that reside or operate in and around an AO. The role and
missions of the CA branch form the basis for training, organizing, equipping, and employing CA forces.
The CA missions are the execution of capabilities that allow the CA force to accomplish its role.
1-14. Core competencies define the overall capabilities of a branch to the Army. The CA branch has the
following core competencies:
* Transitional governance (TG).
* Civil network development and engagement (CNDE).
* Civil knowledge integration (CKI).
* Civil-military integration (CMI).
1-15. CA core competencies are mutually reinforcing, interdependent, and designed to address critical
operational gaps with capabilities that are not organic to any other Army branch. At echelon, the ranges of
capability and capacity to execute the CA core competencies vary significantly. For example, a CA company
or team will have limited capability and capacity to augment the company requirements. On the other hand,
a CA battalion will have greater capability and capacity to augment the company requirements. In addition,
there are further and more specific capabilities that reside in the higher echelons of the CA force, such as
reachback. As a result, understanding the capabilities and limitations of CA organizations is helpful in
employing CA forces efficiently and effectively. Ultimately, the goal of the execution of the core
competencies is to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the civil component with Army operations to
achieve unified action.
1-16. Figure 1-1 depicts the CA core competencies and functions. The foundation of the structure is CA
missions which are found in all the core competencies in some combination. The central pillars of the structure
are TG and CNDE, which focus the other core competencies through interactions with the individuals and
networks that make up the civil component. Next, the support pillars of CKI and CMI provide structure and
guidance to ensure CA forces work in tandem with the overall military campaign while integrating civilian
partners to create unity of effort. Finally, CAO is the roof which the competencies support. These core
competencies, working in concert, create stability and enable consolidation of gains within the civil component.
The CA missions are housed within the framework of the core competencies and provide execution of CA
capabilities at the tactical level. |
3-57 | 17 | Civil Affairs Branch Overview
Figure 1-1. Civil Affairs core competencies and missions
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE
1-17. TG is essential for maintaining stability in periods of competition, promoting resilience in periods of
crisis, and assuring continuity of governance during armed conflict. Transitional governance is the actions
taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the range of
military operations. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish a military government when occupying
enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies a military government as a directed requirement under CAO.
CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT
1-18. Civil network development and engagement is the activity by which the civil network capabilities
and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations. Developing and engaging
civil networks provides commanders with a more complete understanding of the OE, while providing access to
use those networks to shape the operational outcomes. A civil network is a collection of formal and informal
groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that
interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. Civil networks can
be mobilized or self-motivated to bring collective action and/or social or political pressure around an area of |
3-57 | 18 | Chapter 1
common interest. CNDE enables commanders to understand the civil component of the OE. The effects of
CNDE include—
* Enabling freedom of movement and maneuver.
* Managing limited resources.
* Preserving combat power.
* Providing the command with options to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component
such as—
Destabilized or failing infrastructure.
Enemy special purpose forces.
Enemy proxy forces.
Criminal entities or unidentified adversaries who aim to create civil strife.
* Consolidating gains.
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION
1-19. Civil knowledge integration is the actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil
information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function. The resulting civil
knowledge is integrated with other knowledge about the OE to create shared understanding among
commanders, unified action partners, international organizations, and civilian partners. CA forces use CKI
primarily to inform, focus, direct CAO and civil-military operations (CMO) at all echelons.
1-20. In addition, CKI—incorporated through the Army’s integrating processes of intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB), information collection, targeting, risk management (RM), and knowledge
management—enables the commander’s understanding of the OE and develops the common operational
picture. CA units also use this information as inputs to the CNDE process to refine information requirements
and to shape branches, sequels, and other future missions.
CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
1-21. Civil-military integration is the actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage
relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize,
coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. CMI is essential
to effective integration of operations with commanders and unified action partners to achieve unity of effort.
The establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC), or other mechanisms, enables civil
information sharing and integration.
Note: See JP 3-08 for additional information about interorganizational cooperation.
CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSIONS
1-22. Execution of the CA missions allows CA forces to fulfill their role of engaging, influencing, and
leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance. These
missions are executed throughout all the core competencies and provide continuity in CAO.
1-23. CA missions include—
* Conduct civil reconnaissance (CR).
* Conduct civil engagement (CE).
* Conduct civil network development (CND).
* Conduct civil information evaluation (CIE).
* Establish CMOCs.
* Provide support to civil administration (SCA).
* Establish and maintain transitional military authority. |
3-57 | 19 | Civil Affairs Branch Overview
CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE
1-24. CA forces conduct CR across time and space in response to specific information requirements of the OE.
This enhances the situational understanding and decision making of the supported commanders. CR is a
targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil factors in the OE. CR strives to
consider the human, physical, and information dimensions of the OE. CR is conducted systematically over
time to observe certain civil factors through the use of—
* Routine engagement.
* Patterned civil observance.
* Active, passive, and virtual sensors.
* Unmanned mobility systems.
* Other means to support assessments, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness.
1-25. CR is executed throughout all CA core competencies. This is necessary for CA to effectively fulfill its
roles of—
* Engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing
governance.
* Providing input to the commander’s information requirements.
CONDUCT CIVIL ENGAGEMENT
1-26. CA forces conduct deliberate or spontaneous CE with individuals or entities. CE is more effective when
there is continuity between different CA elements and USG entities in the same AO. CE is critical to CNDE
because the civil information and data collected during CE is analyzed, converted into civil knowledge, and
integrated into the CNDE processes. CE is designed to—
* Establish or build relationships.
* Understand, promote, or enhance capability.
* Understand and create stability.
* Gather, confirm, or deny information related to subversive efforts and threats within the civil
component.
* Foster legitimacy or promote cooperation and unified action.
1-27. CE, as an investment of resources, provides access to the individuals and groups that can be leveraged
to support military operations. As an investment of resources, it also reduces the need to apply military resources
against problem sets that belong to local, provincial, or national civil authorities. CE is executed throughout all
CA core competencies. It is also necessary for CA forces to effectively fulfill their role of engaging and
leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance.
CONDUCT CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT
1-28. Civil network development is the planned and targeted action in which Civil Affairs forces develop
networks within the civil component of the operational environment to influence populations and manage
local resources in order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives.
1-29. CND enhances the commander’s understanding of the civil component and legitimizes the U.S.
mission. The most effective means of conducting CND is in person. Other means of conducting CND are
acceptable depending on the authorities and the permissions granted. CA forces conduct CND to promote the
relationship between military forces and the civil component and to develop partner civil networks. CND is
primarily actioned under the core competency of CNDE, but is integral to TG and CMI, through enabling
CA forces to fulfill their role of engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing,
enabling, or providing governance.
CONDUCT CIVIL INFORMATION EVALUATION
1-30. CA forces identify civil information requirements as part of a commander’s information collection
requirements. CA forces conduct CND, CR, CE, and data mining; they also collaborate with IPI, |
3-57 | 20 | Chapter 1
interorganizational entities, NGOs, and other government agencies to collect and process information that is
needed for commanders and staffs to plan successful missions. Commanders and staffs evaluate civil
information for operational relevance to inform feasible courses of action. This civil information analysis
(and subsequent evaluation) is utilized throughout the core competencies to allow CA forces to achieve their
role of engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing
governance.
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTERS
1-31. CA units, from the company through the Civil Affairs Command (CACOM), establish CMOCs, as
required, to serve as a mechanism for integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the efforts of U.S. forces
with unified action partners and IPI. A CMOC is task-organized with CA and other enabling assets (such as
military intelligence, engineer, military police, medical, and transportation assets) to meet specific mission
tasks assigned to the CA element.
1-32. Commanders establish a CMOC to provide continuous and seamless integration, coordination, and
synchronization between military forces and unified action partners with nonmilitary and civilian entities
according to the commander’s operations plan. CA forces conduct CMI to ensure that the integration,
coordination, and synchronization of forces is conducted within the scope of the operational plan of the
commander. CMI is different from CNDE. CMI, which is effected by the CMOC, is focused on ensuring all
entities in the AO are informed and understand the commander’s intent and the common operational picture.
CNDE, however, is focused on the development of civil networks to support and provide capabilities or
resources that enable the mission and desired end state of the commander.
1-33. The CMOC—in coordination with the S-9, G-9, and J-9 by echelon—is designed to share information,
identify and distribute resources, and assist in the execution of CAO and CMO. This mission is primarily
nested under the core competency of CMI, but is integral in TG, through enabling CA forces to fulfill their
role of engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing
governance.
Note: Chapter 2 provides more information on establishing a CMOC.
PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
1-34. Support to civil administration is assistance given by United States armed forces to stabilize or
enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim
government. Through the execution of SCA, CA forces assist an established government or interim civilian
authority to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, or recover from crisis; or support a reconstructed government
in the aftermath of war. SCA supports the U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments
of national power abroad and will often occur in coordination with DOS to implement the U.S. stabilization
strategy. CA forces execute SCA to provide assistance to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign
country, according to international agreements, as part of disaster response or following armed conflict. This
fulfills their requirements for enhancing, enabling, or providing governance.
Note: See Chapter 2 for more details on SCA.
ESTABLISH AND CONDUCT TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY
1-35. Transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil
administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority (FM 3-07). Under extreme circumstances (in
which the host-nation government has failed completely, or an enemy regime has been deposed) the
intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional authority on behalf of the
population. When military forces invade and occupy enemy territory, those forces may establish a transitional
military authority and take the lead in the stability sectors. |
3-57 | 21 | Civil Affairs Branch Overview
1-36. A transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and
organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government that
fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate host-nation authority.
1-37. CA forces enable transitional military authority as early as possible in consolidation areas by applying
civilian sector expertise to those functions normally executed by a civil government. CAO planners prepare
for operations requiring transitional military authority well in advance—in coordination with DOS—to
transfer those responsibilities to another authority as soon as security and political conditions allow.
Note: Transitional military authority is described further in Chapter 2.
BRANCH CHARACTERISTICS
1-38. CA branch characteristics are complementary to Army and joint capabilities. Some branches may
possess similar characteristics, but CA branch characteristics collectively allow for accomplishing the role
of the branch. While the following branch characteristics apply to the branch as a whole, individual units
may possess additional characteristics due to unique mission requirements. The CA Branch is—
* Governance Oriented. CA forces execute the functions of civil administration throughout CAO.
* Civil Component Focused. CA forces are the primary capability of the commander for the
analysis and evaluation of civil considerations during military operations. They enhance the
commander’s situational understanding of the civil component.
* Civil Network Engagement Focused. CA forces engage IPI and unified action partners to
establish and maintain relationships, civil networks, and communication channels in order to—
Gain access to civilian resources and information.
Develop comprehensive situational understanding.
Integrate civil capabilities and information.
Enable unity of effort.
* Civil Knowledge Integration Focused. CA forces collect, collate, process, analyze, and evaluate
civil information to produce valuable and timely civil knowledge for integration and
dissemination.
* Culturally Attuned. Through extensive predeployment study, network engagement, and, when
possible, theater engagement, CA forces are aware of population demographics, cultural nuances,
divergent world views, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes that affect both the civil component and
military operations.
* Diplomatically Astute. CA forces understand the sensitive political aspects of military
operations. They establish relationships with formal and informal influencers and carefully
manage those relationships to achieve positive outcomes during diplomatically sensitive
interactions.
BRANCH PRINCIPLES
1-39. CA principles provide comprehensive and fundamental rules—or assumptions of central importance—
that guide how CA approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations and captures the broad and
enduring guidelines for the employment of CA forces. CA forces are the critical capability that the
commander uses to influence, synchronize, and deconflict military operations with regards to the IPI, unified
action partners, and the interagency. CA branch principles are outlined below.
STABILITY IS A FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
1-40. CAO play an important role in supporting all Army operations—offense, defense, stability, and
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). The CA core competencies describe capabilities that support
the six primary stability operations tasks, which are—
* Establish civil security.
* Establish civil control. |
3-57 | 22 | Chapter 1
* Restore essential services.
* Provide support to governance.
* Support the economic and infrastructure development.
* Conduct security cooperation.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS FOCUS ON CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS WITHIN THE
CIVIL COMPONENT
1-41. CA plays a vital role in preparing, planning, and executing courses of action that must be integrated
with the overall consolidation of gains plan.CA forces develop and engage supporting civil networks to
increase local governance capability. This ensures a sustainable security environment, which allows for a
transition of control to legitimate authorities.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS EMPOWER LOCAL CIVIL NETWORKS TO INCREASE
GOVERNANCE CAPACITY AND PRESERVE COMBAT POWER
1-42. Utilizing civil networks, CA forces build capacity that supplements or replaces requirements with
regard to civil security, cooperation, and services. This control reduces the burden on U.S. forces to provide
for the needs of the population. Without this capacity, a hostile civilian population, or subset of it, can threaten
the operations of friendly forces and undermine mission legitimacy. A supportive civilian population and
accompanying civil networks provide resources, freedom of maneuver, and information that facilitate
friendly operations.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ARE AN INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITY
1-43. CAO involve direct interaction with IPI and unified action partners for the collection, collation, and
dissemination of civil information. They are a capability employed in the information environment to create
and/or assess effects, and shape operationally desirable conditions.
1-44. CA forces enhance and enable information operations (IO) by identifying civil aspects of the
information environment, assessing and evaluating civil indicators of IO effectiveness within the AO, and
providing actionable options to the supported commander’s IO plan regarding themes and messages. CA
forces complete these actions and provide support to IO through the conduct of CAO. CAO are an
information-related capability.
A COMPREHENSIVE, INTERRELATED KNOWLEDGEBASE IS AN INVALUABLE ASSET
1-45. CA forces collect civil data for analysis, evaluation, and transformation into actionable civil knowledge
within the operational area. This base of civil knowledge is available and leveraged for integration into all Army
planning processes and warfighting functions. It is also critical for understanding civil component trends,
predicting civil impacts on military missions, predicting military impacts on the IPI, and identifying threats
within the civil component of the OE.
REGIONAL AND CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING ARE ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
1-46. CA forces rely on CE, relationships, and an understanding of the civil component to effectively plan and
execute CAO. Regional and cultural competencies are critical skills for interacting with people of different
cultures. Also essential to success are the knowledge and understanding of the interests, functions, capabilities,
and vulnerabilities of the populations, institutions, and government apparatus that reside or operate in the region
in which military forces operate.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ARE NESTED WITH UNIFIED ACTION
1-47. Unified action requires the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Each of the
CA core competencies inherently supports these requirements by bringing military and civil capabilities |
3-57 | 23 | Civil Affairs Branch Overview
together in formal and informal ways to achieve common objectives. Early integration of CA forces into
plans, operations and campaigns is critical to freedom of action, reduces operational friction, and enables
unified action at the onset of military operations.
CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES ARE CRITICAL AND ADAPTIVE THINKERS
1-48. CA forces are self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-correcting in their ability to apply
the elements of thought (and the Army’s problem-solving process) to the topics, situations, problems, and
opportunities they encounter. When confronted by unanticipated circumstances during the execution of a
planned military operation or event, they can make adjustments within the context of the plan to either exploit
the advantage or minimize the impact. |
3-57 | 25 | Chapter 2
Civil Affairs Operations
The DoD must maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs operations
necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD Component responsibilities to the
civilian sector in the operational environment across the range of military operations.
DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs
15 May 2017
This chapter provides an overview of the civil component and then provides a detailed
breakdown on the core competencies and missions nested within CAO to give supported
commanders a better understanding of the capabilities that CA forces provide during
operations.
OVERVIEW
2-1. Civil affairs operations are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness
of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate
underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty
skills normally the responsibility of civil government (JP 3-57).
2-2. Army CA forces have the strategic objective of establishing and maintaining a secure and stable OE
that is consistent with U.S. interests. In order to achieve their strategic objective, Army CA forces execute
CAO across the range of military operations to—
* Engage and leverage the civil component (people, organizations, and capabilities) in order to
enhance, enable, or provide governance.
* Increase situational understanding.
* Identify and defeat threats within the civil component.
* Consolidate gains.
THE CIVIL COMPONENT
2-3. The civil component consists of the populations, political institutions, infrastructure, economic
capabilities, public and private civilian resources, and other features of the OE that are tied to the geographic
areas and exclusive of the military apparatus of those areas. The civil component of the OE is largely
consistent throughout the competition continuum. The civil component exists in the OE before, during, and
after all conflicts. As such the civil component of the OE contains many capabilities, threats, and internal
vulnerabilities that could affect the mission.
CAPABILITIES
2-4. The civil capabilities found within an OE depend on factors related to the IPI, government institutions,
foreign actors, and natural resources encountered in specific geographic areas. The capabilities and associated
resources are internal to all countries and allow for the support of a functioning society. Through proper
coordination, U.S. and partner forces work locally to integrate capabilities within the commander’s plan.
Capabilities include, but are not limited to, those unique to individual areas and—
* Economic outputs.
* Communication infrastructure.
* Transportation infrastructure.
* Local resources. |
3-57 | 26 | Chapter 2
* Civil network capabilities.
* Information sharing architecture.
* Government capacity.
* Political and social structures.
2-5. It is the role of the CA elements and CAO staff to identify and plan for the integration and protection of
civil component capabilities within the commander’s plan. CA staff, at all echelons, analyze civil component
capabilities from two distinct perspectives, the degree to which civil component capabilities can—
* Sustain civilian security activities without the introduction of U.S. military or civilian resources.
* Be leveraged to support U.S. military or civilian objectives.
2-6. CA analysts continuously update the status of civil capabilities during operations as conditions change
or as new threats to stability emerge. This analysis feeds into planning of military and civilian operations
across the competition continuum.
THREATS
2-7. The civil threats found within an OE are primarily related to the threats to civil security. Civil security
takes into consideration the factors of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and
political security. Threats within the civil component take many forms. These include, but are not limited to—
* Persistent poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity.
* Hunger and famine.
* Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, and malnutrition.
* Lack of access to basic health care and clean water.
* Environmental degradation, resource depletion, and natural disasters.
* Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, and child labor.
* Interethnic, religious, and other identity-based tensions.
* Political repression and human rights abuses.
* Criminal elements.
* Destabilized or failing infrastructure.
* Elements aimed at fomenting societal collapse.
* Enemy special purpose forces.
* Propaganda, deception, misinformation, and disinformation.
* At-risk populations.
* Other elements or conditions that could lead to a breakdown of society.
2-8. Most threats target social structures within the civil component to destabilize the area. That destabilization
can be used to take advantage of the population or to target U.S. and partner forces maneuvering through (and
working within) the civil component.
2-9. Identification and reduction of threats is key to operational success within the civil component. The
existence of any of these threats to the civil population within an OE is an inherent threat to U.S. military and
civilian organizations operating there. Some of these threats may be created or exploited by adversaries specifically
to destabilize an area to promote threat objectives or hinder the achievement of U.S. or ally objectives.
2-10. The key to defeating these threats is the promotion of local stabilization and governance capabilities and
resources that are developed and leveraged from the CNDE processes. CA elements and staff, at all echelons,
working with interorganizational partners, fully identify threats and potential threats before, during, and after
military operations. CA commanders are responsible for continuous planning, coordination, and integration of civil
and military resources to counter those threats across time and space in the competition continuum.
VULNERABILITIES
2-11. Civil vulnerabilities are those elements within a society that could be exploited by a threat actor or
degraded by a natural event. In any given OE, there are specific, pertinent components that drive power |
3-57 | 27 | Civil Affairs Operations
dynamics, which can be exploited by external powers as openings to gain access and leverage into a society
in order to influence that society.
2-12. The civil vulnerabilities found in an OE depend on a several factors related to resilience.
These vulnerabilities are often associated with the ability of populations, government institutions, and foreign
actors in the OE to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, or recover from one or more of the typical threats to
civil security as discussed above.
2-13. Vulnerabilities vary based on the degree of stability that exists within the specified geographic area
(particularly the degree of stability afforded by levels of civil security, civil control, essential services, and
critical infrastructure). Lack of resources, lack of public confidence and support, and the activities of internal
and/or external individuals or groups who intend to exploit existing vulnerabilities pose great challenges to
those responsible for transitioning to governance or maintaining governance.
2-14. CA forces, at all echelons, identify, classify, and propose courses of action to reduce vulnerabilities
and leverage strengths within the civil component that could affect the overall mission completion. CA forces
accomplish this through CND, CR, and CE. These mission tasks are focused by the civil information
collection plan.
2-15. CA forces (working with interorganizational partners, IPI, unified action partners and other government
entities) will attempt to fully identify the vulnerabilities or potential vulnerabilities. Once military operations
begin, CA forces—using all of their core competencies—will continue to identify civil vulnerabilities and
strengths within the OE. When large-scale combat operations end, CA forces will execute TG, transferring the
OE over to appropriate civil authorities. Once this transition to SCA is complete, CA forces will partner in DOS-
led U.S. stabilization efforts to identify civil strengths and vulnerabilities in targeted operational areas during
competition before they impact the security of the U.S., its allies, and its partners.
CORE COMPETENCIES
2-16. The CA branch provides four core competencies nested within CAO. CA forces may execute
competencies prior to, simultaneously with, or in the absence of other military operations across the conflict
continuum and throughout the range of military operations. The CA core competencies are mutually
supporting. The missions nested under the core competencies are capabilities executed to accomplish the
designated role of the branch. The CA branch has the overall responsibility to perform these missions to—
* Enable the commander to visualize the common operational picture.
* Consolidate gains.
* Extend the culminating point.
* Identify civil resources and capabilities.
* Understand the civil component of the OE.
* Produce effects in the civil component of the OE.
* Synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil knowledge into the warfighting functions and other
Army processes.
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE
2-17. The introduction of foreign military forces into sovereign territories often has a destabilizing effect on
the integrity of local governance structures and their ability to control activities within defined political
boundaries. When U.S. forces deploy to remove threat forces from a friendly country (or to defeat the security
forces and governance structures of a belligerent country or non-state actor) they must be prepared to assume
certain governance responsibilities over newly liberated or occupied territories until those responsibilities are
able to be transferred to another authority. In DODD 5100.01, this military government requirement is listed
as the sixth of thirteen specific functions of the Army. In turn, DODD 2000.13 requires the DOD to maintain
a capability to provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian
authorities.
