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3-22 | 72 | Chapter 4
security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross
violation of human rights.
331, FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES: AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR CONDUCT
OF OPERATIONS
4-31. This section provides support (logistics, supplies, and services) to forces of a friendly foreign country
participating in an operation with the armed forces of the DOD. The operation needs to that benefit U.S.
national security interests, and/or solely for the purpose of enhancing interoperability of military forces in a
combined operation. This support includes the procurement of equipment for the purpose of loaning such
equipment to the military forces of a friendly foreign country participating in a U.S.-supported coalition or
combined operation. It also includes specialized training in connection with such an operation and small-
scale construction (as defined in 10 USC 301) that is directly related to the effective accomplishment of the
training exercise.
332, FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES; INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
DEFENSE INSTITUTION CAPACITY BUILDING
4-32. This section allows subject matter experts, civilian advisors, and other experts to help a respective
country’s ministry of defense and/or various security agencies with defense institution building. This program
provides institutional- and ministerial-level advice and other training to personnel of the ministry or regional
organization to which assigned to support of stabilization or post-conflict activities, and assists such
ministries in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense-related
processes.
333, FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES: AUTHORITY TO BUILD CAPACITY
4-33. Section 333 allows the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment, services, and training to the national
security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity to do one or more of the
following operations: counterterrorism, counter-weapons of mass destruction, counter-illicit drug trafficking,
counter-transnational organized crime, maritime/border security, military intelligence, air domain awareness
operations and cybersecurity operations, or activities that contribute to an international coalition operations.
341, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (SPP)
4-34. Section 341 allows the National Guard to interact with military, security forces, and
emergency/disaster response organizations of friendly partner nations. SPP matches State National Guard
capabilities to a partner nation’s security requirements for the military, security forces (border forces,
constabulary, port, air, and land forces), and first responder organizations with emergency and disaster
response, to include medical and infectious disease. SPP is one of the few programs authorized to engage
across the spectrum of country governmental organizations and is a multi-categorization security cooperation
tool.
22 USC PROGRAMS
4-35. Security assistance programs that build partner capacity, funded under 22 USC, include but are not
limited to—
* Section 2763, Foreign Military Financing.
* Sections 2761, 2762, 2769, Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
* Section, 2347, International Military Education and Training.
* Section 2348, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
* Sections 2321j, 2761, Excess Defense Articles (EDA).
* African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership. |
3-22 | 73 | Legal Considerations
FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING
4-36. FMF funds select partner countries’ purchases of U.S. defense articles, services, and training normally
via the FMS process. The U.S. Congress distributes funding through FMF for eligible FMS clients. The FMF
funding program is a legally sanctioned repayable or nonrepayable loan given to select strategic partners
authorized by the DOS and managed by the DSCA.
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
4-37. Under the general supervision of the DOS and subject to foreign disclosure decisions, the DOD is
authorized to sell defense articles, services, and training to ministries of defense of other countries under the
FMS program. FMS is an acquisition program supported by the DOS and managed by the DSCA and
promotes security cooperation between the United States and its allies. The USG may sell directly from its
own stockpiles in addition to entering into sole-source or competitive contracts.
DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES
4-38. The DOS regulates direct commercial sales and issues export licenses through the department’s
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. In accordance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is authorized to grant export permits for all defense-related goods and
services listed on the U.S. Munitions List, with the exception of those listed as FMS Only.
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES VS. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES
4-39. Foreign clients will generally have more bargaining power when purchasing directly from government
inventories through FMS over direct commercial sales because the U.S. military and other defense
organizations also purchase these same defense systems. Foreign clients generally consider the FMS
procedure to be more dependable, secure, and transparent than direct commercial sales.
4-40. While direct commercial sales do offer more negotiating power over contractual requirements,
delivery, and methods of payment than FMS, direct commercial sales require the foreign client to bear more
risk and administrative responsibility for purchases.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET)
4-41. This section grants funding for the education and training of foreign country personnel in activities
designed to—
* Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the
United States and foreign countries in the furtherance of the goals of international peace and
security.
* Improve the ability of participating foreign countries to use their resources, including defense
articles and services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness,
thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.
* Increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic
issues involving internationally recognized human rights.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
4-42. This section provides funding for articles, services, and training for countries and organizations
conducting international peacekeeping.
EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES
4-43. This section provides no longer needed USG defense articles to countries justified to receive such
assistance. Secretaries of military departments declare items in excess to their military departments causing
them to be available for transfer to other USG agencies, local governments, or foreign governments eligible
to receive them either by FMS or grant transfer. |
3-22 | 74 | Chapter 4
AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING RAPID RESPONSE PARTNERSHIP
4-44. This section builds international peacekeeping capacity and promotes regional security operations so
that African partner nations can execute their own internal security responsibilities and provide support for
African Union/United Nations sponsored peace operations in Africa.
SPECIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORITIES
4-45. In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has passed a number of special foreign
assistance authorities through the NDAA that are not made permanent law within the USC, but rather are
stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriation acts. These special authorities
often contain “dual key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to the
Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State (or in some cases, with the concurrence
of the appropriate chief of mission). Examples include the—
* European Deterrence Initiative.
* Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
* Pacific Deterrence Initiative.
EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE
4-46. The European Deterrence Initiative enhances the U.S. deterrence posture, increases the readiness and
responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, supports the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and
bolsters the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners.
UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE
4-47. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative provides support for Ukraine and various Partnership for
Peace nations to help them develop combat capability to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity
against Russian and Russian-backed separatist aggression and to support agreed-upon ceasefire agreements.
PACIFIC DETERRENCE INITIATIVE
4-48. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative provides support for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command SC activities that
are designed to—
* Enhance the structure and alignment of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific, particularly west of the
international date line.
* Enhance the responsiveness and resiliency of the U.S. forces through modernization and
improvements to infrastructure and logistics.
* Build the defense and security capabilities, capacity, and cooperation of allies and partners’
authority for humanitarian assistance, SA, or combined exercise costs. |
3-22 | 75 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions and other selected
terms. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The
proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for
which FM 3-22 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*).
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A2/AD anti access/area denial
ADP Army doctrine publication
AJP Allied joint publication
AOR area of responsibility
AR Army regulation
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASCC Army service component command
ATP Army techniques publication
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DAMO-SSR Department of the Army Management Office for Army International Affairs
DASA-DEC Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation
DA PAM Department of the Army pamphlet
DATT defense attaché
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DOS Department of State
DOTMLPF-P doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSCA
foreign internal defense
FID
field manual
FM
foreign military financing
FMF
foreign military sales
FMS
foreign security force
FSF
integrated country strategy
ICS
international military education and training
IMET
joint force commander
JFC
joint publication
JP |
3-22 | 76 | Glossary
JSCP joint strategic campaign plan
LSCO large-scale combat operations
MODA ministry of defense advisor
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NSS national security strategy
OE operational environment
OPE operational preparation of the environment
OTEBA organize, train, equip, build, advise
OUSD(P) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PME professional military education
ROE rules of engagement
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SA security assistance
SATMO United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization
SC security cooperation
SCO security cooperation organization
SDO senior defense official
SFA security force assistance
SFAB security force assistance brigade
SPP State Partnership Program
SSR security sector reform
USASAC United States Army Security Assistance Command
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USG United States Government
SECTION II – TERMS
assessment
A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities
during military operations. (JP 3-0)
crisis
An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military
forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or
military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve
national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)
liaison
That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies
to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (FM 6-0) |
3-22 | 77 | Glossary
foreign assistance
Support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian
assistance, and security assistance. (JP 3-0)
military engagement
Contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and
those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to
build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP
3-0).
rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations
under which United States forces will initiate and/ or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. (JP 3-84)
security cooperation
Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that
promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with
peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20).
security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of
foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)
security forces
Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)
security sector reform
A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it
provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)
stability operation
An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)
stabilization activities
Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination
with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and
provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief. (JP 3-0)
support
The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains other forces in accordance with a
directive requiring such action. (JP 1, Volume 2) |
3-22 | 79 | References
All websites accessed on 28 June 2023.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. May 2023.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 09 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 18 May 2022.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most Department of Defense issuances are available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD. Most joint
publications are available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/.
DODD 5105.65. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 26 October 2012.
DODD 5205.75. DOD Operations at U.S. Embassies. 04 December 2013.
DODI 5111.20. State Partnership Program (SPP). 12 October 2016.
DODI 5132.14. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation
Enterprise. 13 January 2017.
DODI 5132.15. Implementation of the Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program. 07 May
2021.
JP 1, Volume 2. The Joint Force. 19 June 2020.
JP 3-0. Joint Campaigns and Operations. 18 June 2022.
JP 3-07. Joint Stabilization Activities. 11 February 2022.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Cooperation. 12 October 2016.
JP 3-20. Security Cooperation. 09 September 2022.
JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 17 August 2018.
JP 3-84. Legal Support. 02 August 2016.
JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 01 December 2020.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 July 2019.
AR 34-1. Interoperability. 09 April 2020.
ATP 3-07.10/MCRP 3-03D.1 [MCRP 3-33.8A/NTTP 3-07.5/AFTTP 3-2.76. Advising Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces. 13 November
2017.
ATP 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 27 August 2021.
ATP 3-94.1. Digital Liaison Detachment. 28 December 2017 |
3-22 | 80 | References
ATP 3-96.1. Security Force Assistance Brigade. 02 September 2020.
DA Pam 11-31. Army Security Cooperation Handbook. 06 February 2015.
FM 3-0. Operations. 01 October 2022.
FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 09 January 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 16 May 2022.
FM 6-27. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare (MCTP 11-10C). 07 August
2019.
UNITED STATES LAW
United States Codes are available at https://uscode.house.gov. Public law references are available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/plaw.
10 USC Section 134, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
10 USC Section 167, Unified combatant command for special operations forces.
10 USC Section 301, Definitions.
10 USC Section 311, Exchange of defense personnel between United States and friendly foreign
countries.
10 USC Section 312, Payment of personnel expenses necessary for theater security cooperation.
10 USC Section 321, Training with friendly foreign countries: payment of training and exercise
expenses.
10 USC Section 322, Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces.
10 USC Section 331, Friendly foreign countries: authority to provide support for conduct of
operations.
10 USC Section 332, Friendly foreign countries; international and regional organizations: defense
institution capacity building.
10 USC Section 333, Foreign security forces: authority to build capacity.
10 USC Section 341, Department of Defense State Partnership Program (SPP).
10 USC Section 384, Department of Defense security cooperation workforce development.
22 USC Section 2321i, Overseas Management of Assistance and Sales Programs.
22 USC Section 2321j, Authority to transfer excess defense articles.
22 USC Section 2347, General authority.
22 USC Section 2348, General authorization.
22 USC Section 2761, Sales from stocks.
22 USC Section 2762, Procurement for cash sales.
22 USC Section 2763, Credit sales.
22 USC Section 2769, Foreign military construction sales.
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329, 30 June 1976.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195, 04 September 1961, as amended through P.L. 116-6,
enacted February 15, 2019.
Foreign Service Act of 1980, P.L. 96-465, as amended through P.L. 117–81, enacted December 27,
2021.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ328/PLAW-114publ328.pdf.
Women, Peace, and Security Act, P.L. 115-68, 06 October 2017.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) History. Available at
https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Groups/5th/5thSFGHistory.html#:~:text=The%205th%20SFG
%20(A)%20added,and%20returned%20in%20April%201991. |
3-22 | 81 | References
2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Available at
https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. 26 June 1945.
Available at https://un.org/en/about-us/un-charter.
Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008: Security Assistance Restrictions. Congressional Research
Service. Report IF10901. March 25, 2020. Retrieved on August 22, 2022, and available at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10901/9.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. October 2022. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-
National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
Security Cooperation Management Greenbook. Fiscal Year 2022. Defense Security Cooperation
University. Available at
https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/pdf/greenbook-e42.pdf.
State Partnership Program. Available at https://www.nationalguard.mil/leadership/joint-staff/j-
5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/.
United States Government Women, Peace, and Security Congressional Report. The White House.
Washington, D.C. July 2022. Retrieved on August 22, 2022, and available at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/US-Women-Peace-Security-Report-
2022.pdf.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Army Multidomain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict. CSA Paper #1.
Headquarters, Department of the Army. 16 March 2021. Available at
https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1022250.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263, 23 December 2022.
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). Defense Security Cooperation Agency 5105.38-M.
Available at https://www.samm.dsca.mil.
The Army in Military Competition. CSA Paper #2. Headquarters, Department of the Army. 01 March
2021. Available at
https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1022251.
Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan. U.S. Department of
Defense. June 2020. Available at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/11/2002314428/-1/-
1/1/WOMEN_PEACE_SECURITY_STRATEGIC_FRAMEWORK_IMPLEMENTATION_
PLAN.PDF
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:
https://armypubs.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. |
3-22 | 83 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
Digital liaison detachment, 2-103, Security force assistance, 1-7, 1-
A-B
2-105, 2-107, 24–1-26, 2-2–2-3, 2-67, 2-103,
Allies, 1-2, 1-5, 1-42, 1-51, 1-55,
2-105
2-5, 2-14–2-15, 2-18–2-19, 2- F, G, H, I, J, K
Security force assistance,
28, 2-72, 3-1, 3-4–3-6, 3-13, 3- Foreign assistance, 1-11, 1-13–1-
Brigade, 2-105
22–3-23, 3-27, 3-31, 3-39, 3-41, 14, 1-20, 1-63, 4-9, 4-13–4-14,
3-56, 3-60, 3-69, 3-90, 4-37, 4- 4-16, 4-19, 4-24, 4-45 Security forces, 1-26, 1-38, 1-47,
46, 4-48, 2-7, 2-15, 2-83–2-84, 2-106, 3-
L 4, 3-6, 3-28, 3-35, 3-73, 3-88, 4-
Assessment, 1-38, 1-54, 1-68, 1-
10, 4-15, 4-19, 4-21–4-22, 4-26,
86, 2-10–2-11, 2-35–2-45, 2- Large-scale combat operations,
4-29, 4-33–4-34,
48–2-49, 2-50, 2-51–2-55, 2-58, Embedded advisor support to,
Security forces, Defined, 1-26
2-64 3-70–3-76
Security sector assistance, 1-14–
Assessment activities, 2-40–2-44 Liaison, 2-75–2-76
1-15
LSCO, 2-26, 3-9, 3-17, 3-24, 3-60,
B SFA, 1-7, 1-18, 1-25, 1-29, 1-36,
3-64, 3-68–3-69, 3-72, 3-74, 3-
Brigade, 2-103, 2-105, 3-64 1-49, 1-69,
79, 3-77–3-83, 3-88–3-89
security force assistance, 2- SFA assessment, Activities, 2-35–
LSCO, Training and equipping
103, 2-105 2-36
during, 3-77–3-83,
C Stability operation, 1-47, 3-87, 3-
M, N, O, P, Q 90, 3-92
Combat power, 1-2, 2-76, 3-4, 3-
19, 3-43, 3-45, 3-60, 3-64, 3-79 Maneuver, 1-2, 1-4, 2-34, 3-4, 3- Stabilization activities, 1-19
40, 3-63, 3-66, 3-71–3-73
Competition, 1-2, 1-32, 2-2, 2-53, Strategic competition, 1-2, 3-3
Military engagement, 1-18, 1-27–
2-72, 2-105, 3-1, 3-15, 3-18, 3- Support, 1-5, 1-7, 1-9–1-10, 1-16,
1-29, 1-43–1-44, 1-74, 3-1, 3-6,
20, 3-24–3-25, 3-32–3-34, 3-39, 1-21–1-22, 1-24–1-26, 1-31, 1-
4-11
3-42, 3-46, 3-49–3-50, 3-56 34–1-35, 1-38–1-41, 1-44–1-50,
Considerations, 1-68, 2-3–2-6, 2- R 1-53, 1-59–1-60, 1-62–1-64, 1-
14–2-15, 2-51–2-55 ROE, 2-84, 4-1, 4-6–4-8 67–1-68, 1-80–1-83, 2-2, 2-5, 2-
14–2-15, 2-19–2-20, 2-25, 2-30,
Crisis, 1-31, 2-16, 2-18, 2-20, 2- Rules of engagement, 2-84, 4-7– 2-34–2-35, 2-61, 2-67, 2-70–2-
26, 2-53, 3-4, 3-10–3-11, 3-16, 4-8 74, 2-79–2-80, 2-82–2-84, 2-88,
3-18, 3-32, 3-34–3-36, 3-38–3-
2-93, 2-98, 2-103–2-104, 2-107,
47, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z
2-110, 2-113, 3-1, 3-4–3-5, 3-7–
D-E Security cooperation, activities, 1- 3-8, 3-12, 3-14, 3-19–3-21, 3-
2, 1-4,1-11–1-19, 1-54, 2-104– 31, 3-33, 3-35, 3-39, 3-42, 3-
Deterrence, 2-1, 2-26, 3-3, 3-5, 3- 105, 3-1, 4-2 45–3-47, 3-50, 3-53, 3-55, 3-57,
9, 3-13, 3-16, 3-19, 3-28, 3-31,
Security environment, shaping, 1- 3-59, 3-62–3-3-71, 3-73, 3-81–
3-38, 3-46, 3-51–3-52, 3-59, 3-
5–1-10, 1-39, 1-47, 1-88, 2-29, 3-82, 3-87, 3-91, 4-1, 4-6, 4-10–
66, 3-85–3-86,
2-88, 3-10, 3-85 4-12, 4-23–4-24, 4-31–4-32, 4-
44, 4-47–4-48 |
3-22 | 85 | FM 3-22
01 July 2023
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2317311
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. To be distributed in |
3-60 | 1 | FM 3-60
Army Targeting
AUGUST 2023
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes ATP 3-60, dated 7 May 2015. |
3-60 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(http://www.armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army Registry site |
3-60 | 3 | *FM 3-60
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-60 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 11 August 2023
Army Targeting
Contents
Page
PREFACE.....................................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1 FOUNDATIONAL GUIDELINES ............................................................................... 1-1
Section I - Terminology ........................................................................................... 1-2
Section II – Principles ............................................................................................. 1-2
Section III – Operations, Planning, and Targeting ............................................... 1-3
Section IV – Key Doctrinal Concepts .................................................................... 1-3
Targeting Guidance ................................................................................................... 1-4
Targeting Categories ................................................................................................. 1-4
Section V – General Responsibilities .................................................................... 1-8
Key Targeting Personnel ........................................................................................... 1-8
Chapter 2 THE TARGETING PROCESS................................................................................... 2-1
General Targeting Methodology ................................................................................ 2-1
Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess ................................................................................ 2-2
Methodology Tools .................................................................................................. 2-15
Chapter 3 BRIGADE TARGETING ............................................................................................ 3-1
Section I - Operational Framework ........................................................................ 3-1
Section II - Functions .............................................................................................. 3-3
Section III - Planning ............................................................................................... 3-3
Section IV - Battle Rhythm Synchronization ........................................................ 3-4
Chapter 4 DIVISION AND CORPS TARGETING ...................................................................... 4-1
Section I – Operational Framework ....................................................................... 4-1
Section II – Functions ............................................................................................. 4-3
Section III – Planning .............................................................................................. 4-3
Section IV – Synchronization ................................................................................. 4-4
Chapter 5 THEATER TARGETING ........................................................................................... 5-1
Section I – Overview ................................................................................................ 5-1
Section II - Operational Framework ....................................................................... 5-2
Section III - Functions ............................................................................................. 5-4
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes ATP 3-60, dated 7 May 2015. |
3-60 | 4 | Contents
Section IV - Planning .............................................................................................. 5-4
Section V - Synchronization .................................................................................. 5-5
Appendix A TARGETING CHECKLIST ....................................................................................... A-1
Appendix B INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING ......................................................... B-1
Appendix C DESIRED EFFECTS AND TARGET CATEGORIES ............................................... C-1
Appendix D EXAMPLE TARGETING PRODUCT FORMATS ..................................................... D-1
Appendix E EXAMPLE BATTLE RHYTHM PRODUCTS ............................................................ E-1
Appendix F EXAMPLE TARGET INFORMATION FOLDER ...................................................... F-1
Appendix G TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS TOOL ........................................................................ G-1
Appendix H TARGET NUMBERING ............................................................................................ H-1
Appendix I ALTERNATE TARGETING METHODOLOGIES ...................................................... I-1
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES ....................................................................................... References-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Targeting categories .................................................................................................... 1-4
Figure 2-1. Decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology ....................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. Example operational assessment ............................................................................. 2-14
Figure 2-3. Decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology and assets .................................. 2-15
Figure 3-1. Brigade operational framework ................................................................................... 3-2
Figure 4-1. Corps and division operational framework .................................................................. 4-2
Figure 5-1. Delineation of area of operation. ................................................................................. 5-3
Figure B-1. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield outputs during the military decision-making
process ....................................................................................................................... B-5
Figure B-2. Intelligence support to the target development process ............................................. B-7
Figure D-1. Information collection synchronization matrix (example) ............................................ D-5
Figure D-2. Essential target information (example) ....................................................................... D-7
Figure E-1. Battalion/Brigade targeting working group (example) ................................................. E-4
Figure E-2. Division/Corps targeting working group (example) ..................................................... E-5
Figure E-3. Battalion/Brigade targeting coordination board (example) ......................................... E-7
Figure E-4. Division/Corps targeting coordination board (example) .............................................. E-8
Figure E-5. Targeting coordination board slide 1 .......................................................................... E-9
Figure E-6. Targeting coordination board slide 2 (Roll Call) ........................................................ E-10
Figure E-7. Targeting coordination board slide 3 (Agenda) ......................................................... E-11
Figure E-8. Targeting coordination board slide 4 (Weather) ....................................................... E-12
Figure E-9. Targeting coordination board slide 5 (Combat Assessment) .................................... E-13
Figure E-10. Targeting coordination board slide 6 (Operational Assessment) ............................ E-14
Figure E-11. Targeting coordination board slide 7 (Current Targeting Cycle) ............................. E-15 |
3-60 | 5 | Contents
Figure E-12. Targeting coordination board slide 8 (Enemy Situation) .........................................E-16
Figure E-13. Targeting coordination board slide 9 (Friendly Scheme of Maneuver) ...................E-17
Figure E-14. Targeting coordination board slide 10 (Information Collection Plan) ......................E-18
Figure E-15. Targeting coordination board slide 11 (Review TC + 1) ..........................................E-19
Figure E-16. Targeting coordination board slide 12 (Enemy Situation) .......................................E-20
Figure E-17. Targeting coordination board slide 13 (Friendly Scheme of Maneuver) .................E-21
Figure E-18. Targeting coordination board slide 14 (Information Collection Plan) ......................E-22
Figure E-19. Targeting coordination board slide 15 (Refine TC + 2) ...........................................E-23
Figure E-20. Targeting coordination board slide 16 (Enemy Situation) .......................................E-24
Figure E-21. Targeting coordination board slide 17 (Friendly Scheme of Maneuver) .................E-25
Figure E-22. Targeting coordination board slide 18 (Information Collection Plan) ......................E-26
Figure E-23. Targeting coordination board slide 19 (Approve TC + 3) ........................................E-27
Figure E-24. Targeting coordination board slide 20 (Approved Targeting Guidance ATO BH) ...E-28
Figure E-25. Targeting coordination board slide 21 (Enemy Situation) .......................................E-29
Figure E-26. Targeting coordination board slide 22 (Friendly Scheme of Maneuver) .................E-30
Figure E-27. Targeting coordination board slide 23 (Information Collection Plan) ......................E-31
Figure E-28. Targeting coordination board slide 24 (Guidance TC + 4) ......................................E-32
Figure E-29. Targeting coordination board slide 25 (Recommended Targeting Guidance) ........E-33
Figure E-30. Targeting coordination board slide 26 (Commanders Guidance) ...........................E-34
Figure F-1. Target Information Folder page 1 (baseball card) (example) ...................................... F-3
Figure F-2. Target Information Folder page 2 (baseball card) (example) ...................................... F-4
Figure I-1. Find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess within the Joint Targeting Cycle ................ I-1
Figure I-2. High-value individual targeting process ......................................................................... I-3
Tables
Introductory Table 1. Modified terms ............................................................................................... viii
Table 3-1. Targeting/military decision-making process crosswalk ................................................. 3-4
Table C-1. Desired effects ............................................................................................................. C-1
Table D-1. High-payoff target list (example) ................................................................................. D-2
Table D-2. Target selection standards matrix (example) .............................................................. D-2
Table D-3. Attack guidance matrix (example) ............................................................................... D-4
Table D-4. Targeting synchronization matrix (example) ............................................................... D-6
Table E-1. Assessment working group agenda (example) ..........................................................E-35
Table G-1. CARVER matrix tool .................................................................................................... G-2
Table H-1. Assignment of first letter (example) ............................................................................. H-1
Table H-2. Assignment of letters (example) .................................................................................. H-2
Table H-3. Assignment of blocks of numbers (example) .............................................................. H-2
Table H-4. Additional assignment of blocks of numbers (example) .............................................. H-3 |
3-60 | 7 | Preface
FM 3-60 provides guidance on targeting processes and procedures used by the United States Army. This
manual has applicability in any theater of operations. The manual offers considerations for commanders and
staffs in preparing for challenges with targeting throughout the competition continuum yet is flexible enough
to adapt to a dynamic situation. FM 3-60 will replace Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-60, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the targeting process. FM 3-60 is written to align with other operations,
intelligence, and fires doctrinal publications.
Readers of FM 3-60 should read and understand many aspects of Army operations as captured in ADP 3-0
and FM 3-0, Operations. Specifically, the reader must understand multidomain operations as the
Army’s operational concept, large-scale combat operations, the Army’s role in unified action, Army
operations across the strategic contexts, operational art, the operations process, and the warfighting
functions. Additionally, because of the close relationship between targeting and intelligence, readers
should be familiar with the key aspects of the following Army intelligence doctrinal publications:
* FM 2-0, Intelligence.
* ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
* ATP 2-01, Collection Management.
The principal audience for FM 3-60 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of
Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable
joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
Successful targeting requires that commanders and their staffs possess—
* An understanding of the functions associated with the targeting process.
* The knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of organic and supporting collection, target
acquisition and delivery systems.
* An appreciation of the key aspects of each domain and the physical, information, and human
dimensions of the operational environment.
