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3-90 | 340 | Chapter 17
Obstacle restricted areas is a command and control measure used to limit the type or number of obstacles
within an area (JP 3-15). The commander with emplacement authority uses obstacle restricted areas to restrict
obstacle placement. The graphic for obstacle restricted areas depicts the impacted area, the unit imposing the
restriction, and the restrictions in effect. (See ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B for more information on obstacle
control measures.)
Figure 17-1. Obstacle control measures and intent symbols |
3-90 | 341 | Chapter 18
Mobility
Mobility is a combined arms activity. This chapter focuses on mobility and the different
mission and tasks associated with combined arms mobility.
MOBILITY
18-1. Freedom to move and maneuver in an operational area is essential to the application of combat power
and mission accomplishment. The operational environment will present numerous challenges to movement
and maneuver. Combined arms mobility overcomes these challenges by integrating the framework of assured
mobility in support of offensive, defensive, and other enabling operations.
18-2. Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place
while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). Mobility is necessary for the conduct of
successful offensive operations. When discussing Army tactics, mobility includes both movement and
maneuver, generally, applying to both collectively unless stated as movement or maneuver. Its major focus
is to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield or an assigned area. Units require
the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a wide front.
18-3. When attacking, the commander wants to concentrate the effects of combat power at select locations.
This may require the unit to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes do not exist. The
surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort expended in
constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles that are identified before starting the offense
instead of breaching them, when possible. However, this must be done with caution because it might give
the enemy an advantage. Bypassed obstacles are reported to higher headquarters, and they are marked as the
situation allows.
18-4. Maintaining the momentum of an offensive operation requires the attacking force to quickly pass
through obstacles as it encounters them. This involves a deliberate effort to capture enemy bridges and other
enemy reserved obstacles intact. In some cases, using air assault and airborne forces is an effective technique
to accomplish this goal. Hasty breaching is the preferred method when time and resources are unavailable to
conduct a deliberate breach. The commander plans how and where subordinate forces conduct breaching.
18-5. Rivers and other gaps larger than navigable by mounted and dismounted forces remain major obstacles
despite advances in high-mobility vehicles and increased aviation support. Wet-gap crossings are among the
most critical, complex, and vulnerable combined arms missions. While units conduct hasty crossings, when
possible, they continue the attack with speed. Operational risk is much higher with hasty crossings, and staff
planning must still incorporate the breaching tenets and gap crossing fundamentals. The size of the gap and
the enemy and friendly situation will dictate the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures used in
conducting the crossing. Gap crossing includes the deliberate, hasty, and covert capabilities. Initial combat
crossings may be further developed in support of LOCs.
MOBILITY TASKS
18-6. Mobility tasks are combined arms activities that mitigates the effects of obstacles to enable freedom of
movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). There are six primary mobility tasks:
* Breach.
* Gap crossing.
* Clear (areas and routes).
* Combat roads and trails. |
3-90 | 342 | Chapter 18
* Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones.
* Traffic management and enforcement.
Note. Chapter 18 only discusses breaching, gap crossing, and clearing. For additional information
on combat roads and trails, forward airfield and landing zones, and traffic management and
enforcement, see ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A.
18-7. Mobility tasks are conducted to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield.
Mobility tasks depend on information collection and intelligence. Breaching and gap crossing in support of
maneuver are primarily conducted using combat engineer units that have, or are augmented by, gap-crossing
equipment. Gap-crossing equipment includes the rapidly emplaced bridge system that is organic to the
Stryker BCT and the joint assault bridge organic to the armored BCT. Units may also receive gap crossing
assets from echelons above brigade such as those typically found in a multi-role bridge company. These
echelons above brigade assets may include the dry support bridge fixed bridging for dry-gaps or the improved
ribbon bridge, which is also capable of rafting, for wet-gap crossing.
18-8. Typically, BCTs are able to execute breaches, dry-crossing, and wet- gap crossings up to a certain
width with little assistance from a division or corps headquarters. Any wet-gap crossing that requires a multi-
role bridge company will usually be at least a division level operation and require additional assistance from
a corps. Engineers at all echelons and can conduct clearing operations.
BREACH
18-9. A successful obstacle breach is a synchronized and rehearsed combined arms activity, under the control
of the maneuver unit. Breaching is a mission undertaken to execute a breach. Breaching allows maneuver
despite the presence of the enemy reinforcing obstacles with direct and indirect fire. For additional
information, see paragraph Chapter 20B-7.
18-10. Breaching begins when friendly forces detect an obstacle and begin to apply the breaching
fundamentals. Breaching ends when battle handover occurs between follow-on forces and the unit conducting
the breach. A breach includes the reduction of minefields, other explosive hazards, and other obstacles.
Generally, breaching requires significant combat engineer support to accomplish.
18-11. Reduction is the creation of lanes through a minefield or obstacle to allow passage of the attacking
ground force (JP 3-15). A lane is a route through, over, or around an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides
passage of a force (ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A). The route may be reduced and proofed as part of breaching,
constructed as part of the obstacle, or marked as a bypass. The number and width of lanes vary depending on
the enemy situation, size and composition of the assaulting force, and the scheme of movement and
maneuver. Proof is the verification that a lane is free of mines or explosive hazards and that the width and
trafficability at the point of breach are suitable for the passing force (ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A). Proofing
can be conducted visually, electronically, or mechanically. Some mines are resistant to reduction assets and
may require a combination of breaching techniques; for example, magnetic and double impulse mines may
resist a mine clearing line charge blast. Proofing is an important component of breaching considering the
wide variety of explosive obstacle threats in use today.
Breach Control Measures
18-12. The breach area is a defined area where a breach occurs (ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A). It is
established and fully defined by the higher headquarters of the unit conducting the breach. Within the breach
area is the point of breach, the reduction area, the far side objective, and the point of penetration. Their
definitions follow in paragraphs 18-13 through 18-16.
18-13. Point of breach is the location at an obstacle where the creation of a lane is being attempted
(ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A). Initially, points of breach are planned locations only within the directed breach
area. Normally, the breach force determines the actual point of breach during the breach.
18-14. Reduction area is a number of adjacent points of breach that are under the control of the breaching
commander (ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A). The commander conducting the attack determines the size and |
3-90 | 343 | Mobility
location of the reduction area that supports the seizure of a point of penetration. The reduction area is
indicated by the area located between the arms of the control graphic for breach. As shown in figure 18-1,
the length and width of the arms extend to include the entire depth of the area that must be reduced.
18-15. Far side objective is a defined location oriented on the terrain or on an enemy force that an assaulting
force seizes to eliminate enemy direct fires to prevent the enemy from interfering with the reduction of the
obstacles and allows follow-on forces to move securely through created lanes (ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A).
A far side objective can be oriented on the terrain or on an enemy force. The higher headquarters assigns the
objective; however, the attacking unit normally subdivides the objective into smaller objectives to assign
responsibilities and to control and focus the assault of subordinate forces. When breaching as part of a larger
force, seizing the far side objective provides the necessary maneuver space for the higher unit follow-on
forces to move securely through the lanes, assemble or deploy, and continue the attack without enemy
interference.
18-16. Point of penetration is the location, identified on the ground, where the commanders concentrate
their efforts at the weakest point of the enemy to seize a foothold on the far side objective (ATP 3-90.4/
MCTP 3-34A). This is achieved along a narrow front through maneuver and direct and indirect fires that are
accurately placed against enemy forces. A commander conducting a breach establishes a point of penetration
that supports planning locations for the reduction area and the seizure of the far side objective.
Figure 18-1. Breach
Breach Types
18-17. Breaching activities must be adapted to best exploit the situation. The level and type of planning
distinguish which of the three general types of breaching:
* Deliberate.
* Hasty.
* Covert. |
3-90 | 344 | Chapter 18
Deliberate Breach
18-18. A deliberate breach is the systematically planned and executed creation of a lane through a barrier
or obstacle (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). Typically, a unit uses a deliberate breach against a strong defense or
complex obstacle system. It is characterized by the most planning, preparation, and buildup of combat power
on the near side of obstacles. It is similar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailed knowledge of the defense
and obstacle systems. Subordinate units are task-organized to accomplish the breach. The breach may require
securing the far side of the obstacle with an assault force before or during reduction.
Hasty Breach
18-19. A hasty breach is the creation of lanes through enemy minefields by expedient methods such as
blasting with demolitions, pushing rollers or disabled vehicles through the minefields when the time factor
does not permit detailed reconnaissance, deliberate breaching, or bypassing the obstacle (JP 3-15). A hasty
breach is an adaptation to the deliberate breach and is conducted when less time is available. It may be
conducted during a deliberate or hasty attack due to lack of clarity on enemy obstacles or changing enemy
situations.
18-20. An in-stride breach is a type of hasty breach used to describe the situation when a subordinate unit
is expected to be able to organize for a conduct a hasty breach with its organic or task-organized assets,
without affecting the higher unit scheme of movement and maneuver or commander’s intent. In-stride breach
is generally not used below the company level since a platoon is unable to form effective support, breach,
and assault forces with its squads.
Covert Breach
18-21. A covert breach is the creation of lanes through minefields or other obstacles that is planned and
intended to be executed without detection by an adversary. Its primary purpose is to reduce obstacles in an
undetected fashion to facilitate the passage of maneuver forces. A covert breach is conducted when surprise
is necessary or desirable and when limited visibility and terrain present the opportunity to reduce enemy
obstacles without being seen. Through surprise, the commander conceals their capabilities and intentions and
creates the opportunity to position support and assault forces to strike the enemy while unaware or
unprepared. The support force does not usually provide suppressive fire until the initiation of the assault or
in the event that the breach force is detected. Covert breaches are usually conducted during limited visibility.
It uses elements of deliberate and hasty breaching, as required.
Breaching Tenets
18-22. Successful breaching missions are characterized by applying breaching tenets. See table 18-1. These
tenets are integrated into the planning process. The tenets are—
* Intelligence.
* Breaching fundamentals (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault [SOSRA]).
* Breaching organization.
* Mass.
* Synchronization.
See ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for more information on the breaching tenets.
Breach Fundamentals
18-23. Breaching fundamentals are integrated into the planning process and applied when a defended
obstacle must be reduced. This includes breaching, gap crossing, and route clearance missions. The
fundamentals are described by the memory aid SOSRA:
* Suppress.
* Obscure.
* Secure.
* Reduce. |
3-90 | 345 | Mobility
* Assault.
See ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for information on breaching.
Table 18-1. Breaching tenets
Breaching Tenets Actions
Intelligence Template enemy obstacles on the SITEMP for each enemy COA during IPB based
on—
• The enemy ability to emplace obstacles based on its capabilities (manpower,
equipment, and materials) and time available.
• The effects of terrain and weather.
• The range of enemy weapon systems covering obstacles and emplacing
scatterable mines.
Develop information requirements on enemy engineer units, equipment, activities,
and obstacles (location, composition, and mine types).
Integrate information requirements and engineer reconnaissance capabilities into
the information collection plan.
Breaching Implement fire control measures to allow the support force to provide effective
fundamentals direct and indirect suppressive fires (suppress).
(SOSRA) Determine the placement (wind condition), density, and timing of placing
obscurants on enemy positions and placing screening obscuration between the
enemy and the reduction area (obscure).
Resource the breach force based on the combat power of enemy forces
overwatching the obstacle (secure).
Determine the number and width of lanes based on the scheme of movement and
maneuver (one lane per company and two lanes per battalion), determine
reduction methods (explosive, mechanical, or physical), and establish a lane
marking system (reduce).
Complete the breach by destroying the enemy on the far side of the obstacle
(assault).
Breaching Suppress enemy direct fire and observed indirect fires on the reduction area
organization (support force).
Control indirect fires and indirect fire obscuration within the breach area (support
force).
Prevent the enemy from repositioning or counterattacking to place direct fires on
breach force (support force).
Create and mark lanes for the breach element (breach force).
Secure the obstacle near side and far side for the security element (breach force).
Report lane status and location (breach force).
Assault through the obstacle and destroy the enemy on the far side (assault force).
Mass Mass effects to create enemy weakness at the POB.
Prevent enemy from massing effects at the POB.
Synchronization Conduct detailed reverse planning.
Communicate clear instructions to subordinate units.
Provide effective command and control.
Perform combined arms rehearsals.
COA course of action POB point of breach
IPB (Army) intelligence preparation of the SITEMP situation template
battlefield SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault
Suppress
18-24. Suppressive fires in sufficient volume serve to secure the reduction area. The purpose of suppression
during breaching is to protect forces reducing obstacles and maneuvering through the reduction area. |
3-90 | 346 | Chapter 18
Successful suppression generally triggers the rest of the actions at the POB. Fire control measures ensure that
all fires are synchronized with other actions at the POB. The mission of the support force is to suppress the
enemy overwatching the obstacle. The breach force also provides additional suppressive fires as the situation
dictates; however, it’s primary roles are first, to secure the near side objective, and then to reduce the obstacle.
18-25. In complex or restrictive terrain, effective suppression may have to be achieved through close-in
fighting. Defenders will tend to be more fortified when defending in urban terrain and may be more difficult
to suppress. Forces tasked with suppressing the enemy may find it necessary to seize terrain at or on the far
side of the obstacle to achieve their mission. Fighting to achieve enemy suppression will likely be
decentralized, and the ability to use indirect fires will be restricted due to the proximity of friendly and enemy
forces and civilians.
Obscure
18-26. Breach forces conduct breaching using available natural cover and concealment. They employ
battlefield obscuration, which hampers enemy observation and target acquisition of the breach force as it
reduces the obstacle and the assault force as it passes through the obstacle. Obscuration requires close
coordination, control, and detailed planning to maximize the desired effects on the enemy while not degrading
friendly capabilities. This is especially important when conducting breaching in complex or restrictive terrain
due to the close-in nature of the fighting. In urban areas, indirect delivered obscuration and suppressive fires
will be more restricted. In some situations, using mortars (because of the ability to fire high-level trajectory),
smoke pots, and smoke grenades rather than artillery-fired obscurants may be more effective. Planners
consider the effects of wind and the time and assets required to build and maintain effective obscuration for
the desired duration. Using indirect fire to provide obscuration often competes with other mission
requirements and requires priorities to be established. Obscuration employed in multiple locations and at
various times can confuse the enemy on the specific location and timing of breaching. (See ATP 3-11.50 for
more information on obscuration.)
Secure
18-27. Forces conducting a breach secure the reduction area to prevent the enemy from interfering with
obstacle reduction and the passage of the assault force through the created lanes. The reduction area must be
secured before attempting to reduce the obstacle. The higher headquarters breaching unit is responsible for
isolating the breach area by fixing enemy forces in their current positions, attacking enemy reserves in-depth,
and providing counterfire.
18-28. Identifying the extent of the enemy defense is critical in selecting the appropriate technique to secure
the point of breach. The point of breach is secured before reducing the obstacle.
18-29. The breach force is resourced with sufficient maneuver assets to provide local security against the
enemy that the support force cannot adequately engage. Elements within the breach force that secure the
reduction area may also be used to suppress the enemy once reduction is complete. Breaching elements
prepare their breaching assets for employment throughout the secure phase.
Reduce
18-30. Normally, engineers and reduction assets (mobility capabilities) are used to reduce an obstacle. The
number and width of lanes needed depend on the enemy situation, terrain, size and composition of the assault
force, and scheme of maneuver. The lanes must allow the assault force to pass through the obstacle rapidly.
In complex or restrictive terrain, the assault force may be constrained to a single lane and the assault force
commander must ensure that the sequencing of forces through the lane is appropriate to achieve the mission.
The breach force will reduce, proof, mark, and report lane locations and the lane marking method to higher
headquarters. Follow-on units will further reduce or clear the obstacle, as required. Reduction begins when
effective suppression and obscuration have been established, the obstacle has been confirmed, and the
reduction area is secure. |
3-90 | 347 | Mobility
Assault
18-31. A breach is complete when the attacking force has assaulted through the obstacle, seized the far side
objective, eliminated enemy direct and observed indirect fires on the reduction area and, if planned, the battle
handover with follow-on forces. Engineers support the flow of combat forces through the lanes or bridges to
build combat power quickly on the far side. These forces may entail follow-on breakout forces if the initial
assault forces culminate or establishes defensive areas to manage operational reach and sustainment for future
operations.
Breach Organization
18-32. Units organize into the following three forces to conduct a breach:
* Support.
* Breach.
* Assault.
Establishing the breach organization facilitates the application of the breaching fundamentals. Table 18-2
shows the responsibilities of the support, breach, and assault forces.
Table 18-2. Support, breach, and assault force responsibilities
Breach
Responsibilities
Organization
Suppress an enemy capable of placing direct fires on the reduction area to protect the
breach force as it reduces the obstacle and the assault force as it passes through the
created lane.
Support force Fix enemy forces to isolate the reduction area.
Control obscuration.
Control other suppressive effects such as electromagnetic warfare and air and missile
defense.
Reduce, proof, and mark the necessary number of lanes through the obstacle.
Report the status and location of created lanes.
Provide local security on the near side and far side of the obstacle.
Breach force
Provide additional suppression of enemy overwatching the obstacle.
Provide additional obscuration in the reduction area.
Assist the passage of the assault force through created lanes.
Seize the far side objective.
Reduce the enemy protective obstacles.
Provide clear routes from the reduction area to the battle handover line for follow-on
forces.
Prevent the enemy from placing direct fires on follow-on forces as they pass through the
Assault force
created lanes.
Conduct battle handover with follow-on forces.
Provide reinforcing fires for the support force.
Destroy the enemy on the obstacle far side that is capable of placing direct fires on the
reduction area.
Planning a Breach
18-33. Units use the reverse planning process when planning a breach. The reverse planning process begins
with actions on the objective and moves backward to the LD, since seizing an objective is typically the
decisive point at the tactical level and directly tied to mission accomplishment. Maneuver planners use
reverse planning and force ratios to determine the size and composition of the maneuver forces that will
perform the tasks that support the main and supporting effort for each COA. Actions on the objective drive
the size and composition of the force that conducts the final assault onto the objective as part of an attack,
which dictates lane requirements (the number and location of required lanes). Lane requirements and the |
3-90 | 348 | Chapter 18
composition of obstacles drive the amount and type of reduction assets needed by the breach force. The
engineer staff officer and other planners use reverse planning to determine how best to allocate mobility
assets within the arrayed forces to facilitate the scheme of movement and maneuver for each COA. The
engineer staff officer focuses on the allocation of reduction assets. The situational template depicting enemy
direct- and indirect fire coverage of template enemy obstacles determines the size and composition of the
support force. Reverse planning for breaching is performed using the following steps:
* Step 1. Identify available reduction assets.
* Step 2. Template enemy obstacles.
* Step 3. Understand the scheme of movement and maneuver.
* Step 4. Identify the number of required breach lanes.
* Step 5. Identify the assets required to reduce, proof, and mark lanes.
* Step 6. Task-organize reduction assets within the maneuver force.
See ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for more information on the reverse planning process for a breach.
18-34. Successful breaching depends on preparation and planning. During preparation, units continue to
review IPB products against the current situation and redirect information collection assets to focus on the
most important requirements remaining, while emphasizing the commander’s critical information
requirements. Plans are continuously refined based on IPB updates and reporting from information collection
assets.
18-35. Key preparation activities for breaching include—
* Planning refinement based on IPB updates and reporting from information collection assets, to
include adjustments to the breach organization (support, breach, and assault forces), the scheme
of movement and maneuver, and the fire support plan.
* Implementing the task organization (breach organization), to include coordinating the linkup of
breaching assets (units and equipment) with the supported unit to allow combined arms breaching
rehearsals to be conducted.
* Performing pre-combat checks and inspections.
* Rehearsals with key breaching assets.
* Position and staging of breaching assets.
18-36. A breaching rehearsal site should reflect the actual obstacle system in as much detail as possible
based on obstacle intelligence. At a minimum, rehearsals should include a leader and key personnel walk-
through and individual rehearsals by support, breach, and assault forces. As time permits, full-scale rehearsals
should be conducted. When possible, friendly forces rehearse the mission under the same conditions
(obscuration and darkness) expected during the actual mission. Rehearsals should also include contingencies
such as enemy counterattacks and attacks by enemy indirect-fire systems, attack helicopters, other air assets,
and enemy use of CBRN material. If updates become available after the last possible rehearsal, the
information should be immediately passed on to affected elements. A key output of rehearsals is that all
participants understand unit-specific brevity codes, and signals associated with the breach.
18-37. Executing task organization changes of critical reduction assets during mission execution may be
required. This situation presents even more challenges, especially with regard to terrain management, because
unit positions and fire control measures may have shifted. War gaming these actions during mission planning
and rehearsals, implementing the necessary control measures, and coordinating instructions are critical to
avoid fratricide. |
3-90 | 349 | Mobility
Execution
18-38. Execution involves monitoring the situation, assessing the mission, and adjusting the order as
needed. When the situation deviates from the order, commanders direct adjustments to exploit opportunities
and counter threats. Adjustments that may be necessary during breaching might include—
* Allocating additional assets to the support, breach, or assault force due to attrition.
* Changing the location of the POB or point of penetration.
* Modifying the scheme of movement and maneuver and changing the order of the units passing
through the created lane.
18-39. For breaching, the commander focuses on monitoring, assessing, and adjusting the critical events of
a breach that were rehearsed. The critical events that are generally associated with a breach are—
* Occupying support by fire positions.
* Suppressing the far side objective.
* Employing obscuration.
* Reducing the obstacle.
* Assaulting the far side objective.
* Consolidating on the far side objective.
* Passage of follow-on forces.
GAP CROSSING
18-40. A gap is a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be
bridged (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). Gap crossing in support of maneuver is similar to a breach in that the
force is vulnerable while moving through a lane or across a gap. Maneuver units are forced to break
movement formations, concentrate within lanes or at crossing points, and reform on the far side before
continuing to maneuver. While much of the terminology and planning associated with gap crossing is the
same as that used in a breach, gap crossing and breach differ in scope. The amount and type of assets involved
also differ. Combined arms breaching sometimes includes gap crossings as a reduction method. Since the
primary focus of planning and preparation is on the breach, they are typically discussed as a subordinate part
of the breach rather than as a separate gap crossing.
18-41. Gaps will exist in the operational environment and present a significant challenge to movement and
maneuver. A gap crossing is the projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap) (ATP
3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). Historically, gap crossings were described only in the context of crossing rivers. A
river crossing is a special type of gap crossing required before ground combat power can be projected and
sustained across a water obstacle. A centrally planned and controlled offensive mission requires the allocation
of specialized crossing resources and a force dedicated to the security of the bridgehead. While river crossing
is still considered one of the most challenging of gap crossings, a river is only one type of gap that can
obstruct freedom of mobility. The fundamentals of crossing any type of gap are essentially the same as those
fundamentals that have been associated with river crossing. River crossings are simply one focused set of
challenges among all of the possible types of gap crossings. A gap crossing encompasses wet or dry gaps in
any type of environment or uses organic and augmenting engineer (and other) elements best suited to
accomplish the mission.
Types of Gap Crossing
18-42. The gap crossing types are―
* Deliberate.
* Hasty.
* Covert.
18-43. Each gap crossing type has a general list of conditions that help define the category. The planning
requirements for each type of gap crossing are similar. However, the required degree of detail and necessary
conditions for a high degree of success will vary based on the type and the unique features associated with a
crossing mission. In all cases, the ability to conduct any type of crossing begins by providing a crossing force |
3-90 | 350 | Chapter 18
with the necessary gap-crossing means and control elements and identifying those requirements early during
planning.
Note. A retrograde gap crossing is not a fourth type of gap crossing. In reality, it is merely a
variation of a deliberate or hasty gap crossing, and it is typically performed as a deliberate gap
crossing. It may be performed with or without enemy pressure on the crossing force. Clearly, it is
more difficult when performed under enemy pressure.
Deliberate Gap Crossing
18-44. A deliberate crossing is the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that requires extensive
planning and detailed preparations (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). A deliberate gap crossing is classified as wet
or dry, and it is usually accomplished with one or more bridge companies in support of combat maneuver. It
is normally accomplished when a hasty crossing is not feasible or has failed. Any deliberate crossing requires
detailed reconnaissance, detailed planning, coordination of fire plans, extensive preparations and rehearsals,
and significant engineer assets. While a BCT is capable of making a deliberate crossing, this type of crossing
normally requires a higher headquarters to assist in planning and command and control since it generally
involves more than one BCT. Deliberate crossings can involve general and combat engineering elements.
Some additional considerations for conducting deliberate gap crossings include the—
* Complexity and the assets required to accomplish the crossing.
* Opposition from a defending enemy and obstacle severity.
* Necessity to clear entry and exit crossing points of enemy forces.
18-45. Normally, deliberate crossings involve gaps that are greater than 65 feet (20 meters). A gap of this
length limits the effectiveness of tactical bridging assets, and the gap will typically require other bridging
assets. Crossing gaps of this magnitude normally require support bridging in the form of float bridging (wet-
gap) or other types of standard bridging (dry-gap).
Deliberate Wet-Gap Crossing
18-46. The deliberate wet-gap crossing is one that requires the use of rafting (non-bridging) and bridging
assets. The use of assault craft (boats and helicopters), rafting, or ferries and the emplacement of bridging
assets may occur sequentially or concurrently. The objective in deliberate wet-gap crossings is to project
combat power to the exit bank of a river or other type of significant water obstacle at a faster rate than the
enemy can concentrate forces for a counterattack. Typically, wet-gap crossings are one of the most difficult
types. They generally require significant augmentation of mobility support assets.
Deliberate Dry-Gap Crossing
18-47. Deliberate dry-gap crossings are usually determined by the strength of the enemy defense and the
magnitude of the gap. These assets are labor intensive and expose personnel to enemy fire during
construction, while providing stable gap-crossing support for continuous mobility.
Hasty Gap Crossing
18-48. A hasty crossing is the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap using the crossing means
on hand or those readily available and made without pausing for elaborate preparations (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP
3-34A). Hasty gap crossings are usually focused on a combined arms activity to project combat power across
a terrain feature (wet or dry) that can be overcome by self-bridging assets within the BCT. These assets may
be organic, provided to the BCT as augmentation, or found as expedient crossing materials within the
assigned area. Typically, a hasty gap crossing is a gap that is under 20 meters (65 feet) or less in width. They
are normally accomplished with tactical bridging assets.
18-49. Hasty gap crossings are most often used when enemy resistance is weak, and the gap is not a severe
obstacle. Hasty gap crossings also feature decentralized control at the BCT level and below, using a task-
organized mobility augmentation company, organic assets, or expedient crossing means at multiple sites
along a broad front. Due to the limited organic crossing assets, additional support from echelons above the |
3-90 | 351 | Mobility
BCT is often necessary. That support is only available when those headquarters have taken purposeful action
to position the assets at the right time and place and to integrate them with the maneuver force to make a
hasty gap crossing feasible. Coordination for these assets must be made early in the planning phase. Some
additional considerations for conducting hasty gap crossings include the—
* Size of the gaps in the maneuver area.