2-18. According to NSPD-44, while the DOS has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DOD has
a requirement to support that effort. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish military government when |
3-57 | 28 | Chapter 2
occupying enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies military government as a directed requirement
under CAO.
2-19. Within its capabilities, and in accordance with international law, the occupying force must maintain an
orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate
and effective civilian government.
2-20. CA forces conduct TG to assure appropriate control and the continuation of government functions during
times of destabilization. CA forces assure the effective transition of governance from civilian control to military
control and then back to civilian control as smoothly and efficiently as possible. All CA missions are essential
to proper execution of TG, but TG has two primary missions, which are—
* Provide transitional military authority.
* Provide SCA.
2-21. These missions give the Army the capability to better understand its military government role and to execute
the legal responsibilities to the residents of liberated and occupied territories defined by international law and,
specifically, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict and the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. DODD 5100.01
mandates that the DOD maintains the capability to conduct military government operations. The DOD supports
this mandate through TG.
2-22. CA forces providing TG use CMI, and the developed civil networks within the AO to support the
establishment of SCA or transitional military authority that will enable the accomplishment of U.S. military
objectives. SCA and transitional military authority support the whole of government approach and U.S.
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power abroad through execution
of governance tasks mandated by U.S. policy and international law.
GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE
2-23. CA forces have two distinct areas of expertise which are interrelated:
* Governance.
* Government functions.
2-24. Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by
which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (JP 3-24).
Governance speaks to the administration of control by authorities exercising the role of the government.
Government functions, however, refers to the structure that is used to conduct governance. That structure
includes all the public systems used to create laws, administer justice, provide essential services, and maintain
order. Expertise in government functions, therefore, is an expertise in those systems. Expertise in governance,
however, is an understanding of how those systems are related and utilized to provide for the needs of a
population.
Governance
2-25. Officers and noncommissioned officers provide governance expertise, while government function
specialties within CA formations are the vehicle for the provision of government function expertise. Further,
commanders and unified action partners have access to governmental sector expertise in the form of
government function specialists, who have extensive civilian experience in provision of specific civil sectors.
2-26. CA forces provide TG expertise to military commanders to enable and enhance options for interacting
with and influencing civil populations and institutions. CA forces execute TG through understanding the civil
factors throughout the competition continuum. These civil factors include, but are not limited to—
* Security.
* Justice.
* Reconciliation.
* Humanitarian assistance.
* Social well-being.
* Governance and participation. |
3-57 | 29 | Civil Affairs Operations
* Economic stabilization.
* Infrastructure.
* Culture.
2-27. CA responsibilities to enhance, enable, and provide governance include—
* Developing monitoring and evaluation plans for TG.
* Providing government function specialists.
* Developing civil networks, as necessary, to provide resources, capabilities, and expertise within
the stability framework to assist in stabilizing the OE.
* Providing instruction, mentorship, and expertise to newly formed government agencies, as required.
* Assisting in the development of predictive analysis about government and civil sectors.
* Developing and updating running assessments of relevant civil networks (which include features,
composition, and structure).
* Advising military commanders on civil impacts to military operations and impacts of military
operations to the civil component at echelon.
* Advising military commanders on integration of CAO and civil network capabilities into military
plans and operations.
Government Functions
2-28. CA force structure contains civil sector expertise within each of the focus areas, which fall under the
five government function specialty areas (depicted in figure 2-1). Technically qualified and experienced
individuals, known as CA government function specialists, advise, enable, and assist commanders and their
direct civilian counterparts with stabilizing and providing governance expertise for the OE until appropriate
civilian control is possible. Within their area of specialization, they possess the critical skills necessary to
establish, support, or reestablish capability and capacity, as well as understand the regional and local impact
of culture on that capability.
Figure 2-1. Government function specialty areas and focus areas
Note: Appendix B provides a detailed description of each focus area.
2-29. The preponderance of government function expertise capability is maintained within the United States
Army Reserve, while a minimal capability comprised of the other Army government function specialist
capabilities resides within the active component CA formations. |
3-57 | 30 | Chapter 2
2-30. Depending on the OE in which CA units perform TG, the missions conducted to accomplish TG are
distinct, complementary, and performed with varying levels of frequency, magnitude, and concentration.
CA forces provide expertise in civilian sector functions and stability function tasks that are normally the
responsibility of civilian authorities in order to establish or improve local government capability, or to
perform military government functions until necessary conditions are established. The goal for TG is to return
governance control to the appropriate civil authorities as soon as possible. CA forces executing TG provide,
enhance, and enable—
* The conduct of governance.
* Building capabilities and capacity.
* Administrative control.
* Sustainability.
* Resources development.
* Transition of the AO to civil control.
2-31. Figure 2-2 illustrates the implementation of TG across the competition continuum.
Figure 2-2. Transitional governance across the competition continuum
2-32. CA forces are trained, educated, and organized to provide commanders with governance expertise,
support host-nation civil administration, and execute the functions of a civil administration. TG is enabled
by the CA core competencies of CNDE, CKI, and CMI to effectively gain situational understanding, ensure
CAO are achieving the desired end state of the supported commander, and assess effects in the civil
component of the OE. |
3-57 | 31 | Civil Affairs Operations
2-33. TG executed by CA forces can be different within the same AO or joint operations area based on mission
requirements, the desired end states of the commander, and the capabilities and resources of the established
local civil networks. At the operational level, CA units inside the theater of operations for large-scale combat
operations may be conducting different TG requirements than CA units outside the theater of operations.
At the tactical level, CA units in the division consolidation area may be at a different point on the SCA graph
performing different missions than a CA unit in the corps consolidation area.
2-34. During the competition phase, CA units are primarily providing governance expertise to their
supported military commander and conducting SCA to—
* Establish assessments of the civil component.
* Create situational understanding.
* Compete with adversaries to gain positions of advantage.
* Build partner capacity to deny freedom of maneuver or action to near peer adversaries.
* Set conditions in theater through persistent and episodic engagement.
2-35. As the joint force quickly transitions to armed conflict, CA forces mobilize civil networks and partners
to enable joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration; populace and resources control (PRC);
and FHA all in support of SCA.
2-36. During the commencement of offensive operations, CA units focus on establishing or reestablishing
contact with civil authorities or civil networks. This enables situational understanding (which enhances the
decision making of the commander), targeting, execution of effects, and reduction of civil interference (which
preserves combat power). CA units can also be allocated or task-organized to engage, assess, and evaluate
the civil components of bypassed population centers to begin the stabilization processes.
Note: These bypassed population centers must meet the bypass criteria established by the ground
force commander.
2-37. CA forces engage, assess, and evaluate the civil components of bypassed population centers through
building and mobilizing of friendly civil networks. These actions lead to preservation of combat power and
extend the operational reach of the supported commander. As units establish area security and designate
consolidation areas, the balance of tasks should shift more heavily towards stability operations tasks aimed
at consolidation of gains and focused on the control of populations and key nodes. The primary stability
operations tasks are—
* Establish civil security.
* Establish civil control.
* Restore essential service.
* Provide support to governance.
* Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.
* Conduct security cooperation.
2-38. The frequency, magnitude, and concentration of TG performed increases as consolidation area
boundaries extend. The President has the authority to implement transitional military authority and the
SecDef and joint forces commander exercise that authority. At the culmination of offensive operations (when
transitional military authority is authorized) the commander must make the decision whether to exercise that
authority or support a local civil administration that still has the capability to conduct governance.
2-39. The Joint Chiefs of Staff formulate broad policies and conduct initial planning for transitional military
authority. However, CACOM commanders, CAO staff of combatant commanders (CCDRs), theater Civil
Affairs planning teams (CAPTs), and CAO staff of Army Service Component Command should begin
transitional military authority planning prior to the initiation of armed conflict.
2-40. If transitional military authority is exercised, CA commanders establish military government or
provide advice and expertise to the commander and the governor. The commander and governor require this
advice and expertise to exercise functions of civil administration until established transition criteria are met
and/or until the arrival of the designated civil control transfer date. |
3-57 | 32 | Chapter 2
2-41. If transitional military authority is not established, CA forces continue to provide SCA within occupied
areas and gradually decrease the frequency, magnitude, and concentration of tasks performed as the civilian
authorities increase capacity to levels prescribed by the stabilization plan of the DOS. The goal should always
be to transition control to civilian authorities as soon as established local government is able to stand on its
own and transition criteria are met.
Transitional Governance in Syria
After the liberation of portions of Northern Syria from Islamic State (IS) forces in late
2016, one thing was abundantly clear; if U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
were to consolidate operational gains it was imperative that governance be restored.
For nearly two years IS had controlled the region, and the city of Manbij in particular,
overseeing the normal functions of government such as essential services. Civil Affairs
teams on the ground partnered with the Syrian Democratic Forces to initially identify
specific priorities for stabilization and humanitarian efforts. Those priorities were
relayed to DOS, USAID, and NGOs to begin the process of stabilization.
As the area became more stable and as IS fighters were increasingly pushed from the
region, the reestablishment of government became a top priority. Civil Affairs teams
advised and assisted the local population of Manbij in the creation of the Manbij Civil
Council. The Manbij Civil Council was specifically formed with male and female
membership representing all ethnic groups within the area. Once created the council
began immediately the process of restoring essential services and partnering with the
international community to establish work throughout the five USG stability sectors to
bring economic and individual prosperity back to the region. The Manbij Civil Council
was so successful that its model was copied numerous times throughout the region as
IS was pushed further and further back. Manbij, in particular, became such a
prosperous area that dislocated persons from across the country flocked to the city for
a new start. From the beginning, Civil Affairs teams on the ground, partnering with local
leaders, assisted in the transition towards inclusive and prosperous governance and
stability for the people of Manbij and surrounding areas.
TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY
2-42. Under this authority, CA forces can provide TG to provide continuity of necessary government
functions until they can be transferred to the appropriate civilian authorities. Transitional military authority
enables commanders to achieve civil security and enable civil control and stability. The DOS has the lead on
foreign policy and controls the majority of the resources which can be used under 22 USC. These resources
are typically tied to achieving U.S. interests. Once an interim civilian government is established, military
resources are engaged to provide SCA.
2-43. During transitional military authority, the following must exist:
* Military Governor. A military governor is the military commander or other designated person,
who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the
laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the government of the commander or
another superior.
* Military Government Ordinance. A military government ordinance is an enactment on the
authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules, which regulate the occupied territory
under such control. |
3-57 | 33 | Civil Affairs Operations
2-44. CA provides transitional military authority through its commanders, governance expertise, and its
government function specialist capabilities. All CA forces are skilled in governance and understand the
importance of the five USG stability sectors to the implementation of governance at any level. These stability
sectors are—
* Establish civil security.
* Establish civil control.
* Restore essential services.
* Provide support to governance.
* Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.
2-45. CA government function specialists have additional expertise within each of the USG stability sectors
to facilitate governance. CA forces enable the continuity of government functions by providing a bridge to
the more robust governance expertise of the DOS and other entities.
Note: See Appendix B for more detailed information on the role of CA in governance.
SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
2-46. SCA is a critical function of support to government operations, which is aligned with the six primary
Army stability operations tasks. Support to governance is a stability operations task required for obtaining a
stable population-centric OE. SCA is assistance given by CA forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of
the governing body of a foreign country, by assisting an established or interim government. SCA occurs when
CA forces support the DOS in the implementation of interim civil authority or U.S. foreign policy in support of
host-nation internal defense and development.
Note: ADP 3-07 provides information on the critical aspects of SCA. Its discussion of movement
corridors and personnel recovery provides guidance to CA forces when conducting these aspects
of SCA.
Note: CA forces can gain a baseline understanding of an OE through several means, which
include, but are not limited to, the reviews of current country studies by other CA forces and
government entities.
2-47. During the competition phase, SCA can complement, support, enhance, and enable security cooperation,
theater security cooperation activities, deterrence, foreign internal defense (FID), and CCDR campaign plans as
a function of stability operations.
2-48. During armed conflict, SCA is implemented through execution of stability operations tasks. SCA is
essential to consolidate gains that are made in offensive operations. In the close area, CA units establish contact
with existing civil authorities and prioritize SCA efforts. As consolidation areas are established, U.S. forces will
increase stability operations. Based on historical data from World War II liberation of occupied territories in the
European theater, a typical sequence of events may look like—
* Dislocated civilian (DC) operations and FHA.
* Re-establishment of local government.
* Provision of emergency supplies.
* Public health and sanitation surveys.
* Organization and training of auxiliary police.
* Issuance of passes for necessary civilian travel.
* Liaison with resistance groups.
* Procurement of civilian labor for the Army.
* Assistance to Army in its relations with the civilian population.
* Restoration to nearly normal pre-conflict conditions. |
3-57 | 34 | Chapter 2
Note: CA is critical to the planning, coordinating, and execution of the above tasks (and others)
with civilian entities. These critical CA capabilities impact the commander’s influence and use of
command and control to consolidate gains within the OE.
2-49. The CA responsibilities during SCA in armed conflict are designed to enable the operational and
support functions of the commander with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation or host
nation (HN). Failure to consolidate gains leads to governance vacuums that will be exploited by adversaries.
2-50. In return to competition, if transitional military authority is not directed, CA units will continue to
provide SCA while gradually transitioning to civilian authorities and decreasing SCA. Continued CMI will
ensure SCA operations are synchronized with unified action partners.
2-51. CA responsibilities in SCA include—
* Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the CA functional specialty
areas.
* Engage and develop civil networks to facilitate TG requirements.
* Develop civil capacity and identify resources and capabilities to support the commander’s mission.
* Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
* Execution of selected SCA operations.
* Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs.
* Facilitating the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
* Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous
government or international transitional government control.
* Targeting and prioritizing SCA with inputs from the CNDE process.
* Mobilizing civil networks to provide civil security and civil control.
* Mobilizing civil networks to enhance emergency management plans.
CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT
2-52. The execution of CNDE enables commanders to develop courses of action that create effects in the
civil component which consolidate gains and create multiple dilemmas for an enemy force attempting to act
and maneuver through that area. Civil networks also enable commanders to assess the effects of IO and other
nonlethal actions in the OE. CNDE and its associated tasks are critical functions of CAO. Supported
commanders utilize CA forces to extend command and control influence where it is not normally present or
established in order to leverage the civil entities within the operational area and achieve desired end states.
CA forces conduct CNDE to enable the operations of the commander.
2-53. When developing and engaging civil networks, CA forces use rigor and diligence to ensure that civil
networks are not threats (and do not become threats) to the civil component. Constant monitoring of these
civil networks is critical to assess changes in motivation and loyalties. As CA forces identify civil networks
within the AO, they categorize the civil networks, and provide them to the appropriate staff entity. For
example, an identified threat network goes to the S-2, an identified sustainment network goes to the S-4, and
a network that requires targeting goes to the S-3.
2-54. The CNDE process consists of the following six steps:
* Develop a civil network engagement plan.
* Conduct civil network engagement.
* Analyze civil networks.
* Develop selected civil networks.
* Evaluate developed civil networks.
* Integrate mobilized civil networks.
2-55. Step one of the CNDE process closely corresponds with the plan activity of the operations process.
Steps two through six correspond to the execute activity of the operations process. Assessment is continuous |
3-57 | 35 | Civil Affairs Operations
throughout all steps and is part of the overall assessment activity of the operations process. While figure 2-3
portrays a cyclical CNDE process, all steps may be executed simultaneously.
Figure 2-3. Civil network development and engagement process
DEVELOP A CIVIL NETWORK ENGAGEMENT PLAN
2-56. The civil network engagement plan organizes CA capabilities to address civil information
requirements and civil resource requirements (including host-nation or foreign nation support). This plan is
achieved through interaction and integration with civil networks for current or future operations in specific
geographic areas. Civil information and resource requirements are derived from multiple sources which
include, but are not limited to—
* Higher headquarters information and resource requirements
* Gaps in pre-deployment assessments and information databases. |
3-57 | 36 | Chapter 2
* Commander’s intent.
* Mission analysis.
* Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
* Priority intelligence requirements of supported and CA unit commanders.
* Planned branches and sequels to combat operations, including consolidation activities and
transition of governance activities to civil authorities.
2-57. CA forces (including individuals and teams) identify individuals, organizations, and existing networks
of people who are able to provide civil information, produce desired effects, or fulfill resource requirements
in the OE. CA forces are trained and required to develop new, or engage existing, civil networks within the
civil populations, government and nongovernment organizations, the private sector, unified action partners,
and others who reside or conduct business in and around the immediate AO.
2-58. The main outputs of this step include—
* A developed civil information collection plan.
* A CND plan to identify specific answers to CCIRs and targeting identification.
* A mission order or concept of operations (CONOPS) that directs targeted CR and CE that answers
all information resource requirements.
* Civil network identifications in an area study.
* The use of initial or deliberate assessment and surveys of identified civil networks to confirm
critical civil information.
2-59. Other outputs include, but are not limited to—
* Updates to the CA running estimate.
* Identification of additional mission tasks to be executed.
* Purpose.
* Objective.
* Effects.
* Measures of performance.
* Measures of effectiveness.
2-60. All these outputs, once analyzed and evaluated, provide civil knowledge that will be integrated by
CAO staff, at echelon, into the command’s planning processes. This information will be used to update the
common operational picture through knowledge management and inform the warfighting functions as
necessary.
2-61. CA forces work with other information-related capabilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess
communication activities. CNDE is used to understand and shape the information environment to create
effects in the cognitive dimension that support information dominance and freedom of action. CA forces
coordinate and synchronize objectives, effects, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance with
the other information-related capabilities.
CONDUCT CIVIL NETWORK ENGAGEMENT
2-62. The key tasks in conducting civil network engagement are CR and CE. CA forces conduct CR across
time and space to enhance the supported commanders’ situational understanding and facilitate decisionmaking.
2-63. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the
OE for the purpose of collecting civil information. The civil information collection plan drives CR and CE
to understand the following in order to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision making—
* Impacts of the civil component on military operations.
* Impacts of military operations on the civil component.
* Development of assessments and running estimates. |
3-57 | 37 | Civil Affairs Operations
2-64. The purpose of CR is to—
* Verify or refute civil information.
* Assess the OE.
* Locate, identify, survey, and observe areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and
events (ASCOPE).
* Detect and monitor changes in the civil component.
2-65. CR and CE enable the synchronization of the CA collection efforts with the commander’s critical
information requirements and specific requests for information through the operations process. The outcomes
from CR and CE add to the understanding of civil considerations and ultimately become inputs to the
common operational picture of the commander.
2-66. CR and CE are also conducted systematically over time to observe and assess certain civil aspects of
the environment through routine engagement, patterned civil observance, utilizing active and passive sensors,
virtual sensors, and other means to support assessments of effects, measures of performance, and measures
of effectiveness.
2-67. Civil engagement is a targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential
contacts in a civil network that is designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect
information. There may be times when CEs are ad hoc or spontaneous—as with chance meetings with new
members of a potential or existing network—but these meetings are also conducted according to a planned
and rehearsed format designed to build relationships; enable partners and increase stability; collect, confirm,
or deny information; foster legitimacy; and promote cooperation and unity of effort.
2-68. CA forces may conduct CE in conjunction with maneuver unit patrols, hold unified action partner
meetings with local leaders, or conduct IO unit polls and surveys. All CEs can be conducted physically, or
virtually if the conditions of the OE will not allow for a physical presence. CE is critical to fully understanding
the key leaders and their desires, interactions, and intentions in the ever-changing conditions of the OE.
CE is necessary to achieve accurate nodal analysis and identification of civil networks that have the greatest
capabilities and resources to support the commander’s operational plan. It also preserves combat power by
enabling military forces to tap into civilian resources that otherwise go unnoticed or unutilized. Through
targeted CE, civil networks could be influenced to mobilize civilian resources to support U.S. military
objectives.
2-69. The inputs to this step include constructing or updating the civil information collection plan based on—
* Planned and targeted activities for engagements and information reporting requirements, such
as—
CCIRs, which includes priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information
requirements.
Named areas of interest.
Targeted areas of interest.
* CONOPS for CND, CR, and CE.
* An assessment crosswalk of—
Task.
Purpose.
Objectives.
Effects.
Measures of performance.
Measures of effectiveness.
2-70. These inputs include civil network information and possible answers to information requirements order
to better understand and assess the OE, build partner capacity, enable unity of effort, enhance freedom of
action, and/or disrupt threats. CA forces must integrate, collaborate, and synchronize with other information-
related capabilities, unified action partners, host-nation entities, and sensitive activities in order to achieve
the commander’s lines of effort, desired effects and enable unity of effort. |
3-57 | 38 | Chapter 2
ANALYZE CIVIL NETWORKS
2-71. CA forces and CAO staff analyze civil network information, which is gained through CND, CR, and CE,
to have an improved understanding of the strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations of local civil
networks. Through this analysis, commanders can better understand which civil networks in their AO are friendly,
neutral, threatening, or unknown in nature. This detailed analysis and mapping of the civil networks allows
commanders and primary staff entities to decide which networks to engage with and which networks to develop.
The analysis of civil network information also allows for the identification of critical capabilities, critical
requirements, and critical vulnerabilities of the civil environment to identify centers of gravity for more effective
targeting, such as natural resources, transportation, power generation, and protected sites.
Note: For further information and discussion on the center of gravity, see ADP 5-0.
2-72. Civil network analysis is a process that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and
influence of nodes within a civil network through network visualizations and qualitative and
quantitative analytical methods. CA forces conduct civil network analysis (CNA) utilizing multiple
methods of network analysis, which include, but are not limited to—
* Organization mapping.
* Nodal analysis.
* Network function analysis.
* Network template analysis.
* Critical factors analysis.
* Link analysis.
* Social network analysis.
2-73. CA forces collate, process, analyze, and disseminate this civil network information for integration into
targeting and operations planning. CAO staff integrate this information into the operations process through CKI
in order to increase the commander’s and staff’s understanding of the OE and to further refine options for the
commander to extend the command influence or to produce desired effects in the civil component of the OE.
2-74. The output of this step is the identification of selected civil networks to be influenced, enhanced,
enabled, and integrated into operations to support the commander’s mission and update the common
operational picture, increase shared understanding of the OE, create freedom of action, and/or disrupt threats
directly or indirectly.