* Decisive points necessary to reach convergence for each echelon.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international, and in some cases, host-nation laws, and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war, law of armed conflict and the rules of
engagement. FM 6-27, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare states the terms “law of
war”, and “law of armed conflict” are used interchangeably in practice. This publication uses the term law of
armed conflict. Law of armed conflict is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of hostilities
and the protection of war victims. For more information, see FM 6-27.
FM 3-60 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-60 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in
the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 3-60 is the
proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and the definitions are boldfaced. For other definitions
shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-60 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standard Agreements (STANAGs) 2934
NATO Joint Fire Support Procedures for Land Operations.
FM 3-60 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. |
3-60 | 8 | Preface
The proponent for FM 3-60 is the Commanding General, United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and
Fort Sill. The preparing agency is the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence, the Army Multidomain
Targeting Center and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Send comments and recommendations on a
Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)
directly to Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 700 McNair Avenue, Suite 128 ATTN: ATSF-DD, Fort Sill,
OK 73503; by e-mail to: [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA
Form 2028. |
3-60 | 9 | Introduction
Field Manual (FM) 3-60, describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with effectively
applying a targeting methodology to integrate and synchronize capabilities to create desired effects on targets
and enable positions of relative advantage during the conduct of operations. Targeting is critical to
synchronize operations from competition to crisis and into armed conflict. During worldwide staffing of the
FM 3-60, significant input was received with valuable recommendations from the force. The Army
Multidomain Targeting Center (AMTC) in conjunction with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine
(DOTD), Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICOE), and the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)
collectively revised the FM to ensure we captured all force requirements, concerns, and recommendations.
Army targeting fed by focused intelligence support is critical to operational success. Some of the new
doctrinal aspects of FM 3-0 drive the need for a sophisticated targeting effort. For example, Army forces
must account for the three dimensions (physical, information, and human) of the operational environment
and nested decisive points and effects to execute an effective targeting methodology across the strategic
contexts. Detailed intelligence on the operational environment supports detailed targeting.
Key elements of this revision are—
* Emphasizes targeting as an operations integrating process.
* Focuses on echelon specific requirements.
* Introduces Operational Framework.
* Introduces intelligence support to targeting appendix.
* Re-introduces target types and a codified list of desired effects, which will enhance the ability to
articulate intent.
* Added information on the assessment working group within the targeting process as assessments
are the foundation of effective targeting.
* Aligns the Army’s targeting manual with FM 3-0, Operations and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
FM 3-60 is designed to be applicable and useful to all members of the Army Profession. This includes
commanders, staffs, leaders, and targeting team members of a Theater Army, Corps, Division, and Brigade.
The publication also provides the foundation for Army training and education curricula on targeting. FM 3-
60 describes how targeting is conducted at echelon, as part of a joint or multinational force. This publication
addresses targeting requirements and processes in support of the Army targeting methodology of decide,
detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) and the integration of the joint targeting cycle, as needed, to support
operations. Targeting is a command responsibility that requires participation of key members of both the
coordinating and special staffs.
The intent of this version is to provide targeting teams at echelon an easy to use and valuable resource that is
relevant to individual needs. We are striving to ensure this release is applicable to the changing environment,
useful at echelon, and most importantly provides the doctrinal foundation expected from a targeting FM.
Although the Army faces a substantial amount of change through the transition from counterinsurgency to
large-scale combat and multidomain operations, it is imperative that we emphasize the effectiveness of the
targeting process and the requirement to plan early. Using the targeting process effectively and efficiently
will enable targeting teams to set conditions during planning and minimize unplanned or unanticipated targets
from derailing friendly schemes of maneuver or impacting the ability to achieve the Commanders intent.
The commander establishes the environment that determines the quality of the targeting effort and targeting
often determines the commander's success or failure. The focus of this publication is on the targeting process
from brigade to theater level. The Targeting methodology is not new or revolutionary. It consists of time-
tested techniques organized in a systematic framework. Emerging organizations, all domain concepts, and
large-scale combat operational considerations are also presented. |
3-60 | 10 | Introduction
FM 3-60 has been updated to reflect current changes in terminology and techniques used for targeting. FM
3-60 contains five chapters and nine appendices.
Chapter 1 discusses the targeting guidelines and philosophy associated with targeting techniques and general
responsibilities of targeting personnel.
Chapter 2 discusses the Army targeting process relating to lethal and nonlethal effects. It discusses the D3A
methodology and the integration and synchronization with maneuver forces.
Chapter 3 discusses targeting at the brigade level to include battlefield framework, functions, planning, and
battle rhythm synchronization.
Chapter 4 discusses targeting at the division and corps level to include battlefield framework, functions,
planning, and battle rhythm synchronization.
Chapter 5 discusses targeting at the theater level to include battlefield framework, functions, planning, and
battle rhythm synchronization.
Appendix A provides a comprehensive checklist for decide, detect, deliver, and assess.
Appendix B provides an overview of intelligence support to targeting.
Appendix C provides a table of desired effects and the desired outcomes, and target categories.
Appendix D provides an example of targeting tools and formats.
Appendix E provides targeting working group and targeting coordination board individual responsibilities
and examples of battle rhythm products.
Appendix F provides examples of a target information folder.
Appendix G provides example of a CARVER target value analysis tool.
Appendix H describes target-numbering procedures.
Appendix I describes alternate targeting methodologies.
NEW, RESCINDED, AND MODIFIED TERMS
FM 3-60 becomes the proponent of the following Army terms. See Introductory table 1.
Introductory Table 1. Modified terms
Term Remarks
high-payoff target list FM 3-60 becomes proponent.
high-value individual FM 3-60 becomes proponent. |
3-60 | 11 | Chapter 1
Foundational Guidelines
Targeting is a complex and multi-disciplined effort that requires coordinated
interaction among many groups. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and
contribute to national objectives across a wide range of operational categories,
including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis
response, and support to security cooperation. While the overwhelming majority of
operations conducted by Army forces occur either below the threshold of armed
conflict or during limited contingencies, the focus of Army readiness is on large-scale
combat operations.
Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which for the most part
occur as part of a larger coalition operation. Leaders must understand the
interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or capabilities
provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined
arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner
capabilities to the degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest
the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when
some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment.
Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously
benefit from air and maritime strategic transportation and space and cyberspace
capabilities that they do not control, including global positioning, satellite
communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Lower echelons
may not always notice the opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that
operate primarily in other domains; however, leaders must understand how the absence
of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision making, and risk
assessment.
The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war
and the changing character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces
operate across the competition continuum given the prevailing characteristics of
anticipated operational environments (OEs) now and in the near future. For more
information on war, warfare, and multidomain operations see FM 3-0.
In order to be successful throughout the range of military operations, across the
competition continuum, and overcome the challenges presented by a very diverse OE,
Army Commanders and staff use several integrating processes to synchronize forces
and the warfighting functions within the military decision-making process (MDMP).
An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines
to achieve a specific end. Key integrating processes that occur within the MDMP
include:
* Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
* Information collection.
* Targeting. |
3-60 | 12 | Chapter 1
* Risk management.
* Knowledge management.
This manual will highlight the key integrating process of Targeting and discuss its use
in support of Army operations.
The targeting methodology is an iterative, and logical means necessary for the
development, planning, execution, and assessment of target engagements.
Commanders establish a targeting team to assist in planning. Key staff components
working together are referred to as the targeting team and include, but are not limited
to, enablers such as fire support (FS), intelligence, operations, plans cells and
information advantage assets. Representatives from these cells and elements are
essential to a comprehensive targeting process. Other members of the staff may help
them in the planning and execution phases of targeting. Close coordination among all
cells and elements is crucial for a successful targeting effort.
The commander establishes the environment that determines the quality of the
targeting effort and targeting often determines the mission's success or failure. This
success is dependent upon the shared understanding of the targeting team, and the use
of a standard lexicon outlined in the following sections.
SECTION I - TERMINOLOGY
1-1. A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement
or other action (JP 3-60). Targets include a wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, and
capabilities that span the physical, information, and human dimensions and that a threat can use to conduct
operations. A target's importance is determined by its potential contribution to achieving a commander's
objectives or otherwise accomplishing assigned tasks or reaching an effect. Targets are continuously refined
or adjusted as an operation unfolds.
1-2. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to
them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). It is an integral part of the operations
process that organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to integrate and synchronize fires in operations.
Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions.
1-3. Targeting encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the joint targeting cycle.
Units may use the Army targeting process or the joint targeting cycle as appropriate according to
organizational echelon to integrate and synchronize capabilities, across warfighting functions and
information advantage, into operations, creating the desired effects in time and space. The targeting team
recommends targeting guidance to the commander, develops targets, selects targets for attack, and
coordinates, integrates, and assigns organic or allocated joint, interagency, and multinational fires to specific
targets and target systems.
SECTION II – PRINCIPLES
1-4. Targeting proceeds from the commander's objectives to an assessment of the results achieved by the
executed course of action (COA). Participants in the targeting process should adhere to these targeting
principles for creating the desired effects while diminishing undesired or adverse collateral effects. The
targeting principles are:
* Focused. Targeting focuses on achieving the commander's objectives. It is the function of targeting
to achieve efficiently those objectives within the parameters set at the operational level, directed
limitations, the rules of engagement (ROE), or rules for the use of force, the law of war, and other
guidance given by the commander. Every target nominated must contribute to attaining the
commander's objectives. |
3-60 | 13 | Foundational Guidelines
* Effects-based. Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal
actions or capabilities. Target analysis encompasses all possible means to create desired effects,
drawing from all available capabilities. The art of targeting seeks to create desired effects with the
least risk and expenditure of time and resources.
* Interdisciplinary. Targeting is a command function that requires the participation of many
disciplines. This entails participation from all elements of the unit staff, other organizations, and
multinational partners in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of targeting tasks.
* Systematic. A targeting methodology is a rational and iterative process that methodically analyzes,
prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets systematically to create those effects that will
contribute to achieving the commander's objectives. During the course of the operation, targets
are systematically analyzed, prioritized, and assigned assets to create effects that will contribute
to the achievement of the commander's objectives. If the desired effects are not created, targets
may be considered again in the process or operations may have to be modified.
SECTION III – OPERATIONS, PLANNING, AND TARGETING
1-5. Targeting plays an important role supporting the Army's operational concept, multidomain operations.
Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and
exploit relative advantage to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint
force commanders (FM 3-0). Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power
from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army's contribution
to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum.
1-6. Targeting is related to all the tenets of operations: agility, convergence, endurance, and depth. FM 3-0
specifically recognizes the overlap of convergence and targeting. Convergence is an outcome created by the
concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive
points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic
area. Convergence requires the synchronization of specific targets and broad objectives by the senior tactical
echelon below the land component command. The ability to achieve convergence is dependent on many
things to include synchronizing the employment of capabilities to generate simultaneous, sequential, and
enduring effects against the enemy system; and assessing individual effects and the probability the overall
effect has been achieved.
1-7. Targeting is also related to planning. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation,
envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning
is a continuous activity of the operations process-the major command and control (C2) activities performed
during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0).
Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to
understand an (OE); visualize and describe the operation's end state and operational approach; and direct,
lead, and assess operations. Plans and orders provide the necessary context to conduct targeting.
1-8. Targeting helps shape operations to meet objectives and the commander's targeting guidance.
Successful targeting requires a close interrelationship between the fires and intelligence warfighting
functions. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and intelligence situational development is critical
to ensure successful FS planning and targeting. In order to conduct successful targeting efforts, Army
echelons must be aware of the operation and contingency plans, target systems analysis (TSA), and threat
assessments produced at the national level to support their operations.
SECTION IV – KEY DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS
1-9. The commander’s targeting guidance must be articulated clearly and simply to enhance understanding.
The guidance must be easily understood by all warfighting functions. Targeting guidance must focus on
essential threat capabilities and functions that could interfere with the achievement of friendly objectives.
Commanders describe the desired effects to be generated. |
3-60 | 14 | Chapter 1
TARGETING GUIDANCE
1-10. The targeting team ensures that the proposed commander’s targeting guidance includes targeting
priorities, operational objectives, HPTs, desired effects, target selection standards (TSS), authorized actions
against targets, any delegated responsibilities for target validation and approval, and the desired endstate.
These elements will be described in further detail in chapter 2. The commander should leverage all available
capabilities to create desired effects.
1-11. The commander can also provide restrictions as part of their targeting guidance. Restrictions at the
tactical level are different than restrictions at the Joint level. Army forces use FS coordination measures to
include no fire areas, target list worksheets, and ROE. Joint forces promulgate the joint force commander’s
(JFCs) no-strike list (NSL) and the restricted target list (RTL). RTLs apply to all subordinate echelons.
1-12. The NSL consists of objects or entities protected by—
* Law of war.
* International laws.
* ROE.
* Other considerations.
1-13. An RTL is a valid target list with specific restrictions such as—
* Limit collateral damage.
* Do not strike during daytime.
* Strike only with a certain weapon.
* Proximity to protected facilities and locations.
Note. See FM 1-04, FM 3-57, JP 3-57, JP 2-0, and JP 3-60 for additional information on legal
considerations and targeting restrictions.
TARGETING CATEGORIES
1-14. There are two targeting categories: deliberate targeting and dynamic targeting see figure 1-1. The two
categories were adopted from joint doctrine but do not directly correlate to operations at the tactical echelons.
Deliberate targeting generally allows for more time and a larger pool of resources in which to leverage against
a target, while dynamic targeting is generally restricted by time, resources available, and command priorities.
Figure 1-1. Targeting categories |
3-60 | 15 | Foundational Guidelines
DELIBERATE TARGETING
1-15. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the area of
operations (AO) and have actions scheduled against them. Examples range from targets on target lists in the
applicable plan or order, targets detected in sufficient time to be placed in the joint air tasking cycle, mission
type orders, or FS plans.
1-16. There are two types of planned targets: scheduled and on-call. The differences are as follows:
* Scheduled targets exist in the AO and are located in sufficient time so that fires or other actions
upon them are identified for engagement at a specific, planned time.
* On-call targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time. The commander expects
to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions.
Target Development
1-17. All Army forces conduct target development. Target development procedures in Army formations are
often less formal and typically standard operating procedure (SOP) dependent. Army units are not typically
manned or equipped to conduct to standard joint target development tasks in accordance with CJCSI
3370.01D. Augmentation my come from external sources, requiring targeting teams to understand targeting
tasks, required skills, and necessary equipment.
1-18. Target development is the systematic examination of potential target systems— and their components,
individual targets, and even elements of targets— to determine the necessary type and duration of the action
that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commander's specific
objectives (JP 3-60). Target development includes functions such as target research, nomination,
deconfliction, aimpoint recommendation, target materials production, and collateral damage estimation.
1-19. Target development includes but is not limited to, the function, criticality, and vulnerabilities of each
potential target, linking targets back to targeting objectives and measures of effectiveness. Target
development is often dependent on the time and assets available. Development may take weeks to months at
joint echelons and potentially minutes to hours at tactical echelons.
Target types
1-20. Before beginning target development, the type of entity target must be established. There are five types
of entity targets. Often referred to as the FIVE-O target types, they are Facilities, Individuals, Virtual,
Equipment, and Organizations.
1-21. Facility. A facility is a physical structure, group of structures, or area that performs one or more
functions that contributes to a threat capability. In the context of entity-level target development, these
measurable geophysical parameters define the real property boundary and ensure no target duplication or
boundary conflicts break unique identification. All facility target elements must reside within the facility
boundary.
1-22. Individual. An individual is a person who provides one or more functions that contribute to a threat
capability. Reserve the individual entity type for personnel that offer unique or critical functions to the threat.
If an individual is only valuable due to their contribution to another target (for example, common soldiers or
workers), the individual belongs to the personnel element of that target.
1-23. Virtual. A virtual entity is a collection of programs, files, or code dependent on each other to perform
a function for the threat. Consider programs, files, data, data paths, signals, and code with the purpose of
enabling equipment to function as a virtual element of equipment. This equipment may in turn be an element
of an organization, facility, or individual.
1-24. Equipment. An equipment entity is an object made up of any number of devices and components,
integrated and codependent, upon which engagement of one-component results in an effect upon the whole.
Consider mass produced equipment (to include tanks, aircraft, and trucks) as target elements of the target
type to which they contribute. |
3-60 | 16 | Chapter 1
1-25. Organization. An organization is a group or unit that provides a function that contributes to a threat
capability. The joint force will differentiate between organizations and target systems. For example, a front
company (an entity) that ships lethal aid (a function) for the terrorist network (the threat) would be a target.
Target elements of an organization could include facilities, individuals, equipment, and virtual entities;
however, facilities and individuals will most often be associated targets instead of elements.
Target Vetting
1-26. Vetting occurs at all Army echelons. The term vetting is commonly used within Army tactical units at
battalion (BN) through corps. When used in this setting, vetting more closely describes the dictionary
definition of applying screening criteria to a piece of information. Staffs at echelon assess and analyze targets
to determine and confirm location, function, and target type for execution. In principle, vetting in a joint
environment is typically external to the organization and a formal process. Within Army processes, vetting
is typically internal to the organization, and a less formal process.
1-27. Vetting is a part of target development that assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence to
targeting (JP 3-60). Vetting is a key component of the target development process to establish a reasonable
level of confidence in a candidate target's functional characterization. In target vetting, the intelligence officer
coordinates an intelligence community review of the target data for accuracy of the supporting intelligence.
An assessment of the supporting intelligence will include a minimum of target identification, significance,
collateral damage considerations, geospatial or location issues, impact on the enemy or friendly forces,
impact of not conducting operations against the target, environmental sensitivity, and intelligence gain or
loss concerns. Vetting does not include an assessment of compliance with the law of war or ROE. Vetting
in a joint environment is prescriptive and includes correspondence with one or more of the intelligence
community members, dependent on authorities (see the most current version of CJCSI 3370.01D for more
details).
Target Validation
1-28. Target validation must occur to receive command approval to perform engagements against targets.
Within Army processes, validation is a commander’s approval of targets to a target list worksheet or a high-
payoff target list (HPTL).
1-29. Validation is a part of target development that ensures all candidate targets meet the objectives and
criteria outlined in the commander's guidance and ensures compliance with the law of war and rules of
engagement (JP 3-60). Multinational considerations should be evaluated when validating targets. Target
vetting and validation should be revisited as new intelligence becomes available or the situation changes.
1-30. Target validation is presented by targeting personnel, in consultation with the planners, servicing judge
advocate general, and other experts and agencies, as required. Validation in a joint environment is the
approval of candidate targets to a joint target list (JTL) or an RTL.
Target Nomination
1-31. Target nominations in a joint environment are targets selected by the combatant command staff,
components, subordinates, and task forces from the JTL and RTL to compile target nomination lists to
nominate targets for engagement (see the current version of CJCSI 3370.01D). Within Army processes, target
nominations from corps and below functioning as a tactical headquarters (HQ) is a lower echelon asking a
higher echelon to execute a target on behalf of the requesting echelon. The higher HQ for all aspects of
targeting to include development and execution owns approved target nominations.
Target Recommendation
1-32. Within Army processes, target recommendations from corps and below functioning as a tactical HQ
are targets that meet execution criteria passed from the intelligence and other staff elements to the fire support
element (FSE) for execution. The distinction between the joint and Army environment target
recommendations is that candidate targets are not yet validated, whereas target recommendations are valid
targets. Target recommendations in a joint environment are called candidate targets submitted by component |
3-60 | 17 | Foundational Guidelines
commanders, appropriate agencies, or the JFC staff for further development and inclusion on the JTL or RTL
or moved to the NSL (see the current version of CJCSI 3370.01D).
DYNAMIC TARGETING
1-33. Dynamic targeting is targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late or not selected for action in
time to be included in deliberate targeting (JP 3-60). Dynamic targeting accounts for the unpredictability of
the threat and prosecutes targets of opportunity during current operations. Targets of opportunity are targets
identified during execution that require the targeting team to account for changes to the previously planned
actions, current assets available and risks to immediate execution.
1-34. There are two types of targets of opportunity: unplanned and unanticipated. The differences are as
follows:
* Unplanned targets are known to exist in the AO, but no action has been planned against them. The
target may not have been detected or located in sufficient time to meet planning deadlines.
Alternatively, the target may have been located, but not previously considered of sufficient
importance to engage.
* Unanticipated targets are unknown or not expected to exist in the AO.
TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS
1-35. A time-sensitive target is a joint force commander-validated target or set of targets requiring immediate
response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger
to friendly forces (JP 3-60). A time-sensitive target (TST) is of such high importance to the accomplishment
of the JFC mission and objectives or one that presents such a significant strategic or operational threat to
friendly forces or allies, that the JFC dedicates intelligence collection and attack assets to ensure success.
1-36. TSTs comprise a very small or limited number of planned targets due to the required investment of
assets and potential disruption of planned execution and are only those targets designated by the JFC and
identified as such in the JFC guidance and intent. TSTs are normally executed rapidly; however, to be targeted
successfully, they require considerable deliberate planning and preparation within the joint targeting cycle.
Army units should be aware of the theater TST matrix.
COMPONENT CRITICAL TARGETS
1-37. Echelons designated as the land component commander (LCC) will identify and nominate component
critical targets. Service component commanders may designate high-priority targets that present significant
risks to, or opportunities for component forces and missions. These are generally targets that the Service
component commander(s) have nominated to the JFC TST list but were not approved as TSTs. This class of
targets known as component critical targets may still require dynamic execution with cross-component
coordination and assistance in an expedited manner. The JFC and Service component commanders should
clearly designate these targets prior to execution of military operations. These targets should receive the
highest priority possible, just below targets on the JFC TST list.
SENSITIVE TARGETS
1-38. Certain targets require special care or caution in treatment because failure to engage them or to engage
them improperly can lead to major adverse consequences. Examples include leader targets (high-value
individuals [HVI]) that must be handled sensitively due to potential political repercussions; targets located
in areas with a high risk of collateral damage; and weapons of mass destruction facilities, where an attack
can lead to major long term environmental damage. Such targets are often characterized as "sensitive" in one
respect or another, without having the intrinsic characteristics, by definition, of a sensitive target.
Nonetheless, the way they are attacked is sensitive and may require coordination with and approval from the
JFC or higher authorities. In most cases, it is best to establish criteria for engaging such targets in as much
detail as possible during planning, before combat commences. For a comprehensive definition of sensitive
targets see the current version of CJCSI 3122.06E. |
3-60 | 18 | Chapter 1
SECTION V – GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
1-39. Targeting team members are competent experts in doctrine and the processes and procedures
associated with operations and targeting. The team understands existing authorities and critical staff
capabilities enabling the creation and assessment of effects to support the commander’s intent.
KEY TARGETING PERSONNEL
1-40. Furthermore, they understand their targeting duties and requirements enough to accomplish
coordination both vertically and horizontally. They are adaptive and have the flexibility to recognize changes
in the OE and makes timely coordination to affect targeting. Key targeting personnel may not exist at all
echelons. Higher echelons provide support if specific skills are required.
1-41. Contribution to effective targeting, requires a common understanding of warfighting functions and
staff officers’ duties and responsibilities. The following paragraphs highlight key tasks and responsibilities
to the targeting process (not all inclusive). Any echelon specific task or reference will be listed explicitly.
All other references to a staff section will be listed with a “G” series but can be substituted for a J or S as
applicable (J/G/S-3, J/G/S-2). For example, the battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) and the
battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3).
COMMANDER
1-42. The commander issues targeting guidance in support of the concept of operations. The commander’s
concept of operations and mission statement contribute to the commander’s intent, are structured to facilitate
shared understanding, and provide focus for the targeting team. Commanders are the final approval authority
on targeting activities and acceptable levels of risk. Commanders can delegate or withhold targeting
authorities and approvals.
1-43. Additional commander targeting responsibilities include directing the formation, composition, and
responsibilities of a targeting board. The commander chairs the targeting board or appoints a delegated
authority. They also ensure the integration of the targeting effort throughout the operation process, and
provide targeting guidance and priorities for shaping deep, close, and rear area operations. The commander
approves the HPTL, TSS, targeting synchronization matrix (TSM), attack guidance matrix (AGM), and the
collection plan.
DEPUTY COMMANDER/ CHIEF OF STAFF (OR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE)
1-44. The commander may delegate control of the unit’s targeting process to include targeting battle rhythm
events, to a deputy commander, chief of staff, executive officer, assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) or
fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This delegate is responsible for supervising the unit's targeting process
and ensuring integration with higher and subordinate HQ.
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
1-45. The staff judge advocate (SJA) provides legal advice and support to the targeting team during all phases
of operations. Members of the SJA team participate in targeting battle rhythm events.
1-46. In conjunction with the G-3 and chief of fires/FSCOORD, the SJA ensures the law of armed conflict,
operational ROE, general restrictions, precautions in attack, separation of military activities, special
protections, national sovereignty, environmental considerations, and the commander's targeting authorities
are disseminated and followed throughout all staff sections and subordinate commands. As needed, liaises
with higher HQ to attain authorities currently not delegable.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
1-47. The assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) is the chief of the intelligence warfighting function and
the principal staff officer responsible for providing intelligence support to targeting, current and future |
3-60 | 19 | Foundational Guidelines
operations, and plans. The G-2 identifies, monitors, and assesses threats as they adapt and change over time
to determine their ability to affect mission accomplishment.
1-48. Together with the G-3, the G-2 helps the commander coordinate, integrate, and supervise the execution
of information collection. The G-2 supports targeting tasks or activities, by refining higher HQ
threat(s)/declared hostile force(s) systems and conducting component analysis. At a minimum the G-2
identifies threat forces combat power to include functions, composition and disposition of enemy units two
levels down with further refinement as the situation requires or as directed by the commander.
1-49. The G-2 supervises development of the threat event template depicting capabilities, capacity and
requirements tied to enemy decision points and differences in enemy courses of action. In addition, they
provide information on the current enemy situation, estimates of current enemy capabilities by function, and
conduct target value analysis (TVA), high-value target (HVT) identification, and the development of high-
payoff targets (HPTs). A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute
to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). A high-value target is a target the enemy commander
requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). The G-2 provides assessments of enemy
activity, syncing with the ATO cycle to better project likely enemy locations for collection and targeting. The
G-2 will send a knowledgeable representative to all targeting battle rhythm events.
STAFF WEATHER OFFICER
1-50. The staff weather officer briefs the terrestrial and extra-terrestrial weather forecast to include light,
weather data, and space weather anomaly(s) for the next 96 hours. The light weather terrestrial data impacts
friendly air operations for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircrafts. The extra-terrestrial data impacts precision
guided (GPS) munitions point of impacts. The staff weather officer (SWO) describes the effects and impacts
to friendly and enemy forces and sensors. Not usually found at echelons below division these tasks are
normally performed by S-2 personnel.