* Availability of existing bridges, fords, bypasses, or expedient crossing materials.
* Recovery of assets.
* Aviation (rotary-wing) asset availability.
18-50. A hasty crossing is conducted in an effort to maintain the momentum of the maneuver force by
quickly massing combat power on the far side of the gap with no intentional pause. This promotes speed,
facilitates surprise, and provides a continuation of maneuver momentum. The planning process is critical to
identify gap locations and their dimensions and request or allocate the necessary assets to ensure unimpeded
movement.
18-51. Hasty crossings are planned, organized, and executed much like a hasty breach. The unit must
consider the integration of the crossing assets in its movement formation, redundancy in crossing means,
traffic flow across the gap, and the recovery of the crossing assets. Units task-organize their force in a manner
that supports the overall mission and facilitates a successful gap crossing followed by a quick recovery. To
accomplish gap crossing efficiently, bridging assets should be in a position within the maneuver formation
where positive control can be maintained. This is an important consideration, as all gap-crossing equipment
does not have the necessary communications means to maneuver effectively as maneuver formations.
Additionally, some of the gap-crossing equipment is less maneuverable and slower than the combat vehicles
support and it is also less survivable in some cases. This may slow down the movement speed for the
maneuver elements. In spite of these challenges, proper planning and command and control can minimize
these negative impacts.
18-52. Two other considerations are the desirability for redundancy of crossing equipment and the
capability to rapidly recover the crossing means. Tactical bridging is designed with these considerations in
mind. Commanders should plan on the use of multiple crossing means, depending on the criticality of the
crossing and the time available. The terrain, transporter, and bridge maintenance, as well as crew training,
rehearsals, and experience can impact bridge launch and recovery.
18-53. The recovery of crossing assets and transition after the crossing is important for units to sustain their
momentum. Typically, units can expect crossing assets to recover and join the maneuver force on the far side
of the gap. The units have at least two options:
* The unit can halt movement on the far side of the gap and wait for the crossing asset to recover
the bridge.
* The unit can continue movement and leave an adequate security force during the recovery, which
can also assist the crossing asset in rejoining the maneuver force.
If the assets are intended to stay with the unit, consideration must be given to follow-on support or LOC
bridging assets to ensure that support or follow-on forces can adequately continue to follow the maneuver
force. The higher headquarters may direct the unit to keep its crossing assets in place for follow-on forces to
use, which will degrade or eliminate that unit’s ability to cross any subsequent gaps unless it has been
resourced with sufficient tactical bridging. If the higher headquarters intends for tactical bridging to remain
in place, it must augment the unit with sufficient assets to accomplish this task while retaining sufficient
tactical gap-crossing capability to facilitate continued maneuver and movement.
18-54. Because a gap crossing constricts and splits the maneuver force at the crossing site, the plan must be
flexible enough for the commanders or their designated representative to execute decisions based on
acceptable opportunity and threat variances. The unit’s command post can assist the command group by
controlling the execution of the crossing and maintaining a status of the location and operational readiness
of the crossing assets. |
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Hasty Wet-Gap Crossing
18-55. The depth and width of the wet gap, bank conditions, and the current velocity are major factors that
impact the ability of a maneuver unit to conduct a hasty wet-gap crossing. These factors will determine if the
maneuver force can cross by fording, if expedient materials can be used, or if specific bridging assets are
required. Identifying wet gaps early and deploying the required resources allow hasty crossings of known or
anticipated gaps to occur.
Hasty Dry-Gap Crossing
18-56. An antivehicle ditch, crater, dry riverbed, partially blown bridge, or similar obstacle is normally
what maneuver forces encounter as a dry-gap crossing obstacle. Maneuver forces can use equipment to push
down the sides of ditches or fill in craters. Substantial fill material placed in the dry gaps allows the passage
of combat tracked vehicles. The crossing site can be improved and maintained for wheeled traffic use by
follow-on forces.
In-Stride Gap Crossing
18-57. The in-stride gap crossing is a variant of the hasty gap (wet or dry) crossing that consists of a rapid
gap-crossing adaptation conducted by forces organic to (or task-organized with) the attacking force. It
consists of preplanned, well-trained, and well-rehearsed gap-crossing battle drills and the use of the unit
SOPs. The in-stride gap crossing takes advantage of surprise and momentum to bridge or defeat gaps and
relies on good and timely reconnaissance for its success as well. The force uses the in-stride gap crossing
against weak defenders or very simple gaps and executes the battle drills on the move. Attacking maneuver
forces generally move configured to be able to execute an in-stride gap crossing, except when a deliberate
gap crossing is planned. In-stride gap crossings may occur when a gap is not the same as the unit planned or
anticipated. To conduct an in-stride crossing, the unit must be well trained, have established SOPs, and be
task-organized with the necessary tactical bridging assets and capabilities.
18-58. Generally, the battalion is the principal unit to plan, coordinate, and control an in-stride gap crossing;
but a company will normally conduct the actual crossing. The battalion will normally designate specific
support forces, and it is responsible for synchronizing the breaching fundamentals as they apply to a gap
crossing through detailed planning and well-rehearsed immediate action drills. (See paragraph 18-23 for
breaching fundamentals.)
18-59. The commander planning for an in-stride gap crossing must also plan for a transition to a deliberate
gap crossing should an in-stride gap crossing be unsuccessful. An unclear situation (enemy and exact gap
dimensions and conditions) will make it necessary for several lead company-sized units to be capable of
conducting an independent gap crossing. Accurate and timely reconnaissance of the gap (obstacle) and the
enemy force that defend the gap set the conditions for properly focusing the location of the in-stride gap
crossing.
Covert Gap Crossing
18-60. A covert crossing is a planned crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap in which the crossing
is intended to be undetected (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). The primary purpose of the covert crossing is to
facilitate undetected infiltration of the far side of a gap. Battalion and smaller forces normally conduct a
covert crossing. It is used when surprise is essential to infiltrate over a gap and when limited visibility and
terrain present the opportunity to reduce or defeat the enemy obstacle (gap) without being seen. Through
surprise, the commander conceals capabilities and intentions and creates the opportunity to position support
and assault forces to strike the enemy unaware or unprepared. Like a covert breach, it is normally conducted
by a battalion or smaller unit (dismounted or in wheeled vehicles). A BCT is typically too large to maintain
the level of stealth necessary to conduct a successful covert gap crossing. A covert gap crossing requires a
level of detailed planning, information collection, and command and control that is normally beyond the
capability of a company.
18-61. A covert gap crossing can be used in a variety of situations to support various missions but should
be considered (as opposed to deliberate or hasty) only when there is a need or opportunity to cross a gap
without being discovered. The covert crossing can be used to cross forces that will support a follow-on |
3-90 | 353 | Mobility
crossing of a larger or similar size element; however, it is planned and conducted as a separate mission. If
conducted as a mission that does not involve crossing additional elements, planning and consideration should
be given to the recovery of the crossing assets. If the crossing is a precursor to a larger, follow-on crossing,
recovery of the crossing assets may be accomplished as part of that follow-on task. If the covert gap crossing
is being used as a precursor to a deliberate crossing and is detected by the enemy, the higher headquarters
may need to reevaluate other potential crossing sites before conducting the deliberate crossing. A contingency
plan must always be included in the planning of covert missions in the event that the mission is compromised.
A covert crossing should not be confused with the assault phase of a deliberate gap crossing.
Gap Fundamentals
18-62. Successful gap crossing is characterized by applying gap-crossing fundamentals. These
fundamentals are applied when a gap is encountered in the operational area. These fundamentals are—
* Surprise.
* Extensive preparation (less for hasty crossing).
* Flexible planning.
* Traffic management.
* Organization.
* Speed.
See ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for more information on gap fundamentals.
Task Organization for Gap Crossing
18-63. Units use the same organic command and control nodes for gap crossings as they do for other
missions. These nodes, however, take on additional functions in deliberate gap crossings. For this reason,
commanders specify which nodes and staff positions have specific planning and control duties for the
crossing. Typically, units designate a crossing area commander, engineer, and headquarters to focus
specifically on the efforts needed to cross the gap. Additional engineer units may also provide additional
command and control nodes depending on the size and complexity of the gap crossing. This may require
some temporary co-location of headquarters cells (or individual augmentation) and an increase in
communication means. Units conducting a deliberate gap crossing organize into the following groups:
* Assault force.
* Assured mobility units.
* Bridgehead force.
* Breakout forces.
Assault Force
18-64. Assault forces seize the far side objective to eliminate direct fire on the crossing sites. Assault forces
may cross by any means to include rubber pneumatic boats, air assault, or the use of civilian boats if available.
The assault force may also be the unit that first secured terrain on the near side and identified if existing
bridges were operational and where enemy forces are fighting or defending. The assault force normally
crosses in waves, as sufficient boats are seldom available to carry the entire force across at once. It is a very
complex operation, requiring synchronization, training and extensive rehearsals.
Assured Mobility
18-65. Mobility support forces (such as combat engineer companies, multi role bridge companies, and
military police units) provide crossing means, traffic control, and other critical tasks supporting the crossing
site. These supporting units are task-organized to perform specific tasks and are controlled using specified
procedures that are clear, simple, and rehearsed by all elements to ensure responsive support of the plan and
unity of command and effort. |
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Bridgehead Force
18-66. A bridgehead force is a force that assaults across a gap, after the crossing is established, to secure
the enemy side (the bridgehead) to allow the buildup and passage of a breakout force during gap crossing
(ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). The bridgehead is an area on the enemy side of the linear obstacle that is large
enough to accommodate the majority of the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the
crossing sites, provides security of crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing
the attack (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A). The bridgehead line is the limit of the objective area in the
development of the bridgehead (ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A).
Breakout Force
18-67. Breakout forces attack to seize objectives beyond the bridgehead as a continuation of the offense.
(See ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for more information on gap organization.)
Gap Crossing Planning
18-68. The discussion on planning mobility applies to gap crossing in ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A; however,
force allocation against enemy units has an added dimension of time that is affected by the crossing rate.
Friendly forces can only arrive at the crossing site at the rate at which they can cross the gap. This rate will
change at various times throughout the crossing. The rate at which combat forces need to cross will directly
affect the number of crossing sites.
18-69. A major control mechanism category is graphic control measures. The unit uses graphic control
measures to delineate areas of responsibility for subordinates and to ease traffic control. (See ATP 3-90.4/
MCTP 3-34A for more information on graphic control measures for a gap crossing.)
Gap Crossing Execution
18-70. A deliberate river crossing is costly in terms of manpower, equipment, and time. Generally, units
conduct it against a well-organized defense when a hasty river crossing is not possible or when one has failed.
A deliberate river crossing requires the concentration of combat power on a narrow front, capitalizing on the
element of surprise.
18-71. A division or corps deliberate river crossing is an operation conducted as part of an offensive
operation. A division is normally the smallest organization that can conduct a deliberate wet-gap crossing. It
is usually an implied task in a larger mission given by the corps. A gap crossing is usually not the final
objective; however, units must quickly cross a river and rapidly secure the bridgehead line to support follow-
on offensive action against the enemy. The enemy will normally use the gap as a tactical obstacle system to
slow and gain positional advantage against the division advance. The intent of the division is to maintain its
momentum through the crossing.
18-72. A deliberate wet-gap crossing has six phases. They are distinct phases for planning, but there is no
pause between them in execution. See table 18-3 for the phases.
Table 18-3. Deliberate wet-gap crossing phases
Phase Description
Set the Conditions The planning and continued targeting operations in the deep, close, and
support areas to defeat enemy forces deep as well as close to
synchronize one or more gap crossing operations with all warfighting
function capabilities in five domains against an adaptive enemy force.
Advance to the gap The attack to seize objectives that secure the near side terrain, which
offers favorable crossing sites and road networks and provides enough
area to stage crossing forces while preventing congestion and an
undesirable massing of assets.
Assault across the gap The units assaulting across the gap to seize the far side objective,
eliminating direct fire into the crossing sites. |
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Advance from the far side The attack to secure the exit bank and intermediate objectives that
eliminates direct and observed indirect fires into the crossing area.
Secure the bridgehead line The tasks necessary to secure bridgehead objectives, defeating any
enemy counterattacks. This gains the necessary time and space for the
buildup of forces for the attack out of the bridgehead.
Continue the attack The attack out of the bridgehead to defeat the enemy at a subsequent or
final objective. It is considered as a phase of the gap crossing because
the timing and initiation of this phase are typically dependent on the
success of the other four phases of the gap crossing.
CLEAR
18-73. Clear is both a tactical mobility task and a mobility task. The mobility task involves the total
elimination of an obstacle that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and explosive ordnance disposal
units. It is not normally performed under the threat of direct or indirect fire. Clearing is conducted to eliminate
tactical and protective obstacles affecting the operational area. Units may order clearing to facilitate
movement within an assigned area based on the mission variables. They may also order a critical route or
area cleared of obstacles. The task is conducted as a single mission to open or reopen routes not under
persistent surveillance or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of movement along routes here
a sustained threat exists along critical routes. (See ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for more information on
clearing.) |
3-90 | 357 | Chapter 19
Tactical Deception
This chapter addresses those considerations unique to tactical deception operations. It
provides an overview of tactical deception, principles, types, means, and variations. It
then discusses tactical deception planning, tactical deception in offensive and
defensive operations, and risk.
OVERVIEW OF DECEPTION
19-1. As a principle of war surprise is a combat multiplier that amplifies the effects of the other principles
of war. Its effective use allows friendly units to strike at a time and place or in a manner that the enemy is
unprepared for, which induces shock and causes hesitation. Every echelon works to achieve surprise in an
operation and only by multiple echelons working together is surprise achieved.
19-2. The easiest way to achieve surprise is to use deception. Units throughout history have used deception
to their advantage. It is an effective way to cause the enemy to dissipate their efforts and resources. Deception
enhances the conditions that allow friendly units to concentrate forces at decisive times and locations.
Executing tactical deception comes with costs. These costs include time, material, and risk. However, history
shows that executing deception at any scale and echelon is almost always worth the costs.
19-3. The enemy commander is the focus of tactical deception, but the enemy can delegate command
authority to an alternate decision maker. This means that someone other than the commander needs to be
deceived. Therefore, this chapter will refer to the enemy decision maker or commander as the deception
target. The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will
achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4).
19-4. Well planned and executed deception, not luck, achieves surprise and its benefits—in both the offense
and defense. Deception can be as simple as using camouflage to conceal friendly forces’ locations,
capabilities, or intent. It could be the use of decoys to create false data for the deception target to deal with.
Or it could be as complicated as a multi-phase and echelon operation that works in accordance to a larger
deception operation. To understand this better, there are two types of deception—military deception and
tactical deception.
MILITARY DECEPTION
19-5. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or
violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4). Military deception
is typically executed at the combatant command level and requires planning, approval, and execution to
adhere to theater-level instructions and AR 525-21. Additionally, information pertaining to tactical deception
(TAC-D) executed in support of a military deception, to include operations, training, and exercises are
generally classified at the Secret or higher level. The rest of this chapter is focused on tactical deception and
the principles, types, means, and variations used. (See FM 3-13.4 for more information and details on military
deception planning.)
TACTICAL DECEPTION
19-6. Tactical deception concepts do not tie into an overall military deception operation. Units must
understand that when executing TAC-D, they are not executing military deception at the tactical level.
Tactical deception is a friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction |
3-90 | 358 | Chapter 19
detrimental to their objectives. Tactical deception operations are designed to support the commander’s plan
by enhancing the probability of mission success. It allows units to create windows of opportunity by causing
the target to react or falsely interpret friendly operations. The purpose of TAC-D is to—
* Gain the initiative.
* Reduce overall operational risk.
* Preserve combat power.
19-7. Properly planned and executed deception operations will make it possible for units to “hide the real”
and “display the false.” Units use all available types, means, and variations of tactical deception to conceal
friendly locations, capability, or intent until a time and place of the friendly commander’s choosing.
19-8. TAC-D by itself is never decisive, although it may be a main effort at some point during the operation.
This distinguishes TAC-D from offensive, defensive, or stability operations and solidifies it as an enabling
operation. As with all enabling operations, units use TAC-D operations to complement current operations;
transition between phases; transition between offense, defense, or stability; or set conditions for future
operations.
19-9. Tactical deception is an effective way to cause the enemy to squander time and resources on irrelevant
objectives. Leaders conduct TAC-D at every echelon with either the resources they have or with assistance
from their higher echelon. Integrating deception between echelons can be a useful tool in altering how the
enemy views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response to friendly operations.
19-10. If the deception effect would affect the friendly force scheme of maneuver outside the echelon’s
assigned area, it needs to be approved by the commander two echelons above the executing unit. For example,
by using decoys in the defense to make friendly forces look three times bigger than it is and cause the enemy
to attack elsewhere needs to be coordinated and approved by higher echelon commanders. If a unit is directly
told to execute a deception action by their higher headquarters, the assumption is the higher headquarters has
already received approval for that order.
19-11. TAC-D is a commander driven activity that is structured around principles, types, means, and
variations used to set favorable conditions to achieve friendly objectives. Commanders decide the location
and time to employ deception in support of operations. The principles of tactical deception provide
subordinates fundamental guidance during the planning of all tactical deception operations. The desired effect
describes the level of uncertainty that the friendly commander wants to achieve against an enemy decision
maker. The means are the tools that friendly commanders use to accomplish tactical deception. Typically,
the means are found in either the coordinating instructions of an order or through commander’s guidance.
Variations of tactical deception are missions that a higher headquarters can assign to a subordinate unit. Vital
to the unit’s ability to execute tactical deception is through maintaining operational security and ensuring the
realism.
PRINCIPLES OF TACTICAL DECEPTION
19-12. Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, the six
principles of tactical deception provide guidance to planning deception. The principles of deception are—
* Centralized planning and control.
* Focus.
* Integration.
* Objective.
* Security.
* Timing.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND CONTROL
19-13. A centralized approach is necessary to provide clarity and to ensure various elements portray the
same story and do not conflict with other objectives or evolving conditions in an operational environment.
Execution of tactical deception may be decentralized as long as all participating organizations adhere to a
single plan. Once the commander approves the deception plan, the designated operational element monitors |
3-90 | 359 | Tactical Deception
the situation and its effects on the target, as well as friendly and partnered forces to ensure synchronization,
deconfliction, and OPSEC.
FOCUS
19-14. The deception plan should focus on the thought process of the deception target since they have the
authority and capability of triggering the desired actions. The enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets are normally targeted. The nine forms of contact are the primary conduit used in the
deception plan to convey selected information to the deception target. Focused deception must cause the
enemy force to commit an action or inaction. See discussion beginning in paragraph 1-60 for the nine forms
of contact.
INTEGRATION
19-15. Units should integrate deception throughout the planning process at all levels since deception is an
integral part of any operation. This integration includes developing a concept for deception that supports the
overall mission as part of COA development. An integration of the deception operation throughout all phases
of the operation begins with planning, continues through execution, and concludes with the termination of
the deception.
OBJECTIVE
19-16. Deception plans focus actions and resources that motivate an enemy to cause desired actions or
inactions. The plan cannot focus solely on motivating the deception target to believe certain things. It must
lead to the deception target taking a specific course of action, known as the objective of the deception.
SECURITY
19-17. Successful deception requires strict security that begins before execution with measures to deny the
enemy knowledge of the friendly force’s intent to deceive. Successful deceptions apply strict need to know
criteria to each aspect of the plan. Maintaining this operational security means limiting the number of planners
and participants to those needed.
TIMING
19-18. Critical to deception planning is proper synchronization with the commander’s intent and
maintaining synchronization during execution. Timing in deception operations is crucial. The challenge is to
get the deception target to act in accordance with the deception plan within the timelines required by the
friendly operation. Planners should conduct a thorough analysis to understand the amount of time required
for an effect to pass through the forms of contact before reaching a deception target. Friendly deception
executions must be completed in a manner that accounts for the time consumed by the enemy’s intelligence
collection and analysis process. The enemy’s decision-making process and current activity is what must be
exploited by friendly forces.
TYPES OF TACTICAL DECEPTION
19-19. All deception aims to either increase or decrease the level of uncertainty in the mind of the deception
target. This dilemma has the potential to compel the deception target to mistakenly perceive friendly motives,
intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities thereby altering the enemy’s assessment and ultimately their
actions. Two generally recognized types of deception are—
* Ambiguity-increasing (confusion effect).
* Ambiguity-decreasing (confirmation effect).
AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION (CONFUSION EFFECT)
19-20. Ambiguity-increasing deception provides the presentation of excessive true and false information to
confuse the deception target and create internal conflict. This provides the enemy with many plausible |
3-90 | 360 | Chapter 19
friendly courses of action through evidence of intentions and capabilities that the friendly force does not
possess. Critical to the confusion effect is that the evidence presented must be doctrinally feasible. The
desired outcome would be action or inaction from the enemy that would lead to a tactical advantage for the
friendly force. These actions could include a delay of a specific decision, operational paralysis, or the
distribution of enemy forces to locations that cannot influence friendly efforts. This effect is best used when
the deception target tends to be indecisive or risk adverse.
AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION (CONFIRMATION EFFECT)
19-21. Ambiguity-decreasing deception exploits deception targets’ pre-existing beliefs by confirming their
desired expectations. This is provided to them through conditioning and diversion of intentional observations
that convinces the enemy to be at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and under equipped. The intent is to
hide the real friendly intentions and current capabilities from the enemy through a vigorous defense of
friendly force information requirements. This information, if uncovered, would be detrimental to the
accomplishment of the mission for the friendly unit. The confirmation effect is best employed when deception
targets tend to accept higher levels of risk with their force and are resolute in their decision making.
19-22. Both types are applied by using the deception principles. These principles can be best employed
when the friendly unit has a reliable understanding of the current situation because desired effects of tactical
deception provide a foundation to build their deception plan on in the planning process.
TACTICAL DECEPTION MEANS
19-23. Deceptions means are applied to observables to increase the probability of being accepted by the
deception target. Deception means are methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey
information to the deception target (JP 3-13.4). There are two tactical deception means categories: physical
and technical. Planners normally employ deception plans to supplement several means that aim to mislead
multiple types of enemy sensors. This increases credibility and the likelihood of deceiving the deception
target. Tactical deception means provide the signatures, associations, and profiles of friendly alleged
activities to the enemy. Units employ as many means as possible within their capabilities to support tactical
deception during all types of operations.
PHYSICAL MEANS
19-24. Physical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey information normally derived
from direct observation or active sensors by the deception target. Most physical means also have technical
signatures visible to sensors that collect scientifically or electronically. Planners typically evaluate physical
means using characteristics such as shape, size, function, quantity, movement pattern, location, activity, and
association with the surroundings. Examples might include—
* Movement of forces.
* Decoy equipment and devices.
* Security measures, such as camouflage and concealment.
* Tactical actions, such as feints and demonstrations.
* Reconnaissance, security, and surveillance activities.
Movement of Forces
19-25. Units frequently reposition forces to increase ambiguity to ongoing or planned operations. They also
do this to hide the main effort. This repositioning is not limited to only maneuver forces but can also apply
to command and control nodes, fires, and sustainment assets. This frequent repositioning requires detailed
terrain management and coordination across all echelons to prevent inadvertent concentration of forces,
unnecessary congestion of routes, and reduce the likelihood of the repositioning creating unanticipated seams
and gaps between units. |
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Decoy Equipment and Devices
19-26. Within their capabilities units use decoys to mislead enemy intelligence collection and direct the
enemy’s attention away from actual forces. These actions can include creating artificial pieces of equipment
to constructing false battle positions that include appropriate cover and concealment. These include using
devices that create false electromagnetic signatures.
Security Measures
19-27. Units employ OPSEC and execute survivability operations to protect friendly forces from enemy
detection. Camouflage blends friendly actions and capabilities with their surroundings while concealment
makes those actions and capabilities unobservable to the enemy. When used in conjunction with other
physical and technical means, camouflage and concealment aid in protecting friendly forces while
simultaneously seeking to deceive an enemy. OPSEC includes denying the enemy access to information on
friendly forces. From a physical means perspective examples include but are not limited to denying personnel
access to friendly bases and locations and establishing blocking positions to hinder an enemy’s ability to
obtain visual contact on unit assembly areas by establishing checkpoints along routes.
Tactical Actions
19-28. Units can employ any number of actions to support tactical deception. These can range from larger
scale actions, such as feints and demonstrations, to small unit actions such as frequent repositioning of forces.
Commanders at all levels ensure their units incorporate tactical deception within their plans.
Reconnaissance, Security Operations, and Surveillance
19-29. As the enemy begins to lose its active intelligence collection capability, its ability to detect the
friendly force’s deception becomes progressively more difficult. Established procedures and doctrine make
friendly deception operations easier to conduct. These procedures result in distinct and recognizable offensive
patterns. Many units have enhanced their offensive capabilities by applying deception variations.
19-30. Increasing patrol and reconnaissance activities in areas away from the main attack may confuse the
enemy. However, friendly activities should not vary with normal procedures to the extent that they reveal
friendly forces who are engaged in deception. For example, a friendly commander may conduct
reconnaissance in an area away from the main effort’s objective, potentially causing the enemy to shift focus
away from the friendly force’s main effort.
TECHNICAL MEANS
19-31. Technical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey or deny selected
information or signatures. Often technical means use technical equipment, to or from the deception target,
by manipulating electromagnetic, acoustic, or other forms of energy, or through smell. Technical means may
be applied with corresponding physical means or alone to replicate something physical that is absent from
visual contact. Planners integrate technical means with other technical activities of the operation. Higher
headquarters may impose restrictions and limitations on the use of specific technical means for TAC-D. This
is because they might interfere with an ongoing military deception or the effects of the technical means might
extend into another friendly units assigned area. Examples of technical means might include—
* The establishment of communications networks and interactive transmissions that replicate a
specific unit type, size, or activity.
* Emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors associated with a specific capability or
activity.
* Organic capabilities that disrupt an enemy sensor or affect data transmission.
Table 19-1 on page 19-6 describes how both physical and technical means enable techniques to provide
deception. |
3-90 | 362 | Chapter 19
Table 19-1. Sample deception techniques
Technique Deception created Example
Amplifying To make a force appear larger and more Increase radio traffic through
signatures capable or to simulate the deployment of critical the use of scripts.
capabilities.
Suppressing To make a force appear smaller and less Radio silence and
signatures capable or to conceal the deployment of critical communication windows.
capabilities.
Overloading enemy To confuse or corrupt their collection assets by Use of decoys to portray a
sensors providing multiple false indicators and displays. larger force.