DEVELOP SELECTED CIVIL NETWORKS
2-75. CA forces develop civil networks following a detailed analysis of the strengths, capabilities
vulnerabilities, and motivations of the civil entities that comprise a potential network. Development of these
civil networks is coordinated with supported command’s targeting and mission planning sections. CA forces
select and develop civil networks to—
* Increase their capability and/or capacity for improved shared understanding and assessment of
the OE.
* Enable maneuverability of Army forces.
* Export capacity building to other civil networks.
* Increase freedom of action for maneuver and maneuver support forces.
* Enable unified action.
* Disrupt threats.
2-76. Civil networks are developed through programs, activities, and directed themes and messages that
either support a friendly or neutral network or disrupt a threat network. The goal of developing civil networks
is to provide courses of action that preserve combat power, consolidate gains, conserve finite resources,
provide freedom of maneuver to friendly forces, and/or deny the enemy freedom of maneuver and access to
the civilian population. |
3-57 | 39 | Civil Affairs Operations
2-77. Civil networks are developed through capacity-building efforts such as training and advising, or
through projects aimed at building legitimacy. Formal governmental networks are aided through SCA
activities and assistance as directed by the command. Building friendly networks facilitates freedom of
maneuver for U.S. and partner forces. This enables initial contact with potential connecting nodes and
streamlines transitioning networks between different CA elements. It is critical that the incoming and
outgoing CA elements update each other on situational understanding and transfer critical civil information
and knowledge. This prevents duplicate efforts by different CA elements and the misuse of finite resources.
This passing of contacts must also occur during the transition between competition to conflict, and during
the rapid movement of CA forces towards the advancing forward line of troops.
2-78. Inputs to this step include analysis of which civil networks are capable of, willing to, and committed
to achieving the commander’s stated objectives and creating effects. This also includes a CND or assessment
plan through which CA forces (in conjunction with unified action partners) assess the civil networks’
capability, willingness, and commitment to achieve objectives and create effects.
EVALUATE DEVELOPED CIVIL NETWORKS
2-79. Before, during, and after development, civil networks must be continuously evaluated based on the
individual strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and motivations of the specific networks. Through
development, civil network capabilities are increased, strengths are enhanced, and weaknesses are mitigated.
Constant vetting is necessary for measuring and evaluating how and whether the direction and motivations
of the developed civil network are in tandem with U.S. objectives. Civil networks developed to enable or
provide governance must be continuously evaluated for appropriateness of action.
INTEGRATE MOBILIZED CIVIL NETWORKS
2-80. CA forces integrate established and developed civil networks with operations, thereby the influence of
a commander into the civil component and assisting in achieving the commander’s operational goals, end
states, and campaign objectives.
2-81. CA forces integrate mobilized friendly civil networks to bring collective action, social pressure, or
political pressure around an area of common interest in support of the commander’s objectives. When
military forces are required to assist in or execute governance, CA forces integrate and manage established
civil networks to meet, enable, or enact governance requirements. Established civil networks have
capabilities and resources that increase governance capacity and efficiency. This allows commanders to
preserve combat power (rather than expending it conducting TG, for example during civil security) and use
that combat power to achieve and maintain dominance within the AO.
2-82. By acting as sensors in the civil environment, friendly networks aid in providing early warning of
threats and increasing shared understanding of the OE. When CA forces integrate civil networks with
operations, this enables a commander’s freedom of movement by—
* Facilitating joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration through civil administration.
* Preserving combat power.
* Consolidating gains through the actions of civil security and civil control.
* Minimizing negative and maximizing positive civil influences.
2-83. Neutral networks can be influenced to self-mobilize and provide passive support to U.S. presence and
deny access to threat actors. Mobilized friendly and neutral civil networks are key to denying threat networks
freedom of maneuver and access to the resources and capabilities of the IPI. Neutral civil networks are
dependable recruiting bases in the civil environment to gain information on threats to the civil population.
These mobilized civil networks—in conjunction with (PRC) measures—when integrated into operations by
CA forces enable the commander to effectively allocate finite resources, create effects, and reduce
operational friction during all phases of operations and throughout the competition continuum to reach
mission end states and goals.
Note: Further discussion of PRC is available in Chapter 3 of this FM. |
3-57 | 40 | Chapter 2
2-84. Once integrated into operations, CA forces utilize these civil networks to engage the OE and the
information environment to—
* Increase shared understanding of the civil component of the OE.
* Increase freedom of action.
* Find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component, both directly and indirectly.
2-85. When integrated with ongoing operations, these networks can extend the operational reach of the
commander to access denied, politically sensitive, or normally inaccessible areas, thereby creating multiple
dilemmas for an adversary force. The integration of these networks can increase the commander’s ability to
reach desired objectives within the AO and reduce operational risk to the force.
2-86. When feasible, these networks are developed and expanded during competition by CA forces. Under
the control of a commander, the networks may be further utilized during large-scale combat operations to
conduct CR and CE in their designated AO. These civil networks are developed to conduct the functions of
government, assist in stability, or increase local civil capabilities and capacities. They may also function in
areas where the commander and assigned forces do not have physical access.
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION
2-87. CKI provides the commanders, staff, and unified action partners with accurate and timely civil
knowledge to update the common operational picture, facilitate decision making, update Army processes,
develop branches and sequels for current and future operations, and inform all warfighting functions. CKI is
the process whereby civil information is collected, analyzed, and evaluated; processed into civil knowledge;
and integrated into the planning processes of the supported element, higher headquarters, USG and DOD
agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. The CA company is limited in its ability to conduct this
process, but the CA company commander is able to request additional support and capabilities from higher
commands to support these requirements. The CAO staff, at every echelon, supports the development of civil
knowledge and its integration into the operations processes and mission planning requirements of the
commander and staff to achieve situational understanding at that echelon.
2-88. The CAO staff, at each echelon, is responsible for integrating civil knowledge into the supported Army
commands, processes, and warfighting functions. CAO staff integrate civil knowledge through the Army’s
knowledge integrating processes and through integration with unified action partners. CA forces, at all
echelons, are focused on the collection of civil information and data by the civil collection plan. The civil
collection plan is a product resulting from civil preparation of the battlefield (CPB) that directs CA forces to
conduct CND, CR, or CE to identify gaps in the CCIR, resources and capabilities within the civil component,
and identification of civil strengths and vulnerabilities. CKI enables the commander and staff to understand
and visualize the OE more clearly and provide situational awareness for all elements in the OE. The
integration of actionable civil knowledge provides the commander and subordinate unit commanders the
ability to achieve decision superiority.
Note: Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion on CPB. Chapter 4 describes the process with
which CAO staff integrates civil knowledge into supported commands.
2-89. CA forces are trained and organized to focus on the CCIRs related to the operational variables of political,
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and civil
considerations of the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations [METT-TC]) in the OE. According to DODD 2000.13, this requires the DOD to
maintain a capability to provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of
civilian authorities.
2-90. CA forces provide the commander with expertise on the civil component of the OE through the
collection and development of civil data and civil information into civil knowledge. Civil knowledge is then
prioritized and integrated into the knowledge management, military decisionmaking process (MDMP),
targeting, other operating processes, and warfighting functions of the command. This civil knowledge is |
3-57 | 41 | Civil Affairs Operations
critical to the commander’s understanding, visualization, and planning for permissive, uncertain, and hostile
environments. Figure 2-4 depicts how data is converted to the achievement of understanding.
Figure 2-4. Achieving understanding
2-91. CA forces at all echelons collect civil data and information through the conduct of CND, CR, CE, and
initial and deliberate assessments and surveys. The data collected provides current civil component
information for analysis and evaluation through the CKI process. Civil considerations are analyzed and
developed from civil knowledge with use of the framework of ASCOPE within the civil component of the
commander’s OE.
2-92. The six steps of the CKI process are designed to logically generate situational understanding by taking
raw civil data from multiple sources, applying proven analysis techniques to the data, fusing the analyzed
data with the intelligence and information systems of units, prioritizing and integrating the resulting civil
knowledge at all military echelons and with unified action partners, and integrating civil knowledge. The
CKI process is conducted in the following six steps:
* Develop a civil information collection plan.
* Collect civil data.
* Process civil information.
* Analyze and evaluate civil information.
* Produce civil knowledge products.
* Integrate civil knowledge.
2-93. This civil knowledge informs all warfighting functions to ensure synchronization with the civil
component to reduce operational friction. This continual process ensures the timely availability of analyzed
and evaluated civil information to military forces throughout the AO in order to—
* Enhance understanding of the common operational picture.
* Update CA running estimates.
* Inform all integrating processes.
* Update critical information pertaining to all warfighting functions at higher echelons of command.
2-94. CA forces should also actively incorporate the supported unit’s information requirements into the civil
information collection plan to enhance the common operational picture, the CA running estimates, and the
IPB process through CKI. Every CA Soldier has the ability to conduct basic analysis and evaluation of civil
information. CMOCs, CKI sections, and higher CA headquarters analysts conduct in-depth analysis and
evaluation of that civil information as part of the process that enhances the situational understanding of the
supported commander, staff, and unified action partners.
2-95. The six steps are depicted in figure 2-5, page 2-18. |
3-57 | 42 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-5. Civil knowledge integration process
DEVELOP A CIVIL INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN
2-96. CA forces and staff identify specific requirements for civil information based on the commander’s
need for a detailed knowledge of civil capabilities, strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, and resources.
A civil information collection plan is designed to identify specific CA elements to conduct CND, CE, and
CR to collect civil information and data that is used to develop civil knowledge. CA planners
2-97. CA planners integrate the civil knowledge into current and planned CAO and Army operations
processes and to inform the warfighting functions. The civil information collection plan initiates the process
of achieving CKI which enables commanders and staffs to visualize the common operational picture and
understand the civil component of the OE.
2-98. An effective civil information collection plan enhances the understanding of the OE and is translated (at
the tactical level) into CONOPS and mission directives. The civil information collection plan must be cross-
referenced with current understanding of civil networks and sources of information that currently exist within a |
3-57 | 43 | Civil Affairs Operations
CA unit. Upon completion of cross-referencing and analysis, CA forces are assigned to conduct specific CND,
CR, or CE missions to engage or reconnoiter for the information needed.
Collect Civil Data
2-99. CA forces collect civil data at all levels of operation through CND; CR; CE; data mining; and
collaboration with IPI, interorganizational entities, NGOs, and other government agencies. The pertinent civil
data ultimately will become civil knowledge that will be used to inform the common operational picture,
assist in the commander’s visualization of the battlefield, and inform the warfighting functions.
2-100. The heart of collection is the daily interaction between U.S. forces and the various civilians in the
AO. The capture of these data points and the relevant contact information for each individual and entity is
equally important. The collection of civil data ultimately provides the commander with knowledge of civil
capabilities and resources that can be leveraged for military purposes. These leveraged capabilities and
resources can help meet military objectives, build capacity during TMA, consolidate gains, and help establish
civil control and civil security.
Process Civil Information
2-101. CA forces process civil information by collating civil data into groupings and then physically and
mentally manipulating separate pieces of data into information. Processing structures the data into a usable
form for analysis and evaluation. Processing focuses on information management, which is the science of
using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect
knowledge products, data, and information.
Note: Chapter 4 provides an example of a PMESII – ASCOPE crosswalk, which is used to collate
civil data.
Analyze and Evaluate Civil Information
2-102. CA forces analyze civil information for patterns and indicators of behaviors or trends that may have
predictive value and application. That analysis is then evaluated, interpreted, and prioritized by CA personnel
to assess, predict, validate, and determine the impact of ongoing operations on the mission of the commander.
Analysis and evaluation molds civil information into civil knowledge.
Produce Civil Knowledge Products
2-103. CA forces package civil knowledge into easily disseminated products. Civil knowledge products
and services are relevant, accurate, timely, and usable by commanders and staffs. These products are then
disseminated to relevant partners, NGOs, interagency partners, or integrated into the Army operations process
through the Army’s integrating functions.
Integrate Civil Knowledge
2-104. CA forces integrate civil knowledge into the knowledge management, MDMP, targeting operations,
and warfighting functions of the supported command. This process is generally conducted by CA personnel
on the staff but is also completed by CA elements that have been integrated into the supported command’s
operations. This civil knowledge is critical to forming the common operational picture, and framing the
commander’s understanding, visualization, and planning for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments.
2-105. If there is no CA staff assigned to the supported unit, the commander of the CA element (as allocated
by echelon) is required to become that CA staff officer while maintaining the command relationship with the
CA unit. Each CA unit, at each echelon, is required to ensure the command receives CA staff support.
Note: Due to the large number of interactions with local and host-nation partners, CA units require
a significant investment in foreign disclosure training and training about assets that are authorized
to conduct foreign disclosure. |
3-57 | 44 | Chapter 2
CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
2-106. Successful military operations place an increased emphasis on civil considerations in order to
achieve U.S. goals and objectives. By design, CA forces seek out and work with the civilian populations,
private entities, government institutions, international organizations, NGOs, interagency, and multinational
partners that reside or operate in and around an AO or area of interest. Bringing these capabilities and
resources together under the influence of the commander and across the competition continuum, enables
CAO to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize civil capabilities and resources within the area. CMI is the
requirement of the CA force to incorporate the interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of these
nonmilitary groups into military plans and operations to enable unity of effort. CMI fosters unified action
with the military force to achieve a desired outcome through the collaboration, integration, and
synchronization of partner knowledge and capabilities.
Civil-Military Integration in Somalia
In 1992, Soldiers of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed to Somalia in support of
Operation Restore Hope. Their primary mission was to conduct liaison between military
commanders, local leaders, and members of NGOs. This was accomplished through
the staffing of Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) in Humanitarian Relief
Sectors throughout Somalia. CA forces conducted medical and engineer assessments
of facilities, coordinated medical and engineer civic action projects, and conducted
liaison between military forces and local Somali communities.
Relations between the CA forces, NGOs, and local communities were generally
positive in nature. The Somalis respected the CA function as liaison between military
security forces and NGOs. This respect and access allowed for CA forces to better
map and understand the factional dynamics and coordinate actions between NGOs,
locals, and military elements.
2-107. There are two primary CMI actions that CA forces conduct within this construct. CA forces establish
a civil-military information sharing architecture and establish a CMOC. These actions are executed
exclusively by CA forces at all echelons, or by partner or allied forces augmented with properly manned and
equipped CAO staff elements. Properly executed CMI—through the use of civil networks—increases shared
understanding of the OE through information and knowledge transfer with unified action partners, preserves
combat power through increased capacity of civilian administration, and consolidates gains through rapid
stabilization efforts.
ESTABLISH CIVIL-MILITARY INFORMATION SHARING ARCHITECTURE
2-108. One of the most important actions to ensure CMI establishment is to create a civil-military information
sharing architecture. CA forces establish a civil-military information architecture (that is, information exchange
systems and processes) to share information between CA forces and applicable partners, such as—
* Developed or existing civil networks.
* Coalition forces.
* NGOs and governmental organizations.
* Host-nation governments.
* Elements of the private sector.
2-109. A well-defined and well-designed civil information architecture provides the best mechanism to
support understanding of the civil component of the OE. The OE includes natural and human-made terrain;
friendly, neutral, and threat elements among civil populations and government institutions; and the
interactions between the civil populace and key terrain in the civil component. In austere environments, CA
forces may have limited access to U.S. Army mission command systems, or even electricity. CA forces and
staffs may adapt their civil information architecture to concepts that can be written in text or posted on white |
3-57 | 45 | Civil Affairs Operations
boards for sharing with the HN and partners. Presentation of civil products is dependent on OE restrictions,
such as no electricity or other restrictive conditions.
2-110. Information-sharing systems must use the lowest classification possible to ensure the widest
distribution of information needed to coordinate with civilian agencies and organizations operating in the
same operational area as military forces. During large scale combat operations, or in response to a disaster,
the organic military information infrastructure enables CA forces to rapidly establish information-sharing
architecture to store, integrate, and disseminate critical civil information. This is accomplished by tying local
civilian entities into the military system or by providing data connections to civilian systems. This exchange
of information increases the amount of information collected and supports an improved situational
understanding, increased trust with other entities within the AO, unity of effort, and a more detailed common
operational picture.
2-111. At the staff level this architecture is centered on the technology and population-centric systems used
to manage and disseminate data with partners. Sharing this architecture is mainly done in a technological
manner, but also includes people and processes as well. Placing liaison officers within participating
government agencies and host-nation institutions, receiving liaison officers from other government agencies
placed inside commands, and conducting scheduled information-sharing meetings and other interactions are
key to achieving CMI.
2-112. Information-sharing architecture also includes working groups and coordination groups. The United
Nations cluster system is an example of a coordination group and is a common system established to coordinate
efforts following disasters. CA liaison officers assigned to participate in the United Nations cluster system (and
other information-sharing platforms) should be empowered by their command to freely disseminate properly
vetted and releasable civil knowledge products that are beneficial to the response effort. Liaison officers should
be placed within other governmental organizations, such as the DOS or the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). In addition, liaison officers from organizations such as USAID and the
DOS, should be placed in the command for seamless planning and coordination.
Note: For more information on the United Nations cluster system, see FM 3-07.
2-113. In large-scale combat operations, a supported CCDR might elect to establish a joint interagency
coordination group or joint interagency task force tailored to meet the operational requirements of the
combatant command. The joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) provides the
CCDR with the capability to collaborate, at the operational level, with civilian USG departments and
agencies. The joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) complements the interagency
coordination that takes place at the national strategic level through the DOD, National Security Council, and
Homeland Security Council systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and crisis action planning
and provide links back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts
of civilian USG departments and agencies.
Note: Due to the large number of interactions with local and host-nation partners, CA units require
a significant investment in foreign disclosure training and assets that are authorized to conduct
foreign disclosure.
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
2-114. Based on the operations plan of the commander, CA units (from the company through CACOM)
establish CMOCs, as necessary, to serve as a mechanism for integration, coordination, and synchronization of
the efforts of U.S. forces with unified action partners and IPI. A CMOC is task-organized with CA and other
enabling assets (such as military intelligence, engineering, medical, and transportation) to meet specific mission
tasks assigned to the CA element by the commander. The CMOC—in coordination with the S-9, G-9, and
J-9—is designed to share information, identify and distribute resources, and assist in the execution of CAO.
Figure 2-6, page 2-22, shows a notional CA CMOC configuration.
2-115. As an extension of mission command, the CMOC provides the supported commander the ability to
integrate, coordinate, and synchronize the activities of stakeholders, which are not under command authority, |
3-57 | 46 | Chapter 2
in an effort to enable unified action. This is a critical requirement in unified land operations during all phases of
operations and across the competition continuum. The CMOC is critical in the integration, coordination and
synchronization of CMI, CAO, and CMO in—
* Defense support to stabilization during competition.
* Joint reception.
* Staging onward movement and integration during transition to armed conflict.
* Consolidation activities, defense support to stabilization, and TG in rear areas (within transitional
military authority or SCA, as appropriate) during armed conflict and return to competition.
2-116. During unified land operations conditions may shift from offense to defense to stabilization, and
multiple conditions can exist simultaneously within an AO. CMOCs are an asset for the commander in their
role of collecting, analyzing, and evaluating information from multiple sources to track and understand
changing conditions. They can also play a role in planning future operations by integrating with stabilization
focused departments, agencies, and organizations.
Figure 2-6. Notional Civil Affairs civil-military operations center configuration
2-117. During conditions that primarily favor offensive operations, CMOCs at the tactical level remain as
mobile as the headquarters element. CMOCs—
* Provide information on resources within an OE that can assist the commander in achieving stated
goals and end states, while reducing internal resource consumption.
* Plan populace control measures to increase freedom of maneuver.
* Plan CAO to increase stability in newly liberated areas, and liaises with joint, interagency, and
interorganizational partners to prepare for the transition to stability operations. |
3-57 | 47 | Civil Affairs Operations
* Generate broad-spectrum information regarding the civil component, which commanders use to
develop an understanding of their OE.
* Support the commander and associated S-9, G-9, and J-9 staff elements by enabling consolidation
of gains through planning and conduct of the minimum-essential stability operations tasks to
establish civil security and provide immediate needs where they exist as a result of combat
operations.
2-118. The ability of the CMOC to coordinate directly with local government is often limited to the tactical
level. When coordinating with the local government, CMOCs initiate PRC measures, humanitarian
assistance, stability operations tasks, and other stabilization activities designated by the commander.
Coordination with the civil component (such as IPI, international organizations, NGOs) the private sector,
and the interagency, is minimized given the urgency of defeating lethal threats.
2-119. During conditions that favor primarily defensive operations, CMOCs become static, much like the
units they support. When static, CMOCs—
* Can focus on the civil conditions within a specific area.
* Increase the amount of civil information gleaned from civil network nodes and ground forces
operating in the area, the longer the CMOCs remain static.
* During mobile defense, work to establish, maintain, or hand off communication with civil entities
to ensure the planning for and conduct of minimum-stability tasks.
* Support the commander and associated S-9, G-9, and J-9 staff elements by enabling consolidation
of gains through planning for and conduct of minimum-essential stability operations tasks to
establish civil security and provide immediate needs where they exist as a result of combat
operations.
* Coordinate with entities within the civil component (such as IPI, international organizations,
NGOs, and the interagency) to—
Identify threats to the civil populace.
Execute TG.
Coordinate civil capabilities and resources to support the commander’s mission.
2-120. Developed and integrated civil networks allow the commander to maintain influence over those
areas that might need to be bypassed or vacated during mobile defense. CMOCs also plan and direct
minimum-essential stability operations where the need exists because of combat operations. During defense,
coordination with civil components (such as IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and the interagency) is
essential and urgent. This is due to the importance of defeating lethal threats within the civil component, and
the need to rapidly and effectively consolidate gains to free resources for prosecuting the enemy in other
areas of the OE.
2-121. CMOCs continuously plan for and reinforce stability during operations to enable consolidation of
gains. During conditions where stability operations tasks prevail, a combination of offensive and defensive
operations will continue, but in lesser proportion than support to stabilization. In such conditions, CMOCs—
* Gain the time necessary to establish and reestablish civil networks through CA units of action
within the civil component.
* Plan for civil component assessments.