INTELLIGENCE TARGETING OFFICER IN CHARGE
1-51. This is an echelon specific position at the division and above. The intelligence-targeting officer
integrates intelligence support to targeting and maintains the target database. The intelligence-targeting
officer applies the criteria for timeliness and accuracy from the TSS, and reports HPTs to the field artillery
intelligence officer (FAIO).
1-52. The intelligence targeting officer participates in the targeting working group and ensures the G-2/S-2
and analytic elements possess the most current HPT, TSS and AGM. They coordinate with the collection
manager to ensure adequate intelligence collection to support targeting to include recommendations for any
named area of interest (NAI) and target area of interest (TAI). The intelligence-targeting officer also
coordinates with the analytic element for targeting intelligence support to organizational fires. They conduct
and maintain battle damage assessments (BDA), provide re-attack recommendations to the identified
decision authority, and participate in targeting battle rhythm events.
COLLECTION MANAGER
1-53. Collection management is integral to Army targeting. The collection manager supports the targeting
process through integration and synchronization of organic collection resources and the development of
priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and targeting intelligence requirements for organic, adjacent,
coalition, mission partner environment, theater/joint, and national assets. The collection manager supports
targeting by providing understanding of all available collection assets and coordinating for any additional
assets required.
1-54. Targeting intelligence requirements, balanced against PIRs and other information requirements, are
incorporated into the collection management plan. The collection manager prioritizes collection assets in
support of the commander's objectives and assists in the development of NAIs and TAIs. In addition, the
collection manager ensures collection times are synchronized with the TSM to support operations and
participates in targeting battle rhythm events. |
3-60 | 20 | Chapter 1
OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-55. The G-3 ensures warfighting functions are integrated and synchronized across the planning horizons
in current operations, future operations, and planning cells. The operations officer authenticates all plans and
orders per commander’s guidance. The G-3 supervises tasks in support of targeting by publishing the
commander's daily guidance, which includes objectives and targeting guidance.
1-56. The G-3 ensures adherence to ROE during operations in coordination with the SJA and other staff
sections/agencies as required. The G-3 disseminates targeting objectives, effects, TAI, and targeting tasks to
subordinate commands, and chairs the target coordination board when necessary.
PLANS OFFICER
1-57. The assistant chief of staff plans in conjunction with the G-3 prepares Annex A (Task Organization),
Annex C (Operations), and Annex M (Assessment) to the operation order (OPORD) or operation plan
(OPLAN). The plans officer supervises the execution of targeting tasks by developing operational endstates
in support of the commander’s intent to include objectives in the long-range planning horizon.
1-58. The plans officer provides projected changes in task organization, joint apportioned resources, and
command and support relationships to include providing updates on branches or sequels to the current plan
and changes to the commander's intent or endstate. The plans officer ensures incorporation of targeting effects
into the operations assessment plan (enabled by the operations research and system analysis (referred to as
ORSA).
1-59. The plans officer provides operations assessments and commander's guidance to targeting battle
rhythm events and recommends targeting tasks and effects to support the commander's decision points. They
participate in targeting battle rhythm events as required.
FUTURE OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-60. The future operations officer is responsible for planning operations in the midrange planning horizon.
The future operations officer supervises performance of targeting tasks by providing adjustments including
positioning or maneuvering of forces in depth that facilitate continuation of the current operation.
1-61. The future operations officer provides friendly schemes of maneuver for mid-range planning horizons,
and provides updates or changes to task organization, commander’s guidance, current objectives, task and
purpose, or graphic control measures. The future operations officer provides the commander’s decision
point(s) (referred to as DPs) and participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
CURRENT OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-62. The current operations officer integrates the approved TSM into the unit's current operations
synchronization matrix. The current operations officer performs targeting tasks or activities by executing and
assessing the approved targeting tasks per the commander's execution guidance. They conduct tasking/re-
tasking of assets to support engagement of dynamic targets and TSTs and participate in targeting battle
rhythm events when able.
CHIEF OF FIRES
1-63. The chief of fires is the senior fires staff officer at echelons above corps who advises the commander
on the best use of available fires resources and provides input to the necessary orders (ADP 3-19). The chief
of fires is located in the Theater Army fires cell or joint task force (JTF), joint fires element that does not
have a theater fires command to execute joint fires.
1-64. The chief of fires facilitates the fires warfighting function and works closely with the G-3 to ensure
mutual understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fires in support of
operations. The chief of fires targeting responsibilities are similar to those of the FSCOORD. |
3-60 | 21 | Foundational Guidelines
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR
1-65. The fire support coordinator is the senior field artillery commander for the theater, corps, division, and
brigade combat team who is the maneuver commander’s primary advisor to plan, coordinate, and integrate
field artillery and fire support in the execution of assigned tasks (FM 3-09).
1-66. The FSCOORD works closely with the chief of staff or executive officer, the G-2 and G-3 to ensure
mutual understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fires in support of
operations. The FSCOORD supervises the execution of targeting tasks or activities by coordinating with
respective higher HQs, Joint Air Operations Center, battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), and other
unified action partners as needed.
1-67. The FSCOORD establishes the targeting process based on the commander's guidance and intent, by
ensuring integration and synchronization of targeting battle rhythm events into the unit's battle rhythm
vertically and horizontally across commands. They establish the targeting working group and targeting
coordination board agenda.
1-68. The FSCOORD oversees the development and management (with assistance from the G-2 and SJA)
of the HPTL, JTL/RTL and NSL as applicable at echelon. They oversee the development of the target
nominations list for external support and recommend engagement procedures for targets of opportunity. The
FSCOORD chairs the targeting working group and facilitates the targeting coordination board as delegated.
AIR LIAISON OFFICER
1-69. The air liaison officer (ALO) is responsible for advising on air operations. The ALO is the senior Air
Force officer with each tactical air control party. The ALO supervises the execution of targeting tasks or
activities by advising the targeting team on the employment of air assets.
1-70. The ALO facilitates the integration of air capabilities to support target execution efforts and ensures
digital communications are established with the air component to support targeting. They participate in
targeting battle rhythm events as necessary.
TARGETING OFFICER
1-71. Targeting officers are assigned to field artillery BNs, field artillery brigades (FAB), division artillery
(DIVARTY), combat aviation brigades, FSEs from brigade combat team (BCT) through corps, fires cells at
echelons above corps (EAC), cyber mission teams, and special forces units. Targeting officers drive the unit's
targeting process and are technical experts on all matters relating to Army and joint targeting.
1-72. Targeting officers ensure the targeting process, systems integration, personnel training, and supporting
procedures comply with Army and joint standards. Targeting officers participate in the MDMP and
coordinate with other staff members in the development of targeting products (HPTL, TSS, AGM, TSM) to
support the unit's mission.
1-73. Targeting officers advise the commander and staff on all facets of targeting and oversee digital
targeting systems integration at echelon. The targeting officer references TSA and outputs from MDMP, IPB,
joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, identifies HPTs, and develop opportunities
within all domains. They assist in measure of performance (MOP), and measure of effectiveness (MOE)
development, and supports the targeting team in the development of BDA criteria. For more information on
TSA see JP 3-60.
1-74. Targeting officers recommend entities for inclusion on targeting lists and conduct target development
and nomination (at echelon). They develop and submit unit targets requiring the sensitive target approval and
review process. Targeting officers facilitate targeting battle rhythm events and conduct battle handoff of
targeting products with current operation. They ensure ROE (with the SJA) and authorities are communicated
and adhered to by the targeting team; and develop and ensure the publication of targeting guidance; and
ensure changes to the approved targeting lists and other targeting-related products are published in
fragmentary orders. |
3-60 | 22 | Chapter 1
FIELD ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
1-75. FAIOs are assigned at FSEs from BCTs through corps, and fires cells at EAC. They are integrated
within the unit's intelligence function to facilitate target development, nomination, prioritization, and
execution. They participate in MDMP and assist with drafting the HPTL recommendation, TSS, AGM, and
assessment criteria. They are responsible for the fires and intelligence systems integration to support target
detection, execution, and assessment.
1-76. FAIOs coordinate with adjacent and higher HQs, subordinate intelligence elements military
intelligence brigade-theater (MIB-T), expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB), analysis and
control element (ACE), and military intelligence company, to develop, nominate, and prioritize targets. They
provide direction and guidance to intelligence elements on HPTL, TSS, and TSM, and assists in the
refinement of enemy order of battle (artillery and air defense focused). The FAIO assists in NAI and TAI
development and coordinates with the collection manager and organic and external intelligence organizations
to create potential targets.
1-77. The FAIO when serving in a joint role typically co-locates with the deputy directorate for targets of a
joint staff (referred to as J2T) for basic target development, intermediate target development, and advanced
target development. They assist the intelligence section with combat assessment and confirm the fires to
intelligence digital systems architecture for responsive target execution. They facilitate execution of targets
detected with current operations and participate in targeting battle rhythm events as available.
CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE OFFICER
1-78. The cyber electromagnetic warfare officer (CEWO) leads the cyberspace electromagnetic activities
(CEMA) section and works closely with the FSE, G-2, operations planning officers, and communications
operations officers to plan, prepare, and execute cyberspace and spectrum management operations to meet
the commander's objectives.
1-79. The CEWO supervises the execution of targeting tasks or activities in conjunction with the G-2 to
identify threat cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare (EW) intent, critical capabilities, requirements, and
vulnerabilities. In conjunction with the intelligence section and the FAIO, the CEWO conducts TVA of threat
critical capabilities which are enabled by cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum operations for
determining cyberspace and EW related HVT.
1-80. The CEWO develops threat objectives and use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum
operations and identifies dual-use capabilities. They nominate cyberspace and EW related HPTs, NAIs, and
TAIs, and provide information requirements to the intelligence cell for collection and analysis to assist in the
target development and selection effort. The CEWO identifies cyberspace and EW capabilities of adjacent,
joint, mission partners, and civilian organizations in the assigned AO.
1-81. The CEWO develops MOP and MOE criteria during targeting to evaluate the effectiveness of offensive
cyberspace operations and electromagnetic attack. When designated, the CEWO serves as jamming control
authority for ground or airborne electromagnetic attacks. The CEWO assists in the development of TSS,
AGM, collateral effects evaluations, and BDA for threat cyberspace and EW. In addition, the CEWO submits
requests for support to higher HQ and joint partners and participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-82. The information operations (IO) officer is responsible for integrating and synchronizing information
capabilities in support of operations. The IO officer combines all information related actions and
incorporates them into targeting objectives to achieve decision dominance in support of the
commander's objectives. The IO officer performs targeting tasks by leading the IO working group to
synchronize and deconflict information capabilities in support of targeting objectives.
1-83. The IO officer contributes to the threat and vulnerability assessment and develops IO-related HVTs.
The IO officer provides IO input to targeting guidance and objectives and deconflicts and coordinates
potential HPTs. The IO officer submits IO information requirements to the G-2 and executes attacks in
accordance with the AGM. They evaluate effects of attacks and participate in targeting battle rhythm events. |
3-60 | 23 | Foundational Guidelines
SPACE OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-84. A space operations officer is in charge of the space support element and is responsible for providing
space-related tactical support, coordination of space capabilities, and may conduct integrated joint special
technical operations (referred to as IJSTO) available to the command. The space support element performs
targeting tasks or activities by providing the targeting team with space domain awareness.
1-85. The space support element under the supervision of the space operations officer provides implications
of the Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment (referred to as D3SOE) on targeting
operations. In conjunction with the G-2 intelligence section, they identify adversary space-based and space
domain targets reliant or enabling capabilities.
1-86. In coordination with the G-2 and G-3, identifies space-based and space domain capabilities of adjacent,
joint, mission partners, and civilian organizations in the assigned AO. They conduct TVA of space-based
capabilities and space domain systems to develop potential targets. Working with the targeting officer and
FAIO they contribute to TSS, AGM, and BDA development for space-based and space domain targets. The
space operations officer participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER
1-87. The assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (referred to as the G-9) is responsible for evaluating
the civil environment during mission analysis, planning, and execution. The G-9 uses the understanding of
the interaction of the operational and mission variables to identify critical capabilities for addition to the NSL,
RTL/JTL, and potential sensitive targets. The G-9 participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-88. The psychological operations officer’s responsibilities include advising the commander and unit staff
on military information support operations. They identify potential targets such as HPTs to be influenced and
provide input to the command targeting guidance.
1-89. The psychological operations officer coordinates military information support operations focused
targeting with relevant sections such as fires, information operations, civil affairs, and the deception officer.
They conduct planning and evaluate military information support operations effectiveness with the G-2.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OFFICER
1-90. The air and missile defense officer is the senior advisor to the commander on all air and missile defense
operations and activities. The air and missile defense officer coordinates the defense of the commander's
specified critical assets against air and missile threats.
1-91. The air and missile defense officer supervises the execution of the following targeting tasks or activities
by supporting the intelligence section in the identification of integrated air defense system, HVTs, and to
determine target characteristics. They assist the FAIO and intelligence section with integrated air defense
system TSS, and BDA criteria. The air and missile defense officer nominates integrated air defense system
HPTs, and TAIs, and participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
CHIEF OF PROTECTION
1-92. The chief of protection has coordinating staff responsibilities for the chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) officer; the explosive ordnance disposal officer; the operations security officer; the
personnel recovery officer; the provost marshal; and the safety officer.
1-93. The chief of protection supervises the execution of the following targeting tasks or activities by
identifying threat CBRN effects, critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. They conduct TVA
of threat CBRN capabilities and characteristics to determine their HVTs and nominates HPTs and TAIs to
affect threat CBRN capacity.
1-94. Under the supervision of the chief of protection they contribute to TSS, AGM, and BDA development
for threat CBRN capabilities and provide updates to the NSL. They nominate targets to the RTL/JTL and |
3-60 | 24 | Chapter 1
conduct area analysis to identify potential medical and environmental hazards and threats. The chief of
protection participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
ENGINEER OFFICER
1-95. The engineer officer assists the assistant chief of plans and G-3 with planning and assessing mobility
and countermobility capability. The engineer officer identifies threat engineering critical capabilities,
requirements, and vulnerabilities. They conduct TVA of threat engineer capabilities and characteristics to
determine their HVTs.
1-96. The engineer officer nominates HPTs and TAIs to affect threat engineer capacity. They contribute to
TSS, AGM, and BDA development for threat engineering capabilities, and recommends obstacles that deny
the enemy freedom of movement across the depth of the AO. The engineer officer identifies critical
infrastructures along the main and supporting line of communication for inclusion on the RTL/JTL and
participates in targeting battle rhythm events.
LOGISTICS OFFICER
1-97. The assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) is the principal staff officer for sustainment plans and
operations, supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and operational contract support. The G-4 (in
conjunction with the G-2 and G-3) is responsible for the logistic preparation of the battlefield.
1-98. G-4 supervises the execution of targeting tasks or activities by recommending sustainment priorities.
At the theater level, the G-4 recommends controlled supply rates for critical munitions and capabilities to the
commander for approval. Subordinate G-4s determine subsequent rates at their level. In conjunction with the
chief of fires, the FSCOORD recommends the distribution of critical munitions to the commander for
approval.
1-99. The G-4 nominates key facilities and infrastructure on the main line of communications for inclusion
on the RTL. The G-4 provides updates on threat logistics, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities,
and intent. They identify threat supply/resupply routes and logistic HVTs and participate in targeting battle
rhythm events.
LIAISON OFFICERS
1-100. Liaison officers present their commander's concept of operations, targeting requirements, target
nominations, and requests for support in lieu of FSEs. Liaison officers participate in targeting battle rhythm
events. |
3-60 | 25 | Chapter 2
The Targeting Process
In large-scale combat operations, targets in all domains are arrayed across the depth
and breadth of the OE. These targets far exceed the number of resources available to
acquire and create desired effects. It is paramount that higher HQ provide adequate
guidance and must anticipate requirements subordinates may have. Targeting is a top-
down driven process with a substantial need for bottom-up refinement. This will be
applicable in any circumstance requiring lead time or insertion into supporting
planning or execution cycles. The importance of what targets to attack and with what
available capabilities must be planned and prioritized. This chapter explains how the
Army conducts targeting using the D3A methodology.
GENERAL TARGETING METHODOLOGY
2-1. The targeting process provides an effective method for matching friendly force capabilities against
enemy targets in order to achieve the commander’s desired effects to achieve the commander’s objectives.
There are two general ways to frame the D3A methodology. During planning and the MDMP, the staff uses
the methodology as a process to assist in product development and visualization. The methodology is applied
to analyze commanders’ guidance in order to determine the right targets, at the right place, at the right time.
It is used through MDMP to make these decisions and apply the required assets to create desired effects.
Further, the methodology is discussed through developing courses of action and wargaming them. It is also
applied to assessment requirements and the analysis needed to facilitate future decisions. As an integrating
process during execution, the second application enables the staff to apply the targeting products (HPTL,
TSS, AGM, intelligence collection synchronization matrix (ICSM), and TSM) to facilitate operations. The
staff is continuously making decisions, adjusting detection methods or location, and revising delivery options
based on changes to threat courses of action. D3A is a flexible, simple, repeatable four-function process and
is not designed to be time constrained or rigidly sequential. Figure 2-1 is a visual depiction of the D3A
methodology.
Figure 2-1. Decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology |
3-60 | 26 | Chapter 2
2-2. The delineation of targeting duties and responsibilities are necessary to prevent the duplication of effort
and misuse of resources. Targeting team members at echelon must understand the ground scheme of
maneuver to ensure synchronized coordination measures to facilitate attack of targets.
2-3. Targeting is cyclic and must keep up with the constantly changing OE. The tools and products
explained later in this chapter, must be updated based on combat assessment. Decisions are rarely made
without information from previous targeting cycle.
DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, ASSESS
2-4. D3A consists of four functions:
* Deciding what, when, where, and how to employ capabilities against targets.
* Detecting targets.
* Delivering appropriate capabilities to create desired effects (conducting the operation).
* Assessing the effects of engagement(s).
DECIDE
2-5. The decide function begins the targeting cycle and is applied throughout the Operations Process (Plan,
Prepare, Execute, Assess). Decisions made during planning will be evaluated and revisited during
preparation and execution, ultimately leading to effective assessments. The targeting team must be conscious
of the decisions made and adjust them during rehearsals, individual, and collective training. The endstate is
to ensure the proper capabilities are integrated and synchronized in the proper geographic locations, at the
right time to create desired effects. Following engagement, how and what assessment must be decided upon.
The application of commander’s guidance is implemented throughout the steps of MDMP and refined until
mission completion.
2-6. The outcome of success results in efficient employment of capabilities, favorable force ratios, and the
accomplishment of all assigned tasks and objectives. The following are the consequences of failure:
* Enemy prevents friendly forces from achieving tasks and objectives potentially leading to mission
failure.
* The commander is presented with unachievable solutions (capabilities are out of range).
* Resources are misused (inaccurate weaponeering or firing solution, mismanagement of
ammunition, employment of wrong capability).
* Force ratios are unfavorable (Failure to see the enemy, lack of anticipation to support
subordinates).
* Subordinate echelons improperly resourced (Task organization, information collection, delivery
capabilities).
2-7. With this information, the targeting team and appropriate staff officers can prepare their respective
running estimates. From the standpoint of targeting: the FS, intelligence, information capabilities, influence
capabilities, and operations estimates are interrelated and closely coordinated among each cell.
2-8. This function provides the overall focus and sets priorities and criteria for information collection and
engagement planning. The decide function draws heavily on the staff's knowledge of the enemy (to include
their tactics, culture, and ideology), a detailed IPB, and continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting
priorities must be addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. The targeting team works in
concert to draft targeting guidance and priorities for the commander. Once approved, the decisions made are
reflected in the following foundational products:
* HPTL.
* TSS.
* AGM.
* ICSM.
* TSM. |
3-60 | 27 | The Targeting Process
Note. For further information on these products see Appendix D.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
2-9. IPB helps the commander to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points in time
and space. IPB helps the commander and staff visualize the operating environment, how the natural
environment affects friendly units and likely enemy COAs.
2-10. IPB is a continuous staff planning activity undertaken by the entire staff. Intelligence preparation of
the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and
civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). Although the
G-2/S-2 leads the IPB, various staff sections contribute to it. IPB, sets the context for operational planning
and targeting. The process is flexible and well suited to account for lethal and nonlethal considerations (across
the physical, information, and human dimensions) during operations. IPB:
* Describes the totality of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces at that echelon.
* Accounts for all relevant domains and dimensions of the OE that may impact friendly and threat
operations.
* Identifies possible defeat mechanisms and relative advantages that friendly forces might be able
to create and exploit.
2-11. Initial IPB, which occurs during mission analysis, is important as a means to focus the staff on various
aspects of the OE specific to that unit, mission, time, and place, as well as a means to create products that are
important to subsequent planning and targeting. As planning progresses, beyond mission analysis, IPB
products are refined to support planning and targeting. Some of the more important products include the
modified combined obstacles overlay, threat models (with generic HVTs), situation templates, event
template, event matrix, and draft HVT list. See Appendix B and ATP 2-01.3 for more information.
High-Payoff Target List
2-12. The high-payoff target list is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation. The
HPTL is a key element commander’s guidance and communicates priority to the staff. Other considerations
include the following:
* The sequence or order of appearance of the system, function, or capability being targeted.
* The ability to detect, identify, classify, and track the target. (This decision must include sensor
availability and processing timeline considerations).
* The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition system(s).
* The ability to engage the target.
* The ability to create the desired effects based on attack guidance.
2-13. Targets are prioritized according to the considerations above within specific time windows. The
targeting working group recommends priorities for the targets according to its judgment and the advice of
the targeting officer and the FAIO. Target list worksheets give a recommended priority and engagement
sequence. If the target list worksheet or war gaming departs from the commander's guidance, it is noted on
the proposed HPTL to inform the commander of the conflict. The target category of the HPT is shown, either
by name or by number, on the list. The category name and number are shown on the target list worksheet.
The number of target priorities should not be excessive. Too many priorities will dilute the intelligence
collection acquisition and engagement efforts. The approved list is shared with the targeting team and staff.
It is used as a planning tool to determine attack guidance and to refine the collection plan. This list may also
indicate the commander's operational need for BDA of a specific target and the time window for collecting
and reporting it.
Note. Any format for prioritizing HPTs serves the purpose of a HPTL for linking targets with
phases of battle. |
3-60 | 28 | Chapter 2
2-14. One way to organize the HPTL is to group all HPTs into target sets that reflect the capabilities and
functions the commander has decided to engage. Target sets are identified and prioritized for each phase of
the operation. Within the sets, individual targets are ordered by target value, sequence of appearance,
importance, or other criteria that satisfy the commander's desired effects. Additionally, the HPTL may be
broken down based on individual targets within a system. Rather than listing integrated fires commands or
integrated air defense systems, a systems approach to analysis may highlight key components of those
systems. Staffs must understand the criticality of the system or system components when constructing their
HPTLs. In this way, the targeting working group reduces, modifies, and reprioritizes HVTs while ensuring
that HPTs support the concept of operations.
2-15. The commander's guidance may require changes, which should be annotated on the HPTL. The target
name or number and description are placed on the list for specific HPTs in each category. Once the
commander approves or amends the HPTL, it goes back to the targeting working group to help them develop
the AGM and collection plan. See appendix D for a sample HPTL.
Target Selection Standards
2-16. TSS are criteria applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) and used in
deciding whether the activity is a target. TSS put nominations into two categories: targets and suspected
targets. Targets meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for engagement. Suspected targets must be
confirmed before any engagement. See Appendix D for a sample TSS worksheet. Units may develop their
own worksheet format.
2-17. TSS are based on the enemy activity under consideration and available weapon systems by using the
following:
* Weapon system target location accuracy requirements such as target location error (TLE).
* Size of the enemy activity (point or area).
* Status of the activity (moving or stationary).
* Timeliness of the information.
2-18. Different TSS may exist for a given enemy activity based on different weapons system. For example,
an enemy artillery battery may have a 150-meter TLE requirement for attack by cannon artillery and a 1-
kilometer requirement for attack aircraft. TSS are developed by the FSE in conjunction with the intelligence
section. Intelligence analysis use TSS to quickly determine targets from battlefield information and pass the
targets to the FSE. Weapon system managers such as FSEs, fire control elements, or fire direction centers
use the TSS to identify targets for expeditious attack. Commands can develop standard TSS based on threat
characteristics and doctrine matched with the standard available weapon systems.
2-19. TSS worksheets are given to the intelligence officer by the FSE. The FAIO uses TSS to confirm or
verify targets that are forwarded to an FSE. Intelligence analysts evaluate the source of the information as to
its reliability and accuracy, confirm that the size and status of the activity meet the TSS, and then compare
the time of acquisition with the dwell time. Accurate information from a reliable source must be verified
before declaring it a target if the elapsed time exceeds dwell time.
Note. Dwell time is the length of time a target is doctrinally expected to remain in one location.
2-20. Some situations require intelligence assets to confirm positive identification before approval to engage
is given. HPT that meets all the criteria should be tracked until they are attacked in accordance with the AGM.
Location of targets that do not meet TSS should be confirmed before they are attacked. See appendix D for
a sample TSM.
Attack Guidance
2-21. Knowing target vulnerabilities and analyzing the probable effect an engagement will have on enemy
operations allows a staff to propose the most efficient available engagement option. Emphasis is placed on
the desired effect and commander’s guidance. During war gaming, decision points linked to events, areas of
interest, or points on the battlefield are developed. |
3-60 | 29 | The Targeting Process
2-22. The attack guidance matrix is a targeting product approved by the commander, which addresses the
how and when targets are engaged and the desired effects (FM 3-09). The AGM is a compilation of
engagement criteria in a format that can be easily understood. Attack guidance applies to both deliberate and
dynamic targets and incorporates lethal and nonlethal engagement against both target types. One AGM may
be produced for execution at any point in the operation, per targeting cycle, or by phase.
2-23. Based on commander's guidance, the targeting working group recommends how each target should be
engaged in terms of the desired effects and engagement options. Desired effects are translated into automation
system default values to engage targets more effectively.
2-24. The decision of what engagement means or system to use is made at the same time as the decision on
when to acquire and engage the target. Coordination is required when deciding to engage with two or more
means such as electromagnetic attack, information capabilities, or attack aviation. Joint Munitions
Effectiveness Manual Weaponeering Software (referred to as JWS) is the digital weaponeering tool used to
assist in attack guidance decisions.
