FM
stringclasses 43
values | page
int64 1
477
| text
stringlengths 6
8.45k
|
|---|---|---|
3-57 | 98 | Chapter 4
4-124. When tasked to form a one-star combined joint integrated CMO task force, the CACOM may also
provide command and control over the following assigned or attached military capabilities across the
competition continuum:
* Joint or multinational engineer.
* Military police.
* Medical.
* Maneuver.
4-125. The CACOM may also provide command and control to other stability-related, civilian and military
capabilities during periods of competition, armed conflict, and return to competition.
CIVIL AFFAIRS TASK FORCE
4-126. A CA task force is a scalable unit in charge of the stabilization elements and organized around the
nucleus of CA and support elements. CA task forces are temporarily task-organized formations sourced from
Army units and assigned to a theater Army, corps, division, or BCT. When operating during consolidation
of gains, CA units establish the core of a CA task force with the commander and staff and their respective
subordinate units. A CA task force may be augmented with any of the following elements:
* Public affairs.
* Maneuver elements.
* Engineers.
* Medical units.
* Military police.
* Logistics and transportation elements.
* Other units as necessary for stabilization operations.
4-127. The primary mission of the CA task force is to focus the stabilization efforts in an AO under one
command line, thereby increasing the speed and efficiency of stabilization operations tasks. The speed with
which transition occurs from U.S. forces to local authorities is dependent on the ability to plan and control
elements aimed at increasing governance at the tactical and operational levels. CA task forces provide the
important linkage between interagency, interorganizational, and NGOs which are important to the success of
stabilization operations. During large-scale combat operations and consolidation of gains, a CA task force
can—
* Be a stand-alone task force or subordinate unit to a higher task force.
* Assist unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the civil needs of their AO.
* Plan and direct CAO in a supported AO.
* Provide CNA and direction for development and mobilization within an AO.
* Provide linkage between the supported command and nonmilitary agencies operating in the AO
through a CMOC.
* Advise the supported commander on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation
sensitivities; and the effects of these components on theater strategy and/or campaign and
operational missions.
* Provide command and control, or direction, of military host-nation advisory, assessment,
planning, and other assistance activities by U.S. forces.
* Assist in establishing military-to-civilian links to facilitate cooperative assistance arrangements.
* Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies; country teams; United Nations
agencies; and deployed U.S., multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistic
organizations.
* Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and
objectives of military assistance projects in order to—
Build civil acceptance and support of U.S. operations.
Promote local capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
|
3-57 | 99 | Operations Structure
* Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services.
* Facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other
government agencies, international organizations, or host-nation responsibility.
4-128. The CA task force, during competition, enables interactions between military and interagency
groups, and interorganizational partners to—
* Respond to humanitarian needs.
* Provide disaster relief.
* Build partner nation capacity and partner nation governance.
4-129. The majority of efforts of the CA task force during competition are completed under 22 USC
authority or in support of the civil-military engagement (CME) mission of USSOCOM.
4-130. CA elements, from company through CACOM, retain the ability to form the backbone of CA task
forces in order to enhance a supported commander’s mission of stabilization. TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI are
essential to effective stabilization efforts. As such, a CA task force empowers the commander with proactive
and responsive CAO leading to consolidated gains and preservation of combat power for the supported
commander to use in offensive or defensive operations elsewhere in the AO.
4-131. CA task forces are capable of command and control over CA forces and partner elements needed
to—
* Increase governance capacity.
* Increase civil security.
* Increase civil control.
* Restore essential services.
* Respond to humanitarian needs.
4-132. When working in joint environments, CA elements also maintain the ability to form the backbone
of a JCMOTF. As a supporting commander, the CA task force commander ascertains and fulfills the needs
of the supported commander within the imposed parameters. The CA task force commander determines the
type of force, employment, and procedures to accomplish the support.
JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
4-133. The JCMOTF is a special-purpose task force made up of units from two or more Services. JFCs may
establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requirements and activities are beyond the organic capability
of the JFC. The JCMOTF is flexible in size and composition.
4-134. CA commands and brigades can be task organized to form the core of a JCMOTF, and although it
is not strictly a CA organization, a CA officer may command the JCMOTF. The JCMOTF will also most
likely have CA units as subordinate elements. The JCMOTF plans, prepares, executes, and continually
assesses CMO in a theater of operations or joint operations area. The expertise of CA personnel in dealing
with government organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI, greatly enhances the opportunity
for success. A JCMOTF may have both conventional forces and SOF assigned or attached to support the
conduct of specific missions. If the JFC properly charters and establishes the JCMOTF, it must meet the
criteria established in JP 3-33. |
3-57 | 100 | Chapter 4
Transfer in Afghanistan
The fall of Kandahar and Kabul in November of 2001 marked the collapse of the
Taliban government and disintegration of its fighting forces. While the organization of
the Afghan Interim Authority was taking place, JSOTF-North consolidated the
stabilization effort by assigning UW to the three 5th SFG battalion commanders.
The Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCEs) were formed to
better control operations by various Alliance warlords and to reduce bypassed pockets
of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance around Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan.
A second Ranger parachute assault (Objective Bastogne) seized a remote airfield to
support ARSOF attack helicopter operations. Destroying al-Qaeda leaders became a
secondary mission for JSOTF-North under the new functional alignment directed by
SOCCENT. That was to be the primary mission of the new JSOTF-South. The ADVON
of that headquarters relocated to Kandahar Air Base when Marine Corps forces at
Objective Rhino moved there. The 10th Mountain Division left K2 for Bagram Air base,
south of Kabul. Just days after Hamid Karzai became interim prime minister, the Joint
Civil Military Operations Task Force was established in Kabul to direct and coordinate
civil and humanitarian affairs in rebuilding Afghanistan. In mid-January 2002, TF
Rakkasan from the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Kandahar Airport to replace
the Marines…
…3rd SFG at Fort Bragg had been alerted to replace 5th SFG in the combat zone, and
19th and 20th SFG (ARNG) battalion staffs and ODAs were arriving in theater.
Mobilized USAR CA and PSYOP units had been “earmarked” to replace Active Army
forces in theater…
Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan
CMH Pub 70-100-1
4-135. The JFC may establish a JCMOTF to accomplish a specific contingency mission with a civil-military
nature (such as FHA, PRC or transitional military authority) and/or to provide CMO support to U.S. or
coalition military forces conducting military operations. Service component and other task force commanders
are still responsible for accomplishing the CMO—that is within their ability—in their AOs. When their need
exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF assists in meeting the shortfall. A JCMOTF can—
* Be a stand-alone JTF or a subordinate unit in a JTF.
* Assist JTF unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the CMO needs of their joint
operations area.
* Provide linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the joint operations area
through a CMOC.
* Advise the JTF commander on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities;
and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
* Provide command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning,
and other assistance activities by joint U.S. forces.
* Assist in establishing U.S. or multinational and military-to-civilian links for greater efficiency of
cooperative assistance arrangements.
* Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies; country teams; United Nations
agencies; and deployed U.S. multinational, host-nation military forces, and their supporting
logistic organizations.
* Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to—
Publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects.
Build civil acceptance and support of U.S. operations.
Promote local capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
* Plan and conduct joint and combined CMO training exercises.
* Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services. |
3-57 | 101 | Operations Structure
* Assess or identify host-nation support, or relief capabilities and funding requirements to the—
Commander.
JTF for transmission to supporting commanders.
Services.
Other responsible USG departments or agencies.
* Facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other
government agencies, international organizations, or host-nation responsibility.
4-136. A JCMOTF should not—
* Be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF.
* Have the primary responsible force for accomplishing all CMO in the joint operations area when
subordinate to a JTF.
* Eliminate the need for all units to train for CMO.
* Eliminate the need for all commanders in the joint operations area to plan and conduct CMO.
Note: JP 3-57 and JP 3-33 provide additional information on the establishment of a JCMOTF and
its capabilities. |
3-57 | 103 | Chapter 5
Unified Action
Commitment to interorganizational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of
common interest, promote a common operational picture, and enable sharing of critical
information and resources.
JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation
Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of
effort (JP 1). Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives,
even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization,
which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unified action partners are those
military forces, governmental organizations and NGOs, and elements of the private
sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the
conduct of operations. Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during,
and after operations.
OVERVIEW
5-1. CA plays an integral role in the coordination of military actions with unified action partners. CA forces
can provide for better local governance (thereby, relieving commanders of the burden of civil security and civil
control), develop networks, share information with interagency and interorganizational partners, and integrate
civilian and military actions. CA forces contribute to unified actions through integration, coordination, and
synchronization with interorganizational partners, joint forces, and interagency partners.
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION
5-2. Interorganizational cooperation refers to the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department
of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and
tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations;
nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). The proper execution of interorganizational
cooperation leads to unity of effort through identifying common objectives and building a common
understanding. CA forces are integral to this effort through their mandate to interact with civilian populations,
organizations, and agencies. Inter-organizational cooperation refers to the interactions between DOD,
participating USG departments and agencies, and:
* Domestic governments such as—
State.
Territorial.
Local.
Tribal.
* Multinational Elements, including—
Foreign military forces.
Foreign government agencies.
* International organizations. |
3-57 | 104 | Chapter 5
* NGOs.
* The private sector, including—
Multinational corporations.
Academia.
Operational contract support.
5-3. CA forces form a critical point in the interaction between U.S. forces and interorganizational partners.
This is due to the training that CA forces receive in governance and governmental sector expertise, regional
expertise, cultural understanding, and language capabilities. CA forces utilize this interaction to help create
a common understanding of the OE. Interorganizational partners can provide local information which may
be available through military channels. This information highlights—
* Historical perspectives and insight.
* Local cultural practices.
* Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders, which are used
to corroborate information provided by Service intelligence and non-intelligence organizations.
* Security situation.
* Role and capabilities of the host-nation government.
5-4. Through development of local civil networks, CA elements are able to increase the capabilities of local
governance and add to the common understanding that is essential to unified action. Through CKI and CMI,
CA forces collect civil information, produce civil knowledge products, and integrate and share those products
in order to increase shared understanding and integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all elements to achieve
unity of effort. Through TG, CA elements are able to build local governance capacity in order to enable
strengthened local efforts leading to more capable and reliable interorganizational partners.
5-5. One of the most important elements for interorganizational cooperation is a CMOC. The CMOC is the
meeting place of stakeholders. It may be physical, virtual, or conducted collaboratively through online
networks, or by intermediates (as NGOs may be reluctant to conduct coordination meetings in settings
managed by the military). At the joint level the CMOC is formed to:
* Execute the CMO guidance of the JFC.
* Provide liaison with departments, agencies, and organizations.
* Provide a forum for organizations that want to discuss CMO issues and raise concerns, yet
maintain their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for
stakeholder discussions but not a stakeholder decision-making forum.
* Receive, validate, and action requests for support from NGOs, international organizations, and the
private sector. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.
Note: JP 3-08 provides more information on interorganizational partners.
Note: CA forces interact with multinational partners in support of interorganizational cooperation,
and these partners are not always able to receive classified information. CA forces should make
every effort available to reduce classification of civil knowledge products that are needed for
interorganizational cooperation. Proper foreign disclosure practices must be executed by CA
organizations (beginning at the lowest level possible) to ensure timely dissemination of civil
knowledge products to interorganizational partners. |
3-57 | 105 | Unified Action
Operation DESERT STORM – Kuwait
Strategic planners of Operation DESERT STORM initially focused exclusively on the
requirements for combat operations, intending to plan the post-conflict phase when
combat operations were over. The timeline for post-conflict planning was sped up when,
two months after the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the
Kuwaiti government-in-exile requested assistance from the U.S. Department of State
(DoS) to establish a reconstruction planning structure. Following a briefing on U.S. Army
Civil Affairs capabilities by a member of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, the Kuwaiti
contingent petitioned President Bush for CA support to help restore their country. By
December 1, 1990, members of the 352d CA Command and the 354th CA Brigade—
units mission-focused on the CENTCOM area of operations—mobilized at the U.S. Army
Reserve Center in Riverdale Park, MD, to execute this mission. The Kuwait Task Force
(KTF), as it was called, was comprised of 57 specially selected officers representing 20
distinct roles of governance organized under the areas of government, economics and
commerce, public facilities, and special functions. Among these veterans of the 1989
Panama restoration effort were highly qualified CA Soldiers whose professional skills
matched perceived shortfalls, including the Director of USAID’s Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and a senior official of the Justice Department.
Working with representatives of 27 different U.S. government agencies and their Kuwaiti
counterparts, the KTF developed plans for executing due process of law regarding
suspected Iraqi sympathizers, addressing possible sabotage done by the Iraqis,
rebuilding electrical grids, dealing with potential oil fires, furnishing needed food and
medicine, and other issues that were codified in Annex G, Civilian Action Plan, which
was designed to become part of the USCENTCOM operational plan. The KTF also
identified reliable contractors, developed workable procedures, and focused on the
sequencing of post-conflict actions for Kuwaiti reconstruction. Upon its arrival in Saudi
Arabia in early February 1991, the KTF was assigned to the Combined Civil Affairs Task
Force (CCATF) under its parent unit, the 352d CA Command, which, in turn, was
assigned to Task Force Freedom, a composite service support unit commanded by the
Deputy Commanding General of Army Central (ARCENT). Within the mission structure
of Task Force Freedom, the KTF was instrumental in restoring 50 percent of the
telecommunications and transportation systems in Kuwait and repairing 30 percent of
the devastated electrical grid within one month after the end of combat operations. Not
one Kuwaiti died from thirst, starvation, or lack of medical attention after the liberation
and there were virtually no acts of retribution or vigilantism directed against suspected
collaborators. By the time the KTF departed, the Kuwaiti medical system was operating
at 98 percent of its pre-war capacity, the international airport was re-opened, and the
police force was fully operational. All major roads and one port were opened while two
other ports were being swept of mines. Although the government of Kuwait requested
that the KTF remain until December 1991, it was redeployed with is parent unit, the
352d CA Command, on May 10th of that year
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination,
Center for Complex Operations, 2010
JOINT OPERATIONS
5-6. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in
specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0).
A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments
operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). Almost all military actions interact with the civilian
population or affect the civilian population, and it is important to ensure proper civil-military interactions
for all operations. U.S. Army CA constitutes the largest proportion of CA forces among the separate |
3-57 | 106 | Chapter 5
branches of the U.S. military. As such, U.S. Army CA often take on a significant portion of joint CA
missions and must plan accordingly.
5-7. When the Army supports the joint force in competition, its role is to shape the OE and prevent conflict
by supporting the theater campaign plan of the JFC. The Army does this by supporting security cooperation.
The primary purpose of supporting security cooperation is to build relationships and gain access. The
secondary purpose is to promote regional stability. Security cooperation is a primary stability operations task.
Security cooperation initiated with partner nations promotes regional stability by deterring potential threats.
Note: FM 3-22 and ADP 3-07 provide more information on Army support to security cooperation
and stability operations respectively.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE OF A JOINT
STAFF
5-8. The J-9 is the principal staff organization in a joint force command responsible for CMO planning.
The J-9 in normally attached or assigned to the supported command to enable the commander and staff in the
conduct of CMO. The J-9, in conjunction with other CA forces, execute CMI to synchronize, coordinate, and
integrate all military forces and civil entities within a given AO to achieve unity of effort. The J-9—
* Establishes civil-military relationships with—
The interagency.
International organizations.
NGOs.
IPI.
* Performs civil-military knowledge management.
* Plans support for civil-military enabling operations.
* Integrates military and civilian organizations that influence operations or campaigns and seeks to
promote stability and achieve unified action.
* Provides a conduit for—
Sharing civil-military information.
Coordinating support requests and activities.
Compiling and analyzing relevant information.
Performing analysis and evaluation that supports the commander’s assessment.
* Plans the actions of various Service capabilities that enable the joint force to achieve CMO
objectives.
5-9. Responsibilities of the J-9 include:
* Serving as staff lead for the organization, employment, and integration of Service CA, military
police, medical, engineer, and any other Service capabilities to conduct CMO.
* Establishing liaison, as needed, with interagency partners, international organizations, NGOs, and
IPI.
* Providing staff oversight to the CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination center, joint
interagency task force, or joint interagency coordination group—if established by the joint force
command.
* Developing Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and assisting in the development of Annex V to
joint operations plans, concept plans, and operation orders.
* Providing civil considerations input and coordinating with the country team, J-3, staff judge
advocate, Service component commands, HN, and IPI in the development of transitional public
security.
* Coordinating with the comptroller and staff judge advocate to obtain advice on proposed
expenditures of allocated funds dedicated to CMO. |
3-57 | 107 | Unified Action
* Facilitating the movement, security, and control of funds to subordinate units and coordinating with
the funds controlling authority and financial manager to meet the objectives of the commander.
* Planning and supporting transitions (such as terminated, transferred to follow-on forces, or
transitioned to USG departments and agencies, IPI, or international organizations), as required.
* Providing expertise and support to the joint interagency coordination group or joint interagency
task force, if either is part of the joint staff.
* Managing collection and integration of civil knowledge in the operational area of the supported
commander.
* Coordinating with the J-2 for the integration of civil knowledge into the joint intelligence
preparation of the OE.
* Coordinating with the comptroller for the disposition of funding for CMO and foreign assistance.
* Coordinating with the J-4 and IPI for host-nation support.
* Coordinating with the J-2 and J-5 to support center of gravity analysis.
* Coordinating with the political advisor of the joint force commander to develop policy for the
implementation of transitional military authority.
* Coordinating with the staff, country team, CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint
interagency task force, humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations
center, and IPI to ensure planning and execution of FHA.
* Coordinating with the staff, country team, CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint
interagency task force, and IPI to ensure planning and execution of foreign assistance.
* Coordinating with the staff, country team, CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint
interagency task force, and IPI to ensure planning and execution of PRC.
* Coordinating with the staff, country team, special operations component command, CMOC, joint
interagency coordination group, joint interagency task force, and IPI to ensure planning and
execution of CME.
* Coordinating with the country team, J-3, J-4, staff judge advocate, Service component commands,
partner nation, and IPI for various permissions and agreements, to include—
Access.
Status of forces.
Overflight.
Frequency usage.
Land use.
* Participating in the targeting process.
5-10. The J-9 is responsible for Annex G to operation plans, concept plans, and operation orders. Annex G
promulgates CMO requirements in a formal plan or operation order. CMO require coordination among CA,
maneuver, health support, military police, engineer, transportation, and SOF. CMO also involve interaction
between staff sections and subordinate units. Annex G identifies, consolidates, and deconflicts the activities
of the various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require significantly more
details than discussed in Annex G.
Note: CJCS GDE 3130 and JP 3-57 provide additional information on Annex G.
THEATER CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING TEAM
5-11. At geographic combatant commands that have an established J-9, the theater CAPT is a complementary
capability and serves to strengthen the directorate’s efforts. The J-9 and theater CAPT develop, integrate,
synchronize, and coordinate CMO plans, policies, programs, and operations in coordination with theater-
aligned CA forces and interagency entities. These are integrated with, and enhance the strategic plans,
campaigns or operations, and theater security cooperation initiatives of the geographic combatant command. |
3-57 | 108 | Chapter 5
JOINT TASK FORCE
5-12. Just as in the military decision-making process, CA Soldiers on the J-9 staff provide the commander with
an analysis of the civil components that shape the OE during the joint planning process. While not all geographic
combatant commands have this staff section organic to their joint manning document, CA has the capability to
provide persistent or episodic planning elements to assist any level JFC with integrating CMO into plans.
5-13. Civil considerations are evaluated for those aspects of the OE that directly affect a mission. The CMO
staff provides the commander with detailed civil considerations analysis focused on the civil component of the
AO. CMO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other
USG agencies and other nonmilitary organizations in order to synchronize U.S. and multinational efforts. The
J-9 responsibilities include, but are not limited to—
* Determining if there is a requirement for a CMOC to maintain liaison with unified action partners,
IPI, interagency, NGOs, and international organizations in the AO.
* Advising the JFC and staff on legal and moral considerations as they pertain to the civil
component.
* Participating in the targeting process.
* Ensuring CMO is synchronized with IO.
* Analyzing the effects of civilian populations on military operations.
* Analyzing the effects of military operations on the civil component.
* Assessing the host-nation resources to support military operations.
* Identifying nongovernmental and other independent organizations operating in the AO.
* Recommending CA force requirements.
* Participating in required boards, cells, and working groups, as required.
* Maintaining the CMO staff estimate.
* Developing Annex G.
* Assisting the J-3 with development of Annex V.
Note: JP 5-0 provides the doctrinal discussion, process, and formats for joint planning.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-14. In order to plan successful CMO, CA planners must consider all aspects of the civil component, the
national security policy and objectives, and national and theater military objectives. Although the following
list is not intended to be all-inclusive, CA planners must consider—
* Host-nation and regional legal institutions, customs, social relationships, economic organizations,
and concepts of human and fundamental rights.
* Input to the development of transitional public security planning and execution.
* Public education.
* Cultural and religious leaders.
* Public health and sanitation.
* Labor, procurement, and contracting leaders.
* DC care and control, civilian supply, public safety, transportation, and humanitarian relief.
* International laws, customs, and practices governing the sovereign territory of each nation.
* The use of water, air, and land as it relates to the IPI.
* The ability to communicate with IPI.
* Criminal activities and the informal economy impacting the economic environment.
* Competing requirements and agendas of multiple stakeholders.
* Administrative, logistic, and communications support requirements of CMO forces.
* The need for early deployment and employment of CMO forces. |
3-57 | 109 | Unified Action
* The coordination of CMO requirements with other appropriate staff functions, the interagency,
international organizations, NGOs, HN, and private sector.
* Additional lead time normally necessary for the availability of reserve component forces.
* CMO input to the targeting process will help reduce destruction of essential civilian capabilities
needed during stabilization.
* The tactical, operational, and strategic objectives achievable via CMO.
* Recommendation of the formation of a JCMOTF, as required.
* Crop cycles of the HN.
* Historical events and local holidays of the HN.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP
5-15. Commanders establish CMO working groups to bring all the stakeholders in CMO together to focus
and synchronize their efforts in achieving the CMO priorities of the commander. In addition to the CMO
working group, the CAO or CMO planners ensure that they are actively involved in the IO working group;
the intelligence fusion working group; the targeting board; and other boards, cells, and working groups
relevant to the current operation.
5-16. The composition of the CMO working group changes based on level of command but the lead CMO
planner (J-9, G-9, or S-9) should chair the group. Other members of this working group may include the
following:
* Director of the CMOC.
* Subordinate CA unit representative.
* PSYOP staff.
* IO representative.
* Medical representative.
* Engineer representative.
* Provost marshal or representative.
* Staff judge advocate representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit’s senior rule of law
officer.
* Chaplain or religious affairs noncommissioned officer.
* Interagency representative, if applicable.
* Political advisor, if applicable.
* Public affairs officer.
* J-2, G-2, or S-2 targeting officer representative.
* J-3, G-3, or S-3 current operations representative.
* J-4, G-4, or S-4 representative.
* Resource management representative.
* Subordinate liaison officer. |
3-57 | 110 | Chapter 5
Civil-Military Operations Working Groups in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (May 2004 through March 2006), the
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan recognized the need to
secure the Shur Ghar Pass in southern Afghanistan. Close collaboration between CA,
coalition forces, IPI, NGOs, international organizations, USAID, DOS, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the UN, and others produced an excellent example of
a civil-military operations working group.