Repackaging known To generate new or deceptive profiles that Movement of critical assets
organizational or increase or decrease the ambiguity of friendly to mislead organizational
capability signatures activity or intent. size.
Conditioning the To desensitize to particular patterns of friendly Increased targeting of
enemy behavior and to induce enemy perceptions that enemy observation points to
are exploitable at the time of friendly choosing. delude their threat template.
Reinforcing the To mislead by portraying one course of action Suppression fires at a false
impression when actually taking a different one. breach.
Conditioning the To believe that an apparently standard routine Increased reconnaissance
target by repetition will be pursued while in fact preparing a quite on the most favorable
different course of action. friendly avenue of approach.
Leading the enemy To believe that nothing has changed by covertly Using unfavorable weather
by substitution substituting the false for the real, and vice conditions (limited visibility)
versa. to replace a real force with a
decoy force.
Leading the enemy To believe that valuable information has come Leaving a partially
by mistake into their possession through a breach of deconstructed terrain model
security, negligence, or inefficiency. for enemy recon to find.
VARIATIONS OF TACTICAL DECEPTION
19-32. Tactical deception variations are operational constructs that encompass a broad range of deceptive
activity and information integrated as a component of the overall plan. A unit may be told to conduct one of
the two variations of TAC-D: feints and demonstrations. These variations are often best employed in TAC-
D to support the commander’s objectives. These variations should not be confused with the tactical deception
means; they are deliberate operations that require higher echelons approval. The selected variation and its
use depend on the planners’ understanding of the current situation as well as the commander’s desired end
state. All other deception guidance should be issued in the coordinating instructions or done to accomplish
the commander’s intent.
19-33. Units should consider cost of tactical deception in terms of resource expenditure. For tactical
deception to appear real, units must dedicate adequate resources. Units should also measure costs in risk and
flexibility. For example, it may be very risky for the success of a unit’s main effort to rely solely on the
success of a planned demonstration. Should the demonstration not produce the expected enemy reaction, it
could cause the main effort to fail. Flexibility is built into the plan by using branches, sequels, or executable
deceptions.
19-34. While feints and demonstrations are specific tactical deception operations, they are not the sole way
a unit should use tactical deception. Units can use many of the variations of offensive and defensive
operations to deceive an enemy. For example, units can incorporate a retrograde that forces the enemy into
an engagement area. Units use their collective creativity, within the time, resources, and authorities allowed
to develop plans that achieve the commander’s end state.
19-35. Whenever units determine to use feints, demonstrations, or another variation of offensive or
defensive operations as a means of deception they are required to gain approval. This approval comes from
the commander that is two echelons higher than the requesting units, for example a corps commander is the |
3-90 | 363 | Tactical Deception
approval authority for a brigade commander requesting to execute a feint or demonstration as part of their
plan,
19-36. Units have two options to disseminate the tactical deception plan to their subordinates. It is
imperative that the unit maintains operational security for the success of the operation. The first option is for
the unit’s leaders to know the true task and purpose of the organization, subordinates may receive a different
task and purpose in order to maintain operational security. The second option is for the unit to provide
complete briefings to their subordinates. In both options, caution must be exercised to ensure that deception
details are not mentioned in their operation orders. OPSEC must be recognized as a vital element of the
variation of the tactical deception.
FEINT
19-37. A feint is a variation of tactical deception that makes contact solely to deceive the adversary as
to the location, time of attack, or both. The feint leads the enemy into erroneous conclusions about friendly
dispositions. Feints are usually offensive in nature and closely resemble an attack; however, they can be
executed during other operations. A feint requires engagement with the enemy to give the appearance of the
main attack. See table 19-2 on page 19-9 for the tactical planning symbol.
19-38. The principal difference between a feint and an attack is that friendly forces assign their troops an
objective limited in size, scope, or some other measure. It should contribute to the overall accomplishment
of the mission and deceive the enemy. Forces conducting feints make direct fire contact with enemy forces
and potentially decisively engage to draw resources from the enemy to enable the success of the friendly
force’s main effort. Several purposes for feints include causing the deception target to—
* Employ their second-echelon forces other than intended.
* Move away from the main attack toward the feint or to hold the enemy’s second echelon force in
its current location.
* Shift its supporting fires from the friendly main attack to the feint.
* Reveal enemy defensive fires and capabilities.
19-39. A single event feint might not always deliver the desired effect. Instead, a series of recurring feints
might be necessary to deceive the enemy decision maker. For example, repeated raids may condition the
enemy to confirm the commander’s perception that the friendly commander lacks the combat power to
conduct a main attack. The enemy may become so accustomed to the pattern of raids that it takes little or no
action when the friendly main attack actually occurs. The enemy will consider it as another raid.
19-40. Another important consideration for the execution of a feint is the location. Observing the terrain
and enemy disposition, the commander or staff considers—
* The enemy’s area of interest. The deception target may not react as desired to the presented threat
because it is of little value to the enemy.
* Whether or not the enemy may displace its force if the feint is deployed beyond the range of its
direct and indirect fires, based on its current positions.
* An assigned area that is sufficient for the successful execution of the feint without interfering with
the main attack.
19-41. Units conduct feints before or during the main attack. Therefore, planners consider the timing of the
main attack in determining the time for the feint. The estimated time necessary for the enemy to react in the
desired manner also influences the timing of the tactical deception. A feint before a main attack usually
requires carefully determined lead time.
19-42. The precise time a feint occurs will vary depending on the commander’s intent. Moving additional
forces will require more time than shifting fires. For example, if the intent is to move the second echelon
forces, the feint has to be initiated well ahead of the main effort.
19-43. A feint conducted simultaneously with the main attack may cause the enemy to divert its attention
and possibly a portion of its forces and supporting fires. A feint conducted after the main attack is launched
can hold the enemy’s uncommitted forces in its present location. Faced with a new threat, the enemy becomes
uncertain about the location of the main effort. |
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19-44. Friendly forces consider the pattern of previous operations. For example, if friendly forces have
regularly made attacks two hours before daylight, it may be desirable to conduct a feint at this time. Although
the timing of a feint is influenced by such factors, the timing of the main effort would most likely be the main
consideration.
DEMONSTRATION
19-45. A demonstration is a variation of tactical deception used as a show of force in an area where a
unit does not seek a decision and attempts to mislead an adversary. It is similar to a feint, but direct or
indirect contact with the adversary is not intended. A demonstration may be conducted for the purpose of
deceiving the enemy by visual contact with the expectation of luring them into a COA favorable to friendly
lines of operation. While a demonstration has certain advantages over the feint, it lacks the realism.
Paragraphs 19-46 and 19-47 lists some advantages and disadvantages of using a demonstration. See
table 19-2 for the tactical planning symbol.
19-46. The advantages of a demonstration are—
* Absence of direct and indirect contact with the enemy facilitates subsequent employment of the
demonstration force elsewhere.
* A full force is not always necessary because no contact is made with the enemy. It is essential that
a demonstration is combined with real capabilities to provide a creditable threat.
* It permits the use of simulation devices, when available, in place of real items to deceive the
enemy’s information collection.
19-47. The disadvantages of a demonstration are—
* It is more difficult to validate the threat to the enemy without direct or indirect contact.
* It is more likely that a demonstration will be identified as a deception earlier in the operation than
a feint.
19-48. A demonstration can be used successfully when there is time and distance between the enemy
positions and the demonstration force that makes the lack of contact appear realistic to enemy forces. In
essence, a demonstration attempts to gain enemy response in an area where a friendly force is displayed.
However, as the enemy reacts the friendly force withdraws without engagement.
19-49. The direct exposure of sustainment operations can illustrate a demonstration. Many times,
sustainment operations are much more visible than combat preparations and become a key indicator of
location, type, and time for when combat operations will be conducted. Sustainment operations used in
support of tactical deception seek to confirm the deception target’s perceptions as to where friendly forces
will commit their main efforts.
19-50. After the unit determines what variation of tactical deception it wants to use to enable its operation,
the unit determines its observables. Observables are often made up of executions, which can include events,
activities, or elements of information that must be seen or sensed by the target to form the desired perceptions. |
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Table 19-2. Forms of tactical deception and planning symbols
Forms of Tactical Deception Tactical Symbol
Feint
Demonstration
TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANNING
19-51. Units should consider deception in all activities of the operations process. It is unlikely that an under
resourced and nonintegrated tactical deception will succeed, and the longer tactical deception is not accounted
for in the operations process, the more probability it will fail. Tactical deception can be used to support a
range of missions and to prevent duplication of deception efforts; therefore, leaders should coordinate tactical
deceptions both laterally and vertically. Preparing and executing a tactical deception requires the same
considerations as any operation but has some key additions in the planning phase.
19-52. Tactical deception is integrated early during the planning process to increase its effectiveness in
causing the enemy to act or react in a desired manner. Prior to the integration of deception, commanders must
determine the desired effects on the enemy. Tactical deception focuses on the enemy’s decision-making
process. Tactical deception must end in an enemy decision to act or not act in a way that supports an operation.
The enemy decision-making process occurs in the see-think-do planning methodology:
* See: What significant physical and technical indicators can the enemy see, sense, or detect?
* Think: Do these indicators lead the enemy to believe what it sees, senses, or detects?
* Do: Has the enemy decided on an action or inaction based on what it believes?
19-53. Planners use the see-think-do planning methodology in reverse to guide deception planning,
execution, and assessment. Planners begin by identifying what they want the enemy to do, then determining
what the enemy must think in order to act as desired, and finally establishing what the deception target must
see to encourage thinking that way. Successful deception operations are those that do more than make the
target believe or think the deception is true. The deception target must make a decision to act or not act in a
way that favors friendly operations.
19-54. Deception planners use this planning methodology to ensure that each tactical deception is properly
constructed. They develop courses of action based on the tactical plan. They integrate any revised
commander’s guidance and updated intelligence analysis to refine and complete their deception plan using
the six-step deception planning process. (See FM 3-13.4 for more detail on tactical deception planning
process.)
TACTICAL DECEPTION IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
19-55. The intent of TAC-D in the offense is to enhance the friendly force’s course of action by avoiding
the enemy’s strengths, striking their weaknesses, and gaining overall surprise. An important consideration in
tactical deception is that the unit must be able to exercise some influence over its assigned area. The unit
needs to influence through some offensive action and not merely react to the enemy’s defensive actions. |
3-90 | 366 | Chapter 19
Showing the enemy multiple observables of a particular intention is the most convincing way to sell the
tactical deception.
19-56. The unit’s tactical deception should be employed in an environment in which the unit has more
options available than the enemy has combat power to cover. If the enemy can effectively defend against all
avenues of approach, then deceiving it as to the friendly choice becomes much less significant. As influence
over the assigned area begins to increase, the unit’s options and, therefore, its opportunity for deception begin
to increase. As the enemy’s influence begins to diminish, its intelligence collection capability becomes more
degraded by increasing friendly control of the assigned area. Consequently, the enemy’s ability to assess
friendly capabilities and probable intentions shifts to an environment of relative uncertainty. The
opportunities for deception continue to increase. The enemy is required to make more tactical decisions based
on the remaining, often uncorroborated, intelligence.
19-57. Deception operations induce the enemy decision maker to view the operation from multiple courses
of action. This provides friendly commanders the ability to develop favorable and exploitable courses of
action. Because of induced misperceptions of the battlefield, the enemy in defense is not given time to identify
the composition, location, and time of the friendly force’s attack.
19-58. As the enemy begins to lose its active intelligence collection capability, its ability to detect the
friendly force’s deception becomes progressively more difficult. Established procedures and doctrine make
friendly deception operations easier to conduct. These procedures result in distinct and recognizable offensive
patterns. Many units have enhanced their offensive capabilities by applying deception variations.
19-59. Increasing patrol and reconnaissance activities in areas away from the main attack may confuse the
enemy. However, friendly activities should not vary with normal procedures to the extent that they reveal
friendly forces who are engaged in deception. For example, a friendly commander may conduct
reconnaissance in an area away from the main effort’s objective, potentially causing the enemy to shift focus
away from the friendly force’s main effort.
TACTICAL DECEPTION IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
19-60. Due to the relatively static nature of defensive operations at the lower tactical levels, tactical
deception takes on an increased importance. Tactical deception is used in the defense to preserve combat
power by hiding the location of friendly forces in the main battle area, the main effort, and friendly reserves.
By concealing friendly defensive positions, this preserves combat power and improves survivability. This
causes the enemy to expend combat power and exhaust intelligence efforts and resources unprofitably.
Creating false targets to cause the enemy to misuse reconnaissance efforts and firepower is a concurrent,
coordinated activity during all phases of the defense to cause the enemy to pursue a COA favorable to friendly
operations.
19-61. At the point of the attack, the enemy has decided on its course of action. It is easier to convince the
enemy to continue that course rather than alter its plans or tactics. A successful tactical deception operation
conducted by a defender can result in the inappropriate deployment of attacking enemy forces. Maintaining
that tactical deception can result in the continued commitment of enemy forces at a time and location least
advantageous to the enemy.
19-62. In the defense, operational security is an ally of tactical deception. For example, the enemy has
decided on a course of action, it is easier to convince them to continue their course of action than alter their
plan. A successful deception in the defense can result in the inappropriate deployment of attacking enemy
forces. The far easier task of maintaining that deception can result in the continued commitment of enemy
forces at a time and location least advantageous to them.
RISK TO TACTICAL DECEPTION
19-63. Tactical deception, by its very nature, implies taking calculated risks to gain the tactical advantage
over the enemy. Planned deceptions allow friendly forces to sequence the presentation of the battlefield to
the enemy in the manner in which friendly forces allows the enemy to view the battlefield. |
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19-64. Units should be aware that deceptions may produce unintended and unwanted consequences.
Believing that a threat is real, an enemy can act unpredictably. Proper planning and coordination and knowing
the enemy can reduce the chance that deceptions will result in unfavorable action. Friendly forces consider
second- and third-order effects of the deception plan to mitigate unintended consequences. The possibility of
failure stems from the uncertainties surrounding how the target receives and interprets information intended
for the target and, eventually, how it affects the target’s desired perceptions. If discovered, resources used
for the deception may be in jeopardy. As with any military operation that puts forces at risk, leaders decide
to use deception after a deliberate assessment that weighs opportunity against need and cost against benefit. |
3-90 | 369 | Chapter 20
Linkup
This chapter addresses those considerations unique to a linkup. This chapter addresses
the general considerations for a linkup, planning and preparing a linkup, and types of
linkup.
LINKUP OPERATIONS
20-1. A linkup is a type of enabling operation that involves the meeting of friendly ground forces, which
occurs in a variety of circumstances. For example, when converging maneuver forces meet, when an
advancing force reaches an objective area previously seized by an airborne or air assault force, when an
encircled force breaks out to rejoin friendly forces, and when a force comes to the relief of an encircled force.
During optimal linkup conditions, there is a stationary force and a linkup force. However, both forces may
be moving toward each other simultaneously. Whenever possible, the joining forces exchange as much
information as possible prior to starting the linkup.
PLANNING A LINKUP
20-2. A linkup is a complex operation that requires detailed planning and coordination. Planning for a linkup
is coordinated as far in advance as possible to allow coordination between the two or more friendly units.
Commanders and staffs coordinate responsibilities to preventing fratricide and ensure mission success.
Command and Control
20-3. The headquarters directing the linkup operation must establish command relationships and
responsibilities of the forces involved. Both the linkup force and the force with which linkup is to be made
can remain under control of the directing headquarters. The communications plan includes the channels for
radio communications between the two forces. It must prescribe day and night identification procedures,
including primary and alternate means. Aircraft can extend communications range. Units can use visual
signals such as flares or panels during daylight and flashlights or infrared devices during darkness. To prevent
friendly troops from exchanging fires, recognition signals must be established and communicated between
the linkup forces. They may be pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, panels, colored smoke, distinctive
light patterns, and passwords.
20-4. The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes—
* A common operational picture using available command and control systems, ideally both
digitally and analog.
* Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during, and after linkup.
* Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup, including control measures.
* A linkup method.
* Recognition signals (near and far) and communication procedures, such as pyrotechnics, vehicle
markings, gun tube orientation, panels, colored smoke, lights, and challenge and passwords.
* Operations to conduct following linkup.
Intelligence
20-5. The linkup force will begin the IPB process in preparation for the operation essentially as for any
offensive or defensive operation. The significant difference is that the commander and staff will have to
consider the location and effect of other friendly forces on the enemy forces within the assigned area. As a |
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result, the probable enemy course of action, situation template, and event template must include both the
stationary and maneuvering forces perspective of the operation.
Movement and Maneuver
20-6. Linkup operations of two or more friendly forces are conducted to—
* Complete the encirclement of an enemy force.
* Assist the breakout of an encircled friendly force.
* Join an attacking force with a force operating adjacent to it.
* Join an attacking force with airborne or air assault elements following a vertical envelopment.
20-7. The two forces carefully define and coordinate their schemes of maneuver, placing particular attention
to graphic control measures and the subsequent mission to be performed by each force after linkup is
complete. A linkup point is normally positioned behind or along one flank of the enemy’s positions.
20-8. A linkup point is a designated place where two forces are scheduled to meet. This point should be large
enough for all forces to assemble and it should offer cover and concealment for these forces. When planning
a linkup point, the staff should look for an easily identifiable point on the ground. The staff should position
linkup points on defensible terrain located away from normal enemy movement routes. Planned alternate
linkup points provide needed flexibility. A liaison is normally established during planning and continues
throughout the operation to facilitate coordination between the two forces. See paragraph A-27 for definition
and symbol.
20-9. Units carefully coordinate linkup operations with forces of other nations. This is especially true if the
two forces are not both members of an alliance with established internationally standardized procedures, or
if the forces involved have not previously established the necessary procedures. In such situations, extensive
use of liaison is necessary to ensure understanding and synchronization of operations. Additional rehearsals
may be necessary to ensure maneuver forces clearly understand the operation or to ensure no hostile actions
affect the stationary force. Aircraft can improve and expedite this coordination.
20-10. The engineers will be task-organized to conduct mobility operations. The speed of the operation will
be essential, whether it is designed to assist in the movement towards the linkup point with an encircled force
or to complete the encirclement of the enemy.
Fires
20-11. When a division or corps directs a linkup operation, they normally establish fire support coordination
measures for both forces. Fire support coordination measures are adjusted as one force moves toward the
other. A restricted fire line is established between the forces when necessary, usually at the point where the
two forces plan to establish contact. During linkup operations, particularly with airborne or air assault forces,
indirect fire support becomes extremely important. The division artillery headquarters must ensure timely
dissemination of information and coordination so that fires do not engage friendly aircraft supporting the
airborne or air assault forces.
Sustainment
20-12. Sustainment support requirements may be greater during linkup operations than during other
operations. Additional considerations for planning logistics support in linkup operations include—
* Distance to the objective area.
* Duration to hold the objective area.
* Planned operations or movement out of the objective area.
* Resupply of the stationary force.
* Movement of drop zones and landing zones of airborne or air assault forces involved in the linkup.
* LOCs secured by follow-on forces.
20-13. Supply requirements for a linkup operation may exceed the transportation capability of the unit
conducting the linkup. The sustainment elements may have to request additional vehicles or resupply by air.
In linkup operations with airborne and air assault forces, priority for supply by air is given to the forces |
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assaulting the objective area. Supplies for the linkup forces normally move by land transportation. However,
when the objective area is to be defended jointly by the linkup and airborne or air assault force, supplies for
the linkup force maybe flown into the objective area and stockpiled.
20-14. Evacuation of equipment and wounded may create major problems for a linkup force. If supply
routes are open, the normal evacuation procedures apply. When ground routes are not secure, helicopters
may be used for evacuation of wounded while damaged equipment may be moved forward with the linkup
forces until a suitable opportunity for evacuation is available.
PREPARATION FOR A LINKUP
20-15. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces opportunities for success during the
linkup. Units rehearse, refine the linkup plan, and conduct liaison activities prior to the execution for the
linkup.
Command and Control
20-16. Staffs will walk the subordinate forces through a rehearsal of the operation. While this occurs, they
will ensure that the control measures established for the operation are effective. Specifically, they will want
to monitor the progress of the subordinate forces as they maneuver along the axis of advance. Simultaneously,
they will be prepared to issue a fragmentary order for a hasty defense or attack, depending on the situation.
Actions on contact and operating within the commander’s guidance are aspects of the operation that the
commander will want to ensure that subordinates completely understand.
Intelligence
20-17. The intelligence staffs will prepare for the linkup by war-gaming the operation with the commander.
They will want to ensure that the unit is prepared for likely enemy’s actions, preventing the linkup from
occurring. Additionally, they will want to practice the conduct of the linkup and subsequent operations within
the context of the enemy situation.
Movement and Maneuver
20-18. There will probably be little time to conduct a combined arms rehearsal for movement and maneuver,
especially due to the time-sensitive nature of the operation. The commanders will issue the order and attempt
to walk the executing forces through the operation. The rehearsal will stress the linkup and the coordination
required to linkup without confusion. Moreover, it will ensure that each force is prepared to respond to a
meeting engagement or enemy attack during the linkup. A commander’s primary concern is that subordinate
forces focus on the complexity of the linkup.
Fires
20-19. The fire support coordination cell will ensure that the counterpart force in the linkup operation,
whether moving or stationary, has the fire support plan. Specifically, the cell will want to ensure that both
forces completely understand the fire control measures, coordinated fire lines and restricted fire lines. Further,
if these control measures shift during the operation, the conditions and signals under which the change occurs
must also be coordinated. Units position air defense assets to support the force as in a movement to contact
or deliberate attack. Units will want to ensure that air defense will be prepared to protect the forces at the
linkup point. This is where the two forces could collide and become congested.
Sustainment
20-20. The sustainment elements will organize as they do for any other offensive operation. However, as
mentioned earlier, they will carry additional supplies and material if they are conducting the linkup with an
encircled force. Generally, this will include Class I, III, V, and VIII items. The logistic staffs will also ensure
that each force understands the distribution plan, including traffic control. They will want to push as much
material forward as possible during this operation. This is because the force will not only expend supplies as |
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it attacks, but once having conducted the linkup, it can expect to continue the mission (even if it is to remain
in place and defend), which will require even more supplies.
EXECUTION FOR A LINKUP
20-21. The commander must be able to observe the progress of the operation. Generally, this means that
the commander will follow the lead force. If a particular flank is of concern during the operation or a
supporting attack is required to penetrate the enemy’s lines, then the unit will place a headquarters where it
can observe the force’s secondary action. The commander and operations officer must remain in
communication throughout the operation, using the main command post if necessary to relay messages. The
staff must maintain the tempo of the operation because a stalled force is difficult to get moving again. Forces
must have the ability to move forward from time to time to continue the forward momentum on the operation.
The staff monitors the actions of subordinate forces to ensure that the control measures established in
planning the operation are still valid. The staff will issue a fragmentary order for changes as necessary.
20-22. As the force begins to maneuver, the intelligence staffs will monitor the enemy situation. They will
also monitor the situation facing the linkup force. Together this information will portray an overall enemy
disposition which will greatly assist the intelligence staffs in calculating the enemy’s most probable course
of action. The intelligence staffs identify as far in advance as possible the direction, strength, and time of the
enemy counterattack. Likewise, they will also advise the commander of any identifiable weaknesses within
the counterattack.
20-23. The initial conduct of the linkup will be identical to a movement to contact or deliberate attack,
depending on the enemy situation. As the forces begin to maneuver, they will attempt to establish and
maintain contact with their corresponding friendly force. Each force will monitor the progress of the other,
adjusting the plan as necessary. The linkup point can be moved closer to the linkup force if it is unable to
travel at a speed proportionate with the plan. Similarly, the fire control measures will also adjust. As the two
forces draw closer, higher headquarters controls the maneuvering forces. If possible, the forces will also
attempt to establish contact on a predesignated frequency to control the actual linkup. At this point, the
momentum of the operation will slow to help prevent fratricide. The tradeoff may be that some enemy forces
may slip between the two closing forces. Coordination signals identify each force as it approaches the linkup
point.
20-24. The fire control measures shift based on the progress of the forces and the enemy situation.
Specifically, the coordinated fire lines, which will initially protect each force as it maneuvers, change to
protect the two forces as they begin to meet. Restricted fire lines prevent fratricide between the linkup forces.
Once the linkup has occurred, the stationary and linkup forces organize as per the higher headquarters’ plan
for future operations. If possible, the air defense elements in both linkup forces should monitor the same early
warning net. This is particularly important if the linkup is attempting to reach an encircled force. This unity
of air defense effort will ensure the most appropriate use of weapon systems and reduce unnecessary
redundancy. Once the linkup is complete, air defense assets may be reorganized to support the next operation.
20-25. The engineers will provide mobility support to the higher headquarters, probably as attached
elements of the lead forces. Once the linkup is complete, engineers may assist in countermobility or
survivability operations depending on the plan. Another task organization may be required on the objective
to accomplish the new missions.
20-26. Sustainment priorities focus on the forward movement of the force. Evacuation will be forward to
logistics resupply points, reducing the turnaround time for recovery assets. As the linkup forces begin to
close, sustainment assets must be as far forward as possible. Time is essential to the success of this operation,
so assets must be prepared to keep pace with extremely fast operations. They must be prepared to address the
immediate needs of the encircled force, to stockpile ammunition, or to move to other positions if the force
should revert to a defensive posture. |
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TYPES OF LINKUPS
20-27. The linkup force concentrates its efforts on completing the linkup. Linkup operations frequently will
require a passage of lines. Regardless of the purpose of the linkup, the operation will take on one of two
forms:
* Linkup of a moving force with a stationary force.
* Linkup of two moving forces.
LINKUP OF A MOVING FORCE WITH A STATIONARY FORCE
20-28. To ensure the forces join without engaging one another, linkup points are at locations where the axis
of advance of the linkup force intersects the security elements of the stationary force. (See figure 20-1.) These
points must be readily recognizable to both forces. Units plan alternate points in the event enemy activities
cause linkup at places other than those planned. The number of linkup points selected depends on the terrain
and number of routes used by the linkup force. Personnel in the linkup force must be thoroughly familiar
with mutual identification procedures and plans for rapid passage of lines. Stationary forces assist in the
linkup by opening lanes in minefields, breaching or removing selected obstacles, furnishing guides, and
designating avenues of approach. Use of a common radio frequency enhances coordination and
responsiveness between forces.
Figure 20-1. Linkup of a moving force with a stationary force
LINKUP OF TWO MOVING FORCES
20-29. Linkup between two moving forces is one of the most difficult operations often conducted to
complete the encirclement of an enemy force. Units plan primary and alternate linkup points for two moving
forces on boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge. As linking forces move closer, positive
control must be coordinated to ensure they avoid firing on one another. This deliberate coordination ensures |
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the enemy does not escape between the two forces. Leading elements of each force should monitor a common
radio network. Figure 20-2 depicts a linkup of two moving forces.