2-25. The commander, with recommendations from the targeting working group, must approve the attack
guidance. Attack guidance may address specific or general target descriptions and is provided to weapons
systems managers via the AGM. This guidance should detail the following:
* A prioritized HPTL.
* When, how, and desired effects of engagement.
* Any special instructions.
* BDA requirements.
Attack Guidance Matrix
2-26. The AGM is a tool usually disseminated as a matrix. The AGM includes as a minimum:
* Phase or time period covered by the AGM.
* Specific HPT.
* Timing of engagement.
* How targets are engaged.
* Desired Effects.
* Remarks to include restrictions.
Note. A sample AGM is shown in appendix D.
Information Collection Synchronization Matrix
2-27. The information collection plan focuses the collection effort to answering PIRs and identifying HPTs.
To support the detection of HPTs on the battlefield, the targeting cell provides indicators and specific
information requirements (SIRs) to the collection management team for each HPT. The information
collection matrix accounts for PIRs and other intelligence requirements. The collection management team
accounts for targeting intelligence requirements, if developed, in a targeting addendum to the information
collection matrix. If the collection management team does not develop a targeting addendum, the team must
graphically account for TAIs and HPTs through other means. For example, the team could add both TAIs
and HPTs as columns to the information collection matrix or develop a supporting crosswalk of HPTs with
supporting SIRs, NAIs, TAIs, an NAI, and collection assets.
Targeting Synchronization Matrix
2-28. The TSM visually illustrates the HPTs and is designed to list specific targets with locations, in each
category. The matrix has entries to identify if a target is covered by a NAI; the specific detect, deliver, and
assess assets for each target; and engagement guidance. Once completed, the TSM serves as a basis for
updating the information collection plan and issuing a fragmentary order once the targeting working group
and targeting board concludes their sessions. In addition, the TSM facilitates the distribution of results |
3-60 | 30 | Chapter 2
produced by the targeting working group and targeting board. The TSM ensures planned activities are
coordinated and execution is feasible in time and space.
DETECT
2-29. Operations officers, at all levels, are responsible for directing the effort to detect HPTs identified in
the decide function. To identify the specific who, what, when, and how for target acquisition, operations
officers must work closely with the targeting team. The collection manager is a critical piece of this effort.
The detect function is planned during the decide function and conducted during the execution of the OPORD.
2-30. The outcome of success achieves relative advantage in all dimensions, (human, information, and
physical). It provides for positional, information, capability, and decision advantage. Successful detection
enables timely and accurate employment of capabilities. The following are outcomes and consequences of
failure to detect:
* Enemy prevents friendly forces from achieving tasks and objectives potentially leading to mission
failure.
* PIR/information requirements remain unanswered and decision points are affected.
* The enemy retains critical capabilities to achieve mission success.
* HPTs are not affected, and friendly objectives remain unaccomplished.
* May require rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP).
* Increased risk to mission and risk to force.
2-31. The effective and efficient delivery of capabilities is achieved through a comprehensive collection
plan. Detect and track targets by the maximum use of all available capabilities to create an effective layered
collection plan. A collection plan is a systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available
collection capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources to satisfy specific
information requirements (JP 2-0). The collection manager must focus the collection efforts on approved
PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements and other information requirements. The collection manager
considers the availability and capability of all collection assets. The collection manager translates PIR and
targeting intelligence requirements into indicators and specific information requirements. Dissemination of
targeting information from collection will be through pre-determined channels and in accordance with unit
SOPs.
Information Collection
2-32. The accurate and timely detection of targets is dependent upon a comprehensive collection plan and
facilitates effective and efficient employment of capabilities. The collection manager must focus the
collection efforts on approved PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements and other information requirements.
The collection manager considers the availability and capability of all collection assets. The collection
manager translates PIR and targeting intelligence requirements into indicators and specific information
requirements. Dissemination of targeting information from collection will be through pre-determined
channels and in accordance with unit SOPs.
2-33. HPTs must be detected in a timely and accurate manner, and reported in sufficient detail to enable the
commander, through various lethal and nonlethal capabilities, the ability to produce the desired effects. Clear
and concise tasks must be given to the reconnaissance units, information collection elements, weapons
locating radars or any asset that can detect a given target within the information collection plan (Annex L).
Information collection assets collect information and report back within operations and intelligence or
targeting channels. Some collection assets provide actual targets, while other assets must have their
information processed to produce valid targets. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED)
capabilities play an important role within targeting. The target priorities developed in the decide function are
used to expedite the processing of targets. As the situation changes during operations the current operations
or staff, led by the collection management team, assesses collection, and updates the collection management
plan as needed to meet new requirements. For more information see ATP 2-01.
2-34. The information collection plan focuses the collection effort to answering PIRs and identifying HPTs.
To support the detection of HPTs on the battlefield, the targeting cell provides indicators and SIRs to the |
3-60 | 31 | The Targeting Process
collection management team for each HPT. The information collection matrix accounts for PIRs and other
intelligence requirements. The collection management team accounts for targeting intelligence requirements,
if developed, in a targeting addendum to the information collection matrix. If the collection management
team does not develop a targeting addendum, the team must graphically account for TAIs and HPTs through
other means. For example, the team could add both TAIs and HPTs as columns to the information collection
matrix or develop a supporting crosswalk of HPTs with supporting SIRs, NAIs, TAIs, an active NAI, and
collection assets.
2-35. The information collection matrix and information collection synchronization matrix are products used
by the collection manager to ensure that collection tasks are tied to the scheme of maneuver in time and
space, effectively linking reconnaissance and surveillance to maneuver and effects.
2-36. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. As
a part of information collection, successfully acquiring and identifying HPTs, tracking HPTs, and conducting
BDA are often critical to the success of the mission. This effort is collection asset-, intelligence analysis-,
and support-intensive. Depending on circumstances, this effort is often controlled out of the current
operations cell in conjunction with the targeting team and intelligence section. In some situations, a unit may
choose not to conduct BDA on an HPT, but then the unit assumes an operational risk because it will not know
the effects of fire on and the status of the HPT.
Actions Within Detect
2-37. The first portion of the detect function is positive identification. This is confirming the threat entity
acquired in collection is in fact an HPT. Depending on the collection capability of this initial acquisition it
may require the cueing of another asset to confirm identification of the HPT.
2-38. Mobile HPTs present an additional requirement within the detection function. Tracking is often
required to maintain a current target location. Tracking priorities are based on the commander's concept of
the operation and targeting guidance. Target tracking requires a specific level of timeliness, accuracy, and
detail necessary to support the execution of fires. The HPT is tracked as it either moves to the TAI as planned
or as subsequent planning occurs to develop a new TAI to engage the target. In accordance with the TSS, the
FSE tells the collection manager the degree of accuracy required and dwell time for a target to be eligible for
engagement. The collection manager must match accuracy requirements to the TLE of the collection systems.
If the target type and its associated signatures (for example, electronic, visual, and thermal) are known, the
most capable collection asset can be directed against the target. The asset is positioned according to estimates
of when and where the enemy target will be located.
2-39. When an HPT is detected, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO, or designated targeting
officer, located in the intelligence cell for necessary action. These actions include validating if the target is
an HPT, and determining the target’s priority, and if the target complies with TSS. In those cases where
identification of the HPT is too uncertain, the collection manager and current operations integration cell must
cue other information collection assets to conduct further collection and the FAIO, or designated targeting
officer, must notify the intelligence cell and targeting team of the need for subsequent analysis.
2-40. As the assets collect information, it is forwarded to the intelligence analysts of the ACE. The ACE uses
the information in developing situational awareness (SA) and situational understanding and target
refinement. Continuous updates to the collection plan and ICSM are required as targets are detected. Once
an HPT is identified, it is passed from G-2 to operations.
Essential Target Information
2-41. Target recommendations are passed from the G-2 to the FSE by a number of means either digital or
analog. It is important that the essential information be passed for proper analysis and engagement to take
place. At a minimum, the target report (digital or analog) must include the following:
* Reporting agency.
* Sensor type.
* Report Date Time Group.
* Acquisition Date Time Group. |
3-60 | 32 | Chapter 2
* Target Description.
* Posture.
* Activity.
* Size of the target.
* Target location.
* TLE.
* Dwell time.
2-42. See appendix D for a sample target report.
DELIVER
2-43. Deliver is the third function in the Army targeting methodology and occurs during the execution
portion of the operations process. This function executes the target attack guidance and supports the
commanders battle plan once the HPTs have been located and positively identified. The main objective is to
create effects as planned in the decide phase and in accordance with the commander's guidance. Additional
activities include the prosecution of targets that were not selected for action in sufficient time to be included
in deliberate targeting. The selection of a capability or a combination of capabilities to meet the desired effect
requires a synchronized time of engagement dependent on the tactical situation and the technical solution for
the selected capability.
2-44. The outcome of success allows friendly forces to achieve relative advantage in the human, physical
and information dimensions. Consequences of failure are as follows:
* Tasks, Objectives, and End-states not met resulting in mission failure.
* Attrition of Friendly Forces and unfavorable force ratios.
* Increase in human and material cost.
* Loss of initiative, inability to shape/set conditions.
2-45. Targeting products developed during the decide phase of the targeting process simplify and expedite
delivery decisions during execution. A dedicated effort by the targeting team during planning enables
predictability and assists the staff in executing the commander's guidance in support of the decision support
matrix (DSM). During the initial targeting product development, when more time is available, the staff may
not have all necessary information. As operations progress, the staff will inherently gain additional
information. This will force the transfer of considerations into execution under increased time constraints and
potentially reduced asset availability. This ultimately causes the targeting team to react to operational
changes. When deviating from planned guidance (AGM, TSS), the decision maker needs to weigh the
operational risks of tactical patience balanced with the immediacy of directed action.
2-46. Unplanned or unanticipated targets always have the potential to be identified during operations.
Unforeseen variables in the operation can cause a change in commander's or attack guidance.
2-47. Dynamic targets or targets of opportunity are processed the same as planned targets. Targets of
opportunity are first evaluated to determine when, or if, they should be engaged. The decision to engage
targets of opportunity follows the engagement guidance and is based on a number of factors such as the:
* Criticality of target compared to other targets being processed for engagement.
* Activity of the target (risk to friendly forces).
* Dwell time.
2-48. If the decision is made to engage immediately, the target is processed further. The availability and
capabilities of assets to engage the target are assessed. If the target exceeds the capabilities or availability of
the unit delivery asset, the target should be sent to a higher HQ for immediate engagement. If the decision is
to defer the engagement, then continue tracking, determine decision point(s) for engagement, and modify
collection tasking as appropriate. |
3-60 | 33 | The Targeting Process
Engagement Considerations
2-49. The engagement of targets must satisfy the targeting guidance developed in the decide phase and be
integrated with the friendly scheme of maneuver. The plan for target engagement is typically developed via
the targeting working group and presented for approval in the targeting board. Target engagement requires
several decisions and actions. These considerations fall into two categories: tactical and technical.
2-50. Tactical considerations:
* Time of the engagement.
* Desired effect, degree of damage, or both.
* Capability to use for engagement.
* Potential for collateral damage.
2-51. Technical considerations:
* Number, type, and duration of effect (munition/payload/action).
* Unit/agency/organization to conduct the engagement.
Tactical Considerations
2-52. Tactical considerations include the time of engagement, desired effects, capabilities, and collateral
damage. These considerations are described in the following paragraphs.
Time of Engagement
2-53. The time of engagement is determined according to the type of target: planned target or target of
opportunity. Time of engagement is a critical consideration when synchronizing multiple capabilities to
create desired effects on the target. The targeting team must be conscious of each decision and the second
and third order of effects created.
Desired Effects
2-54. The desired effects to be created from targeting efforts are critical elements of the commander targeting
guidance. Desired effects should result in measurable and observable changes in the OE to enable assessment
for follow on actions. A complete list can be found in appendix C.
2-55. A trained observer or analyst is required to properly assess effects. It is important that each target has
a primary and alternate observer. Each observer must understand the desired effects to include when and for
how long they are required.
Capabilities
2-56. The next consideration is the selection of the appropriate delivery mechanism. For planned targets, this
decision is made during the decide function of the targeting process. A check must be made to ensure that
the selected target engagement capability is still available and can conduct the engagement. If not, the
targeting working group must determine the best delivery mechanism available to engage the target.
2-57. Weaponeering is a key part of determining the appropriate method of engagement. Weaponeering is
the process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target (JP 3-60).
Weaponeering also considers such things as enemy actions (the effects of actions and countermeasures),
munition delivery errors and accuracy, damage mechanism and criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability,
and trajectory. The commander's intent and end state, desired effects, tasks, and guidance provide the basis
for weaponeering assessment activities. Targeting personnel quantify the expected results of fires against
prioritized targets to produce desired effects. Since time constraints may preclude calculations of potential
effects against all targets, calculations should proceed in a prioritized fashion that mirrors the HPTL.
2-58. The weaponeering process, across all domains, is achieved through multiple approaches. The use of
the Joint Munition Effectiveness Manual Weaponeering Software (referred to as JWS) is the automated
system for employment of lethal munitions. Information capabilities such as Space, Cyber, special technical
operations (referred to as STO), and CEMA have structured procedures (access, placement, resources, and |
3-60 | 34 | Chapter 2
planning horizons) to take into account during weaponeering analysis. Other information capabilities such as
information, public affairs officer, civil affairs and psychological operations assess employment and
effectiveness.
Collateral Damage
2-59. Collateral damage estimation is a methodology that assists the commander in staying within the law
of armed conflict and ROE. The law of armed conflict requires:
* Reasonable precautions to ensure only legitimate military objects are targeted.
* Combatants to refrain from intentionally targeting civilian or noncombatant populations or
facilities through lethal means.
* Anticipated civilian or noncombatant injury or loss of life and damage to civilian or noncombatant
property incidental to engagements must not be excessive in relation to the expected military
advantage to be gained.
Note. See the current version of CJCSI 3160.01D for more information on No-strike and collateral
damage.
2-60. Failure to observe these obligations could result in disproportionate negative effects on civilians and
noncombatants and be considered a law of war violation. Furthermore, United States leadership and the
military could be subject to global criticism, which could adversely affect achievement of current and future
military objectives and national goals. Finally, adversaries and enemies may call attention to any U.S. and
ally missteps through propaganda to decrease legitimacy and undermine support for operations.
2-61. During targeting the staff has the responsibility to mitigate the unintended or incidental risk of damage
or injury to the civilian populace and noncombatants, structures in the immediate area, targets that are on the
NSL, RTL, livestock, the environment, civil air, and anything that could have a negative effect on military
operations. This will assist the commander in weighing risk against military necessity and in assessing
proportionality within the framework of the MDMP.
2-62. The targeting working group determines the delivery means subject to the maneuver commander's
approval. All available engagement assets should be considered when delivering an information capability
to create a nonlethal effect the targeting team must account for unintended collateral effects. This is SOP
dependent until a formal methodology is published.
2-63. The availability and capabilities of each resource is considered using the following:
* Desired effects on the target.
* Degree of risk in the use of the asset against the target.
* Impact on friendly operations.
Technical Considerations
2-64. Technical considerations include the number, type and duration of the effect, and the unit, agency, or
organization to conduct the engagement. Technical considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Number, Type, Duration of Effect
2-65. At the recommendation of the FSCOORD and targeting team the G-3 directs the appropriate asset to
engage the target once the tactical decisions have been made. This can be in an OPORD or as the tactical
situation dictates. The targeting team evaluates all available capabilities against approved targets to determine
appropriate options available for engagement and develops the best possible solution under given
circumstances. A careful analysis is necessary to employ all capabilities efficiently and effectively with the
appropriate number, type and required duration to create the desired effect. |
3-60 | 35 | The Targeting Process
Unit/Agency/Organization to Conduct the Engagement
2-66. The systems or asset managers, tasked unit, or agency determine if their system or capability can create
the desired effects. The targeting team is notified when a capability is unable to provide the desired effects.
There are various reasons a capability may not be able to create the desired effects which may include the
following:
* System, asset, capability not available at the specified time.
* Required munitions, asset, or authority not available.
* Targets out of range.
ASSESS
2-67. Assessment occurs at all levels and across the range of military operations. Staffs help the commander
by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander
timely information needed to make decisions.
2-68. During the planning and preparation for operations, the targeting team must take all aspects of
assessment into consideration. Assessments are difficult and time consuming. They require dedicated
personnel and resources and must be included in the collection plan and synchronized through the collection
and targeting working group. The staff must prioritize the use of collection assets and consider the risk of
tasking assets for assessment versus other requirements. For further information on assessment see FM 5-0.
2-69. The outcome of success is effective targeting, efficient use of resources, and lower risk to mission and
force. The following are consequence of failure to assess:
* Tasks, Objectives, and End-states not met resulting in mission failure.
* PIR/information requirements remain unanswered and decision points are affected.
* The enemy retains critical capabilities to achieve mission success.
* Inaccurate understanding of the operational situation.
* Inability to capture Munitions effectiveness or make reattack recommendations.
* Inability to measure effectiveness of target engagement.
2-70. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during
military operations (JP 3-60). Combat assessment is composed of three elements:
* BDA.
* Munitions effectiveness assessment.
* Reattack recommendation.
2-71. In combination, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment inform the commander of effects
against targets and target sets. Based on this information, the enemies' ability to make and sustain war and
centers of gravity are continuously estimated. During the review of the effectiveness of operations, reattack
recommendations are proposed or executed.
Battle Damage Assessment
2-72. BDA includes known or estimated enemy unit strengths, degraded, neutralized, or destroyed enemy
weapon systems, and all known captured, wounded, or killed enemy personnel during the reporting period.
BDA in targeting pertains to the results of lethal and nonlethal engagements on targets designated by the
commander. Producing BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility but requires coordination with
operational elements to be effective. BDA requirements may be translated into PIR. BDA accomplishes the
following purposes:
* Commanders use BDA to get a series of timely and accurate snapshots of effects on the enemy.
Assessment provides commanders an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness, capabilities,
and intentions. This helps the staff determine when, or if, their targeting effort is accomplishing
their objectives.
* As part of targeting, BDA helps to determine if a reengagement is necessary. The information is
used to allocate or redirect weapon systems to make the best use of available combat power. |
3-60 | 36 | Chapter 2
2-73. The need for BDA for specific HPTs is determined during the decide function. BDA requirements
should be recorded on the AGM and the information collection plan. The commander's decision must be
made with the understanding that an asset used for BDA may not be available for target development or
target acquisition. BDA information is received and processed by the ACE, and the results of engagement
are analyzed in terms of desired effects. The results are disseminated to the targeting working group. The
targeting working group must keep the following BDA principles in mind:
* BDA must measure things that are important to commanders.
* BDA must be objective. The intelligence officer should verify BDA received from another echelon
if time permits. Intelligence officers strive to identify and resolve discrepancies between the BDA
results at different HQ at all echelons.
* The degree of reliability and credibility of the assessment relies largely upon collection resources.
The quantity and quality of collection assets influence whether the assessment is highly reliable
(concrete, quantifiable, and precise) or has low reliability (best guess). The collection manager
plans and coordinates organic and nonorganic collection assets to obtain the most reliable
information when conducting BDA for each HPT.
2-74. BDA has three components. They are:
* Physical damage assessment.
* Functional damage assessment.
* Target system assessment.
Physical Damage Assessment
2-75. Physical damage assessment estimates the quantitative extent of physical damage through munitions
blast, fragmentation, and fire damage effects to a target. This assessment is based on observed or interpreted
damage.
Functional Damage Assessment
2-76. Functional damage assessment estimates the effect of engagement on the target to perform its intended
mission compared to the mission objective established against the target. This assessment is inferred based
on all-source intelligence and includes an estimate of the time needed to replace the target function. A
functional damage assessment is a temporary assessment (compared to target system assessment) used for
specific missions.
Target System Assessment
2-77. Target system assessment is a broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of all types of
engagement against an entire target system capability, for example, enemy air defense artillery systems. It
may also be applied against enemy unit combat effectiveness. A target system assessment may also look at
subdivisions of the system compared to the commander's stated mission objectives. The target system
assessment is a relatively permanent assessment (compared to a functional damage assessment) that will be
used for more than one mission.
2-78. BDA may take different forms besides the determination of the number of casualties, or the amount of
equipment destroyed. Other information of use to the targeting working group includes, but not limited to,
the following:
* Whether the targets are moving or hardening in response to the engagement.
* Changes in enemy behavior and techniques.
* Increased communication efforts as the result of jamming.
* Whether the damage resulting from an engagement is affecting the enemy's combat effectiveness
as expected.
2-79. BDA results may change plans and earlier decisions. The targeting working group must periodically
update the targeting decisions and products made during the decide function. |
3-60 | 37 | The Targeting Process
Munitions Effectiveness Assessment
2-80. The operations officer, in coordination with the FSE and targeting working group, conducts munitions
effectiveness assessment concurrently and interactively with BDA, as a function of combat assessment.
Munitions effectiveness assessment is an assessment of the military force in terms of the weapon system and
munitions effectiveness. Munitions effectiveness assessment is conducted using approved weaponeering
software and provides the basis for recommendations to increase the effectiveness of:
* Methodology.
* Tactics.
* Weapon systems.
* Munitions.
* Weapon delivery parameters.
2-81. The targeting working group may recommend modifying commander's guidance concerning:
* Unit basic load.
* Required supply rate.
* Controlled supply rate.
Reattack Recommendation
2-82. Failure to achieve BDA, or failure to create necessary effects as a result of BDA, requires a decision
from the commander. The targeting team and current operations must assess operational risks associated with
the HPT and provide options to mitigate the risks. Based on the BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment,
the intelligence officer in conjunction with the FSCOORD or deputy FSCOORD and operations officer
consider the level to which objectives have been achieved and make recommendations to the commander.
Reattack and other recommendations should address objectives relative to:
* Targets.
* Target critical elements.
* Target systems.
* Enemy combat force strengths.
* Friendly maneuver.
Battle Damage Assessment and Operational Assessment
2-83. Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progress of operations and compare them to their
initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are
met and the military end state is achieved. Figure 2-2 provides an example of an operational assessment.
2-84. Operational Assessment is normally performed only at echelons above brigade. At the echelons above
brigade this is typically achieved through the assessments working group. The assessment working group is
led by the plans or operations staff officers with participation from the entire staff. The key output of the
assessment working group is the consolidated assessment of effects created during the assessed targeting
cycle and assessed progress toward operational objectives. An example assessment working group agenda
can be found in Appendix E Battle Rhythm Products. For more information on assessments working groups
see FM 6-0 or ATP 5-0.3. At brigade and BN levels, commanders and their staffs normally execute tactical
assessment. Tactical assessment is primarily concerned with the unit’s success or failure to set conditions for
the close fight, focused on assessing:
* The unit’s success in detecting their HPTs.
* The unit’s success in attacking those HPTs as planned (lethally or nonlethally).
* The unit’s success in producing the desired effects against HPTs, the enemy or on the OE more
broadly. |
3-60 | 38 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-2. Example operational assessment
2-85. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous
aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed
for decisions. The commander's critical information requirement is linked to the assessment process by the |
3-60 | 39 | The Targeting Process
commander's need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. Planning for the
assessment process identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely
monitoring, and where the commander wants to make decisions.
METHODOLOGY TOOLS
2-86. Understanding the D3A methodology itself is quite simple but the creative thinking and
synchronization of resources required to be successful during operations takes repetition and experience.
Tools are available to assist the targeting team with effective and efficient execution. A targeting checklist
covering the D3A methodology can be found in Appendix A and the diagram below. Figure 2-3 provides a
visual example of assets and desired effects that can be used during each function of the methodology.
Figure 2-3. Decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology and assets |
3-60 | 41 | Chapter 3
Brigade Targeting
Targeting at the tactical level is largely defined by the capability and capacity of
personnel and equipment. The sheer numbers of personnel at the brigade are far less
than that of a corps or Theater Army. The staff and targeting team must assess
capability and requirements to determine the feasibility and level of detail when
applying the D3A methodology. The brigade is realistically the first echelon where a
formal process will be conducted. The application of the methodology will be very
similar at echelon; however, processes and procedures may be abbreviated. Targeting
decisions at a higher HQ affect targeting decisions at subordinate HQ. The brigade staff
may use the targeting products of the division or produce their own, depending on time
and personnel available, to coordinate and integrate targeting actions. The brigade will
focus on synchronizing assets to meet the commander's objectives within their assigned
AO and submit requests for support or target nominations to division for effects they
are unable to create with task organized capability or organic assets and enablers.
Targeting at these echelons is typically more focused on specific threat systems,
equipment, or individuals than on larger threat capabilities or functions such as
integrated air defense systems, integrated fires commands, or logistics.
SECTION I - OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
3-1. The understanding of the operational framework allows commanders and staff the ability to
geospatially, as well as temporally understand their assigned area of responsibility. Furthermore, it provides
them the understanding to define the rear, close, and deep fight of the organization. Additionally, it provides
an appreciation for the depth and breadth of their assigned AO across the multi-domain battlefield to include
the electromagnetic spectrum, and information dimension. It ensures the correct orientation of forces while
constantly assessing the adversary’s ability to contest friendly forces across all domains. True understanding
of the operational framework better allows the commander to make informed targeting decisions that quickly
creates windows of opportunity and convergence of effects.
3-2. Although BNs rarely, independently conduct organizational targeting, they play a valuable role in the
tactical success of the brigade. The brigade applies the organizational targeting process to synchronize effects
and to strike the enemy rapidly at decisive points to set favorable force ratios and enable conditions for
continuous consolidation of gains. To accomplish this, the brigade leverages the operational framework to
focus fires and effects ahead of friendly forces probable line of contact.
3-3. The operational framework extends from the brigade to theater army level in a single avenue in depth.
Once identified, the brigade delineates a rear, close, and deep area to describe the physical arrangement of
friendly forces in time, space, and purpose. This provides focus to the brigade targeting team and requires
the commander and staff to examine the capabilities and operational reach of its forces and assigned enablers.
Once applied, the brigade develops, as well as applies measures that favor the employment, timeliness, and
synchronization of effects. Organizations apply the capabilities and limitations of its assigned sensors and
weapon systems to inform placement. This is useful when articulating requirements to higher HQ or requests
for assistance.
3-4. Figure 3-1 contains the brigade operational framework, which highlights the targeting effort at the
brigade level and shades other echelon's AOs denoting they are outside of the brigade’s responsibility.