The Shur Ghar Pass is in central Zabul Province in southern Afghanistan. The pass
sits in a mountain range that splits the province. The surrounding mountains make
approaches to the pass unobservable. In addition, the rock-strewn sand road makes it
an ideal location for improvised explosive devices and ambushes. Several coalition
soldiers lost their lives in the pass due to these threats.
Through numerous civil-military operations working groups at Kandahar Air Base and
Zabul Province, CA Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion (A) and coalition forces
prepared a concept to secure the Shur Ghar Pass. The concept included placing
Afghan police in the pass, building a hardened police barracks compound, and
instituting numerous police checkpoints. Personnel secured Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP) funding to build the police barracks and checkpoints in the
pass. CA Soldiers supporting the task force coordinated with the commander of joint
task force 76 to use CERP funding provided by the provincial reconstruction team
(PRT) in Qalat, the capital of Zabul Province. CA forces eventually transferred the plan
to the commander of Joint Task Force 76, specifically 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division,
and the Qalat PRT. The DOS contractors from DynCorp ran a police training program
in Zabul, in conjunction with the 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division that produced trained
police to staff the pass.
When the 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division redeployed, the plan to secure the Shur Ghar
Pass was transferred to the 173d (A) BCT. The 173d (A) BCT dedicated virtually all its
engineer assets to complete the initial road cut and base course. With approval from
the commander of Joint Task Force 76, the Qalat PRT funded road construction
equipment and a rock crusher and was able to provide training for Afghans to operate
them. USAID agreed to fund an asphalt-finish topcoat using a private contractor to
pave the road.
This collaborative effort took over a year from conception to completion. It involved
civil-military operations working groups at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
and was composed of elements from SOF and conventional forces, USAID, the DOS,
the government of Afghanistan, and others to make it successful. The net result
produced secure access to southern Afghanistan for coalition and Afghan security
forces. It stimulated the economy in Zabul Province and southern Afghanistan, and
legitimized the local governments, the provincial government, and the government of
Afghanistan.
JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP
5-17. The joint interagency coordination group is a staff group that establishes regular, timely, and
collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners (JP 3-08).
Note: JP 3-08 provides additional information on the joint interagency coordination group.
5-18. A CACOM has the capabilities to provide theater-level analysis of civil considerations in coordination
with the joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) and to develop strategic-level civil
input to the supported JFC. A J-9 staff section plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and
civilian component issues through direct coordination with the J-3 of the supported unit. Throughout the |
3-57 | 111 | Unified Action
process, the plans officer of the CACOM staff continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received
from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and
host-nation sources to the common operational picture of the JFC. The integration of CMO into the staff or
working group is imperative. The capabilities of the private sector partnership, when orchestrating
interagency coordination, is extremely valuable.
CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
5-19. CME is part of the DOD’s strategy, to building partner nation capacity in a preventive, population
centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered indigenous
governments. It is persistent engagement conducted by, with, and through unified action partners to shape
and influence the IPI within the OE in support of the campaign plans of the commander and the campaign
support plan of the theater special operations command (TSOC). CME is also and executed in conjunction
with U.S. embassy strategies. The conduct of CME—
* Increases the capability of USG-supported IPI.
* Reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions.
* Leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE.
5-20. CME identifies and addresses critical civil strengths and vulnerabilities in under-governed and
ungoverned areas or high-threat environments where host-nation authorities, the country team, or USAID
cannot operate. These objectives are accomplished through the conduct of CAO during the execution of the
following CME program key tasks:
* CR. CME elements conduct CR to observe and evaluate specific aspects of the civil environment
to fulfill information requirements. CME practitioners must understand the overall preparation of
the environment plan during the conduct of CR. By planning and executing targeted CAO that
influences unified action partners and IPI relationships and resources, CA elements help shape the
OE, thereby contributing to preparation of the environment efforts.
* Network Analysis. Regional and theater civil-military support elements (CMSEs) conduct
network analysis and evaluation to identify critical and relevant nodes. This is done by using
CNDE and CKI to partner with friendly networks and engage neutral networks in order to counter
threat networks. Network analysis is executed with the purpose of determining, analyzing, and
evaluating links between these nodes as a means of gaining an understanding of a group, place,
physical object, or system.
* Network Engagement. Regional CMSEs and CMSEs conduct network engagement to engage
critical nodes within friendly and neutral networks in order to counter threat networks. All the data
and information gathered through CR and CE are used during the CKI process. Network
engagement is conducted continuously and simultaneously at all levels of warfare to help achieve
the commander’s objectives within the OE.
* Interorganizational Cooperation. Inter-organizational cooperation enables unity of effort,
common objectives, and a common understanding by synchronizing actions. It facilitates
cooperation in areas of mutual interest, promotes a common operational picture, and enables the
sharing of critical information and resources that contribute to economy of force in accomplishing
TSOC objectives.
* Capacity Building. Capacity building develops the capability and capacity—within friendly and
neutral networks—to counter malign actor influence and activities. Capacity building increases
host-nation government and military capacity to reduce the causes of instability, thereby denying
malign actor influence. |
3-57 | 112 | Chapter 5
5-21. The CME program consists of four distinct capabilities-based, task-organized units of action.
These units of action include:
* CMSE. A civil-military support element is a task-organized Civil Affairs force established to
plan, facilitate, and execute Civil Affairs operations in support of civil-military engagement
in a specified country, region, or theater. The CMSE is primarily sourced by a special operations
CAT. Through CAO, the CMSE conducts planned and targeted CR and CE, engaging networks
to affect the behavior and will of relevant actors, audiences, and adversaries in the OE in support
of combatant command campaign plans, the TSOC campaign support plan, and in conjunction
with U.S. embassy strategies.
* Regional CMSE. The regional CMSE conducts network engagement and analysis within a
subordinate command architecture to the TSOC, and is primarily sourced by a special operations
CA company. It conducts tactical to operational level human network analysis to comprehensively
study and understand the relationships of networks to support preparation of the environment.
The regional CMSE is a task-organized unit of action based upon mission specific requirements
with the ability to conduct command and control of the CME elements in their assigned region to
achieve desired effects.
* Theater CMSE. The theater CMSE is primarily sourced by elements from a special operations
CA battalion headquarters and is filled based upon specific mission requirements. It conducts and
integrates network analysis into the joint planning process, joint intelligence preparation of the
OE, and the joint targeting cycle. The theater CMSE is collocated with a theater-level special
operations command and control node. It also has the ability to conduct command and control of
the CME elements in their theater to achieve desired affects.
* Trans-Regional CME Element. The trans-regional CME element is sourced from special
operations CA personnel assigned to USSOCOM who carry out their duties at interorganizational
partners in USSOCOM-identified priority locations. This unit of action is tasked with developing
and maintaining long-term relationships through an enduring presence across the unified action
partner network to enhance trans-regional synchronization and improve inter-organizational
cooperation.
5-22. Trans-regionally and persistently engaged CME elements conduct targeted CAO to increase the
capability of USG-supported IPI and to reduce the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and
regions. These elements leverage civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE in support of the
campaign plans of the CCDR and the TSOC campaign support plan, and in conjunction with U.S. embassy
strategies.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
5-23. Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between agencies of the
USG, including the DOD, to accomplish an objective. The accomplishment of strategic objectives identified
in U.S. national security policy requires a whole-of-government approach that achieves unity of effort.
The Tsunami Relief Disaster in the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster-relief effort at the end of 2004 is a good example
of interagency cooperation, collaboration, and communication. As both DOD and
OFDA rapidly responded to the disaster areas, both realized the need for close
cooperation and coordination. OFDA dispatched liaison officers at the tactical level to
CMOCs operating in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as at USPACOM.
The DOD similarly embedded liaison officers at OFDA’s response management team
in Washington, DC. These steps greatly simplified the request for assistance process
from international organizations and NGOs and increased the ability of both
organizations to respond effectively and quickly to those affected by the disaster.
FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |
3-57 | 113 | Unified Action
Note: FM 3-05.401 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in
the Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
5-24. CA forces enable interagency coordination through organizational structures at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels including—
* J-9.
* Theater CAPT.
* G-9.
* CAPT.
* S-9.
* CMOCs.
* Civil-military advisory group.
* Theater CMSE.
* Regional CMSE.
* Civil liaison teams (CLTs).
* CMSE.
* CATs.
Note: JP 3-08 provides additional information regarding interagency coordination.
5-25. The DOS is the lead entity when coordinating between interagency partners of any given country.
The DOS is also the lead in establishing an international agreement. The DOD and its components are
governed by international agreements under DODI 5530.3 (figure 5-1, page 5-12), and that authority is
limited under Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 181.
5-26. When not engaged in a forcible entry, invasion, or occupation, military forces are not permitted in
foreign countries in their official capacity without authority being advanced through an international
agreement or country clearance of some type. Access granted by the permissions manager is designated as
part of joint deployment and redeployment operations. Therefore, they must be addressed in a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, which is consummated by the U.S.
5-27. Contingency basing (agreement to stay in a country) must be negotiated with a foreign country unless
basing is being established through forcible entry and establishing a lodgment. Such basing can be authorized
through a bilateral agreement also called a defense cooperation agreement. It can also be negotiated through
a status-of-forces agreement or a “diplomatic note”. These international agreements are sometimes referred
to as host-nation agreements or host-nation support agreements or diplomatic agreements in common usage.
In such agreements use of existing HN, host country, or partner nation bases can be utilized. If new
construction is occurring or land is set aside for U.S. forces, it usually requires a separate land use agreement.
Note: See JP 3-0, JP 3-34 and JP 3-35 for more information about deployment and redeployment,
joint engineer operations, and joint operations. |
3-57 | 114 | Chapter 5
International Agreements (DODI 5530.3)
An international agreement is any agreement concluded with one or more foreign governments
(including their agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions) or with an international
organization, that—
Is signed or agreed to by personnel of any DOD component, or by representatives of the
DOS or any other Department or Agency of the U.S. Government.
Signifies the intention of its parties to be bound in international law.
Is denominated as an international agreement or as a memorandum of understanding,
memorandum of agreement, memorandum of arrangements, exchange of notes,
exchange of letters, technical arrangement, protocol, note verbal, aide memoire, agreed
minute, contract, arrangement, statement of intent, letter of intent, statement of
understanding or any other name connoting a similar legal consequence.
Any oral agreement that meets the criteria set forth in DODI 5530.3 is an international agreement.
The DOD representative who enters into the agreement will cause such agreement to be reduced
to writing.
During a state of war, the Law of War (codified in the Geneva-Hague Conventions), permits local
“special” agreements in some cases, that are necessitated by interaction at the tactical and
operational level.
The following are not considered to constitute international agreements for the purposes of this
Directive:
Contracts made under the Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Foreign Military Sales Credit Agreements.
Foreign Military Sales Letters of Offer and Acceptance and Letters of Intent.
Standardization agreements, quadripartite standardization agreements, Army Service
component command air standards, and naval standardization agreements in accordance
with DODI 5530.3.
Leases under Title 10, United States Code, Sections 2667 and 2675 (reference [f]), and
Title 22, United States Code, Section 2796 (reference [l]).
Agreements solely to establish administrative procedures.
Acquisitions or orders pursuant to cross-servicing agreements made under the authority of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act (Title 10, United States Code,
Section 2321 et seq. (reference [f]) and DODD 2010.9 (reference [m]). (Umbrella
agreements, implementing arrangements, and cross-servicing agreements under the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act are international agreements.)
Figure 5-1. International agreements according to Department of Defense Issuance 5530.3
5-28. DODI 5530.3 governs the DOD responsibilities regarding such agreements. In essence, the DOD
defers to the DOS in the negotiation of international agreements and it binds the DOD to adhere to such
agreements.
5-29. CA forces, in conjunction with the judge advocate general, must understand these agreements in order
to advise commanders on what their forces can and cannot do in keeping with the U.S. obligations to an HN,
or partner nation. This advice would also include the interaction of U.S. forces with IPI or other foreign
nationals. CA forces also play a significant role in achieving unified action and integrating, coordinating, and
synchronizing with civilian entities in keeping with the international agreements.
5-30. International agreements can be bilateral (between the U.S. and a partner nation) or multilateral (such
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Bilateral agreements can be negotiated on any number of
international matters—to include economic, trade, or defense cooperation. Bilateral defense cooperation
agreements are referred to as defense cooperation agreements or less formal agreements can be negotiated as
simply diplomatic notes exchanged between foreign ministers. |
3-57 | 115 | Unified Action
Note: U.S. DOS Foreign Affairs Manual, Correspondence Handbook, describes the use of
diplomatic notes (5 FAH-1).
5-31. Commanders have limited authority to negotiate or interact at a tactical or operational level. Such
interaction is limited to special agreements as addressed under the law of war. Such agreements are typically
verbal and must not have an adverse effect on protected persons (such as prisoners of war or civilians).
Special agreements are binding between those governments or military commanders that made the
agreements. When engaging the civil component, CA Soldiers often negotiate and make agreements with
segments of the populations, HN, or partner nation institutions.
THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES EMBASSIES
5-32. An embassy is the headquarters for USG representatives serving in a foreign country. It is normally
led by an ambassador, who is the representative of the U.S. President to the host country. An embassy is
normally located in the capital city. It may have branches, known as consulates, in other cities.
5-33. U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, and foreign embassies and consulates in the United States, each
have special status. While the host government is responsible for the security of U.S. diplomats and the area
around an embassy, the embassy belongs to the country it represents. Representatives of the host country
cannot enter an embassy without permission—even to put out a fire—and an attack on an embassy is
considered an attack on the country it represents.
5-34. The ambassador, also known as the chief of mission, is the highest-ranking diplomat to the host country
and is the personal representative of the President. This person is comparable to a CEO of a corporation and
has to be a strong leader and a good manager. The ambassador is supported by a deputy, known as the deputy
chief of mission, and a team of U.S. foreign service officers and specialists from the DOS. The ambassador
may also be supported by representatives from other U.S. agencies, such as the USAID DOD, Department
of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and so on. No matter their agency,
all employees work under the direction of the ambassador.
5-35. The primary purpose of an embassy is to assist American citizens who travel to or live in the host
country. U.S. Foreign Service Officers also interview citizens of the host country who wish to travel to the
U.S. for business, education, or tourism purposes. Embassy staff interact with representatives of the host
government, local businesses, nongovernmental organizations, the media and educational institutions, and
private citizens to increase understanding of the U.S. and its policies and to collaborate on shared interests.
5-36. Embassy staff analyze the political and economic situation in the host country and report back to the
DOS on issues that affect the United States. They help U.S. businesses find partners and customers, and may
train the police and military of the host government to support better security in the country. They also
sponsor educational, professional, and cultural exchanges to introduce emerging and established leaders to
the U.S., and to promote ties between U.S. and foreign students, academics, scientists, entrepreneurs,
political, religious, and civil society figures.
5-37. While Americans work at embassies and consulates, most of the staff comes from the host country.
These employees are essential to the success of any embassy because they know the local culture, have
essential skills, or are well-connected to government and civil society leaders.
5-38. A large embassy may have annexes. The main embassy building is called the chancery. As the public
face of the U.S., it is often an architectural work of art. In some countries, American staff may live on the
embassy compound, but they frequently live in apartments or houses in the host city. The residence of the
ambassador is often used for official functions, and its public areas are often decorated with American art on
loan from museums. |
3-57 | 116 | Chapter 5
5-39. While each U.S. embassy is different, CA Soldiers may interact with embassy stakeholders, such as
defense attachés, political and economic officers, and USAID mission personnel. While the missions CA
Soldiers support will most likely fall under the authority of geographic CCDRs (not under the authority of
Chiefs of Mission), it is still critical for CA Soldiers to—
* Understand the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the host country.
* Understand the status of the bilateral relationship.
* Ensure that all activities conducted in country are mutually supportive of the U.S.-host nation
objectives.
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION
5-40. The DOD provides support to stabilization as directed in DODD 3000.05. Stabilization is an inherently
political endeavor that requires aligning USG efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and
defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage
conflict and prevent violence. The DOS is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts in
accordance with NSPD-44. The USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization
assistance. The DOD is a supporting element, which performs several functions—including providing
requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory
authorities.
5-41. The DOD is required to establish a defense support to stabilization process to—
* Identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies.
* Convey the defense stabilization objectives through strategic documents.
* Organize to achieve the defense stabilization objectives.
* Prioritize requisite defense resources.
5-42. The DOD is also required to ensure Annex G and Annex V are fully developed and integrated in global
campaign plans, concept plans, and operation plans, in accordance with JP 5-0.
STABILIZATION AND SECURITY COOPERATION
5-43. As part of SCA, CA forces conduct stabilization and security cooperation activities in an effort to
strengthen local governance and build partner capacity. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense
interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United
States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense
and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to
allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). Stabilization and security cooperation are mainly, though not solely,
accomplished through foreign assistance, FHA, FID, support to counterinsurgency, and the CME program of
USSOCOM.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
5-44. Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to a foreign nation through development
assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and SA. The U.S. provides foreign assistance through security
cooperation in conjunction with the theater security cooperation plan of a geographic CCDR. Foreign
assistance can also be provided when the U.S. is sponsoring a FID program or FHA in conjunction with other
security cooperation efforts. Foreign assistance operations support an HN by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. |
3-57 | 117 | Unified Action
5-45. Figure 5-2 highlights the components of foreign assistance, which can be divided into three broad
categories:
* SA. This fosters stability and security abroad by strengthening the military and law enforcement
forces in our partner countries through capacity building and training and helps countries purchase
defense equipment and services produced in the U.S.
* Economic and Development Assistance. This advances our national security by helping countries
meet near-term political, economic, and development needs.
* HA. This supports disaster and emergency relief efforts, including programs that save lives,
alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity.
Figure 5-2. Components of foreign assistance
5-46. CAO focus on the civil component during foreign assistance to provide the commander with viable
courses of action to assist in the stabilization of the populace and resources in an AO. This focus assists the
commander in synchronizing efforts and capabilities in the most efficient manner possible. Ultimately, CA
will reduce the redundancy of resources, maximize the usage of the current infrastructure, and assist in the
coordination of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency groups supporting foreign assistance operations.
5-47. CA forces possess the capabilities to evaluate the civil component through the planning and execution
of TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI, in support of foreign assistance. The focus of foreign assistance programs is
to legitimize and enhance the stability of the political, military, economic, social, informational, and
infrastructure systems of an HN. CA forces provide a sociocultural understanding of the OE that enhances
the ability of the U.S. to achieve the desired end state. Support to foreign assistance can include technical
expertise, advice, and assistance that can exponentially influence the success of other ongoing programs and
initiatives. This assistance forms a better foundation on which a nation can build programs to meet the needs
of the populace and promote its own sustainable development or growth. CA forces assist in the development
of these programs and provide assessments to the commander on their effectiveness and sustainability. |
3-57 | 118 | Chapter 5
Note: ATP 3-57.30 provides additional information regarding SA, FID, and 10 USC authorities
that oversee these missions.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
5-48. A principal objective of the foreign policy of the U.S. is the encouragement and sustained support to
people of developing countries for improving the quality of their lives. Development assistance programs are
programs executed by the DOS directly or indirectly, through USAID, which finances numerous
development assistance programs to address the following needs:
* Agriculture and nutrition.
* Population control.
* Health.
* Education.
* Energy.
* Environment improvement.
* Humanitarian and civic assistance programs.
* Economic programs.
5-49. CA forces support these named needs with the full range of SCA.
5-50. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by 22 USC and 10 USC 401. This assistance
can only be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and it must fulfill unit training
requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency
relief conducted under FHA operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs generally encompass
planned activities in the following categories:
* Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care (and their associated education, training, and
technical assistance) provided by professionals in each practice in rural or underserved areas of a
country.
* Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.
* Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
* Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
5-51. CA units and personnel supporting humanitarian and civic assistance provide capabilities of CNDE
and CMI with an understanding of the cultures within the HN.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
5-52. SA programs are governed by 22 USC. SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended). SA is also authorized by
other related statutes through which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-
related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.
5-53. According to JP 3-22, SA is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by the DOS, to
be administered by the DOD or Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Through these programs, the U.S.
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations. These
programs are implemented by the DOD in accordance with policies established by the DOS. The principal
components of these programs include foreign military sales, foreign military financing, international
military education and training, peace operations, and excess defense articles.
5-54. CA personnel in support of these SA programs can—
* Identify host-nation requirements.
* Develop or review the nomination list of programs or projects to support the mission objectives.
* Provide input to the feasibility of each program.
* Provide input to the prioritization of each program to meet the desired end states and goals. |
3-57 | 119 | Unified Action
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
5-55. Foreign humanitarian assistance is Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United
States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation (JP 3-29).
Most USG agencies, as well as USC and DOD directives, utilize the terms humanitarian assistance and
foreign disaster relief.
5-56. FHA operations are different from foreign assistance primarily because they have a direct humanitarian
need. The DOD uses appropriated funds specifically for FHA in the form of overseas humanitarian disaster
and civic aid. Foreign assistance is not funded by overseas humanitarian disaster and civic aid, and it is
intended as deliberate assistance to promote long-term stability. FHA activities conducted by U.S. armed
forces fall into two broad categories:
* Steady-state FHA. Steady-state FHA are activities normally planned and conducted as part of the
theater campaign plan of the geographic CCDR. The intent of steady-state FHA activities is to
assess and increase the affected nation’s capacity and capability to respond to disaster. Steady-
state FHA is a security cooperation tool that can improve visibility, access and influence. It can
also promote regional stability with foreign military and civilian counterparts and increase
interoperability between that nation and U.S. forces in the event that U.S. forces have to respond
in support of foreign disaster relief.
* Foreign Disaster Relief. Foreign disaster relief is a limited duration contingency operation.
The goal of foreign disaster relief is to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims—
including victims of natural disasters and conflicts, internally displaced persons, refugees, stateless
persons, and vulnerable migrants. Normally, foreign disaster relief includes:
Provision of basic services and commodities, such as food, water, sanitation, health care,
nonfood items (clothing, bedding, and so on), and emergency shelter.
Establishment of distribution points and collection points.
Support to critical infrastructure and logistics necessary for the delivery of those essential
services and commodities.
Medical equipment, medical and technical personnel, and making repairs to essential services.
5-57. DODD 5100.46 directs that DOD components will provide disaster assistance in support of U.S.
foreign disaster relief efforts only in any of the three following instances:
* At the direction of the President.
* When the SecDef or a designee approves (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State) a request
for assistance from another federal department or agency.
* In emergency situations in order to save human lives where there is not sufficient time to seek the
prior concurrence of the Secretary of State, in which case the SecDef will advise and seek the
concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter.
5-58. Nothing in DODD 5100.46 will be construed as preventing a military commander with assigned forces
at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from taking prompt action to save human lives. In cases
in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the HN and U.S. Chief
of Mission of the affected country before committing forces. Also, the CCDR will follow up as soon as
possible (but no later than 72 hours after the start of relief operations) to secure SecDef or Deputy SecDef
approval for continuing assistance. CCDRs must also obtain SecDef or Deputy SecDef approval in order to
obtain reimbursement with Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds. Such assistance during
the first 72 hours does not include the authority to provide military assistance that does not contribute to
urgent life-saving efforts.