Figure 20-2. Linkup of two moving forces
ACTIONS FOLLOWING LINKUP
20-30. When the linkup is made, the linkup force may join the stationary force, or it may pass through or
around to continue the attack. If the linkup force is to continue operations in conjunction with the stationary
force, a single commander for the overall force should be designated. The linkup force may immediately pass
through the perimeter of the stationary forces, be assigned objectives within the perimeter, or be assigned
objectives outside the perimeter, depending on its mission. Plans for these operations must be made in
advance. |
3-90 | 375 | Appendix A
Tactical Control Measures
This appendix expands the control measure discussion from Chapter 1 and explains
maneuver control measures, fire support coordination measures, and airspace
coordination measures common to offensive, defensive, and enabling operations.
These control measures apply to both automated and hand drawn graphics or symbols,
displays, and overlays. Most tactical control measures are used in both planning
products and operation overlays.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONTROL MEASURES
A-1. Units use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate the warfighting functions, control
operations, and prevent fratricide. Well-conceived control measures facilitate current and future operations.
Throughout an operation, commanders adjust control measures as necessary to maintain synchronization and
ensure mission accomplishment.
A-2. Control measures apply to all forces. Control measures are used throughout the operations process and
are graphically depicted within digital systems and on analog map overlays. Commanders ensure that all
higher echelon control measures are incorporated into their units’ orders and common operational picture.
Subordinate units develop additional control measures to command and control their forces and ensure those
control measures are shared with adjacent, higher, and subordinate units and staffs. They reference the control
measures established by higher headquarters when making reports to that headquarters.
A-3. Units generally establish and follow standard operating procedures for naming common control
measures. During operations, units follow the timelines or procedures prescribed by their higher headquarters
regarding control measure updates. For example, a division artillery headquarters will normally establish
rhythmic times for subordinate units to provide updates to their current and planned fire support coordination
measures.
A-4. The sections below consist of common maneuver control measures, fire support coordination
measures, airspace coordination measures, and obstacle control measures. These control measures are not a
comprehensive listing of all possible control measures a unit may employ during operations. (See FM 1-02.2
for a listing of all control measures.)
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER CONTROL MEASURES
A-5. Maneuver control measures are used by maneuver forces and headquarters at all echelons to control
the movement and maneuver of forces. Paragraphs A-7 through A-41 list and describe control measures
commonly used during offensive, defensive, and enabling operations. Paragraphs A-44 through A-61 list and
describe control measures commonly used in offensive operations while paragraphs A-62 through A-79
include those control measures that are only applicable to defensive operations. Paragraphs A-80 through A-
88 include direct fire control measures.
COMMON CONTROL MEASURES
A-6. Many graphical control measures are applicable to offensive, defensive, and enabling operations. The
following are control measures discussed throughout FM 3-90. However, this list is not inclusive of all
control measures. For a comprehensive listing of all approved control measures see FM 1-02.2. |
3-90 | 376 | Appendix A
Area of Operations
A-7. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that
should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). An area of operations
(AO) is always completed enclosed by boundaries. An AO could consist of a singular boundary. An AO can
also be enclosed with forward, rear, and lateral boundaries as shown in figure A-1. Figure A-2 depicts a
division AO with subordinate BCT assigned areas. See paragraph 1-56 for more information on an AO.
Figure A-1. AO with forward, rear, and lateral boundaries |
3-90 | 377 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-2. Division AO with single boundary and contiguous BCT assigned areas
Assembly Areas
A-8. An assembly area is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation. Units of all types and
echelons can be assigned assembly areas. In figure A-3 on page A-4, are examples of multiple units
occupying one assembly area is a graphical shortcut taken when the map scale makes depiction of multiple
assembly areas unreadable. In reality, the higher echelon commander would subdivide ASSEMBLY AREA
THOMAS into two smaller assembly areas, one for each unit. A unit assembly area is normally within the
assigned area of a higher headquarters and are typically noncontiguous. This means that a unit has the same
responsibilities within its assigned assembly area as it has for any other assigned area.
A-9. A tactical assembly area is an area that is generally out of the reach of light artillery and the location
where units make final preparations (precombat checks and inspections) and rest, prior to moving to the line
of departure (JP 3-35). Tactical assembly areas are where enemy contact is likely and the commitment of a
unit into combat is possible or anticipated. Examples of tactical assembly areas include locations occupied
by units designated as tactical reserves, by units after completing a rearward passage of lines, temporarily by
units during tactical movement, and by units during reconstitution. Units in tactical assembly areas are
typically preparing to move forward to execute a forward passage of lines followed by offensive operations
or have been assigned a reserve mission by their higher commander.
A-10. Planning for, occupying, and departing an assembly area is difficult and time consuming and requires
careful consideration. Ideally, an assembly area provides—
* Concealment from air and ground observation.
* Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.
* Space for dispersion |
3-90 | 378 | Appendix A
* Enough distance from other areas and units to preclude mutual interference.
* Cover from direct fire.
* Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier
movements.
* Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.
* Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the assembly area.
* A location beyond enemy medium artillery range.
Figure A-3. Assembly areas
A-11. The proper location and size of assembly areas contributes significantly to both security and flexibility.
The location should facilitate future operations, so movement to subsequent positions can take place smoothly
and quickly by concealed routes. An assembly area must be large enough to accommodate the type and size
of the force occupying it. Generally, dismounted infantry assembly areas are smaller than those assigned to
armored or Stryker units. Because of their smaller signature, infantry units can use assembly areas closer to
enemy forces than armored and Stryker units without excessive risk of enemy detection. The tactical mobility
of armored and Stryker units allows them to occupy assembly areas at a greater distance from the LD than
infantry units.
A-12. There are three methods to organize an assembly area: as a single area, as part of a large assembly area,
or dispersed. The biggest difference between the three methods is the amount of security required since every
assembly area inherently conducts a perimeter defense. See Figures A-4, A-5, and A-6 for examples of each
method.
A-13. The single area method configures a unit in a perimeter defense with maneuver units deployed along
the entire perimeter. Command and control, sustainment, and any other supporting units are located within
the interior of the assembly area. Figure A-4 is an example of a single area assembly area for a battalion task
force. |
3-90 | 379 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-4. Single assembly area method
A-14. A unit can also occupy a portion of a larger assembly area. This typically occurs when a subordinate
formation occupies a portion of their higher headquarters assembly area. With this method, a unit has
boundaries with adjacent units and may only have a portion of their assembly area focused on a perimeter.
See figure A-5 for an example of an armor battalion occupying a portion of a larger assembly area.
Figure A-5. Portion of a larger assembly area method
A-15. A unit may also use a dispersed method to assign assembly areas. In this method subordinate units are
assigned individual assembly areas. These subordinate units maintain their own 360-degree security. Similar
to the single assembly area method, maneuver units occupy perimeter assembly areas with command and
control, sustainment, and other units located within the interior. See figure A-6 on page A-6 for an example
of the dispersed method by a division. |
3-90 | 380 | Appendix A
Figure A-6. Dispersed assembly area method
Boundaries
A-16. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and
deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 3-0). Boundaries are normally
drawn along identifiable terrain features and are used to delineate responsibility between adjacent units and
between higher and lower echelon headquarters. Boundaries should not split responsibilities for key or
decisive terrain, roads, rivers, or railways. Within their assigned areas, units may maneuver within the overall
plan without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise restricted. Direct fire may be placed
across boundaries on clearly identified enemy targets without prior coordination, provided friendly forces are
not endangered. Indirect fire also may be used after prior coordination with the adjacent unit. Commanders
adjust boundaries as necessary in response to the evolving tactical situation.
A-17. Boundaries by themselves or with other control can be used to define a unit’s assigned area: area of
operations, zone, or sector. A forward boundary is a boundary that delineates the forward edge of a unit’s
area of operation. A lateral boundary is a boundary defining the left or right limit of a unit’s assigned
area. A rear boundary is a boundary that delineates the rearward limits of a unit’s assigned area. The
forward boundary is the farthest limit in the direction of the enemy, of an organization’s responsibility. The
rear boundary also defines the start of the next echelon’s rear area. Figure A-1 on page A-2 depicts an AO
with forward, rear, and lateral boundaries. |
3-90 | 381 | Tactical Control Measures
Checkpoint
A-18. A checkpoint is a predetermined point on the ground used to
control movement, tactical maneuver, and orientation. Checkpoints
are used by all units in all types of operations. Units may use checkpoints
to supplement or as substitutes for phase lines. Units can also use a
checkpoint as a fire control measure in lieu of the preferred control
measure, a TRP. Figure A-7 depicts CHECKPOINT 13.
Contact Point
A-19. In land warfare, a contact point is a point on the terrain, easily
Figure A-7. Checkpoint 13
identifiable, where two or more units are required to make contact (JP 3-
50). A commander establishes a contact point where a PL crosses a lateral boundary or another identifiable
terrain feature as a technique to ensure coordination between two units. The commander provides a date-time
group to indicate when to make that physical contact. Figure A-8
depicts CONTACT POINT 8.
A-20. If both units are moving or are stationary, the mutual higher
echelon commander normally designates the location of contact points
and times of contact. When one unit is stationary, its commander
normally designates the location of the contact point and the meeting
time and transmits this information to the commander of the moving
unit.
Figure A-8. Contact point 8
Coordination Point
A-21. A coordination point is a point that indicates a specific
location for the coordination of tactical actions between
adjacent units. It is used when a PL crosses a lateral boundary
between two units or whenever a boundary crosses the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA). The difference between a contact
point and a coordination point is that the establishing headquarters
does not dictate the exact time when contact is required. Figure A-9
depicts a coordination point. Figure A-9. Coordination point
Forward Line of Own Troops
A-22. The forward line of own troops is a line
that indicates the most forward positions of
friendly forces in any kind of military
operation at a specific time. The forward line
of own troops (FLOT) normally identifies the
forward location of security forces. In the
defense, it may be beyond, at, or short of the
FEBA. It does not include small, long-range
reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind
forces. Friendly forces forward of the FLOT
may have a restrictive fire coordination
measure, such as a restrictive fire area (RFA),
placed around them to preclude friendly fire
incidents. An enemy FLOT indicates the
forward most position of enemy forces. Figure
Figure A-10. Forward line of own troops
A-10 depicts the symbol for the FLOT. |
3-90 | 382 | Appendix A
Gap
A-23. A gap is an area free of obstacles that enables forces to maneuver in a
tactical formation. It is wide enough to allow a friendly force to pass through while
dispersed in a tactical formation. The presence of gaps prevents inadvertent
concentrations of Soldiers and equipment around the entry points of lanes. Figure
A-11 depicts the graphic control measure for a gap.
Figure A-11. Gap
Infiltration Lane
A-24. An infiltration lane is a control measure that coordinates
forward and lateral movement of infiltrating units and fixes fire
planning responsibilities. Commanders select infiltration lanes that
avoid enemy forces, provide cover and concealment, and facilitate
navigation. Each unit assigned an infiltration lane picks its own routes
within the lane and switches routes as necessary. The left and right
limits of the infiltration lane act as lateral boundaries for the unit
conducting the infiltration. Staffs must coordinate with the infiltrating
unit any attacks by rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft, indirect fires, or
munitions effects that impact the lane. Units leaving their assigned lane
run the risk of impact by friendly fires. Company-sized units normally Figure A-12. Infiltration
have a single infiltration lane, although they can use more than one lane MICHAEL
lane. Larger organizations are always assigned more than one
infiltration lane. Figure A-12 depicts the graphic control measure for INFILTRATION LANE MICHAEL.
Line of Contact
A-25. The line of contact is a general trace
delineating the location where friendly and
enemy forces are engaged. Units develop their
line of contact (LC) based on the maximum
effective range of the direct fire weapons systems
or the visual line of sight from known or templated
enemy locations. The commander designates the
enemy side of the LC by the abbreviation “ENY.”
In the defense, a LC is often synonymous with the
FLOT. In the offense, commanders may combine
the LC with the LD. When combined with the LD,
it is represented by a phase line with LD/LC
written next to the name. Figure A-19 on page A-
11 depicts PL JOHN being used as a LD/LC.
A-26. For other forms of contact, a phase line can
be designated as a probable line of contact. For Figure A-13. Line of contact
example, based on IPB and information collection
friendly forces can depict known or anticipated locations of enemy artillery assets and determine a probable
line of contact for enemy indirect fires. Figure A-13 shows an example line of contact. |
3-90 | 383 | Tactical Control Measures
Linkup Point
A-27. A linkup point is a designated place where two forces are
scheduled to meet. This easily identifiable point on the ground is
where two forces meet or consolidate before proceeding on with their
mission. Besides being easily identifiable, the linkup point must also be
rather inconspicuous, or the enemy will be able to predict the location
of the coordination and quickly target it. It should also be relatively
isolated from direct fire and observation of possible enemy elements
located on the surrounding terrain. Alternate linkup points must meet
the same criteria and should be reconnoitered to the same degree as
primary linkup points. Linkup points are normally positioned behind or
Figure A-14. Linkup point 8
along one flank of the enemy’s positions on defensible terrain and
located away from normal enemy troop movement routes. The linkup point should be large enough for all
infiltrating elements to assemble, and it should offer cover and concealment for these elements. Figure A-14
depicts LINKUP POINT 8.
Named Area of Interest
A-28. A named area of interest is the geospatial
area or systems node or link against which
information that will satisfy a specific
information requirement can be collected,
usually to capture indications of enemy and
adversary courses of action (JP 2-0). In this
latter case, the NAI may be a person, group, or
portion of cyberspace. Staffs tailor the shape of
their NAI symbols to the actual area they want
observed rather than using a prescribed shape. It
is possible to re-designate a NAI as a target area
of interest (TAI) when Soldiers confirm enemy
activity in the area and have assets that can
target it. This allows commanders to mass the Figure A-15. Named area of interest AUGUSTA
effects of combat power on that area. Figure A-
15 depicts NAI AUGUSTA.
Objective
A-29. An objective is a location used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction,
and provide for unity of effort (ADP 3-90). Objectives should be easily identifiable on the ground to facilitate
their recognition. They normally assign subordinate commanders only their final objectives, but they can
assign intermediate objectives as necessary. Figure A-19 on page A-11 depicts OBJECTIVE PAT.
OBJECTIVE PAT is further divided into two subordinate objectives: OBJECTIVE KAI and OBJECTIVE
ZEKE.
Passage Lane
A-30. A passage lane is a lane through an obstacle that provides safe
passage for a passing force. It is a clear route through an obstacle. The
lane may be cleared, including being reduced and proofed, as part of a
breach operation, or it may be included as part of the design of a friendly
obstacle. Passage lanes normally end where a route begins. That route
should allow the passing unit to move rapidly through the stationary
unit’s area. Figure A-16 depicts the graphic control measure for a
passage lane.
Figure A-16. Passage lane |
3-90 | 384 | Appendix A
Passage of Lines
A-31. A passage of lines occurs under two conditions. A forward
passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s
positions while moving toward the enemy (ADP 3-90). A rearward
passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s
positions while moving away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). Ideally, a
passage of lines does not interfere with the conduct of the stationary
unit’s operations. Figure A-17 shows the symbols for both a forward
and a rearward passage of lines. The arrow goes in the direction the
passing unit is moving. Figure A-17. Forward and
rearward passage of lines
Passage Point
A-32. A passage point is a designated place where the passing units
pass through the stationary unit. The location of this point is where
the commander wants subordinate units physically to execute a passage
of lines. Figure A-18 depicts the graphic control measure for
PASSAGE POINT 7.
Figure A-18. Passage point
Phase Line
A-33. A phase line is an easily identified feature in the operational area utilized for control and coordination
of military operations (JP 3-09). A commander establishes PLs to control the maneuver of the units. PLs are
not boundaries unless designated as such and do not establish any specific responsibilities between units,
unless the operation order so specifies. When possible, commanders place them along easily recognizable
terrain features—such as roads, railroad tracks, rivers, and ridgelines—to ensure easy identification. Units
normally report crossing PLs, but do not halt unless specifically directed. Some PLs have additional
designations for specific purposes, such as an LD or a PLD. Figure A-19 depicts five phase lines being used
for an offensive operation. |
3-90 | 385 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-19. Phase lines
Position Area for Artillery
A-34. A position area for artillery is an area assigned
to an artillery unit to deliver surface to surface
fires. A position area for artillery (PAA) is not an AO
for the artillery unit occupying it. Commanders assign
PAAs for terrain management and for locations where
individual artillery systems can maneuver to increase
their survivability. Establishing a PAA lets other
subordinate units know they should avoid occupying
that same terrain. While the exact size of a PAA
depends on mission variables, a Paladin platoon
normally requires a PAA encompassing over 4 square
kilometers whereas a multiple launch rocket system
(known as MLRS) platoon requires 9 square
kilometers. Figure A-20 depicts a PAA.
Figure A-20. Position area for artillery
A-35. The maneuver echelon operations officer of the
unit that owns the terrain establishes the PAA. The
occupying artillery unit does not have the same authority and responsibilities toward the PAA that are
associated with a unit assigned an assigned area. For example, other units can move through a PAA without
clearing that movement with the artillery unit. However, to prevent fratricide or inadvertently concentrating
forces units should make attempt to contact the artillery unit to determine if the PAA is occupied.
Additionally, units moving through or occupying terrain within a PAA should be cognizant of the increased
risk of receiving indirect fire from enemy artillery due to enemy counterbattery or preparatory fires. The
artillery unit occupying a PAA establishes liaison with the unit that owns the assigned area where the PAA |
3-90 | 386 | Appendix A
is located. The echelon fire support officer usually conducts this liaison in accordance with standard
command and support relationships.
A-36. The decision to establish a PAA affects airspace control for rotary-wing, fixed-wing, unmanned, and
tilt-rotor aircraft integration. A PAA is a base upon which to establish future grid target lines for lateral
deconfliction and areas for rotary-wing, fixed-wing, unmanned, and tilt-rotor aircraft to avoid, depending on
high or low angle artillery fires.
Rally Point
A-37. A rally point is an easily identifiable point on the ground
at which units can reassemble and reorganize if they become
dispersed. Forces conducting a patrol or an infiltration commonly
use this control measure. Figure A-21 depicts RALLY POINT 14.
Figure A-21. Rally point 14
Release Point
A-38. A release point is a designated place on a route where elements are released from centralized
control. Once released from centralized control they are released back to the authority of their respective
commanders. Each start point (SP) must have a corresponding release point (RP), which must also be easy
to recognize on the ground. Marching units do not stop at the RP; instead, as they move through the RP and
continue toward their own appropriate destination. Figure A-23 shows RP 3 on ROUTE IRON.
Relief in Place
A-39. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of
higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by
the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced
elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are
transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). Figure A-22
depicts a relief in place. (See Chapter 15 for more information
on relief in place.)
Figure A-22. Relief in place
Route
A-40. A route is the prescribed course to be traveled from a point of origin to a destination. Routes can
have different functions. Commanders can add those functions as adjectives to specify different types of
routes. Examples of such routes include a passing route, main supply route, and alternate supply route.
Commanders can further designate routes as open, supervised, dispatch, reserved, or prohibited. They can
assign names, numbers, or alphanumeric designations to routes within their assigned areas. Figure A-23
depicts ROUTE IRON. |
3-90 | 387 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-23. Routes
Start Point
A-41. The start point is a designated place on a route where elements fall under the control of a
designated march commander. All routes have a designated SP and RP that are easily recognizable on the
map and on the ground, such as a road junction. It is far enough from the assembly area to allow units to
organize and move at the prescribed speed and interval when they reach the SP. Figure A-23 depicts SP 7 on
ROUTE IRON.
Target Area of Interest
A-42. A target area of interest is the geographical area
where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged
by friendly forces (JP 2-0). Commanders use TAIs to
apply a specific effect against a specific target with a
defined outcome. The difference between a TAI and an
NAI is that an NAI is established to obtain information
and answer a specific information requirement whereas
a TAI is established to create a pre-determined effect.
The unit staff develops TAIs during the MDMP, based
on the currently available products resulting from the
IPB. These TAIs are further refined during course of
action analysis and finally approved by the commander
during course of action approval. The shape of a TAI
reflects the target and effect intended for the TAI.
Information collection assets normally cue their use.
Commanders designate TAIs for any organic or Figure A-24. Target area of interest
supporting systems. TAIs differ from engagement WHITETAIL
areas. Engagement areas plan for the use of all
available weapons, while TAIs might be engaged by a single weapon or system. Figure A-24 depicts TAI
WHITETAIL. |
3-90 | 388 | Appendix A
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS CONTROL MEASURES
A-43. This section defines in alphabetical order those common offensive control measures commanders use
to synchronize the effects of combat power. The commander uses the minimum control measures required to
successfully complete the mission while providing subordinates the flexibility needed to respond to changes
in the situation. Figure A-25 depicts some of the common offensive control measures that will be further
discussed throughout this section.
Figure A-25. Common offensive control measures
Assault Position
A-44. An assault position is a covered and concealed position short of the objective from which final
preparations are made to assault the objective (ADP 3-90). Assault positions are typically only assigned to
attacking maneuver formations. Units supporting and maneuvering with the maneuver force execute their
final preparations in the same assault positions as the maneuver force. These final preparations can involve
tactical considerations, such as a short halt to coordinate the final assault, reorganize to adjust to combat
losses, or make necessary adjustments in the attacking force’s dispositions. These preparations can also
involve technical activities, such as engineers conducting their final checks on obstacle clearing systems and
the crews of plow and roller equipped tanks removing their locking pins. Commanders may locate their
assault positions near either a final coordination line (FCL) or a probable line of deployment (PLD). Figure
A-25 depicts ASSAULT POSITION PEGGY. (Paragraphs A-52 and A-57 define a FCL and PLD
respectively.)
Assault Time
A-45. The assault time is the moment to attack the initial objectives throughout the geographical scope of the
operation (ADP 3-90). Higher echelon headquarters impose this control measure to achieve simultaneous
results from several different units. Using an assault time synchronizes the moment an enemy force feels the
effects of friendly combat power. Assault times are similar to the time-on-target control method used by field |
3-90 | 389 | Tactical Control Measures
artillery units when processing fire missions. A commander uses an assault time instead of a time of attack
because of differences in distance, tactical mobility, and known obstacles among subordinate units. (See
paragraph A-59 for more information on a time of attack).
Attack by Fire Position
A-46. An attack by fire position designates the general
position from which a unit performs the tactical task of attack
by fire (ADP 3-90). The purpose of these positions is to mass
the effects of direct fire systems for one or multiple locations
toward enemy forces. Attack by fire positions rarely apply to
units larger than a company. An attack by fire position does
not indicate the specific site. Figure A-26 depicts ATTACK
BY FIRE POSITION BRANDON. (See paragraph B-3 for
more information on the tactical mission task of attack by
fire).
Figure A-26. Attack by fire
position JAMES
Attack Position
A-47. The attack position is the last position an attacking force occupies or passes through before crossing
the line of departure (ADP 3-90). An attack position facilitates an attacking force’s deployment and last-
minute coordination before it crosses the LD. Located on the friendly side of the LD, an attack position offers
cover and concealment for the attacking force. Commanders use it primarily at battalion level and below.
Whenever possible, units move through the attack position without stopping. An attacking unit occupies an
attack position for various reasons, including when the unit is waiting for specific results from preparation
fires or when it is necessary to conduct additional coordination, such as a forward passage of lines. If the
attacking unit occupies the attack position, it stays there for the shortest amount of time possible to avoid
offering enemy forces a lucrative target. Figure A-25 on page A-14 depicts ATTACK POSITIONS BLUE
and GOLD.
Axis of Advance
A-48. An axis of advance designates the general area through which the bulk of a unit’s combat power must
move (ADP 3-90). A commander uses an axis of advance for three primary reasons:
* To direct the bypass of locations that could delay the progress of the advancing force, such as
known contaminated areas.
* To indicate that the force is not required to clear the entire assigned area as it advances. The force
will be required to clear the axis based on specified bypass criteria.
* To indicate to a unit involved in offensive encirclement, exploitation, or pursuit operations the
need to move rapidly toward an objective.
A-49. An axis of advance can be used by any maneuver echelon. Subordinate maneuver units can develop
their own axis of advance within the confines of their higher headquarters axis of advance. For example, a
battalion can establish multiple company level axis of advance as long as each company’s axis of advance
remains within the bounds of the battalion’s axis of advance. The width of the axis varies based on factors
such as terrain, size and type of friendly forces, and time. Generally, a wider axis of advance is used in
unrestricted terrain. When using an axis of advance, the risk is that friendly forces do not detect enemy forces
outside the axis and the enemy is inadvertently bypassed. Figure A-25 on page A-14 depicts AXIS OF
ADVANCE JAN. When developing the axis of advance, commanders also establish bypass criteria (see
paragraph 12-27 for bypass criteria).
Battle Handover Line
A-50. The battle handover line is a designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary
force to the moving force and vice versa (ADP 3-90). The common higher echelon commander of the two
forces establishes the battle handover line (BHL) after consulting both commanders. The stationary
commander determines the location of the line. The BHL is forward of the FEBA in the defense or the FLOT |
3-90 | 390 | Appendix A
in the offense. Commanders draw it where the direct fires of forward combat elements of the stationary unit
can effectively support the passing unit until completion of the passage of lines. The area between the BHL
and the stationary force belongs to the stationary force commander. The stationary force commander may
employ security forces, obstacles, and fires in the area. Figure A-27 depicts a BHL at PL DANIEL used in
conjunction with other control measures during a forward passage of lines.
Figure A-27. Battle handover line DANIEL
Direction of Attack
A-51. The direction of attack is a specific direction or assigned route a force uses and does not deviate from
when attacking (ADP 3-90). It is a restrictive control measure that requires a subordinate unit to attack as
indicated and is not normally allowed to bypass the enemy. It is normally used at battalion and lower levels.
Direction of attack is a more restrictive control measure than axis of advance and units are not free to
maneuver off the assigned route. Direction of attack is normally used in counterattacks or to ensure that
supporting attacks make maximal contribution to the main attack. It is also used during night attacks,
infiltrations, and when attacking through obscuration. When using a direction of attack, commanders
designate a PD at the beginning. Figure A-25 on page A-14 depicts DIRECTION OF ATTACK JOAN.
Final Coordination Line
A-52. The final coordination line is a phase line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or
shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of maneuver elements (ADP 3-90). Brigade and below
maneuver formations typically use an FCL. The FCL should be placed on easily recognizable terrain. Final
adjustments to supporting fires necessary to reflect the actual versus the planned tactical situation take place
before crossing the FCL. The FCL is not a FSCM. Figure A-25 on page A-14 depicts PL ROBERT as an
FCL. |
3-90 | 391 | Tactical Control Measures
Limit of Advance
A-53. The limit of advance is a phase line used to control forward progress of the attack (ADP 3-90). A LOA
is a restrictive control measure because the attacking unit does not advance any of its elements or assets
beyond the LOA, but the attacking unit can push its security forces to that limit. Units can employ direct and
indirect fires beyond the LOA. A LOA is typically established by a higher echelon headquarters.