Despite being outside the brigade’s responsibility, it is within their area of interest and brigade targeting
teams should be conscious of activities in the areas that may impact their AO. |
3-60 | 42 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-1. Brigade operational framework |
3-60 | 43 | Brigade Targeting
SECTION II - FUNCTIONS
3-5. As described in section I, brigades may build off the division's targeting products to ensure integration
with higher HQ plan and to save time. This does not preclude the brigade staff from inherent targeting
functions to meet its own commander's intent. These functions and products are explained in detail in the
corresponding appendices.
* Develop the HPTL.
* Develop the AGM.
* Establish TSS.
* Develop and synchronize the information collection plan with targeting efforts.
* Develop TSM
* Nominate targets to higher HQ.
* Synchronize desired effects with scheme of maneuver.
* Integrate and synchronize all elements of the targeting team (targeting battle rhythm).
* Receive and evaluate BDA.
SECTION III - PLANNING
TARGETING AND MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
3-6. The D3A methodology is an integral part of the MDMP. Targeting is inherently a planning function.
Targeting begins with receipt of mission and continues through OPORD execution and assessment activities.
The fast-paced, ever-changing nature of the battlefield at the brigade level presents challenges to the targeting
process that the targeting team must consider:
* Brigade operational timing and tempo (when and where targets will be acquired).
* The brigade has limited organic assets with which to detect and must leverage the all-weather,
ground reconnaissance of the assigned cavalry squadron to detect and deliver against targets in the
brigade deep fight.
* Targets are generally highly mobile.
* Planning time is limited, and planners are often also executers.
* Planning is primarily focused on future operations out to 24-48 hours.
3-7. Integrating and synchronizing planning, execution and assessment is pivotal to the success of
targeting. The targeting team must participate in all steps of MDMP. Understanding the objectives, intentions,
capabilities, and limitations of all actors within the OE enables the maximum use of all available means to
create desired effects and accomplish the mission.
3-8. As the MDMP is conducted, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander's guidance and
intent. Table 3-1 illustrates the relationship between the D3A methodology and the MDMP along with
products generated during targeting. |
3-60 | 44 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. Targeting/military decision-making process crosswalk
MDMP Steps Inputs Outputs Notes
1.Receipt of Mission Gather the Tools: Set up Analog Map
Gather targeting products and resources
Establish mission command information system
2.Mission Analysis Enemy order of battle HVTL Assets Available 1.
Enemy COA/ Objectives/decision Request for forces
points Begin FST/HPTL (Task/Purpose) formulation
Air Operations Products: Special Formulate Targeting Guidance and Targeting
instructions, Joint Air Operations Objectives
Plan, Air Operations Directive
Initial information Collection Plan
3.COA Development Assets Available Refined Targeting Guidance 2.
Initial HPTL Weapon- Target Pairing 3.
Initial FSTs (Task/Purpose) Desired Effects on HPTs 4.
Initial Targeting Guidance Weaponeering Solution
Initial HPTL-TSS-AGM-TSM
Initial Air Support Requests for shaping
Friendly COAs
4.COA Analysis Initial TSM-HPTL-TSS-AGM Refined TSM-HPTL-TSS-AGM 4.
Corps/Division/BDE Target Type Corps/Division/BDE Target Type Delineation
Delineation
5.COA Comparison Targeting Products Refine Targeting Products
Begin Target Working Group
6.COA Approval Targeting Products Refine Targeting Products
Continue Target Working Groups Complete Target Coordination Boards
7.Orders Production Approved TSM-HPTL-TSS-AGM Appendix 3 to Annex D (Targeting Products)
Notes:
1.The FSTs are enemy focused and include the entity and a change metric from a baseline. The purpose is friendly
focused and will reflect the supported maneuver tasks.
2.FSCOORD guidance may include desired firing elements (PLT/BTRY/BN) depending on the target sets. This will shape
the weaponeering solutions, such as positioning guidance.
3.Weaponeering analysts, in conjunction with the Fire Direction Officer/Fire Control Officer, typically develop weaponeering
solutions for surface-to-surface targets.
4.To facilitate war gaming and rehearsal, use scheduled/on-call targets planned during COA Development.
AGM – attack guidance matrix, BDE – brigade, BN-battalion, BTRY-battery, COA – courses of action, FSCOORD- fire
support coordinator, FST – fire support task, HPTL – high-payoff target list, HVTL – high-value target list, PLT-platoon, TSM
–targeting synchronization matrix, TSS – target selection standards
3-9. Upon completion of orders production, rehearsals are critical for success on the battlefield. Planning
time must be allocated for technical and tactical rehearsals. Rehearsals clarify the fire plan for observers,
sensor operators, attack system managers, and the maneuver units they support. Rehearsals ultimately
facilitate the synchronization of FS with maneuver.
SECTION IV - BATTLE RHYTHM SYNCHRONIZATION
3-10. The battle rhythm is the key to synchronizing the warfighting functions in support of the scheme of
maneuver. Battle rhythm events aid the staff in coordinating the critical targeting functions required to
achieve the commander's guidance. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space,
and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place (JP 2-0).
3-11. Battle rhythm provides structure and sequencing of actions and events within the HQ regulated by the
flow and sharing of information supporting all decision cycles. It is a cycle of command and staff activities
intended to synchronize current and future operations. Battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings,
briefings, working groups, boards, and other activities logically arranged to support cross-functional team |
3-60 | 45 | Brigade Targeting
events, higher HQ, and the commander's decision-making cycle. The essential functions for a battle rhythm
include, but are not limited to, the following:
* Provide a routine for staff interaction and coordination within the HQ.
* Provide a routine for the commander and staff interaction.
* Synchronize staff organizations' activities.
* Facilitate the staff's shared understanding, planning, and commander's decision making the staff's
shared understanding, planning, and commander's decision making.
BATTLE RHYTHM EVENTS
3-12. Targeting working group and targeting coordination board are the key sessions that must be effectively
integrated into the brigade battle rhythm and nested within the higher HQ targeting cycle to ensure that
targeting focuses, rather than disrupts operations. There needs to be an adequate balance and sufficient time
allocated between the targeting working group and the targeting coordination board. This includes time to
conduct the meetings, as well as implement guidance, develop or adjust products, and conduct staff
coordination. Thus, sufficient time is also required for supporting working groups (IO, intelligence, CEMA)
to produce their inputs to the targeting working group. Task organization changes, modifications to the
information collection plan, target nominations that exceed organic capabilities, air support requests, unit
airspace plan, HPTL changes, and information related tasks all must be made with full awareness of time
available to prepare and execute. This is a continuous process for the working group throughout operations.
3-13. The timing of targeting working group sessions is critical. While the time-focus for brigade level
sessions of the targeting working group is normally 24 to 48 hours out, the brigade employment of assets and
certain targeting decisions, such as target nominations and air support requests, must be planned in advance
and in conjunction with the division, corps, theater Army, and the joint air tasking cycle. However,
commanders must choose a targeting cycle based on the pace of operations. These cycles may be 6-12 hours
apart if required. The brigade fire support officer (FSO) also schedules internal FSE targeting huddles so FS,
information operations, and EW activities related to target nominations arrive within the BCT and higher
echelon target nomination windows.
3-14. The number and frequency of targeting working group meetings varies based on the battle rhythm,
operating tempo, or the commander's guidance. A preliminary working group facilitated by the FSE ensures
the effects of fires meet the brigade commander's guidance and intent. The brigade FSO, FSE planners, and
targeting team assess ongoing targeting efforts, and ensure air support requests with target nominations are
processed through higher HQ to meet division, corps, theater Army, and JTF targeting timelines. The
targeting coordination board is generally more formal and is focused on updating the commander, gaining
new guidance, and obtaining approval of the collection plan and associated targeting actions. Targeting
working group and coordination board sessions should be the minimum length required to present targeting
information, situation updates, provide recommendations, and obtain decisions.
TARGETING WORKING GROUP
3-15. The targeting working group is a selection of predetermined staff representatives involved with
targeting who meet to provide analysis, coordination, warfighting function updates, and running estimates to
synchronize the targeting efforts and generate options presented to the commander at the targeting
coordination board. The targeting working group has a set structure and agenda but is not a briefing. It is a
discussion, organized by topic, with all participants involved in that discussion and all providing input.
3-16. Assembling the targeting working group brings various members of the brigade staff together to
synchronize the targeting process and obtain approval for any changes to the targeting products. The targeting
working group focuses and synchronizes the brigade's combat power and resources toward targeting and
engaging HPTs. The targeting working group usually includes:
* Brigade FSO (Chairs or is the officer in charge of the working group).
* Brigade operations officer.
* Brigade intelligence officer.
* Targeting officers. |
3-60 | 46 | Chapter 3
* Air defense, airspace management, and brigade aviation element representative.
* Combat aviation brigade FSO/targeting officer.
* Brigade judge advocate.
* Field artillery BN operations and intelligence representatives.
* FSE representatives or liaison officers from the maneuver BNs, the reconnaissance squadron, and
the task organized engineer unit (if available).
* ALO or tactical air control party representative.
* EW Officer or EW representative.
* CEMA representative.
* Civil affair officer.
3-17. Additional staff personnel may provide relevant information and recommendations to the commander,
operations officer, or FSO as necessary.
TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD
3-18. A board is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives with delegated decision authority for a
particular purpose or function (FM 6-0). The targeting coordination board is a temporary grouping of selected
staff representatives with delegated decision authority to provide targeting decision recommendations for
command approval. When the process or activity being synchronized requires command approval, a board is
the appropriate forum. The targeting coordination board usually includes:
* Brigade Commander (chairs the board)
* Brigade executive officer (often delegated to chair the board).
* Brigade operations officer.
* Brigade intelligence officer.
* FSCOORD.
* Brigade FSO.
* Targeting officers. (leads/facilitates the board).
* Air defense, airspace management, and brigade aviation element representative.
* Combat Aviation Brigade FSO/Targeting Officer
* Counterfire Officer
* Brigade Judge Advocate
* Field artillery BN operations and intelligence representatives.
* FSE representatives or liaison officers from the maneuver BNs, the reconnaissance squadron, and
the task organized engineer unit (if available).
* ALO or tactical air control party representative.
* EW Officer or EW representative.
* CEMA representative.
* Civil affair officer.
3-19. Additional staff personnel may be present and provide relevant information and recommendations to
the commander, S3, FSCOORD, or FSO as necessary. See appendix E for example targeting working group
and targeting coordination board formats.
BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
3-20. The FSE is the centerpiece of the brigade and BN targeting architecture and must be focused on both
lethal and nonlethal effects. Primary targeting functions of the FSE includes the following:
* Working with the information officer, civil affairs officer, public affairs officer, and brigade judge
advocate to integrate appropriate aspects of information related capabilities into brigade targeting.
* Providing information to the operations officer for coordinating the tasking of sensors during
development of the information collection plan with the brigade intelligence officer, the military
intelligence company commander (as needed), and the reconnaissance squadron to acquire targets. |
3-60 | 47 | Brigade Targeting
* Managing brigade targeting and facilitating the coordination board.
* Coordinating clearance for attacks against targets (clearance of fires).
* Coordinating assessment.
3-21. The lethal and nonlethal effects elements prepare recommendations for the brigade targeting working
group sessions and implement the resulting decisions. Leveraging the reconnaissance and surveillance assets
available to the main command post, the elements plan and synchronize the fires and nonlethal effects of
brigade operations.
BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
3-22. The FS organizations in the maneuver BNs and the reconnaissance squadron support their respective
commanders but work closely with the brigade FSE. Lacking the capacity to conduct an independent
targeting cycle, BNs must integrate and synchronize efforts with the brigade targeting team.
3-23. The maneuver BNs and the reconnaissance squadron are each supported by a FSE, and each may have
an Air Force tactical air control party. The FS teams participate in targeting by nominating and refining
targets. For more information of FS teams see ATP 3-09.30 and FM 3-09.
BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
3-24. Intelligence support to the BCT is provided by the organic intelligence cell and military intelligence
company. The intelligence cell, augmented with components from the military intelligence company,
provides timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support
(to include target development, target detection, and combat assessment) to the BCT commander, staff, and
subordinate units. Most intelligence personnel in a BCT are assigned to the military intelligence company
but work under the direction of the brigade S-2 during operations. The BCT military intelligence company
comprises a brigade intelligence support element, an information collection platoon, an Air Force staff
weather officer, an EW platoon, and a tactical unmanned aircraft systems (TUAS) platoon. The military
intelligence company commander provides command, control, and coordination of the TUAS platoon and
the EW platoon, which integrates signals intelligence (SIGINT) and EW capabilities and target threat
electronic capabilities to support the friendly scheme of maneuver.
3-25. The brigade intelligence support element conducts analysis, target development, and proposes HVTs.
The element supports development of the brigade level collection plan in support of targeting efforts,
integrates the intelligence architecture to support targeting priorities, and assists the BCT S-2 with
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization and collection management tasks.
3-26. The Information Collection Platoon conducts multiple discipline intelligence collection: SIGINT
collection in support of EW and targeting, human intelligence (HUMINT) collection in support of detainee
operations and technical control of HUMINT (Operations Management Team) and SIGINT/EW (Technical
Control and Analysis Cell). The Technical Control and Analysis Cell creates target intelligence folders for
SIGINT collection missions and recommends targets for action to the commander. The cell's SIGINT
collection teams provide SIGINT collection, exploitation, and limited analysis to detect, track, and locate
targets.
3-27. The EW platoon supports information collection efforts, survey of the electromagnetic spectrum,
integration, and multisource analysis by providing warnings and indications, radio frequency direction
finding and geolocation of threat emissions. The EW Platoon's electronic support tasks include
electromagnetic reconnaissance, threat warning, and direction finding.
3-28. The TUAS platoon conducts maintenance and flight operations to ensure availability of the brigades
deepest looking organic collection asset. Flight operations require coordination with both the brigade
aviation element for friendly airspace considerations, and the brigade intelligence support element for enemy
threats to their systems and development of a flight plan in support of their collection tasks. The TUAS
platoon also provides initial tactical identification of enemy vehicles in support of targeting.
3-29. The staff weather officer is responsible for the weather forecast to include light weather data for the
next three to four targeting cycles and its impacts to both friendly and enemy operations. |
3-60 | 49 | Chapter 4
Division and Corps Targeting
The key to successful targeting at the corps and division is three-fold. First is
understanding the support needed by the subordinate echelons and shaping efforts
required to enable their operational success. Second is understanding division and
corps schemes of maneuver, time, and assets available and third is understanding the
planning horizons associated with requests for support and target nominations for
external capabilities. Corps and divisions must operate in all domains. Targeting at
these levels require the integration and synchronization of many more organizations,
elements, and capabilities to create the desired effects within a joint environment.
Organizations and elements such as the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC),
FAB, and E-MIBs are key components at these echelons. Organically, corps and
divisions have separate, subordinate elements to provide unique capabilities to support
the achievement of the commander’s objectives but must establish relationships with
necessary external joint interagency multinational (referred to as JIM) partners to be
truly effective and successful.
Targeting at this echelon is complicated by expanding roles and a greater operational
reach. This is also the first echelon where delineation of the D3A methodology and the
Joint Targeting Cycle must occur. It is critical for division and corps targeting teams to
definitively understand their task organization and the capabilities organic to their
respective formations.
SECTION I – OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
4-1. The AO inherently expands at the corps and division levels. Understanding that corps control multiple
divisions and divisions control multiple brigades is critical to understanding the size, scope, and scale of the
corps and division AO. It is essential for corps and division targeting teams to understand the assigned
boundaries from front to rear and left to right. Working in concert, the two organizations establish an
operational framework that is advantageous to friendly forces and enables mission accomplishment. The
established boundaries define the space in which each echelon is responsible for achieving the Commanders
objectives and setting conditions for subordinate echelons to be successful.
4-2. Targeting at the corps and division is primarily conducted at the tactical level of war. It involves
commanders and staffs using the D3A methodology in support of tactical operations within the roles of a
senior Army forces (ARFOR) HQ or Army tactical formation. A corps and division commander might also
command a joint force land component or a JTF. The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or
JTF commander will execute the joint targeting cycle.
4-3. Corps and division staffs must have a thorough understanding of the joint targeting cycle and the
associated planning horizons and execution timelines. Corps and divisions, depending on roles will be tasked
to integrate and perform the targeting functions of an operational HQ. Ensuring the corps and divisions staffs
are adequately manned, trained and equipped to execute joint targeting cycle tasks and request joint assets
when necessary is critical to mission success. Failure of the corps and division to synchronize capabilities
and shape for their subordinate echelons will ultimately result in failing to create desired effects and achieving
commander's objectives. Figure 4-1 on page 4-2 illustrates the operational framework
demonstrating targeting responsibilities at the corps and division. |
3-60 | 50 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-1. Corps and division operational framework |
3-60 | 51 | Division and Corps Targeting
SECTION II – FUNCTIONS
4-4. Targeting functions at the corps and division expand when compared to the brigade and BN. The
targeting team must consider the Joint requirements when functioning as a JTF or JFLCC to include systems,
software, credentials, and authorities. Training and rehearsing the increased targeting functions will enable
the corps or division to seamlessly transition between roles. The below lists highlights functions required by
the corps and division:
* Develop the HPTL.
* Develop the AGM.
* Establish TSS.
* Develop and synchronize the information collection plan with targeting efforts.
* Develop TSM.
* Nominate targets to higher HQ.
* Attend higher HQs battle rhythm events.
* Synchronize desired effects with scheme of maneuver.
* Integrate and synchronize all elements of the targeting team (targeting battle rhythm).
* Synchronize joint interagency multinational assets and organizations.
* TST nomination, management, and execution.
* Conduct Joint target development (See current version CJCSI 3370.01D).
* Conduct target list management (JFLCC or JTF).
* Conduct operational and combat assessment.
SECTION III – PLANNING
4-5. Targeting remains a critical integrating function within the operations process and will be applied
through all phases of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the operation. It will exist as part of the
MDMP but will also be applied to changes in plans during execution.
TARGETING AND THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS
4-6. The expanded, multidomain nature of the OE at corps and division levels presents additional challenges
in scale and scope to the targeting process that the targeting team must consider:
* Corps and division operational timing and tempo (when and where targets will be acquired).
* Planning horizons and execution timelines of joint capabilities.
* Capability to detect far more targets than they can engage with organic assets.
* Target taxonomy and target systems.
* Theater battle rhythm events and timelines.
* Anticipate needs and support requests from subordinates.
* Operational framework (rear, close, and deep area).
4-7. Corps information capabilities planning horizons and ability to gain placement and access often
require more than a typical 24-to-96-hour period to properly plan and execute engagements.
4-8. Integrating and synchronizing is more than just MDMP. The targeting team must also consider joint
planning methods, such as the joint planning process (JPP), joint targeting cycle, joint air tasking cycle, joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and unit airspace planning. Understanding the
objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all actors within the OE enables the maximum use of
all available means to create desired effects and accomplish the mission.
4-9. The targeting team must consider the role (JTF, LCC), ARFOR, Tactical HQ) in which they are
operating to determine the appropriate planning process, products, and procedures required. Operating as an
ARFOR or Tactical HQ, planning and targeting methods remain the same as described in Chapter 3 (reference
Fig 3-2 on page 3-5 for targeting and MDMP integration crosswalk). However, in the case of a corps or |
3-60 | 52 | Chapter 4
division serving in a role as a JTF or LCC, joint publications such as JP 3-0, JP 3-60, and JP 5-0 will dictate
these processes, products, and procedures.
4-10. Upon completion of orders production, rehearsals are critical for success in the OE. Planning time must
be allocated for technical and tactical rehearsals. Rehearsals clarify the concept of targeting for observers,
sensor operators, attack system managers, collection managers and the maneuver units they support.
Rehearsals assist in identifying gaps and unfeasible options.
SECTION IV – SYNCHRONIZATION
4-11. The battle rhythm events at division and corps (primary synchronization mechanism) become
progressively complex due to the increase in organizations, agencies, and enablers contributing to the
targeting effort. The additional roles performed at these echelons place a greater demand on synchronizing
internal and external elements in support of operations. In addition to a greater number of contributors,
coordinating the parallel and supporting bureaus, boards, centers, cells, and working groups (referred to as
B2C2WGs) within the staff must be emphasized to ensure integration and maximize the joint targeting
working group and joint targeting coordination board.
BATTLE RHYTHM EVENTS
4-12. Divisions and corps operating as a combined/JTF or combined/JFLCC are expected to conduct the
joint targeting cycle and perform all associated joint targeting tasks in accordance with JP 3-60 and applicable
CJCSIs. In the event a division or corps is tasked as the ARFOR or tactical HQ, the targeting team must be
prepared to participate in the joint targeting process of the higher HQ to submit target nominations for joint
capabilities. All effects that cannot be created by organic capability must be requested through predetermined
channels. Higher HQ typically prescribe the methods for support requests and target nominations. In addition
to participating in the higher HQ processes, divisions and corps will conduct joint targeting working groups
(referred to as JTWGs) and joint targeting coordination boards (referred to as JTCBs) at their level for echelon
specific synchronization and integration. Working group and board facilitators must be conscious of role,
targeting tasks, and command and support relationships to include all necessary participants. Units must train
and develop B2C2WGs to enable distributed execution if the tactical environment dictates smaller command
posts.
JOINT/ TARGETING WORKING GROUP
4-13. The targeting working group participants could vary widely at the division and corps. When operating
as the ARFOR or a tactical HQ, attendees will be very similar to those at the brigade targeting working group.
In addition to organic staff sections, below is a list of members to consider when building the working group
at this level:
* BCD/Air Operations Center.
* Air Operations Center.
* Higher HQ.
* Corps/division intelligence targeting officer.
* Corp/division and lower-echelon collection management, ACEs, and PED elements.
* Military intelligence company unit commander, staff, and technical control elements in the unit.
* Coalition mission partners and unified action partners as applicable.
* Components (JFLCC, joint force air component commander, joint force maritime component
commander.
* Special operations joint task force (referred to as SOJTF).
* Any relevant intelligence community members (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State).
* United States Space Command (referred to as USSPACECOM) or designated representative.
* United States Cyber Command (referred to as USCYBERCOM) or designated representative.
* Combat Aviation Brigade. |
3-60 | 53 | Division and Corps Targeting
* Subordinate unit liaison officers (division, BCT, FAB, MEB).
JOINT/ TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD
4-14. The joint targeting coordination board provides a forum for the commander to make decisions and
provide guidance. This forum allows components, organizations, agencies, and staff sections to articulate
strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure they are synchronized and integrated. The joint
targeting coordination board normally facilitates and coordinates targeting activities with the schemes of
maneuver to ensure that the commander's priorities are met. Specific targeting issues are resolved by direct
coordination between elements below the level of the joint targeting coordination board. The joint targeting
coordination board is the primary forum to enable the commander to make targeting decisions and provide
guidance.
* Attendees of the board are often mission dependent. The number can fluctuate depending on
echelon, physical location, and agenda.
* Additional staff personnel may be present and provide relevant information and recommendations
to the commander, chief of staff, G-3, or FSCOORD as necessary.
* See appendix E for example targeting working group and targeting coordination board formats.
DIVISION AND CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT
4-15. The primary action agency for targeting at the division and corps is the FSE. The FSE leads targeting
activities which include coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing capabilities to create desired effects.
The FSE serves as the staff conduit between planning and execution.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE
4-16. Serving as the force field artillery HQ and/or the counterfire HQ the FAB plays a critical role in the
corps targeting process. The FAB assists and facilitates the targeting process for higher or supported
command by planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and deconflicting the employment of
suppression of enemy air defenses and deep shaping fires utilizing multiple launch rocket system or high
mobility artillery rocket system BNs in support of multi domain operations (MDO). In most cases, the FAB
commander serves as the corps FSCOORD.
4-17. The duties and responsibilities between the corps staff and the FAB personnel must be clearly defined.
Collective effort between the corps and FAB staff is required for successful targeting efforts. There is
typically a level of augmentation that occurs within the corps FSE by the FAB staff to meet all manning
requirements in support of targeting efforts. FABs lack the capacity to conduct an independent targeting cycle
and should integrate and synchronize efforts with the corps targeting team.
DIVISION ARTILLERY
4-18. Serving as the force field artillery HQ and/or counterfire HQ the DIVARTY plays a critical role in the
division targeting process. The DIVARTY commander serves as the division FSCOORD. Collective effort
between the division and DIVARTY staff is required for successful targeting efforts.
4-19. There is typically a level of augmentation that occurs within the division FSE by the DIVARTY staff
to meet all manning requirements in support of targeting efforts. DIVARTYs lack the capacity to conduct an
independent targeting cycle and should integrate and synchronize efforts with the division targeting team.
JOINT AIR–GROUND INTEGRATION CENTER
4-20. The JAGIC provides commanders a technique to coordinate, integrate, and control operations in
division-assigned airspace and efficiently collaborate requirements with external airspace elements outside
of the division area. The JAGIC plays a critical role in the execution of current targeting cycles. Close
coordination between the JAGIC and FSE is imperative to ensure effective transitions occur from planning
to operations. See ATP 3-91.1 for more information on JAGIC operations. |
3-60 | 54 | Chapter 4
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AT CORPS AND DIVISION
4-21. Corps and division intelligence capabilities provide rapid detection, identification, and dissemination
of threat HPTs, all of which are essential to the timely targeting required to disintegrate threat anti-access
and area denial systems. Each corps has an E-MIB to enhance the Army's corps and division intelligence
collection capabilities and ability to detect, locate, identify, and track targets across multiple domains. The
E-MIB's intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) BN (corps) and IEW BN (division) in coordination with
the G-2 section provide support to the targeting effort.
4-22. The IEW BN (corps) conducts multi-discipline intelligence analysis and PED in support of the corps
G-2; intelligence analysis and targeting support, PED, and collection in support of corps multidomain effects;
and provides general support counterintelligence and HUMINT to the corps. It provides sensing and target
development capability to support the corps' operations and comprises the BN headquarters and headquarters
detachment, Analysis and PED detachment, multidomain military intelligence detachment,
Counterintelligence (CI) & HUMINT company, and EW (corps) company.
* The CI/HUMINT company conducts CI operations (force protection) and HUMINT and
interrogation in support of corps and division operations.
* The analysis and PED detachment conducts multi-discipline intelligence analysis, targeting
support, and BDA; processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and open-source intelligence
(referred to as OSINT) in support of corps operations.