* Recommend initial procedures necessary for commanders to expand beyond the minimum-
essential stability operations tasks and conduct the full range of stability operations tasks.
* Provide greater visualization of the civil component of the OE to the commander to enable
effective mission planning.
2-122. CMOCs orchestrate assessments and recommend initial procedures necessary for commanders to
expand beyond the minimum-essential stability operations tasks to conduct the full range of stability
operations tasks. CMOCs plan and direct the implementation of PRC measures, SCA, FHA, and nation
assistance to achieve stability in the civil component of an OE. Through the commander, the CMOC has the
latitude and freedom of action (that is necessary during stability-oriented operations) to exercise all its
capabilities. When fully operational, the CMOC provides commanders with greater visualization of the civil |
3-57 | 48 | Chapter 2
component within an OE to achieve essential stability objectives through unified land operations via the
execution of TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI.
2-123. The CMOC, at each CA echelon, is manned and equipped with the same mobility, communications,
and protection capabilities of its supported unit to facilitate quick and continuous interoperability in high
tempo, mobile, and static operations. It is also capable of locating and configuring itself in multiple
environments to facilitate the integration of, and interaction with, civilian partners who have varying degrees
of mobility, communications, and protection capabilities of their own. Finally, the CMOC is capable of
safeguarding the collection, storage, and transmission of sensitive or classified information in all operations. |
3-57 | 49 | Chapter 3
Unified Land Operations
If America’s armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over
two centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military
undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.
The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005:
Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15
Dr. Lawrence A. Yates
According to ADP 3-0, unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains,
and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in
sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability
operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions
for favorable conflict resolution. The goal of unified land operations is to establish
conditions that achieve the end state of the joint force command by applying land
power as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy.
This chapter details CA support to the Army’s strategic roles as addressed through
unified land operations and executed through decisive action. The strategic roles clarify
the enduring reasons for which the U.S. Army is organized, trained, and equipped.
Strategic roles are not tasks assigned to subordinate units nor are they phases. Strategic
tasks should not be confused with the joint phasing construct. The civil population
impacts every aspect of military operations. Failure to plan and failure to leverage the
IPI within the OE will lead to failure of the military mission and failure to achieve the
desired end state.
CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTRIBUTION TO OPERATIONS
3-1. The CA capability is vital to all operation types—across the competition continuum, in crisis or
conflict—to achieve the required effects and the desired end states of the commander. Land operations disrupt
routine life patterns of civilians who can dramatically impact military operations. It is critical for CA forces
to be involved in the planning, development, and execution of appropriate civil controls. This protects
civilians throughout military operations, reduces civilian casualties during consolidation of gains, and
minimizes negative impacts on maneuver forces during large-scale combat operations.
3-2. In addition, large-scale ground combat often disrupts lines of communications and access to basic
needs and essential services. There are few uninhabited places in which the Army is likely to fight so, Army
forces must plan to conduct the minimum-essential stability operations tasks (providing security, food, water,
shelter, and medical treatment) as an integral part of large-scale ground combat.
3-3. Before, during, and after large-scale ground combat, CA forces neutralize or disrupt adversaries by
leveraging civil networks, resources, capabilities, and relevant populations. The civil knowledge derived
from CNDE enables the situational understanding of the OE for the commander, enables visualization of the
battlefield for the commander, and increases the lethality of the unit through targeting processes.
3-4. The Army generates CA forces to plan, direct, and execute CAO. Each CA unit and staff section applies
the CA core competencies, which are nested within CAO, to virtual, cognitive, temporal, and physical
operations across the competition continuum. |
3-57 | 50 | Chapter 3
ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES
3-5. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force with unified land operations, thus
fulfilling the four strategic roles of—
* Shape OEs.
* Prevent conflict.
* Prevail in large-scale ground combat.
* Consolidate gains.
3-6. CA forces engage and leverage civil networks (people, organizations, and capabilities) to produce
desired effects and defeat threats in the civil component. These support the strategic objective of establishing
a secure and stable OE that is consistent with U.S. interests. CA forces support the Army’s strategic roles by
performing four core competencies of TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI in support of unified land operations as
executed through the elements of decisive action.
3-7. CA supports the strategic roles by—
* Conducting TG to improve and/or implement governance. This supports military objectives across
the competition continuum—such as interagency-led stabilization efforts, or DOD-led endeavors in
post-conflict or post-crisis environments. TG conducted by CA forces supports the whole of
government approach as well as U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments
of national power abroad through execution of governance tasks mandated by U.S. policy and
international law. TG supports military objectives across the competition continuum.
* Providing commanders with options to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component;
extending command and control; enabling freedom of movement and maneuver; and leveraging
available resources in the civil component. This is accomplished by engaging civil networks to
build friendly networks, influence neutral networks, classify unknown networks, and degrade
threat networks.
* Integrating civil knowledge gained through CNDE, CR, and other information collection methods
to enhance situational understanding for the supported commander, provide inputs to operations
and targeting processes, and provide detailed mission planning to units at all echelons.
* Conducting CMI to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces,
partners, IPI, and other non-military entities. This is done by directly supporting the achievement
of objectives related to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN.
CMI is essential to effective partnerships between U.S. forces, HNs and partner nations, unified
action partners, multinational forces, NGOs, international organizations, the interagency, and the
private sector. CMI enables unified action and supports unity of effort based on the commander’s
mission goals.
SHAPE
3-8. Shaping the OE helps set the conditions for successful theater operations. Shaping operations are
designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, assure friends, and set conditions for contingency plans. CA forces
support the shaping activities of the commander through conducting CAO, enabling unified action, and
providing an added stabilizing effect on the OE. Shaping activities precede operation order activation and
continue through and after an operation order is terminated, with the intent of enhancing international
legitimacy and gaining multinational cooperation. CAO, through its support of the elements of decisive
action, enable—
* Building civil networks through CNDE.
* Conducting preparation of the environment.
* Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.
* Mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.
* Setting the conditions for stability through TG.
* Setting the conditions for civil security through TG, CMI, and CNDE.
* Increasing governance capacity and capability through SCA. |
3-57 | 51 | Unified Land Operations
* Improving information exchange and intelligence sharing through the collaborative fusion of civil
and threat information through CKI and CMI.
* Developing allies and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations in
conjunction with inter-organizational partners.
* Shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries and allies.
* Increasing situational understanding of the civil component for the commander in exercise of
command and control.
PREVENT
3-9. Prevent operations include all activities to deter an adversary’s undesirable actions and cease
deterioration of a situation in a manner that is contrary to U.S. interests. These activities are an extension of
shaping operations. These activities are designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit
positions of relative advantage by raising the potential costs, to adversaries, of continuing activities that
threaten U.S. interests.
3-10. Prevent activities enable the joint force to gain positions of relative advantage prior to potential combat
operations. Prevent activities are weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and
to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation.
3-11. During operations to prevent, CA forces provide or enable stability and prevention of future conflict
by supporting Army forces in the performance of the following activities:
* Developing and executing flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.
* Enabling the Army to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; tailor forces;
and project power through CNDE and CMI.
* Increasing information collection through CNDE and CKI to provide detection, focus relevant
collection on named areas of interest, and recognize early warnings and threat indicators to the
civil component.
* Building friendly civil networks, influencing neutral civil networks, and degrading threat networks
in the civil component.
* Integrating friendly civil networks into operations to—
Increase governance capacity and capability through TG.
Disrupt threats in the civil component.
Increase freedom of action for U.S. forces.
Create multiple dilemmas to obstruct and disrupt threat actors.
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
3-12. The execution of large-scale combat operations involves the combination of offense, defense, and
stability operations tasks. Army forces defeat enemy organizations, control terrain, protect populations, and
preserve joint force and unified action partner freedom of movement as part of the joint team. During large-
scale combat operations, it is imperative to plan for civil considerations because they are a key piece of every
operation. CA forces conduct CAO in support of decisive action to enable the following components of large-
scale combat operations:
* Situational understanding through CKI to—
Effect enhanced decision making of the commander.
Enable command and control.
Inform warfighting functions.
* Stability within the civil component, through TG, focused through the five USG stability sectors.
* Targeting.
* Reduction of civil interference through TG, CNDE, and CMI.
* Enablement of freedom of maneuver through TG, CNDE, and CMI. |
3-57 | 52 | Chapter 3
* Preservation of combat power.
* Creation of multiple dilemmas.
CONSOLIDATE GAINS
3-13. CA forces secure the victory by consolidating gains. Army operations to consolidate gains include
activities to convert any temporary operational success into an enduring success and to set the conditions for
a sustainable security environment—allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.
Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving
success across the competition continuum. Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all
phases of an operation. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation conducted while
other operations are ongoing, and they enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest
time span. CA forces enable consolidation of gains through developing and leveraging of civil networks.
These networks have capabilities and resources that can be used to reestablish a sustainable security
environment that will allow commanders to use fewer military resources.
3-14. Army forces consolidate gains by executing area security and stability operations tasks (focused
through the five USG stability sectors) when the operational emphasis in an AO shifts from large-scale
combat operations. Consolidating gains enables a transition from the occupation of a territory and control of
populations by Army forces—that occurred as a result of military operations—to the transfer of control to
civil authorities. Activities to consolidate gains continue through all phases of a military operation.
3-15. CA forces must evaluate the capability and capacity of the HN to provide services. These forces must
also determine the ability of other USG agencies, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors to provide
support. CA forces, as required, will lead and direct these identified capabilities and capacities until the proper
civilian control is enacted. The goal is to address sources of conflict or friction, foster resilience of the HN,
and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. CA forces conduct CAO in support of the
elements of decisive action to—
* Conduct SCA and transitional military authority during transitions across the competition
continuum.
* Enable situational understanding through CNDE and CKI.
* Establish security, create stability, and reduce civil interference through CNDE, CMI, and PRC.
* Provide essential services (such as restoration or development) through TG.
* Prevent future conflict.
* Enable area security through CNDE by the identification of civil network resources, capabilities,
and capacities that can be utilized.
* Support stability operations tasks.
* Influence local and regional audiences.
* Plan and execute measures to transition from area security to civil security.
Note: FM 3-0 provides additional information on the strategic roles of the Army in support of joint
operations.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
3-16. Post-conflict stability activities begin with significant military involvement then, move increasingly
toward civilian dominance—with the diminishment of the threat and the reestablishment of civil security and
civil control. Termination or transition occurs when U.S. forces accomplish their mission, or the President or
SecDef directs that the mission be completed. Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation
require significant preparation, planning, and coordination among the partner nation government, HN,
interagency community, NGOs, and international organizations. During transition, U.S. military forces will
support long-term U.S. interests and strategic objectives, including the establishment of security and stability
in the region. |
3-57 | 53 | Unified Land Operations
3-17. Commanders must initiate transition planning prior to, or during, the initial phases of operation
planning to ensure they give adequate attention to this critical area. Leaders may base the criteria for
termination or transition on events, measures of effectiveness and success, availability of resources, or a
specific date. Transitions may occur independently, sequentially, or simultaneously across the AO or within
a theater. Ideally, U.S. forces execute each type of transition according to synchronized transition plans.
Depending on the situation, CAO in transition operations may be—
* Terminated.
* Transferred to follow-on forces.
* Transitioned to other government agencies, IPI, or international organizations.
3-18. CA forces play a critical role in TG planning. Based upon their expertise and understanding of
governance, stability operations tasks, and the USG stability sectors, these planners are the best individuals to
perform this function. Planners must have a clearly identifiable end state and transition of authority, or
termination criteria for the operation to accomplish the task of transition planning. The transition plan prioritizes
and plans for the successful handover of missions to interorganizational partners or a follow-on military force.
3-19. CA forces play a critical role in both planning and executing the transition process. In any major
operation or lesser contingency, CA forces have significant interaction with the civilian populace and the
local government. CA personnel must ensure that the gains made in the AO are not lost in the transition
process. Civil Affairs teams (CATs) are also expected to prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing
projects, coordination points of contact, resources, and other information for incoming forces or appropriate
civil authorities.
3-20. CA forces are heavily involved in the transition process. During transition, CA forces prepare to hand
over their role as the facilitator between U.S. forces and international organizations, NGOs, other interagency
organizations, and local government agencies. CA personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all
ongoing projects and coordination points of contact for all agencies, possible resources, and any other
information that may facilitate the transition process. CA forces support joint, combined, or single-Service
operations from the strategic to the tactical level.
DECISIVE ACTION
3-21. As depicted in figure 3-1, page 3-6, CAO are conducted within the four elements of decisive action,
which are offense, defense, stability, and DSCA. CA forces support unified land operations through all
phases at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Commanders at all levels must plan to
integrate civil considerations during operations. Within the OE, U.S. commanders could and can have
access to indigenous supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources that may be used to support military
operations. Combat operations can be disrupted by uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians
and hostile or illegal actions by entities within the populace. Leveraging, integrating, and coordinating of
IPI and local civil networks with military operations enhances the ability of the commander to achieve a
desired end state. |
3-57 | 54 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-1. Decisive action
OFFENSE
3-22. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat and destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain,
resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations impose the will of the commander on the
enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a
physical and psychological advantage. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden action directed
toward enemy weaknesses, which capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation fails to destroy
the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. Executing offensive operations compels the
enemy to react, which creates new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can then exploit.
Note: ADP 3-90 provides a detailed outline of offensive operations.
3-23. During offensive operations, the primary focus is defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of
terrain. During these operations, CA forces must also plan for civil considerations and threats within the civil
component. The full capability of the CA force is essential to and manifests in the conduct of successful
offensive operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CAO support to offense includes the
execution of all four CA core competencies and continuous analysis of the civil component—in terms of both
operational and mission variables—by CAO staff elements. Critical tasks executed by CA forces in support
to offense include—
* Providing employment options for CA capabilities.
* Gaining civil information and developing civil networks through CND, CR and CE.
* Collecting civil information to—
Develop and maintain the civil component of the common operational picture of the commander.
Enhance and enable freedom of movement and maneuver.
Enhance and enable preservation of combat power.
Enable the isolation of enemy forces.
Enable the legitimacy of the U.S. mission.
* Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of—
Irregular threats.
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
|
3-57 | 55 | Unified Land Operations
Critical links and nodes of civil networks.
Branches and sequels.
* Denying civil component resources to the enemy through CNDE.
* Leveraging established civil network capabilities and resources to create multiple dilemmas for
an enemy, thereby reducing the ability of the enemy to allocate resources and forces to the fight.
* Nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to minimize damage to the civil infrastructure
and culturally sensitive sites.
* Producing effects in the civil component of the OE.
* Integrating with operations to secure critical civil assets, thereby freeing U.S. forces for other
tasks.
* Tracking damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
* Providing civil component analysis to planning processes.
* Integrating civil knowledge to develop the common operational picture.
* Planning and conducting PRC operations to increase the burden to adversaries and threats (by
creating strategic and political dilemmas).
* Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the AO.
* Developing courses of action that will lead to area security and civil control by integrating stability
operations tasks.
* Preventing or mitigating civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military
operations on the civil populace.
* Identifying, preventing, and addressing friction points between military forces and the civil
population.
DEFENSE
3-24. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Normally the defense cannot
achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables
forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action. They defeat
attacks, thereby destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land,
resources, and populations. The purpose of defensive operations is to retain key terrain, guard populations,
protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. Commanders execute
defensive operations to gain time, promote civil security, and economize forces so offensive operations can
be executed elsewhere.
Note: ADP 3-90 provides a detailed outline of defensive operations.
3-25. The full capability of the CA force is essential to and manifests in the conduct of successful defensive
operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CAO support to defense includes the execution of
all four CA core competencies and continuous analysis of the civil component—in terms of both operational
and mission variables—by CAO staff elements. Critical tasks executed by CA forces supporting defense
include—
* Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
* Collecting civil information through CNDE to—
Develop the civil component of the common operational picture for the supported commander.
Isolate enemy forces.
Fill intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps through CND, CR, and CE.
* Providing civil component analysis and evaluation through CNDE and CKI toward the
identification of—
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
|
3-57 | 56 | Chapter 3
Critical links and nodes.
Branches and sequels.
* Developing and engaging civil networks to provide civil security and civil control.
* Denying the enemy civil component resources through CNDE.
* Creating multiple dilemmas for an enemy thereby reducing the ability of the enemy to allocate
resources and forces to the fight.
* Nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to minimize damage to the civil infrastructure
and culturally sensitive sites.
* Tracking damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
* Providing options to the commander to produce effects in the civil component of the OE.
* Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets,
infrastructure, and resources.
* Integrating civil networks to secure critical civil assets, thereby freeing U.S. forces for defensive
tasks.
* Planning and conducting PRC options to increase the burden to adversaries and threats (by
creating strategic and political dilemmas).
* Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the AO.
* Advising on counter mobility operations directed at economically significant roads, railways,
bridges, and other infrastructure.
* Advising the commander on civilian movements during the planning for emplacement of obstacles,
such as minefields.
* Developing courses of action that will lead to area security and civil control by integrating stability
operations tasks.
* Preventing or mitigating civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military
operations on the civil populace.
* Identifying and leveraging civil network capabilities, capacities, and resources to enhance the
commander’s mission and reduce the use of military resources.
* Identifying and addressing friction points between military operations and the civil population.
STABILITY
3-26. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0).
According to ADP 3-0, “Commanders are legally required to provide minimum-essential stability operations
tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These essential services provide minimal levels of
security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.”
3-27. CAO are inherently stabilizing in the context of U.S. interests and consolidation of gains.
Stability operations—
* Support governance by an HN, an interim government, or a military government.
* Involve coercive and constructive actions.
* Help to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among
local or regional adversaries.
* Assist in building relationships among unified action partners.
* Promote U.S. security interests.
* Help establish and improve political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting
transition to a legitimate host-nation government.
* Cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives.
* Must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve causes of instability. |
3-57 | 57 | Unified Land Operations
Note: JP 3-07, ADP 3-07, and FM 3-07 provide additional information on stability.
3-28. CA forces set the conditions for stability operations by conducting CAO during the execution of
offensive and defensive tasks to preserve combat power and lethality by mitigating the effects of the civil
component on combat operations. The level of CAO support required to execute stability operations is
directly related to the conditions within the OE. The CAO staff continually monitors the condition of the
HN throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian component, and
recommends military government or functional skills required to support this critical phase. CAO support
conventional forces, SOF, USG agencies, and the host-nation civil administration in transitioning power
back to a local government.
3-29. CAO provide the commander with the ability to execute the stability mechanisms of compel, control,
influence, and support in order to establish a lasting and stable peace. TG, CNDE, and CMI, specifically provide
the commander the capability to interface with the civil component. CNDE actions enable the commander to
compel in order to effect behavioral change. TG and CNDE actions provide the commander the ability to control
in an effort to establish civil order and safety. CNDE and CMI provide options to influence in an effort to alter
opinions of friendly, neutral, unknown, and threat populations. The implementation of all CA core competencies
provides support to the civil population in order to set conditions necessary for the instruments of the host-
nation government to function effectively.
3-30. Integration with civil networks in the AO also enables a commander to fully employ the defeat
mechanisms of dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Civil networks provide advanced indicators and warnings
of enemy presence through civil knowledge (which is integrated within CPB to inform IPB of a command)
and targeting processes to allow for more accurate and effective planning.
3-31. The full capability of the CA force is essential to, and manifests in, the conduct of successful stability
operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CAO support to stability includes the execution of
all four CA core competencies and continuous analysis of the civil component—in terms of both operational
and mission variables—by CAO staff elements. Critical tasks executed by CA forces supporting stability
include—
* Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
* Collecting civil information through CND, CR and CE.
* Integrating civil knowledge to develop the common operational picture.
* Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of—
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
Critical links and nodes of civil networks.
Branches and sequels.
* Providing government function specialists to enable SCA and transitional military authority
missions.
* Providing government function specialist support as required.
* Strengthening governance and participation through CMI and CNDE.
* Safeguarding civil component resources and capabilities.
* Planning and directing PRC, in coordination with the provost marshal and military police that
support transitional public security to promote, restore, and maintain public order, and protect
civilian populations when civil security has broken down or is nonexistent.
* Developing mitigation strategies to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and
culturally sensitive sites.
* Identifying and tracking damage to civil infrastructure, personal property, and culturally sensitive sites.
* Integrating civil knowledge into the planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets, and
infrastructure.
* Planning and executing DC operations to address endangered populations. |
3-57 | 58 | Chapter 3
* Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the AO.
* Fostering economic stability and development.
* Assessing the activities and capabilities of the IPI, unified action partners, and interagency in
relation to achieving national policy goals and shaping the environment for interagency and host-
nation success.
* Conducting budgetary programming and management in order to resource stability projects and
programs in support of stability objectives.
* Providing liaisons to the interagency, IPI, and unified action partners, as necessary.
* Identifying and assessing the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness of CAO.
* Through CMI, facilitating the integration, coordination, and synchronization of civilian agencies
and organizations with military forces.
* Providing civil component analysis and evaluation to identify root causes of instability.
* Providing CAO support to the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegration of former belligerents
into civil society, and providing a secure environment.
* Providing CAO support to rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security
forces.
3-32. Figure 3-2 depicts CA support to a corps offensive. |
3-57 | 59 | Unified Land Operations
Figure 3-2. Civil Affairs support to a corps offensive
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
3-33. According to DODD 3025.18, DSCA is support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DOD civilians,
DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the SecDef, in coordination
with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in 32 USC status) in response |
3-57 | 60 | Chapter 3
to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. DSCA is a task executed in the homeland and
in U.S. territories. DSCA is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local
authority. National Guard forces are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When
federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under federal military command and
control at all times.
3-34. It is DOD policy that the DOD will cooperate with and provide DSCA as directed by and consistent
with applicable law, presidential directives, executive orders, and DODD 3025.18. Defense assistance is in
support of civilian authorities who retain primary responsibility. DODD 2000.13 states “DOD Civil Affairs
capabilities may be used to assist in domestic emergencies and to provide other support to domestic civil
authorities consistent with law and in accordance with DODD 3025.18, DODI 3025.21, other DOD issuances,
and supporting plans.”