Commanders usually select linear terrain features, perpendicular to the direction of attack, on the far side of
the objective as LOAs because such terrain features are easily identifiable. They employ LOAs to prevent
overextending the attacking force and to reduce the possibility of fratricide and friendly fire incidents by fires
supporting the attack. They position LOAs far enough beyond their objectives to allow their units to defend
the objective. A LOA prevents units from exploiting success and launching a pursuit; therefore, commanders
should only use LOAs if they do not want to perform an exploitation or pursuit. A forward boundary is always
a LOA, but a LOA is not necessarily a forward boundary. In fact, a LOA and the unit’s forward boundary
should rarely coincide because of the resulting limitations that a forward boundary places on supporting fires
beyond the forward boundary. Figure A-25 on page A-14 shows PL BASIL used as a LOA.
Line of Departure
A-54. In land warfare, the line of departure is a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements
(JP 3-31). The purpose of the LD is to coordinate the advance of the attacking force so that its elements strike
the enemy in the order and at the time desired. The LD also marks where the unit often transitions from
movement to maneuver. Commanders can also use it to facilitate the coordination of fires. Generally, it
should be perpendicular to the direction the attacking force will take on its way to the objective. Friendly
forces should control the LD. Commanders analyze the terrain before designating an LD. Different units have
different movement rates on leaving their assembly areas based on their inherent mobility characteristics and
the terrain traversed. Commanders consider these different characteristics when establishing an LD to prevent
these differences from affecting the synchronization of the operation. When possible, commanders select the
LD so that the terrain the attack unit traverses before crossing the LD provides sufficient cover for the
attacking unit’s final deployment into a maneuver formation before crossing the LD. In many cases, the LD
is also the LC because the unit in contact is conducting the attack from its current positions. Figure A-25 on
page A-14 depicts PL JOHN as a combined LD and LC.
Objective Rally Point
A-55. The objective rally point is an easily identifiable point where all elements of the infiltrating unit
assemble and prepare to attack the objective (ADP 3-90). It is typically near the infiltrating unit’s objective;
however, there is no standard distance from the objective to the objective rally point. It should be far enough
away from the objective so that the enemy will not detect the infiltrating unit’s attack preparations.
Point of Departure
A-56. The point of departure is the point where the unit crosses
the line of departure and begins moving along a direction of
attack (ADP 3-90). Units conducting reconnaissance and
security patrols and other operations in a low-visibility
environment commonly use a point of departure (PD) as a
control measure. Like the LD, it marks the point where the unit
transitions from movement to maneuver under conditions of
limited visibility. Figure A-28 depicts PD 7.
Figure A-28. Point of departure 7
Probable Line of Deployment
A-57. A probable line of deployment is a phase line that designates the location where the commander intends
to deploy the unit into assault formation before beginning the assault (ADP 3-90). Commanders at battalion-
sized and smaller units primarily employ PLDs when their units do not cross their LD in an assault formation.
It is usually a linear terrain feature perpendicular to the direction of attack and recognizable under conditions |
3-90 | 392 | Appendix A
of limited visibility. The PLD should be located outside the range where enemy forces can place the attacking
force under effective direct fire. In figure A-25 on page A-14, PL ROBERT is designated as the PLD.
Support by Fire Position
A-58. A support by fire position designates the general position
from which a unit performs the tactical mission task of support
by fire (ADP 3-90). Paragraph B-58 defines the tactical mission
task of support by fire. The purpose of these positions is to
increase the supported force’s freedom of maneuver by placing
direct fires on an objective that a friendly force is going to
assault. Support by fire positions are located within the
maximum friendly direct fire range of the enemy positions.
Commanders select them so that a moving assault force does not
mask its supporting fires. For this reason, support by fire
positions are normally located on the flank of an assault force, Figure A-29. Support by fire
elevated above the objective if possible. Support by fire positions position
are rarely applicable to units larger than company size. When
used as a planning symbol, the support by fire position depicted in figure A-29 indicates the general location
and direction from which the unit provides fires. When used as a control measure, the position of the symbol
dictates the actual location of the position, and the arrows define the left and right limits of the unit’s sector
of fire.
Time of Attack
A-59. The time of attack is the moment the leading elements of the main body cross the line of departure, or
in a limited-visibility attack, the point of departure (ADP 3-90). Commanders use it when conducting
simultaneous operations where supporting efforts must accomplish their mission to create conditions for the
success of the main effort. When determining a time of attack, they consider the time subordinates require
to—
* Conduct necessary reconnaissance, prepare plans, and issue orders.
* Synchronize plans among all subordinate units.
* Complete attack preparations, such as pre-combat inspections.
* Move to the LD or PD.
A-60. Orders normally designate the time of attack as H hour. This occurs when the main body crosses the
LD. However, H-hour can also designate the time to implement a phase of an operation, such as an airborne
or air assault phase. The headquarters planning the operation specifies the term’s exact meaning. This is
usually a part of the unit’s standard operating procedures.
Zone
A-61. A zone is an operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries
(FM 3-0). By not emplacing a boundary to a unit’s front it allows them to move quicker and synchronize
fires better against the enemy they are facing. A zone is different from an area of operations in that instead
of a forward boundary to restrict movement and fires a higher headquarters uses maneuver control measures
and fire support coordination measures. Example control measures to use include things such as a limit of
advance and a coordinated fire line. Zones are most appropriate for any unit likely to make direct fire contact
with the enemy during high-tempo offensive operations or when there is a fluid FLOT. Units assigned a zone
treat areas behind the FLOT as an AO. Zone can be further subdivided as needed into area of operations,
zones, or sectors as appropriate. Any unit not expecting to be in direct fire contact with the enemy should use
an area of operations or other means of terrain management. If a unit is attacking in a zone and culminates
and transitions to a hasty defense, they will continue to use the zone because they eventually expect to go
back on the offense and the defense is a temporary thing. Figure A-30 depicts a battalion zone for 1-66 Armor. |
3-90 | 393 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-30. Example zone for 1-66 Armor
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS CONTROL MEASURES
A-62. The commander controls the defense by using control measures to provide the flexibility needed to
respond to changes in the situation and allow the defending commander to rapidly concentrate combat power
at the decisive point. Defensive control measures within a commander’s assigned area include designating
the security area, BHL, MBA with its associated FEBA, and the echelon support area. The commander can
use battle positions and additional direct fire control and FSCMs in addition to those control measures
discussed earlier in appendix A to further synchronize the employment of combat power. The commander
designates disengagement lines to trigger the displacement of subordinate forces. These common defensive
control measures are discussed in alphabetical order in paragraphs A-63 through A-79.
Battle Positions
A-63. A battle position is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach (ADP 3-90).
A battle position is generally only used during defensive operations. The battle position (BP) is a symbol that
depicts the location and general orientation of most of the defending forces. A commander’s use of a battle
position does not direct the position of the subordinate’s entire force within its bounds since it is not an
assigned area. There are five kinds of BPs—primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strong point.
When assigning BPs, the higher echelon always designates the primary BP. The subordinate unit designates
and prepares alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions as time and other resources permit and if the
terrain or situation requires them. Figure A-31 on page A-20 depicts the five kinds of BPs. |
3-90 | 394 | Appendix A
Figure A-31. Five kinds of battle positions
A-64. The primary position is the position that covers the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach into
the assigned area. It is the best position from which to accomplish the mission, such as cover an engagement
area.
A-65. An alternate position is a defensive position that the commander assigns to a unit or weapon
system for occupation when the primary position becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out
the assigned task. It covers the same area as the primary position. Commanders locate alternate positions so
the occupants can continue to fulfill their original tasks, such as covering the same avenue of approach or
engagement area as their primary positions. These positions increase the defenders’ survivability by allowing
defenders to engage enemy forces from multiple positions. For example, a unit moves to its alternate positions
when enemy forces bring suppressive fires on the primary position.
A-66. A supplementary position is a defensive position located within a unit’s assigned area that
provides the best sectors of fire and defensive terrain along an avenue of approach that is not the
primary avenue where the enemy is expected to attack. For example, an avenue of approach into a unit’s
assigned area from one of its flanks normally requires establishing supplementary positions to allow a unit
or weapon system to engage enemy forces traveling along that avenue.
A-67. A subsequent position is a position that a unit expects to move to during the course of battle. A
planned and, to some extent, prepared location for a defense or delay that is behind the primary positions
initially occupied for a defense. A defending unit may have a series of subsequent positions. Subsequent
positions can be further organized into primary, alternate, and supplementary positions.
A-68. A strong point is a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an
anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain (ADP 3-90). Strong points require
extensive engineer support to create obstacles and increase survivability efforts. This include providing all
assets overhead protection, trenches, and other protective construction using both natural and man-made
terrain. Commanders prepare a strong point for all around defense. Commanders also establish a strong point
when anticipating that enemy actions will isolate a defending force retaining terrain critical to the defense. |
3-90 | 395 | Tactical Control Measures
A-69. Before assigning a strong point mission, commanders ensure that the strong point force has sufficient
time and resources to construct the position. A minimally effective strong point typically requires one day of
effort from an engineer unit the same size as the unit defending the strong point. Normally, companies and
battalions occupy strong points, although brigades may construct them. Units do not normally establish strong
points for units smaller than company size. This is because a platoon or squad cannot secure a perimeter large
enough to contain all required assets and supplies.
A-70. Units as large as battalion task forces and as small as squads or sections use BPs. Commanders select
positions based on terrain, enemy capabilities, and friendly capabilities. A commander can assign all or some
subordinates’ BPs within their BP. Figure A-32 depicts a combined arms battalion BP.
A-71. A commander may assign subordinates BPs in situations when there is a need to retain a greater degree
of control over the maneuver of subordinate units than that provided through only using an assigned area, as
the higher unit controls maneuver outside the general location of the BP. A commander can assign multiple
BPs to a single unit, which allows that unit to maneuver between BPs. The commander specifies mission and
engagement criteria to the unit assigned to a BP. Security, functional and multifunctional support, and
sustainment forces typically operate outside a unit’s BP. Figure A-33 on page A-22 depicts a brigade assigned
area with battalion BPs.
A-72. Units occupy or depart BPs as part of the overall plan. The commander assigning a unit to a BP should
specify when and under what conditions the unit can displace from the position, since a BP is not normally
held at all costs. If a higher echelon commander orders a unit to defend a BP, its commander has the option
of moving off the BP. If a higher echelon commander directs a unit to retain a BP, the subordinate commander
needs to know the specific conditions that need to exist before the unit can displace.
Figure A-32. Combined arms battalion with company battle positions |
3-90 | 396 | Appendix A
Figure A-33. Brigade assigned area with battalion battle positions
Disengagement Line
A-73. A disengagement line is a phase line located on identifiable terrain that, when crossed by the enemy,
signals to defending elements that it is time to displace to their next position (ADP 3-90). Commanders use
these lines in the delay and the defense when they want their defending units to avoid becoming decisively
engaged. They establish criteria, either time or condition based, for disengagement, such as number of enemy
vehicles by type, friendly losses, or enemy movement to flanking locations. They may designate multiple
disengagement lines, one for each system in the defense, or if they want the unit to conduct multiple
displacements. Figure A-34 depicts PL JOAN as a disengagement line.
Engagement Area
A-74. An engagement area is an area where the commander masses effects to contain and destroy an
enemy force. This includes organic direct fire systems and supporting systems, such as close air support.
The size and shape of the engagement area is determined by the relatively unobstructed intervisibility from
the weapon systems in their firing positions and the maximum effective range of those system. Commanders
designate EAs to cover each enemy avenue of approach into unit positions. The commander routinely
subdivides their EA into smaller EAs for subordinates using one or more target reference points or by
prominent terrain features. While subordinates are assigned sectors of fire, responsibility for an avenue of
approach or key terrain is never split. Commanders at battalion and below typically use this control measure.
The seven steps of engagement area development are: identify all likely enemy avenues of approach,
determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver, determine where to kill the enemy force, plan and integrate
obstacles, emplace weapon systems, plan and integrate indirect fires, and rehearse. Figure A-34 depicts a
sketch of several engagement areas used within the context of a reinforced battalion task force defense. |
3-90 | 397 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-34. Task force engagement areas
Final Protective Fire
A-75. Final protective fire is an immediately available,
prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement
across defensive lines or areas (JP 3-09.3). Both direct and
indirect fire weapons can provide final protective fires (FPFs). A
commander can only assign each firing battery or platoon a
single FPF. Firing units should lay on their FPFs (or other
assigned priority targets) but do not “engage” or fire them unless
directed. A FPF is a priority target for an element or system, and
those fire units engage that target when they are not engaged in
other fire missions. When an enemy force initiates its final
Figure A-35. Final protective fire
assault into a defensive position, the defending unit initiates its
FPFs to engage enemy infantry soldiers and armored vehicles. Figure A-35 depicts an FPF to be fired by
A/1-16 Field Artillery. |
3-90 | 398 | Appendix A
Final Protective Line
A-76. A final protective line is a selected
line of fire where an enemy assault is to be
checked by interlocking fire from all
available weapons and obstacles.
Whenever possible, units reinforce the final
protective line (FPL) with protective
obstacles. All company and below echelons
identify their final protective lines as part of
their defensive preparations. Typically,
initiation of FPFs is the signal for all
elements to shift fires to their assigned
portion of the final protective line and spare
no ammunition in repelling the enemy
assault. Figure A-36 depicts a FPL.
Figure A-36. Final protective line
Forward Edge of the Battle Area
A-77. Forward edge of the battle area is
the foremost limits of a series of areas in
which ground combat units are deployed to
coordinate fire support, the positioning of
forces, or the maneuver of units, excluding
areas in which covering or screening forces
are operating (JP 3-09.3). A FEBA is not a
boundary, but a phase line designating the
forward most point of the MBA and helps
convey the commander’s intent. It marks
the foremost limits of the areas in which
most ground combat units deploy,
excluding the areas in which security
forces are operating. MBA forces can
temporarily move forward of the FEBA to
expedite the retrograde operations of
security forces. A commander designates a
FEBA to coordinate fire support and to
Figure A-37. Forward edge of the battle area
help maneuver subordinate forces. The
FEBA shows the senior commander’s planned limit for the effects of direct fires. Defending units must
address this area in their scheme of maneuver and exchange information regarding tactical plans at contact
points. The Army only uses a FEBA during defensive operations. Figure A-37 depicts the current FEBA and
a proposed FEBA.
Main Battle Area
A-78. The main battle area is the area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of their unit to
defeat an attacking enemy. The bulk of a unit’s combat power is deployed in MBA. The MBA extends
from the FEBA to the unit’s rear boundary. Security forces are located outside of the MBA.
Sector
A-79. A sector is an operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral boundaries
with interlocking fires (FM 3-0). By not emplacing a boundary to a unit’s front it allows them to synchronize
fires better against the enemy they are facing. A sector is different from an area of operations in that instead |
3-90 | 399 | Tactical Control Measures
of a forward boundary to restrict movement and fires a higher headquarters uses maneuver control measures
and fire support coordination measures. Example control measures to use include things such as a battle
position and a coordinated fire line. Sectors are most appropriate for any unit likely to make direct fire contact
with the enemy during high-tempo defensive operations or when there is a fluid FLOT. Units assigned a
sector treat areas behind the FLOT as an AO. Sectors can be further subdivided as needed into area of
operations, sectors, or zones as appropriate. Any unit not expecting to be in direct fire contact with the enemy
should use an area of operations or other means of terrain management. If a unit is defending in a sector and
transitions to a hasty attack to exploit the enemy, they will continue to use the sector until an order can be
issued that will better control the attack, which will then change it to either a zone or area of operations.
Figure A-38 depicts a battalion sector for 1-66 Armor.
Figure A-38. Example sector for 1-66 Armor
DIRECT FIRE CONTROL MEASURES
A-80. Commanders communicate to subordinates the manner, method, and time to initiate, shift, and mass
direct fires by using direct fire control measures. The commander controls unit fires to direct the engagement
of enemy systems and gain the greatest effect. The commander uses IPB products and reconnaissance to
determine the most advantageous way to use direct fire control measures to mass the effects on the enemy
and reduce friendly fire incidents from direct fire systems. The commander must understand the
characteristics of weapon systems and available munitions (such as the danger to unprotected Soldiers when
tanks fire discarding sabot ammunition over their heads or near them). Direct fire control measures defined
in this publication include engagement criteria, engagement priorities, sectors of fire, TRPs, and trigger line.
Maneuver platoon and company publications address and go into further detail on other direct fire control
measures, such as frontal, cross, or depth fire patterns and simultaneous, alternating, or observed techniques
of fire. Figure A-39 on page A-26 depicts common graphical direct fire control measures. |
3-90 | 400 | Appendix A
Figure A-39. Direct fire control measures
Engagement Criteria
A-81. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an
enemy force. They may be restrictive or permissive. Commanders establish engagement criteria during direct
fire planning. Commanders and leaders of small tactical units use engagement criteria in conjunction with
engagement priorities and other direct fire control measures to mass fires and control fire distribution.
Engagement Priority
A-82. Engagement priority identifies the order in which the unit engages enemy systems or functions.
Commanders assign engagement priorities based on the type or level of threat at different ranges to match
organic weapon systems capabilities against enemy vulnerabilities. Engagement priorities depend on
situations. Commanders use engagement priorities to distribute fires rapidly and effectively. Subordinate
elements can have different engagement priorities. Normally, units engage the most dangerous targets first,
followed by targets in depth or specialized systems, such as engineer vehicles. |
3-90 | 401 | Tactical Control Measures
Sector of Fire
A-83. A sector of fire is the area assigned to
a unit or weapon system in which it will
engage the enemy in accordance with
established engagement priorities. Battalions
and smaller echelons primarily use this direct
fire control measure. Each sector of fire can
extend from a firing position to the maximum
engagement range of the weapon, or it can be
an enclosed area at a distance from the firing
position. Commanders assign each subordinate
unit or available weapon system a primary
sector of fire and a secondary sector of fire to
increase the capability of concentrating fire in
certain areas. The primary sector of fire is that
area in which the assigned unit, individual, or Figure A-40. Sectors of fire
crew-served weapon is initially responsible for
engaging and destroying enemy targets located in that sector based on established priorities for engagement.
Fire shifts to the secondary sector on order when there are no targets in the primary sector or when the
movement of another friendly element needs covering. This secondary sector of fire should correspond to
another element’s primary sector of fire to obtain mutual support. Subordinate commanders may impose
additional fire control measures as required. Figure A-40 depicts primary, secondary, and enclosed sectors
of fire.
Target Reference Point
A-84. A target reference point is a predetermined point of
reference, normally a permanent structure or terrain feature that
can be used when describing a target location (JP 3-09.3). A
target reference point (TRP) is an easily recognizable point on
the ground, either natural or manmade used to initiate, distribute,
and control fires. Maneuver leaders at battalion and lower
echelons designate TRPs to define unit or individual sectors of
fire and observation, usually within an engagement area. A TRP
can also designate the center of an area where a commander
plans to rapidly distribute or converge fires. Leaders designate
TRPs using the standard target symbol and numbers. Once Figure A-41. Target reference
approved by the echelon fire support officer, TRPs can be point 032
designated as indirect fire targets by using the standard target
symbol and target numbering identification (using two letters and four numbers). If a TRP is not also used as
an indirect fire target, it is designated using numeric marking only. Figure A-41 depicts the symbol for TRP
032, a direct fire only TRP. The rest of the TRPs in the figures in this publication are both direct and indirect
fire targets and are thus designated using indirect fire procedures.
Trigger Line
A-85. A trigger line is a phase line used to initiate and mass fires into an engagement area or an
objective at a predetermined range for all or like weapon systems. Event or time-oriented criteria are
used to initiate planned actions directed toward achieving surprise and inflicting maximum destruction on
the enemy. Commanders can designate one trigger line for all weapon systems or separate trigger lines for
each weapon or type of weapon system. Commanders specify the engagement criteria for this situation. The
criteria may be either time or event driven, such as when a certain number or certain types of vehicles cross
the trigger line before initiating engagement. Commanders can use a time-based fires delivery method or a
geography-based fires delivery. Commanders may reserve the authority to initiate engagement by firing the
commander’s own individual weapon or giving the command to fire. |
3-90 | 402 | Appendix A
A-86. Commanders designate a PL as the
trigger line for available supporting fire support
systems. They base the location of the trigger
line on the mission variables, including such
variables as the time of flight for artillery
shells, positioning of the guns, and the
existence of quick-fire links. The trigger line’s
location varies from situation to situation. Its
position reflects the distance an enemy force is
likely to traverse in the time it takes from when
fires are requested to when artillery rounds
impact at a given enemy’s movement speed.
This gives time for supporting fire support
systems to respond to the initial call for fire. For
example, in a desert environment an enemy
force is expected to travel two kilometers in
three minutes. The battalion creates an indirect
fire trigger line that is approximately two Figure A-42. Trigger line
kilometers beyond the point where the
commander wants to engage enemy forces with indirect fires since it takes three minutes to process a call for
fire and for rounds to impact. Figure A-42 depicts both direct fire and fire support trigger lines based on
enemy movement.
A-87. Commanders can establish another trigger line for the unit’s most accurate long-range weapon system
in the vicinity of the area where the fire support impacts to capitalize on the asymmetric attack. However,
dust and debris resulting from the artillery fire may prevent direct fire systems from engaging enemy forces.
Commanders establish other trigger lines and TRPs for shorter-range systems. Commanders may give
guidance to extremely proficient crews to engage enemy forces at longer than normal ranges or give them
different engagement priorities than the rest of the force, such as giving priority to engaging air defense or
engineer breaching systems.
A-88. As enemy forces advance, commanders establish a decision point to help force a determination on
whether to continue to fire in depth or to concentrate unit fires on a single point. Many factors impact this
decision, most of which concern enemy forces regarding their methods of maneuver and the effects of the
defending force’s fires.
COMMON FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
A-89. Commanders employ FSCMs to facilitate rapid target engagement and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly forces. The fire support coordinator recommends FSCMs to the commander based on
the commander’s guidance, location of friendly forces, scheme of maneuver, and anticipated enemy actions.
Locations and implementing instructions for FSCMs are disseminated electronically and via overlays through
command and fire support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent units. Once established, FSCMs are entered
into or posted on all the command’s displays and databases. Below are some of the most commonly used
FSCMs. FSCMs are either permissive or restrictive. (See ADP 3-19 and FM 3-09 for a detailed explanation
on the use of all FSCMs.)
PERMISSIVE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
A-90. Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of surface targets. Permissive FSCMs do not include the
clearance of airspace and all fires require terrain and airspace clearance prior to engagement. FSCMs will
change frequently during operations and the commander adjusts FSCMs as required to keep pace with
operations Common permissive FSCMs include a coordinated fire line (CFL), a fire support coordination
line (FSCL), kill box, and a free-fire area (FFA). |
3-90 | 403 | Tactical Control Measures
Coordinated Fire Line
A-91. A coordinated fire line is a line
beyond which conventional surface-to-
surface direct fire and indirect fire support
means may fire at any time within the
boundaries of the establishing
headquarters without additional
coordination but does not eliminate the
responsibility to coordinate the airspace
required to conduct the mission (JP 3-09).
The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the
surface-to-surface attack of targets
beyond the CFL without coordination
with the ground commander in whose area
the targets are located. Such fires still
comply with rules of engagement and law
of war targeting constraints; designation
of a CFL is not authorization to fire
Figure A-43. Coordinated fire line
indiscriminately into the area. Brigade
combat teams or divisions usually
establish a CFL although a maneuver battalion may establish one, particularly during amphibious operations.
It is possible for each echelon to establish a CFL so a unit would need to be aware of the several constraints.
A CFL should be placed on identifiable terrain, however, additional considerations include the limits of
ground observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the requirement for maximum
flexibility in both maneuver and the delivery of supporting fires. Subordinate CFLs may be consolidated by
higher headquarters. Figure A-43 depicts a CFL.
Fire Support Coordination Line
A-92. The fire support coordination line is a fire support
coordination measure established by the land or
amphibious force commander to support common
objectives within an area of operations, beyond which all
fires must be coordinated with affected commanders prior
to engagement and, short of the line, all fires must be
coordinated with the establishing commander prior to
engagement (JP 3-09). FSCLs facilitate the expeditious
attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the
coordinating measure. The FSCL is not a boundary, the
synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is
the responsibility of the establishing commander, out to the
limits of the land or amphibious force boundary. FSCLs
apply to all fires of air-, land-, and sea-based weapon
systems using any type of ammunition. If possible, the
FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to assist
identification from the air. The joint force land component Figure A-44. Fire support
commander (JFLCC) and joint force maritime component coordination line
commander (JFMCC) cannot employ fires long of the
FSCL without coordination with affected commanders, and the joint force air component commander
(JFACC) cannot employ fires short of the FSCL without coordination with the JFLCC or JFMCC. Supporting
elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that an attack will not produce adverse effects on,
or to the rear of, the line. Short of a FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are
controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL
is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. Figure A-44 depicts an
example FSCL. |
3-90 | 404 | Appendix A
A-93. The decision on where to place or even whether to use a FSCL requires careful consideration. If used,
its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. The establishment of a FSCL
does not create a free-fire area (FFA) beyond the FSCL. Engagements beyond the FSCL must be consistent
with the establishing commander's priorities, timing, and desired effects. Location of enemy forces,
anticipated rates of movement, concept and tempo of the operation, organic weapon capabilities such as wide-
area munitions, or those with delayed effects, and other factors are all considered by the commander. The
establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. A series
of disseminated "on-order" FSCLs will help accelerate the coordination required. The establishing
commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure
that appropriate controlling agencies coordinate engagement operations. Changes to the FSCL require
notification of all affected forces within the AO and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or
components to incorporate the FSCL change. Current technology and collaboration tools between the
elements of the joint force determine the times required for changing the FSCL. The FSCL is normally
positioned closer to the forward line of own troops in the defense than in the offense; however, the exact
positioning depends on the situation. Placing the FSCL at greater depths will typically require support from
higher headquarters and other supporting commanders. Also, when the FSCL is positioned at greater depth,
there is greater requirement for detailed coordination with the establishing commander and can slow the
expeditious clearance of fires short of the FSCL. By establishing a FSCL close in, yet at sufficient depth so
as to not limit high tempo maneuver, land and amphibious force commanders ease the coordination
requirements for engaging targets within their assigned areas by forces not under their control, such as naval
surface fire support or air interdiction.