* The multidomain military intelligence detachment conducts multi-discipline intelligence analysis
and targeting support, and BDA; SIGINT collection support to EW and cyber operations; SIGINT
technical control; expeditionary PED capability, enabled by organic classified communications,
in support of operations.
4-23. The IEW BN (division) conducts multi-discipline intelligence analysis and PED in support of the
division G2; intelligence analysis and targeting support, PED, and collection in support of division effects.
The IEW BN (division) does not have a CI and HUMINT company; instead, it has an interrogation section
with a limited interrogation capability to enable the division commander to exploit other targets of interest.
The IEW BN (division) comprises the BN headquarters and headquarters detachment, an analysis and PED
detachment, a multidomain military intelligence detachment, and an EW (division) company.
* The analysis and PED detachment conducts multi-discipline intelligence analysis, targeting
support, and BDA; PED; and open-source intelligence in support of division operations.
* The multidomain military intelligence detachment conducts multi-discipline intelligence analysis
and targeting support, and BDA; SIGINT collection support to electromagnetic warfare and cyber
operations; SIGINT technical control; expeditionary PED capability, enabled by organic classified
communications, and limited interrogation capability in support of division operations. |
3-60 | 55 | Chapter 5
Theater Targeting
Targeting in support of a theater is primarily conducted at the operational to strategic
level of war. It involves commanders and staffs using the Joint Targeting Cycle in
support of operations. A corps and division commander might also command a JFLCC
or a JTF, requiring them to perform Joint tasks and integrate targeting efforts at a
theater level.
SECTION I – OVERVIEW
5-1. Through targeting, the commander prioritizes resources, solves emerging problem sets, synchronizes
the staff and subordinate unit operations, and manages the overall tempo of operations. Detailed planning
and integration across all warfighting functions allows the application of joint FS and effects in the deep area,
which facilitates surprise, concentration, and audacity. Effective integration, synchronization, and
employment of joint FS and joint targeting is essential to creating conditions that provide the supported
commander freedom of action. Since many joint capabilities are not organic to Army forces, commanders
and staffs plan, coordinate, and integrate joint and unified action partner capabilities in a multidomain
approach to operations.
5-2. The LCC may request joint fires from the JFC through the joint targeting cycle. In certain situations,
the JFC may task the LCC to provide surface-to-surface fires in support of a JFC target. At the LCC level,
outputs from the Joint targeting cycle are translated into actions conducted by tactical units. LCCs also
contribute to the joint targeting cycle by nominating their own targets specific to their own environment and
mission within the JFC's intent. Such targets could be outside their own AO.
5-3. LCCs contribute to the joint targeting cycle by assisting the JFC in formulating guidance, integrating
land component fires with other joint fires to support JFC operations, conducting target development,
synchronizing, and coordinating the use of collection assets, engaging targets, and providing feedback as part
of the assessment process. These functions remain constant regardless of how the joint force is organized
(functional or Service components).
5-4. Targeting in support of the theater presents the most complex challenges regarding integration and
synchronization of organizations, elements, and capabilities to create the desired effects within a joint
environment. Organizations and elements such as the BCD, theater fires command or theater fires element
(referred to as TFC/TFE), multidomain task force (MDTF), and MIB-T are key components at these echelons.
5-5. At the theater level, targeting tasks demand greater outputs than lower echelons. At this echelon a
target production cell (referred to as a TPC) may be established to consistently address theater targeting
requirements. This cell places priority and dedicated effort to the discovery, development, nomination, and
management of targets in support of combatant commands. This allows these organizations to maintain
qualification, certification, and currency. Corps or divisions may develop a target production cell at their
echelon as mission dictates. The makeup of a target production cell is tailorable to the demand but is
comprised of a collection of fires, intelligence, and information capabilities. A target production cell is
separate and distinct from a target material production (referred to as TMP) workcenter that is required to
produce target materials. See CJCSI 3505.01E for more information on target material production
workcenters. |
3-60 | 56 | Chapter 5
SECTION II - OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
5-6. The operational framework at theater level encompasses the entirety of the AO. Understanding the
command and support relationships of all subordinate units is critical to understanding the size, scope, and
scale of the theater AO.
5-7. Theater operations must integrate and synchronize all available capabilities as well as holistically
understand the depth and breadth of threat capabilities. Figure 5-1 on page 5-3 illustrates the AO to
demonstrate targeting responsibilities at the theater. |
3-60 | 57 | Theater Targeting
Figure 5-1. Delineation of area of operation |
3-60 | 58 | Chapter 5
SECTION III - FUNCTIONS
5-8. Targeting functions at the theater expand when compared to lower echelons. The targeting team must
consider joint requirements as well as planning horizons and associated timelines for all other theater level
planning cycles. Theater targeting teams must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped to perform all
joint targeting tasks. The below lists highlights functions required at the theater:
* Develop measures and indicators.
* Develop and synchronize the information collection plan with targeting efforts.
* Nominate targets to higher HQ.
* Attend higher HQs battle rhythm events.
* Synchronize desired effects with scheme of maneuver.
* Integrate and synchronize all elements of the targeting team (joint targeting working group/joint
targeting coordination board/and other bureaus, boards, centers, cells, and working groups).
* Synchronize joint interagency multinational assets and organizations.
* TST nomination, management, and execution.
* Conduct joint target development (See current version of CJCSI 3370.01D).
* Conduct target list management.
* Conduct operational and combat assessment.
SECTION IV - PLANNING
5-9. The targeting process occurs in the context of joint operation planning, both before and during
execution. This contributes to creating the commander JTF's desired effects and achieving objectives. During
execution, commanders and planners continue to consider the tenets of multidomain operations (agility
convergence, endurance, and depth) and adjust both current operations and future plans to capitalize on
tactical and operational successes as the joint operation unfolds.
5-10. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the range of military operations using the closely
related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive JPP. The JPP shares the same basic approach and problem-
solving elements as the MDMP, such as mission analysis and COA development. The JPP promotes coherent
planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-
phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving high-intensity
combat operations.
5-11. JPP is a less formal but proven analytical process, described in detail in JP 5-0, which provides a
methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint
operations. The focus of JPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander, staff, the
commanders, and staffs of the next higher and lower commands and supporting commanders and their staffs.
Although the ultimate product is an OPLAN or OPORD for a specific mission, the process is continuous
throughout an operation. Even during execution, it produces plans and orders for future operations as well as
fragmentary orders (referred to as FRAGORDs) that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation.
5-12. Joint targeting is integral to joint operation planning and assessment. Some targeting activities occur
concurrently with the steps of JPP during planning. It begins with the planning initiation and mission analysis
steps of JPP and continues through publication of the OPLAN, OPORD, or FRAGORD. Detailed joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment, country assessments, and TSA set the stage for
detailed targeting within the joint targeting cycle. Many products used to support joint operations are
developed, maintained, and continuously updated as foundational information for targeting by combatant
commands and combat support agencies.
5-13. Integrating and synchronizing planning, execution, and assessment is pivotal to the success of
targeting. Understanding the objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all actors within the OE
enables the use of joint, interagency, and multinational means to accomplish tasks and create effects. Planning
enables the targeting team to focus on creating the desired target effects that accomplish targeting-related
tasks and objectives in support of the JFC's overall objectives and endstate, rather than simply servicing a list |
3-60 | 59 | Theater Targeting
of targets or basing targeting decisions on the availability of particular weapons, platforms, or system. Theater
organizations may federate targeting tasks and elements of planning to subordinate or supporting
organizations.
SECTION V - SYNCHRONIZATION
5-14. The battle rhythm events at the theater army (primary synchronization mechanism) become
progressively complex due to the increase in organizations, agencies, and enablers contributing to the
targeting effort. The additional roles performed at these echelons place a greater demand on synchronizing
internal and external elements in support of operations. In addition to a greater number of contributors,
coordinating the parallel and supporting bureaus, boards, cells, centers and working groups (referred to as
B2C2WGs) within the staff must be emphasized to ensure integration and maximize the joint targeting
working group and joint targeting coordination board.
BATTLE RHYTHM EVENTS
5-15. The joint force battle rhythm and the JFC's decision cycle are two factors that affect planning at this
echelon. The targeting team must be keenly aware of supporting component processes (such as the air tasking
cycle and cyber tasking cycle) to ensure the joint force battle rhythm and decision cycles are nested within
the joint targeting cycle.
JOINT TARGETING WORKING GROUP
5-16. The targeting working group membership should include SMEs in all capabilities. The integration of
capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal effects should be a function of all phases of joint operations. The
joint targeting working group should be flexible enough to consider all capabilities for appropriate targeting.
Members may include but are not limited to the following:
* BCD.
* Air operations center.
* Higher HQ.
* Components (JFLCC, joint force air component commander, joint force maritime component
commander).
* Theater fires command or element.
* Target production centers.
* Multinational and unified action partners (as applicable).
* Special Operations Joint Task Force.
* Any relevant Intelligence Community members Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State).
* United States Space Command (referred to as USSPACECOM) or designated representative.
* United States Cyber Command (referred to as USCYBERCOM) or designated representative.
* Theater Combat Aviation Brigade.
* MIB-T.
* Army Air and Missile Defense Command (referred to as AAMDC).
* MDTF.
JOINT TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD
5-17. The joint targeting coordination board provides a forum in which components, organizations, agencies,
and staff sections can articulate strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure they are synchronized
and integrated. The joint targeting coordination board normally facilitates and coordinates targeting activities
with the schemes of maneuver to ensure that the commander's priorities are met. Specific targeting issues are
resolved by direct coordination between elements below the level of the joint targeting coordination board.
The joint targeting coordination board is the primary forum to enable the commander to make targeting
decisions, validate targets, and provide guidance. Attendees of the board are often mission dependent. The |
3-60 | 60 | Chapter 5
number can fluctuate depending on echelon, physical location, and agenda. Members may include but are
not limited to the following:
* BCD.
* Air operations center.
* Higher HQ.
* Components (JFLCC, joint force air component commander, joint force maritime component
commander).
* Special Operations JTF.
* Any relevant Intelligence Community members (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State).
* United States Space Command (referred to as USSPACECOM) or designated representative.
* United States Cyber Command (referred to as USCYBERCOM) or designated representative.
* Theater Combat Aviation Brigade.
* MIB-T.
* Army Air and Missile Defense Command (referred to as AAMDC).
* Coalition mission partners.
* Additional staff personnel may be present and provide relevant information and recommendations
to the commander, chief of staff, G-3, or FSCOORD as necessary.
5-18. See appendix E for example joint targeting working group and joint targeting coordination board
formats.
FIRES CELL OR JOINT FIRES ELEMENT
5-19. The primary action agency for targeting at the theater is the fires cell. The fires cell leads targeting
activities in conjunction with the intelligence targeting officer which include target development, capabilities
analysis, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing lethal and nonlethal capabilities. The fires cell serves
as the staff conduit between planning and execution.
THEATER FIRES COMMAND OR THEATER FIRES ELEMENT
5-20. An Army theater fires command, or a theater fires element provides C2 of assigned strategic fires
capabilities, serves as the senior HQ assigned to an Army Service component command/theater Army to
integrate theater fires assets, and executes critical FS functions across the competition continuum. The
organizational difference is minimal. The two different organizational structures represent requirements in
different regions and may continue to evolve.
5-21. The theater fires command and theater fires element are designed to develop, nominate, and converge
effects on joint targets across the theater. This support to joint targeting will enable continuous efforts to set
the theater for the joint force land component command, field army, and corps operations during competition
below armed conflict and crisis. The theater fires command ensures the Army's contribution to the joint
targeting process is effectively planned and executed during shape and prevent and can seamlessly transition
to large-scale ground combat operations in accordance with the ground force commander's priorities.
MULTIDOMAIN TASK FORCE
5-22. The MDTF is forward postured to synchronize and employ multidomain capabilities (lethal and
nonlethal) to achieve the supported commander's strategic objectives by conducting operational preparation
of the environment (referred to as OPE) and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
during competition and by conducting integrated strikes across domains to shape, penetrate, and dis-integrate
enemy anti-access and area denial defenses in order to enable joint force freedom of action during conflict.
5-23. The MDTF leverages theater fires command/theater fires element, combatant command, and other
intelligence community members for guidance, authorities, and target development (to include TSA, entity
target development, and target list management) based off organizational role, and provides liaison officers
to supported commands to synchronize employment and targeting. |
3-60 | 61 | Theater Targeting
BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT
5-24. A BCD is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior liaison between the
ARFOR commander and the air component commander. A BCD is co-located with the joint air operations
center, combined air operations center, or the Air Force air operations center.
5-25. The BCD is the Army's interface for systems connectivity to the joint air operations center and for
personnel integration with their joint air operations center counterparts. Its tasks include facilitating the
exchange of current intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and
interpreting the land battle situation, coordinating airlift, and integrating airspace requirements. A BCD must
possess adequate knowledge of LCC target nominations to advocate for integration into theater targeting
efforts and battle rhythm events. These events may be hosted by designated component command.
ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
5-26. The Army air and missile defense command is a HQ element responsible for the command of all
subordinate Army air and missile defense units as well as the army air and missile defense coordinator for
the land component. When required by the geographic combatant command, the Army air and missile defense
command will be attached to the theater army, if not already assigned. Air and missile defense units in an
area of responsibility are assigned or attached to the Army Air and Missile Defense Command (referred to
as AAMDC) typically do not run their own targeting cycle or process. They are a critical member of theater
targeting efforts and battle rhythm events.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AT THEATER ARMY
5-27. Theater army intelligence capabilities provide support to the target development of threat systems. A
MIB-T, as the theater Army's permanently assigned ground intelligence organization, can deploy scalable
and tailorable intelligence capabilities to meet combatant command, Army Service component command,
and JTF intelligence requirements. The operations BN within a MIB-T serves as the theater Army G-2's ACE
and performs highly complex queries using advanced analytical tools to determine precisely when, where,
and how targets of interest operate. The operations BN's S-2/S-3 section prioritizes intelligence assets to meet
intelligence support targeting requirements. The following intelligence elements within the MIB-T operations
BN support the targeting effort:
* Analytical company- focuses primarily on conducting ongoing combatant command daily
operational requirement-related analytical activities. The company's SIGINT, geospatial
intelligence, and CI/HUMINT sections support units in nominating targets to be destroyed,
deceived, degraded, or neutralized as well as targets to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
information in computers, computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.
* All-source company- focuses primarily on managing the 24/7 watch operations necessary to
prioritize the efforts of the analytical company. The company's open-source intelligence section
produces target development and BDA products. The watch section supports units in nominating
targets to be destroyed, deceived, degraded, or neutralized as well as targets to disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy information in computers, computer networks, or the computers and networks
themselves. |
3-60 | 63 | Appendix A
Targeting Checklist
Targeting is a very complex and challenging process. There are many considerations
and variables that impact the ability of the targeting team to plan and execute with
efficiency. The below checklist, like many of the appendices, is intended to be printable
and used throughout planning and execution to minimize mistakes and missed
opportunities.
SECTION I – DECIDE
A-1. _____The commander's planning guidance and intent contain enough detail to enable the targeting
working group to determine:
* HVTs to nominate as HPTs.
* Desired effects on each HPT.
* When to attack each HPT.
* How to attack each HPT.
* Any restrictions or constraints.
* Which HPT requires BDA.
A-2. _____What targeting assets (organic, attached, and supporting) are available to detect and attack
HPTs?
A-3. _____What detect, deliver, and assess support is needed from higher HQ?
A-4. _____When must requests to higher HQ be submitted to obtain the support required?
A-5. _____Have target tracking responsibilities been established?
A-6. _____Are systems in place to pass the detected targets to assets that are capable of tracking them?
A-7. _____What detect, deliver, and assess support is required from subordinate units, and when is it
required?
A-8. _____What detect, deliver, and assess support requests have been received from subordinate units, and
what has been done with them?
A-9. _____Has the TSM been synchronized with the decision support template and the maneuver and FS
plans?
A-10. _____Are all commands using a common datum for locations? If not, are procedures in place to correct
differences in datum?
A-11. _____Are all commands on a common time zone standard?
SECTION II – DETECT
A-12. _____Does the collection plan focus on PIRs and finding the necessary HPTs?
A-13. _____What accuracy, timeliness, and validity standards TSS are in effect for detection and delivery
systems?
A-14. _____Are all target acquisition assets fully employed?
A-15. _____Have alternate target acquisition systems been identified for HPTs? |
3-60 | 64 | Appendix A
A-16. _____Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit agency for detection of each HPT?
A-17. _____Are HPTs being tracked?
A-18. _____Have verification procedures using alternate systems been established where necessary?
A-19. _____Are target acquisition and BDA requirements distributed properly among systems that can
accomplish both?
SECTION III – DELIVER
A-20. _____Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for engagement of each
HPT?
A-21. _____Has an alternate engagement asset been identified for each HPT? (The primary system may not
be available at the time the HPT is verified.)
A-22. _____Have applicable FS coordination measures, airspace coordinating measures and clearance
procedures, and the AGM been established to facilitate target engagement?
A-23. _____Have on-order FS coordination measures, airspace coordinating measures and AGM been
established to facilitate future and transition operations?
A-24. _____Have potential fratricide situations been identified, and have procedures been established to
positively control each situation?
A-25. _____Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for tracking specified HPT
and providing BDA on specified HPTs?
A-26. _____What are the procedures to update the HPTL and synchronize the AGM and decision support
template if it becomes necessary to change the scheme of maneuver and FS as the situation changes?
SECTION IV – ASSESS
A-27. _____Are the collection assets, linked to specific HPTs, still available?
A-28. _____Has the collection manager been notified of the engagement of a target requiring assessment?
A-29. _____Have the assessment asset managers been updated as to the actual target location?
A-30. _____Has all coordination been accomplished for the assessment mission, particularly airborne assets?
A-31. _____What is the status of BDA collection?
A-32. _____Has the information from the mission been delivered to the appropriate agency for evaluation?
A-33. _____Has the targeting working group reviewed the BDA to determine if requests for restrike are
required?
A-34. _____Has the target intelligence gathered from the assessment been incorporated into the overall threat
situational development? |
3-60 | 65 | Appendix B
Intelligence Support to Targeting
Intelligence support to targeting is a specialized and synchronized effort as it overlaps
with operations functions and all components of the intelligence warfighting function.
Specifically, intelligence support to targeting touches several all-source intelligence
analysis tasks, all aspects of collection management, and every intelligence discipline
and complementary intelligence capability. This support occurs across the echelons as
an intelligence push from the theater army, which has regional expertise and extensive
capabilities, down to each successive echelon. Therefore, understanding intelligence
support to targeting must begin with understanding intelligence.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING OVERVIEW
B-1. Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to support the
targeting effort, which includes the selection, prioritization, execution, and assessment of targets. Therefore,
the intelligence support to targeting effort must be resourced, carefully planned, and supported by a large
portion of the intelligence architecture. The intelligence architecture is the compilation and interrelationship
of all relevant intelligence and communications capabilities, data centers, organizations, supporting
capabilities, concepts of operations, and personnel necessary to ensure the successful execution of the
intelligence process. (See ADP 2-0.)
B-2. Intelligence support to targeting is specialized as it occurs across a significant portion of the
intelligence warfighting function. While all intelligence disciplines and complementary intelligence
capabilities support targeting, the effort is ultimately focused by the close collaboration between the all-
source intelligence analysis element (whether dedicated to targeting or ad hoc), the collection management
element, and various targeting and fires elements, including the target development working group if
applicable.
B-3. Intelligence support to targeting is one of the four primary intelligence tasks and provides the
commander information and intelligence support needed to both lethal and nonlethal targeting. It includes
support to the planning (target development), identification (target detection), and assessing the effect of
those operations (combat assessment). The intelligence warfighting function provides support during all
functions of D3A.
DECIDE
B-4. During MDMP, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander's guidance and intent. Once
objectives are determined by the commander, the intelligence staff must continuously review them with
respect to the threat and the changing situation to ensure they remain relevant to the commander's intent.
Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the threat in terms of probable intent,
objectives, strengths, weaknesses, probable COA, most dangerous COA, values, and critical vulnerabilities.
Additionally, intelligence analysts recommend objectives based on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities,
centers of gravity, and likely COAs. The decide function of the targeting methodology provides the overall
focus and sets priorities for information collection and attack planning. It is the most important targeting
function and requires close interaction between the intelligence, plans, operations, and FSE/fires cells, and
the servicing judge advocate. This step draws heavily on the staff's knowledge of the threat, a detailed IPB
(which occurs simultaneously), and a continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities are
addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. |
3-60 | 66 | Appendix B
B-5. During the targeting meeting, the collection management team advises the targeting working group on
the ability of available collection systems to acquire and identify HPTs, track HPTs, and support BDA on
HPTs. The team assists the group, as needed, in developing an architecture that disseminates target-related
intelligence to attack systems in near-real-time. The targeting working group further refines event templates
and associated event matrices, developed during IPB, into targeting matrices, which provide the level of
detail the collection management team requires to focus information collection to support targeting. The team
uses targeting matrices, IPB products, and the TSS to break down HPTs into collection functions, SIRs, NAIs
and TAIs, and specific collection tasks. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4 for detailed
information)
DETECT
B-6. The current operations integration cell is the primary cell responsible for directing the execution of the
information collection effort to detect HPTs identified in the decide function. The intelligence cell (with the
current operations integration cell) must focus their intelligence analysis efforts to support both situation
development and the targeting effort. Therefore, close coordination between the intelligence cell and the FSE
is critical. Key staff members in this effort include the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, information operations officer,
FAIO (when staffed), targeting officer, and FSCOORD/FSO.
B-7. The collection manager directs the information collection synchronization effort with focus on PIRs
and target intelligence requirements. The collection manager ensures the information collection plan supports
the finalized targeting plan. The collection management team, in coordination with the targeting team (or
intelligence targeting officer), develops collection strategies to satisfy PIRs and targeting intelligence
requirements. The collection management team may have to differentiate collection tasks to support the
acquire and identify collection function or the track collection function when a collection asset cannot
perform both collection functions. This is a major challenge during large-scale ground combat operations at
which time the concept of persistent surveillance is often not possible. National technical means may have
to serve as an intermittent form of surveillance in conjunction with Army collection assets to acquire, identify,
and track HPTs. Some collection assets provide actual targetable information while information from other
collection assets requires PED to produce valid targets. The target priorities developed in the decide function
are used to expedite the processing of targets. The collection management team:
* Plans for synchronized collection, focusing on the proper HPT at each phase in the COA.
* Plans collection to satisfy that set of SIRs if BDA is required to support the COA.
* Plans and arranges, when possible, direct dissemination of targeting intelligence from the collector
to the targeting cell or the appropriate fires element.
B-8. During operations, the collection management team monitors the execution of the collection
management plan; uses the information collection matrix to ensure collection assets are focused on the proper
HPTs (and their associated NAIs and TAIs); tips off the appropriate fires element as targets of opportunity
present themselves, and cross-cues collection assets to support the targeting effort. When detecting a planned
HPT, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO to determine if the target is an HPT, the target's
priority, and if the target complies with TSS. To ensure the target-related intelligence is disseminated quickly,
the FAIO should be co-located in the intelligence cell with communications to the FSE/fires cell. If the target
is an HPT, the FAIO coordinates with the intelligence cell and disseminates the target-related intelligence
directly to the FSE/fires cell. If the commander approves actioning the target, it is transferred to a firing unit.
In those cases where the situation dictates the development of a new HPT or when the staff assesses a
significant change to an existing HPT, subsequent target development must occur. When subsequent target
development is necessary, the targeting information is forwarded for intelligence analysis and the target
development process must occur quickly. Upon identifying a target specified for attack, analysts pass the
target to the FSE/fires cell. The FSE/fires cell executes the attack against the target. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-
01.3, and ATP 2-33.4 for detailed information)
DELIVER
B-9. During the deliver function, the intelligence staff examines potential target systems and their
components to make a recommendation for generating the commander's intended effect on the target, though
the final decision is made by the FSO in collaboration with the operations officer. The intelligence input is |
3-60 | 67 | Intelligence Support to Targeting
based primarily on the AGM - determining the most effective friendly means available to produce the
commander's desired effect on the target. During the deliver function, the collection management team cues
collectors to continue tracking targets during their engagement. Preplanned or cued BDA collection and
reporting assists in determining if the engagement produced the desired effects; if not, continued tracking
supports immediate reengagement. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4 for detailed information)
ASSESS
B-10. Intelligence supports the assessment function by determining if targeting actions have met the desired
effects and if reattack is necessary to perform essential fires tasks and achieve the commander's intent for
fires. Intelligence support to combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing physical damage
assessments and functional damage assessments. During the assess function, the collection management team
continuously assesses the information collection effort and compares ongoing actions to the collection
management plan and the original intent. As operations progress and the situation deviates from the plan, it
is important to ensure information collection is supporting all requirements. If the staff's assessment reveals
that some requirements are not answered, the collection management team must reevaluate the collection
management plan. Then the team and staff must provide input on adjustments to the collection effort,
retaskings, or the development of new tasks. The collection management team and current operations track
the situation relative to those requirements to determine the completion of collection tasks; the effectiveness
of targeting and resulting effects on the target; continued synchronization with other operations or emerging
collection opportunities; and most critically, the requirements for target reengagement, if required.
B-11. The assess function of the targeting methodology is nested in the overall continuous assessment of
operations within the operations and intelligence processes. Assessments are directly tied to the commander's
decisions throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Planning for assessment
identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander directs be closely monitored, and where the
commander wants to make the decisions. Intelligence plays a major role in assessments as a part of the
targeting methodology. The assess function of the targeting methodology is performed through combat
assessment. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force employment during military
operations (JP 3-60). Combat assessment comprises three elements:
* BDA.
* Munitions effectiveness assessment.
* Reengagement recommendation.
B-12. BDA is the estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as
target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force (JP 3-0). The
staff determines how combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing BDA. Producing BDA is
primarily an intelligence cell responsibility but requires coordination across the staff, similarly to IPB and
most steps of intelligence support to targeting. BDA requirements should be captured as PIRs or as similar
high-priority information collection requirements. Together, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment
provide the commander and staff with an assessment of the effects achieved against targets and whether the
targeting guidance was met. Based on this information, the staff can recommend reengagement when
necessary.