5-59. Although U.S. military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend and protect U.S. national
interests, they may be readily adapted to FHA requirements. Military organization, structure, and readiness
enable commanders to rapidly and effectively respond when time is of the essence. In addition to—or
sometimes in lieu of—host-nation humanitarian assistance efforts, hundreds of NGOs from around the world
respond to disasters to provide humanitarian assistance in various forms and for varied durations.
However, U.S. military forces are not the primary USG means of providing FHA. They normally supplement
the activities of U.S. and foreign government authorities, NGOs, and international organizations. The USAID |
3-57 | 120 | Chapter 5
is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and humanitarian assistance to foreign countries.
The USAID will normally serve as the lead federal agent for the U.S.
5-60. FHA missions conducted by U.S. military forces span the full competition continuum. This could be
from crisis response and limited contingency operations to activities in various steady-state programs as part
of the security cooperation program of the geographic CCDR, or to achieve specific theater campaign plan
objectives.
5-61. DODD 5105.65 assigns the Defense Security Cooperation Agency the responsibility to direct,
administer, and provide DOD-wide guidance for the execution of DOD SA and security cooperation. It
further directs the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to provide oversight and exercise overall program
management responsibility for DOD humanitarian assistance and demining activities funded by the Overseas
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The directive directs the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency to produce Defense Security Cooperation Agency manual 5105.38-M. This manual provides policy
and direction for humanitarian assistance.
5-62. The CA role in FHA is to assist the commander in planning; advising on the activities; and coordinating
with unified action partners, IPI, and interagency to synchronize efforts. CA forces also play a key role in
conducting assessments. FHA operations are inherently complex and require a significant amount of
interagency coordination. FHA is normally directed from the strategic level, planned and managed at the
operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. On all levels, in support of FHA activities, CA forces—
* Participate in interagency assessment, planning and synchronization of FHA activities.
* Identify, validate, or evaluate host-nation and international resources available for FHA activities.
* Mobilize vetted and developed civil networks to aid in FHA activities.
* Advise, assist, and plan displaced civilian movement and control.
* Participate in the execution of selected FHA activities as directed.
* Provide liaison with IPI.
* Assist in the coordination of local labor.
* Coordinate with judge advocates to assist the commander to meet legal and moral obligations.
* Monitor and evaluate FHA.
* Assess requirements and support for the operation of a CMOC.
* Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions.
* Identify shortfalls in host-nation humanitarian assistance programs and resources.
5-63. Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type
has unique characteristics. For example, FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace
operations, but each has its own strategic end state. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit
their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA
simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives, as well
as measures of effectiveness and measures of performance complementary to simultaneous military
operations. Civil networks developed and integrated into operations through the CNDE process aid in
execution of FHA tasks, thereby relieving commands of resource demands that might take away from
completion of other operations.
5-64. One example of FHA is humanitarian mine action, which includes activities related to the furnishing
of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to detection, clearance, physical security, and
stockpile management of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. Explosive remnants of war include
landmines, unexploded ordnance (mortar rounds, artillery shells, bomblets, rockets, sub-munitions, rocket
motors and fuel, grenades, small arms ammunition, and so on), and abandoned ammunition storage and cache
sites. The CA role in humanitarian mine action is normally to assist with the request and approval process
and to assist the HN in establishing a national demining office. |
3-57 | 121 | Unified Action
5-65. There are many operations that are related to FHA. These operations are diverse and CA forces will
support these related operations as necessary. The related operations consist of—
* Stability operations.
* Foreign assistance, to include—
Humanitarian and civic assistance.
SA.
Development assistance.
* Peace operations.
* Noncombatant evacuation operations.
* Mass atrocity response operations.
* International chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
5-66. Foreign internal defense is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any
of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).
The focus of U.S. FID efforts is to support the internal defense and development of the HN. Internal defense
and development can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth, and
protect itself from security threats. Figure 5-3 depicts the interrelationship of security cooperation, SA, and
FID.
5-67. In FID, CAO facilitate the integration of U.S. military support into the overall internal defense and
development programs of the supported nation. Within the FID framework and functional areas associated
with joint strategic capabilities planning, CA forces—
* Perform specific planning tasks in support of the Services and combatant commands.
* Identify civil considerations.
* Execute assessments.
* Coordinate internally and with the HN.
Figure 5-3. Security assistance and foreign internal defense |
3-57 | 122 | Chapter 5
5-68. CAO are vital to theater FID operations in areas from planning to execution. It is a valuable resource in—
* Planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct support (not involving combat
operations), and combat operations in support of the overall FID effort.
* Supporting the reconstitution of viable and competent civil infrastructure in the operational areas
that were previously ungoverned, under-governed, or in the direct control of threat forces or
shadow governments.
5-69. Through CAO, CA forces also assist the government by executing SCA.
5-70. The CA forces supporting FID range from staffs to CATs. Essential tasks performed may include—
* Incorporating CAO in all activities related to FID (from planning to execution).
* Reviewing and supporting host-nation internal defense and development goals.
* Ensuring host-nation public support, from local to national levels.
* Establishing and maintaining contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
* Ensuring the relevant parties always maintain host-nation sovereignty.
* Advocating for host-nation self-sufficiency.
Note: JP 3-05, JP 3-22, JP 3-57, FM 3-18, and ATP 3-05.2 provide more information on FID.
COUNTERINSURGENCY
5-71. Insurgencies exist apart from, before, during, or after a conventional conflict. Elements of a population
often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a population or groups in a population are willing to fight
to change the conditions to their favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the
prevailing authority, they often initiate an insurgency. Ideally, the host country is the primary actor in
defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central
government, or after a major conflict, the host country must eventually provide a solution that is culturally
acceptable to its society and meets U.S. policy goals.
5-72. The U.S. uses a range of methods to aid a partner nation in defeating an insurgency.
Effective counterinsurgency operations require—
* Understanding of the military profession, civil factors, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
* Execution of and challenges to governance.
* Societal understanding.
* Cultural knowledge.
5-73. The tasks that counterinsurgents perform in countering an insurgency are not unique. It is the organization
of these tasks in time and space that is unique. Although all tasks executed to establish the conditions to reach
a desired end state are significant, stability operations may be critical in a counterinsurgency.
5-74. By definition, counterinsurgencies occur in the civil component. As such, a civil component solution is the
most effective deterrent to counterinsurgencies. Insurgencies are most readily defeated locally by local actors. Civil
networks provide the commander a partner in the civil component to identify and defeat insurgent threats with
minimal use of U.S. military resources while also utilizing a local partner. SCA missions allow CA forces to
reinforce the stability, security, and effective governance needed to choke out insurgent support. Effective
governance meets the needs of the population and provides security.
5-75. Entities best qualified to accomplish nonmilitary tasks may not always be available. In such cases,
military forces may need to perform those tasks until civilian-led capabilities become available. Within the
Army, CA is the branch ideally organized, trained, and equipped to assist in these functions. CA forces are
also ideally suited to interact with the population to determine the root causes of instability and improving
the relationship between the populace and the HN. CAO, in counterinsurgency, should focus on the following
tasks:
* Planning and conducting CR, CE, and CND to determine causes of instability.
* Providing SCA, as required, to bolster host-nation government capability or capacity.
* Building and/or mobilizing civil networks to support stable governance. |
3-57 | 123 | Unified Action
* Conducting transitional military authority until the host-nation government has the capacity to
conduct required governance activities.
* Improving host-nation legitimacy through activities such as military civil action.
* Developing, planning, and executing projects that address the humanitarian needs of the populace.
* Providing CAO and CMO training to host-nation and partner security forces and civilian agencies.
* Providing coordination and liaison between the IPI, interagency, and civil component to support
unified action.
* Conducting activities with host-nation authorities, interagency, international organizations, NGO,
private sector, or international military partners to deny support to the insurgents.
Note: JP 3-24 provides additional information on counterinsurgency. |
3-57 | 125 | Appendix A
History of Civil Affairs
The history of U.S. Army CA—known as Military Government prior to 1959—can best
be described as one of continuous evolution. From its ad hoc origins in the immediate
aftermath of World War I, the Army professionalized CA as a reserve branch (1955) and
a regular Army branch (2006). This brief history provides a short overview of U.S. Army
CA. While it highlights critical events, it is not comprehensive.
A-1. Since its creation in the early Republic, the U.S. Army conducted roles and functions similar to CA
(Military Government). Examples include the Lewis and Clark Expedition (1804 to 1806), Major General
Winfield Scott’s occupation of Mexico City (1847 to 1848), post-Civil War Reconstruction in the American
South (1865 to 1877), and the Philippine-American War (1899 to 1913).
A-2. During the Civil War, the Army implemented General Orders No. 100 (1863), otherwise known as the
Lieber Code. It provided the U.S. Army with guidelines that regulated the just treatment of civilians and
property in the occupied South. Post-war, General Orders No. 100 served as the foundation for the
development of laws dictating how the U.S. Army operated in occupied territory. The U.S. Army codified
these laws in the Rules of Land Warfare (1914), later revised as FM 27-10, then FM 6-27. As important as
the Lieber Code was, it was just another step toward developing formal CA (Military Government) structure,
doctrine, and training.
Note: FM 27-10 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in the
Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
A-3. The true beginning of modern U.S. Army CA was the post-World War I occupation of the German
Rhineland by the Third U.S. Army from December 1918 until 11 July 1923. The lessons from this experience
led the Army to develop CA doctrine, provide professional education, and eventually create specialized CA
(Military Government) units. In the words of Major Truman Smith, the main author of the final report on the
occupation, the Army’s post-World War I actions “lacked both training and organization to guide the
destinies of nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”
While it lasted, the U.S. Army occupation performed civil administration tasks and ensured that Germany
would not resume hostilities. A new experience for the modern Army, it left such an impact that it led to the
creation of a formal CA capability.
A-4. For CA, the most important development was the subsequent publication of American Military
Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army
and American Forces in Germany. Known as the Hunt Report after its director, Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, it
provided analyses of the Army’s experience, highlighting the lack of formal CA training. This groundbreaking
official study, which published the experiences of American Soldiers who occupied Germany, drove change.
A-5. The Hunt Report and similar, but less widely distributed, studies of Army involvement in the
Philippines pointed to requirements for a standing CA staff section for incorporating CA in war planning.
This led to the publication of an updated Rules of Land Warfare in 1934 that contained a section on military
government and established the need for a CA (Military Government) capability. Based on these sources, in
1940, the Army published its first doctrine that focused on these special skills, FM 27-5, which guided U.S.
Army CA (Military Government) efforts throughout World War II. Further study of the Hunt Report and the
new doctrinal publications led to the creation of the first formal U.S. Army CA training program—the School
of Military Government—at the University of Virginia in May 1942.
Note: FM 27-5 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in the
Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM. |
3-57 | 126 | Appendix A
A-6. The school instructed officers in staff-level military government functions. However, because the
School of Military Government could not meet the growing demand for trained CA personnel, the Army
exported the program to other civilian universities throughout the U.S. By 1945, the Army taught CA courses
at Fort Custer, Michigan; the CA Staging Area at Fort Ord/Presidio of Monterey, California; or in overseas
schools.
A-7. To manage its CA (Military Government) efforts, the U.S. Army created the Military Government
Division, established in July 1942 under the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Its small size and lack
of influence, compounded by the sheer number of CA matters experienced by Lieutenant General Dwight D.
Eisenhower after the invasion of North Africa on 8 November 1942, prompted the formation of the
CA Division under the War Department in March 1943. Led by Major General John H. Hilldring, the
CA Division formulated policy for CA (Military Government) units. These units ranged in size from the
European CA Division, with more than 8,200 personnel, to nine-person CA Detachments spread throughout
combat units.
A-8. These elements worked closely, near, or with combat forces, helping to address the concerns of civilian
populations and stabilizing rear areas so that combat commanders could remain focused on the enemy.
CA (Military Government) elements had expanded roles in the final year of World War II and particularly in
stabilizing post-war Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and Korea. However, the number of CA personnel
declined considerably as the Army reduced force structure in the postwar drawdown. A standing CA
capability appeared to be on its way out of the Army until another conflict guaranteed its survival as a
permanent U.S. Army capability.
A-9. The Korean War not only resurrected U.S. Army CA, but also served as a turning point for the
employment of CA and led to a permanent establishment of the capability in the U.S. Army. With the brief
exception of conducting military government in North Korea in late 1950, U.S. CA personnel worked in
South Korea, a sovereign allied country with a functioning government. There, CA Soldiers, organized first
under the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment (1950), then the United Nations Civil
Assistance Command (1951 to 1953), and later, under the Korean Civil Assistance Command (1953 to 1955).
CA Soldiers provided refugee assistance and medical care for the civilian population, while helping to rebuild
destroyed public infrastructure. The large-scale effort provided the rationale for the U.S. Army to establish
the CA (Military Government) Branch in the USAR on 17 August 1955. On 2 October 1959, the Army
eliminated the term Military Government and renamed it the CA Branch. This name change reflected recent
operations and changes in doctrine describing how the U.S. Army would employ CA in future conflicts.
A-10. Similar to the Korean War, the U.S. Army CA effort in South Vietnam (1965 to 1971) was based on
operating within a sovereign allied country. However, this time, as guided by FM 41-10, CA became associated
with unconventional warfare (UW). The three active duty CA companies—the 41st, 2d, and 29th—assigned to
South Vietnam helped integrate rural and war refugee populations into the national economic and political
systems. The CA companies provided medical care and assisted with agricultural, educational, and
infrastructure improvements, while giving credit to the government of South Vietnam for their efforts. That
mission would be later reincarnated as village stability operations in Afghanistan in 2010 to 2014.
Note: FM 41-10 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in the
Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
A-11. The experience in Vietnam brought lasting changes to CA. On 15 September 1971, the CA School,
then administered under the Provost Marshal General’s Office and based at Fort Gordon, Georgia, moved to
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There, it came under the direction of the U.S. Army Institute for Military
Assistance, now the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USAJFKSWCS). Active duty CA units soon relocated to Fort Bragg and were placed under the 95th CA
Group. However, in the post-Vietnam drawdown, the Army disbanded most active duty CA units. Only the
96th CA Battalion at Fort Bragg remained on active duty. Then, as now, the preponderance of CA units
resided in the USAR.
A-12. During the next two decades, CA made incremental steps toward becoming a core element of U.S.
Army Special Operations. On 1 October 1982, the Army established 1st Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) at Fort Bragg in which the 96th CA Battalion was a subordinate element. After the U.S. Army |
3-57 | 127 | History of Civil Affairs
created the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) at Fort Bragg on 1 December
1989, the 96th CA Battalion remained under 1st SOCOM. All reserve CA units based in the contiguous U.S.
were assigned to the United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC), which became
the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) on 27 November 1990.
Subordinated under USASOC, this placed the command and control of all contiguous U.S.-based active duty
(96th CA Battalion) and the USAR CA and PSYOP units under a single headquarters. On 3 March 1993,
Secretary of Defense Leslie ‘Les’ Aspin formally designated active and reserve CA units in the contiguous
U.S. as Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). The reserve formation based outside the contiguous U.S.,
the 322d CA Brigade in Hawaii, was not designated as ARSOF.
A-13. These organizational changes coincided with the Army’s increased use of CA units following the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent global instability. USASOC routinely deployed CA
forces to assist in all phases of operations—including supporting peacekeeping, disaster relief,
counterinsurgency, combat, and stability efforts. Reserve CA units, namely the 352d CA Command,
spearheaded the Kuwaiti Task Force and its efforts to stabilize Kuwait following the expulsion of the Iraqi
invaders in February 1991. Other USAR CA units and the 96th CA Battalion provided CA support in Iraq
for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the post-war
humanitarian mission to assist the Kurds. Other notable deployments for CA units include peacekeeping and
disaster relief efforts in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in
Haiti, and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in the Balkans. However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack
on the United States ushered CA into a new era.
A-14. Significant changes for CA took place during the Global War on Terror. To meet the growing needs
of the conventional force, on 1 October 2006, the Army reassigned USACAPOC from USASOC to USAR.
USASOC retained the single Active Duty special operations CA unit, the 96th CA Battalion. Two weeks
later, on 16 October 2006, the Army established CA as a branch in the regular Army. Prior to that, it had
been a functional area. Constant rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq accelerated the operating tempo of CA
units and promoted growth in the active force. USASOC used 96th CA Battalion personnel as cadre to create
four additional active special operations CA Battalions (91st, 92d, 97th, and 98th) under the newly organized
95th CA Brigade (2007). Currently, the 95th CA Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) is assigned to the
1st Special Forces Command supporting ARSOF and USSOCOM commitments.
A-15. The demand to support continued Global War on Terror operations also resulted in the creation of the
conventional 85th CA Brigade on 16 September 2011, with five subordinate battalions (80th, 81st, 82d, 83d,
and 84th). Based at Fort Hood, Texas, this regular Army unit was subordinated to United States Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and provided CA support to conventional forces. However, following troop level
drawdowns, the Army deactivated the 80th and 84th CA battalions on 15 September 2016. The 85th CA
Brigade, along with its 81st and 82d battalions were inactivated on 15 March 2018, leaving the 83d CA
Battalion as the sole active CA unit supporting the conventional force.
A-16. Army CA has evolved considerably since its origins in the post-World War I occupation of Germany.
The Army has recognized the continuing need for formal CA instruction and planning and the requirement
for a standing CA force. CA engages across the range of military operations—from the prevention of
hostilities to assisting people in returning to daily life after hostilities or humanitarian crises end. The demand
for CA is strong because it is a force multiplier and has a history of proven utility. |
3-57 | 129 | Appendix B
Civil Affairs Government Function Expertise
This appendix describes the role of CA Soldiers as government technical sector experts,
known as government function specialists. This expertise is essential to CA fulfillment
of its role of engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing,
enabling, or providing governance.
PROVIDING GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE - FUNCTIONAL
SPECIALTY AREAS
B-1. The CA military government function expertise capability is organized around five functional specialty
areas based on the five USG stability sectors. These functional specialty areas are:
* Civil Security. The CA civil security functional specialty area is concerned with civil security and
public order that generates the foundational conditions for stability within the OE. This relates to
the development and administration of policies, planning mechanisms, and training of partner
nation public officials to respond to threats and hazards (human-made, natural, internal and
external) across all levels of government. When required, the capabilities within this functional
specialty area assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.
* Civil Control. The CA civil control functional specialty area is concerned with the administration
of legal systems and institutions for the application of civil and criminal laws within the civil
component of the OE. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area assist
in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.
* Essential Services. The essential services functional specialty area is concerned with activities
designed for the provision of basic needs and services (water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health
services), as well as those that facilitate the restoration of a social fabric and community life, the
systems and institutions for the provision of primary and secondary education, and the return or
voluntary resettlement of those displaced. When required, the capabilities within this functional
specialty area assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.
* Governance Support. The governance and participation functional specialty area is concerned
with public administration, cultural relations, public information, and environmental management.
Collectively, these programs, policies, systems and institutions enable a state’s ability to serve the
citizenry, articulate interests, manage resources, and exercise bestowed power in a society. These
same programs, policies, systems, and institutions confer participation and the individual and
collective citizenry’s ability to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political
processes, and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation.
When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area assist in the establishment and
maintenance of a transitional military authority.
* Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. The economic stabilization and infrastructure
functional area is concerned with foundational commerce, monetary, fiscal labor issues;
agriculture, utilities, and public works; communications systems; and transportation fields.
Collectively, these programs, policies, systems, and institutions constitute an economic system.
The economic system is the intersection of government institutions and activities, corporate and
private enterprises, and populations, and the mobilization of resources for the production and
distribution of goods and services, which are integral to the stability of a region or society.
When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area assist in the establishment and
maintenance of a transitional military authority. |
3-57 | 130 | Appendix B
FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY FOCUS AREAS
B-2. Each functional specialty area has one or more focus areas nested within it, as shown and discussed in
Chapter 2 of this FM. Not all focus areas are provided solely by the CA government function specialists (that
is, public administration expertise resides with CA officers and noncommissioned officers, while corrections
could be provided by military police).The 16 CA functional specialty focus areas are described below.
LAW AND BORDER ENFORCEMENT
B-3. The law and border enforcement functional specialty places emphasis on indigenous ministerial and
sub-ministerial responses required to enforce laws and secure national borders. Application of the technical
expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments, analysis, and evaluation, which allow for the
provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional resources. This augmentation to those institutions
enhances capability of those institutions to implement and conduct assessments and oversight, provide and
regulate policies and programs, and operate institutional systems and agencies from national to local levels.
B-4. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, technology, processes, and personnel development required to
implement and sustain the activities for the maintenance of public order. These activities ensure the enforcement
of the rule of law through authenticity, safe-guarding, preserving documentation, cataloging and accounting,
accessibility, and transparency of the actions and interactions required of public law and border enforcement
agents. Law and border enforcement efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the
other functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume administrative and supervisory roles
of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
RULE OF LAW
B-5. The rule of law functional specialty places emphasis on the judiciary systems of the national and
subnational governments that incorporate customary indigenous methods with internationally acceptable
standards. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments,
analysis, and evaluation, which allow for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional
resources. This augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to
implement and conduct assessments and oversight, provide policies and programs, and operate institutional
systems and agencies from national to local levels.
B-6. This enhanced capability provides development for the structuring, resourcing, organizing,
rehabilitation, and implementation of the requisite curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel
development required to implement and sustain the rule of law. This functional specialty team is prepared to
assume administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by
conditions of the OE. Additional advice and expertise is also resident with this team to support war crime
courts and tribunals, and the establishment and administration of truth commissions.
CORRECTIONS
B-7. The corrections functional specialty places emphasis on the role of the national and subnational
governments in fulfilling the punitive phase of the rule of law through a transparent correctional system that
conveys safe and humane detention, incarceration, rehabilitation, and reintegration of qualified prisoners.
Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments, analysis, and
evaluation, which allows for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional resources.
This augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to conduct
assessments, implement oversight, provide policies and programs, and operate institutional systems and
agencies at national to local levels.
B-8. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement
and sustain a correctional system. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume administrative and
supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE. |
3-57 | 131 | Civil Affairs Government Function Expertise
PUBLIC SAFETY
B-9. The public safety functional specialty advises and assists in (or reestablishes) the evaluation,
assessment, planning, and implementation of systems and programs that establish civil security sector
assistance, or emergency management administration, and planning assistance. They promote community
resilience through application of the prevention and resolution framework, and planning for the mitigation of
effects of human-made or natural disasters for the maintenance of public order. This section consists of teams
educated and experienced in emergency management, policing, and community relations.
PUBLIC EDUCATION
B-10. The public education functional specialty team is concerned with the structure and conduct of the
formal education system of indigenous institutions, any competing system, and their collective impacts upon
stability across the OE. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers
assessments, analysis, and evaluation that permits this team to provide advice and guidance access to
additional resources. This augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those
institutions to conduct assessments, implement oversight, provide policies and programs, and operate
institutional systems and agencies at national to local levels.
B-11. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement
and sustain inclusive public education. With consideration toward equitable accessibility by individuals,
institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for reestablishment of stability.
These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional areas.