3-35. United States Northern Command and United States Pacific Command are the combatant commands
with standing missions to conduct DSCA providing, as directed by the President or the SecDef, military
assistance to civil authorities including crisis management and consequence management (domestic incident
management). In addition, USSOCOM has responsibilities for countering weapons of mass destruction and
civil disturbance operations in accordance with DODD 2060.02 and DODI 3025.21. Generally, CA tasks
include—
* Providing consultation to decision makers through the defense coordinating officer.
* Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of DSCA tasks through the
joint task force (JTF) and the defense coordinating officer.
* Executing CAO in support of selected DSCA tasks, as needed or directed.
3-36. CA government function specialists may participate in DSCA based on METT-TC analysis.
Note: DODD 3025.18, JP 3-28, and ADP 3-28 provide additional information on the role of U.S.
forces in DSCA. DODI 3025.21, DODI 5400.11, and DODD 5200.27 provide information
regarding the legalities of the collection of data during DSCA.
POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL
3-37. All military operations are conducted in environments where a civilian presence or influence might
impact the mission. Military operations can be disrupted by actions of the IPI, non-state actors, and entities
inside and outside of the AO. Whether controlled, uncontrolled, or uncoordinated, these civilian movements
can adversely affect the battlefield. Civilian movement within the OE (such as illegal activities, protests,
displaced civilians, or any other civil functions) can impact the mission of the commander. Commanders
must consider PRC measures in the planning and execution of operations. These measures must always be
coordinated with local civil leadership and conducted in support of civil administration.
3-38. PRC is a primary requirement of the military police, and CA forces are integral to the planning,
execution, and assessment of military operations concerning PRC measures. Properly conducted, PRC is an
extension of the functioning local civil administration and is more effective when led and executed locally.
3-39. CA forces are highly attuned to the impacts that military operations may have on the civil population,
and impacts the civil component will have on military operations. They assist in the development of courses
of action that will support the goals of the commander while having minimum impact on civil-military
relations and current and future operations. Civil networks developed during the CNDE process are integrated
into operations to aid in the planning and execution of PRC actions. Utilizing these networks builds
legitimacy with local populations. It also provides for the preservation of combat power of commanders
during large-scale combat operations and requires fewer military resources during competition and return to
competition.
3-40. PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components—populace control and resources control.
Both components are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or
military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce PRC measures. For practical and security
reasons, military forces employ PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the competition |
3-57 | 61 | Unified Land Operations
continuum. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations. CA forces
provide multiple capabilities to the commander assisting in the development and execution of these measures.
Every CA unit has the ability to access government function specialties capabilities within the CACOM to
facilitate the identification, requisition, and utilization of the full range of CA government function specialist
capabilities, as required, in support of PRC efforts.
POPULACE CONTROL
3-41. Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability operations in the
areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves—
* Establishing public order and safety.
* Securing borders, population centers, and individuals.
3-42. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure
environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace, resources, and capabilities.
CA forces are critical in the planning, development, and assessment of these control measures to ensure
commanders are provided with the effects that meet mission requirements. Control measures require a
capability to—
* Secure borders.
* Protect the population.
* Hold individuals accountable for criminal activities.
* Control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk.
* Reestablish essential civil services.
* Set conditions in the OE that support stability through unity of effort.
3-43. The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly
with the type of mission and the OE. The OE includes a wide variety of intangible factors, such as the culture,
perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, enemy, neutral, or friendly political and social systems.
These factors must be analyzed and continuously assessed throughout the operations process to develop a
situational understanding of the environment. The characterization of the OE as permissive, uncertain, or
hostile further impacts the planning for and the execution of populace control measures.
3-44. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access
to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures may
include the following:
* Establishing border security, including immigration procedures to—
Prevent trafficking of persons.
Regulate immigration and emigration.
Establish control over major points of entry.
* Establishing identification procedures, including securing documents relating to—
Personal identification.
Property ownership.
Court records.
Voter registries.
Birth certificates.
Driver’s licenses.
|
3-57 | 62 | Chapter 3
* Establishing and disseminating rules relevant to movement, including—
Curfews.
Movement restrictions.
Travel permits.
* Instituting policies regarding the regulation of air and overland movement.
* Relocating the population as necessitated by military operations.
* Establishing transitional political authority and interim civil administration.
3-45. CA forces provide the commander and staff the capability to plan, synchronize, and assist in the
execution of populace control through mobilization of developed civil networks and SCA. Once the populace
control measures are in place, CA forces assess these measures, provide feedback to the commander on the
effectiveness of the measures, and provide recommendations on adjustment to the measures as necessary.
3-46. DC operations are a special category of populace control that requires extensive planning and
coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations. DC operations are actions required to
move or keep civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster.
The disaster may be natural (such as a flood or an earthquake), human-made (such as combat operations,
social, or political strife), or a technological (such as radiological disaster, network outage, intrusion,
cyberspace attack, or a complete loss of electricity).
3-47. The requirement to conduct DC operations may occur during any phase across the competition
continuum. The execution of CNDE is critical to identifying and developing civil network capabilities,
capacity, and resources that can be used to provide for the needs of DCs. If DCs are within their nations’
borders, USAID may be involved in providing assistance, whereas a refugee falls under the assistance of the
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration of the DOS.
3-48. The supporting tasks conducted by CA forces in DC operations support the freedom of movement of
the friendly forces while safeguarding the civilian population. These tasks include—
* Identifying or evaluating existing host-nation and international community DC plans and operations.
* Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
* Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
* Publicizing control measures among the IPI.
* Assessing measures of effectiveness.
* Participating in the execution of selected DC operations as needed or directed and in coordination
with the internationally mandated organizations (such as United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the International Committee
of the Red Cross).
* Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures and
deconflicting with host-nation plans.
* Identifying DC locations and composition.
* Coordinating with the sustainment warfighting function to deconflict humanitarian assistance in
the unit’s area of responsibility.
* Collect information regarding possible threat locations, composition, and pending attacks.
* Collect civil information regarding civil conditions of the locations from which the DCs travelled.
* Develop civil networks to leverage capabilities, capacities, and resources within the AO to support
DCs. |
3-57 | 63 | Unified Land Operations
3-49. The term DC is unique to the DOD and not used by the DOS and NGOs. These organizations use the
term internally displaced persons for civilians displaced within their country and the term refugees for people
who flee their country of origin and cross an international border. The following distinctions exist among the
various categories of DCs:
* According to JP 3-29, displaced persons is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally
displaced persons collectively. In addition—
Returnees are displaced persons who have returned voluntarily to their former place of
residence.
Resettled persons are a subset of displaced persons. These are civilians who have been able
to resettle in a third country, usually with the assistance of United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the government of their new country of residence, rather than
returning to their previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement.
Resettled persons are usually a very small subset of the original displaced population as
opportunities for third country resettlement are rare.
* Evacuees are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by military direction for
reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.
Note: The term evacuee is unique to the DOD and not used by the DOS (except for noncombatant
evacuation operations), NGOs, or international organizations.
* Internally displaced persons are any persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects
of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
* Migrants are persons who belong to a normally migratory culture who may cross national
boundaries or have fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or
ethnic persecution. Migrants travel to escape economic stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast
to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death.
* Refugees are any persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside
the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail
themselves of the protection of that country.
* Stateless persons are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose country of origin
cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.
3-50. While the following are not categories of DCs, they are categories of civilians with whom military
members may come into contact in an operational area and should be part of this discussion for FHA:
* Trafficking Victims. Simply stated, trafficking in persons is modern-day slavery, involving
victims who are forced, defrauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation, such as
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision of, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a
commercial sex act, in which any of these apply:
A commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion.
The person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age.
The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision of, or obtaining of a person for labor or
services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion is for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
* Vulnerable Persons. Vulnerable persons are persons who may not have equal access to
humanitarian assistance because of physical, cultural, or social barriers (examples include,
women, children, the elderly, the disabled, ethnic minorities, and people living with an incurable
virus or disease). While this is not a legal distinction, it is important to describe this population,
as it is the most vulnerable who often have the greatest needs.
Note: JP 3-29 provides additional information on DCs. |
3-57 | 64 | Chapter 3
3-51. In DC operations, controlling agencies (such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross, or the HN)
normally care for the basic needs of DCs. This usually means they provide food, water, shelter, sanitation,
and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable
disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces.
Note: FM 3-39, ATP 3-39.30, and ATP 3-57.10 provide additional information on DC operations.
3-52. During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians—
* Those remaining at their homes or places of habitual residence.
* Those dislocating.
3-53. U.S. policy dictates the placement of people in one of these categories. The U.S. category may conflict
with how international organizations, NGOs, and the HN refer to the people. Therefore, CA forces executing
CNDE must ensure that the description of each category of civilian is accurate and used the same throughout
the process. These categories become critical as CA forces develop civil networks to support DCs and execute
TG to consolidate gains, enable area security, and increase civil security.
3-54. The first category includes civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians
from other countries. Civilians within this category may need help. If they are able to care for themselves,
they should remain in place.
3-55. On the other hand, DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence hinder
military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing,
and similar items. These needs will be identified through the execution of CNDE, and the civil networks that
are developed can be leveraged to assist with appropriate resources to support DCs. DCs may not be
indigenous to the area or to the country in which they reside.
RESOURCES CONTROL
3-56. Resources control provides security for the natural and human-made materiel resources of a nation-
state, mobilizes economic resources, denies enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the
effectiveness of enemy agents and criminal entities. Resources control measures include, but are not limited
to—
* Licensing.
* Regulations or guidelines.
* Checkpoints.
* Border security, to include—
Customs inspections.
Ration controls.
Amnesty programs.
Inspection of facilities.
3-57. Resources control directly impacts the economic system of an HN or territory occupied and governed
by U.S. forces. Resources control measures regulate public and private property and the production,
movement, or consumption of materiel resources. Controlling a nation’s resources is the responsibility of
indigenous civil governments. During a civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and
enforce resources control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stability
operations in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to
economic and infrastructure development tasks.
3-58. Enactment of resources control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be enforced
justly and firmly by the governing authority. U.S. forces will not execute these measures unless the
requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the security forces of the HN, the HN has requested
assistance, and appropriate U.S. authorities (to include the U.S. Ambassador) have granted approval for such
assistance. |
3-57 | 65 | Unified Land Operations
3-59. Resources control includes property control which is the control of movable and immovable private
and public property. CA generalists support the lead of the HN by facilitating integration and security while
CA military government and government function specialists support by providing advice, assistance, and
training for host-nation forces executing these missions. Resource control measures may include—
* Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
* Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
* Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
* Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (such as food and fuel).
* Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop
contraband (such as drugs and natural resources).
* Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
* Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives
to bring trade into the market.
* Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
* Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants.
* Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
* Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and
archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.
3-60. Implementing effective resources control requires the host-nation government or transitional military
authority to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. The message
to the population must clearly convey that the control measures are necessary to ensure the security of the
populace. Enforcement of the restrictions must be consistent and impartial so that the government establishes
and maintains legitimacy among the populace. A well-crafted PRC plan limits control measures to the least
restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect. Continuous assessment of the OE measures the
effectiveness of the restrictions, the attitude of the population toward the government, and the impact the
restrictions have on the OE. As the security situation improves, restrictions should be modified or rescinded.
HOMELAND DEFENSE
3-61. Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President
(JP 3-27). The DOD has lead responsibility for homeland defense. The strategy for homeland defense (and
DSCA) calls for defending the U.S. territory against attack by state and non-state actors through an active,
layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protects the homeland.
The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to
U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland.
3-62. CA forces conduct CAO in support of homeland defense if directed by government authorities. CA forces
possess unique capabilities to assist in the stabilization of civil infrastructure and functions. This includes the
establishment of a CMOC for integration, coordination and synchronization of resources, personnel, and efforts
by multiple entities that are working toward stabilizing the impacted areas. The capabilities provided by CNDE,
CR, CE, and SCA, along with the processing of civil information through CKI enables the transition of
operations back to the proper civilian authorities more quickly.
THE EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD
3-63. CA forces interact with the civil component of the OE. This increasingly places their interactions in
dense urban environments, cyberspace, and the information environment. CA forces must understand the
environments that are frequented by civilians and how to enable commanders to monitor and produce effects
in those environments. |
3-57 | 66 | Chapter 3
DENSE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
3-64. With the increasing urbanization of modern society conflicts will inherently take place in dense urban
environments. These environments present a number of challenges that the Army must prepare for and
address if it will be successful in future missions. Major cities grow together forming regions of dense
populations that stretch hundreds of kilometers and can encompass over 100 million people. These dense
urban environments are extremely complex in the following ways, which make them difficult to control:
* Modern cities are multidimensional (subterranean, surface, and vertical).
* Cities are interconnected through globalization, social media, and modern methods of
communication/information dissemination.
3-65. Through the execution of TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI, CA forces provide critical civil knowledge to,
and expand options for, the supported commander. This increases situational understanding of the OE and
allows clarity for visualization of the battlefield and actionable civil knowledge for the decision-making
process. During the fast pace of offensive operations commanders may bypass large population centers.
When passing by or through large population centers civilians and military elements may come into conflict
and slow the advance. CA forces develop networks and support governance in these population centers as a
way to enable host-nation elements to maintain control.
3-66. By developing these civil networks, CA forces can identify civil capabilities, capacities, and resources
that can support consolidation of gains, provide area security, and enable civil security within these
population centers. CA forces can conduct TG to ensure that government functions continue until those
functions can be turned over to proper civilian authorities.
3-67. Using these methods, CA forces can use combat power elsewhere on the battlefield to defeat the enemy
when CA forces enable a commander to—
* Preserve combat power.
* Extend command and control into areas that are normally not within the control of the commander.
* Control influence (through CA units of action and their associated civil networks).
* Increase the maneuverability of forces.
3-68. In defense and stability operations, CA forces develop and mobilize networks that deny space to threat
networks and simultaneously provide governance to address the hardships placed on the population due to
the destruction caused by large-scale combat operations. These networks allow for an effective transition of
the OE to host-nation control. These networks also reduce the amount of military resources necessary to
consolidate gains. These efficiencies enable commanders to focus military resources and capabilities in areas
where civil networks are not as robust or in locations where there is a lack of essential civil capabilities and
resources.
CYBERSPACE
3-69. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks
of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12). Friendly, enemy, adversary,
and host-nation networks, communications systems, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical
infrastructures are all part of cyberspace.
3-70. Cyberspace has increasingly become a domain that will provide the capability for essential interactions
between CA forces and the civil populace. Social media, internet-based radio stations, internet-based
communications systems, and other advancements have enabled CA forces to conduct information collection,
engagement opportunities, and influence activities using cyberspace resources. CND, CR, and CE might even
be conducted through social media. Given the proper communications resources, CA forces are able to
maintain near constant contact with IPI, multinational forces, unified action partners, NGOs, international
organizations, and private entities while not being able to physically maintain a presence in that environment.
3-71. CMOCs utilize local social media and cyber networks to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize critical
information to unified action partners and to ensure dissemination of civil knowledge to all required entities
within the AO, thereby enabling unity of effort. Ensuring that CA forces are able to use the cyber domain |
3-57 | 67 | Unified Land Operations
efficiently will help fill critical gaps in information requirements and relieve the supported command from
providing critical communications to attached CA forces.
INFORMATION ADVANTAGE
3-72. CAO are designed to provide accurate, balanced, credible, and timely civil information to local
officials, agencies, and external audiences. CA forces and CAO planners ensure CAO are consistent with the
themes and messages of the command in order to ensure legitimacy and unity of effort. While the public
affairs office, judge advocate general office, and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces are purveyors of
messaging for the commander, CA forces enable messaging through dissemination of information to
developed civil networks and other civil entities within the civil component of the AO. This dissemination
of information enables developed civil networks to assist in the planning, preparation, execution, and
assessment of targeted effects.
Information Operations
3-73. According to FM 3-13, CAO are an information-related capability. CAO are a capability that
commanders employ to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. CA representation in the IO
working group assists in—
* Identifying civil networks to target.
* Synchronizing communications media, media assets, and messages.
* Providing news and information to the local population.
* Provide civil knowledge.
3-74. CAO complement IO and facilitate mission accomplishment by enhancing the relationship between
the civilian populace and the military force. CAO enhance or enable conditions that create a decisive
advantage in the information decision making cycles. It is critical when CA forces are used to support IO,
that CA forces maintain their credibility with the civilian populace.
Note: For more information regarding IO see FM 3-13.
Public Affairs
3-75. As an official spokesperson, the public affairs officer ensures—through established public affairs
guidance—that the command speaks with one voice and observes operations security. CA, PSYOP, and
public affairs elements use many of the same communications media and present similar messages to
audiences for varied intended purposes. CA personnel engage IPI and unified action partners to influence,
coordinate, and integrate their support for the command’s messaging. PSYOP personnel address friendly,
neutral, and adversary populations to influence. Public affairs personnel address national and international
news media and U.S. forces in order to inform.
Military Support to Information Operations
3-76. The importance of integrating CAO with the activities of PSYOP and public affairs personnel cannot
be overstressed. For example, if information released to the host-nation populace by CA and PSYOP
personnel conflicts with information released to news media and U.S. Soldiers through public affairs
channels, the result may be a loss of credibility for all involved and a negation of any positive
accomplishments.
COMPETITION CONTINUUM
3-77. Competition is the condition when two or more actors in the international system have competing and
potentially incompatible interests but neither seeks to escalate to open conflict in pursuit of those interests.
While violence is not the adversary’s primary instrument in competition, challenges may include a range of
violent instruments including irregular forces with uncertain attribution to the state sponsor. This closely
corresponds with the shape and prevent strategic roles and is where the vast majority of military operations |
3-57 | 68 | Chapter 3
are actioned. Winning in competition is critical for the strategic interests of the U.S. government because it
reduces the requirement to deploy and utilize combat forces to achieve diplomatic goals.
3-78. During competition, regional security is promoted by the forward presence of strategic land forces,
accessing potential trouble spots, and enabling partner nations to participate in a community (or network) of
partners to establish or maintain security and stability. CA forces are an economy of force effort to maintain
awareness of conditions within an OE. CA forces augment and enable U.S. embassies or U.S. missions, joint
force headquarters, or a theater Army by building the civil knowledge necessary for strategic leaders to make
decisions.
3-79. CA forces identify critical civilian infrastructure status and capabilities, and areas of cultural
significance (protected targets) in order to develop running estimates for mission analysis and course of action
development. They also identify causes of instability within a civil society and identify potential threat
networks as they develop within the society.
3-80. CA forces engage and develop friendly or neutral networks that enable rapid entry of other U.S. or
coalition capabilities. These forces may also support civil administration during competition to help the
country team develop democratic institutions or to address governmental sectors that CA forces have civil
functional expertise to advise in.
3-81. Civil preparation of the environment is the continuous development of civil knowledge within an
area of operations to help commanders identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated
with operations for stability and security activities. This minimizes the requirement for U.S. Army forces
to conduct some of these actions and facilitates the maintenance or restoration of host-nation governance and
legitimacy.
3-82. A critical strategy for winning in competition is through the provision of effective, responsive local
governance. This strategy uses a whole of government approach which engages the diplomatic, information,
military, and economic instruments of national power. CA forces develop and integrate mobilized civil
networks that are in line with U.S. interests; deny space, resources, and capabilities to threat networks; and
simultaneously provide governance, as directed, to address the hardships placed on the population due to the
destruction of infrastructure during manmade or natural disasters. CAO degrade the freedom of action of
threat networks, reduce their flexibility and endurance, and disrupt their plans and coordination.
3-83. Degrading access to the civil populace, resources, and capabilities places critical threat functions at
risk, and denies threat elements the ability to synchronize or recruit from vulnerable populations. The
application of CAO capabilities in a complementary and reinforcing manner with the instruments of national
power creates critical problems for the threat element. These operations effectively reduce the ability to
engage and mobilize a population in support of the ideals and goals of the threat networks, thereby eroding
both the effectiveness and the will to fight of the threat network. |
3-57 | 69 | Chapter 4
Operations Structure
Intelligence about civil considerations may be as critical as intelligence about enemy forces.
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process
This chapter describes the CA role in Army operations through CAO planning, design,
and capabilities within the operational framework and defines its integration into the
Army’s operational structure.
CA Soldiers, elements, and units are assigned to, have a command relationship with,
or provide support to Army, joint force, coalition, and U.S. government civilian
headquarters at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This chapter focuses on
the CA role in Army operations. CA leaders and CAO planners must clearly understand
the Army operations structure, planning, and orders production. They must understand
the mechanics that underlie Army operations and the manner in which civil knowledge
and CAO are integrated into the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and
CONOPS.
OVERVIEW
4-1. The operations structure consists of the operations process, combat power, and the operational
framework. This is the Army’s common construct for unified land operations. It allows Army leaders to
organize efforts rapidly, effectively, and in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations
process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting
functions provide a common organization for critical functions. The operational framework provides Army
leaders with conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations.
4-2. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out
effective ways of bringing that future about. Well-considered and developed plans lead to success. Plans for
military operations are based on an imperfect understanding and uncertainty of how the military situation will
evolve once the operation has started. CAO is one tool a commander uses to enhance understanding of the OE.
4-3. A plan does not guarantee mission success. Instead, a well-developed plan ensures the consideration of
multiple competing factors within the OE, adherence to the commander’s mission and intent, and the ability for
leaders and Soldiers to be flexible and adaptable during implementation. In the military, decisive actions demand
a flexible approach to operations that adapts methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures
the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. Following this type
of planning process—whether for offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA operations—offers the best opportunity
for mission success.
CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-4. Commanders organize forces according to purpose by determining whether each unit’s operation will be
decisive, shaping, or sustaining. These decisions form the basis of the CONOPS of the commander through the
MDMP and METT-TC analysis. Through the MDMP and evaluation of METT-TC variables, the CAO planner
recommends the allocation of CA forces in support of operations. During MDMP, the CAO staff integrates civil
knowledge into the process to enhance the understanding of the OE in which they are planning operations. This
information is then shared with the commander and staff for that OE. At each stage of MDMP there are specific
inputs for civil considerations of the OE which help to drive the decision-making process. |
3-57 | 70 | Chapter 4
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION INPUT TO THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
4-5. The organic or attached CAO staff at maneuver and maneuver support units are responsible for the
integration of civil knowledge into the MDMP. Civil knowledge that is an output from the CNDE and CKI
processes flows to the CAO staff elements from the supporting CA units and teams. The CAO staff then ensures
that actionable civil knowledge is applied throughout the MDMP to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civilian
capabilities and activities with all other staff processes to promote unity of effort in the development of the
commander’s plan.