B-13. Characteristics that best describe the intelligence support to targeting effort include deliberate
planning, collaboration across national to tactical intelligence echelons, and precise intelligence to target
threat capabilities at the right time and place and to open windows of opportunity to achieve positions of
relative advantage. This effort is challenging because the threat, especially peer threats, makes precisely
analyzing threat target systems, predicting threat COAs, accounting for terrain and weather effects, providing
intelligence specific to a location and time, and accurately assessing the employment of capabilities extremely
difficult. Intelligence support to targeting includes tracking highly mobile targets and simultaneously
engaging targets, including targets in complex terrain (such as subterranean and urban areas, and jungle and
mountainous terrain) across multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information
environment. Intelligence support to targeting primarily consists of:
* IPB.
* Collection management. |
3-60 | 68 | Appendix B
* Intelligence support to target development.
* Intelligence support to target detection.
* Intelligence support to combat assessment.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
B-14. Conducting IPB allows commanders and staffs to take a holistic approach to analyzing the OE. The
IPB process comprises four steps: define the OE, describe environmental effects on operations, evaluate the
threat, and determine threat COAs. It is a collaborative staff effort led by the G-2/S-2 and the intelligence
staff. IPB products developed during MDMP, specifically during mission analysis, and continuously updated
facilitate situational understanding and assist commanders and staffs in identifying relevant aspects within
the AO that can affect mission accomplishment.
B-15. IPB is critical to targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity
across domains. Close interaction between the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the rest of the staff is
essential, as the entire staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes. During
step 2 of MDMP (Mission analysis), the intelligence staff when conducting IPB, works closely with targeting
team members to provide and integrate a holistic IPB. This integration enables the planning process to reduce
uncertainty in the conduct of IPB across the physical, virtual, cognitive and temporal framework of the OE.
The holistic approach:
* Describes the totality of relevant aspects of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral
forces.
* Accounts for all relevant domains that may impact friendly and enable threat operations.
* Allows commanders to leverage positions of relative advantage at a time and place most
advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available.
B-16. IPB results in intelligence products that are used during MDMP in developing friendly COA and
decision points (referred to as DPs) for the commander. Targeting personnel contribute to and leverage IPB
to understand the effects of the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure (referred to as PMESII-PT) and civil considerations, the AO, mission variables of mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, civil considerations, and information
considerations (referred to as (METT-TC[I]), on friendly and enemy operations, and to identify and develop
high-value targets (HVTs), assist with developing HPTs, as well as provide nominations and
recommendations to the NSL, RTL, and TST nominations. Figure B-1 on page B-5 contains a list of outputs
(intelligence products) used during MDMP. Several of these products are crucial to planning information
collection and targeting. They include:
* Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and high-value target list.
* Event templates and associated event matrices.
* Modified combined obstacle overlay (referred to as the MCOO), terrain effects matrices, and
terrain assessments.
* Weather effects, light and illumination tables, and weather assessments.
* Civil considerations overlays and assessments.
* Initial collection plan with all available assets.
* Initial PIR recommendations. |
3-60 | 69 | Intelligence Support to Targeting
Figure B-1. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield outputs during the military decision-
making process
B-17. During step one of IPB the targeting team leverage the limits of the AO to identify significant
characteristics that could affect operations. These characteristics may include-
* Critical structures or facilities that support transportation, communications, and information
systems that can be sensitive or need to have restricted actions placed on them.
* Cultural or social factors that are sensitive.
* Facilities, structures, or industries that can be considered sensitive, or if affected can produce an
occupational and environmental health threats.
* Foreign embassies, international government organizations, and non-government organizations. |
3-60 | 70 | Appendix B
B-18. During step two of IPB, the targeting team seeks to understand the impact of the environmental effects
on operations and the operational and mission variables. These might include, but not limited to the
following:
* The impact and continuing assessment of the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).
* The effects of weather and terrain.
* Civil capabilities and vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to affect operations.
B-19. During steps three and four of IPB, the intelligence staff uses all relevant intelligence products, threat
templates, models, characteristics, and matrices to evaluate the threat. This is done to understand how they
can affect friendly operations and to determine possible courses of actions that can enable friendly forces'
mission accomplishment. Each warfighting function and staff section contribution to steps three and four of
IPB is crucial in understanding the various functions and the critical capabilities the enemy requires and
depends on to accomplish missions.
B-20. During the IPB process, the targeting team should have a clear understanding of civil capabilities that
can affect friendly and enemy operations. The team identifies threat forces critical capabilities, requirements,
dependencies, and vulnerabilities. This will lead to the identification of HVTs and potential HPTs for COA
development and war gaming.
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
B-21. Successfully collecting timely, relevant, and useful information requires the staff to plan for and use
well-developed procedures and flexible planning to facilitate situational understanding, track emerging
targets, adapt to changing operational requirements, and meet the requirement for combat assessment. The
collection management team participates in various meetings, such as intelligence synchronization meetings,
operational update briefs, and targeting working groups. Routine exposure to these meetings assists collection
management teams in understanding important aspects of and considerations for operations and fires.
B-22. Both collection management and intelligence analysis are driven by PIRs, targeting intelligence
requirements, and other intelligence requirements to develop information collection recommendations. These
recommendations assist in the tasking or requesting of collection assets to collect information, which results
in timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence that answers the commander's requirements.
B-23. The collection management team, commander, requesters, and the rest of the staff collaborate to define
what requirements to collect against and when to collect. The collection management team must:
* Be heavily involved in all aspects of the targeting process.
* Rely on the knowledge generated from mission analysis and the IPB process to ensure the
collection management plan is structured to meet target intelligence requirements.
* Use knowledgebase about the enemy and other relevant aspects of the OE to develop requirements
that are strongly connected to decision points and targeting intelligence requirements that will
affect operations.
B-24. The collection management team, operations staff, and collection assets (or assets' C2 element)
collaborate to specify what assets should collect against target intelligence requirements and define when,
where, and how to employ those assets and PED capabilities.
B-25. The collection management plan is an output of the completion of MDMP. This plan guides the
information collection efforts and drives analysis in support of targeting and providing combat assessments.
The collection management plan includes the following:
* Evaluating collection assets, including their availability, capability, sustainability, and
vulnerability.
* Collection Strategy.
* Collection management tools (information collection matrix, information collection
synchronization matrix, information collection overlay).
* Annex L (Information Collection). |
3-60 | 71 | Intelligence Support to Targeting
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGET DEVELOPMENT
B-26. Intelligence support to target development involves a flexible but detailed process, displayed in figure
B-2. The tasks of the intelligence support to target development process are:
* Analyze target systems.
* Conduct TVA.
* Develop initial and continually update target intelligence folders.
* Identify specific HVTs.
* Refine/adjust HVTs, when necessary.
* Support the selection of HPTs and other products.
* Support subsequent target development.
Figure B-2. Intelligence support to the target development process
ANALYZE TARGET SYSTEMS
B-27. Friendly forces cannot target threat forces and capabilities without understanding threat target systems,
from the most general level to very detailed target elements (a macro to micro approach). This effort results
in intelligence that is pushed from the joint force and theater army down to the BN level. Analyzing target
systems overlaps with developing threat models during generate intelligence knowledge and should be
conducted as early as possible before actual operations-preferably well before MDMP. Analyzing target
systems is a priority primarily for theater organizations during the shape and prevent Army strategic roles.
However, the task may be conducted at any time if the staff does not have general HVTs, or if it lacks an
understanding of the components of a threat function and how that threat performs that function. Often, there
are major differences in how and when this task will be conducted to support stability operations versus
offensive and defensive operations. It is more likely analysis of target systems will be conducted at the lower
tactical levels, as well as during MDMP, when necessary, to support stability operations.
B-28. When possible, the targeting working group participates in the Army analysis of threat systems effort
led by the intelligence targeting element. Analysis of target systems focuses on breaking down target systems
into successive elements at a greater level of detail to eventually identify HVTs and HVT elements. The
resulting products and the development of threat models support subsequent and more detailed target
development. The first step is evaluating which target systems are relevant to future or current operations. |
3-60 | 72 | Appendix B
Typically, a target system comprises a broad set of interrelated and functionally associated components that
generally produce a common output or have a shared mission (such as the air defense structure within a
specific threat unit). From the target system, analysts carefully determine all associated target system
components, general HVTs, and HVT elements. With each level, there is a growing number of entities.
B-29. Analysis of threat systems is related to/supported by functional analysis using critical factors analysis
(CFA), an advanced structured analytic technique detailed in ATP 2-33.4. CFA is an overarching analytic
framework that assists analysts in identifying threat critical capabilities, threat critical requirements, and
threat critical vulnerabilities, which they may integrate into other structured analytical techniques. Functional
analysis supports analysis of threat systems in effectively identifying windows of opportunity and threat
vulnerabilities. At EAC, the CFA assists in identifying threat centers of gravity.
B-30. As the number of entities grows with each level, all relationships of those entities are mapped. These
relationships can occur from a physical, logical, or complex social system or from another perspective. While
a target system component or HVT may be significant because of its characteristics, the component's or
target's real importance is in its relationship to other components or targets within a target system.
Components and HVTs are both intra-dependent to perform specific functions and interdependent to support
threat capabilities (for example, the capabilities of a certain theater army-level integrated air defense target
system may depend on logistics, C2, radar coverage, automation, and many other components). Analysts
must link all the components down to HVTs and HVT elements, when necessary, to properly template all
elements of the target system.
B-31. Considerations for conducting analysis of target systems include but are not limited to:
* Open-source research.
* Existing intelligence, databases, and files from generating intelligence knowledge.
* Existing threat center of gravity and other forms of functional analysis.
* Conducting TVA (for example using the CARVER technique) iteratively as part of analysis of the
target system.
* Signatures emitted from HVTs and the ability to collect on those HVTs.
* Understanding the five broad methods (systems warfare, isolation, preclusion, information
warfare, and sanctuary) employed by peer threats. (See both ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for more
information on peer threats.)
* Theater army-level guidance on the conduct of analysis of target systems.
CONDUCT TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS
B-32. The intelligence targeting element conducts TVA with the targeting working group, FSE/fires cell,
(based on unit SOPs). From the coordination and work performed during the IPB effort, the targeting working
group, especially the intelligence staff and targeting officer, perform TVA that yields HVT lists (which may
include HVI lists) for a specific threat COA. TVA is a methodology which assists in prioritizing HVTs and
identifies potential HVT sets with a given tactical situation. It is a process led by the FSE/fires cell as part of
targeting that quantifies the relative value of HVTs with each other in relation to a threat operation. This
analysis is based in part on the conclusions reached by the intelligence staff upon evaluating threat
characteristics. TVA continues the detailed analysis of relevant threat factors, including doctrine, tactics,
equipment, capabilities, and expected actions for a specific threat COA. However, TVA is a valuable tool
that can be applied multiple times during intelligence support to target development, as well as:
* During step 3 of IPB (evaluate the threat) to identify general HVTs.
* During step 4 of IPB (determine threat COAs) to identify specific HVTs.
* Following step 4 of IPB and step 3 of MDMP (COA development) to select HPTs.
* At any point to support subsequent target development. |
3-60 | 73 | Intelligence Support to Targeting
Note. To be effective, this analysis depends on the most current intelligence related to the threat.
Initially, based on the threat template, TVA should be refined based on the threat COAs, and
refined continually based on changes to the threat overlay during operations. Whenever conducted,
the intelligence staff supports TVA with the most up-to-date threat-related intelligence. See JP 3-
60, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4 for more details on TVA.
DEVELOP INITIAL AND CONTINUALLY UPDATE TARGET INTELLIGENCE FOLDERS
B-33. EAC organizations are critical to building target folders (also referred to as joint target folders or
electronic target folders) during the competition phase and then disseminating those target folders to land
forces commanders. Target folders, hardcopy or electronic, contain target intelligence and related materials
prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target (JP 3-60). Target folders are built during
the competition phase and disseminated to land forces commanders to support MDMP in preparation for
large-scale combat operations and targeting. Currently, MIB-Ts and aerial exploitation battalions hold/will
hold the Army's organic deep collection assets that are essential to collecting information relevant to
targeting. MIB-Ts have the data storage and data transport necessary to connect ground units at echelons
corps and below to joint target folders and other theater-level targeting materials. As such, EAC intelligence
organizations support targeting through competition to conflict.
B-34. Like joint target folders, Army echelon corps and below intelligence targeting elements develop and
refine target intelligence folder. Target intelligence packets support he target folder. Army intelligence
targeting elements develop and refine targeting intelligence packets based on their requirements. When not
covered by joint target folders, Theater Army G-2 requirements, standards, and unit SOPs drive Army target
intelligence packets. As required, target development elements develop target intelligence folders using
specific intelligence products and analysis from the corps or division ACE. Target intelligence folders are
both offensive and defensive in nature and are subsequently updated throughout operations to further detail
information and intelligence over time. Initially, a target intelligence folder includes the same level of detail
as the associated threat model. The target intelligence folder contains two subfolders:
* Target intelligence packages (also referred to as intelligence target packet/package). The folder
contains individual intelligence target packages used by the targeting working group to plan
targeting operations.
* Work folders. The folders contain raw data, working aids, and analyst notes used by individual
analysts to form conclusions that the target development element presents to the G-2 ACE chief,
G-2, and commander.
B-35. Following the D3A targeting methodology, the target development element develops HVTs, assists in
developing HPTs for the AGM, conducts combat assessment, and creates target intelligence packages for
target nominations. The target development element collaborates closely with the fusion element, the FAIO,
and the information operations staff to ensure its analysis addresses the physical and functional aspects of
each target.
B-36. A target intelligence packet contains pertinent target system, complex, or component information
collected during target development. Information in the target intelligence packet is used to build target
studies once HPTs are approved or validated. Generally, target intelligence packets deal with fixed or
semifixed targets. This information may be in the form of databases, selected imagery, or graphics. The
FSE/fires cell and intelligence cell develop and maintain target intelligence packets. Once the commander
has approved a target, intelligence cell analysts develop target and objective studies to support mission
planning. Target intelligence packets are focused, detailed intelligence products that assist in applying fires
against a specific target set or area. These studies are graphically oriented and may use many of the graphics
derived during the IPB process. Target intelligence packets identify HVTs in relation to operations by
providing detailed targeting information. Target intelligence packets are IPB and wargaming products as well
as a compilation of products that support the targeting methodology for a specific target. The purpose is to
have all necessary products (including relevant IPB, operations, and legal products and information) in a
single product. |
3-60 | 74 | Appendix B
B-37. These packets are developed and maintained at the Army HVT level (but referenced to the larger threat
target system and component) and include a unique target intelligence number that is maintained throughout
operations.
B-38. After target intelligence packets are first developed, they are subsequently updated throughout
operations to further detail information and intelligence over time. Initially, a target intelligence packet
includes the same level of detail as the associated threat model, except for unit and geographic specificity.
Over time, the target intelligence packet includes analysis and supporting intelligence and information down
to a detailed assessment of target element vulnerabilities and a historical record of HVT collection and
analysis.
IDENTIFY SPECIFIC HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
B-39. HVTs are developed during step 3 (Evaluate the threat) and initially refined during step 4 (Determine
threat COA) of the IPB process, an integrated process of step 2 (Mission analysis) of MDMP. Outputs from
step 3 include the threat template, HVT list, and threat capability statement. Step 4 requires an understanding
of the threat characteristics, as well as the effects of terrain, weather, and civil considerations on operations.
The most important element in determining threat COAs is understanding threat operational art and tactics.
The process for determining the COAs these threat forces may employ consists of the following:
* Identify likely objectives and the desired end state.
* Determine threat battlefield functions.
* Determine threat capabilities available to perform each battlefield function.
* Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.
* Evaluate and prioritize each threat COA.
* Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows.
* Identify HVTs for each COA.
* Identify initial collection requirements for each COA.
B-40. Below are several techniques used by the intelligence staff in identifying and evaluating HVTs:
* Identify HVTs from threat models, situation templates with time phase lines, existing intelligence
studies, database evaluations, patrol debriefs, and size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
(also called SALUTE) reports.
* A review of threat tactics, techniques, and procedures.
* Previous threat operations.
* Understanding the threat's objective, tasks, purpose, and intent.
* Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation, branches, or sequels of threat
COAs.
* Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the threat's
ability to substitute other assets and adopt branches or sequels.
* Consider AO and area of interest effects and potentially broader effects.
* Consider how the threat may use multiple capabilities to create the effects of one or more HVTs.
* Consider how the threat may use assets by phases of an operation, which may lead to classifying
certain threat assets, functions, or systems as HVTs across all domains, the information
environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum.
* Consider the multidomain nature of complex OEs and how threat forces may use assets to disrupt
friendly operations at multiple echelons and locations. |
3-60 | 75 | Intelligence Support to Targeting
* After identifying HVTs, place them in order of their relative worth to the threat's operation and
record them as part of the threat model. The value of an HVT varies throughout an operation.
Identify and annotate changes in value by phase of the operation. The following are additional
considerations:
Use all available intelligence sources (for example, patrol debriefs, reporting) to update and
refine the threat models.
Categorize the updates to reach a conclusion concerning the threat's operations, capabilities,
and vulnerabilities.
B-41. CFA is an overarching analytic framework that assists the intelligence staff in identifying threat critical
capabilities, threat critical requirements, and threat critical vulnerabilities. This assists friendly forces in
effectively identifying windows of opportunity and threat vulnerabilities. CFA is most effective when
conducted by a team of experienced analysts. At EAC, the CFA assists in identifying threat centers of gravity
that friendly forces can use for operational planning. Identified threat critical vulnerabilities are key when
identifying and developing HVTs, which are later prioritized by the FSE/fires cells through TVA.
Note. Potential pitfalls - units may not have enough experienced personnel to apply CFA
effectively, as multiple analysts are optimal. Additionally, there may not be enough time to
conduct a thorough functional analysis.
B-42. HVTs drive target development. Identification of HVTs overlaps with IPB. Developed prior to IPB,
TSA templates and matrices or predeveloped threat models assist IPB significantly, especially in time-
constrained environments. During step 3 of IPB, analysts develop general HVTs not associated with specific
threat COAs and the terrain and weather. Then, analysts consider specific threat COAs and the terrain and
weather to develop HVTs for each threat COA. Analysts must be proficient with the IPB steps and cannot
develop specific HVTs outside of the IPB process. See ATP 2-01.3 for detailed information about the steps
of the IPB process.
REFINE/ADJUST HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
B-43. During step 3 of MDMP, the targeting working group, led by the intelligence targeting element, refines
the high-value target list one last time based on the most current intelligence and analysis. The entire staff
conducts further analysis, including another iteration of TVA. Conducting TVA assists the staff in prioritizing
HVTs and identifies potential HVT sets for each threat COA. They are placed in order of their relative worth
to the threat’s operation and recorded as part of the threat model. The value of HVTs varies over the course
of an operation. The entire staff analyzes and identifies those HVTs that must be attacked to ensure friendly
mission success. Additionally, the staff analyzes all implications of attacking those HVTs and possible threat
counteractions. Results of this analysis is the refined high-value target list. Those critical HVTs that the staff
confirms as acquired and attacked are nominated as potential HPTs for each COA.
SUPPORT THE SELECTION OF HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS AND OTHER PRODUCTS
B-44. HPTs are initially developed during step 3 (COA development) of MDMP. Each friendly COA requires
engaging specific HPTs to reach a specific effect at a specific time and location to ensure COA success. HPTs
are critical to both the adversary's needs and the friendly concept of operations. They support achieving the
commander's intent and executing the concept of operations. They are determined based on the commander's
targeting guidance. Upon receipt of the HPT nominations, the staff groups the HPTs into a prioritized HPTL,
associating the HPTs to a specific point in the battle. HPTs are incorporated into the scheme of fires and used
to develop TSS and AGMs for each friendly COA. The HPTL, TSS and AGM are later refined during step
4 (COA analysis) and finalized during step 6 (COA approval) of MDMP.
B-45. The HVTs and HPTs are developed during steps 2 and 3 of MDMP, and further refined during the step
4, COA analysis. During COA analysis, the entire staff, led by the chief of fires/FSCOORD, refines or adjusts
the key targeting products (HPTL, TSS, and AGM). The intelligence targeting element ensures the staff has
the necessary intelligence products to validate or adjust the targeting products during COA analysis. Then, |
3-60 | 76 | Appendix B
the chief of fires/FSCOORD presents the HPTL, TSS, and AGM for the recommended friendly COA to the
commander for approval.
B-46. Wargaming is conducted during step 4 (COA analysis) of MDMP. During wargaming, the staff
compares each friendly COA with the enemy's most probable COA. The staff recommends which HVTs are
to become HPTs for each friendly COA. When listed in priority, the HPTs for the approved COA compose
the HPTL. Other related decisions include:
* When to engage each HPT.
* Which system to use against each HPT.
* The best places to attack an HPT.
* The desired effects of each attack, expressed in terms of the targeting objectives.
* Which HPTs require BDA.
* Which HPTs require special instructions or require coordination.
B-47. Target selection depends on the ability to acquire the target. The collection manager must be closely
involved in ensuring information collection on HPTs is carefully synchronized into the information collection
plan. This task includes:
* Breaking HPTs into subsets, when necessary.
* Developing adequate collection tasks.
* Considering the use of cueing, collection redundancy, and sensor mix during the development of
the information collection synchronization matrix.
B-48. Based on wargaming, the targeting team refines specified targeting products for each friendly COA.
These products include:
* HPTL.
* TSS.
* AGM.
B-49. Wargaming also assists the intelligence staff in refining and updating intelligence products in support
of targeting. These include:
* Updated IPB products (threat model, threat COAs, event template, event matrix).
* Updated collection management products (refined intelligence requirements, information
collection plan, information collection matrix, information collection support matrix, information
collection overlay).
SUPPORT SUBSEQUENT TARGET DEVELOPMENT
B-50. After MDMP, more detailed target development occurs. Some aspects of subsequent target
development-such as target validation and dynamic target development-overlap with intelligence support to
target detection. The intelligence target element is not the lead element for developing most of the subsequent
target development products. However, the intelligence target element produces supporting target
intelligence, updates target intelligence folders, and supports the FSE in performing different tasks, including:
* Conducting deconfliction.
* Making aim point recommendations.
* Producing targeting materials.
* Linking targets back to targeting objectives and MOE.
* Vetting targets, when necessary.
* Validating targets.
* Developing dynamic targets, when necessary.
* Clearing fires.
B-51. Target vetting, when necessary, is conducted to establish a reasonable level of confidence in a target's
designated functional characterization. The intelligence targeting element accomplishes the initial portion of
vetting by reviewing the target intelligence to determine the level of accuracy on that target. At a minimum, |
3-60 | 77 | Intelligence Support to Targeting
after the intelligence review, target vetting includes the following: it does not include an assessment of
compliance with the laws of war or ROE:
* An assessment of the target's identification and significance.
* Collateral damage estimation.
* Geospatial or location issues.
* Threat or friendly impacts of servicing the target.
* Impact of not servicing the target.
* Environmental and other effects.
* Intelligence gain or loss concerns.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGET DETECTION
B-52. The targeting working group establishes target detection and tracking priorities based on targeting
priorities. Target tracking is inherent in target detection. The FSE/fires cell provides the intelligence cell with
the degree of accuracy required and dwell time for a target to be eligible for engagement. Then the collection
manager can match those requirements to the TLE of the information collection asset. Execution of the
information collection plan begins as early as possible during planning and continues all the way through the
assess function and even helps transition unit operations into the next mission. The execution of the
information collection plan to answer the targeting information requirements is central to detection. Targets
are detected by using the appropriate information collection assets.
B-53. The current operations integration cell is the primary cell responsible for directing the execution of the
information collection effort to detect HPTs. The unit intelligence cell (with the current operations integration
cell) must focus their intelligence analysis efforts to support both situation development and the targeting
effort. Therefore, close coordination between the unit intelligence cell and the FSE is critical. Key staff
members in this effort include the G-2/S-2, information operations officer, FAIO, targeting officer, and FSO.
B-54. The G-2/S-2 makes maximum use of all available information collection assets to detect targets and
focus the intelligence acquisition efforts on designated HPTs and PIRs. Situation development information,
through detection and tracking, accumulates as information collection assets satisfy PIRs and information
requirements. The collection manager-
* Considers information collection assets' capabilities and availability within the echelon, and those
assets available to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.
* Considers joint or combined force assets.
* Arranges direct dissemination of targeting information, from the information collection asset to
the targeting cell or targeting intelligence, to the FSE/fires cell if possible.
B-55. When detecting a planned HPT, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO to determine if
the target is an HPT, the target's priority, and if the target complies with TSS. To ensure the target information
is disseminated quickly, the FAIO should be located in the intelligence cell with communications to the
FSE/fires cell. If the target is an HPT, the FAIO coordinates with the G-2/S-2 analytic element and
disseminates the target directly to the FSE/fires. If the commander approves the target, it is transferred to a
firing unit.
B-56. In those cases, where the situation dictates the development of a new HPT or a significant change to
an existing HPT, subsequent target development must occur. When subsequent target development is
necessary, the targeting information is forwarded for intelligence analysis and the target development process
must occur quickly. Upon identifying a target specified for attack, analysts pass the target to the FSE/fires
cell. The FSE/fires cell tasks the appropriate capability to execute the attack against the target.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMBAT ASSESSMENT
B-57. Intelligence also plays a major role in assessment as a part of the targeting methodology. The assess
function of the targeting methodology is performed through combat assessment. Combat assessment is the
determination of the effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Units conduct
combat assessment by determining the effectiveness of force employment during military operations (BDA |
3-60 | 78 | Appendix B
and munitions effectiveness assessment). Battle damage assessment is the estimate of damage composed of
physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the
application of fires. (JP 3-0). The staff determines how combat assessment relates to specific targets by
completing BDA. Producing BDA is primarily an intelligence cell responsibility but requires coordination
across the staff, similarly to IPB and most steps of intelligence support to targeting. BDA requirements should
be captured as PIRs or as similar high-priority information collection requirements. From this determination,
they make recommendations for maneuver operations (reengagement recommendation). Identifying,
defining, and maintaining accurate threat characteristics are also essential in conducting combat assessment.
For example, understanding a threat's composition assists the intelligence staff in determining the threat's
combat effectiveness. The intelligence staff incorporates the entire staff's input into IPB products for staff
planning, decision making, targeting, and combat assessment.
B-58. BDA provides commanders with an assessment of the target's combat effectiveness, overall status,
capabilities (whether full or partial), and likely reactions or any change to their intent. This assists the staff
in determining if the engagement is meeting the targeting guidance and is critical to any recommendation to
reengage the target. BDA also provides important analysis used to conduct quick target development and
decide on the allocation or redirection of assets or weapon systems for any reengagement.