Note. During large-scale combat operations, it is likely that divisions and corps are operating as a
tactical headquarters and will only provide input on proposed FSCL locations to the land
component commander.
Free-Fire Area
A-94. A free-fire area is a specific region into which any
weapon system may fire without additional coordination with
the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Where indirect fires
and aircraft share a FFA, units should establish an airspace
coordination area to assist in deconflicting operations.
Normally, division or higher echelon headquarters establish a
FFA on identifiable terrain. Figure A-45 depicts a FFA.
Figure A-45. Free fire area
Kill Box
A-95. A kill box is a three-dimensional permissive fire support coordination measure with an associated
airspace coordinating measure used to facilitate the integration of fires (JP 3-09). It is used to facilitate
integrating joint fires and coordinating associated airspace. The two types of kill boxes are blue kill box and
purple kill box. A blue kill box facilitates the attack of surface targets with air-to-surface munitions without
coordination with the AO commander’s headquarters. Within its boundaries a blue kill box extends from the
surface to a ceiling altitude agreed upon by the requesting unit, AO commander, and airspace control
authority. A purple kill box facilitates the attack of surface targets with subsurface-to-surface, surface-to-
surface, and air-to-surface munitions without coordination with the AO commander’s headquarters. Within
its boundaries a purple kill box extends from the surface, through an airspace coordinating measure floor to
a ceiling altitude agreed upon by the requesting unit, AO commander, and airspace control authority. |
3-90 | 405 | Tactical Control Measures
Figure A-46 depicts a blue kill box. Figure A-47 depicts a purple kill box. (See ATP 3-09.34/MCRP 3-
31.4/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP 3-2.59 for more information on kill box planning and employment.)
Figure A-46. Blue kill box
Figure A-47. Purple kill box
RESTRICTIVE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
A-96. Restrictive fire support coordination measures prevent fires into or beyond the control measure without
detailed coordination. Their primary purpose is to provide safeguards for friendly forces, noncombatants,
facilities, or terrain. Restrictive FSCMs include a no-fire area (NFA), a restrictive fire area (RFA), and a
restrictive fire line (RFL). Establishing a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific
coordination before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure. |
3-90 | 406 | Appendix A
No-Fire Area
A-97. A no-fire area is an area designated by the
appropriate commander into which fires or their
effects are prohibited (JP 3-09.3). Any echelon
commander uses a no-fire area to protect
independently operating elements, such as forward
observers and special operations forces. A
commander can also use it to protect friendly forces
in the echelon support area and for humanitarian
reasons, such as preventing the inadvertent
engagement of dislocated civilian concentrations, or
to protect sensitive areas, such as cultural monuments.
Figure A-48 depicts a no-fire area. This rule has two
exceptions:
* The establishing headquarters may
approve fires within a no-fire area on a
case-by-case mission basis. Figure A-48. No fire area
* When an enemy force within a no-fire area
engages a friendly force, the friendly force may engage a positively identified enemy force to
defend itself.
Restrictive Fire Area
A-98. A restrictive fire area is a location in which
specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires
that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered
without coordination with the establishing
headquarters (JP 3-09). The purpose of the RFA is to
regulate fires into an area according to the stated
restrictions, such as no unguided conventional or dud-
producing munitions. Maneuver battalion or larger
ground forces normally establish RFAs. On occasion,
a company operating independently may establish an
RFA. Usually, it is located on identifiable terrain by
grid or by a radius (in meters) from a center point.
Commanders may depict RFA restrictions on a map
or overlay, or they can reference an operation order
that contains the restrictions. Figure A-49 depicts a
restricted fire area. Figure A-49. Restrictive fire area |
3-90 | 407 | Tactical Control Measures
Restrictive Fire Line
A-99. A restrictive fire line is a specific
boundary established between converging,
friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or
their effects from crossing (JP 3-09). Both or
only one of those converging forces may be
moving. Fires and their effects can cross a RFL
when the event has been coordinated with the
affected force. The purpose of the line is to
prevent interference between converging
friendly forces, such as what occurs during a
linkup operation. The next higher common
commander of the converging forces
establishes the RFL. Located on identifiable
terrain, it is usually located closer to the
Figure A-50. Restrictive fire line
stationary force—if there is one—than to the
moving force. Alternatively, a commander can use an RFL to protect sensitive areas, such as cultural
monuments. Figure A-50 depicts a restricted fire line.
FIRE SUPPORT TARGETS
A-100. A target is an entity or object
that performs a function for the threat
considered for possible engagement
or other action (JP 3-60). There are
control measures for point targets,
circular targets, rectangular targets,
and linear targets. Commanders
designate fire support targets using a
two-letter and four-digit code
established in field artillery doctrine.
A-101. Commanders may choose to
attack two or more targets
simultaneously or sequentially. A
group of targets consists of
simultaneously engaging two or more
targets. Commanders graphically
show a group of targets by circling the
targets and identifying the group with
Figure A-51. Fire support targets
a group designator. This group
designator consists of the two letters
assigned to the block of target numbers assigned to a unit with a number inserted between the two letters. A
series of targets consists of engaging two or more targets sequentially. A series can include individual targets
or combinations of individual and group targets. Commanders show a series of targets as individual targets
or groups of targets within a prescribed area. Commanders assign each series a code name or nickname. The
designation of a series or group of targets does not preclude the attack of individual targets within the series
or group. It also does not preclude the attack of one or more groups of targets within the series. Figure A-51
depicts the different fire support targets.
COMMON AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES
A-102. Airspace coordinating measures are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to
accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-52). Airspace
coordinating measures (ACMs) are employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions
and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. ACMs provide the three-dimensional description |
3-90 | 408 | Appendix A
of the airspace, associated restrictions, requests for access and other applicable coordination procedures. The
details of each ACM are provided in the airspace control order. Airspace elements establish ACMs to
accomplish one or more functions:
* Establish reserved airspace for specific airspace users.
* Restrict the actions of some airspace users.
* Create airspace in which units can use weapons with minimal risk of friendly fire incidents.
(Friendly fire incidents include death by fratricide, injury, and property damage.)
* Control actions of specific airspace users.
* Require airspace users to accomplish specific actions.
A-103. Paragraphs A-104 through A-112 discuss some of the common airspace coordinating measures. (See
JP 3-52 for a complete listing of ACMs and their uses see.)
AIR CORRIDORS
A-104. An air corridor is a restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft established for
the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired upon by friendly forces (JP 3-52). It is used to
route Army aviation elements between areas such as holding areas and forward arming and refueling points.
An air corridor’s altitude will not exceed the coordinating altitude prescribed in the airspace control order.
There are seven specific uses of air corridors. Two examples of these uses are the minimum risk route and
standard use army aircraft flight route.
Minimum Risk Route
A-105. A minimum risk route is a temporary air corridor of defined dimensions recommended for use by
aircraft that presents the minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting the combat zone (JP 3-52).
These routes are recommended by the ground commander and are used primarily for cross FLOT operations.
They are established based on known threats and friendly unit locations. Aircraft executing close air support
missions do not usually use these routes in the vicinity of the target area.
Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Route
A-106. A standard use Army aircraft flight route is a route established below the coordination level to
facilitate the movement of Army aircraft (JP 3-52). It is generally used by Army aircraft for administrative
and logistic purposes. If a coordination level has been established the using authority can implement it as
long as it remains below the coordination level. If no coordination level has been established the airspace
control authority establishes it upon the ground commander’s request. |
3-90 | 409 | Tactical Control Measures
COORDINATING ALTITUDE
A-107. A coordinating altitude is an airspace
coordinating measure that uses altitude to
separate users and as the transition between
different airspace control elements (JP 3-52).
The establishment of a coordinating altitude
allows the airspace control authority to assign a
volume of airspace to another airspace control
organization. Army forces must be aware that
any airspace user that transits or fires through an
established coordinating altitude must
coordinate with the appropriate airspace control
agency. For example, all artillery fires that
exceed the coordinating altitude must be
coordinated and approved prior to execution.
The coordinating altitude is normally expressed
in feet above mean sea level.
A-108. The joint force airspace control
authority establishes the coordinating altitude,
typically after consultation with the other
Service components. The airspace control
authority publishes the coordinating altitude as
part of the airspace control order. Army forces Figure A-52. Coordinating altitude and
can request adjustments to the coordinating coordination level
altitude based on mission requirements for
approval by the airspace control authority. Typically, the only echelon that does this is a division if has a
joint air-ground integration center. Figure A-52 depicts a coordinating altitude of 13,000 feet mean sea level.
COORDINATION LEVEL
A-109. A coordination level is an airspace coordinating measure below which fixed-wing aircraft by
normally will not fly (JP 3-52). The coordination level and coordinating altitude are not synonymous terms.
The key distinction being that a coordination level is used to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft while a
coordinating altitude is used to separate different airspace control elements. Additionally, a coordination level
can be established with or without a coordinating altitude. Army forces recommend a coordination level, or
any adjustments to an existing coordination level to the airspace control authority for approval. BCTs and
above can initiate a request for a coordination level within their air defense airspace management/brigade
aviation element cell or joint air-ground integration center. A coordination level is established by the airspace
control authority and is reflected in the airspace control order. The coordination level is normally expressed
in feet above ground level. Figure A-52 depicts a coordination level.
RESTRICTED OPERATIONS ZONE
A-110. A restricted operations zone is airspace reserved for specific activities in which the operations of
one or more airspace users is restricted (JP 3-52). A restricted operations zone (ROZ) ACM has fourteen
specific uses. Example uses include close air support and unmanned aircraft.
Close Air Support ROZ
A-111. A close air support ROZ is airspace designated for holding orbits and is used by rotary- and fixed-
wing aircraft in proximity to friendly forces. This ROZ is used in support of air assets performing close air
support missions in support of ground maneuver forces. When determining the appropriate ROZ size units
need to consider the type of aircraft providing support and altitude limits This ROZ is requested by the
applicable ground maneuver force and is established by the airspace control authority. |
3-90 | 410 | Appendix A
Unmanned Aircraft ROZ
A-112. An unmanned aircraft ROZ is airspace of defined dimensions created specifically for UAS
operations. Generally, this airspace defines where UAS operations are conducted, and does not include en
route airspace. This ROZ is only for use with UAS. Requesting units should request sufficient airspace to
facilitate the requirements unique to the UAS platform such as turn radius requirements. This ROZ is
requested by the applicable ground maneuver for and is established by the airspace control authority. |
3-90 | 411 | Appendix B
Tactical Mission Tasks
The tactical mission tasks in this appendix describe the results or effects commanders
want to achieve—the what of a mission statement. These tasks have specific military
definitions.
TASKS FOR TACTICAL MISSIONS
B-1. Tactical mission tasks are the “what” of a mission statement. Most of these actions and effects have
associated military symbols. Staffs use them in course of action development and sketches as part of the
military decision-making process. Some are also graphic control measures or obstacle effects and are used
as such. See table B-1 for a list of all tactical mission tasks.
Table B-1. Tactical mission tasks
Attack by fire Control Fix Reduce
Block Counterreconnaissance Follow and assume Retain
Breach Destroy Follow and support Secure
Bypass Disengage Interdict Seize
Canalize Disrupt Isolate Support by fire
Clear Exfiltrate Neutralize Suppress
Contain Occupy Turn
B-2. Commanders are not limited to the tactical mission tasks listed in this appendix in specifying desired
subordinate actions in operation orders or operation plans. Many of the words and terms used to describe the
what of a mission statement do not have special connotations beyond their common English language
meanings. However, units must have a shared understanding of the what of the operation. Tasks involving
only actions by friendly forces rarely provide sufficient clarity for a mission statement, thus the addition of a
solid purpose coupled with the task adds understanding and clarity. Commanders ensure that missions
assigned to subordinate units are consistent with their schemes of maneuver and resources allocated to those
subordinates. For example, a defending unit requires far greater effort (resources) to destroy an enemy force
than to disrupt it. Likewise, an attacking unit requires more combat power to clear enemy forces from a given
area than to contain enemy forces in that same area.
ATTACK BY FIRE
B-3. Attack by fire is a tactical mission task using direct and
indirect fires to engage an enemy from a distance. Friendly forces
use direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy force
without closing with the enemy to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive
that enemy. This task is usually given when the mission does not
dictate or support occupation of the objective. An attack by fire is
not done in conjunction with a maneuvering force. When assigning
this task, the commander must state the desired effect on enemy
forces, such as neutralize, fix, or disrupt. A commander may assign
the force conducting an attack by fire to a battle position with either Figure B-1. Attack by fire task
a sector of fire or an engagement area. The arrow points at the
targeted force or objective, and the commander places the base of the arrow in the general area from which |
3-90 | 412 | Appendix B
the commander wants to deliver the attack. Attack by fire positions are rarely applicable to units larger than
company size. Figure B-1 on page B-1 depicts the attack by fire tactical mission task.
B-4. An attack by fire closely resembles the task of support by fire. The chief difference is that one unit
conducts the support by fire task to support another unit, so the second unit can maneuver against enemy
forces. The attack by fire task includes—
* Assigning sectors of fire or engagement areas to each subordinate weapon system to include the
enemy force’s defensive positions or avenues of approach.
* Designating control measures for massing, distributing, and shifting of direct and indirect fires.
* Designating BPs, an assigned area, or an axis of advance to allow the friendly force to engage the
enemy force.
* Providing for security and all-around defense, including control measures to ensure tie in of
subordinate elements and maximum use of hide positions.
* Using OPSEC to deceive enemy forces about movement, occupation, and intent of the operation.
* Reconnoitering, preparing, and securing movement routes and firing positions before the
movement of the main body, and stocking class V items.
* Providing movement instructions to the initial battle positions.
BLOCK
B-5. Block is a tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to
an area or an avenue of approach. A blocking task normally requires
the friendly force to block the enemy force for a certain time, or until a
specific event has occurred. The line perpendicular to the enemy’s line
of advance indicates the limit of enemy advance. A blocking unit may
have to hold terrain and become decisively engaged. Block as a tactical
mission task differs from the tactical mission task of fix. A blocked
enemy force can move in any direction other than the obstructed one,
while a fixed enemy force cannot move in any direction. Figure B-2
depicts the block tactical mission task.
Figure B-2. Block task
B-6. Block is also an obstacle effect that integrates fire
planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a
specific avenue of approach or prevent the attacking force
from passing through an engagement area. The vertical line
in the obstacle effect graphic indicates the limit of enemy
advance. It also indicates where the obstacle ties in to restricted
terrain. A force may employ blocking obstacles to assist in the
task. Blocking obstacles are complex, employed in depth, and
integrated with fires to prevent enemy forces from proceeding
along an avenue of approach or to proceed only at unacceptable
Figure B-3. Block obstacle effect
cost. When employed, blocking obstacles serve as a limit, not
allowing enemy forces beyond that point. Obstacles alone cannot accomplish a blocking task. Figure B-3
depicts the block obstacle effect. (See Chapter 17 for more information on the block obstacle effect.)
BREACH
B-7. Breach is a tactical mission task in which a unit breaks through or establishes a passage through
an enemy obstacle. An enemy obstacle can include enemy defenses, obstacles, minefields, or fortifications.
Units attempt to bypass and avoid obstacles and enemy defensive positions to the maximum extent possible
to maintain tempo and momentum. Breaching enemy defenses and obstacle systems is normally the last
choice. If a breach is necessary, units employ all available means to break through or establish a passage. A
breach is a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of the maneuver commander. |
3-90 | 413 | Tactical Mission Tasks
B-8. The area located between the arms of the graphic
shows the general location for the breach. The length of the
arms extend to include the entire depth of the area that must
be breached. Breaching operations may be required to
support an attack anywhere along the continuum from a
deliberate to a hasty attack. Regardless of where the attack
falls along the continuum, the breaching tenets—
intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching
organization, mass, and synchronization—apply when
conducting breaching operations in support of an attack. Figure B-4. Breach task
Figure B-4 depicts the breach tactical mission task. (See
ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A for more information concerning breaching operations.)
BYPASS
B-9. Bypass is a tactical mission task in which a unit
deliberately avoids contact with an obstacle or an enemy
force. A commander orders a bypass to maintain momentum
while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force. A
bypass can take place in offensive or defensive actions. The
arms of the graphic go on both sides of the location or unit
that will be bypassed. Figure B-5 depicts the bypass tactical
mission task.
B-10. Commanders base the bypass decision on—
* The requirement to maintain momentum and Figure B-5. Bypass task
aggressive action.
* Knowledge of the enemy force’s strength, intent, or mission.
* The degree to which the bypassed enemy force can interfere with the advance.
* The general state of the enemy force; for example, if enemy resistance is crumbling, the friendly
force can take greater risks.
* Any bypass criteria established by a higher echelon headquarters.
B-11. The force conducting the bypass immediately reports any bypassed obstacles and enemy forces to its
higher echelon headquarters. This force normally keeps the bypassed enemy force under observation until
relieved by another force unless it is part of a raid. A senior commander does not normally delegate authority
to bypass below the battalion task force level. Commanders establish bypass criteria to limit the size of enemy
forces that subordinates can bypass without their approval. Before approving the bypass, commanders ensure
that the bypassing force checks the bypass route for enemy presence and trafficability. The bypassing force
prevents the bypassed enemy force from interfering with the moving friendly force.
B-12. The two bypass techniques that a force can employ are—
* Avoiding the enemy force totally.
* Fixing the enemy force in place with fires and then conducting the bypass. |
3-90 | 414 | Appendix B
B-13. If the bypassing force cannot avoid the enemy force, then the bypassing force fixes the enemy force
with part of its maneuver elements and bypasses it with the
balance of the force. (See figure B-6.) Generally, a
commander will not attempt to bypass an enemy force if
more than a third of the unit’s combat power is required to
fix the enemy force. The commander assigns one
subordinate unit the mission of fixing the enemy force in this
situation, reinforcing the fixing force as required by the
mission variables. The fixing force coordinates with the unit
assigned to relieve the fixing force as soon as possible and
provides the new unit with all available information about
the enemy and terrain. The relieving unit is normally another
unit assigned a follow and support task. Once relieved, the
force fixing the enemy force either rejoins its parent
organization or becomes part of the following element and
comes under its control.
B-14. Occasionally a commander may direct the fixing
force to break contact with the enemy force after the
Figure B-6. Task force conducting a
bypassing force completes the bypass. This occurs when the
fix and a bypass
bypassing force has no requirement to maintain an
uninterrupted logistics flow, such as in a raid. In this case,
the fixing force fixes the enemy force by employing defensive and limited offensive actions in
synchronization with all available fire support until ordered to rejoin the bypassing force.
CANALIZE
B-15. Canalize is a tactical mission task in which a unit restricts
enemy movement to a narrow zone. Friendly forces do this by
exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly
maneuver. Successful canalization results in moving the enemy
formation, individual Soldiers, or weapon systems into a predetermined
position where they are vulnerable to piecemeal destruction. Figure B-7
depicts the canalize tactical mission task.
Figure B-7. Canalize task
CLEAR
B-16. Clear is a tactical mission task in which a unit eliminates all
enemy forces within an assigned area. Friendly forces do this by
destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces, so they
cannot execute organized resistance and interfere with the friendly unit’s
mission. In all cases, this task requires a thorough reconnaissance to
discover the enemy force’s locations. After discovering the enemy
force’s location, the clearing force maneuvers against the enemy force.
The bar connecting the arrows designates the desired limit of advance
for the clearing force. The bar also establishes the width of the area to
clear. Figure B-8 depicts the clear tactical mission task. Figure B-8. Clear task
B-17. This task requires significant time and other resources. In the
mission statement, a commander can modify the objective associated with this task to destroying, capturing,
or forcing the withdrawal of only enemy forces larger than a stated size. In this case, the clearing force keeps
smaller enemy forces under observation, while the rest of the friendly force bypasses them.
B-18. Clear is also a mobility task that involves the total elimination of an obstacle that is usually performed
by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. Units conduct clearing operations to eliminate completely
the enemy’s obstacle effort or the residual obstacles affecting the operational area. (See FM 3-90.4 for more
information on mobility clearing operations.) |
3-90 | 415 | Tactical Mission Tasks
CONTAIN
B-19. Contain is a tactical mission task in which a unit stops, holds,
or surrounds an enemy force. This causes the enemy to center their
activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of
their forces for use elsewhere. Contain may identify a specific enemy
unit, or geographic terms or time may express the limits of the
containment. Containment allows an enemy force to reposition itself
within the designated geographic area, while fixing an enemy does not.
The contain graphic encompasses the entire area desired to contain
enemy forces during the development of alternative courses of action.
Figure B-9 depicts the contain tactical mission task.
Figure B-9. Contain task
CONTROL
B-20. Control is a tactical mission task in which a unit maintains
physical influence over an assigned area. By controlling an area, units
prevent its use by an enemy force or create conditions necessary for
friendly operations. That influence can result from friendly forces
occupying the specified area or dominating that area by their weapon
systems. Control of an area does not require the complete clearance of all
enemy soldiers from that area. The tactical mission task of control differs
from that of secure because secure does not allow enemy fires to impact
on the secured area. Enemy forces can engage targets within the
controlled area, but they cannot move ground forces through that area. A Figure B-10. Control task
unit designated to control a route or area directs and regulates the use of
the area, to include movement of friendly traffic through the designated area or route. Control may also mean
a command relationship or a function commanders exercise through their command and control systems.
Figure B-10 depicts the control tactical mission task. (See ADP 3-0 and ADP 6-0 for more information on
command and control.)
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
B-21. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a unit
to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct
mission, but a component of all security operations and local security measures. It prevents hostile
observation of a force or area. It involves both active and passive elements and includes combat action to
destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units and surveillance assets, such as unmanned aircraft systems.
B-22. Destroying enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance assets while denying the enemy information
through other collection systems allows friendly force commanders to operate against an enemy who is
operating blindly. The enemy commander’s inability to see the battlefield eventually desynchronizes the
enemy commander’s actions and renders that commander’s force vulnerable to aggressive action by friendly
forces. (See Chapter 13 for additional information on counterreconnaissance.)
DESTROY
B-23. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an
enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted.
Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it
cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without
being entirely rebuilt. The amount of damage needed to render a unit
combat ineffective depends on the unit’s type, discipline, and morale.
Destroying armored or dug in targets with area fire weapons requires
considerable ammunition and time, so forces do not normally attempt it
unless they have terminally guided munitions. Figure B-11 depicts the
destroy tactical mission task.
Figure B-11. Destroy task |
3-90 | 416 | Appendix B
DISENGAGE
B-24. Disengage is a tactical mission task in which a unit breaks contact with an enemy to conduct
another mission or to avoid becoming decisively engaged. It involves moving to a location where enemy
forces cannot engage the friendly force with either direct fires or observed indirect fires. Disengaging from
enemy forces while displacing from one position to the next is a difficult procedure. Figure B-12 depicts the
disengage tactical mission task.
B-25. A disengagement plan includes—
* The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements
after disengagement, along with the movement routes for
each subordinate unit.
* Fires to suppress enemy forces and cover the unit’s
movement.
* Screening smoke to conceal the unit’s movement, as part
of a military deception operation, or to cover passage
points.
Figure B-12. Disengage task
* Contact and passage points if moving through friendly
lines.
* The time disengagement starts.
* The earliest time that functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements move.
B-26. The senior headquarters conducts operations to support the disengaging forces and relieve pressure on
units in contact with enemy forces. For example, if a division is conducting a delay, the division commander
uses attached aviation assets to help a BCT disengage from close operations. Simultaneously, the division
uses its long-range artillery, rocket, and electromagnetic warfare systems to destroy or disrupt enemy follow-
on echelons to prevent them from interfering with the disengagement. The intent is to create conditions that
allow the unit to disengage while avoiding decisive combat.
B-27. To facilitate disengagement, units suppress the enemy force in contact by bombarding the enemy force
with large volumes of both direct and indirect fires provided by forces other than the disengaging unit. In
open terrain, a unit generally moves its short-range systems first. In close terrain, a unit generally moves its
long-range systems first to support by fire positions. The time involved to move a system to its next position
also affects when that system moves. Small-unit leaders usually direct this movement because of the limited
range of combat net radios and the fact that the tactical situation varies across a unit’s front. This process is
repeated as necessary. Once disengagement starts, units must complete it rapidly. A commander can employ
supporting units or reserves to protect the disengaging unit’s flanks and assist in freeing any closely engaged
elements. The unit then moves to its next position using the appropriate movement techniques.
B-28. If enemy combat systems have not closed within direct fire range of the friendly disengaging unit, all
its elements may be able to move simultaneously under the cover of massed fires and smoke. Speed of
execution and continued coordination are essential to the success of this task.
DISRUPT
B-29. Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a unit upsets an
enemy’s formation or tempo and causes the enemy force to attack
prematurely or in a piecemeal fashion. Units disrupt an enemy force
by integrating direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles. This
increases an enemy force’s vulnerability to friendly fires. It may
temporarily knock a unit out of a battle. Disruption is not an end; it is
the means to an end. The center arrow points toward the targeted enemy
unit. Figure B-13 depicts the disrupt tactical mission task.
B-30. The maneuver force attempting to disrupt an enemy force must
attack the defending enemy force with enough combat power to achieve Figure B-13. Disrupt task
the desired results with one mass attack or sustain the attack until it
achieves the desired results. It may involve attacking the enemy force while it is still in its assembly areas or |
3-90 | 417 | Tactical Mission Tasks
in an approach march before it can deploy into a movement formation. A commander determines the degree
of acceptable risk based on anticipated friendly losses, the location of the attack, the number of attacks, and
other risk management factors.
B-31. Disrupt is an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning
and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up its
formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit
breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal
effort. It also helps to deceive an enemy force concerning the
location of friendly defensive positions, to separate combat
echelons, or to separate combat forces from their logistics
support. The short arrows in the obstacle effect graphic indicate
where obstacles impact the enemy’s ability to maneuver. The
longer arrows indicate where units allow enemy forces to
Figure B-14. Disrupt obstacle
bypass the obstacle effect, so the defending force can engage
effect
the enemy force with fires. The arrows indicate the direction of
an enemy attack. A defending unit normally uses the disrupt obstacle effect forward of engagement areas.
Obstacles alone cannot disrupt an enemy unit. Figure B-14 depicts the disrupt obstacle effect. (See Chapter
17 for more information on the disrupt obstacle effect.)
EXFILTRATE
B-32. Exfiltrate is a tactical mission task in which a unit removes
Soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth,
deception, surprise, or clandestine means. Friendly forces use stealth,
deception, surprise, or other clandestine means to exfiltrate the area.