4-6. Through CNDE and CKI, CA personnel develop civil information and knowledge. Through CKI, that
knowledge is assessed for operational relevance and integrated into the MDMP. A greater understanding of
the interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the resident population, government institutions,
and interorganizational partners allow for more precise courses of action for the commander as a guide for
mission planning. Figure 4-1 shows where those inputs fit into the MDMP.
Step in MDMP Inputs Outputs
Higher headquarters’ plan or order of a Initial guidance from commander.
Step 1 new mission anticipated by the Initial allocation of time.
Receipt of commander. Review of area study.
Mission Open source resources.
Initial estimate.
Higher headquarters’ plan or order. Problem statement.
Higher headquarters’ knowledge and Mission statement.
intelligence products. Initial assessment.
Knowledge products from other Initial commander’s intent.
organizations. Initial planning guidance.
Army design methodology products. Initial CCIRs and critical information.
Updated IPB and running estimates.
Civil considerations from the area study.
Step 2 Initial CAO running estimate.
CA input to restated mission statement.
Mission Analysis Assumptions.
Identifications of mission and operational
Restated mission statement.
variables and potential centers of gravity.
Identification of civil information
Trend verification.
requirements.
Civil vulnerability identification.
Layered geospatial information.
Civil information for the common
operational picture.
Mission statement. CAO statements and sketches such
Initial commander’s intent, planning as—
guidance, CCIRs, and critical information. Tentative task organization.
Updated IPB and running estimates. Tactical tasks assigned to CA
forces.
Assumptions.
Broad concept of operations.
Step 3 CAO running estimate.
Course of Action Continued and refined center of gravity CAO concept of support.
Development analysis. Revised planning guidance.
Updated CAO running estimate.
Updated assumptions.
Identification of MOEs and MOPs.
Identification of center of gravity.
Initial civil information collection plan.
Figure 4-1. Civil Affairs inputs and outputs in the military decision-making process |
3-57 | 71 | Operations Structure
Step in MDMP Inputs Outputs
Refined and updated center of gravity Refined courses of action.
analysis. Potential decision points.
Updated running estimates. Civil considerations for wargaming.
Step 4 Revised planning guidance. War game results.
Course of Action Course of action statements and sketches. Initial assessment measures.
Analysis Updated assumptions. Updated assumptions.
Updated CAO running estimate. Refined civil information collection plan.
Tactical tasks assigned to CA forces.
Civil information collection requirements.
Center of gravity analysis. Evaluated courses of action.
Updated running estimate Recommended courses of action.
Refined courses of action. Updated running estimates.
Step 5 Evaluation criteria. Updated CAO running estimate.
Course of Action War game results. Updated assumptions.
Comparison Updated assumptions.
Civil considerations from initial
assessment.
CAO concept of support.
Updated running estimates. Commander-selected course of action
Step 6 Evaluated courses of action. and any modifications.
Course of Action Recommended course of action. Refined commander’s intent, CCIRs,
Approval and critical information.
Updated assumptions.
Updated assumptions.
Commander-selected course of action Approved OPLAN or OPORD that—
with any modifications. Produces Annex K.
Refined commander’s intent, CCIRs, and Assists in the production of Annex V.
Step 7
Production, critical information. Understanding of plan or order by
Dissemination, Updated assumptions. subordinates.
and Transition of Refined CAO concept of support. Revised civil information collection plan.
Orders Tasks to CA forces. Any CA-specific FRAGORDs.
Civil information collection requirements. Updated restricted target list.
Updated no-fire area.
Note: Purple italicized text denotes CA requirements.
Legend:
CA Civil Affairs MDMP military decisionmaking process
CAO Civil Affairs operations MOE measure of effectiveness
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement MOP measure of performance
FRAGORD fragmentary order OPLAN operation plan
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield OPORD operation order
Figure 4-1. Civil Affairs inputs and outputs in the military decision-making process (continued)
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION IN THE INTEGRATING PROCESSES OF THE ARMY
4-7. CKI is executed by performing analysis and evaluation of civil information and data for operational
relevance and integrating the resulting actionable civil knowledge into the Army’s integrating processes.
These integrating processes include—
* IPB.
* Information collection.
* Targeting.
* RM.
* Knowledge management. |
3-57 | 72 | Chapter 4
4-8. The integration of civil knowledge allows commanders to increase their situational understanding of
the OE and allows staffs to produce plans and operations orders armed with the most accurate and current
understanding of the civil component of the OE. As missions intersect with varying types of civilian activity,
this increased understanding is essential to enable unified action at all echelons and achieve the mission,
goals, and end state of the commander.
CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
4-9. Civil preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an
area of interest to determine their effects on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations. The role of CA
forces is to engage and leverage the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing
governance. This systematic process is informed by IPB and also informs IPB and these integrating processes
are critical to the development of the common operational picture.
4-10. CPB is conducted by all CA forces at all echelons, is critical to informing the CNDE process, and
provides direction for the engagement and development of specific civil networks. CPB analyzes and
evaluates the political, economic, and social operational variables in an area of interest to determine
opportunities and risks in an AO. The goal is to provide the commander with the capability to enhance,
enable, or provide governance. The analysis and evaluation of civil information gained through CNDE, area
studies, initial and deliberate assessments, and other CA processes, is developed into civil knowledge.
CA forces integrate civil knowledge into CAO and all Army planning processes and use this civil knowledge
to inform the warfighting function. This civil knowledge—
* Provides commanders with a greater situational understanding of the OE.
* Enables the commander’s visualization of the battlefield.
* Provides options that facilitate decision making and enables information advantage.
* Allows planners to develop effective plans and operations.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
4-11. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables
of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on
operations (ATP 2-01.3). IPB is normally led by the S-2 or G-2, or the intelligence functional cell—with staff
participation from all functional and integrating staff cells. The CAO staff provides operationally relevant
civil knowledge to the S-2 or G-2 within the fusion cell of the command (where civil knowledge is used to
inform IPB). Within the IPB process, analysts examine information and knowledge related to predetermined
and evolving civil information requirements. These civil information requirements include the effect of
sociocultural factors within a particular geographic area, the availability of critical resources for use by
military or civilian activities, and the efficiency of integration of important or influential civil network
structures in achieving mission objectives.
4-12. Civil considerations of ASCOPE assist commanders in refining their understanding of the operational
variables of PMESII-PT and mission variables of METT-TC within the AO. CAO staff integrate civil
knowledge into the IPB process to increase understanding of civil considerations and identify risk to mission.
4-13. Understanding the relationship between military operations, populations, local governance structures,
properties of cultural significance, and other aspects of the OE is essential to developing effective plans and
conducting successful operations. Combat operations directly affect the population, infrastructure, and the
ability of the force to transition authority to local control. The degree to which the population is expected to
support or resist U.S. and friendly forces also affects the offensive and defensive operational design.
Commanders and staffs use personal knowledge, civil knowledge gained from CA forces and staff, and
running estimates to assess social, economic, and political factors.
4-14. Commanders consider the relationship between these factors as they relate to illicit activities such as
lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency that adversely affect the operation. Commanders then use this
understanding to estimate the effects of friendly actions, predict potential outcomes, and direct subordinates. |
3-57 | 73 | Operations Structure
INFORMATION COLLECTION
4-15. Information consists of data, in context, to inform or provide meaning for action. Information collection
is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the
processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations
(FM 3-55). CA forces are a valuable information collection and management capability because of their
interaction with populations, government institutions, and inter-organizational partners.
4-16. CA forces collect information through physical engagements such as CR, CEs, area studies, and
assessments. When physical meetings cannot take place due to constraints within the OE, these meetings can
be done via computer or cell phone resources. CR, and CE can be conducted using satellites, computer links,
or cell phone resources. This is done in the virtual context. CA forces also collect information through
integration, coordination, and synchronization with unified action partners.
4-17. CA forces collaborate with other information-related capabilities within the information environment
to ensure synchronization of information collection to meet the priorities of the commander. The S-9 or G-9
CAO staff officer develops a civil information collection plan that supports the information requirements of
the commander or fulfills information gaps in the CA area study. This collection plan is passed down to the
lowest echelons, allowing for collection plans to be developed down to the CAT level.
TARGETING
4-18. According to JP 3-0, targeting is a complex and multidisciplinary effort that requires coordinated
interaction among many command and staff elements. The functional elements necessary for effective
collaboration participate in the targeting working group.
4-19. CA forces provide commanders with options for engagement of the civil component of the OE by
utilizing CATs and partner civil networks. This engagement capability empowers commanders with courses
of action to produce nonlethal effects in the civil component of the OE. Through CKI, supported commanders
are provided with actionable civil knowledge, which is needed to identify and produce—
* Targeted lethal and nonlethal effects in the civil component with the least amount of force.
* Least disruption to the population.
* The most efficient use of finite resources and capabilities.
* Leverages in the capabilities and resources of the civil network.
RISK MANAGEMENT
4-20. The Army uses RM to help maintain combat power while ensuring mission accomplishment in current
and future operations. The Army also uses RM to reduce collateral damage to civilians, critical infrastructure,
and noncombatants. According to JP 3-0, hazards create the potential for harmful events that cause
degradation of capabilities or mission failure.
4-21. CAO staff analysis identifies threats to military operations and hazards to the force that emerge from
within the civil component or that will affect the interests, functions, or capabilities of civil sector groups or
organizations. For example, the presence of a large civilian population and its daily activities may create
hazards to U.S. forces during operations. High civilian traffic densities may present hazards to convoys and
maneuver schemes. Planners must assess such diverse elements as insurgents, riots, and criminal activity that
emerge from civil society. Legal, regulatory, or policy considerations may introduce hazards that affect
operations and other activities. Commanders and staffs must also weigh the importance of protecting civilians
from violence during operations.
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
4-22. Knowledge management is performed by the staff to enhance the commander’s understanding and
support the commander’s decision making. Knowledge is information that has been analyzed to provide
meaning or value and is evaluated for operational implications. CA forces enhance the knowledge
management process by producing civil knowledge through CKI. Civil knowledge is produced by analyzing
and evaluating civil data and civil information gained through engagement with civil networks, through CR |
3-57 | 74 | Chapter 4
and CE, and through conducting area studies and assessments. CAO staff, at all echelons, integrates civil
knowledge into the operations process in order to create a common understanding of the mission and OE.
STAFF INTEGRATION
4-23. The commander’s intent links the mission, CONOPS, and tasks to subordinate units. CAO staff integrates
the capabilities of supporting CA forces into the operation plan in support of the commander’s intent. CAO staff
also integrate civil knowledge gained through CNDE, CKI, and CMI into the operational planning cycle of the
commander all the way through execution of CKI. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of Annex K (Civil Affairs
Operations) to the operation plan of the supported command addresses the CAO scheme of support and
subordinate unit tasks. Paragraph 3 of Annex K also coordinates instructions that CA and other Army forces
execute to accomplish the commander’s intent. The execution paragraph outlines what the supported commander
wants CAO to achieve in support of the mission.
4-24. CA forces execute TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI to enhance the understanding of the OE, visualization
of the battlefield, and decision-making of the commander and staff so that they may accomplish missions
and achieve unified action. In the absence of an integrated CA staff, CA forces assigned by echelon will be
required to conduct the CAO planning requirements. The following CA elements provide direct input to, or
augment, the planning process:
* Assistant chief of staff, CAO (G-9).
* Battalion and brigade CAO staff officer (S-9).
* Civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9).
* Theater CAPT.
* CAPT.
* CAO working groups.
* Security force assistance brigade CAO staff section.
* CA company staff.
* CMOC staff.
* CATs.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER
4-25. The G-9 or S-9 is the dedicated principal staff officer position, from battalion through theater Army,
responsible for all matters concerning CAO. The G-9 or S-9 is required at all echelons—from brigade combat
team (BCT) through theater Army, and in special operations formations at battalion and group. Roles of the
G-9 or S-9 include—
* Evaluating civil considerations during mission analysis.
* Recommending the establishment of a CMOC in conjunction with the supporting CA unit commander.
* Working with interorganizational partners to prepare the groundwork for transitioning the AO
from military to civilian control.
* Advising the commander and staff on the effect of military operations on civilians in the AO
relative to the complex relationship of these people with the terrain and institutions over time.
* Advising the commander on options for CA units to engage and influence civil networks and the
population in order to produce desired effects in the civil component of the OE.
* In coordination with the supporting CA unit commander, maintaining responsibility for developing
plans and operations that enhance the relationship between Army forces and the civil authorities and
people in the AO.
* Preparing Annex K of the operation order or operation plan.
4-26. During the MDMP, the G-9 or S-9 provides the commander with an analysis of the civil factors that
shape the OE. As a part of mission analysis, the METT-TC mission variables are evaluated for those aspects
of the OE that directly or indirectly affect a mission. The CAO staff provides the commander with a detailed
civil considerations analysis which focuses on how ASCOPE affects the civil component of the AO. |
3-57 | 75 | Operations Structure
CAO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other
USG departments and agencies and participating nonmilitary organizations in order to synchronize U.S. and
multinational efforts. Responsibilities of the G-9 or S-9 include—
* Enhancing the conduct of CAO by integrating the capabilities of a CA government function
specialty skills into areas which are normally the responsibility of civil government.
* Evaluating civil information and data in collaboration with other staff entities to develop civil
knowledge and to advise the commander on recommended courses of action.
* Ensuring civil knowledge is integrated with supporting CA elements.
* Ensuring civil knowledge, in conjunction with CMI, is integrated with unified action partners to
achieve unity of effort.
* Coordinating with the fires support officer on the restricted target list, which should include
cultural, religious, historical, and high-density civilian populace areas.
* Participating in the fires targeting board.
* Providing options for producing effects in the civil component of the OE.
* Providing the intelligence staff officer information gained from civilians in the AO and
information gained about the civil component of the AO.
* Coordinating with the surgeon on the military use of civilian medical treatment facilities,
materials, and supplies.
* Coordinating with the IO officer to ensure planned activities are synchronized and disseminated
and information is not contradictory.
* Coordinating with the public affairs officer on supervising public information media under civil control.
* Providing instruction to units on identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support
civilian populations and strengthen internal defense and development.
* Identifying and assisting the assistant chief of staff, signal or the battalion or brigade signal staff
officer with military use of local information systems.
* Coordinating with the provost marshal to control civilian traffic in the AO.
* Assisting the G-4 or S-4 in identifying and procuring services, facilities, supplies, and other
materiel resources available from the civil sector to support operations.
* Analyzing and evaluating the effects of civilian activities on military operations.
* Analyzing and evaluating the effects of military operations on the HN and its population.
* Analyzing HN evacuation plans to propose DC movement, routes, and assembly areas.
* Assessing the ability of the IPI to care for civilians.
* Assessing the IPI resources to support military operations.
* Identifying private sector, NGOs, and other independent organizations operating in the AO.
* Identifying U.S. departments and agencies in the AO and their objectives, capabilities, and
activities.
* Preparing the CAO annex and its attachments.
* Preparing the CAO running estimates.
* Participating in boards, groups, centers, and cells to integrate the analysis of civil considerations.
* Planning for and determining the requirements and priority of the distribution of Class X across
the civil component.
* Coordinating with the G-4, S-4 or, functional quartermaster organization for the storage and
movement of Class X.
* Coordinating with the division or corps transportation officer to deconflict humanitarian assistance
convoys.
* Providing guidance for the civil information collection plan.
THEATER CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING TEAM
4-27. The theater CAPTs are five regionally-assigned planning teams, consisting of five CA planners
assigned to a theater Army with duty at their respective geographic combatant command. The role of the |
3-57 | 76 | Chapter 4
theater CAPT is to provide a dedicated CAO planning capability. At geographic combatant commands that
have an established J-9, the theater CAPT is a critical capability that serves to strengthen the directorate’s
efforts. The J-9 and theater CAPT develop, integrate, synchronize, and coordinate CAO plans, policies,
programs, and operations with theater-aligned CA forces and interagency entities. These are integrated with
and enhance the geographic combatant command’s strategic plans, campaigns or operations, and theater
security cooperation initiatives. Responsibilities of the theater CAPT include—
* Developing, integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating strategic and operational-level CAO into
theater campaign and contingency plans in all phases of operations.
* Developing—from civil knowledge—the strategic-level civil component factors that inform
operational variables (PMESII-PT) and incorporating them into the joint planning process.
* Advising and assisting combatant and Service component commanders to develop, implement,
assess, and execute theater-level, population-centric policies, strategies, and plans for confronting
challenges to U.S. national security interests across the competition continuum.
* Providing theater-level analysis and evaluation of civil strengths and vulnerabilities based on
operational variables.
* Liaising across military and civilian organizations.
* Participating with and supporting the joint interagency coordination group or joint interagency
task force if either is part of the joint staff.
* Assisting the CCDR and staff to—
Integrate stability activities and considerations into their theater campaign plans, theater
strategies, and applicable DOD-directed plans.
Incorporate stability activities and concepts into training, exercises, and experimentation.
Incorporate military government operations into training, exercises, experimentation, and
planning.
CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING TEAM
4-28. CA forces, from battalion through CACOM, organic CAPTs. These dedicated planning elements are
designed to meet specific mission requirements. They are also designed to be assigned or attached to the
commander and staff to assist with CMO planning; develop and incorporate CA plans, policy, and programs,
and to assist with CAO planning (including planning for stability activities and military government).
CAPTs support the CMO staff of the joint force commander (JFC) and other military planners throughout
the joint planning process and are normally assigned or attached for operations. Responsibilities of the CAPT
include—
* Integrating civil knowledge—derived from analysis and evaluation of civil networks and civil
information affecting the civil component of the AO—into planning.
* Developing, from civil knowledge, the strategic-level civil component factors that inform the
operational variables of PMESII-PT and incorporating it into the MDMP or the joint planning
process.
* Developing annexes in support of current operations and contingency plans.
* Developing, integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating strategic and operational-level CAO into
theater campaign and contingency plans in all phases of operations.
* Advising and assisting combatant and Service component commanders to develop, implement,
execute, and assess theater-level and population-centric policies, strategies, and plans for
confronting challenges to U.S. national security interests across the competition continuum.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP
4-29. Commanders may establish a CAO working group for bringing all the stakeholders together to focus
and synchronize their efforts in achieving the priorities of the commander. In addition to the CAO working
group, CAO planners ensure that they are actively involved in the IO working group; the intelligence
fusion working group; the targeting board; and other boards, cells, or working groups relevant to the
current operation. |
3-57 | 77 | Operations Structure
4-30. The composition of the working group changes based on the level of command, but the G-9 or S-9
should chair the group. Other members of this working group may include the following:
* Government sector functional specialists.
* Director, CMOC.
* CA unit representatives.
* Targeting working group.
* IO representative.
* Medical representative.
* Engineer representative.
* Provost marshal or representative.
* Staff judge advocate representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit’s senior rule of law
officer.
* Chaplain or religious affairs noncommissioned officer.
* Interagency representative, if applicable.
* Political advisor, if applicable.
* Public affairs officer.
* S-2, G-2, or J-2 targeting officer representative.
* S-3, G-3, or J-3 current operations representative.
* S-4, G-4, or J-4 logistics representative.
* S-5, G-5, or J-5 plans representative
* Resource management representative.
* Subordinate liaison officer.
4-31. As these lists (and the doctrinal publications that discuss them) are not all inclusive, CA professionals
should constantly assess the battle rhythm of the units they are assigned to, attached to, or supporting in order
to identify those opportunities to engage and provide input to best support the mission of the commander. Some
additional Army and joint boards, groups, centers, and cells are listed below:
* Rules of engagement or rules for the use of force working group.
* Emerging planning teams.
* Assessment working group (plans or future operations cell).
* Operations and intelligence working group (intelligence cell).
* Protection working group (protection cell).
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION
4-32. The security force assistance brigade CAO staff section is responsible for—
* Training and advising foreign security force counterpart staff elements to enable them to build
rapport with IPI, civilian unified action partners, and independent foreign agencies.
* Enhancing foreign security forces capabilities to assess interests, functions, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities of IPI, civilian unified action partners, and independent foreign agencies.
* Integrating civil knowledge into all CAO and Army planning processes.
* Ensuring CPB outputs are integrated into other staff functions.
* Training foreign security forces to plan and conduct FHA projects that reduce civilian
vulnerabilities to security and environmental threats.
* Providing liaison between the security force assistance brigade and the country team.
* Establishing relationships with civil component entities in the area of interest of the security force
assistance brigade.
* Assisting in identifying and coordinating host-nation support resources for security force
assistance brigade mission support.
* Identifying and monitoring civil considerations in the area of interest of the security force assistance
brigade and assessing their impact on the mission of the security force assistance brigade. |
3-57 | 78 | Chapter 4
* Promoting the legitimacy of the missions of the security force assistance brigade and the foreign
security force among the IPI.
* Understanding civil knowledge of the civil component to update the common operational picture.
4-33. Understanding the civil component of the OE requires comprehension and analysis of civil considerations
within METT-TC. Civil considerations reflect the influence of human-made infrastructure; civilian institutions;
and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct
of military operations. CAO staff organizes data collection for mission analysis according to groupings of
ASCOPE (for example, cities and population sizes, resources, capacities, ethnicities, and cultural nuances as
they apply to the IPI). CAO planners and staff must understand the strengths, vulnerabilities, opportunities, and
threats of the civil component with respect to each category represented by ASCOPE.
4-34. Army forces use operational variables to understand, analyze, and evaluate the broad environment in
which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of
the environment that apply to their mission. Military planners describe the OE in terms of operational
variables. Operational variables describe the military aspects of an OE and the population’s influence on it.
Joint doctrine identifies the operational variables as political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure (PMESII). U.S. Army doctrine adds two variables to the joint variables, physical environment,
and time (PT), to make PMESII-PT.
4-35. The application of the elements of ASCOPE during civil considerations analysis identifies the key and
decisive civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each operational variable.
For example, analysts would apply ASCOPE to the entire concept of economics. The staff would ask the
questions—
* Where are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?