This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national
and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC HEALTH
B-12. The public health functional specialty advises and assists commanders, interagency, and host-nation
representatives in matters pertaining to the vulnerabilities and strengths of indigenous health care institutions
through the data collection, analysis, evaluation, legislation, regulation, and/or policy guidance. If necessary,
the public health functional specialty also reestablishes the administration of health care institutions and
programs at the national, regional, and provincial levels. With consideration toward equitable accessibility
by individuals, institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for reestablishment
of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the
national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
CIVILIAN SUPPLY
B-13. The civilian supply functional specialty is concerned with the response mechanism of indigenous
institutions in reaction to a crisis through surveying, assessing, and conducting a resources analysis and
evaluation of the local area. Results are used to determine the status of the essential needs of the indigenous
population. This helps determine the type and amount of resources available, and the location and application
of solution sets. Civilian needs that cannot be met with reallocated indigenous resources are then assessed
and requested to integrate the donor-sourced resources of NGOs or international organizations, or U.S.
military resources—including Class X supplies. An additional competency of this team is development of
civil authorities available to collect and distribute supplies or provide statistical analysis and operational
oversight as a response to refugees and displaced persons. This functional specialty team is prepared to
assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by
conditions of the OE. In doing so, the team identifies supplies and resources that can be diverted for U.S.
military use and identifies any associated negative impacts upon the civil component of the OE.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
B-14. The public administration functional specialty places emphasis on the structure and conduct of the
indigenous government from national to local levels. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this |
3-57 | 132 | Appendix B
functional specialty team provides advice and guidance access to additional resources to augment the nationwide
network of indigenous civil authorities to promote oversight and assessing, advising, improving, or establishing
legislative and executive institutions from national to local levels; and the processes of these institutions in the
administration of governance. Considerations for the public administration functional specialty include political
parties, eligibility for franchise, elections, tenure, civil servant service, policy and programming, and all other
aspects of the development and operation of the apparatus of government. These activities enable the
interconnectivity of individuals, civil society, and institutions to produce coordinated, integrated, and
synchronized efforts toward stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements
of, the other functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and
supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC INFORMATION
B-15. The public information functional specialty places emphasis on the ability of the indigenous government
to be transparent, accountable, informative, and effective in communicating to the citizenry. Application of the
technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments, analysis, and evaluation that permits
this team to provide advice and guidance access to additional resources. This augmentation to indigenous
institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to conduct assessments, implement oversight, provide
policies and programs, and operate public information systems and agencies from national to local levels.
B-16. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel required to develop and execute public
relations and information dissemination activities. These activities include support to the political and
electoral processes, emergency management actions, societal participation in issues, respect of dissenting
views, independence of private and international media, communication of policy and development
objectives, and the provision of equitable accessibility by individuals, institutions and the private sector.
Public information efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the
national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
CULTURAL RELATIONS
B-17. The cultural relations functional specialty places emphasis on the stewardship of the social and cultural
resources, official public records, and archives of the state. This functional specialty also places emphasis on
the educated expertise, and the focused understanding of traditional culture, customs, and arts of an area of a
nation, or region. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments
and analysis, which allow for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional resources. This
augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to conduct assessments,
implement oversight, provide and regulate policies and programs, and operate institutional systems and
agencies at national to local levels.
B-18. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement and
sustain the activities for the administration of public records, archives, and cultural assets. These activities
ensure the authenticity, safe-guarding, preservation and restoration, cataloging and accounting, accessibility,
and transparency of public documents, heritage, and properties. With consideration toward equitable
accessibility by individuals, institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for
reestablishment of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other
functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume administrative and supervisory roles of
the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
B-19. The environmental management functional specialty places emphasis on the principles of protection and
conservation of the natural resources and mitigation of hazards or pollution as it concerns the state, while
fostering supportable access, development, and utilization. Through the application of technical skills,
functional specialists advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government
environmental management agencies and systems and their associated requisite plans, policies, and procedures |
3-57 | 133 | Civil Affairs Government Function Expertise
while supporting the integration of the efforts of individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs, international
organizations, and other U.S. assistance and resources. With consideration toward equitable accessibility by
individuals, institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for reestablishment or
preservation of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other
functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles
of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
B-20. The economic development functional specialty places emphasis on the existing national to localized
economic network, any competing system, and their collective impacts upon stability within the OE.
Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this functional specialty team provides advice and guidance
access to additional resources to augment the national network to develop, implement, regulate, and enforce
interstate and international policies and programs focused upon macroeconomics, market(s) development,
and microeconomics. These activities enable the interconnectivity of individuals, civil society, and
institutions to produce coordinated, integrated, and synchronized efforts. These efforts have inherent
crosscutting affects upon, and requirements of, the other functional areas. This functional specialty team is
prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as
required by conditions of the OE.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
B-21. The food and agriculture functional specialty places emphasis on the indigenous, national through local
agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, methods, resources, institutions, and facilities.
These include any competing systems and their collective impacts upon conditions of the OE and effects on
stability. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments,
analysis, and evaluation, which allow for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional
resources. This augmentation to the indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to
conduct assessments and implement oversight, provide and regulate policies and programs, and operate
systems and agencies at the national to local levels.
B-22. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum and education, facilities, technology, processes, and personnel
development required to implement and sustain food and agriculture activities. These activities include the
production, processing, storage, product safety, marketing, and distribution of foodstuffs, food by-products,
and fiber and wood products. With consideration toward equitable access by individuals, institutions, and the
private sector, these activities position communities for the continuation, or establishment, of stability.
These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional specialties.
This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national
and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES
B-23. The public works and utilities functional specialty places emphasis on the national to localized public
facilities and utilities network as it exists within the OE. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this
functional specialty team provides advice and guidance access to additional resources aimed to enhance these
networks. This includes the ability and capabilities to develop, implement, regulate, and enforce policies and
programming for essential services. With consideration toward equitable accessibility by individuals,
institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for continuation, or establishment,
of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the
national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
B-24. The public communications functional specialty places emphasis on the national communications
network as it exists within the OE. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this functional specialty team |
3-57 | 134 | Appendix B
provides advice and guidance access to additional resources aimed to enhance the national network to develop,
implement, regulate, and enforce interstate and international policies for communications by radio, television,
wire, wireless, satellite, cable, and postal means. These activities enable the interconnectivity of individuals,
civil society, and institutions to produce coordinated, integrated, and synchronized efforts. These efforts have
inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional specialty areas. This functional
specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational
institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
B-25. The public transportation functional specialty places emphasis on the national transportation network
as it exists within the OE. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this functional specialty team
provides advice and guidance access to additional resources aimed to enhance the national network to
develop, implement, regulate, and enforce interstate and international policies for the physical movement of
commerce and people across ground, water, and through air conveyances. These activities enable the
interconnectivity of individuals; civil society; and associated organizations, institutions, and the private
sector. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
specialties. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of
the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE. |
3-57 | 135 | Appendix C
Civil Affairs in Special Operations
This appendix describes the contribution of CA forces to special operations. CA forces
can support all special operations, such as UW, direct action, special reconnaissance,
counterterrorism, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This appendix also
describes the USSOCOM CME program.
OVERVIEW
C-1. CAO are conducted within conventional and special operations missions. The difference between the two
is that CA special operations are generally conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments
utilizing specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures. CA special operations are conducted alongside other
SOF from across the DOD, and in support of DOS priorities in embassies around the world.
C-2. Given the environments in which special operations are conducted, CA forces conducting those
missions are at a greater risk for isolation than conventional forces. This greater risk necessitates extended
training on small unit tactics, tactical movement, survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and other techniques
that are unique to special operations.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
C-3. The DOD defines unconventional warfare as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with
an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (JP 3-05). UW is a core activity of ARSOF,
and has strategic utility to alter the balance of power between sovereign states.
C-4. CA forces support UW through the execution of CAO, which is critical to the planning and execution
of UW campaigns. When integrated throughout all phases of UW planning and execution, CA forces provide
the capability to analyze the strengths, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the civil component, as applicable,
to both the existing regime and the resistance movement. CAO also provide a comprehensive approach
toward assisting the resistance in legitimacy and TG, from the initial resistance movement, through transition,
to an emergent stable government. CA forces also are able to assist in developing broader governance efforts
in support of the resistance.
C-5. CA forces are typically sought for their unique capabilities with regards to identifying and mitigating
the underlying causes of instability in order to create a stable environment. This same analysis, however, can
be utilized by the resistance to identify and degrade those identified strengths and bonds of the existing regime
into vulnerabilities, resulting in its continued delegitimization. This creates legitimacy opportunities for the
movement.
C-6. Separately, within their sphere of control and influence, the resistance can consolidate gains in public
support and initial governance capacity by utilizing CA assessments, strengthening civil vulnerabilities, and
cementing a bond with the greater population. Methods to realign the legitimacy of power should consider
the timeliness required to restore essential services and strengthen the bonds between the population and the
resistance movement (or new government) upon the collapse of the old regime.
C-7. Through CNDE and SCA, CA forces can support an underground, auxiliary, or government-in-exile
to plan for and administer civil government in the areas of rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure,
governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information. SCA is the systematic
application of specialized skills for assessing and advising on the development of stability and governance.
When conducting CR and CE to develop civil consideration data, ARSOF CA forces collaborate with CA |
3-57 | 136 | Appendix C
military government specialists within USAR CA formations to formulate governance and stability lines of
effort for the resistance.
C-8. The resistance gains legitimacy through TG via support to its alternate administration. This is
accomplished by addressing grievances and providing essential services to create a civil strength or bond
with the population. As the regime becomes severely degraded or collapses, CA will assist with addressing
the remaining civil vulnerabilities to create stability for the emergent government, and inclusively, across the
indigenous population.
C-9. It is critical to note that CAO support to UW, is not intended to represent a linear process. As depicted
in figure C-1, it represents the relationship between civil strengths and civil vulnerabilities as they pertain to
civil instability for the current regime, civil opportunities for the resistance, and stability for a new
government. The left side depicts CAO and corresponding resistance actions that increase the de-
legitimization of the current regime, through degradation of civil strengths with the population, and attacking
civil vulnerabilities to provide legitimacy opportunities for the resistance.
Note: DODD 3000.07, JP 3-05, FM 3-05, FM 3-18, ATP 3-05.1, and ATP 3-18.1 provide more
information on UW.
Figure C-1. Civil Affairs operations in unconventional warfare
DIRECT ACTION
C-10. Direct action is a core activity of ARSOF consisting of short-duration strikes and other small-scale
offensive actions conducted by select ARSOF elements as a special operation in hostile, denied, or |
3-57 | 137 | Civil Affairs in Special Operations
diplomatically sensitive environments, which employs specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy,
capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive
actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
C-11. CA forces do not conduct direct action missions; however, CA forces conduct CR and CE to gain shared
understanding of the civil component to address possible adverse effects of direct action and to mitigate those
effects through civil network engagement and civil considerations analysis. CAO planning support to direct
action may include—
* Gaining civil information to develop the civil component of the common operational picture of
the commander.
* Providing civil component analysis to planning processes.
* Providing civil component analysis toward the identification of—
Critical links and nodes.
Decisive points.
Centers of gravity.
* Advising on the presence and potential of culturally, economically, and politically significant
assets and resources within the objective area.
* Participating in the targeting process by nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to
minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
* Evaluating damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
* Providing post-strike employment options for CA capabilities.
Note: JP 3-05 and ATP 3-18.3 provide additional information on direct action.
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
C-12. Special reconnaissance is a core activity of ARSOF consisting of reconnaissance and surveillance actions
conducted by select ARSOF elements as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or
politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, which
employs military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. CA forces do not conduct special
reconnaissance missions. However, CA forces conduct CND, CR, and CE to gain shared understanding of the
civil component to inform the planning effort for special reconnaissance missions. CAO planning support to
special reconnaissance may include—
* Engaging civil networks that have access to denied or sensitive areas.
* Gaining civil information to develop the civil component of the common operational picture of
the supported commander.
* Providing civil component analysis to planning processes.
* Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the objective area.
Note: FM 3-05 and ATP 3-18.4 provide additional information on special reconnaissance.
COUNTERTERRORISM
C-13. Counterterrorism consists of activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies to achieve their goals (JP 3-26). Counterterrorism actions include strikes and raids
against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the U.S. and its territories. |
3-57 | 138 | Appendix C
C-14. CA forces combat terrorism efforts indirectly through activities to defeat the ideologies or motivations
that spawn terrorism. Counterterrorism is usually attributed to direct action specifically against terrorists or
violent extremist organizations. CAO planning support to counterterrorism action may include—
* Identifying TSOC objectives and developing nonlethal activities that support them.
* Identifying CCDR objectives and developing nonlethal activities that support them.
* Identifying the ambassador or country team objectives and developing nonlethal activities that
support them.
* Gaining civil information through CR, CE, and CND to develop the civil component of the
common operational picture of the supported commander.
* Providing civil component analysis toward the identification of—
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
Critical links and nodes.
* Denying the enemy civil component resources.
* Recommending post-strike employment options for CA capabilities.
* Participating in the targeting process to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure
and culturally sensitive sites.
* Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect—
The populace.
Critical assets.
Infrastructure.
* Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the objective area.
Note: JP 3-26 and ADP 3-05 provide more information on counterterrorism.
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
C-15. SOF support USG efforts to curtail the development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of
weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery by state and
non-state actors. USSOCOM supports CCDRs through technical expertise, materiel, and special teams to
complement other combatant command teams that locate, tag, and track weapons of mass destruction.
C-16. The CA contribution to countering weapons of mass destruction is CAO. CAO support the USG
strategic approach and lines of effort to prevent acquisition, contain or reduce threats, and provide
information to understand weapons of mass destruction pathways. CAO also support the USG by identifying
partner nation capabilities to respond to weapons of mass destruction events. These efforts—
* Promote weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat
awareness.
* Improve military interoperability.
* Enhance military and civilian preparedness and deterrence.
* In some cases facilitate security of dual-use and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
materials.
Note: JP 3-40, JP 3-05, and ADP 3-05 provide additional information on countering weapons of
mass destruction.
CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
C-17. CME is USSOCOM’s contribution, and part of the DOD’s strategy, to building partner nation capacity
in a preventive, population-centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy
of partnered indigenous governments. CME is persistent engagement conducted by, with, and through unified |
3-57 | 139 | Civil Affairs in Special Operations
action partners to shape and influence the IPI within the OE in support of the campaign plan of CCDR and
the campaign support plan of the TSOC, in conjunction with U.S. embassy strategies. The CME program—
* Increases the capability of USG-supported IPI.
* Reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions.
* Leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE.
* Engages with civil networks to provide access, information, and effects across the competition
continuum.
Note: The CME program is described in Chapter 5. |
3-57 | 141 | Appendix D
Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
This appendix shows a variety of symbols and graphic control measures related to CA and
CA tactical mission tasks. The appendix does not attempt to produce all conceivable
combinations for CA symbols or control measures, but it shows several examples of each
type as a starting point.
OVERVIEW
D-1. A military symbol is a graphic representation of a unit, equipment, installation, activity, control measure, or
tactical task relevant to military operations that is used for planning or to represent the common operational picture
on a map or overlay. Military symbols are governed by the rules in MIL-STD-2525D. FM 1-02.2 also provides an
extensive number of icons and modifiers for building a variety of framed symbols.
MODIFIERS FOR FRAMED SYMBOLS
D-2. A modifier provides an abstract pictorial or alphanumeric representation displayed inside the framed symbol
in conjunction with a main icon. It provides information about the icon (unit, equipment, installation, or activity)
being displayed. Sector 1 modifiers (or modifiers placed above the main icon) show a specific function that the
unit is organized and equipped to perform. Sector 2 modifiers (or modifiers placed below the main icon) reflect
the mobility, size, range, or altitude of unit equipment, or an additional capability of the unit.
AMPLIFIERS FOR FRAMED SYMBOLS
D-3. An amplifier provides additional information about the symbol being shown and is displayed outside the
frame. To avoid cluttering the display, only essential amplifier fields should be used. The amplifier location in the
figure E-1 have changed from previous editions of FM 1-02.2. The locations also vary from MIL-STD-2525D.
Figure D-1 and table D-1, pages D-2 through D-3, standardize the field locations of additional information.
Figure D-1. Main and modifier icon and amplifier placement locations |
3-57 | 142 | Appendix D
Table D-1. Description of main icon and amplifier fields for unit frames
Field Field Title Description
The innermost part of a symbol that represents the main function (main
A Main and modifier icons
icon) and its capabilities (modifiers 1 and 2).
B Echelon A graphic amplifier in a unit symbol that identifies command level.
C Quantity A text amplifier that identifies a specific number and type of items.
D Task force indicator A graphic amplifier that identifies a unit or activities symbol as a task force.
A text amplifier in a unit symbol that displays (+) for reinforced, (-) for
Attached and detached
F reduced, (+) reinforced and reduced.
(reinforced or reduced)
Note: A maximum of 3 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier for units, equipment, and installations; content is
G Staff comments implementation specific.
Note: A maximum of 20 characters are allowed in this field.
A unique alphanumeric designation that identifies the unit being displayed.
H Additional information
Note: A maximum of 20 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier for units, equipment, and installations that consists of a
single-letter reliability rating and single-digit credibility rating.
Reliability Ratings:
A–completely reliable.
B–usually reliable.
C–fairly reliable.
D–not usually reliable.
E–unreliable.
J Evaluation rating F–reliability cannot be judged.
Credibility Ratings:
1–confirmed by other sources.
2–probably true.
3–possibly true.
4–doubtfully true.
5–improbable.
6–truth cannot be judged.
Note: A maximum of 2 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier for units and installations that indicates effectiveness.
The entries are—
Fully operational (FO).
Substantially operational (SO).
K Combat effectiveness
Marginally operational (MO).
Not operational (NO).
Unknown (UNK).
Note: A maximum of 5 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier for units that indicates number or title of higher echelon
M Higher echelon formation command (corps are designated by Roman numerals).
Note: A maximum of 5 characters are allowed in this field.
Identification, friend or A text amplifier displaying one or more identification, friend or foe, or
foe selective identification feature, identification modes and codes. Display
P
Selective identification priority is mode 5, mode 4, mode 3, and mode 2.
feature Note: A maximum of 15 characters allowed in this field. |
3-57 | 143 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
Table D-1. Description of main icon and amplifier fields for unit frames (continued)
Field Field Title Description
Direction of movement A graphic amplifier for units and equipment that identifies the direction of
Q
indicator movement or intended movement of an object.
S S2 Offset location indicator A graphic amplifier used to indicate the offset or precise location.
1. An amplifier field reserved for command and control systems that
uniquely identifies a particular symbol with a track number.
Prefix = TN #####
T Unique identifier
Example: TN: 13579
2. May also be used for unit designation.
Note: A maximum of 30 characters are allowed in this field.
An alphanumeric designator for displaying a date-time group
(DDHHMMSSZMONYYYY), or O/O for on order. The date-time group is
composed of a group of six numeric digits with a time zone suffix, and the
standardized three-letter abbreviation for the month, followed by four digits
W Date-time group representing the year. The first pair of digits represents the day; the second
pair, the hour; the third pair, the minutes; and the fourth pair, the seconds.
For automated systems, two digits may be added before the time zone suffix
and after the minutes to designate seconds.
Note: A maximum of 16 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier that displays either altitude, flight level, depth for submerged
objects, or height of equipment or structures on the ground. Measurement
units will be displayed within the string.
X Altitude or depth
Example 1: Example 2:
1500 MSL FL150
Note: A maximum of 14 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier that displays a symbol’s location in degrees, minutes, and
decimal minutes (or in military grid reference system, global area
Y Location
reference system, or other applicable display formats).
Note: A maximum of 14 characters are allowed in this field.
A text amplifier for units and equipment that displays velocity.
Z Speed
Note: A maximum of 8 characters are allowed in this field.
A text modifier for units. The indicator is contained inside he frame. A
named command such as, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe;
United States Southern Command; United States Central Command; and
AA Offset location indicator
joint, multinational, or coalition commands such as, combined joint task
forces or joint task forces.
Note: A maximum of 9 characters are allowed in this field.
A graphic amplifier, placed immediately atop the symbol, which may denote—
Local or remote status.
Engagement status.
Weapon type.
AO Engagement bar
The engagement amplifier is arranged as A:BBB-CC
A (1 character) denotes a local, versus remote, engagement.
BBB (up to 3 characters) denotes engagement state.
CC (up to 2 characters) denotes weapon deployment or asset control.
A three-letter code that indicates the country of origin of the organization.
AS Country In stability activities, this field can be used for factions or groups.
Note: A maximum of 3 characters are allowed in this field. |
3-57 | 144 | Appendix D
CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT OR ELEMENT SYMBOLS
D-4. The symbols in the tables that follow portray the different types of CA units and elements. These tables
also depict how to use modifiers and amplifiers, which affords the opportunity to show additional information
about the main icon.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMANDS
D-5. Table D-2 shows the framed symbol for a CACOM. The symbol is comprised of the main icon, CA,
inside the frame, reflecting the main function of the symbol. In addition to the main icon, there is the echelon
amplifier for command above the frame and the unique alphanumeric unit designation amplifier for the unit
on the right side of the frame.
Table D-2. Civil Affairs command framed symbols
Symbol Title Description
350th Civil Affairs Command
351st Civil Affairs Command
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
command with the echelon amplifier
for command and the unique
alphanumeric unit designation
amplifier outside the frame.
352d Civil Affairs Command
353d Civil Affairs Command |
3-57 | 145 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADES
D-6. Table D-3 shows the framed symbol for CA brigades. The basic CA brigade symbol is comprised of the
main icon for CA inside the framed symbol. Each symbol also has the brigade echelon amplifier centered above
and outside the frame and unique alphanumeric unit designation amplifiers outside the right edge of the frame.
Table D-3. Civil Affairs brigade framed symbols
Symbol Title Description
361st Civil Affairs Brigade
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
brigade with the echelon amplifier for
322d Civil Affairs Brigade brigade and the unique alphanumeric
unit designation amplifier outside the
frame.
308th Civil Affairs Brigade
The same symbol for a Civil Affairs
95th Civil Affairs Brigade brigade, with the addition of the
(Special Operations) special operations forces modifier in
(Airborne) the sector 1 location, and airborne
modifier in the sector 2 location. |
3-57 | 146 | Appendix D
CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALIONS
D-7. Table D-4 shows the framed symbol for CA battalions. The basic CA battalion symbol is comprised
of the main icon for CA inside the framed symbol. Each symbol also has the echelon for brigade centered
above and outside the frame and the unique alphanumeric unit designation amplifiers outside the right edge
of the frame.
Table D-4. Civil Affairs battalion framed symbols
Symbol Title Description
422d Civil Affairs Battalion
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
battalion with the echelon amplifier for
battalion and the unique alphanumeric
unit designation amplifier outside the
frame.
83d Civil Affairs Battalion
The same symbol for a Civil Affairs
92d Civil Affairs Battalion battalion, with the addition of the
(Special Operations) special operations forces modifier in
(Airborne) the sector 1 location, and airborne
modifier in the sector 2 location.
The same symbol for a Civil Affairs
426th Civil Affairs Battalion battalion, with the addition of the
(Airborne) airborne modifier in the sector 2
location.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY
D-8. Table D-5 shows the framed symbol for CA companies. The symbol is comprised of the main icon for
CA inside the framed symbol. Each symbol has the echelon amplifier for company centered above and
outside the frame and the unique alphanumeric unit designation amplifiers outside the right edge of the frame. |
3-57 | 147 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
Table D-5. Civil Affairs company framed symbols
Symbol Title Description
B Company,
83d Civil Affairs Battalion
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
company with the echelon amplifier for
company and the unique alphanumeric
unit designation amplifier outside the
frame.