Friendly forces exfiltrate when they have been encircled by enemy
forces and cannot conduct a breakout or be relieved by other friendly
forces. Forces returning from a raid, an infiltration, or a patrol behind
enemy lines can also conduct an exfiltration. A commander exfiltrates
an encircled force to preserve a portion of the force; it is preferable to
the capture of the entire force. A force exfiltrates only after destroying
Figure B-15. Exfiltrate task
or incapacitating all equipment, except medical, that it must leave
behind. Only as a last resort, when the alternative is the capture of the entire force, does a force conducting
an exfiltration leave its casualties in place with supplies, chaplain support, and medical personnel.
Figure B-15 depicts the exfiltrate tactical mission task.
B-33. Exfiltration is most feasible through rough or difficult terrain in areas lightly covered by enemy
observation and fire. These conditions often allow undetected movement of small elements when movement
of the entire force would present more risk. Exfiltration requires resourcefulness, a high degree of discipline,
expert land navigation skills, and motivation. It is unlikely that the entire force will be able to exfiltrate since
part of it may have to create a diversion. Good, small-unit leadership is essential in this type of operation.
B-34. The exfiltrating force first establishes its rally points and exfiltration lanes. It coordinates its linkup
plans with other friendly units. A commander designates exfiltration lanes as RFAs or no-fire areas. The
exfiltrating force uses preparation fires to cover its movement and to expend stockpiled ammunition. Based
on reconnaissance and available intelligence, the exfiltrating force subdivides into small groups and
exfiltrates during periods of limited visibility, passing through or around enemy defensive positions. If
detected, it tries to bypass enemy forces. Exfiltration may be more difficult with combat and tactical vehicles
because the noise they make and the limitations they impose on exfiltration routes make detection more
likely. |
3-90 | 418 | Appendix B
FIX
B-35. Fix is a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents the
enemy from moving from a specific location for a specific period.
This may occur by engaging an enemy force to prevent its withdrawal
for use elsewhere, or by using deception, such as transmitting false
orders. A commander uses fix in offensive and defensive actions; it is
always a supporting effort. The point of the arrow faces toward the
desired enemy unit to fix. The broken part of the arrow indicates the
desired location for that event to occur. Figure B-16 depicts the fix
tactical mission task.
B-36. Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. The friendly Figure B-16. Fix task
force has to prevent the enemy force from moving in any direction. This
task usually has a time constraint, such as “fix the enemy reserve force until OBJECTIVE FALON is
secured.” The tactical mission task of fix differs from that of block in that a fixed enemy force cannot move
from a given location, but a blocked enemy force can move in any direction other than the one obstructed.
B-37. Fix is an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and
obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a
specified area, normally an engagement area. The primary use
of this effect is to give a friendly force time to acquire, target, and
destroy an attacking enemy force with direct and indirect fires
throughout the depth of an engagement area or avenue of
approach. The irregular part of the arrow in the obstacle intent
graphic indicates the location where complex obstacles slow the
enemy force’s rate of advance. The arrow indicates the direction
of enemy force’s advance. Figure B-17 depicts the fix obstacle
Figure B-17. Fix obstacle effect
effect.
FOLLOW AND ASSUME
B-38. Follow and assume is a tactical mission task in which
a committed force follows and supports a lead force
conducting an offensive operation and continues the mission
if the lead force cannot continue. The lead force may be unable
to continue for several reasons such as becoming fixed or
attrited by enemy forces. The follow and assume force is not a
reserve, but it is committed to accomplish specific tasks.
Planners place the box part of the associated task military
symbol around the icons of units assigned this task. Figure B-18
depicts the follow and assume tactical mission task.
Figure B-18. Follow and assume
B-39. Tasks for a follow and assume force include— task
* Preparing to execute all missions of the followed
unit.
* Maintaining contact with the trail elements of the leading force.
* Preparing to conduct a forward passage of lines through the force it is following.
* Monitoring all combat information and intelligence being provided to and from the force it is
following.
* Avoiding engaging enemy forces bypassed by the force it is following.
B-40. A commander assigns a follow and assume mission to ensure that the attacking force maintains the
momentum of its offensive action. The follow and assume force ensures it can immediately execute a forward
passage of lines and assume the lead force’s mission.
B-41. A commander assigning a unit mission the task of follow and assume has two options in establishing
the relationship between the lead and trail units. Commanders normally retain command of both units and |
3-90 | 419 | Tactical Mission Tasks
require that all requests for support from the supported unit to the supporting unit pass through their
headquarters. Alternatively, in situations where a commander will not be able to maintain control over both
units, the supporting unit is placed in a standard command relationship with the supported unit, such as
attached or operational control. An example of this occurs when both units are trying to encircle a
retrograding enemy force and the commander remains with the direct pressure force.
FOLLOW AND SUPPORT
B-42. Follow and support is a tactical mission task in which a
committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting
an offensive operation. A follow and support force is not a reserve
but is a force committed to specific tasks. It contains an arrow
graphic around the symbol of the unit being assigned this task.
Figure B-19 depicts the follow and support tactical mission task.
B-43. Missions of a follow and support force include—
* Destroying bypassed enemy units when the lead unit
does not clear the assigned area as it advances.
Figure B-19. Follow and
* Blocking movement of enemy reinforcements.
support task
* Relieving in place any direct pressure or encircling force
halted to contain enemy forces.
* Securing lines of communications.
* Clearing obstacles.
* Guarding prisoners, key areas, and installations.
* Recovering friendly battle losses.
* Securing key terrain.
* Controlling dislocated civilians.
B-44. A commander assigns a unit the task of follow and support to keep the supported force from having to
commit its combat power to tasks other than the main effort, which would slow the momentum and tempo of
the offense. The follow and support force accomplishes its tasks to prevent enemy forces, obstacles, and other
factors from interfering with offensive actions, especially along the lines of communications.
B-45. A commander assigning the follow and support task has two options in establishing the relationship
between the supported and the supporting units. A commander can place the follow and support unit in a
standard command relationship with the supported unit, such as attached or operational control. Alternatively,
a commander can retain command of the follow and support force and require that all tasking requests from
the supported unit go through that commander’s headquarters.
INTERDICT
B-46. Interdict is a tactical mission task where a unit prevents,
disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route in any
domain. It is an offensive action that desynchronizes the enemy.
Interdiction is a supporting effort conducted to complement and
reinforce other ongoing offensive or defensive operations. The two
arrows should cross on the unit or location targeted for interdiction. An
interdiction tasking must specify how long to interdict, defined as a
length of time or some event that must occur before the interdiction is
lifted, and the exact effect desired from the interdiction. Figure B-20
depicts the interdict tactical mission task.
Figure B-20. Interdict task
B-47. A friendly force’s capability to interdict may have a devastating
impact on an enemy force’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions. For example, interdiction efforts
that result in an enemy force’s maneuver being delayed or disrupted enhance the friendly force’s ability to
achieve tactical advantages. Delaying or disrupting enemy resupply efforts limits the enemy force’s ability
to sustain intense, high tempo offensive or defensive actions and restricts enemy mobility. Space and |
3-90 | 420 | Appendix B
cyberspace capabilities prevent, disrupt, or delay enemy communications capabilities, which degrades the
enemy’s ability to command and control their forces.
B-48. The depth at which the attacking force conducts the interdiction generally determines the friendly
force’s freedom of action. Increasing the depth of operations reduces the danger of fratricide to air and surface
forces, reduces the coordination required, and allows increasingly flexible operations. Aerial forces, such as
manned and unmanned aircraft, can attack enemy forces to interdict their movement throughout the assigned
area.
B-49. The depth at which interdiction takes place also determines the speed with which units observe its
effects. Normally, ground maneuver units first focus on targets close to the FLOT. Interdiction efforts there
immediately impact enemy forces near the interdiction target, but they do not affect the enemy force’s ability
to mass effects. Attacks at greater distances from the FLOT have a delayed impact on close combat but
eventually degrade the enemy force’s ability to mass effects.
B-50. Interdicting the movement of enemy units can be extremely effective in assisting the encirclement of
those forces and their eventual destruction. Fixed enemy ground forces—or those trapped by the loss of their
mobility—provide lucrative targets. A commander plans to interdict withdrawing enemy forces to enhance
the pursuit. While interdiction can contribute to success by hampering reinforcement and resupply, it can also
contribute by trapping enemy forces or canalizing their maneuvers, leading to their destruction in detail.
ISOLATE
B-51. Isolate is a tactical mission task in which a unit seals off an
enemy, physically and psychologically, from sources of support and
denies it freedom of movement. An isolated force is prevented from
having contact with other enemy forces. A unit does not allow an
isolated enemy force sanctuary within its present position. Instead, a unit
continues to conduct offensive actions against an enemy force. The
position or direction of the arrow has no significance, but the graphic
surrounds the targeted enemy unit. Figure B-21 depicts the isolate
tactical mission task.
Figure B-21. Isolate task
NEUTRALIZE
B-52. Neutralize is a tactical mission task in which a unit renders
the enemy incapable of interfering with an operation. The two lines
cross over the symbol of the unit or facility targeted for neutralization.
When assigning a task to neutralize, a commander specifies the enemy
force or materiel to neutralize and the duration, which is time or event
driven. The neutralized target may become effective again when
casualties are replaced, damage is repaired, or effort resulting in the
neutralization is lifted. A unit normally uses a combination of lethal
and nonlethal effects to neutralize enemy personnel or materiel. The
assets required to neutralize a target vary according to the type and size Figure B-22. Neutralize task
of the target and the weapon and munitions combination used.
Figure B-22 depicts the neutralize tactical mission task.
OCCUPY
B-53. Occupy is a tactical mission task in which a unit moves into an
area to control it without enemy opposition. Both the friendly force’s
movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition.
A unit can control an area without occupying it, but not vice versa. That
is the difference between the tactical mission tasks of occupy and control.
The symbol should encompass the entire area that a commander desires
to occupy. Units typically occupy assembly areas, objectives, and
Figure B-23. Occupy task
defensive positions. Figure B-23 depicts the occupy tactical mission task. |
3-90 | 421 | Tactical Mission Tasks
REDUCE
B-54. Reduce is a tactical mission task in which a unit destroys an encircled or bypassed enemy force.
This task can occur at any location on the battlefield. Reduce is also a mobility task to create and mark lanes
through, over, or around an obstacle to allow the attacking force to accomplish its mission (ATP 3-
90.4/MCTP 3-34A). There is no symbol for this task.
RETAIN
B-55. Retain is a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents
enemy occupation or use of terrain. A commander assigning this task
specifies the area to retain and the duration of the retention, which is
time or event driven. While a unit is conducting this task, it expects
enemy forces to attack and prepares for decisive engagement. A unit
tasked to retain a specific piece of terrain does not necessarily have to
occupy it. The direction of the arrow has no significance, but the symbol
includes the entire area to be retained. Figure B-24 depicts the retain
tactical mission task.
Figure B-24. Retain task
SECURE
B-56. Secure is a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents the
enemy from damaging or destroying a force, facility, or
geographical location. This task normally involves conducting area
security operations. A force given the mission of securing a unit, facility,
or geographic location, such as a route or base, not only prevents enemy
forces from over running or occupying the secured location, but also
prevents enemy direct fires and observed indirect fires from impacting
the secured location, unit, or facility. Stated simply, the secured area or
location is safe enough to build and project combat power. There is a
difference between control and secure. The control tactical mission task
Figure B-25. Secure task
allows enemy direct and indirect fires to affect the location being
controlled while secure does not. A unit does not have to physically occupy the area immediately around the
unit, facility, or geographic location it is securing if it can prevent the enemy from occupying or firing at that
location by other means. The commander states the mission duration in terms of time or event when assigning
a mission to secure a given unit, facility, or geographic location. The direction of the arrow has no
significance, but the symbol includes the entire area to be secured. Figure B-25 depicts the secure tactical
mission task.
SEIZE
B-57. Seize is a tactical mission task in which a unit takes possession
of a designated area by using overwhelming force. An enemy force
can no longer place direct fire on a seized objective. The arrow points to
the location or objective to seize. This task differs from secure because
it requires offensive action to obtain control of the designated area or
objective. It differs from the task of occupy because it involves
overcoming anticipated enemy opposition. Once a friendly force seizes
a physical objective, it clears the terrain within that objective by killing,
capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of all enemy forces. Figure B-26
depicts the seize tactical mission task. Figure B-26. Seize task |
3-90 | 422 | Appendix B
SUPPORT BY FIRE
B-58. Support by fire is a tactical mission task in which a unit
engages the enemy by direct fire in support of another
maneuvering force. The primary objective of the support force is
normally to fix and suppress enemy forces so that they cannot
effectively fire on the maneuvering force. The secondary objective is
to destroy enemy forces if they try to reposition. The commander
specifies the desired effect on enemy forces when assigning this task.
The support by fire tasked is rarely applicable to units larger than
company size. Figure B-27 depicts the support by fire tactical mission
task. Figure B-27. Support by fire
task
B-59. A unit conducting the task of support by fire does not maneuver
to capture enemy forces or terrain. A commander gives this task to another unit as part of a larger maneuver.
When assigning a support by fire mission, a commander designates the enemy force, when to attack, the
general location from which to operate, the friendly force to support, and the purpose of the task, such as fix
or suppress. The ends of the arrows point in the general direction of the targeted unit or location. The base of
the area indicates the general area from which to deliver fires.
B-60. Once a commander gives an element the task of support by fire, it should occupy support by fire
positions that have cover and concealment, good observation, and clear fields of fire. Elements occupying
support by fire positions should—
* Check the security of the position.
* Search for targets.
* Orient weapons on likely or suspected enemy positions.
* Occupy fighting positions providing some degree of protection. Armored and Stryker forces
occupy hull-down firing positions, while infantry forces use trees, natural berms, and similar
existing terrain features.
* Assign observation sectors to each Soldier or weapon system in the support by fire element.
* Use available thermal sights to locate heat sources not visible to the naked eye, such as vehicles
concealed in tree lines or other wooded areas or personnel serving at observation posts.
B-61. Support by fire closely resembles the task of attack by fire. The difference is that support by fire
supports another force so that it can maneuver against enemy forces, while an attack by fire does not support
the maneuver of another friendly force.
SUPPRESS
B-62. Suppress is a tactical mission task in which a unit temporarily
degrades a force or weapon system from accomplishing its mission.
It occurs when a unit employs direct or indirect lethal and nonlethal
effects, such as artillery, electromagnetic warfare, or smoke on enemy
personnel, weapons, and equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires,
sensors, and visual observation of friendly forces. Unlike the
neutralization task, the original target regains its effectiveness without
needing to reconstitute once the effects of the systems involved in the
suppression effort lift or shift to another target. Figure B-28 depicts the
suppress tactical mission task. Figure B-28. Suppress task |
3-90 | 423 | Tactical Mission Tasks
TURN
B-63. Turn is a tactical mission task in which a unit forces an enemy
force from one avenue of approach or movement corridor to
another. A commander relates obstacles, fires, and terrain to improve
the friendly tactical situation while degrading the enemy force’s
situation. For example, in the offense, a commander might want to turn
a pursued enemy force to place it in a position where the friendly force
can destroy it. In the defense, a commander might want to turn an
attacking enemy force to allow the friendly force to conduct a
counterattack into the enemy force’s flank. The place where the arrow
breaks indicates the general location of the obstacle complex that will Figure B-29. Turn task
make enemy forces move from one avenue of approach to another.
Figure B-29 depicts the turn tactical mission task.
B-64. Turn is an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning
and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one
avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or
into an engagement area. Its development requires well-
defined mobility corridors and avenues of approach. To achieve
this effect, the obstacles have a subtle orientation relative to the
enemy force’s approach. The obstacles and their associated fires
allow bypasses in the direction desired by the friendly scheme of
maneuver. Finally, the obstacles tie into restrictive terrain at the
initial point of the turn. A commander normally uses the turn Figure B-30. Turn obstacle effect
effect on the flanks of an engagement area. The direction of the
arrow indicates the desired direction of turn. Figure B-30 depicts the turn obstacle effect. |
3-90 | 425 | Appendix C
Encirclements
Encirclements are an outcome that can result from offensive operations to isolate and
destroy enemy forces or result from a friendly force being isolated by enemy forces.
This appendix provides an overview of encirclement operations and consists of the
organization of forces for an encirclement, control measures, and planning and
execution of encirclement operations. It also includes what to do if a unit is encircled
and how to break out from an encirclement.
ENCIRCLEMENT OVERVIEW
C-1. Encirclement is where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able
to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement. A unit can conduct
offensive encirclement operations designed to isolate an enemy force or they could become encircled
resulting from the unit's isolation by the actions of an enemy force. Encirclements occur because combat
operations involving modernized forces are likely to be chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending
across large areas containing relatively few units as each side maneuvers against the other to obtain positional
advantage.
C-2. Typically, encirclements result from penetrations and envelopments, or are extensions of exploitation
and pursuit operations that bypass large enemy forces in order to maintain momentum. As such, they are not
a separate form of maneuver but an extension of an ongoing operation. They may be planned sequels or result
from exploiting an unforeseen opportunity. They usually result from the linkup of two encircling arms
conducting a double envelopment. However, they can occur in situations where an attacking unit uses a major
obstacle, such as a shoreline, as a second encircling force. Although a commander may designate terrain
objectives in an encirclement, isolating and destroying or defeating enemy forces are the focus. Ideally, an
encirclement results in the surrender of the encircled force. This minimizes friendly force losses and resource
expenditures. A key consideration prior to executing an encirclement is understanding that the encircling
force is fixed and therefore unavailable for other operations until the enemy force being encircled is reduced.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR AN ENCIRCLEMENT
C-3. An encirclement operation usually has at least two phases—the actual encirclement and actions taken
against the isolated enemy forces. Commanders consider adjusting subordinate units’ task organizations
between phases to maximize unit effectiveness in each phase. The first phase is the actual encirclement that
results in the enemy force’s isolation. The organization of forces for an encirclement is similar to that of a
movement to contact or an envelopment. The unit executing an encirclement organizes encircling forces into
a direct pressure force and one or more encircling arms. Armored, mechanized, and motorized infantry, air
assault, and airborne units are especially well suited for use as an encircling force since they have the tactical
mobility to reach positions that cut enemy ground lines of communication. Bypassed and non-encircled
enemy forces on the flanks and rear of advancing friendly forces require all around security.
C-4. A commander should direct the encirclement effort. However, there must also be unity of command
for each encircling arm. The encircling force headquarters may name one of its subordinate units as the
headquarters for an encircling arm. Alternatively, that force’s headquarters may create a temporary command
post from organic assets, such as its tactical command post, to control one or more arms of the encirclement.
If that encircling arm has subordinate inner and outer arms, each of them also requires separate subordinate
commanders. The missions and spatial orientation between the inner and outer encircling arms are
sufficiently different; therefore, one force cannot act in both directions at once. Figure C-1 on page C-2
depicts an encirclement. |
3-90 | 426 | Appendix C
Figure C-1. Inner and outer arms of an encirclement
C-5. The encirclement unit organizes only an encircling arm if there is no possibility of the encircled forces
receiving relief from enemy forces outside the encirclement. If there is danger of an enemy relief force
reaching the encircled enemy force, the unit organizes both an inner and outer encircling arms. The
commander assigns the outer encircling arm a security mission, an offensive mission to drive away any
enemy relief force, or a defensive mission to prevent the enemy relief force from making contact with the
encircled enemy force. Once the encirclement is complete, these inner or outer encircling arms form a
perimeter.
C-6. The second phase of an encirclement operation involves actions taken against an isolated enemy force.
The commander’s decision to fix, contain, or destroy isolated enemy forces affects the task organization of
subordinate units, as do enemy attempts to break out from the encirclement or linkup with the encircled force.
All these possible outcomes require resources in terms of units and supplies, but some require more resources
than others do. If the unit’s mission is to contain or fix an isolated enemy force, the unit organizes subordinate
forces for defensive action and arranges them around the enemy force’s perimeter. If the unit’s mission is to
reduce or destroy that same enemy force, that unit organizes subordinate forces for offensive action. A higher
echelon commander often assigns either mission to the commander of a follow and support force.
C-7. Regardless of whether a commander decides to fix, contain, or destroy enemy forces, the unit conducts
reconnaissance to maintain contact and monitor enemy force actions in response to the encirclement. This
allows the unit to respond effectively to any enemy movement. The most effective reconnaissance combines
ground, aerial, and surveillance systems to provide constant coverage and multiple assessments of enemy
activities throughout the encircled area.
ENCIRCLEMENT CONTROL MEASURES
C-8. As shown in figure C-2, control measures for an encirclement are similar to those of other offensive
operations, especially an envelopment, but with a few additional considerations. If the encirclement unit uses
both an inner and an outer encircling arm, the unit must establish a boundary between them. The unit places
the boundary so that each element has enough space to accomplish their mission. The inner force requires
enough space to fight a defensive battle to prevent the encircled force from breaking out. The outer force
requires adequate terrain and depth in its assigned area to defeat any attempt to relieve the encircled force. |
3-90 | 427 | Appendix C
Figure C-2. Example of encirclement control measures
C-9. The commander who controls both converging forces establishes a RFL between them. The unit may
also establish a free-fire area, which encloses the area occupied by a bypassed or encircled enemy forces.
The unit may also establish contact points.
PLANNING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
C-10. Encirclement operations may require allocating large forces and significant resources. They take a
great deal of time and usually slow an advance. The encircling force maintains contact with an encircled
enemy force, the following general planning considerations apply. Units—
* Determine the best available assets that gain and maintain contact with enemy forces.
* Keep encircled enemy forces isolated and incapable of receiving intelligence, logistics, and fire
support from enemy formations outside of the encirclement.
* Use reconnaissance and surveillance assets so that they know the capabilities of the encircled force
and, as much as possible, its commander’s intentions.
* Retain freedom of maneuver.
* Control fires and fields of fire to avoid fratricide.
C-11. Units apply the general planning considerations for the offense or the defense depending on the overall
mission. Units plan to rotate the forces involved in reducing the encircled pocket to maintain constant
pressure on the enemy.
C-12. Every encircled enemy unit reacts differently. Initially, some become demoralized and cannot offer
any serious resistance. Additional methods for psychologically affecting enemy personnel and reducing their
mental and physical capabilities is by disrupting their sleep and rest patterns. However, if left undisturbed,
most enemy units recover and attempt to break out and regain contact with their main force or attack the
flank and rear of advancing friendly units. The encircling force must plan for the enemy force’s most probable
reactions.
C-13. If the enemy force is not reduced, and it can be resupplied or has access to considerable supply stocks,
then it continues to be a serious threat to encirclement units in future operations. The encircling force must
be approximately equal in size to this type of encircled force to fix or contain it. This situation occurred when |
3-90 | 428 | Appendix C
German forces occupied various fortified French ports after Allied armies liberated the rest of France in 1944.
Each encircled German division took approximately one Allied division to maintain its isolation. Conversely,
an enemy force isolated without adequate supplies either surrenders or faces containment by considerably
smaller forces. This situation occurred in Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when an Israeli division
isolated the Egyptian 3rd Army.
EXECUTING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
C-14. When feasible, encircling forces advance parallel to the enemy’s direction of movement. They attempt
to reach key passes, bridges, and other critical points before the main enemy force reaches them. When the
encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy force, it engages the enemy force’s flanks to force the enemy
to fight under the most unfavorable conditions possible, ultimately in two or more directions simultaneously.
Engineer units rapidly breach obstacles in the path of the encircling force. Friendly forces emplace obstacle
complexes, supported by fires, to block probable avenues of escape, as they counter attempted enemy
breakouts from encirclement. Units may use air assault and airborne forces to seize key passes or other critical
terrain objectives to cut enemy LOCs. The encircling force completes the encirclement when it cuts all enemy
ground LOCs. This generally occurs when the two arms of a double envelopment complete their linkup.
C-15. Intervals in an attacking force can also occur during combat operations as the result of different rates
of advance by movement formations that face different levels of enemy resistance and different terrain. An
encircled enemy force attempts to discover intervals and take advantage of them as it tries to escape or
breakout of the encirclement. Once the enveloping force completes the linkup that creates the encirclement,
it must close these intervals as quickly as possible to prevent enemy forces from exploiting them.
C-16. An enemy force may attempt to cut off an encircling force and extend its flank beyond the area of the
friendly attack. If the enveloping unit attempts to outflank such a hostile extension, it may lead to the
overextension of the enveloping force or to a dangerous separation of the enveloping force from support. It
is usually better to take advantage of the enemy force’s extension and subsequent weakness by penetrating
the thinly held front of an enemy force rather than risk the overextension of the enveloping force in an effort
to outflank the enemy force’s positions completely. Alternatively, in response to the unfolding encirclement
an enemy force may attempt a frontal, spoiling attack. In this case, the friendly force in contact defends itself
or engages in a delaying operation, while the enveloping force continues the envelopment or moves directly
toward the enemy force in a counterattack.
C-17. Commanders of highly mobile forces forming the inner encircling arm may choose not to establish a
continuous series of positions around an encircled enemy force. They may order subordinate forces to occupy
only key terrain from which they can strike at encircled enemy forces to prevent them from concentrating
forces and to isolate them further. Units who adopt this technique need to be able to detect enemy attempts
to breakout and concentrate sufficient combat power against these attempts to thwart their efforts to isolate
encircled enemy forces. Units of the outer encircling arms prevent additional enemy forces from reinforcing
the isolated enemy force or interfering with the activities of the inner encircling arm.
C-18. Once units decide to destroy encircled enemy forces, they reduce those enemy forces as rapidly as
possible to free resources for use elsewhere. The reduction of an encircled enemy force continues without
interruption, using the maximum concentration of forces and fires, until the encircled enemy force’s complete
destruction or surrender. Units may destroy encircled enemy forces by fires or by maneuver.
Reduction by Fires
C-19. Reducing an encircled enemy force by fires alone is the least preferred method to destroy an enemy
force. This method implies that the encircling friendly forces commander will use fire support as the primary
or sole means of reducing the encircled enemy force. It includes the use of artillery, mortars, direct fires,
fixed- and rotary-wing aviation (including armed UAS), and cyber and electromagnetic warfare capabilities.
C-20. This method has advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that it generally reduces the number
of casualties suffered by the encircling force. Disadvantages of this method include an extensive amount of
attack/delivery systems, ammunition, and time to reduce the encircled force. Additionally, fires alone might
not be sufficient to force the surrender of the encircled enemy force. In most cases, reducing an encircled
enemy force requires using fires and movement. |
3-90 | 429 | Appendix C
Reduction by Maneuver
C-21. Reduction by maneuver uses a combination of fire and ground maneuver forces to attack and destroy
an encircled enemy force. In many cases the constraints of time, munitions, and availability of sufficient fires
assets will lead a commander to use the reduction by fires and movement method. The four techniques for
reducing an encircled enemy are squeeze, hammer and anvil, wedge, and escape route.