* Where are the key and decisive structures associated with economic activity?
* What are the key and decisive economic capabilities that forces must engage and restore (for
example, banking)?
* What are the key and decisive economic organizations?
* Who are the key and decisive economic people?
* What are the key and decisive economic events?
4-36. These questions would lead to effective CAO supporting plans to the CONOPS of the commander,
identify measures of effectiveness, and provide the basis for troops-to-task analysis.
4-37. An operational and mission variable analysis approach integrates people and processes by using
multiple information sources, collaborative analysis, and evaluation to build a common, shared, holistic
knowledge base of the OE. Operational variable analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach toward
situational understanding, distinguished by an analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE
within each variable. Table 4-1 depicts a PMESII/ASCOPE analysis. |
3-57 | 79 | Operations Structure
Table 4-1. Example of political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure/areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events analysis
P M E S I I
Land use, natural Religious, economic, rivers and
Designated areas Radio,
resources and ethnic estuaries, electric
National, provincial, of responsibility, Television,
A district and municipality jurisdictions, key financial services, demographics, internet service service area/grid,
markets, cities, population centers sewer networks,
borders and boundaries terrain, security areas, word of
agricultural, mining, tribal boundaries, water tables,
and party and tribal boundaries, mouth,
manufacturing, traditional meeting irrigation networks,
affiliation areas Coalition bases, newspaper,
salvage yards, sites, national and water distribution
historic ambush graffiti
import/export local parks systems
Infrastructure from Operating bases,
Commercial Parks, club houses, Radio, television, Interstate system,
which any level of provincial/district
centers, sport facilities, satellite reception, rail system,
S governance or political police banks, energy religious structures, internet systems, power generators
activity is perpetuated headquarters and
infrastructure, historic/cultural/ transmission secondary and
including National, buildings, border
transportation archeological sites, facilities and tertiary roads,
Provincial and district points of entry,
(highways, rail, informal gathering relays, print government
centers, government or gang locations,
ports, airports), places, universities shops, internet buildings, banks,
political buildings, militia, enemy or
processing plants schools, courthouses cafes schools
meeting halls insurgent bases
Response times, Commodity market
Influence control or Land ownership, Social media,
training, aircraft Economic class interstate
communication land use, water internet,
and boats number system, social commerce,
C between the governed resources controls, telephone, radios
and type mobility, tribal regional economic
and the governing. energy resources or television per
of personnel, influences, religious zones, jail/prison
Monetary policy, Fiscal controls, food household,
security, offense influences, support capacity,
policy, informational production, raw printing abilities,
and defense networks emergency
distribution material mining literacy rate
weapons services
Coalition/host-
Political parties or Ministries,
nation Army, Navy, Religious, News networks,
opposition, Regional criminal
O collective security Air Force, Marines, organizations educational, and religious Ministries, unions,
border police, advocacy groups, organizations,
organizations or national commodity construction firms,
highway police, relief organizations, ministry of public
alliances, religious, exchange, trading medical and
municipal police, government affairs, religious,
intergovernmental guilds, banks, Transportation
national police, ministries, police, tribal, political and
organizations, money exchanges, companies
national worship, tribal, government
nongovernmental government support
investigation family, sports, clubs businesses
organizations agencies
services, gangs
Business leaders,
Media owners,
Defense and ministers, banks, Political leaders,
reporters,
P Key leaders, Formal coalition leaders, non-state entities, minorities, influential influencers, Civil servants,
ministries, morale business owners, families, religious builders,
and informal political Religious leaders,
of members, labor leadership, leaders, tribal or contractors, local
leaders, religious teachers,
commanders, poverty level, village elders, key development
leaders, judges, clergy prominent
police chiefs, tribal foreign investors, mentors with social councils, engineers
families, tribal
leaders landholders, money influence
leaders
lenders, criminals
Elections, holidays Days of worship, Days of worship,
Lethal events, loss Medical, police,
Elections, tribal planting seasons holidays, holy days, media publishing
of leadership, transportation,
gatherings, provincial harvest seasons births, weddings, dates, project
operations, peace Disruptions of
E council meetings, drought, flood, rain, deaths and bazaar openings, civilian
operations support, Service, major
protests and speeches, snow fall or melt days, traditional casualty events,
attacks, crime, construction
religious gatherings, cycles, financial holidays, state opening and
riots, political and projects or
political meetings, crisis, business holidays, religious closing of media
labor unrest, capability/capacity
rallies, trials, debates activity, agricultural holidays, gatherings, outlets,
regional meetings increases
activities, weather festivals information media
Legend:
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and event
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure |
3-57 | 80 | Chapter 4
MISSION VARIABLES
4-38. During the planning process, CA planners at each echelon provide the commander with analysis and
evaluation of the civil aspects that shape the OE using the evaluation tool known as ASCOPE. The CAO
staff apply the METT-TC mission variables, concentrating on the “C” as the civil considerations aspect of
the AO during conduct of the MDMP. This is similar to how observation and fields of fire, avenues of
approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment evaluate the physical terrain of METT-TC.
The six characteristics of ASCOPE are discussed in FM 6-0.
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES
4-39. The conditions of an OE are described in terms of operational variables. Operational variables describe
not only the military aspects of an OE, but also the population’s influence on it. Army planners analyze an OE
in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time—PMESII-PT. Joint planners use only the initial six variables,
not including physical environment and time.
4-40. The operational variables provide the commander with a systems perspective of the OE. A systems
perspective facilitates Army design methodology and provides the staff with a common frame of reference
for collaboration with unified action partners. Civil data and information for each of these variables that has
been transformed into civil knowledge informs the IPB process, warfighting functions, and the common
operational picture through CKI.
Note: JP 5-0, JP 3-24, JP 3-57, ADP 5-0, and FM 3-24 provide additional information on operational
variables.
SYNTHESIZING OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES
4-41. A fully developed collaborative environment comprised of individuals, organizations, knowledge
management systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge
is ultimately desired in order to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations. Commanders seek to make
informed decisions faster to achieve decision advantage over the enemy or adversary. Commanders and staffs
require the capability and capacity to create a shared understanding.
4-42. Knowledge management techniques and procedures support collaboration within the headquarters,
agency, interagency, and subordinate unit. These techniques and procedures must encompass the processes
and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate orders that support
information and CA products. Integration of civil knowledge through the CKI process, automation, and
decision-support capabilities all enhance the efficiency of the battle rhythm of the organization and the
commander’s decision making. The collaborative environment must provide the right information, to the
right people, at the right time, and in an understandable and actionable format or display.
4-43. CA forces prepare area studies, conduct assessments, and create and maintain running estimates to
assist in the planning and updating of mission plans across the competition continuum. CA-produced area
studies, assessments, and running estimates include geo-references. These geo-references allow for future
geospatial application of these products into operations and mission planning sequences. These products
develop and update the understanding of the civil component for the common operational picture of the
commander. The information and material contained within these products are critical for the situational
understanding of the commander and the staff and the formation of the commander’s vision for the OE. This
information includes—
* Identification and reinforcement efforts to consolidate gains.
* Information requirements that drive and focus the civil information collection plan.
* Impacts of civilian activities on military operations.
* Impacts of military operations on resident civilian populations, government institutions, and
interorganizational partners.
* Development of courses of action. |
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* Development of branches and sequels.
* Completion of objectives, goals, and milestones.
* The transition of Army operations across the competition continuum or to follow-on military or
civilian organizations.
CIVIL INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN
4-44. Information requirements are, in intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary
and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to
meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. (JP 2-0). Commanders cannot successfully accomplish
activities involved in the operations process without the necessary information to make informed decisions.
CND, CR, CE, CNA and evaluation, and data mining (the collection of information from a combination of
open- and restricted-source materials for routine and continuous study and research) should be focused on
specific civil information requirements and synchronized into the civil information collection plan. For the
purposes of the mission command, a validated civil information collection plan establishes requirements that,
when answered, will fill a gap in knowledge and understanding of the civil component through analysis and
evaluation of civil considerations within an AO and the area of interest.
4-45. CND, CR, and CE fill identified gaps or requirements in the civil information collection plan and may
be conducted concurrently with other operations. The commander’s intent, priority intelligence requirements,
and the CCIRs focus CAO and the civil information collection plan. In return, CA forces execute CKI to
provide the operations process with a continual flow of essential and actionable civil knowledge during
offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This civil knowledge enables CA forces to conduct CAO that
effectively identify and assess civil strengths and vulnerabilities in order to provide commander-driven
effects in the civil component, thereby enabling U.S. military forces to achieve decisive results.
Note: FM 3-55 provides the fundamentals of information collection.
AREA STUDIES
4-46. CA personnel obtain, analyze, evaluate, and record information in advance of the need. The basic
evaluation of an area is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil
components of the area in question. The CA area study is a pre-mission study prepared regionally, by country,
or for a specific subnational area within a country, as the baseline research document for CA operational
planning. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the
social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security
systems and institutions of a country. The CA area study uses a combination of open- and restricted-source
materials and, when possible, interviews of people who recently operated in the area. CA personnel update
the information detailed in the CA area study periodically, as required, prior to the receipt of a mission.
CA requires the ability to retrieve accurate and current data on demand. This requirement necessitates a
system to capture, store, collate, and produce this data in the form of a report, which is comprised of all
available collected data at any given time.
4-47. This baseline information is used as the basis for the creation of the CAO running estimate during the
planning process. If an area study for a particular area does not already exist, then the CA force must use all
available resources to develop a hasty study during mission preparation and planning. If unable to develop a
hasty study, it must use similar research and analysis techniques to produce the initial CAO running estimate,
which will be continuously updated over time.
CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENTS
4-48. CA assessments provide a precise means to collect meaningful and significant civil information.
CA Soldiers perform three basic types of assessments—the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment,
and the survey. Each type of assessment is based upon civil information, requirements necessary to
understand actual conditions on the ground, and a refinement of information available in previous
assessments. In addition, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and |
3-57 | 82 | Chapter 4
detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying civil interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities that
affect mission outcomes.
4-49. During continuous operations, the results of each type of assessment must be shared and passed on to
follow-on CA forces to preclude wasting time, resources, effort, and good will associated with over-assessing
target facilities, organizations, and individuals. As with all military missions, this task must have a well-
formed, practical plan.
INITIAL ASSESSMENTS
4-50. The initial assessment is conducted upon initial entry into a designated AO and every time a CA unit
moves into a new area not covered by previous assessments. The objective and focus of the initial
assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly obtain an updated baseline of the general
conditions within the entire AO. This allows CA forces to validate or refute the information and
assumptions of the area study used in planning, and to update the CAO priorities and civil information
collection plan. CATs conducting initial assessments must always be aware of the security situation.
DELIBERATE ASSESSMENTS
4-51. Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities, and
against specific civil information requirements. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities,
or attitudes within defined geographic areas or social, economic, governmental, or infrastructure systems of
interest. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observations, interviews, and other tools to
collect information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for
follow-on, in-depth analysis. CATs may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a
deliberate assessment to ensure they have scrutinized all aspects of the assessment area.
SURVEYS
4-52. The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during
an inspection or investigation. Surveys are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities
and specific civil information requirements identified during deliberate assessments. This investigation may
include people, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical geopolitical,
cultural, or ethnic system. During the survey, the CAT may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats to
ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the specified entity, location, or facility targeted for survey.
Survey development should leverage operations or research analysis capabilities, if available. The findings of a
survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources.
RUNNING ESTIMATE
4-53. ADP 5-0 describes how running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations
from the perspective of each staff section. Running estimates help to refine the common operational picture
and supplement it with information not readily displayed. Staffs evaluate and synthesize information and
provide it to commanders in the form of running estimates to help commanders build and maintain their
situational understanding. Upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its
estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. CA forces record relevant civil
information in running estimates. They maintain a continuous assessment of the civil component as related
to current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the mission, commander’s
intent, and common operational picture.
4-54. The CAO running estimate feeds directly into the MDMP—whether conducted unilaterally as part of
CA-only operations, or integrated into the supported unit’s planning process and development of the common
operational picture through CKI. To focus the estimate process, planners first develop a restated mission
statement that delineates those CAO tasks necessary to successfully support the commander’s mission.
The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the CAO essential task (or tasks) and
purpose of the unit that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the
elements of who, what, when, where, and why, as well as the reason thereof, but seldom specifies how.
Figure 4-2, shows the crosswalk of the MDMP steps with the information in the CAO running estimate. |
3-57 | 83 | Operations Structure
4-55. During course of action analysis, CAO staff ensure each course of action effectively integrates civil
considerations (the C of METT-TC) and present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their
findings impact or are impacted by other staff functions. The CAO staff must be able to articulate how
operations affect civilians and estimate the requirements for essential stability operations related to the
mission. Ultimately, the CAO staff recommends the most effective way to integrate CA, host-nation, and
interorganizational capabilities into combined arms operations to support unified land operations.
4-56. CAO planners and staff use the running estimate throughout the operations process to—
* Provide the civil situation portion of operations orders and course of action wargaming
* Maintain awareness of the changing situation.
* Determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent.
* Develop branches and sequels to current operations.
* Determine resource requirements for future operations.
Step in MDMP CAO Running Estimates
Step 1
Preparation and commencement of recording information.
Receipt of Mission
Paragraphs 1 and 2, Mission or Situations and Considerations, such as—
CAO concept of support.
Step 2 Enemy forces.
Mission Analysis Friendly forces.
Assumptions.
METT-TC/ASCOPE.
Step 3
Course of Action Paragraph 3, Course of Action Development.
Development
Paragraph 4, Course of Action Analysis including—
CAO in course of action 1.
CAO concept of support.
Step 4
CAO goals and objectives.
Course of Action Analysis
Analysis.
Risk analysis.
CAO in course of action 2, and so on…
Step 5
Course of Action Paragraph 5, Course of Action Comparison.
Comparison
Step 6
Course of Action Paragraph 6, Recommendations and Conclusions.
Approval
Step 7
Production,
Update of running estimate to reflect approved course of action information.
Dissemination, and
Transition of Orders
Legend:
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CAO Civil Affairs operations
MDMP military decisionmaking process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations
Figure 4-2. Military decision-making process–running estimate sync chart |
3-57 | 84 | Chapter 4
ANNEXES
4-57. FM 6-0 describes how staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the
OE; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make
recommendations and prepare plans and orders for the commander. Staffs use annexes as attachments to
plans and orders to provide more detail and organize information. The CAO staff supports the commander
in communicating the commander’s decisions and intent through these products. Key information recorded
in the running estimate informs the orders process—particularly in the functional annexes.
4-58. The CAO staff (G-9 or S-9) refines the CAO aspects of the plan and order by publishing Annex K,
further amplifying the commander’s intent in terms of CAO. In addition to Annex K, the CAO staff is
involved in the development of Annex V (Interagency Coordination), in conjunction with the G-3 or the S-3
and operations staff. In addition, the CAO staff must take great interest in Annex P (Host-Nation Support).
ANNEX K, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS, PUBLISHED BY G-9 OR S-9
4-59. Commanders and staffs use Annex K to describe how CAO—integrated with other military and civil
organizations—support the CONOPS described in the base plan or order. This annex follows the five-
paragraph attachment format. Annex K can have an unspecified number of Appendixes, but it typically has
at least the following three:
* Appendix 1–Execution Matrix.
* Appendix 2–Populace and Resources Control Plan.
* Appendix 3–Civil Information Collection Plan.
Note: The base format for Annex K is found in FM 6-0.
ANNEX P, HOST-NATION SUPPORT, PUBLISHED BY G-4 OR S-4
4-60. Annex P uses the five-paragraph attachment format. Commanders and staffs use Annex P to describe
how sustainment operations support the CONOPS described in the base plan or order.
4-61. The G-4 or S-4 is the staff officer responsible for Annex P. Host-nation support is the civil and
military assistance provided by the HN to the forces located in or transiting through that HN’s territory.
Efficient use of available host-nation support greatly aids forces and augments the deployed sustainment
structure. Much of any host-nation support will be derived through a bilateral, multilateral, or other
international agreement. International agreements are with the entirety of the host-nation population and
thus have an impact on the IPI. These international agreements will often call for additional acquisition
and cross support agreements. U.S. forces obtain local resources to support operations from these
agreements. The CMOC is usually in the best position to engage with the civil component on behalf of the
G-4 or S-4 for utilization of local resources. Such resources may include water, energy, food, ports, roads,
and other resources to sustain the force.
Note: FM 6-0 provides an example of the format for Annex P.
ANNEX V, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, PUBLISHED BY G-3 OR S-3 AND G-9 OR S-9
4-62. Annex V follows the five-paragraph attachment format; however, some subparagraphs are modified to
accommodate communication with the interagency. This annex is important to CA forces because it identifies
the interagency organization, military forces, and other entities within the AO and it designates the CA
capability that is assigned to integrate CMO through the execution of CMI. This annex clarifies roles,
responsibilities and actions that all involved must take to effect critical CMI in the AO and promote unity of
effort.
4-63. The G-3 or S-3, in conjunction with the G-9 or S-9, develops Annex V. Annex V provides military and
interagency personnel with detailed information (such as mission, scheme, and tasks) to direct the necessary
coordination and interaction between Army forces and interagency organizations. It describes how the
commander intends to cooperate, provide support, and receive support from interagency partners throughout |
3-57 | 85 | Operations Structure
the operation. The G-9 or S-9 is the primary staff entity for contact with the interagency and other entities
within the civil component for civil-military matters.
4-64. Interagency partners may require the establishment of coordination mechanisms. These coordination
mechanisms must be addressed in Annex V. They may include exchanges of liaison officers. They may also
include the establishment of a CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations
center, joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or other interagency coordination
entities.
Note: The format for Annex V is found in FM 6-0. JP 3-08 provides additional information on
interagency coordination.
CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN MISSION COMMAND
4-65. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate
decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports the
Army’s operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting
the initiative. Mission command is a principle of unified land operations that enables commanders to blend
the art of command and the science of control while integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the
warfighting functions during operations.
4-66. Commanders understand that they do not operate independently, but as part of a larger force united by
a common operational purpose. They integrate, coordinate, and synchronize their actions with the rest of the
force to achieve the overall objective of the operation. CA forces enable the commander to extend mission
command influence beyond military forces and into the civil networks, organizations, and institutions that
the commander does not have command and control over. These civil networks are built and integrated into
operations through CNDE, and partnerships are managed through CMI. Integration, coordination, and
synchronization between military forces and civilian elements is crucial to mission success and achieving
unity of effort.
4-67. Commanders create and sustain situational understanding through collaborative dialogue within their
organization (and with unified action partners) to facilitate unity of effort. Commanders provide a clear intent
and use mission orders to assign tasks, allocate resources, and issue broad guidance. CAO staff develop and
identify civil information collection requirements through CNDE, CKI, and CMI. The collected civil data
and information is analyzed and evaluated to produce actionable civil knowledge. In CKI this civil knowledge
is integrated into Army operations systems and updates running estimates enabling the commander to
visualize the civil component, and increasing the commander’s situational understanding of the OE.
CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
4-68. CA has several roles in the warfighting functions, which are displayed in figure 4-3, page 4-18, and
detailed in the following paragraphs. |
3-57 | 86 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-3. Civil Affairs in the warfighting functions
COMMAND AND CONTROL
4-69. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of mission (JP 1). The command and control |
3-57 | 87 | Operations Structure
warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other elements of combat power to
accomplish missions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities
within their headquarters and across the force through the command and control warfighting function.
These tasks are—
* Command forces.
* Control operations.
* Drive the operations process.
* Establish the command and control system.
4-70. CA forces provide the commander with increased command and control by providing an improved
situational awareness through CKI, enabling unity of effort through CMI, and providing expertise in
governance when conducting TG. Civil networks built and integrated into operations during all phases of the
competition continuum provide commanders with a wealth of information regarding the civil component of
the OE. CNDE provides access to information sources, resources, and the ability to produce desired effects
in areas where U.S. forces may have no physical presence. CNDE and CMI also provide the commander the
ability to extend command influence across the operational area and into areas of interest.
4-71. In the consolidation and support areas, CNDE provides access to resources, information, and data that
leads to better plans for SCA or transitional military authority. Identification of civil governance resources,
capabilities, and critical infrastructure enable civil security and civil control requirements. The enhanced
understanding and knowledge promote decisions that lead to more accurate and precise operations in support
of offensive, defensive, or stability actions needed at other locations within the AO. In the close and deep
areas, civil networks developed by CA forces provide valuable civil information and data regarding the
conditions that await U.S. forces beyond the forward line of own troops. This information also allows staffs
to prepare for the consolidation operations, identification of critical infrastructure, and resources that are
needed as the bulk of the U.S. offensive moves forward.
4-72. Through CNA, civil information is used to produce relevant and current civil knowledge. CKI is
accomplished through CAO staff to integrate the resulting civil knowledge into the commander’s decision-
making process to increase the effectiveness of command and control at all echelons and to gain the
information advantage.
CIVIL AFFAIRS INTEGRATION INTO INFORMATION OPERATIONS
4-73. The role of CAO as an information-related capability is multifaceted. CAO is integrated with other
information-related capabilities into the IO plan of the commander to provide the tangible actions or events
needed for the commander to translate a message through the physical dimension of the information
environment. In this way, CAO act as the tangible connection for the commander to be able to influence the
cognitive dimension and produce desired effects in the civil component.
4-74. Assessments of atmospherics through CE and changes in behavior spotted through patterned CR also
allow for commanders to understand the effects of IO plans and actions. When the IO effort of the commander
necessitates an attack orientation, CA forces integrate mobilized civil networks into operations to increase
civil security and civil control, thereby impairing threat networks and degrading popular support for threat
elements. In stabilization, CAO is most often synchronized with combat camera, PSYOP, public affairs, and
foreign disclosure to align actions with messages and themes to create support for rule of law, local security
forces, and legitimate authority.
4-75. Through the IO working group, the CAO staff provides advice and support with the following
information:
* Specific country information.
* Timely update of the civil component of the common operational picture through the CKI process.
* Civil considerations within the OE.
* Concerns of population groups within the projected joint operations area or AO and potential flash
points that might result in civil instability.