B-59. Together, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment inform the commander of effects against
targets and target sets. The threat's ability to make and sustain war is estimated continually. During the
munitions effectiveness assessment of the targets, restrike recommendations are proposed or executed. BDA
pertains to the results of attacks on commander-designated targets. Although BDA is conducted primarily by
the intelligence staff, it requires coordination with the entire staff. BDA requirements are translated into PIRs.
BDA-
* Is conducted at the tactical level by commanders to obtain a series of timely and accurate snapshots
of how they are affecting the threat. BDA provides commanders an estimate of the threat's combat
effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions (threat characteristics). From this information,
commanders determine when or whether their targeting effort accomplishes their objectives.
* Assists in determining if restrike is necessary. Commanders use BDA to allocate or redirect attack
systems to make use of available combat power.
B-60. The Army's integrated systems demonstrate the seamless availability of national, theater, and tactical
access-protected information, allowing Department of Defense users and mission partners to confidently
share the information as needed. Intelligence personnel use these integrated systems to receive and distribute
intelligence and information to support decision making, situation development, target development, and
information collection at every echelon. |
3-60 | 79 | Appendix C
Desired Effects and Target Categories
Throughout the manual, creating the desired effects has been highlighted as an essential
part of meeting the commander’s intent. Commanders’ guidance should include the
task that they want to conduct, and the outcome intended by the specific action.
Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a
desired effect on a given target. The targeting team may develop these effects through
planning or the use of the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual Weaponeering
Software (referred to as JWS) for specific lethal engagements. Both lethal and
nonlethal capabilities are considered.
SECTION I – DESIRED EFFECTS
C-1. Desired effects should be created with the outcome in mind (see table C-1). The outcome must be
perceivable providing the targeting team the ability to measure created effects. A desired effect represents a
condition for achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect could inhibit progress toward the
same objective.
C-2. Effects of fires can only be properly assessed by an observer, sensor, or analyst. It is important that the
assessment of desired effects is tasked for collection to a capable asset. Each asset must understand the
desired effects to include when and for how long they are required.
Table C-1. Desired effects
TASK Effect/Outcome
Attrit To wear down or weaken (an opponent or enemy).
Compel 1)To force, drive or constrain.
2)To make necessary.
Convince 1)To overcome by argument.
2)To bring to belief, consent, or a course of action (COA).
Damage To reduce the soundness, effectiveness, or perfection of.
Deceive To cause to believe what is not true.
Defeat To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives.
Degrade 1)Damage done to the function is permanent, but only portions of the function were
affected; that is, the function still operates, but not fully.
2)A function's operation is permanently impaired, but the damage does not extend to all
facets of the function's operation.
Deny 1)To hinder the enemy the use of space, personnel, or facilities. It may include
destruction, removal, contamination, or erection of obstructions.
2)Damage done to the function is only temporary, but all aspects of the function were
affected.
3)A function's operation is impaired over the short term, but the damage extends to all
facets of the function's operation.
Delay 1)To slow down the arrival of a unit on the “battlefield.”
2)An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down
the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in
principle, becoming decisively engaged. |
3-60 | 80 | Appendix C
Table C-1. Desired Effects (continued)
TASK Effect/Outcome
Destroy 1)To damage the condition of the target so that it cannot function as intended nor be
restored to a usable condition.
2)Damage done to the function is permanent, and all aspects of the function have been
affected.
3)A function's operation is permanently impaired, and the damage extends to all facets
of the function's operation.
Diminish 1)To make less or cause to appear less.
2)To reduce the effectiveness of an activity. This is similar to degrade without the kinetic
overtones.
Disrupt 1)To break apart, disturb, or interrupt a function.
2)Damage done to the function is temporary, and only portions of the function were
affected.
3)A function's operation is impaired over the short term and the damage does not
extend to all facets of the function's operation.
Divert To restrict the enemy's capabilities to pursue a particular COA.
Enhance To increase or make greater the capabilities of a force or a people.
Exploit To gather information that will enable opposition ability to conduct operations to induce
other Effects.
Expose 1)To make known or cause to be visible to public view.
2)To make visible, to reveal something undesirable or injurious.
Harass To disturb the rest of enemy troops, curtail their movement and lower morale by threat of
loss.
Influence 1)To affect or change how someone or something develops.
2)To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a particular entity.
Inform To impart information or knowledge.
Manipulate 1)To influence or control someone to your advantage, often without that person knowing
it.
2)Control or change information, information systems, and/or networks in gray or red
cyberspace to create physical denial effects, using deception, decoying, conditioning,
spoofing, falsification, and other similar techniques.
Negate/Neutralize 1)To render an enemy weapon system and maneuver units ineffective or unusable for a
specific period of time.
2)To render ineffective, invalid or unable to perform a particular task or function.
3)To counteract the activity or effect of.
Prevent 1)To deprive of hope or power of acting or succeeding.
2)To keep from happening, to avert.
Protect/Safeguard 1)To cover or shield from exposure, damage, or destruction.
2)To keep from harm, attack, injury or exploitation.
3)To maintain the status or integrity of.
Suppress(ion) 1)Involves temporary or transient degradation of an actual or suspected enemy
weapons system for the purpose of degrading its performance below the level needed to
fulfill its mission objectives at a specific time for a specified duration.
2)Temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a
weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives.
SECTION II – TARGET CATEGORIES
C-3. The target categories represent target groupings based on their battlefield functions, not on the
associated equipment. The categories (also known as target sets) cover all the major battlefield functions of
the Threat. The categories are as follows:
* C2 targets are command, control, and communications centers that affect maneuver or combined
arms.
* FS category covers the entire Threat FS system to include counter-battery radars. |
3-60 | 81 | Desired Effects and Target Categories
* MANEUVER targets are combat arms tactical subunits in various postures.
* AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY refers to air defense system targets, including missile unit HQ and
processing centers, radar sites, and short-range air defense platoons.
* ENGINEER denotes engineer targets, including crossing sites, snorkeling sites, and movement
support elements.
* RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE assets include ground surveillance radars,
reconnaissance patrols, and airborne sensor systems.
* CEMA category is radio-electronic combat, known as offensive EW. Because of the nature of the
peer, near peer system, some dedicated collection target acquisition assets are listed in this
category instead of under Reconnaissance and surveillance.
* INFORMATION refers to the personnel and the development and production capabilities (both
mobile and fixed) a threat employs to influence targeted individuals and groups or gain decision
dominance. (May include functions such as print facilities or access points for internet-based
activities).
* CBRN targets include all aspects of enemy CBRN programs.
* SUSTAINMENT
CLASS III petroleum, oil, and lubricants (referred to as POL) support and includes transport
and pipeline units and POL points.
The CLASS V AMMO category covers the ammunition support targets.
CLASS IX MAINT covers maintenance and repair capabilities.
* LIFT refers to general transport units in the Threat.
* LINE OF COMMUNICATION (referred to as LOC) represents means for which people traverse
terrain for deployment, maneuver, redeployment or sustainment and transmit or share information. |
3-60 | 83 | Appendix D
Example Targeting Product Formats
The commander, the targeting team, supporting, and supported units should implement
the targeting products developed during the targeting process to facilitate the planning
and execution of operations. The products allow the team to control and synchronize
targeting in an effective and efficient way.
TARGETING TOOLS AND FORMATS
D-1. There are no prescribed formats for the targeting tools. Each unit will develop tools that work best for
them. Factors to consider in developing formats are as follows:
* Type, level, or role of the command.
* Operational environment.
* Assets available.
* Missions.
* SOPs.
D-2. Regardless of the formats used, the targeting methodology applicable for the unit’s role must be
followed. Targeting products can be presented in many forms. It is important forms be sharable in oral
presentations, hard copy publications, or electronic format.
D-3. The purpose of this appendix is to provide a menu of formats and a focus on the targeting information
and knowledge the commander and staff requires. The formats may be copied or modified by the targeting
team to support the requirements of the command. These examples are intended to provide a baseline
understanding of the required information in each product. In the example products a mix of acceptable forms
of inputs are used to further demonstrate the flexibility a unit has when developing its own targeting product
standards.
HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET LIST
D-4. The HPTL identifies HPTs by phases in the battle and order of priority. Other considerations include
the following:
* The sequence or order of appearance.
* The ability to detect, identify, classify, locate, and track the target. (This decision must include
sensor availability and processing timeline considerations.)
* The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition system(s).
* The ability to engage the target.
* The ability to create the desired effects based on attack guidance.
D-5. Targets are prioritized according to the considerations above within specific time windows. The
targeting working group recommends priorities for the targets according to its judgment and the advice of
the FSE targeting officer and the FAIO. The target category of the HPT is shown, either by name or by
number, on the list. The number of target priorities should not be excessive. Too many priorities will dilute
the intelligence collection acquisition and engagement efforts. The approved list is given to the operations,
intelligence, and FSE. It is used as a planning tool to determine attack guidance and to refine the collection
plan. This list may also indicate the commander's operational need for BDA of the specific target and the
time window for collecting and reporting it. Table D-1 shows an example of a HPTL. |
3-60 | 84 | Appendix D
Table D-1. High-payoff target list (example)
High-Payoff Target List
Phase or Critical Event
Priority Category Targets
1 ADA SA-15, SA-17, Tracking Radar, Engagement Radar
2 Fire Support HVY MRL, Cannon ARTY, CTR BTY Radar
3 R&S UAS GCS, Scouts
4 Lift ATK helo, FARP, Utility helo, Airfields
5 Sustainment Bulk fuel, logistics, ammunition, maintenance
ADA – air defense artillery, ARTY– artillery, ATK – attack, BTY – battery, CTR – counter, FARP –
forward arming and refuel point, GCS – ground control station, helo – helicopter, HVY – heavy,
MRL-multiple rocket launcher, R&S – reconnaissance and surveillance, SA – surface-to-air, UAS –
unmanned aircraft systems
TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS
D-6. TSS are usually comprised of the essential elements listed in the TSS matrix. Table D-2 provides an
example format of a TSS matrix. Units may develop their own target selection format:
* HPT. This refers to the designated HPT that the collection manager is tasked to acquire.
* TIMELINESS. Valid targets are reported to weapon systems within the designated timeliness
criteria.
* ACCURACY. Valid targets must be reported to the weapon system meeting the required TLE
criteria. The criteria are the least restrictive TLE considering the capabilities of available weapons
system. A compiled list of sensor TLE can be found within the Joint Munitions Effectiveness
Manual Weaponeering Software (referred to as JWS).
* SIZE. Echelons should understand the size of the element to be engaged. This assists in the
efficient use of capabilities to maximize resource employment. Echelons should establish
discrimination criteria based on capability or objectives. The targeting team must determine
engagement standards during the development of the TSS.
Table D-2. Target selection standards matrix (example)
Target Selection Standards
High-Payoff Target Timeliness Accuracy Size
Tor 15 minutes 200 meters Battery
HVY MRL 30 minutes 100 meters Battalion
Ammunition Holding Point 6 hours 200 meters
UAS ground control station 1 hour 100 meters Individual
Counter-battery radar 30 minutes 200 meters Section
Print Facilities 2 hours 50 meters Individual
Forward arming and refueling point 1 hour 200 meters
Access Point (Internet Activities) 10 minutes 50 meters Individual
HVY – heavy, MRL– multiple rocket launcher, Tor – surface-to-air missile system, UAS – unmanned aircraft systems
ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX
D-7. The AGM example in table D-3 on page D-4 provides guidance on what HPT should be attacked and
when and how they should be attacked. Units may develop their own AGM format. The AGM includes the
following elements:
* High-payoff target. The high-payoff target column is a prioritized list of HPTs by phase of the
operation. This column lists the HPTs identified during war gaming or the targeting working
group. These targets have priority for engagement. |
3-60 | 85 | Example Targeting Product Formats
* WHEN. The WHEN column indicates the time the target should be engaged. Timing the
engagement of targets is critical to maximizing the effects. During war gaming or the targeting
working group, the optimum time is identified and reflected in the WHEN column:
Planned (P): These targets should be engaged according to the planned timeline (scheme of
maneuver, critical event, gap crossing, suppression of enemy air defenses). If the planned time
is beyond a reasonable time, the target should be tracked or re-confirmed before engagement
per the planned engagement schedule.
As Acquired (A): These targets should be engaged as they are detected. If multiple targets are
found at the same time, the targets should be prioritized in accordance with the HPTL.
Immediate (I): These targets must be attacked immediately and take precedence over all other
targets (except TST). They are conducted even if attack systems must be diverted from attacks
already underway. This designation should be limited to the most critical targets such as those
CBRN capable systems, HQ (division, integrated fires commands, integrated air defense
systems, long-range missiles, and rockets). The operations officer, FSCOORD, and FSO
must establish procedures within the main command post (CP) that allow for immediate
engagement of targets.
* HOW. The HOW column links the engagement means to the HPT. It is best to identify a primary
and alternate engagement means of HPTs. Each engagement system may require different TSS
criteria to produce the same effect.
* EFFECT. The EFFECTS column refers to the target engagement criteria. The targeting working
group should specify engagement criteria according to the commander's general guidance. Target
engagement criteria should be given in quantifiable terms (number of systems to be destroyed,
length of time to suppress/disrupt). (See the legend below the example.)
* The desired effects on the target or target system are stated in this column.
* REMARKS. This column should note which targets should not be engaged in certain tactical
situations (for example, targets not to be engaged if the enemy is withdrawing). Some examples
of how this column should be used are:
Collateral damage estimation limitations
Accuracy or time constraints.
Required coordination.
Limitations on the amount or type of ammunition.
Specific combat assessment requirements.
D-8. As the operation progresses, the AGM may change. The AGM is a tool that must be updated based
on the changing enemy situation. The AGM should be discussed and updated during routine staff planning
meetings. Consider a separate AGM for each phase of the concept of operations. The AGM should be
synchronized with the decision support template and ensure the selection of HPTs is supported by targeting
intelligence requirements and the information collection plan.
* FORMAT. The formats for the HPTL, TSS, and AGM presented in the preceding paragraphs are
examples only. Data from these documents should be integrated into mission command systems
to facilitate digital execution, coordination, and assessments. Targeting personnel must understand
all the considerations that are involved in building these targeting tools. However, experienced
staffs may prefer to develop their own formats tailored for their situation. See appendix D for
examples of the formats. |
3-60 | 86 | Appendix D
Table D-3. Attack guidance matrix (example)
Attack Guidance Matrix
HPT When How Effect Remarks
BM-30 A Field Artillery Neutralize Coordinate and ensure CFFZ and
CFZ are emplaced and active
Tor A UAS Destroy Maneuver engages target and calls
in UAS strikes as necessary.
UAS Ground P (1330Z) Electromagnetic Neutralize Jam Communications at H-1
Control Station Attack
WLR I SCAR Destroy Monitor for signals transmission to
trigger engagement
Print Facilities A AI/Cyber Neutralize Coordination required to
synchronize lethal engagement with
cyber effects.
A – as acquired, ACM – airspace coordinating measures, AI – air interdiction, BM – boyevaya mashina,
CFFZ – call for fire zone, CFZ – critical friendly zone, H – hour, HPT – high-payoff target, I – immediate, P-
planned, SCAR – strike coordination and reconnaissance, Tor – surface-to-air missile system, UAS –
unmanned aircraft system, WLR – weapons locating radar
INFORMATION COLLECTION SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX
D-9. The collection management team develops the ICSM in conjunction with the information collection
matrix and information collection overlay in order to synchronize information collection activities with
enemy activities and friendly force operations, as well as to show actual tasked and requested assets. The
ICSM example shown in figure D-1 on page D-5 synchronizes and communicates information collection
activities horizontally and vertically across echelons and units.
D-10. In conjunction with the other targeting products (HPTL, TSS, AGM), the ICSM allows the targeting
team to effectively build an accurate and detailed TSM. The collective products enable the targeting team to
visualize collection efforts and make engagement recommendations synchronized across warfighting
functions and in time and space. |
3-60 | 87 | Example Targeting Product Formats
Figure D-1. Information collection synchronization matrix (example)
TARGETING SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX
D-11. Table D-4 provides an example of the TSM. The TSM is a successful way to synchronize targets by
identifying responsibilities to detect, deliver, and assess attacks on specific HPTs. The HPTs are listed in
priority by category under the Decide column. Units and agencies are listed under the Detect, Deliver, and
Assess columns across from the specific HPTs for which they are responsible. As responsibilities are fixed,
the asset envisioned to be used is also indicated. This provides the targeting working group the checks to
ensure all assets are used and that assets or agencies are not overtaxed. This matrix could also be prepared
for a specific event or for each phase of the battle. Units may develop their own TSM format. |
3-60 | 88 | Appendix D
Table D-4. Targeting synchronization matrix (example)
DECIDE DETECT DELIVER ASSESS
P Category HPTs Agency Asset Agency Asset Agency Asset
BM-30 FAB Q-53 1-FAB 1-MLRS E-MIB FMV
BM-27 CAB FMV 2-Avn 2-AH-64E FAB Q-53
G-2 JSTARS
1 1V18
Fire Support 1V19 G-2 JSTARS DIVARTY Artillery E-MIB Rivet Joint
Counter- FAB Q-53 FAB MLRS
battery Radar NOS FAB MLRS E-MIB FMV
E-MIB Rivet Joint FAB MLRS G-2 Rivet Joint
G-2 CAB AH-64E CAB AH-64E
FMV
2 Tor G-2 Rivet Joint AI F35, F16 AOC MSNREP
ADA
Buk CAB FMV MLRS CAB FMV
Tracking Radar E-MIB Rivet Joint FAB G-2 NOS
AI F22, F16
UAS ground CEMA NOS FAB MLRS AOC MSNREP
3
R&S control station AMD Sentinel BCT Artillery
Scouts G-2 FMV FAB Organic G-2 EAD ELINT
Artillery
BCT BCT Prophet
ADA - air defense artillery, AI -- air interdiction, AMD – air and missile defense, AOC – air operations center, Avn –
aviation, BCT - brigade combat team, BM – boyevaya mashina, Buk – enemy air defense missile system, CAB –
combat aviation brigade, CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activity, DIVARTY – division artillery, EAD - echelons
above division, ELINT – electronic intelligence, E-MIB – expeditionary military intelligence brigade, FAB - field
artillery brigade, FMV – full motion video, G-2- Intelligence staff officer, HPTs - high-payoff targets, JSTARS – joint
surveillance target attack radar system, MLRS - multiple launch rocket system, MSNREP – mission report, NOS –
National overhead systems, P - priority, R&S -- reconnaissance and surveillance Tor – surface-to-air missile system,
UAS – unmanned aircraft system
D-12. The following steps are a recommended way of completing the TSM while conducting the targeting
working group.
* Step One. Select, or update the HPTL. These targets are derived from the S-2’s list of HVTs.
* Step Two. Determine and prioritize collection assets responsible for detecting, confirming, or
denying the location of each suspected target or HPT. This information should then be entered
into the “detect” portion of the TSM. See table D-4. Be specific, state what unit or asset must
detect or confirm or deny the location of each specific target. Clear and concise tasking must be
given to acquisition assets and resources. Mobile HPT targets must be detected and tracked to
maintain current target location. Assets and resources should be placed in the best position
according to estimates of when and where the enemy targets will be. Consider assigning a NAI to
the target and enter the number on the TSM.
* Step Three. Determine which attack asset or resource will be used to attack each target once
detected or confirmed by using the list of delivery assets and resources available. Enter this
information into the “deliver” portion of the TSM. The lethal and nonlethal effects and applicable
aspects of EW and information related capabilities are considered depending on the commander’s
targeting guidance and desired effects. Consider redundant means to attack each target. When
determining an attack asset or resource for each target, the attack guidance is also determined and
entered. Determine for each delivery means when to attack the target (immediately, as acquired,
or planned) and the effects to be created by attacking the target. For example, the effects of Army
indirect fires, joint fires, and EW, including nonlethal effects can be to deceive, degrade, delay,
deny, destroy, disrupt, divert, exploit, interdict, neutralize, or suppress the target.
* Step Four. Determine and prioritize which assets will assess how well the attack was executed and
whether desired effects were created on the targets. Enter this information into the “assess” portion
of the TSM. |
3-60 | 89 | Example Targeting Product Formats
D-13. Both nonlethal and lethal capabilities approved in the targeting coordination board should be included
in the same TSM.
TARGET REPORT
D-14. When targeting information is passed from one agency to another, all essential information must be
included to allow for proper analysis and attack. Figure D-2 is an example of a target report that captures
information that will aid the targeting work group in establishing the most practicable attack response.
Figure D-2. Essential target information (example) |
3-60 | 91 | Appendix E
Example Battle Rhythm Products
There are two battle rhythm events that directly facilitate the deliberate targeting
process at the brigade through theater level, a targeting working group and a targeting
coordination board. The assessments working group is a third battle rhythm event at
echelons above brigade that supports the deliberate targeting process. All events
require participation from staff sections, warfighting functions, subordinate
commands, and other agencies as required. Each unit must develop an SOP that is
based on the unique mission, organization, equipment, personnel, and philosophy of
the commander. The responsibilities for the targeting working group and targeting
coordination board are broken out by individual personnel and groups listed below.
Example targeting working group, targeting coordination board, and assessments
working group agendas follow below.
TARGETING BATTLE RHYTHM INDIVIDUALS
E-1. The following is a list of targeting individuals and their responsibilities. The list is an example but is
by no means all-inclusive as commander’s guidance and mission may require additions or deletions.
Targeting individuals include the:
COMMANDING GENERAL/COMMANDER
* Provide guidance, objectives, priority of effort, and intent for targeting.
* Provide guidance and approve joint force command TST nominations and engagement criteria.
* Provide guidance and approve sensitive target for engagement and or removal (the STAR process).
CHIEF OF STAFF/EXECUTIVE OFFICER
* Chair the targeting coordination board (When delegated).
* Promulgate the commander’s future targeting guidance.
FIRES SUPPORT COORDINATOR
* Supported by the FSO and targeting officer lead the targeting working group.
* Facilitate the targeting coordination board.
* Manage all aspects of the targeting process.
* Present the commander’s targeting guidance and intent.
G-2 INTELLIGENCE
* Manage all aspects of target development.
* Assist in the development of TSTs, sensitive targets, restricted targets, and no-strike entities.
* Identify targeting requirements in support of PIRs and decision points.
* Ensure targeting requirements are fully integrated into the collection plan.
* Develop the high-value target list for each phase of the operation and ATO cycle.
G-3 OPERATIONS
* Chair the targeting coordination board (When delegated). |
3-60 | 92 | Appendix E
* Oversees the targeting effort for each targeting cycle is synchronized with the appropriate scheme
of maneuver.
FUTURE OPERATIONS
* Provide the concept of operation and commander’s intent by phase.
* Identify key tasks and objectives of subordinate commands by phase.
* Provide focus area for future targeting.
G-33 CURRENT OPERATIONS
* Responsible for the execution of the dynamic targeting process.
* Coordinate the execution of actions and activities in support of deliberate targeting.
G-4 LOGISTICS
* Identify logistic issues unique to fires (status of precision-guided munitions).
* Ensure infrastructure needed for future logistical operations are nominated for protection.
G-39 INFORMATION
* Integrate information (at echelon) into the targeting process.
* Identify host nation information capabilities.
CYBERSPACE ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
* Participate in target development, validation, and vetting, of all EW attack and offensive cyber
capabilities supporting target nominations.
* In coordination with the targeting cell, prioritize all EW and offensive cyber capabilities
supporting targets nominations (including subordinates’ nomination).
CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR OFFICER
* Coordinate with the G2 and staff weather officer concerning CBRN targets and forecasted
weather.
* Perform CBRN modeling to estimate the effects to include collateral damage from striking CBRN
targets.
* Assess the effects of CBRN targeting on the friendly and enemy schemes of maneuver.
* Recommend CBRN targets for the RTL, JTL or NSL as appropriate when CBRN modeling effects
exceed higher HQ or the commander’s targeting guidance.
G-9 CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
* Identify civilian entities for inclusion into the NSL.
* Nominate host nation/local civil networks, cultural sites, internally displaced person, or dislocated
civilian camps for inclusion on the RTL.
* Provide information on nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and or
local humanitarian operations with the area of responsibility.
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
* Participate in target development, validation, and vetting to ensure compliance with ROE, Law of
armed conflict, and other legal agreements.
* Highlight any potential harmful environmental impacts or consequences that should be considered
in the targeting process. |
3-60 | 93 | Example Battle Rhythm Products
TARGETING WORKING GROUP
E-2. The targeting working group agenda is divided to account for multiple targeting cycles. The
Commanders designated representative (G-3, Chief of Staff, FSCOORD, Targeting Officer) directs the
process and keeps the members focused on the unit mission, commander's intent, targeting guidance, and
targeting priorities. The intent is to develop options for the Commander. As indicated by the name, work is
meant to be done during the working group. Contingency operations may be developed, lethal and nonlethal
capabilities are discussed and solutions for the best means of creating the desired effects should be worked
through. New information, changes to previous understanding, and updates to approved plans should be
discussed. The targeting working group is not intended to be a rehearsal for the targeting coordination board.
Meeting times should be established to allow timely coordination of the parallel targeting effort of senior and
subordinate HQ.
ORGANIZATION
E-3. Figure E-1 provides recommendations, routine functions, and delineates responsibilities for operations
in the BN/brigade targeting working group. |
3-60 | 94 | Appendix E
Figure E-1. Battalion/Brigade targeting working group (example)
TARGETING WORKING GROUP EXECUTION
E-4. The targeting working group is an action officer level venue, led by a delegated authority of the
commander (typically the Director of the Fires function, FSCOORD that meets as required in accordance
with the commander’s guidance and battle rhythm. Targeting working group responsibilities:
* Disseminate the commander's targeting guidance and priorities.
* Consolidate, deconflict, and prioritize target nominations from subordinate and supporting
commands, warfighting functions, staff sections, and other agencies. |
3-60 | 95 | Example Battle Rhythm Products
* Synchronize the lethal and nonlethal capabilities and effects to ensure target engagement remains
nested with higher HQ objectives and is supportive to subordinated commands.
* Synchronize detection and collection requirements with the collection manager.
* Identify delivery capabilities.
* Maintaining and updating the HPTL, candidate target list (referred to as CTL), NSL, RTL/JTL,
and other relevant target-related lists.
E-5. Figure E-2 provides general information, participants, the overall agenda, and the inputs and outputs
related to the division/corps targeting working group.
Figure E-2. Division/Corps targeting working group (example) |
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