A Company,
402d Civil Affairs Battalion
The same symbol for a Civil Affairs
D Company,
company, with the addition of the
96th Civil Affairs Battalion
special operations forces modifier in
(Special Operations)
the sector 1 location, and the airborne
(Airborne)
modifier in the sector 2 location.
The same symbol for a Civil Affairs
A Company,
company, with the addition of the
478th Civil Affairs Battalion
airborne modifier in the sector 2
(Airborne)
location.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND, BRIGADE, BATTALION, AND COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
D-9. Every echelon, from CACOM through CA company, has a headquarters or headquarters element.
In Table D-6, a horizontal line across the sector 1 modifier field, inside the framed symbol, depicts the
headquarters or headquarters element. The rest of the symbol is the same as in the preceding tables.
Table D-6. Civil Affairs headquarters elements framed symbols
Symbol Title Description
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
Headquarters, command, with the addition of the
350th Civil Affairs Command headquarters element modifier in the
sector 1 location.
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
Headquarters, brigade, with the addition of the
354th Civil Affairs Battalion headquarters element modifier in the
sector 1 location. |
3-57 | 148 | Appendix D
Table D-6. Civil Affairs headquarters elements framed symbols (continued)
Symbol Title Description
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
Headquarters, battalion, with the addition of the
422d Civil Affairs Battalion headquarters element modifier in the
sector 1 location.
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
Headquarters, A Company company, with the addition of the
478th Civil Affairs Battalion headquarters element modifier in the
(Airborne) sector 1 location and the airborne
modifier in the sector 2 location.
CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAMS
D-10. Table D-7 shows the framed symbol for CATs. The basic CAT symbol is comprised of the main icon
for CA inside the framed symbol. Each CAT symbol has the echelon amplifier for team centered above and
outside the frame and the unique alphanumeric unit designation amplifiers outside the right edge of the frame.
Active Component special operations CATs use 3-digit identifiers, and active component conventional CATs
use 4 digit identifiers. Reserve component conventional CATs do not have a standardized team numbering
convention.
Table D-7. Civil Affairs team framed symbols
Symbol Title Description
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
team, with the echelon amplifier for
team and the unique alphanumeric
unit designation amplifier. The first two
Civil Affairs Team 8324, numbers in the Civil Affairs team
B Company, naming convention are for the
83d Civil Affairs Battalion battalion; in this example this is 83 for
the 83d. The next number is for the
company (example: A Co-1, B Co-2,
C Co-3, and so on). The final number
is the team within the company.
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
team, with the echelon amplifier for
Civil Affairs Team ----, team and the unique alphanumeric
B Company, unit designation amplifier. A team
414th Civil Affairs Battalion naming convention for United States
Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command does not exist. |
3-57 | 149 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
Table D-7. Civil Affairs team framed symbols (continued)
Symbol Title Description
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
team, with the echelon amplifier for
team and the unique alphanumeric
unit designation amplifier. The first two
numbers in the Civil Affairs team
Civil Affairs Team 642, naming convention are for the
D Company, battalion; in this example this is 96 for
96th Civil Affairs Battalion the 96th. The next number is for the
(Special Operations) company (example: A Co-1, B Co-2,
(Airborne) C Co-3, and so on). The final number
is the team within the company. In
addition, the special operations forces
modifier is included in the sector 1
location, and the airborne modifier is
included in the sector 2 location.
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
team, with the echelon amplifier for
team and the unique alphanumeric
Civil Affairs Team ----,
unit designation amplifier. A team
C Company,
naming convention for the
416th Civil Affairs Battalion
United States Army Civil Affairs and
(Airborne)
Psychological Operations Command
does not exist. In addition, the airborne
modifier is included in sector 2.
CIVIL AFFAIRS ELEMENTS
D-11. Table D-8 demonstrates the building of symbols for all levels of CAPTs, CMOCs, and CLTs. The
symbol is comprised of the main icon for CA inside the framed symbol. The echelon of each element is shown
as an amplifier centered above on the outside of the framed symbol. The level of where these elements are
from can only be depicted with the unique alphanumeric unit designation amplifiers on the right edge outside
the frame.
Table D-8. Civil Affairs elements
Symbol Title Description
Framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
planning team is comprised of the
main icon for CA, with the echelon
351st Civil Affairs Command, amplifier for team, and the unique
Civil Affairs Planning Team alphanumeric unit designation
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
the level of the Civil Affairs planning
team.)
The framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
planning team is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs echelon
308th Civil Affairs Brigade, amplifier for team and the unique
Civil Affairs Planning Team alphanumeric unit designation
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
the level of the Civil Affairs planning
team.) |
3-57 | 150 | Appendix D
Table D-8. Civil Affairs elements (continued)
Symbol Title Description
Framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
planning team is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
echelon amplifier for team, and the
92d Civil Affairs Battalion
unique alphanumeric unit designation
(Special Operations)
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
(Airborne)
the level of the Civil Affairs planning
Civil Affairs Planning Team
team.) In addition, the modifier for
special operations forces is included in
the sector 1 location and the airborne
modifier is in the sector 2 location.
Framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
planning team is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
echelon amplifier for team, and the
97th Civil Affairs Battalion
unique alphanumeric unit designation
(Special Operations)
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
(Airborne)
the level of the Civil Affairs planning
Civil Affairs Planning Team
team.) In addition, the modifier for
forward is included in the sector 1
location and the airborne modifier is in
the sector 2 location.
Framed symbol for a theater Civil
Affairs planning team is comprised of
United States Army, Europe
the main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
Theater Civil Affairs
echelon amplifier for team and the
Planning Team
unique alphanumeric unit designation
amplifier for the unit.
Framed symbol for a civil-military
operations center is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
353d Civil Affairs Command
echelon amplifier for section, and the
Civil-Military Operations
unique alphanumeric unit designation
Center
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
the level of the civil-military operations
center.)
Framed symbol for a civil-military
operations center is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
308th Civil Affairs Brigade
echelon amplifier for section, and the
Civil-Military Operations
unique alphanumeric unit designation
Center
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
the level of the civil-military operations
center.)
Framed symbol for a civil-military
operations center is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
415th Civil Affairs Battalion
echelon amplifier for section, and the
Civil-Military Operations
unique alphanumeric unit designation
Center
amplifier. (This is the only way to show
the level of the civil-military operations
center.) |
3-57 | 151 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
Table D-8. Civil Affairs elements (continued)
Symbol Title Description
Framed symbol for a civil-military
operations center is comprised of the
B Company main icon for Civil Affairs, with echelon
83d Civil Affairs Battalion amplifier for section, and the unique
Civil-Military Operations alphanumeric unit designation
Center amplifier. (This is the only way to show
the level of the civil-military operations
center.)
Framed symbol for a civil-military
support element is comprised of the
Civil-Military Support Element, main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
C Company echelon amplifier for section and the
92d Civil Affairs Battalion unique alphanumeric unit designation
(Special Operations) amplifier. In addition, the modifier for
(Airborne) special operations forces is in the
sector 1 location and the airborne
modifier is in the sector 2 location.
Framed symbol for a civil liaison team
is comprised of the main icon for Civil
Affairs, with the echelon amplifier for
350th Civil Affairs Command
team, and the unique alphanumeric
Civil Liaison Team
unit designation amplifier. (This is the
only way to show the level of the civil
liaison team.)
Framed symbol for a civil liaison team
is comprised of the main icon for Civil
Affairs, with the echelon amplifier for
95th Civil Affairs Brigade team, and the unique alphanumeric
(Special Operations) unit designation amplifier. (This is the
(Airborne) only way to show the level of the civil
Civil Liaison Team liaison team.) In addition, the modifier
for special operations forces is in the
sector 1 location and the airborne
modifier is in the sector 2 location.
Framed symbol for a civil liaison team
is comprised of the main icon for Civil
Affairs, with the echelon amplifier for
492d Civil Affairs Battalion
team, and the unique alphanumeric
Civil Liaison Team
unit designation amplifier. (This is the
only way to show the level of the civil
liaison team.)
Framed symbol for a civil-military
advisory group is comprised of the
main icon for Civil Affairs, with the
echelon amplifier for section, and the
95th Civil Affairs Brigade
unique alphanumeric designation
(Airborne)
amplifier for the 95th. In addition, the
Civil-Military Advisory Group
modifier for special operations forces
is in the sector 1 location and the
airborne modifier is in the sector 2
location |
3-57 | 152 | Appendix D
MAIN ICONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
D-12. The military has a much larger role beyond fighting wars. The symbols in table D-9 are a recognition
that military forces are often engaged in stability activities and support to civil authorities across the world.
Table D-9 shows individual and organization symbols that represent civilians; however, these symbols do
not have prescribed structures. The organization symbols can reflect civic, ethnic, religious, social, or other
groups. The framed symbols below are in the friendly standard identity frame, which is rectangular in shape.
For a more comprehensive list of symbols for units, individuals, and organizations, refer to FM 1-02.2, or
MIL-STD 2525D.
Table D-9. Organizations and individuals
Main Icon Name Description
Framed symbol for a governmental
Governmental organization organization comprised of the main
icon for a governmental organization.
Framed symbol for a nongovernmental
Nongovernmental organization comprised of the main
organization icon for a nongovernmental
organization
Framed symbol comprised of the
Unspecified individual
symbol for unspecified individual.
Framed symbol comprised of the
Unspecified organization
symbol for unspecified organization.
Framed symbol comprised of the
Criminal activities victim symbol for unspecified individual with
the modifier for victim.
Framed symbol comprised of the
Criminal activities victims symbol for unspecified organization
with the modifier for victim.
Framed symbol comprised of the
Attempted criminal activities
symbol for unspecified individual with
victim
a modifier for attempted crime.
Framed symbol comprises of the
Attempted criminal activities
symbol for unspecified organization
victims
with a modifier for attempted crime. |
3-57 | 153 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
MODIFIERS FOR CIVILIAN INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONS
D-13. Table D-10 shows modifiers that reflect the function of civilian individuals or organizations. Some
modifiers are framed in the friendly standard identity frame (rectangular shape), others are framed in the
hostile standard identity frame (diamond shape).
Table D-10. Modifiers for individuals and organizations
Modifier Name Description
Leader
Displaced persons, refugees,
and evacuees
Assassination victim(s)
Modifiers in these sections are used to
add more detail to the main icons,
giving the user a way to provide
additional information. (These are not
complete symbols, but mere
representations of the location of the
Execution victim(s)
modifiers in the symbols.)
Targeted person, group, or
organization
Terrorist person, group, or
organization
CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS
D-14. Installations are sites that vary from permanent to temporary structures. Icons in the main sector
represent the main function of the symbol and sector 1 modifiers reflect specific capabilities of the
installation. The framed symbols below are in the friendly standard identity frame (rectangular shape).
Table D-11, pages D-14 and D-15, shows common examples of civil installations. |
3-57 | 154 | Appendix D
Table D-11. Civilian installations
Symbol Name Description
Framed symbol for a school or
educational facility comprised of the
School or main icon for school, along with the
educational institution filled in rectangle in the echelon
amplifier location representing an
installation.
Framed symbol for a school or
educational facility comprised of the
main icon for school, along with the
filled in rectangle in the echelon
College or university
amplifier location representing an
installation. The symbol also has a
sector 1 modifier for college or
university.
Framed symbol for an economic
installation (bank, tax office, and so
on) comprises of the main icon for
Economic installation
economic, along with the filled in
rectangle in the echelon amplifier
location representing an installation.
Framed symbol for a displaced
persons, refugees, and evacuees
camp comprised of the main icon for
Displaced persons, refugees, tented camp, along with the filled in
and evacuees rectangle in the echelon amplifier
tented camp location representing an installation.
The symbol has a sector 1 modifier for
displaced persons, refugees, and
evacuees.
Framed symbol for an electric power
plant comprised of the main icon for
Electric power plant electricity, along with the filled in
rectangle in the echelon amplifier
location representing an installation.
Framed symbol for a water treatment
facility comprised of the main icon for
water, along with the filled in rectangle
Water treatment
in the echelon amplifier location
(purification)
representing an installation. The
symbol also has a sector 1 modifier for
purification.
Framed symbol for a food distribution
center comprised of the main icon for
Food food, along with the filled in rectangle
in the echelon amplifier location
representing an installation. |
3-57 | 155 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
D-11. Civilian installations (continued)
Symbol Name Description
Framed symbol for a medical
treatment facility comprised of the
main icon for medical, along with the
Medical treatment facility filled in rectangle in the echelon
amplifier location representing an
installation. The symbol also has
modifiers for medical treatment facility.
Framed symbol for a safe house
comprises of the main icon for a safe
house, along with the filled in rectangle
Safe house in the echelon amplifier location
representing an installation.
CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES
D-15. Activity symbols are applicable across the competition continuum, but they normally focus on stability
activities and DSCA activities. These activities may affect military operations. Table D-12 shows common
examples of civilian activities. Icons in the main sector reflect the main function of the symbol. Some of are
framed in the friendly standard identity frame (rectangular shape), others are framed in the hostile standard
identity frame (diamond shape). FM 1-02.2 provides a more extensive list of icons and modifiers for
activities.
Table D-12. Civilian activities
Symbol Name Description
Election, voting, or
polling place
Demonstration
Symbol used to designate a specific
activity on both overlays or in civil
information management products.
Meeting
Black market |
3-57 | 156 | Appendix D
Table D-12. Civilian activities (continued)
Symbol Name Description
Type of killing (murder)
Type of killing (assassination)
Symbol used to designate a specific
activity on both overlays or in civil
information management products.
Type of killing (execution)
Riot
CIVIL AFFAIRS GRAPHICS CONTROL MEASURES
D-16. A graphic control measure is a graphic used on a map or overlay to regulate forces and warfighting
functions. Control measure symbols generally fall into one of three categories: points, lines, and areas. These
symbols can be combined with other military symbols, icons, and amplifiers to display operational
information. The only modifiers that are used for graphic control measures are chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear events and contaminated areas. Figures D-2 and D-3, and table D-13, page D-18,
show the description of control measure symbol amplifier fields and the standardized placements. |
3-57 | 157 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
Figure D-2. Standard template point
Figure D-3. Standard area template |
3-57 | 158 | Appendix D
Table D-13. Amplifier descriptions for control measure symbols
Field Field Title Description
The part of the symbol that represents the unit symbol, or object function
A Symbol icon
(modifier).
B Echelon This is a unit symbol that identifies command level.
C Quantity This identifies the number of items present.
H Additional information This content is implementation specific.
N Hostile (enemy) The letters ENY denote hostile control measure symbols.
Direction of movement Identifies the direction of movement (or intended movement) of an object.
Q
indicator
For points and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events,
S Offset location indicator
used for placing an object away from its actual location.
T is used to differentiate points by numbering, lettering, or a combination
of both. T1 may be used to include the unit designation.
Notes:
1. In some cases, this tactical symbol may require multiple instance of a T
T, T1 Unique designation
amplifier to fully create or represent an object.
2. T1 may be used if the field used is displayed more than once in a
tactical symbol.
3. The unnumbered fields should be filled before the numbered fields.
V Type Indicates type of equipment or nuclear weapon type.
W identifies the start date-time group, and it can be displayed alone or
in conjunction with W2 to identify the projected date-time group end
date. The W represents an alphanumeric designator for displaying a
date-time group (DDHHMMSSZMONYYYY), or O/O, for on order.
When W and W2 are used in conjunction, this identifies the time
control measure is in effect.
W,
Date-time group The date-time group is composed of a group of six numeric digits with a
W2
time zone suffix, and the standardized three-letter abbreviation for the
month, followed by four digits representing the year. The first pair of digits
represents the day; the second pair, the hour; and the third pair, the
minutes. The last four digits, after the month, represent the year. For
automated systems, two digits may be added before the time zone suffix
and after the minutes to designate seconds.
Displays the minimum, maximum, or specific altitude (in feet or meters)
X Altitude or depth in relation to a reference datum and the flight level or depth for
submerged objects (in feet below sea level).
Y Location Displays the location of a symbol in degrees, minutes, and decimal minutes.
An alphanumeric amplifier that displays a minimum, maximum, or specific
AM Distance
distance (including range, radius, width, or length) in meters.
A numeric amplifier that displays an angle measured from true north to any
AN Azimuth
other line—in degrees.
A six-character text modifier used in fire support operations to uniquely
designation targets where characters 1 and 2 are alphabetic, and characters
AP Target number
3 through 6 are numeric.
Example: AANNNN (where A is alphabetic, and N is numeric) |
3-57 | 159 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
CIVIL AFFAIRS TACTICAL MISSION TASKS
D-17. A tactical mission task is a specific activity performed by a unit while executing a tactical operation.
Tactical task symbols are used in course-of-action sketches, synchronization matrices, and maneuver
sketches. The following tables show examples of how CND, CR, and CE can be displayed using standard
framed symbols in conjunction with control measure symbols.
Note: FM 1-02.2 provides further information on symbols for tactical mission tasks.
CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT
D-18. Table D-14 portrays examples of how CND can be displayed on a maneuver or course of action sketch.
The control measure symbols use the standard point and area symbols combined with the CA main icon,
unique unit designation, echelon, and free text amplifiers.
Table D-14. Civil network development symbols
Symbol Example Description
The point civil network development
Civil Affairs Team 123 symbol is comprised of the symbol for
conducts civil network standard point. The main icon for Civil
development at a point of Affairs and the unique alphanumeric
interest (grid coordinate or designation amplifier for the unit are
specific location) to meet with included inside the symbol. In addition,
the mayor to identify sources of the mission task acronym and the
instability in the town. purpose verb for the mission task are
in the number 5 amplifier position.
The area civil network development
control measure symbol is comprised
Civil Affairs Team 8334, of the symbol for an area. A framed
C Company, symbol is included inside the area
83d Civil Affairs Battalion symbol with the main icon for Civil
conducts civil network Affairs and the echelon and unique
development in a designated alphanumeric designation amplifiers
area to identify sources of for the unit. In addition, the mission
instability. task acronym and the purpose verb for
the mission task are in the number 5
amplifier position. |
3-57 | 160 | Appendix D
CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE
D-19. Table D-15 portrays examples of how CR can be displayed on a maneuver or course of action sketch.
The control measure symbols use the standard point and area symbols combined with the CA main icon,
unique unit designation, echelon, and free text amplifiers.
Table D-15. Civil reconnaissance symbols
Symbol Example Description
The point civil reconnaissance symbol is
comprised of the symbol for standard
Civil Affairs Team 123
point. The main icon for Civil Affairs and
conducts civil reconnaissance
the unique alphanumeric designation
at a specific point (grid
amplifier for the unit are included inside
coordinate or specific location)
the symbol. In addition, the mission task
to assess for a specified
acronym and the purpose verb for the
reason.
mission task are in the number 5
amplifier position.
The area civil reconnaissance control
measure symbol is comprised of the
Civil Affairs Team 8334,
symbol for an area. A framed symbol is
C Company,
included inside the area symbol with the
83d Civil Affairs Battalion is
main icon for Civil Affairs and the
ordered to conduct civil
echelon and unique alphanumeric
reconnaissance in a specified
designation amplifiers for the unit. In
area to assess for a specified
addition, the mission task acronym and
reason.
the purpose verb for the mission task are
in the number 5 amplifier position.
The area civil reconnaissance control
measure symbol is comprised of the
B Company, symbol for an area. A framed symbol
425th Civil Affairs Battalion is is included inside the area symbol with
ordered to conduct civil the main icon for Civil Affairs, and the
reconnaissance in a specified echelon and unique alphanumeric
area to assess for a specified designation amplifiers for the unit. In
reason. addition, the mission task acronym and
the purpose verb for the mission task are
in the number 5 amplifier position.
The linear civil reconnaissance symbol
is comprised of the symbol for a
designated linear area for civil
reconnaissance. The linear area would
A civil-military support element
be between the points of the two
from B Company,
arrows. A framed symbol is included
92d Civil Affairs Battalion is
with the main icon for Civil Affairs, the
ordered to conduct civil
special operations forces modifier in
reconnaissance between
sector 1 location, the airborne modifier
designated locations to
in sector 2 location, and the echelon
validate certain information.
and unique alphanumeric designation
amplifiers for the unit. In addition, the
purpose verb for the mission task is in
the number 5 amplifier position. |
3-57 | 161 | Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures
CIVIL ENGAGEMENT
D-20. Table D-16 portrays examples of how CE can be displayed on a maneuver or course of action sketch.
The control measure symbols use the standard point, area, and point of interest symbols combined with the
CA main icon, unique unit designation, echelon, and free text amplifiers.
Table D-16. Civil engagement symbols
Symbol Example Description
The point civil engagement symbol is
Civil Affairs Team 123 comprised of the symbol for standard
conducts civil engagement at point. The main icon for Civil Affairs
a point of interest (grid and the unique alphanumeric
coordinate or specific location) designation amplifier for the unit are
to meet with the mayor to included inside the symbol. In addition,
identify sources of instability in the mission task acronym and the
the town. purpose verb for the mission task is in
the number 5 amplifier position.
The area civil engagement control
measure symbol is comprised of the
symbol for an area. A framed symbol
Civil Affairs Team 8334,
is included inside the area symbol with
C Company,
the main icon for Civil Affairs and the
83d Civil Affairs Battalion
echelon and unique alphanumeric
conducts civil engagement in
designation amplifiers for the unit.
a designated area to identify
In addition, the mission task acronym
sources of instability.
and the purpose verb for the mission
task are in the number 5 amplifier
position.
The area civil engagement control
measure symbol is comprised of the
symbol for an area. A framed symbol
B Company, is included inside the area symbol with
425th Civil Affairs Battalion the main icon for Civil Affairs and the
conducts civil engagement in echelon and unique alphanumeric
a designated area to identify designation amplifiers for the unit.
sources of instability In addition, the mission task acronym
and the purpose verb for the mission
task are in the number 5 amplifier
position. |
3-57 | 163 | Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADP Army doctrine publication
AO area of operations
ARCENT United States Army Central Command
ARNG Army National Guard
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events
ATP Army techniques publication
BCT brigade combat team
CA Civil Affairs
CACOM Civil Affairs command
CAO Civil Affairs operations
CAPT Civil Affairs planning team
CAT Civil Affairs team
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CE civil engagement
CIE civil information evaluation
CJCS GDE Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guide
CKI civil knowledge integration
CME civil-military engagement
CMI civil-military integration
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CMSE civil-military support element
CNA civil network analysis
CND civil network development
CNDE civil network development and engagement
CONOPS concept of operations
CPB civil preparation of the battlefield
CR civil reconnaissance
DA Department of the Army
DC dislocated civilian
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DOS Department of State
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FID foreign internal defence
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans
G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations |
3-57 | 164 | Glossary
FM field manual
FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command
HN host nation
IO information operations
IPB information preparation of the battlefield
IPI indigenous populations and institutions
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9 civil-military operations/interagency cooperation directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force
JFC joint force commander
JP joint publication
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JTF joint task force
MDMP military decisionmaking process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available and civil considerations
NGO nongovernmental organization
OE operational environment
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, time
PRC populace and resources contol
PSYOP Psychological Operations
RM risk management
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 battalion or brigade plans staff officer
S-9 battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SA security assistance
SCA support to civil administration
SOF special operations forces
TG transitional governance
TSOC theater special operations command
USACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USAR United States Army Reserve
USARSOC United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USC United States Code
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USG United States government
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UW unconventional warfare |
3-57 | 165 | Glossary
SECTION II – TERMS
Civil Affairs operations
Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the
interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and reduce underlying
causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills
normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)
*civil engagement
a targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential contacts in a civil network that is
designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect information. Also called CE.
(FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil information evaluation
The evaluation of civil information for operational relevance and feasible courses of action. Also
called CIE. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil knowledge integration
The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational
relevance and informing the warfighting function Also called CKI. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion
in FM 1-02.1)
*civil military integration
The actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and
indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational
cooperation and to achieve unified action. Also called CMI. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in
FM 1-02.1)
*civil-military support element
A task-organized Civil Affairs force established to plan, facilitate, and execute Civil Affairs operations
in support of civil-military engagement in a specified country, region, or theater. Also called CMSE.
(FM 3-57)
*civil network
A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations
within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency,
trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil network analysis
A process that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and influence of nodes within a civil
network through network visualizations and qualitative and quantitative analytical methods. Also
called CNA. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil network development
The planned and targeted action in which Civil Affairs forces develop networks within the civil
component of the operational environment to influence populations and manage local resources in
order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. Also called
CND. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil network development and engagement
The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and
integrated into operations. Also called CNDE. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1) |
3-57 | 166 | Glossary
*civil preparation of the battlefield
The systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effects
on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations. Also called CPB. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in
FM 1-02.1)
*civil preparation of the environment
The continuous development of civil knowledge within an area of operations to help commanders
identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated with operations for stability and security
activities. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
command and control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of mission. Also called C2. (JP 1)
counterterrorism
Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to
render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve
their goals. Also called CT. (JP 3-26)
cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks of
information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 3-12).
defensive operation
An operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable
for offensive or stability operations. (ADP 3-0)
fires warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or
enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations. (ADP 3-0)
foreign humanitarian assistance
Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly
relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 3-29)
foreign internal defense
The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken
by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion,
lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also known as FID. (JP 3-22)
governance
The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are
articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (JP 3-24).
homeland defense
The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure
against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 3-27)
host-nation support
Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during
peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.
Also called HNS. (JP 4-0)
information collection
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well
as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future
operations. (FM 3-55) |
3-57 | 167 | Glossary
information requirements
In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of
the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence
requirements of a commander. Also called IR. (JP 2-0)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. Also called IPB.
(ATP 2-01.3).
intelligence warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil
considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. (ADP 3-0)
interorganizational cooperation
The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States
Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military
forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the
private sector. (JP 3-08).
joint force
A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating
under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0).
joint interagency coordination group
A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian
and military operational planners. Also called JIACG. (JP 3-08).
joint operations
Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command
relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0).
movement and maneuver warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage
over the enemy and other threats. (ADP 3-0)
offensive operation
An operation to defeat and destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population
centers. (ADP 3-0)
protection warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat
power to accomplish the mission. (ADP 3-0)
security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security
relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation
military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States
forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. (JP 3-20)
stability operation
An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)
support to civil administration
Assistance given by United States armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing
body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government. Also called SCA.
(FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1) |
3-57 | 168 | Glossary
sustainment warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended
operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADP 3-0)
*transitional governance
The actions taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the
range of military operations. Also called TG. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
transitional military authority
A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a
legitimate civil authority (FM 3-07)
unconventional warfare
Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a
government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla
force in a denied area. (JP 3-05)
unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).
unity of effort
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily
part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). |
3-57 | 169 | References
All URLs accessed on 19 June 2021.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as of January 2021.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 9 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 10 November 2020.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most DOD issuances are available online: https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/
DODD 2000.13. Civil Affairs. 11 March 2014.
DODD 2010.9. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements. 28 April 2003.
DODD 2060.02. DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy. 27 January 2017.
DODD 3000.05. Stabilization. 13 December 2018.
DODD 3000.07. Irregular Warfare (IW). 28 August 2014.
DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.
DODD 5100.01. Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components. 21 December 2010.
DODD 5100.46. Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR). 6 July 2012.
DODD 5105.65. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 26 October 2012.
DODD 5200.27. Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated With
The Department of Defense. 7 January 1980.
DODI 3025.21. Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. 27 February 2013.
DODI 5400.11. DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs. 29 January 2019.
DODI 5530.3. International Agreements. 4 December 2019.
DSCA 5105.38-M. Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). 30 April 2012. Available at
https://www.dsca.mil/resources/publications.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online at: https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine.
CJCS GDE 3130. Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework. 5 March 2019.
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-05. Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 22 September 2020.
JP 3-07. Stability. 3 August 2016.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Cooperation. 12 October 2016.
JP 3-12. Cyberspace Operations. 8 June 2018.
JP 3-20. Security Cooperation. 23 May 2017.
JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 17 August 2018.
JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 25 April 2018.
JP 3-26. Joint Combating Terrorism. 30 July 2020. |
3-57 | 170 | References
JP 3-27. Homeland Defense. 10 April 2018.
JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 29 October 2018.
JP 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 14 May 2019.
JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 31 January 2018.
JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 6 January 2016.
JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 10 January 2018.
JP 3-40. Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 27 November 2019.
JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 9 July 2018.
JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 4 February 2019.
JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 1 December 2020.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-05. Army Special Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 1 March 2019.
ATP 3-05.1. Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level.
9 April 2021.
ATP 3-05.2. Foreign Internal Defense. 19 August 2015.
ATP 3-18.1. Special Forces Unconventional Warfare. 21 March 2019.
ATP 3-18.3. (U) Special Forces Direct Action Operations (C). 23 December 2015.
ATP 3-18.4. Special Forces Special Reconnaissance. 18 August 2015.
ATP 3-39.30. Security and Mobility Support. 21 May 2020.
ATP 3-57.10. Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control. 6 August 2013.
ATP 3-57.30. Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance. 1 May 2014.
FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 9 January 2014.
FM 3-07. Stability. 2 June 2014.
FM 3-13. Information Operations. 6 December 2016.
FM 3-18. Special Forces Operations. 28 May 2014.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-24. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 13 May 2014.
FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 9 April 2019.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 7 August 2019. |
3-57 | 171 | References
OBSOLETE PUBLICATIONS
This section contains references to obsolete historical doctrine. The Archival and Special Collections in the
Combined Arms Research Library on Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas, contains copies. These publications are
obsolete doctrine publications referenced for citations only.
FM 3-05.401/MCRP 3-33.1A. Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 5 July 2007.
FM 27-5/OPNAV 50E-3. United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and
Civil Affairs. 22 December 1943.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.
UNITED STATES LAW
Unless otherwise noted, most acts and public laws are available online at: https://uscode.house.gov.
10 USC. Armed Forces.
10 USC 401. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations.
10 USC 2321. Validation of proprietary data restrictions.
10 USC 2667. Leases: non-excess properties of military departments and Defense Agencies.
10 USC 2675. Leases: foreign countries.
22 USC. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
22 USC 2151. Congressional findings and declaration of policy.
22 USC 2292. General provisions. (International Disaster Assistance)
22 USC 2292b. Disaster assistance coordination through a Special Coordinator for International
Disaster Assistance; Presidential appointment and duties.
22 USC 2796. Leasing authority. (Arms Export Control)
32 USC. National Guard.
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. (22 USC 2751 et seq.)
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (22 USC 2151 et seq.)
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
5 FAH-1 H-600. Correspondence Handbook, Diplomatic Notes. 7 February 2019.
https://fam.state.gov/Default.aspx.
1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. https://www.loc.gov.
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
www.unesco.org.
American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of
Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany,
https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/interwar_years/american_military_governm
ent_of_occupied_germany_1918-1920.pdf.
Center for Complex Operations. The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency
Coordination. Complex Operations Case Studies Series. Naval Postgraduate School. 2010.
https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/case-studies/4-kuwait_task_force-teacher.pdf.
CMH Pub 70-100-1. Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan. 2003.
https://history.army.mil/catalog/index.html
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for
the Execution of the Convention 1954. 14 May 1954. http://www.unesco.org/.
Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague, II), https://www.loc.gov/.
Lincoln, Abraham. General Orders No. 100. 24 April 1863.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
MIL-STD-2525D. Joint Military Symbology. 10 June 2014. https://assist.dla.mil. |
3-57 | 172 | References
NSPD-44. Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.
7 December 2005. https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-directives.
Part 181, Title 22 Code of Federal Regulations. Coordination, Reporting and Publication of
International Agreements. https://ecfr.federalregister.gov/.
Rules of Land Warfare 1914. https://www.loc.gov/.
Rules of Land Warfare 1934. https://www.loc.gov/.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. https://www.loc.gov/.
Yates, Lawrence A. The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005: Global War on
Terrorism Occasional Paper 15.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. |
3-57 | 173 | Index
Entries are listed by paragraph number.
A Civil Affairs planning team 2-91, 2-96, 2-98, 2-99, 3-7,
(CAPT), 2-39, 4-24, 3-23, 3-25, 3-31, 3-62, 3-70,
Annex G, 5-9, 5-10, 5-13, 5-42 4-27, 4-28, 5-11, 5-24, D-11 4-16, 4-22, 4-44, 4-45, 4-74,
Annex K, 4-23, 4-25, 4-58, 4-59 4-79, 4-85, 4-108, 4-10,
civil engagement (CE), 1-23,
4-14, 5-20, 5-21, 5-75, C-7,
Annex P, 4-58, 4-60 1-26, 1-27, 1-30, 1-46, 2-14,
C-11, C-12, C-14, D-17,
Annex V, 4-58, 4-62 through 2-58, 2-62, 2-63, 2-65, 2-66,
D-19
4-64, 5-9, 5-13, 5-42 2-68, 2-67, 2-69, 2-71, 2-86,
2-88, 2-91, 2-96, 2-98, 2-99, civil-military integration (CMI),
area study, 2-58, 4-17, 4-46,
3-23, 3-25, 3-31, 3-61, 3-62, 1-14, 1-16, 1-21, 1-29, 1-32,
4-47, 4-50
3-70, 4-16, 4-22, 4-44, 4-45, 1-33, 2-22, 2-32, 2-50, 2-106
Army Special Operations 4-74, 4-79, 4-85, 4-108, through 2-108, 2-111, 2-115,
Forces (ARSOF), A-12, 4-110, 4-114, 5-20, 5-21, 2-122, 3-6 through 3-8, 3-11,
A-14, C-3, C-7, C-10, C-12 5-75, C-7, C-11, C-12, C-14, 3-12, 3-15, 3-29, 3-31, 3-65,
assessments, 1-24, 2-27, 2-34, D-17, D-20 4-23, 4-24, 4-26, 4-62, 4-66,
2-51, 2-56, 2-63, 2-66, 2-91, 4-67, 4-70, 4-86, 4-94, 4-95,
civil knowledge integration
2-121, 2-122, 4-10, 4-16, 4-100, 4-110, 4-111, 4-114,
(CKI), 1-14, 1-16, 1-19, 1-20,
4-22, 4-43, 4-48, 4-50 4-130, 5-4, 5-8, 5-47, 5-51
2-32, 2-73, 2-87, 2-88, 2-91,
through 4-52, 4-74, 4-79, 2-92, 2-94, 2-97, 2-122, 3-6, civil-military operations (CMO),
5-47, 5-62, 5-57, B-3, B-5, 3-8, 3-11, 3-12, 3-15, 3-25, 1-19, 1-33, 2-115, 4-28,
B-7, B-10, B-14, B-15, B-17, 3-62, 3-65, 4-5 through 4-7, 4-30, 4-62, 4-120, 4-124,
B-20, B-21, B-23 through 4-19, 4-22 through 4-24, 4-133 through 4-136, 5-5,
B-25, C-6 4-40, 4-42, 4-45, 4-54, 4-67, 5-8 through 5-16, 5-18, 5-75
B 4-70, 4-72, 4-75, 4-79, civil-military operations center
4-130, 5-4, 5-20, 5-47 (CMOC), 1-21, 1-31 through
branch characteristics, 1-38
civil network analysis (CNA), 1-33, 2-107, 2-114, 2-115,
branch principles, 1-39 2-72, 4-44, 4-72, 4-127 2-118, 2-122, 2-123, 3-62,
4-24, 4-25, 4-30, 4-61, 4-64,
C civil network development
4-113, 4-114, 4-117, 4-127,
(CND), 1-23, 1-28 through
Civil Affairs operations (CAO), 4-135, 5-5, 5-9, 5-13, 5-16,
1-30, 2-58, 2-69, 2-71, 2-78,
1-1 through 1-5, 1-8, 1-16, 5-62
2-88, 2-91, 2-96, 2-98, 2-92,
1-17, 1-19, 1-22, 1-33, 1-37,
3-23, 3-70, 4-44, 4-45, 4-79, consolidate gains, 1-1, 1-28, 2-
1-38, 1-40, 1-43, 1-46, 2-1,
4-85, 4-111, 5-75, C-12, 2, 2-16, 2-48, 2-49, 2-52, 2-
2-2, 2-5, 2-16, 2-18, 2-27,
C-14, D-17, D-18 76, 2-100, 2-120, 3-5, 3-13,
2-32, 2-39, 2-52, 2-60, 2-71,
3-14, 3-53, 3-68, 4-43, C-6
2-73, 2-87, 2-88, 2-97, civil network development and
2-106, 2-107, 2-114, 2-115, engagement (CNDE), 1-14, core competencies, 1-1, 1-14
2-117, 3-4, 3-8, 3-12, 3-15, 1-16, 1-18, 1-20, 1-26, 1-29, through 1-16, 1-22, 1-24,
3-17, 3-21, 3-23, 3-25, 3-27 1-32, 2-10, 2-32, 2-51, 2-52, 1-27, 1-30, 1-40, 1-47, 2-15,
through 3-29, 3-31, 3-35, 2-54, 2-55, 2-61, 2-122, 3-3, 2-16, 2-32, 3-4, 3-6, 3-23,
3-61, 3-72 through 3-74, 3-6 through 3-8, 3-11, 3-12, 3-25, 3-29, 3-31
3-76, 3-82, 3-83, 4-2, 4-4, 3-15, 3-23, 3-25, 3-29, 3-31, counterinsurgency, 5-43
4-5, 4-10 through 4-12, 4-17, 3-39, 3-47, 3-53, 3-55, 3-62, cyberspace, 3-16, 3-20, 3-21,
4-21 through 4-29, 4-32, 3-65, 4-5, 4-6, 4-10, 4-23, 4-27, 5-72, 5-73, 5-75, A-13
4-33-4-36, 4-38, 4-45, 4-47, 4-24, 4-66, 4-67, 4-70, 4-71,
4-50 through 4-52, 4-54 4-86, 4-94, 4-95, 4-98, D
through 4-59, 4-67, 4-72 4-100, 4-120, 4-130, 5-20, decisive action, 3-6, 3-8, 3-12,
through 4-75, 4-78, 4-85, 5-47, 5-51, 5-63, C-7 3-15, 3-21
4-99, 4-102, 4-1018, 4-111 civil preparation of the defense support of civil
through 4-113, 4-115, 4-116, battlefield (CPB), 2-88, 3-30, authorities (DSCA), 1-40,
4-118, 4-120, 4-127, 4-130, 4-9, 4-10, 4-32 3-21, 3-33 through 3-36,
5-15, 5-20 through 5-22,
civil reconnaissance (CR), 3-61, 4-3, D-15
5-46, 5-67 through 5-70,
5-75, C-1, C-4, C-9, C-11, 1-23 through 1-25, 1-30, direct action, C-10, C-11, C-14
2-14, 2-58, 2-62 through
C-12, C-14, C-16
2-66, 2-69, 2-71, 2-86, 2-88, |
3-57 | 174 | Index
F operational variables, 2-89, 2-33, 2-38, 2-42, 2-51, 2-81,
4-10, 4-12, 4-27, 4-28, 4-34, 2-115, 2-119, 2-122, 3-6
foreign humanitarian
4-39, 4-40, 4-82 through 3-8, 3-11, 3-12,
assistance (FHA), 1-8, 2-35,
3-15, 3-18, 3-29, 3-53, 3-65,
2-48, 2-122, 3-50, 4-32, P
3-66, 4-24, 4-70, 4-130, 5-4,
4-135, 5-9, 5-55, 5-43, 5-44,
populace and resources control 5-47, C-4, C-8
5-50, 5-56, 5-59, 5-60, 5-62
(PRC), 2-35, 2-83, 2-118,
through 5-65 transitional military authority,
2-122, 3-15, 3-23, 3-25,
1-23, 1-35 through 1-37,
foreign internal defense (FID), 3-31, 3-37 through 3-40,
2-20, 2-22, 2-38, through
2-47, 5-43, 5-44, 5-47, 5-66 3-60, 4-80, 4-81, 4-85, 4-98
2-44, 2-50, 2-115, 3-15,
through 5-68, 5-70 through 4-100, 4-135, 5-9
3-31, 3-60, 4-71, 4-135, 5-9,
functional specialty areas, Psychological Operations 5-75, B-1
2-51, B-1, B-24 (PSYOP), 3-72, 3-75, 3-76,
U
4-74, 5-16, A-12
I
unconventional warfare (UW),
indigenous populations and R
A-10, C-3, C-4, C-9
institutions (IPI), 1-10, 1-21, rules of allocation, 4-103, 4-105
unified action, 1-13, 1-15, 1-19,
1-30, 1-31, 1-38, 1-39, 1-43,
running estimate, 4-54, 4-56, 1-21, 1-26, 1-31, 1-32, 1-38,
1-45, 2-4, 2-15, 2-51, 2-83,
4-57 1-39, 1-43, 1-47, 2-15, 2-25,
2-99, 2-114, 2-118 through
2-50, 2-57, 2-68, 2-70, 2-75,
2-120, 3-7, 3-17, 3-21, 3-31, S
2-78, 2-87, 2-88, 2-92, 2-94,
3-37, 3-48, 3-70, 3-75, 4-26,
shape, 1-18, 1-20, 1-43, 2-61, 2-106, 2-107, 2-114, 2-115,
4-32, 4-33, 4-61, 4-113,
3-5, 3-8, 3-77, 4-26, 4-38, 3-7, 3-8, 3-12, 3-27, 3-31,
4-134, 5-8, 5-9, 5-13, 5-14,
5-7, 5-12, 5-19, 5-20, C-17, 3-70, 3-71, 3-75, 4-8, 4-16,
5-19, 5-20, 5-22, 5-29, 5-46,
D-12 through D-15 4-24, 4-26, 4-32, 4-40, 4-67,
5-62, 5-75, C-17
support to civil administration 4-84, 4-97, 4-121, 5-1, 5-4,
information collection, 1-20,
(SCA), 1-23, 1-34, 2-15, 5-8, 5-13, 5-19, 5-20, 5-21,
1-30, 2-14, 2-58, 2-63, 2-69,
2-20, 2-22, 2-33 through 5-29, 5-46, 5-52, 5-75, C-17
2-92, 2-94, 2-96, 2-97, 2-98,
2-35, 2-41, 2-42, 2-46, unified land operations, 1-6,
3-7, 3-11, 3-70, 4-7, 4-15,
through 2-51, 2-77, 2-115, 2-115, 2-116, 2-122, 3-5,
4-17, 4-26, 4-43 through
2-122, 3-8, 3-15, 3-31, 3-45, 3-6, 3-21, 4-1, 4-55, 4-65
4-45, 4-50, 4-59, 4-67, 4-82
3-62, 4-71, 4-98, 4-108,
unity of effort, 1-16, 1-21, 1-38,
M 5-43, 5-49, 5-69, 5-74, 5-75, 1-47, 2-67, 2-70, 2-106,
C-7
mission variables, 2-89, 3-23, 2-110, 3-7, 3-42, 3-71, 3-72,
3-25, 3-31, 4-11, 4-12, 4-26, T 4-5, 4-26, 4-62, 4-66, 4-67,
4-34, 4-38 4-70, 5-2, 5-4, 5-8, 5-20,
transitional governance (TG),
5-23
O 1-14, 1-16, 1-17, 1-29, 1-33,
2-15, 2-20 through 2-22,
offense, 1-40, 2-116, 3-12,
2-26, 2-27, 2-30 through
3-21, through 3-23, 4-81 |
3-57 | 175 | FM 3-57
28 July 2021
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2120401
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in |
3-12 | 1 | FM 3-12
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS AND
ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
AUGUST 2021
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-12, dated 11 April 2017. |
3-12 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site |
3-12 | 3 | Foreword
Over the past two decades of persistent conflict, the Army has deployed its most capable communications systems
ever. During this time, U.S. forces have continued to dominate cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum
while conducting counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq against enemies and adversaries who lack
the ability to challenge our technological superiority. However, in recent years, regional peers have demonstrated
formidable capabilities in hybrid operational environments. These capabilities threaten the Army’s dominance in
both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
The Department of Defense information network-Army is an essential warfighting platform that is a critical
element of the command and control system and foundational to success in Army operations. Effectively
operating, securing, and defending the network to maintain trust in its confidentiality, integrity, and availability
is essential to commanders’ success at all echelons. A commander who cannot access or trust communications
and information systems or the data they carry risks the loss of lives, loss of critical resources, or mission failure.
At the same time, our adversaries and enemies are also increasingly reliant on networks and networked weapons
systems. The Army, as part of the joint force, must be prepared to exploit or deny our adversaries and enemies
the operational advantages that these networks and systems provide.
As the Army shifts its focus to large-scale combat operations against regional peers, we must anticipate that these
threat actors will persistently attempt to infiltrate, exploit, and degrade access to our networks and data. In the
future, as adversary and enemy capabilities grow, our continued dominance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum will become less certain, while at the same time our ability to access cyberspace and spectrum-
dependent capabilities will become both more challenging and more critical to fight and win in multiple domains.
Leveraging cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare effects throughout the competition continuum is key to
achieving relative advantages through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum while denying the same to
our enemies and adversaries. To achieve these positions of relative advantage, commanders must integrate and
synchronize cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare with all other available military capabilities using
a combined arms approach. Moreover, intelligence, signal, information advantage activities, space, and fires
capabilities are all critical to successful planning, synchronization, and execution of cyberspace operations and
electromagnetic warfare. Commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize all of these capabilities across
multiple domains and warfighting functions to maximize complementary effects in and through cyberspace and
the electromagnetic spectrum.
FM 3-12 defines and describes the principles and tactics to address challenges in the operational environment
while providing an overview of cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, and their planning, integration,
and synchronization through the operations process. It describes the units that conduct these operations and how
they enable accomplishment of commanders’ objectives in Army operations.
Due to the rapid evolution of friendly and threat capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures in cyberspace
and the electromagnetic spectrum, the Cyber Center of Excellence will review and update FM 3-12 and supporting
publications frequently in order to keep pace with the continuously evolving operational environment.