* Cultural awareness briefings. |
3-57 | 88 | Chapter 4
* Information on DC movement routes; critical infrastructure; and significant social, religious, and
cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities.
* Information impacts on the civil component.
* Key civilian nodes.
* Review of lethal fires packets to ensure that lethal and nonlethal effects of targeting are synchronized.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
4-76. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and
employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0).
The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection.
Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole, or in part, when maneuvering.
Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective
maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Both tactical and operational maneuver require
sustainment support. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes these tasks:
* Move.
* Maneuver.
* Employ direct fires.
* Occupy an area.
4-77. On the modern battlefield, almost all movement and maneuver take place amongst the civilian population
and with the use of civilian infrastructure. Populace and civil infrastructure are force multipliers when
developing plans which utilize timely and accurate information. However, without proper planning and
preparation, those civilians and infrastructure become a great hindrance to effective movement and maneuver.
4-78. CAO enables movement and maneuver through identification and utilization of civilian infrastructure,
networks and systems, and reduction of civilian interference. Integration of civil networks and partnership
with civil authorities also enables the commander to establish movement and maneuver corridors which are
cleared of civilians to the greatest extent possible. This allows for the use of alternatives for security such
as—
* Use of local security for lines of communication and maneuver corridors.
* Enablement of freedom of movement.
* Efficient us of finite resources and capabilities.
4-79. In the planning process, CKI is utilized to provide commanders and staffs with the civil knowledge
needed to ensure that all movement and maneuver is planned to avoid or mitigate civilian interference with
operations. Planners also use this civil knowledge to mitigate the effects of military operations on the civilian
population and infrastructure. Civil information and data gained through CR, CE, CND, area studies, and
initial and deliberate assessments provide commanders and staffs with an understanding of—
* Civilian choke points.
* Areas where U.S. movements are more likely to be opposed by the population.
* Areas where movement and maneuver will not be hindered by civilian interference.
4-80. During offensive operations, civil networks that have been identified, developed, and integrated into
operations by CA forces perform functions of governance and PRC measures to ensure civilian
interference with military movement is greatly reduced. Proper utilization of PRC in consolidation and
support areas mitigates the need for commanders to dispatch troops to control these areas, thereby
preserving combat power and effectively using finite resources. Effective use of PRC in consolidation
areas increases the freedom of movement between consolidation areas and close areas. This allows
commanders to—
* Maintain the initiative and extend their culmination point at the forward line of troops.
* Enable joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
* Allocate military resources when and where they are needed.
4-81. During defensive and stability operations, civil networks that CA forces have identified, developed,
and integrated into operations to aid PRC (in consolidation and rear areas) enable commanders to move |
3-57 | 89 | Operations Structure
troops and materiel around the battlefield in a more efficient and timely manner, thereby maintaining
operating tempo. This frees military resources the commander needs to continue the offense in other areas.
INTELLIGENCE
4-82. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the
enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment
(ADP 3-0). Other significant aspects of an OE include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, which
vary with the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection
with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations.
Intelligence is driven by commanders, and it involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting
operations to develop the situation. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
through operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information
collection. The intelligence warfighting function includes these tasks:
* Provide intelligence support to force generation.
* Provide support to situational understanding.
* Conduct information collection.
* Provide intelligence support to targeting and IO.
4-83. Interaction with civil networks across the operational area and area of interest provides commanders with a
greater understanding of societal factors and allows staffs to create a more detailed map of the interactions of
friendly and threat actors in the OE. Friendly civil networks provide the commander an exponentially larger
platform for surveillance and reconnaissance than would otherwise be available. Engagement with civil networks
also provides the commander with access to civil information coming from areas where the commander might not
have physical or virtual presence. This understanding empowers commanders with the ability to plan and execute
greater and more effective operations actions against threat activities. Greater situational understanding of culture
and civil considerations also identifies the risks to U.S. forces and the overall military campaign in the civil
component of the OE, thereby ensuring the commander is able to make more timely and informed decisions.
FIRES
4-84. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains
against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks
and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint forces, as well as other unified
action partners. CA forces typically provide effects in the nonlethal realm but also use civil knowledge to enhance
considerations for the use of lethal actions. Targeting is a function of fires and is greatly enhanced by the integration
of civil knowledge.
4-85. Civil information gained through CR, CE, CND, area studies, and other methods is analyzed and
evaluated and the resulting civil knowledge is integrated into the commander’s targeting process. To enhance
targeting the CAO staff provide—
* Options for engagement and effects utilizing CA forces.
* Identified, developed, and integrated civil networks.
* Validate survey control points.
* Enhanced governance capability.
* Services and recommendations for PRC that protect—
Civilians.
Critical infrastructure.
Resources.
Other noncombatants.
4-86. In consolidation and support areas, CNDE and CMI provide the commander with courses of action to
create effects in the civil component of the OE which support the commander’s lines of effort, mission, and end
states. Partner civil networks provide early identification of threats and adversarial actors which might pose a |
3-57 | 90 | Chapter 4
threat to local security and military missions. Mobilization of those same networks to enhance governance also
provides the commander an option for neutralizing threat actors locally with minimal resources and damage.
4-87. In close and deep areas, partner civil networks help identify threats and adversaries in the civil component
of the OE which might not be readily visible to military intelligence processes. Partner civil networks provide
commanders with options to neutralize those threats through local governance action, and to identify and categorize
civilian entities and infrastructure which must be protected from the effects of war to the greatest extent practicable.
Information gained through civil networks also helps to fill in gaps in the targeting process, which enable the
targeting staff to provide more accurate and effective targeting to meet the operational needs of the commander.
4-88. During targeting the staff has the responsibility to mitigate the unintended or incidental risk of damage
or injury to the—
* Civilian populace and noncombatants.
* Military personnel.
* Structures and cultural heritage sites in the immediate area.
* Targets that are on the—
No-strike list.
Restricted target list.
* Livestock.
* Environment.
* Civil air.
* Other factors that could have a negative effect on military operations.
4-89. This will assist the commander in weighing risk against military necessity and in assessing
proportionality within the framework of the MDMP. CA forces identify civilian entities and infrastructure
that should be protected and placed on a no strike list or should be protected with restricted fire.
The commander may issue targeting guidance that constrains and restrains the use of fires by identifying no-
strike or restricted target lists. The no-strike list consists of objects or entities protected by:
* Law of war.
* International laws.
* Rules of engagement.
* Other considerations.
4-90. A restricted target list is a valid target with specific restrictions such as:
* Limit collateral damage.
* Preserve select ammo for final protective fires.
* Do not strike during daytime.
* Strike only with a certain weapon.
* Proximity to protected facilities and locations.
SUSTAINMENT
4-91. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services
to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment
determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by
increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and
exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements:
* Logistics.
* Financial management.
* Personnel services.
* Health service support.
4-92. CA forces provide commanders, at all echelons, options for enhancing reception, staging, onward
movement and integration, and for utilizing civilian support channels for provision of military needs. Persistent |
3-57 | 91 | Operations Structure
or episodic engagement with civil networks, and development of partner capacity through security cooperation
missions allows commanders access to civil information that is critical in planning initial entry and staging
operations. Those same partner civil networks can be utilized to identify and provide civilian resources which
can be allocated for military use and for the creation of partnerships with local governments for the purpose of
enhancing host-nation support that has been negotiated between the U.S. and the HN.
4-93. Sourcing requirements locally reduces the logistical burden on commanders and allows for greater
conservation of resources which are hard to acquire, but necessary for prosecuting the fight against the enemy.
Local resources also shorten the logistic lines, which slow a force’s movement. Host-nation support is civil
and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or
emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 4-0).
4-94. CA forces in the consolidation and support areas partner with local governments and organizations
through CNDE and CMI to ensure that there is no disruption to logistics supply from adversaries in the civil
component. Logistics convoys, especially those contracted locally during operational preparation of the
environment and stability operations, are ripe for exploitation from criminal elements. CA forces partnered with
local civil networks and governments help identify and disrupt criminal enterprises that may be associated with
enemy elements. This action benefits the security of logistics supplies into the close area. Greater civil security
in the rear area frees military resources that the commander needs to push to the forward line of own troops. It
also allows for more reliable logistics chains supporting elements on the offensive.
4-95. During stabilization operations, CA forces and planners are critical in identifying humanitarian needs and
working with local sources and international partners to provide for the humanitarian needs of the population.
Partnerships built through CNDE and executed through CMI ensure that local governance elements always
provide a local face for the diminution of humanitarian distress. These actions help to build legitimacy of the
HN.
PROTECTION
4-96. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the
commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). Commanders
incorporate protection when they understand and visualize threats and hazards in an OE. This allows them to
synchronize and integrate all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces.
4-97. Preserving the force includes protecting the following assets of the U.S., unified action partners, and HNs:
* Personnel (combatants and noncombatants).
* Physical assets.
4-98. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations so that forces may
counter or mitigate those threats before they can act. However, protection is not a linear activity—planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing protection are continuous and enduring activities. The protection
warfighting function includes these tasks:
* Conduct survivability operations.
* Conduct support to SCA.
* Integrate civil knowledge in the development of security control, area security, and civil security plans.
* Execute CNDE to inform the common operational picture.
* Develop civil networks to identify capabilities, capacities, and resources that can be used to secure
and protect the force.
* Provide force health protection.
* Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
* Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
* Coordinate air and missile defense support.
* Conduct personnel recovery.
* Conduct detention operations.
* Conduct RM.
* Implement physical security procedures. |
3-57 | 92 | Chapter 4
* Apply antiterrorism measures.
* Conduct police operations.
* Conduct PRC.
* Conduct area security.
* Perform cyberspace security and defense.
* Conduct electromagnetic protection.
* Implement operations security.
4-99. Civil knowledge is integrated into the RM process of the supported commander, thereby empowering the
commander and associated staff with a greater situational understanding of risks and hazards that might be
present in the civil component of the OE across the competition continuum and emanating from multiple
domains. CAO staff, in coordination with the protection cell, also develop and recommend controls that reduce
risk to the population and reduce risk to U.S. forces from threats and hazards emerging from civilian society.
These types of risks and hazards to U.S. and partner forces take the form of local demonstrations, criminal
enterprises, ineffective PRC, and lack of civil security and civil control. Each of these are issues that are
ameliorated through effective local governance. CA forces support protection by identifying risks in the civil
component and partnering with local civil networks to mitigate those risks and protect civil assets through
effective governance.
4-100. In consolidation and support areas, CA forces—in conjunction with other capabilities—may be called
upon to identify and implement PRC measures. CA forces utilize partner civil networks, through CNDE and
CMI, to enhance local governance capability and identify critical infrastructure and resources to increase civil
security and civil control. These actions aid in the implementation of PRC measures while simultaneously
freeing combat power for more tactical operations.
4-101. In close and deep areas, civil networks provide information leading to early identification of threats
and hazards of which the commander may not otherwise be aware. This allows the commander and staff to
adjust plans as the offensive continues to push the forward line of own troops. Friendly civil networks can also
be integrated into operations to conduct protection and security efforts in support of the commander’s end state.
CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITY BY ECHELON
4-102. The CA workload rule of allocation provides a method to analyze non-echelon aligned allocation of
CA force requirements. CA planners should understand this is the basis for employment, but not the only
model. There is also a workload model and a workload command and control model. The CAO staff officer
is responsible for providing recommendations to the commander on the allocation of CA forces to the
appropriate headquarters. The CAO staff officer advises on the capabilities, capacity, allocation, and
employment of subordinate CA units attached to the command.
4-103. The CA company is the lowest level unit allocated by rules of allocation. CATs are not allocated to Army
forces through rules of allocation, but CATs—based on the mission requirements—may be attached from the
company down to subordinate elements of the BCT.
4-104. CA companies and battalions are most commonly allocated as direct support elements for a specific
command, but can serve a general support function (depending on the AO and the security of the environment).
CA brigades and CACOMs are most effectively allocated as general support elements for a specific AO.
4-105. CA planners should understand that figure 4-3, page 4-18, shows the baseline rules of allocation for CA
employment, but this is not the only model. Urbanization trends will continue to challenge the proper allocation of
CA units to ensure mission success. Larger urban areas may require a more robust allocation of CA forces per
BCT or to adequately identify and mitigate or defeat threats to civil society. Furthermore, not all operations will
be conducted in conjunction with a BCT.
4-106. Figure 4-4 (which continues on page 4-26) depicts CA unit’s functions, operational scope and coordination,
from the strategic down to the tactical level. Functions at each level correspond to activities from planning to
execution. The operational scope represents the approximate operational area, and the coordination depicts key
organizations that interact with CA forces. |
3-57 | 93 | Operations Structure
4-107. The nature of the mission may require more CA assets. For example, advising on or conducting the
responsibilities normally performed by a civil government will likely require more CA augmentation to succeed.
The workload rule of allocation shown in figure 4-5, page 4-27, was designed to account for these variables.
Using the metrics provided at the bottom of figure 4-5 helps create an accurate assessment of CA force
requirements based on population of an area in square miles or based on a population within a specific
population center.
Level of
Operational
Support Unit Focus of Functions Coordination
Scope
(Name)
Plan, assess, and manage U.S. embassy.
theater CAO. USAID or interagency.
Plan, assess, and manage International partners or
TG. donors.
Facilitate and enable International
information advantage. organizations or NGOs.
Regional
Support stabilization, IPI.
to
CACOM reconstruction, and
National
development.
Enable IPI, interagency,
and interorganizational
Strategic
coordination.
Identify requirements for
(Geographic
functional specialist
Combatant
assistance.
Command,
Theater
Plan, assess, and manage U.S. embassy.
Army)
theater CAO. USAID or interagency.
Plan, assess, and manage International partners or
TG (national). donors.
Facilitate and enable International
Regional
Theater information advantage. organizations or NGOs.
to
CAPT Support stabilization, IPI.
National
reconstruction, and
development.
Enable IPI, interagency,
and interorganizational
coordination.
Plan, assess, and manage U.S. embassy.
CAO. USAID (OFDA and
Plan, assess, and manage OTI).
Operational
TG (subnational). Interagency.
Facilitate and enable International
(Corps, National
information advantage. organizations or NGOs.
JTF, CA Brigade to
Support stabilization,
1st Special Subnational IPI.
reconstruction, and
Forces
development.
Command)
Enable IPI, interagency,
and interorganizational
coordination.
Figure 4-4. Civil Affairs allocations and support functions |
3-57 | 94 | Chapter 4
Level of
Operational
Support Unit Focus of Functions Coordination
Scope
(Name)
Plan, assess, and execute U.S. embassy.
Operational CAO. USAID (OFDA and
to Tactical Plan, assess, stability OTI).
Subnational
activities. Interagency.
to
(Division, CA Battalion Facilitate and enable International
Province or
JTFs, information advantage. organizations or NGOs.
Large City
TSOCs Enable IPI, interagency,
IPI.
JSOTF) and interorganizational
coordination.
Plan, assess, and OFDA.
manage CAO (execution Interagency.
Tactical
oriented) such as— International
CR, CE, CKI, CMOC. organizations or NGOs.
(BCT, JTF,
Foreign assistance,
COM, Province IPI.
CA FHA, PRC, CMI.
Special to
Company Plan, assess, and enable
Forces Large City
local stability activities.
Battalions,
Facilitate and enable
Regional
information advantage.
CMSE)
Enable IPI and
interagency coordination.
Note:
Operational Scope and Level of support for CA echelons can vary widely based on operational need
Legend:
BCT brigade combat team FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
CA Civil Affairs IPI indigenous populations and institutions
CACOM Civil Affairs command JSOTF joint special operations task force
CAO Civil Affairs operations JTF joint task force
CAPT Civil Affairs planning team NGO nongovernmental organization
CE civil engagement OFDA Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
CKI civil knowledge integration OTI Office of Transition Initiatives
CMI civil-military integration PRC populace and resources control
CMOC civil-military operations center TG transitional governance
CMSE civil-military support element TSOC theater special operations command
COM collection operations management U.S. United States
CR civil reconnaissance USAID United States Agency for International Development
Figure 4-4. Civil Affairs allocations and support functions (continued) |
3-57 | 95 | Operations Structure
Figure 4-5. Civil Affairs workload rule of allocation
CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM
4-108. The CAT conducts CAO missions at the tactical level. Teams have the ability to conduct CR and
CE and to establish connections with and mobilize civil networks. The CAT is also the element that can
produce desired effects in the civil component by—
* Working with and through civil networks.
* Conducting CA projects and programs.
* Coordinating and directing humanitarian aid provision and distribution.
* Providing governance expertise and SCA at the local level.
* Conducting other CAO meant to interact directly with civilian populations.
4-109. A limitation of the CAT is its size and need for theater-mandated force protection support. While in
competition environments, the CAT has much greater freedom of movement than regular forces due to
interactions with the civil population. However, during large-scale combat operations, CATs are generally in
need of force protection support as the team is only four members and it is routinely embedded in other
maneuver elements to provide for the force protection needs of the team.
4-110. CATs are deployable CA units of action capable of—
* Conducting CR and CE to support strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level civil-military
objectives in support of conventional brigade level missions.
* Developing and leveraging civil networks and conducting CMI to find, disrupt, and defeat hybrid
threats in the civil component.
* Providing an advantage to the USG, allies, and partners, through the conduct of CR, CE and CMI.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY
4-111. In large-scale combat operations, the CA company operations section provides the supported commander
the capability to analyze, evaluate, and direct CND and engagement in order to create effects in the civil component |
3-57 | 96 | Chapter 4
of the OE. While CATs are generally placed under the tactical control of maneuver battalion commanders, the CA
company headquarters element maintains the ability to develop CAO plans, across BCTs, which are aimed at—
* Developing civil networks to create effects in the civil component of the OE.
* Establishing support to governance aimed at increasing civil security, civil control, and local authority.
* Conducting CMI with local governments, NGOs, and interagency partners.
4-112. While the CA company provides a great asset to the supported commander by increasing analytical
capability for understanding the civil component of the OE and adding support to plan and direct CAO, the
CA company is not as robust a planning and analysis element as the CA battalion. A CA company has the
ability to displace and move rapidly with its supported BCT, but the CA company is in need of certain life
support sustainment and force protection.
4-113. Whether as a CA company headquarters supporting a BCT or CAT supporting maneuver battalions,
CA company personnel can contribute to and or perform—
* Mission command of assigned or attached CMOC and CATs.
* Tactical-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of CAO within the
supported commander’s AO.
* Assessment of the civil component of the AO of the supported command facilitating integration
of civil input into the common operational picture of the supported command.
* Collation, analysis, and fusion of civil information for input to the common operational picture of
the supported command.
* Assistance in coordinating IPI, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and U.S. assistance and
resources to support local government as part of CMO.
4-114. The CA company is a deployable CA command and control node capable of commanding and
controlling CATs and operating a CMOC. CA companies conduct CR and CE at the tactical level to support
strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level civil-military objectives capable of—
* Developing and leveraging civil networks.
* Conducting CMI to find, disrupt, and defeat hybrid threats in the civil component.
* Providing an advantage for the USG, allies, and partners.
* Being task-organized or augmented to form the core of a joint civil-military operations task force
(JCMOTF) led by a major.
CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION
4-115. The CA battalion provides all the analytical capacity needed to analyze and evaluate civil network
information and civil information products by CA companies within their supported command. This analysis
and evaluation is integrated into planning and command and control processes of the supporting command
to enable situational understanding and provide for effects in the civil component through targeted CAO.
4-116. The CA battalion provides direct support CA capabilities to missions in geographic combatant
command areas of operation. This direct support is provided with emphasis on theater persistent presence
activities that—
* Build and employ local, regional, and trans-regional networks.
* Anticipate and exploit changing conditions in human geography.
* Implement conflict prevention strategies.
* Set conditions for successful CAO in support of the requirements for the following:
Geographic combatant command.
Army Service component command.
The USG.
|
3-57 | 97 | Operations Structure
4-117. This support includes the following:
* Planning and coordination of tactical-level stabilization and reconstruction focused on the civil
institutions at provincial level and below.
* Tactical-level to operational-level civil components for the supported commander’s common
operational picture.
* Operation of CMOC away from the supported unit, as required, by serving as the focal point for
civil-military coordination collaboration, and communication for the supported unit headquarters.
4-118. When required, the CA battalion also deploys as echelons above brigade- or division-level command
and control headquarters for assigned and attached units conducting CAO. The CA battalion can also be task-
organized or augmented to form the core of a JCMOTF led by a lieutenant colonel.
CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE
4-119. There are nine reserve component conventional CA brigades and one active component special
operations-capable CA brigade. Each has unique capabilities and supports the Army in different conditions.
4-120. The CA brigade is a deployable expeditionary command and control node capable of providing
command and control of up to five CA battalions—both assigned and attached units. These CA brigades—
* Provide focused CA capabilities to corps-level, theater Army, and field Army missions and areas
of operation.
* Plan, synchronize, and conduct CAO to—
Develop, leverage, and exploit regional and trans-regional civil networks.
Anticipate and exploit changing conditions in human geography.
Set conditions for successful CMO in support of corps objectives.
* Plan, direct, and integrate CNDE to conduct stabilization and irregular warfare across the
competition continuum in support of—
CCDRs.
U.S. Ambassadors.
Other agencies (as directed).
* Can be task-organized or augmented to form the core of a JCMOTF led by a colonel.
* Provide crisis response or rapid deployment for natural and manmade disaster responses.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND
4-121. The U.S. Army has four Civil Affairs commands (CACOMs) in the United States Army Reserve
(USAR). Each CACOM is commanded by a brigadier general (known as the theater CA coordinator) who
serves as the senior CA military government advisor to—
* Geographic CCDRs.
* Theater army commanders.
* Field army commanders.
* Unified action partners.
4-122. The CACOM is a formation that provides command and control for operational planning,
supervision, and coordination of assigned or attached CA units engaged in CA, military government, and
stabilization missions across the competition continuum for a theater Army or JTF.
4-123. The CACOM also—
* Provides theater-level CA coordination, policies, and programs in support of stabilization,
reconstruction, and development efforts.
* Develops plans, policy, and programs through planning teams, regional engagement, and civil
component analysis at both the strategic and theater levels.
* Integrates civil knowledge to inform all operations processes. |
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