Squeeze Technique
C-22. The squeeze technique uses simultaneous, coordinated attacks on enemy forces from various
directions. Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of an enemy force is methodical and
thorough. Units use fire and movement together in a controlled contraction of the encirclement. As an
enemy’s perimeter contracts, commanders remove units from the inner perimeter and add them to the reserve
depending on the terrain and other mission variables. This technique is effective against battalion-size or
smaller groups of encircled enemy forces. Figure C-3 depicts the squeeze technique.
Figure C-3. Squeeze technique
C-23. The squeeze technique promotes an enemy force’s confusion and rapid dispersion of combat power
and prevents an enemy commander from using the enemy’s reserves in a decisive manner. The friendly unit
shapes the operation by initially concentrating on destroying enemy command nodes, air defense systems,
artillery systems, and sustainment capabilities. These sustainment capabilities include any drop zones,
landing zones, or airstrips available to the enemy forces that would allow them to receive support from
outside the encirclement. |
3-90 | 430 | Appendix C
Hammer and Anvil Technique
C-24. The hammer and anvil technique employs a stationary blocking force as an anvil on one or more sides
of the inner perimeter, while other elements of the encircling force use offensive action as a hammer to force
the encircled enemy force against the blocking force. Either the anvil or the hammer can destroy the enemy
force. Usually the hammer, as the attacking element, accomplishes this task. This technique is most effective
when the blocking force is located on or to the rear of a natural terrain obstacle. On favorable terrain, units
can use an airborne or air assault force as the anvil or blocking element. Figure C-4 depicts the hammer
technique.
Figure C-4. Hammer technique
Wedge Technique
C-25. The wedge technique uses a unit to divide enemy forces in the pocket while the rest of the encircling
force remains in place. This technique allows units to concentrate against a small portion of the encircled
enemy force. However, the encircling force maintains pressure on other encircled enemy forces to prevent
them from reinforcing or supporting the threatened area. The unit dividing the pocket conducts sudden and
swift attacks immediately after the end of supporting preparation fires. Figure C-5 depicts the wedge
technique. |
3-90 | 431 | Appendix C
Figure C-5. Wedge technique
Escape Route Technique
C-26. The escape route technique involves leaving one or more gaps in the inner encircling arm to entice
enemy forces to attempt a breakout. Once an enemy force starts moving and is no longer sheltered in
defensive positions, that moving enemy force is more vulnerable to acquisition, attack, and destruction. A
unit using this technique should integrate military information support operations with constant offensive
action to demoralize the escaping enemy force.
C-27. The negative aspect of these techniques is that they require considerable forces and supplies, which
are not always available. Therefore, at times the encircling force has to limit itself to less decisive measures.
These include temporarily containing or fixing bypassed enemy forces until resources become available to
enable the encircling force to destroy the enemy force. Continued isolation of the encircled force can only be
guaranteed when the enemy force cannot strengthen its forces by inserting additional units and supplies by
air. Even total, long-term isolation does not necessarily lead to decisive defeat of an encircled enemy. It is a
temporary measure designed to provide additional time to the attacking force.
DEFENDING ENCIRCLED
C-28. Encirclement of a friendly force is likely to occur during highly mobile and fluid operations or when
operating in restrictive terrain. Unit offensive actions may result in encirclement. Likewise, encirclements
may occur when units employ detachments left in contact. Units anticipate becoming encircled when assigned
stay-behind missions or when occupying either a strong point or a combat outpost. Units make appropriate
preparations in these situations.
C-29. If a unit finds itself encircled, they immediately form a perimeter defense which can evolve into
defending an encirclement. If this happens, distinct tactics exist for the encircled force. An encircled force
has the following options: continue to defend encircled, conduct a breakout, exfiltrate toward other friendly
forces, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory. Once encircled, the unit’s form of maneuver depends
on the senior commander’s intent and mission variables, including the—
* Availability of defensible terrain.
* Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
* Sustainment status of the encircled force and its ability to be resupplied, including the ability to
treat and evacuate wounded Soldiers. |
3-90 | 432 | Appendix C
* Morale and fighting capacity of the Soldiers.
C-30. The senior commander in an encirclement assumes command over all encircled forces and takes
immediate action to protect them. In the confusion leading to an encirclement, it may be difficult to determine
what units are encircled, let alone identify the senior commander. However, the senior commander is
identified within the encirclement as quickly as possible. That senior commander needs to decide quickly
what assets should stay within the potential encircled pocket and what assets should leave. The senior
commander immediately informs their higher echelon headquarters of the situation. Simultaneously, the
senior commander directs the performance of the following tasks:
* Establish security.
* Re-establish a chain of command.
* Establish a reserve.
* Establish security elements as far forward as possible to provide early warning.
* Reorganize and centralize control of all artillery.
* Maintain morale.
* Centralize the control of all supplies.
C-31. The senior commander positions security elements as far forward as possible to reestablish contact
with enemy forces and provide early warning. Vigorous patrolling begins immediately. Each unit clears its
position to ensure that there are no enemy forces within the perimeter. Units use technical assets and
electromagnetic warfare systems to augment local security and locate areas along the perimeter where enemy
forces are deploying additional forces.
C-32. The senior commander re-establishes unity of command. The senior commander reorganizes any
fragmented units and places Soldiers separated from their parent units under the control of other units. The
senior commander establishes a clear chain of command throughout the entire encircled force, adjusts support
relationships with the encirclement, and re-establishes communications with units outside the encircled force.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR AN ENCIRCLED DEFENDER
C-33. With the establishment of a perimeter defense, the commander learns about the specific capabilities
and limitations of the different friendly units isolated in the encirclement. The commander uses this
information to design a defense to maximize the capabilities of available forces. Forward units establish
mutually supporting positions around the perimeter and in depth along principal avenues of approach. Units
occupy the best available defensible terrain. It may be necessary to attack to seize key or decisive terrain to
incorporate that terrain into the perimeter defense. Once a unit is given an assigned area, preparations are the
same as in the defense. Figure C-6 illustrates an encircled division’s perimeter defense. Encircled units make
their defensive positions as strong as possible, given time and resource constraints. The unit anticipates that
enemy forces will attempt to split the defenses of the encircled force and defeat it in detail. |
3-90 | 433 | Appendix C
Figure C-6. Encircled division perimeter defense
C-34. The encircled force commander establishes a reserve that is mobile enough to react quickly to events
anywhere along the perimeter. Therefore, given the availability of sufficient fuel, the unit constitutes a reserve
using some of any available armored, mechanized, and Stryker units. The unit centrally positions this mobile
reserve to take advantage of interior lines, which exist if the encircled force commander can maneuver the
reserve or reinforce threatened positions on the perimeter faster than an enemy force can shift location or
reinforce. A unit can achieve interior lines through a central position (with operations diverging from a central
point) from superior lateral LOCs or greater tactical mobility. If only dismounted infantry forces are
available, the unit establishes small local reserves to react to potential threats. The unit organizes a mobile
anti-armor element from the best available anti-armor systems. If possible, subordinate echelons also retain
reserves.
C-35. While defending encircled, a unit may use the reserve to limit penetrations along the perimeter. The
reserve may conduct spoiling attacks or counterattacks. The commander initiates a counterattack at the
decisive moment and location as the enemy force attempts to penetrate friendly defensive positions.
BREAK OUT FROM AN ENCIRCLEMENT
C-36. A breakout is an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact
with friendly units (ADP 3-90). It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas
of the perimeter must be maintained. A breakout is both an offensive and a defensive operation. An encircled
force normally attempts to conduct breakouts when one of the following four conditions exist:
* The commander directs the breakout or the breakout falls within the intent of a higher echelon
commander.
* The encircled force lacks sufficient relative combat power to defend itself against enemy forces
attempting to reduce the encirclement. |
3-90 | 434 | Appendix C
* The encircled force lacks adequate terrain available to conduct its defense.
* The encircled force cannot sustain itself long enough for relief by forces from outside the encircled
pocket.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A BREAKOUT
C-37. Encircled units conducting a breakout attack typically task-organize to perform rupture, follow and
assume, main body, and rear guard missions. The senior commander within an encirclement organizes a
reserve and a separate deception force if sufficient forces exist. Previous combat may have attired the combat
power of encircled units. The commander prioritizes which ones to resource if sufficient combat power does
not exist to resource each of the forces. See the applicable organization depicted in figure C-7.
Figure C-7. Organization of forces for a breakout operation
C-38. Normally, the commander’s first priority is to resource the force with the rupture mission. The
commander typically assigns multiple missions to subordinate forces because there are typically not enough
forces in the encirclement to have separate forces for each required mission. For example, the follow and
assume force could receive a be-prepared mission to help extract the rear guard, a mission generally given to
the reserve. Forces located outside the encirclement assist the breakout by conducting shaping operations.
Above all, the encircled force maintains the momentum of the breakout attack; otherwise, it is more
vulnerable to destruction than it was before the breakout attempt.
C-39. The encircled force reorganizes to conduct the breakout based on available resources. Without
resupply, armored, mechanized, and motorized infantry units may not be able to move all their vehicles
during the breakout attack. Priority of support may be limited to the rupture force and the rear guard, with
the remaining force keeping only sufficient transportation assets to move the wounded and critical assets and
supplies. The breakout plan outlines the commander’s destruction criteria for equipment or supplies left
behind. The unit destroys all vehicles, critical munitions, supplies, and equipment (except medical supplies)
it cannot move.
C-40. An encircled force attacks using the rupture force to penetrate the enemy defensive positions in at least
one location. The unit produces overwhelming combat power at each breakout point. The unit assigns the
rupture force, which varies in size from one-third to two-thirds of the total encircled force, the mission to
penetrate the enemy force’s encircling position, widen the gap, and hold the shoulders of the gap until all |
3-90 | 435 | Appendix C
other encircled forces can move through. The rupture force must have sufficient strength to penetrate the
enemy force’s position. This force must use surprise, mobility, and firepower to achieve a favorable combat
power ratio over the enemy force at the point of attack.
C-41. Initially, the rupture force is the main effort. The attack occurs where the unit anticipates a successful
rupture of the enemy force’s inner ring, which facilitates subsequent operations by enabling the unit to attack
enemy units from their flanks and rear. The rupture force unit probably has additional attached assets, such
as additional maneuver forces and engineers. The unit should integrate these assets to achieve the rupture.
C-42. The follow and assume force follows the rupture attack and is committed to maintain the momentum
of the attack and seize objectives past the rupture. After the rupture force seizes a gap in the enemy
encirclement, the follow and assume force normally main effort until completing linkup operations with
another friendly force. When a unit receives a follow and assume mission in a breakout, its commander must
coordinate closely with the rupture force commander regarding the location of the gap, the enemy situation
at the rupture point, and the enemy situation, if known, along the direction of attack past the rupture point.
The commander does not assign this force supporting shaping tasks, such as clear routes and fix bypassed
enemy forces, if those tasks dissipate its available combat power. If executing these support tasks is vital to
the success of the breakout and resources permit, then the unit designates a separate follow and support force
to perform these tasks.
C-43. The main body consists of the main command post, the bulk of encircled sustainment assets, the unit’s
casualties, and some functional and multifunctional support assets. It contains combat forces not required for
other missions and has sufficient combat power to protect itself. The overall commander places one
subordinate commander in charge of the various elements of the main body to ensure orderly movement.
Typically, the main body establishes a flank security force that deploys once the main body passes through
the point of penetration and performs a flank screen or guard mission for the main body.
C-44. The rear guard consists of Soldiers and equipment left on the perimeter to provide protection for the
rupture attack and any supporting efforts, such as deception forces. Forces left in contact must conduct a
vigorous delaying operation on the perimeter so that the enemy force cannot isolate any portion of the rear
guard. Under a single commander, the rear guard protects the main body from attack while it moves from the
area. In addition to providing security, the rear guard deceives the enemy forces about the intentions of the
encircled force, simulating its activities until the main body clears the gap.
C-45. A reserve primarily aims to retain flexibility through offensive action. The unit makes every attempt
to keep a small portion of the encircled force uncommitted for employment at the decisive moment to ensure
the breakout’s success. The unit may be unable to establish a separate reserve force because of the need to
resource either the rupture force, the follow and assume force, or the rear guard. In this event, the unit assigns
and prioritizes various be-prepared missions to the follow and assume force.
C-46. A successful diversion is important to the success of any breakout operation. If the diversion fails to
deceive the enemy commander regarding the intentions of the encircled force, the enemy commander could
direct the enemy’s full combat power at the rupture point. On the other hand, the deception force may rupture
the enemy’s lines. If a rupture occurs, the diversion force commander follows the intent of the commander
of the encircled force. The encircled force commander may choose to exploit the success of forces conducting
a diversion, or the commander may have to disengage them for use elsewhere in the breakout attempt.
CONTROL MEASURES FOR A BREAKOUT
C-47. At a minimum, units use boundaries, a LD or line of contact, a time of the attack, phase lines, an axis
of advance or direction of attack, objectives, and a limit of advance to control and synchronize breakouts.
Units only impose those control measures necessary to synchronize operations.
PLANNING A BREAKOUT
C-48. The encircled commander initiates a breakout attack as quickly as possible after encirclement by enemy
forces. At this time, enemy forces are normally also somewhat disorganized, and they may not respond in a
coordinated manner. Commanders should initiate a breakout attack even though detailed combat information
about the enemy force’s dispositions is probably not available. The enemy force probably has not yet brought |
3-90 | 436 | Appendix C
in sufficient combat power to encircle the friendly force in strength, and weak points probably exist in the
enemy force’s perimeter.
C-49. Early in an encirclement, there are gaps between or weaknesses in the enemy’s encircling forces. The
friendly unit uses available reconnaissance and surveillance assets, including available joint systems, to
provide information that increases the accuracy of the unit’s situational understanding and determines enemy
weak points. The unit’s plans for the breakout attack capitalize on those identified weak points. Although the
resulting attack may be along a less direct route or over less favorable terrain, it is the best COA because it
avoids enemy strength and increases the chance for surprise.
C-50. An encircled force may be operating under adverse conditions and may not have its normal information
collection capabilities. This forces the encircled unit to conduct aggressive reconnaissance to collect
information on enemy forces. The encircled unit also obtains information from joint assets, stay-behind units,
and special operations forces in the area. If the enemy force is in close contact, the encircled unit may need
to conduct a reconnaissance in force to ascertain enemy strengths. In any case, the unit quickly selects a COA
and develops a plan accordingly.
C-51. A supporting effort, such as a deception, assists a breakout by diverting enemy attention and resources
away from the rupture effort. The force conducting a supporting effort may be located either inside or outside
the encirclement area. The enemy force must regard the efforts of this force as credible and a threat to the
continuity of the enemy force’s maneuver plan. The encircled commander directs the friendly force’s
deception efforts to a point where the enemy force might expect a breakout or relief effort. The deception
force is as mobile as available vehicles, fuel stocks, and trafficability allow, so it can reposition to take part
in the breakout or maneuver elsewhere to support the breakout. Mobile, self-propelled weapons systems suit
the needs of forces conducting supporting efforts. Additionally, the probability of a successful breakout
increases measurably if another friendly force attacks toward the encircled force as it attempts to breakout.
C-52. The encircled unit conducts tactical deception along with cyberspace electromagnetic activities tasks
to assist the breakout attempt. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating,
and synchronizing cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare operations in support of unified land
operations (ADP 3-0). Tactical deception operations mislead enemy forces about the intentions of the
encircled force, especially the location of the breakout attempt. For example, unmanned aircraft can
concentrate their activities in an area away from where the rupture effort occurs to deceive enemy forces as
to the exact location of the rupture. If it is not possible to breakout immediately, the encircled unit attempts
to deceive enemy forces regarding the time and place of the breakout by concealing friendly breakout
preparations and changing positions. The encircled unit can also make it appear that the encircled force will
make a resolute stand and await relief.
C-53. Units can use dummy radio traffic for the enemy to monitor or landlines that the enemy might be able
tap to convey false information. The breakout should not be along the obvious route toward friendly lines,
unless there is no other alternative. In this respect, breakout preparations mirror the preparations for any other
offensive operation. As in other offensive actions, secrecy, tactical deception, and surprise allow for success.
The other planning considerations for the breakout are the same as for any other attack.
EXECUTING A BREAKOUT
C-54. The unit exploits darkness and limited visibility during a breakout if friendly encircled forces have
superior night vision capabilities. Concealment provided by darkness, fog, smoke, or severe weather
conditions favor breakout by mitigating the effectiveness of the encircling enemy weapon systems or night
vision devices/optics. The enemy has difficulty following the movements of the breakout force during
conditions of limited visibility. However, if the encircled force waits for darkness or limited visibility, the
encircling enemy may have time to consolidate containment positions. If friendly forces have air superiority,
they may initiate a daylight breakout attack to exploit close air support capabilities.
C-55. The encircled force takes all possible precautions to deceive the enemy force about the location of the
main effort. The rupture force minimizes occupation of attack positions before starting the breakout. An
encircled unit may require one or more supporting effort to assist the rupture force in penetrating enemy
positions and expanding the shoulders of the rupture. The encircled unit may use feints and demonstrations |
3-90 | 437 | Appendix C
to deceive enemy forces concerning the location and time of the main effort. However, deception attacks
need not always occur first.
C-56. The encircled commander organizes and controls the rupture force in the same manner as during an
attack or movement to contact. Figure C-8 illustrates an example organization of forces for a breakout by an
encircled division. The rupture force generates overwhelming combat power at the point of penetration and
rapidly overwhelms enemy positions and expands the penetration. Encircled units unable to generate
sufficient combat power for both the rupture force and the perimeter defense can thin their defensive
perimeter in certain areas by using a detachment left in contact in conjunction with a withdrawal before
executing the attack. They may also shorten the perimeter’s length, which reduces the size of the area
occupied by the encircled force.
Figure C-8. Example breakout organization of forces by an encircled division
C-57. The rupture force applies the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault
to ensure its success at the point of penetration. These fundamentals always apply, but their application varies
based on the prevailing mission variables.
C-58. The encircled commander orders the rupture force to hold the shoulders of the penetration while the
follow and assume force moves forward, if enemy forces at the penetration point have roughly the same
combat power as the rupture force. As depicted in figure C-9 on page C-14, the actions of the follow and
assume force then become the main effort. The encircled commander may have the rupture force continue
its attack if enemy forces are not strong. If there are no identified enemy forces beyond the penetration, the
rupture force may transition to a movement to contact. After the encircled friendly force breaks out, it moves
toward other friendly forces and links up with them.
C-59. Initially, the follow and assume force passes through the gap created by the rupture force. This force
continues to move rapidly from the encircled area toward its final objective. If the follow and assume force
becomes the encircled unit’s main effort, it cannot allow itself to become bogged down. Preparation fires by
artillery, Army aviation, close air support, and air interdiction help the follow and assume force in
maintaining momentum out of the encircled area.
C-60. Once the breakout attack starts, the rear guard and any deception forces disengage or delay toward the
area of the rupture. Perimeter forces integrate smoothly into the rear of the breakout column. Once the
breakout succeeds, the commander shifts priority of fires as required by the mission variables. |
3-90 | 438 | Appendix C
C-61. As other encircled units support or move through the area of penetration, the rear-guard commander
must deploy forces over an extended area. The rear guard requires flexibility and mobility. The rear guard
maintains the perimeter against enemy pressure. If the enemy force succeeds in destroying or encircling the
original rear guard in the breakout process, then the unit must reconstitute a new rear guard.
Figure C-9. Example breakout by an encircled division
C-62. The main body follows the follow and assume force. It moves rapidly on multiple routes in an approach
march immediately behind the follow and assume force, protected on its flanks by security elements. It should
contain sufficient combat power to protect itself and reinforce the flank or rear security forces if they come
under attack.
C-63. Normally, the rear guard initially conducts a withdrawal to break contact with the enemy forces around
the perimeter. It contracts the perimeter as it delays behind the main body. If enemy forces closely pursue the
breakout force, the efforts of the rear guard may become the main effort for the encircled force. The unit
should position the reserve where it can also support the rear guard.
C-64. Initially, the priority for fire support is with the rupture force. Those fires focus on suppressing and
obscuring the point of penetration. Fire support assets move as part of the main body and rear guard so
security forces have adequate fire support. Target identification difficulties resulting from proximity and
intermixing of forces, as well as the rapidly changing ground situation during the execution of a breakout,
make close air support difficult.
C-65. Engineers with the rupture force focus on mobility operations. Engineers with the follow and assume
force or the reserve improve routes as necessary. Engineers supporting flank security elements focus on
conducting countermobility operations. The rear guard must also have enough engineer support to conduct
countermobility operations.
C-66. The senior commander prioritizes supporting AMD assets to protect the rupture force, the rear guard,
and the main body. This support may come from outside the encircled perimeter. The rear guard is second in
priority of protection to help prevent enemy forces targeting the main body from overrunning it.
C-67. Commanders can relieve sustainment shortfalls by using aerial resupply, ordering external forces to
establish support areas, and using captured supplies. All units and vehicles carry the maximum supplies
possible, with emphasis on carrying petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammunition. The encircled force only |
3-90 | 439 | Appendix C
takes vehicles it can support. It may be possible for the higher echelon headquarters of the encircled force to
establish an intermediate staging base as the breakout attack moves toward a linkup with other friendly forces.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ENCIRCLED DEFENDER
C-68. When defending an encircled area, units consider employing aviation, fires, engineer, and sustainment
assets. Divisions and corps may consider relocating aviation systems from any attached combat aviation
brigades to locations that are not in danger of encirclement. Aviation assets can rapidly bring additional
firepower to bear on an encircling enemy force or rapidly move reaction forces to threatened locations along
a defensive perimeter. Generally, aviation assets fly out of an encirclement when it becomes small enough to
allow the enemy force’s artillery to range throughout the area.
C-69. The commander centrally controls fire support systems, such as artillery, to provide support at
numerous points along the perimeter and mass fires. The commander designates the senior field artillery staff
officer, such as the chief of fires or brigade fire support officer, to control fire support. At the BCT level, the
field artillery battalion commander also advises the commander. At lower echelons, commanders may co-
locate mortars from various units under centralized control, especially if there are insufficient artillery assets.
C-70. Generally, engineers concentrate first on countermobility, then survivability, and then mobility.
Defensive protective positions include, but are not limited to, command posts, signal nodes (and other
facilities for the command and control warfighting function), critical equipment (to include sensors), supply
and ammunition storage/holding areas, and other items that are likely to be targeted by enemy action.
Dispersal is difficult in a perimeter type defense; therefore, the next best alternative is position hardening by
constructing field fortifications.
C-71. Encircled units closely monitor their sustainment assets and supply stocks, especially if they cannot be
resupplied for an extended period. Leader’s conserve and centrally control available resources. A commander
may force units on the perimeter to cease all vehicle movement to allocate remaining fuel assets to the reserve.
The senior commander within an encirclement retains essential sustainment capabilities to sustain the defense
under the control of a senior sustainment operator or commander. When possible, that commander positions
these units and their assets beyond the reach of potential penetrations in protected and concealed locations.
The senior commander may incorporate other sustainment units into defensive positions in depth or around
key facilities. A commander may choose to augment maneuver units with non-maneuver Soldiers, although
this action may affect the non-maneuver (sustainment) capabilities of the encircled force.
C-72. Casualty evacuation and mortuary affairs pose challenges for an encircled force. The unit evacuates
wounded from the encirclement whenever possible for humanitarian reasons. This also reduces the burden
of providing long-term medical care to wounded Soldiers.
C-73. Soldiers have an inherent fear of encirclement by enemy forces. Unchecked, this fear can lead to a
degradation in morale and discipline. When encircled, Soldiers under the firm control of their leaders can
withstand the mental strain. Discipline can disintegrate rapidly in an encirclement. Officers and
noncommissioned officers must uphold the highest standards of discipline. Their personal conduct sets the
example. Encircled Soldiers need to see their senior commander and other leaders frequently. Leaders at all
levels need to display a calm and confident manner. Soldiers in an encirclement must not regard their situation
as desperate or hopeless. Commanders and leaders at all levels maintain the confidence of Soldiers by resolute
action and a positive attitude. They must keep their Soldiers informed to suppress rumors and counter enemy
propaganda. |
3-90 | 441 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions,
and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army)
follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-90 is the proponent publication (the authority)
are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in
parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACM airspace coordinating measure
ADP Army doctrine publication
AMD air and missile defense
AO area of operations
ATP Army techniques publication
AR Army regulation
BCT brigade combat team
BHL battle handover line
BP battle position
C2 command and control
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CFL coordinated fire line
COA course of action
COP common operational picture
DA Department of the Army
DLIC detachment left in contact
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense Directive
EA engagement area
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EPW enemy prisoner of war
FCL final coordination line
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual
FPF final protective fire
FPL final protective line
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure |
3-90 | 442 | Glossary
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
JP joint publication
LC line of contact
LD line of departure
LOA limit of advance
LOC line of communication
MBA main battle area
MDMP military decision-making process
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
METT-TC(I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MSR main supply route
NAI named area of interest
OPSEC operations security
PAA position area for artillery
PD point of departure
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PL phase line
PLD probable line of deployment
POB point of breach
RFA restrictive fire area
RFL restrictive fire line
ROE rules of engagement
ROZ restricted operations zone
RP release point
SOP standard operating procedure
SP start point
TAC-D tactical deception
TAI target area of interest
TCP traffic control post
TM technical manual
TRP target reference point
UAS unmanned aircraft system
U.S. United States
SECTION II – TERMS
*actions on contact
A process to help leaders understand what is happening and to take action.
air and missile defense
Direct [active and passive] defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of
hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets. (JP 3-01) |
3-90 | 443 | Glossary
air corridor
A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft established for the purpose of
preventing friendly aircraft from being fired upon by friendly forces. (JP 3-52)
air movement
An air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including airdrops and air landings.
(JP 3-36)
airspace control
The exercise of delegated authority over designated airspace and users through control procedures and
coordination measures to maximize operational effectiveness. (JP 3-52)
airspace control order
An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for
airspace coordinating measures. (JP 3-52)
airspace coordinating measures
Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-52)
airspace management
The planning, coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace by airspace control elements in
support of airspace control. (JP 3-52)
*alternate position
A defensive position that the commander assigns to a unit or weapon system for occupation when the
primary position becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned task.
*ambush
A variation of attack from concealed positions against a moving or temporarily halted enemy.
antiterrorism
Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts,
including limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. (JP 3-26)
*approach march
The advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is intended.
area damage control
Measures taken before, during, and/or after hostile actions or natural or man-made disasters to reduce
the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (JP 3-10)
area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain
for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)
area of influence
A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver
or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 3-0)
area of operations
An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough
to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)
*area reconnaissance
A form of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or
enemy activity within a prescribed area.
*area security
A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, installation
routes and actions within a specific area. |
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