NEIL S. HERSEY
Major General, U.S. Army |
3-12 | 5 | *FM 3-12
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-12 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 24 August 2021
Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic
Warfare
Contents
Page
PREFACE..................................................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW ........................................................ 1-1
Overview of the Operational Environment ................................................................. 1-1
Cyberspace and the Electromagnetic Spectrum ....................................................... 1-1
Section I – Core Competencies and Fundamental Principles ............................ 1-3
Core Competencies ................................................................................................... 1-3
Fundamental Principles ............................................................................................. 1-4
Section II – Operational Environment ................................................................... 1-4
Cyberspace Domain .................................................................................................. 1-5
Electromagnetic Spectrum ........................................................................................ 1-7
Trends and Characteristics........................................................................................ 1-8
Conflict and Competition ......................................................................................... 1-11
Section III – Contributions to the Warfighting Functions .................................. 1-12
Command and Control ............................................................................................ 1-12
Movement and Maneuver ........................................................................................ 1-13
Intelligence .............................................................................................................. 1-14
Fires ......................................................................................................................... 1-15
Sustainment ............................................................................................................. 1-15
Protection................................................................................................................. 1-15
Chapter 2 CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS AND ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................................................... 2-1
Section I – Cyberspace Operations ....................................................................... 2-1
Joint Force and Army ................................................................................................ 2-3
Department of Defense Information Network Operations ......................................... 2-4
Defensive Cyberspace Operations ............................................................................ 2-4
Offensive Cyberspace Operations ............................................................................ 2-5
Cyberspace Actions ................................................................................................... 2-5
Section II – Electromagnetic Warfare .................................................................... 2-8
Electromagnetic Attack .............................................................................................. 2-8
Electromagnetic Protection...................................................................................... 2-11
Electromagnetic Support ......................................................................................... 2-14
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-12, dated 11 April 2017. |
3-12 | 6 | Contents
Electromagnetic Warfare Reprogramming.............................................................. 2-15
Section III – Interrelationship with other Operations ........................................ 2-16
Intelligence Operations ........................................................................................... 2-16
Space Operations ................................................................................................... 2-16
Information Operations ........................................................................................... 2-18
Chapter 3 ARMY ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ............................... 3-1
Section I – Army Cyberspace Operations Organizational Structure ................. 3-1
United States Army Cyber Command ....................................................................... 3-1
Army Information Warfare Operations Center .......................................................... 3-2
Section II – Electromagnetic Warfare Organizations .......................................... 3-3
Electromagnetic Warfare Platoon (Brigade Combat Team) ..................................... 3-3
Intelligence, Information, Cyber, Electromagnetic Warfare, and Space
Detachment ........................................................................................................ 3-4
Section III – Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities at Corps and Below........ 3-4
Commander’s Role ................................................................................................... 3-4
Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Section ........................................................ 3-5
Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Working Group ........................................... 3-8
Staff and Support at Corps and Below...................................................................... 3-8
Chapter 4 INTEGRATION THROUGH THE OPERATIONS PROCESS .................................. 4-1
Section I – The Operations Process...................................................................... 4-1
Planning .................................................................................................................... 4-2
Preparation ................................................................................................................ 4-3
Execution .................................................................................................................. 4-3
Assessment ............................................................................................................... 4-4
Section II –Integrating Processes ......................................................................... 4-4
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ................................................................. 4-5
Information Collection ............................................................................................... 4-8
Targeting ................................................................................................................. 4-11
Risk Management ................................................................................................... 4-18
Knowledge Management ........................................................................................ 4-20
Appendix A ARMY METHODOLOGIES USED FOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES .......................... A-1
Appendix B RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND UNITED STATES CODE ................................... B-1
Appendix C INTEGRATION WITH UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS ............................................ C-1
Appendix D NATIONAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ARMY RESERVE AND JOINT
CYBERSPACE AND ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS ........ D-1
Appendix E REQUEST FOR SUPPORT ...................................................................................... E-1
Appendix F ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE REPROGRAMMING ........................................ F-1
Appendix G TRAINING ................................................................................................................. G-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare logic chart ............................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. Relationship between the cyberspace network layers ................................................ 1-6 |
3-12 | 7 | Contents
Figure 1-3. The electromagnetic spectrum .................................................................................... 1-8
Figure 1-4. Congestion in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum .................................... 1-9
Figure 1-5. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum in a contested environment ............ 1-10
Figure 2-1. Cyberspace operations taxonomy ............................................................................... 2-3
Figure 2-2. Cyberspace operations missions and actions ............................................................. 2-6
Figure 2-3. Electromagnetic warfare taxonomy ............................................................................. 2-8
Figure 4-1. The operations process and integrating processes ..................................................... 4-5
Figure A-1. Annex C, Appendix 12 ...............................................................................................A-16
Figure D-1. Cyber mission force team allocations ........................................................................ D-6
Figure D-2. National electromagnetic spectrum operations organizational structure. .................. D-9
Figure E-1. Routing process when requesting offensive cyberspace operations support .............E-3
Figure E-2. Routing process when requesting defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive
measures support .......................................................................................................E-5
Figure E-3. Routing process for defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures
(non-Department of Defense information network) and defensive cyberspace
operations-response actions support..........................................................................E-6
Figure E-4. Joint tactical airstrike request form. ...........................................................................E-11
Figure E-5. Electromagnetic attack request. ................................................................................E-13
Tables
Table 4-1. Targeting crosswalk .................................................................................................... 4-13
Table A-1. Step 1: Receipt of mission ............................................................................................A-3
Table A-2. Step 2: Mission analysis ...............................................................................................A-6
Table A-3. Step 3: Course of action development .........................................................................A-9
Table A-4. Step 4: Course of action analysis and war-gaming ....................................................A-11
Table A-5. Step 5: Course of action comparison .........................................................................A-12
Table A-6. Step 6: Course of action approval ..............................................................................A-13
Table A-7. Step 7: Orders production, dissemination, and transition ...........................................A-14
Table B-1. United States Code with specific cyberspace roles ......................................................B-4
Table B-2. Federal cyberspace security laws and policies protecting United States citizens .......B-5
Table D-1. Elements of the cyber mission force and their associated teams ............................... D-5
Table E-1. Airborne cyberspace attack, electromagnetic attack, or electromagnetic support
request tool ...............................................................................................................E-10 |
3-12 | 9 | Preface
FM 3-12 provides tactics and procedures for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing Army cyberspace
operations and electromagnetic warfare to support unified land operations and joint operations. FM 3-12
explains Army cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare fundamentals, terms, and definitions. This
publication describes how commanders and staffs can integrate cyberspace operations and electromagnetic
warfare into unified land operations. This publication provides overarching guidance to commanders and
staffs on Army cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare at all echelons. This publication
supersedes FM 3-12, dated 11 April 2017.
The principal audience for FM 3-12 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of
Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also apply joint or
multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers
and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international, and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
their Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement (See FM 6-27). They also
adhere to the Army Ethic as described in ADP 1.
FM 3-12 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms. Terms and definitions for
which FM 3-12 is the source publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the
term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-12 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard or Army National Guard of the United States,
and United States Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-12 is the United States Army Cyber Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is
the Doctrine Division, United States Army Cyber Center of Excellence. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States. Army Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Gordon, ATTN: ATZH-OP-D (FM
3-12), 506 Chamberlain Avenue, Fort Gordon, GA, 30905-5735; by e-mail to usarmy.gordon.cyber-
[email protected]. |
3-12 | 11 | Introduction
FM 3-12 provides Army doctrine on using cyberspace electromagnetic activities to integrate and synchronize
cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare into operations while managing assigned portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum in support of unified land operations. FM 3-12 defines and provides an
understanding of Army cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, statutory and title authorities, roles,
relationships, responsibilities, and capabilities to support Army and joint operations. It expands upon the
methods by which Army forces conduct offensive and defensive cyberspace operations and addresses how
commanders and staff integrate tailored cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities across the range
of military operations.
FM 3-12 nests with and supports joint cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare doctrine and ADP
3-0, Operations, and provides the doctrinal context to address the relationship among the Army’s operations
process and cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. To understand the fundamentals of
integrating and synchronizing cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare, readers should be familiar
with ADP 2-0, ADP 3-0, ADP 3-19, ADP 3-37, ADP 3-90, ADP 5-0, ADP 6-0, FM 3-09, FM 3-13,
FM 3-55, FM 6-0, ATP 2-01.3, JP 3-12, and JP 3-85.
FM 3-12 describes how personnel conducting cyberspace electromagnetic activities integrate and
synchronize cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare functions and capabilities across warfighting
functions, defend the network, and provide commanders critical capabilities at all levels during unified land
operations.
FM 3-12 contains four chapters and seven appendixes:
Chapter 1 outlines how cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare support the Army forces during
the conduct of unified land operations. It provides an overview of the aspects of an operational environment
in which units perform cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. This chapter also details how
cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare support the Army warfighting functions.
Chapter 2 details the types of cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare and their associated tasks
and common effects. It also discusses the interrelationship between cyberspace operations and
electromagnetic warfare with other types of Army operations.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the joint and Army organizations that conduct cyberspace operations and
electromagnetic warfare. It also describes the cyberspace electromagnetic activities section roles and
responsibilities at echelon. This chapter discusses the interactions between the cyberspace electromagnetic
activities section and other staff sections and explains the role of the cyberspace electromagnetic activities
working group.
Chapter 4 describes how commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize cyberspace operations and
electromagnetic warfare through the operations process. This chapter further details key inputs and outputs
related to intelligence preparation of the battlefield, information collection, targeting, risk management, and
knowledge management.
Appendix A describes the two most common Army decision-making methodologies (the Army design
methodology and the military decision-making process) and procedures for these methodologies to plan,
integrate, and synchronize cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare with the operations process
and integrating processes.
Appendix B describes the rules of engagement and applicable sections of the United States Code associated
with cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. It includes a table with all cyberspace operations
and electromagnetic warfare related to the United States Code (title authorities). Appendix B also consists of
a table with a list of federal laws protecting United States civilians’ information and privacy rights. |
3-12 | 12 | Introduction
Appendix C discusses considerations when conducting cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare
as part of a joint force or with unified action partners.
Appendix D discusses the national, Department of Defense, and Army Reserve components that support
cyberspace operations. This appendix also provides an overview of the United States Cyber Command and
its subordinate joint organizations that deliver cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare support to
Army commanders using cyberspace mission forces.
Appendix E discusses how Army units request cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare support
when operating in a joint environment. Graphic depictions display the request for support processes for both
offensive and defensive cyberspace operations.
Appendix F provides general procedures for conducting electromagnetic warfare reprogramming. It
describes the four phases of electromagnetic warfare reprogramming and its three major categories and
actions.
Appendix G provides an overview of Soldier training and expands on training for those seeking a career in
cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare. |
3-12 | 13 | Chapter 1
Operational Environment Overview
This chapter describes the aspects of the operational environment in which the Army
conducts cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. It describes cyberspace
and electromagnetic warfare forces’ core competencies and lays out the fundamental
principles of cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. This chapter
discusses interrelationships and interdependencies between cyberspace operations,
electromagnetic warfare, and the warfighting functions.
OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare (EW) play an essential role in the Army’s conduct
of unified land operations as part of a joint force and in coordination with unified action partners. Cyberspace
operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives
in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Electromagnetic warfare is a military action involving the use of
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85).
1-2. Cyberspace is one of the five domains of warfare and uses a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum
(EMS) for operations, for example, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and satellite transport. Therefore, cyberspace operations
and EW require frequency assignment, management, and coordination performed by spectrum management
operations. Spectrum management operations consist of four key functions—spectrum management, frequency
assignment, host-nation coordination, and policy adherence. Spectrum management operations include
preventing and mitigating frequency conflicts and electromagnetic interference (EMI) between friendly forces
and host nations during Army operations (refer to ATP 6-02.70).
CYBERSPACE AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
1-3. Cyberspace and the EMS are critical for success in today’s operational environment (OE). U.S. and
adversary forces alike rely heavily on cyberspace and EMS-dependent technologies for command and control,
information collection, situational understanding, and targeting. Achieving relative superiority in cyberspace
and the EMS gives commanders an advantage over adversaries and enemies. By conducting cyberspace
operations and EW, commanders can limit adversaries’ available courses of action, diminish their ability to
gain momentum, degrade their command and control, and degrade their ability to operate effectively in the
other domains.
1-4. Commanders must leverage cyberspace and EW capabilities using a combined arms approach to seize,
retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Effective use of cyberspace operations and EW require
commanders and staffs to conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA). Cyberspace electromagnetic
activities is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace operations and electromagnetic
warfare in support of unified land operations (ADP 3-0). By integrating and synchronizing cyberspace
operations and EW, friendly forces gain an information advantage across multiple domains and lines of
operations. Figure 1-1 on page 1-2 illustrates how cyberspace operations and EW contribute to Army
operations. |
3-12 | 14 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare logic chart |
3-12 | 15 | Operational Environment Overview
SECTION I – CORE COMPETENCIES AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1-5. The Army’s reliance on networked systems and weapons necessitates highly trained forces to protect
warfighting systems and networks dependent upon access to cyberspace and the EMS. Cyberspace and the
EMS are heavily congested due to the high volume of friendly, neutral, and adversary use, and contested due
to adversary actions.
1-6. Adversaries continue to develop sophisticated weapons and networked systems that project power
through or depend on cyberspace and the EMS. The Army employs cyberspace and EW capabilities as part of
a joint and combined arms approach to defeat threat activities in cyberspace and the EMS, protect friendly
forces, and enable friendly freedom of action across the conflict continuum. Army cyberspace and EW forces
apply the following core competencies and underlying fundamental principles to ensure friendly forces gain
and maintain positions of relative advantage.
CORE COMPETENCIES
1-7. Cyberspace forces and EW professionals are organized, trained, and equipped to provide the following
core competencies that deliver essential and enduring capabilities to the Army—
* Enable situational understanding.
* Protect friendly personnel and capabilities.
* Deliver effects.
CREATE UNDERSTANDING
1-8. Cyberspace forces execute cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in and through
the information environment to identify and understand adversary networks, systems, and processes. This
information enables commanders to understand adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities, thereby enhancing
the commanders’ ability to prioritize and deliver effects.
1-9. EW professionals surveil the EMS to collect combat information used to characterize adversary use of
the EMS and understand the integration of adversary emitter systems arrays at echelon. This information
enables understanding friendly vulnerabilities and threat capabilities while allowing commanders to prioritize
and deliver effects.
PROTECT FRIENDLY PERSONNEL AND CAPABILITIES
1-10. Cyberspace forces defend networks, warfighting platforms, capabilities, and data from ongoing or
imminent malicious cyberspace activity. By protecting critical networks and systems, cyberspace forces help
maintain the Army’s ability to conduct operations and project power across all domains.
1-11. EW forces, in coordination with the G-6 or S-6 and in support of the commander’s directive, implement
and enhance measures to protect friendly personnel, facilities, warfighting platforms, capabilities, and
equipment from adverse effects in the EMS. EW forces recommend measures to mask or control friendly
emissions from enemy detection and deny adversaries the ability to locate and target friendly formations. EW
forces detect and mitigate enemy attacks in or through the EMS to maintain the Army’s ability to conduct
operations and project power across all domains.
DELIVER EFFECTS
1-12. Cyberspace forces deliver cyberspace effects against adversary networks, systems, and weapons.
These effects enhance the Army’s ability to conduct operations, reduce adversary combat power, and project
power across all domains.
1-13. EW professionals deliver effects in the EMS against adversary networks, systems, and weapons. These
actions reduce adversary combat power, protect friendly forces, and enhance friendly forces and weapons’
lethality. |
3-12 | 16 | Chapter 1
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1-14. Fundamental principles are basic rules or assumptions of central importance that guide how cyberspace
and EW professionals’ approach and conduct cyberspace operations and EW. These fundamental principles
are—
* Operational focus.
* Adaptability and versatility.
* Global reach.
OPERATIONAL FOCUS
1-15. Cyberspace and EW forces execute missions in support of a commander’s overarching operational
design. When properly integrated and synchronized as part of a combined arms approach, cyberspace and EW
capabilities can produce layered dilemmas for the adversary in multiple domains and enhance relative combat
power. To accomplish this, cyberspace and EW staff must collaborate across all warfighting functions.
ADAPTABILITY AND VERSATILITY
1-16. Cyberspace and EW forces conduct operations using capabilities that are adaptable to a variety of
mission requirements. Cyberspace and EW capabilities vary in both the size of the force employed and the
magnitude or scope of effects created. Depending on mission requirements, cyberspace and EW capabilities
may be used as primary or supporting efforts for decisive, shaping or sustaining operations.
GLOBAL REACH
1-17. The nature of the cyberspace domain increases the operational reach of cyberspace and EW forces.
Combat mission force(s) and EW professionals deliver strategic, operational, or tactical effects worldwide from
remote, co-located, or forward operating positions.
SECTION II – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-18. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Conditions in cyberspace
and the EMS often change rapidly and can positively or negatively impact a commander’s ability to achieve
mission objectives. Friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy actions in cyberspace and the EMS can create near-
instantaneous effects on the battlefield or in garrison. Given the global nature of cyberspace and the EMS, these
actions can impact a commander’s OE even though the actions may originate or terminate beyond that OE.
Cyberspace and EW effects also cross through and impact multiple domains simultaneously. For these reasons,
commanders must gain and maintain an in-depth understanding of the OE that extends beyond the land domain
to the multi-domain extended battlefield to seize, exploit, and retain operational initiative.
1-19. Operational initiative is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation (ADP 3-0).
By gaining and maintaining positions of relative advantage, including information advantage in and through
cyberspace and the EMS, commanders can seize and retain the operational initiative. To gain and maintain
information advantage, commanders must account for the temporal nature of information and the temporary
nature of many cyberspace and EW effects. On average, the relative operational advantage that a commander
can gain from a piece of information or from a cyberspace or EW effect degrades over time. This means that a
commander who takes action first, on average, will obtain a greater information advantage from a similar piece
of information or effect than a commander who acts later. In this way, the commander who can sense,
understand, decide, act, and assess faster than an opponent will generally obtain the greatest information
advantage.
1-20. Commanders can use cyberspace and EW capabilities to gain enhanced situational awareness and
understanding of the enemy through reconnaissance and sensing activities. These reconnaissance and sensing
activities can augment and enhance the understanding a commander gains from information collection and
intelligence processes. Commanders can also use cyberspace and EW capabilities to decide and act faster than
an adversary or enemy. By protecting friendly information systems and signals from disruption or exploitation |
3-12 | 17 | Operational Environment Overview
by an adversary or enemy, a commander can ensure command and control and maintain tactical and operational
surprise. Conversely, a commander might use cyberspace and EW capabilities to slow or degrade an enemy’s
decision-making processes by disrupting enemy sensors, communications, or data processing. To make
effective use of cyberspace and EW capabilities to achieve an information advantage, a commander must plan
early to integrate cyberspace operations and EW actions fully into the overall scheme of maneuver.
CYBERSPACE DOMAIN
1-21. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12).
Cyberspace operations require the use of links and nodes located in other physical domains to perform logical
functions that create effects in cyberspace that then permeate throughout the physical domains using both wired
networks and the EMS.
1-22. The use of cyberspace is essential to operations. The Army conducts cyberspace operations and
supporting activities as part of both Army and joint operations. Because cyberspace is a global communications
and data-sharing medium, it is inherently joint, inter-organizational, multinational, and often a shared resource,
with signal and intelligence maintaining significant equities. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation
networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media websites, and technical
infrastructures are all part of cyberspace.
1-23. To aid the planning and execution of cyberspace operations, cyberspace is sometimes visualized in
three layers. These layers are interdependent, but each layer has unique attributes that affect operations.
Cyberspace operations generally traverse all three layers of cyberspace but may target effects at one or more
specific layers. Planners must consider the challenges and opportunities presented by each layer of cyberspace
as well as the interactions amongst the layers. Figure 1-2 on page 1-6 depicts the relationship between the three
cyberspace layers. The three cyberspace layers are—
* The physical network layer.
* The logical network layer.
* The cyber-persona layer. |
3-12 | 18 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-2. Relationship between the cyberspace network layers
PHYSICAL NETWORK LAYER
1-24. The physical network layer consists of the information technology devices and infrastructure in the
physical domains that provide storage, transport, and processing of information within cyberspace, to include
data repositories and the connections that transfer data between network components (JP 3-12). Physical
network components include the hardware and infrastructure such as computing devices, storage devices,
network devices, and wired and wireless links. Components of the physical network layer require physical |
3-12 | 19 | Operational Environment Overview
security measures to protect them from damage or unauthorized access, which, if left vulnerable, could allow
a threat to gain access to both systems and critical data.
1-25. Every physical component of cyberspace is owned by a public or private entity. The physical layer
often crosses geo-political boundaries and is one of the reasons that cyberspace operations require multiple
levels of joint and unified action partner coordination. Cyberspace planners use knowledge of the physical
location of friendly, neutral, and adversary information technology systems and infrastructures to understand
appropriate legal frameworks for cyberspace operations and to estimate impacts of those operations. Joint
doctrine refers to portions of cyberspace, based on who owns or controls that space, as either blue, gray, or red
cyberspace (refer to JP 3-12). This publication refers to these areas as friendly, neutral, or enemy cyberspace
respectively.
LOGICAL NETWORK LAYER
1-26. The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network related to one another in a way
that is abstracted from the physical network, based on the logic programming (code) that drives network
components (i.e., the relationships are not necessarily tied to a specific physical link or node, but to their ability
to be addressed logically and exchange or process data) (JP 3-12). Nodes in the physical layer may logically
relate to one another to form entities in cyberspace not tied to a specific node, path, or individual. Web sites
hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where content can be accessed through a single uniform
resource locator or web address provide an example. This may also include the logical programming to look
for the best communications route, instead of the shortest physical route, to provide the information requested.
CYBER-PERSONA LAYER
1-27. The cyber-persona layer is a view of cyberspace created by abstracting data from the logical network
layer using the rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop descriptions of digital representations of
an actor or entity identity in cyberspace, known as a cyber-persona (JP 3-12). Cyber-personas are not confined
to a single physical or logical location and may link to multiple physical and logical network layers. When
planning and executing cyberspace operations, staffs should understand that one actor or entity (user) may have
multiple cyber-personas, using multiple identifiers in cyberspace. These various identifiers can include different
work and personal emails and different identities on different Web forums, chatrooms, and social network sites.
1-28. For example, an individual’s account on a social media website, consisting of the username and digital
information associated with that username, may be just one of that individual’s cyber-personas. Conversely,
multiple different users may share a single cyber-persona or set of cyber-personas. Planners must understand
that enemy use of cyber-personas can make attributing responsibility for cyberspace actions difficult.
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
1-29. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) - is a maneuver space essential for facilitating control within the
operational environment (OE) and impacts all portions of the OE and military operations. Based on specific
physical characteristics, the EMS is organized by frequency bands, including radio waves, microwaves, infrared
radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, and gamma rays. Figure 1-3 on page 1-8 illustrates the
range of standard frequencies in the EMS and some of the common devices operating in those frequencies. |
3-12 | 20 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-3. The electromagnetic spectrum
TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS
1-30. The rapid proliferation of cyberspace and EMS capabilities has further congested an already
challenging OE. In addition to competing with threat actors in cyberspace and the EMS, U.S. forces also
encounter challenges resulting from neutral actors. Such neutral systems as commercial aircraft and airports,
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, and commercial cellular infrastructures contribute to
continuing congestion in cyberspace and the EMS. Figure 1-4 on page 1-9, depicts cyberspace and the EMS in
a congested OE.
1-31. Several key trends and characteristics impact a commander’s ability to use cyberspace and the EMS.
Such trends and characteristics include—
* Congested environments.
* Contested environments.
* Threats.
* Hazards.
* Terrain.
CONGESTED ENVIRONMENTS
1-32. Both cyberspace and the EMS are increasingly congested environments that friendly, neutral, and
threat actors use to transmit and process large amounts of information. Since 2000, the Army’s use of networked
information systems in almost every aspect of operations has increased tenfold. Neutral and threat actors have
similarly expanded their use of cyberspace and the EMS for a wide range of military and non-military purposes. |
3-12 | 21 | Operational Environment Overview
Figure 1-4. Congestion in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum
CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS
1-33. As cyberspace and the EMS continue to become more congested, the capabilities of state and non-state
actors to contest U.S. advantages in both areas have also expanded. State and non-state threats use a wide range
of advanced technologies that may represent relatively inexpensive ways for a small or materially
disadvantaged adversary to pose a significant threat to the United States. The application of low-cost cyberspace
capabilities can provide an advantage against a technology-dependent nation or organization and an asymmetric
advantage to those who could not otherwise effectively oppose U.S. military forces. Figure 1-5 on page 1-10,
depicts an operational view of cyberspace and the EMS in a contested OE. |
3-12 | 22 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-5. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum in a contested environment
THREATS
1-34. For every operation, threats are a fundamental part of an OE. A threat is any combination of actors,
entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national
interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threat is an umbrella term that includes any actor with the potential to
harm the United States or its interests. Threats include—
* Enemies.
* Adversaries.
* Peer threats.
* Hybrid threats.
* Insider threats.
1-35. An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An
enemy is also called a combatant and treated as such under the laws of war. Enemies will employ various
advanced technologies to attack Army forces in cyberspace and EMS to disrupt or destroy the ability to conduct
operations or collect information that will give friendly forces a strategic, operational, or tactical advantage.
1-36. An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the
use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Though an adversary is not treated as a combatant, the goal is still to
prevent and deter conflict by keeping their activities within a desired state of cooperation and competition.
1-37. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy able to effectively oppose U.S. forces world-wide while
enjoying a position of relative advantage in a specific region (ADP 3-0), including cyberspace and the EMS.
Peer threats often have cyberspace and EW capabilities that are comparable to U.S. capabilities. Peer threats |
3-12 | 23 | Operational Environment Overview
may employ these capabilities across the competition continuum to collect intelligence, delay the deployment
of U.S. forces, degrade U.S. capabilities, and disrupt U.S. operations. Peer threats have electromagnetic attack
(EA) capabilities such as telecommunications and EMS jamming equivalent to or better than U.S. forces. Peer
threats can conduct advanced cyberspace attacks, including denial-of-service, various forms of phishing,
eavesdropping, and malware.
1-38. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, or criminal
elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADP 3-0). Commanders and staffs must understand
that the diversity of a hybrid threat complicates operations since hostility is coming from multiple actors
operating from various geographical territories. A hybrid threat complicates the United States' efforts to
identify, characterize, attribute, and respond to threats in cyberspace and the EMS.
1-39. Organized crime or other non-state, illegitimate organizations often make sophisticated malware
available for purchase or free, allowing even unsophisticated threat actors to acquire advanced capabilities at
little to no cost. Because of the low barriers to entry and the potentially high payoff, the United States can
expect an increasing number of adversaries to use cyberspace capabilities to attempt to negate U.S. advantages
in military capability.
1-40. An insider threat is a person with placement and access who intentionally causes loss or degradation
of resources or capabilities or compromises the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission through
espionage, providing support to international terrorism, or the unauthorized release or disclosure of information
about the plans and intentions of United States military forces (AR 381-12). Insider threats may include spies
within or working with U.S. forces, as well as personnel who may be unaware of their actions either through
deception or third party manipulation. Insider threats present unique challenges because they are trusted
individuals with authorized access to Army capabilities and sensitive operational information. Insider threats
may include spies within or working with U.S. forces.
Note. Law enforcement and counterintelligence capabilities also operate in cyberspace during
their efforts to neutralize criminal activities. Countering insider threats falls primarily within the
purview of these organizations and outside the authorized activities of the cyberspace forces.
However, information discovered in the course of authorized cyberspace operations may aid these
other organizations.
HAZARDS
1-41. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel, damage to or
loss of equipment or property, or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Disruption to cyberspace’s physical
infrastructure often occurs due to operator errors, industrial accidents, and natural disasters. These
unpredictable events may have just as significant impact on operations as the actions of enemies. Recovery
from accidents and hazardous incidents may require significant coordination external to the DOD or the
temporary reliance on backup systems with which operators may be less familiar.
1-42. Electromagnetic energy can also impact the operational capability of military forces, equipment,
systems, and platforms. Various hazards from electromagnetic energy include electromagnetic environmental
effects, electromagnetic compatibility issues, EMI, electromagnetic pulse, and electromagnetic radiation
hazards.
1-43. Electromagnetic radiation hazards include hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel; hazards
of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance; hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuels; and natural phenomena
effects such as space weather, lightning, and precipitation static.
CONFLICT AND COMPETITION
1-44. Army forces face continuous competition and conflict in cyberspace and the EMS from threats
intending to diminish friendly capabilities. Commanders must seek and exploit opportunities for success in
cyberspace and the EMS wherever and whenever authorized. |
3-12 | 24 | Chapter 1
COMPETITION CONTINUUM
1-45. Cyberspace operations, EW, and spectrum management operations take place across the competition
continuum. The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture
of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict Superiority in cyberspace and the EMS
enables U.S. forces to conduct operations to achieve the goals and accomplish the objectives assigned to them
by the President and Secretary of Defense. Though U.S. forces may conduct cyberspace operations and EW
during competition below the level of armed conflict, they are critical enablers to combat power when
conducting large-scale combat operations during armed conflict. Competition below armed conflict consists of
situations in which joint forces take actions outside of armed conflict against a strategic actor in pursuit of
policy objectives.
1-46. Spectrum management operations fulfill a crucial within the CEMA construct. Spectrum management
operations take place across the entire competition continuum and ensure proper coordination of EMS activities
spanning the entirety of military operations.
MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD
1-47. The enemy seeks to employ capabilities to create effects in multiple domains to counter U.S. interests
and impede friendly operations. Threat actors will conduct activities in the information environment, space,
and cyberspace to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt the deployment of friendly forces. Land-based
threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of action across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace
domains. They will disrupt the EMS, sow confusion, and challenge the legitimacy of U.S. actions.
Understanding how threats can present multiple dilemmas to Army forces in all domains helps Army
commanders identify (or create), seize, and exploit their opportunities. Implementing operations security
(OPSEC) is critical to protecting essential friendly information technology infrastructures, command and
control, and targeting systems. Operations security is a capability that identifies and controls critical
information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations and incorporates
countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3).
POSITIONS OF RELATIVE ADVANTAGE IN CYBERSPACE AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC
SPECTRUM
1-48. The Army conducts cyberspace operations and EW to attain positions of relative advantage in
cyberspace and the EMS, to establish information superiority. A position of relative advantage is a location or
the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with
temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk
and move to a position of disadvantage (ADP 3-0).
SECTION III – CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
1-49. This section describes how cyberspace operations and EW support the warfighting functions. It
specifies the types of cyberspace operations and EW missions and actions that contribute to the various tasks
related to each warfighting function.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
1-50. Commanders rely heavily on cyberspace and the EMS for command and control. At corps and below,
the network in the command-and-control system is the Department of Defense information network-Army
(DODIN-A). The Department of Defense information network-Army is an Army-operated enclave of the
DODIN that encompasses all Army information capabilities that collect, process, store, display, disseminate,
and protect information worldwide (ATP 6-02.71). Signal forces establish, manage, secure, and defend the
DODIN-A by conducting Department of Defense information network operations and maintaining
cybersecurity compliance to prevent intrusions into the DODIN-A. For more information on DODIN
operations, refer to FM 6-02 and ATP 6-02.71. The networks and systems that comprise the DODIN-A enable
commanders to control units, have a shared understanding of the OE, and interact with subordinate units in near
real-time. |
3-12 | 25 | Operational Environment Overview
1-51. EW supports command and control through electromagnetic protection (EP) to eliminate or mitigate
the negative impact of friendly, neutral, enemy, or naturally occurring EMI on command-and-control systems.
The frequency assignment and deconfliction tasks of spectrum management operations support EP (See ATP
6-02.70). Such EP tasks include—emission control, mitigating electromagnetic environmental effects,
electromagnetic compatibility, electromagnetic masking, preemptive countermeasures, and electromagnetic
warfare reprogramming. These tasks require integration with spectrum management operation for frequency
management and deconfliction. Chapter 2 of this publication and ATP 3-12.3 details information on EP.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
1-52. Cyberspace operations and EW enhance friendly forces commanders’ movement and maneuver by
disrupting adversary command and control, reducing adversary and increasing friendly situational awareness,
and negatively affect the adversary’s ability to make sound decisions. Due to the range and reach of cyberspace
capabilities, cyberspace forces are often able to support friendly maneuver in close areas while simultaneously
supporting deep area operations. For information on close and deep area operations, refer to FM 3-0. For
techniques on deep operations, refer to ATP 3-94.2.
1-53. DODIN operations support movement and maneuver by establishing secure tactical networks that
allow communications with friendly forces conducting operations laterally in close and deep areas, in addition
to communications with higher headquarters in the rear area. Units use the DODIN-A as the primary means of
communication during movement and maneuver. Satellite communications, combat net radios, and wired
networks are elements of the DODIN-A used to synchronize operations, collaborate, understand the
environment, and coordinate fires. The network enables near real-time updates to the common operational
picture. The upper and lower tiers of the DODIN-A connect headquarters to subordinate, adjacent, and higher
headquarters and unified action partners.
1-54. Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) in coordination with other forms of fires also support
movement and maneuver by opening avenues necessary to disperse and displace enemy forces. Synchronizing
OCO with other fires sets conditions that enable maneuver to gain or exploit positions of relative advantage.
OCO will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
1-55. EW assets support movement and maneuver by conducting operations to degrade, neutralize, or
destroy enemy combat capabilities in the EMS. Defensive EA protects friendly forces from enemy attacks
during movement and maneuver by denying the enemy the use of the EMS. Using friendly EA to counter radio-
controlled devices, such as improvised explosive devices, drones, robots, or radio-guided munitions is an
example of defensive EA. During defensive EA, EW assets conduct operations to degrade, neutralize, or destroy
enemy combat capabilities in the EMS. EW assets conduct defensive EA by employing EA capabilities such
as counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare and devices used for aircraft
survivability. Offensive EA supports movement and maneuver by projecting power within the time and tempo
of the scheme of maneuver. Electromagnetic jamming, electromagnetic intrusion, and electromagnetic probing
are examples of offensive EA. Electromagnetic support (ES) supports movement and maneuver by providing
combat information for a situational understanding of the OE.
1-56. A variety of EP tasks also support movement and maneuver. Spectrum managers and EW personnel
deconflict friendly frequencies to prevent or mitigate frequency interference from friendly forces. Frequency
deconfliction includes preventive and mitigating measures to ensure friendly radio devices used during
movement and maneuver tasks do not cause frequency interference to the radios used by other friendly forces.
Electromagnetic masking supports movement and maneuver by concealing electromagnetic signatures radiated
by friendly forces’ spectrum dependent systems during operations. Conducting emission control during
movement and maneuver reduces electromagnetic signatures of friendly forces’ spectrum dependent
communications and navigational systems during movement and maneuver. EW forces also employ sensors
before a movement as preemptive countermeasures. Electromagnetic security supports movement and
maneuver by denying an enemy the ability to decipher information derived from electromagnetic energy that
they intercept. These tasks are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 of this publication and in ATP 3-12.3. |
3-12 | 26 | Chapter 1
INTELLIGENCE
1-57. Cyberspace operations, EW, and intelligence mutually identify the cyberspace and EMS aspects of the
OE to provide recommendations for friendly courses of action during the military decision-making process.
Cyberspace and EW forces support information collection that may be used by intelligence professionals.
Conversely, intelligence operations provide products that enhance understanding of the OE, enable targeting,
and support defense in cyberspace and the EMS. It is critical that information acquired through cyberspace
operations and EW is standardized and reported to the intelligence community.
1-58. Intelligence supports cyberspace operations through the intelligence process, intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB), and information collection. Intelligence at all echelons supports cyberspace operations
and EW planning, and helps measure performance and effectiveness through battle damage assessment.
Cyberspace planners leverage intelligence analysis, reporting, and production capabilities to understand the
OE, develop plans and targets, and support operations throughout the operations process. In the context of
cyberspace and the EMS, the OE includes network topology overlays that graphically depict how information
flows and resides within the operational area and how the network transports data in and out of the area of
interest.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
1-59. During IPB, the staff considers how the adversary or enemy utilizes cyberspace and the EMS to achieve
their objectives. Intelligence and CEMA staff also consider state and non-state actors with capability, access,
and intent to affect friendly operations as they define and analyze the area of interest.
1-60. Intelligence analysts, with support from other staff elements, evaluate enemy and adversary use of
cyberspace and the EMS. This includes evaluating aspects such as—
* Adversary or enemy use of cyberspace and the EMS.
* Reliance on networked capabilities.
* Sophistication of cyberspace attack capabilities.
* Adversary cyberspace defense capabilities.
* Adversary EW capabilities.
* Network vulnerabilities (both adversary and friendly).
* Ability to synchronize cyberspace operations with other operations.
* Adversary use of social media for social engineering.
1-61. When assessing the enemy or adversary courses of action, the intelligence staff considers how the
enemy or adversary will include cyberspace and the EMS in its operations. The commander and staff should
consider threat courses of action in cyberspace and the EMS when planning friendly operations. (See ATP 2-
01.3 for more information about IPB).
1-62. Weather (terrestrial and space) also affects operations in cyberspace and the EMS. In assessing weather
effects, the staff considers key terrain in cyberspace and the EMS in relation to other aspects of the area of
interest and the area of operations.
ELECTROMAGNETIC SUPPORT AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
1-63. ES and signals intelligence (SIGINT) are similar in function, but SIGINT requires separate authorities.
EW personnel conduct ES to acquire information in support of a commander’s maneuver plan. No requirement
or restriction exists for EW personnel to have SIGINT authorities to conduct these activities.
1-64. EW and SIGINT personnel both identify emitters in the EMS and may cue each other for targeting,
but have distinct mission responsibilities. EW personnel characterize and identify emitters by analyzing
external signals for immediate threat recognition and warning, force protection, and targeting. ES provides
combat information that has a limited time value to support operations. ES information may be passed to
intelligence units or staff for further SIGINT analysis depending on situation and authorities. SIGINT personnel
analyze internal signal parameters to produce and disseminate intelligence, which requires SIGINT authorities. |
3-12 | 27 | Operational Environment Overview
FIRES
1-65. OCO and EA tasks are part of the fires warfighting function. Cyberspace forces employ cyberspace
attacks to deny, degrade, disrupt, and destroy or otherwise affect enemies’ cyberspace or information-dependent
capabilities. EW personnel employ EA to degrade, and neutralize the enemies’ ability to use the EMS.
Cyberspace and EW effects transcends beyond cyberspace and the EMS and may result in second-and-third-
order effects that could impact the other physical domains.
1-66. Army cyberspace and EW effects applied against enemy capabilities and weapon systems deny their
ability to communicate, track, or target. EW also supports fires by enabling lethal fires through the employment
of ES to search for, identify, and locate or localize sources of radiated electromagnetic energy used by the
enemy for targeting. Defensive EA can support fires through the deployment of decoys or noise to mask friendly
fires networks.
SUSTAINMENT
1-67. Cyberspace operations support sustainment through DODIN operations and defensive cyberspace
operations (DCO). Sustainment organizations, functions, systems, and sustainment locations that are highly
dependent on DODIN operations include—
* The global supply chain.
* Army logistics networks and information systems.
* Mobilization and power projection platforms.
* Aerial ports of debarkation.
* Seaports of debarkation.
1-68. DODIN operations establish the necessary communications to conduct sustainment functions.
Cyberspace forces defend sustainment systems when adversaries breach cybersecurity measures of networks
and systems from threat cyberspace attacks. EW supports sustainment through EP and ES, ensuring freedom
of action for DODIN operations in and through the EMS for continued sustainment support. Management,
coordination, and deconfliction of frequencies in the EMS are functions of spectrum management operations.
Refer to Chapter 2 for more information on defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures
(DCO-IDM).
PROTECTION
1-69. DCO-IDM and EP tasks, in addition to the cyberspace security tasks of DODIN operations, are part of
the protection warfighting function. DODIN operations, DCO-IDM, EP, and defensive EA support protection
by securing and defending the DODIN-A. Cyberspace forces conduct DCO-IDM to detect, characterize,
counter, and mitigate ongoing or imminent threats to the DODIN-A. DODIN operations and DCO-IDM also
enable other protection tasks by providing secured communications for—
* Area security.
* Police operations.
* Personnel recovery.
* Air and missile defense.
* Detention operations.
1-70. EP involves actions to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from friendly, neutral, or enemy use
of the EMS. EP includes measures to protect friendly personnel and equipment in a contested and congested
electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). The EMOE is a composite of the actual and potential
electromagnetic energy radiation, conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and the decisions of the commander. The CEMA spectrum manager work closely with the S-6 or
G-6 spectrum manager to deconflict frequencies used by friendly forces. Friendly forces can employ proactive
measures such as emission control to reduce their electromagnetic signature, thus increasing OPSEC. Defensive
EA protects friendly forces by denying enemy use of the EMS, disrupting their ability to target, guide, or fire
weapons. Refer to Chapters 2 and 4 of this publication for more information on emission control. |
3-12 | 29 | Chapter 2
Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare
Fundamentals
This chapter describes the types of cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare
and associated tasks. It details common effects that commanders can achieve through
cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare, and discusses the interrelationship
between cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare and other Army
operations. This chapter also discusses training used to prepare Soldiers to execute
cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare missions.
SECTION I – CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
2-1. Cyberspace operations and EW can benefit from synchronization with other Army capabilities using a
combined arms approach to achieve objectives against enemy forces. Cyberspace operations and EW can
provide commanders with positions of relative advantage in the multi-domain fight. Effects that bleed over
from the cyberspace domain into the physical domain can be generated and leveraged against the adversary.
A cyberspace capability is a device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware,
or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace (JP 3-12).
Note. Law enforcement and counterintelligence capabilities may create effects in cyberspace
during their efforts to disrupt, destroy, deny, or degrade an enemy or adversary’s activities in
cyberspace.
2-2. Electromagnetic spectrum superiority is the degree of control in the electromagnetic spectrum that
permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting
the threat’s ability to do the same (JP 3-85). EW creates effects in the EMS and enables commanders to gain
EMS superiority while conducting Army operations. EW capabilities consist of the systems and weapons
used to conduct EW missions to create lethal and non-lethal effects in and through the EMS. |
3-12 | 30 | Chapter 2
Russia’s Application of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic
Warfare during the Russo-Ukrainian War
In 2013, Ukraine’s pro-Russian leadership opted for closer ties to the pro-Russian
Eurasian Economic Union rather than sign with the European Union. In response,
violent protests erupted throughout Ukraine. In constant competition with the United
States and China to increase the flow of trade, Russia has always sought access in
expanding commerce throughout the region. As Ukraine descended into chaos,
Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation recognized conditions were optimal for
seizure of Ukraine’s Black Sea warm water ports in the Crimea. Seizure of these ports
not only provided lucrative access to Mediterranean trade and commerce, but also
challenged the United States’ military power on the Black Sea. Russian actions also
included strategic efforts to stop NATO expansion and to reduce the buffer zone
between the west and Russian economic expansion.
Ukraine’s use of Russian command, control, communications, computer, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) made them vulnerable to Russian exploitation and
attacks. Formulating their campaign plans around thematic denial and deception
operations, Russian military planners went to work on a hybrid campaign that was a
multifaceted mix of regular and irregular actions. Russian planners identified Ukraine’s
center of gravity as their C4ISR. Russia infiltrated Ukrainian telecommunication
systems, while Ukrainian’s use of communication devices likely aided Russia’s
targeting efforts. In order to inject strategic, operational, and tactical chaos within
Ukraine’s decision-making cycle, Russia conducted targeted cyberspace operations
and electromagnetic warfare (denial of service, manipulation of social media, etc.) on
critical C4ISR nodes. At the tactical level, the Russian Army’s utilization of targeted
cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare actions were lethal.
The Ukrainian Army moved several mechanized brigades near the Russian border in
order to interdict illegal cross border shipments of equipment heading to rebels in
Eastern Ukraine. On the morning of 11 July 2014, Ukrainian soldiers spotted a drone
orbiting above them. Shortly after the drone disappeared, one of the Ukrainian
brigades was struck with a devastating barrage from a 9A52-4 Tornado multiple rocket
system.
Rockets containing a mixture of high explosive, cluster, and thermobaric munitions
rained down on the unit’s positions over the course of four minutes. Following this initial
rocket salvo, the Russians followed with high explosive artillery rounds and the
cumulative effects were devastating. In a post mortem of the action, the Ukrainian Army
suffered 37 killed and 100 wounded. One Ukrainian battalion was virtually destroyed,
and others were rendered combat ineffective due to heavy losses in personnel and
equipment. It was later assessed that the Russian Army’s ability to collect intelligence
and geo-locate, coupled with their ability to target Ukrainian communication nodes,
played a significant role in enabling the Russians to find, fix, and destroy an entire
Ukrainian combat arms brigade. The Russians’ targeted application of electromagnetic
warfare and cyber attacks created chaos within Ukraine’s civil and military leadership
and left them confused, a second-order effect. Western leaders found themselves
limited in their ability to respond to Russian actions in the region. Russia’s use of
cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to Ukraine’s command and
control enabled them the seize Crimea and achieve their strategic goal of obtaining
commercial and military ports on the Black Sea. |
3-12 | 31 | Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals
JOINT FORCE AND ARMY
2-3. The joint force and the Army divide cyberspace operations into three categories based on the portion
of cyberspace in which the operations take place and the type of cyberspace forces that conduct those
operations. Each of type of cyberspace operation has varying associated authorities, approval levels, and
coordination considerations. An Army taxonomy of cyberspace operations is depicted in figure 2-1, below.
The three types of cyberspace operations are—
* DODIN operations (refer to ATP 6-02.71).
* DCO.
* OCO.
2-4. The Army conducts DODIN operations on internal Army and DOD networks and systems using
primarily signal forces. The Army employs cyberspace forces to conduct DCO which includes two further
sub-divisions—DCO-IDM and defensive cyberspace operations-response actions (DCO-RA). Cyberspace
forces conduct DCO-IDM within the DODIN boundary, or on other friendly networks when authorized, in
order to defend those networks from imminent or ongoing attacks. At times cyberspace forces may also take
action against threat cyberspace actors in neutral or adversary networks in defense of the DODIN or friendly
networks. These types of actions, called DCO-RA, require additional authorities and coordination measures.
Lastly, cyberspace forces deliberately target threat capabilities in neutral, adversary, and enemy-held portions
of cyberspace by conducting OCO. Cyberspace forces may include joint forces from the DOD cyber mission
forces or Army-retained cyberspace forces. See Chapter 3 of this publication for more details on cyberspace
forces.
Figure 2-1. Cyberspace operations taxonomy |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.